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A Rationalist Argument for Libertarian Free Will

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A Rationalist Argument for Libertarian Free Will A rationalist argument for libertarian free will Stylianos Panagiotou PhD University of York Philosophy August 2020 Abstract In this thesis, I give an a priori argument in defense of libertarian free will. I conclude that given certain presuppositions, the ability to do otherwise is a necessary requirement for substantive rationality; the ability to think and act in light of reasons. ‘Transcendental’ arguments to the effect that determinism is inconsistent with rationality are predominantly forwarded in a Kantian manner. Their incorporation into the framework of critical philosophy renders the ontological status of their claims problematic; rather than being claims about how the world really is, they end up being claims about how the mind must conceive of it. To make their ontological status more secure, I provide a rationalist framework that turns them from claims about how the mind must view the world into claims about the ontology of rational agents. In the first chapter, I make some preliminary remarks about reason, reasons and rationality and argue that an agent’s access to alternative possibilities is a necessary condition for being under the scope of normative reasons. In the second chapter, I motivate rationalism about a priori justification. In the third chapter, I present the rationalist argument for libertarian free will and defend it against objections. Several objections rest on a compatibilist understanding of an agent’s abilities. To undercut them, I devote the fourth chapter, in which I give a new argument for incompatibilism between free will and determinism, which I call the situatedness argument for incompatibilism. If the presuppositions of the thesis are granted and the situatedness argument works, then we may be justified in thinking that to the extent that we are substantively rational, we are free in the libertarian sense. 2 Table of contents Abstract 2 Preface 5 Acknowledgements 6 Author’s declaration 7 Introduction 8 Chapter I 15 Section A: Reason, reasons and rationality 16 A.1 Reason 16 A.2 Kinds of reasons 19 A.3 Reasons and normativity 23 A.4 The double threshold theory of normative responsibility 32 A.4.1 OIC and PAP 38 A.4.2 Rationality as reasons-responsiveness 43 Section B: Rationality and the normative question 49 B.1 What is the normative question? 50 B.2 Divorcing rationality from normative reasons 52 B.2.1 Structural requirements 52 B.2.2 Substantive and structural rationality 57 B.2.2.1 The first reply 61 B.2.2.2 Coherence and conspiracy 65 B.3 The error theoretic objection 66 Conclusion 74 Chapter II 76 Section A: the concept of a priori Justification 76 A.1 Internalism and externalism about justification 77 A.2 Experience, sense-experience and independence 80 Section B: Deficiency arguments 86 B.1 Rationale 86 B.2 Possible reactions 91 B.2.1 Rationalism 94 B.2.2 Kantianism 96 B.2.3 Logical empiricism 98 B.2.4 Radical empiricism 100 Section C: the case for a priori justification 103 C.1 A priori justification and the law of non-contradiction 104 C.1.1 Contradictions and radical empiricism 105 3 C.1.2 Contradictions and fallibility 110 C.1.3 Inadequacy and occultness 115 Conclusion 122 Chapter III 125 Section A: the argument 126 Section B: objections 134 B.1 Reducing normative facts to evaluative facts 135 B.2 A compatibilist account of OIC and PAP 140 B.3 The objection from chance 145 B.4 Problems with alternative possibilities 149 B.4.1 Yaffe’s objection to the derivation of PAP from OIC 150 B.4.2 The semi-compatibilist objection 152 B.4.3 The asymmetrical objection 155 B.5 Lack of voluntary control over belief 161 B.6 The possibility of a-rationalism 164 Conclusion 166 Chapter IV 169 Section A: What would make free will impossible? 169 A.1 The concept’s constituent notions 170 A.2 The conditional analysis of ability 180 A.2.1 Traditional criticisms of the conditional analysis of ability 182 A.2.2 Reformed conditional analyses of abilities 184 A.2.3 The situatedness argument 191 Section B: Is determinism committed to what would make free will impossible? 201 B.1 Issues in defining determinism 203 B.1.1 Traditional formulations 205 B.1.2 Two versions of determinism 207 B.2 The question of compatibility 209 B.2.1 Free will and RCD 210 B.2.2 Free will and NHD 215 Conclusion 217 Conclusion of the thesis 220 Bibliography 227 4 Preface This is a thesis about libertarian free will and normative reasons. It aims to show that beings that are under the scope of normative reasons, are free in a robust libertarian sense. It takes insights from transcendental arguments against determinism and reframes them in a rationalistic framework, in order to free them from the frequently Kantian nature in which they are argued for and the restrictions it poses for the ultimate status of ontological claims. Instead of focusing predominantly on moral reasons, this thesis focuses on epistemic reasons as well. It is held that the conditions for being under the scope of normative reasons in the moral domain are structurally the same with the conditions for being under the scope of normative reasons in the epistemic domain. It is argued that such conditions have to involve the agent’s access to alternative possibilities of action. Assuming that knowledge requires our access to epistemic reasons, we are led to the conclusion that to hold each other accountable to reasons, as well as beings capable of knowing that such and such is the case, we have to hold ourselves and others as beings with libertarian free will. Due to the limited amount of space that a PhD project allows for, certain presuppositions are made, which are not defended. Unfortunate though this may be, it is a necessity for a project of this sort. Such presuppositions are: i) the falsity of global epistemic skepticism, ii) an internalist conception of justification, iii) The Kantian OIC principle (OIC), iv) a verification transcendent conception of truth and v) a conception of reasons as irreducibly normative. The topics that this thesis deals with are many and some are treated in an inconclusive manner. All that I aim to achieve in this project is to develop the outlines of a philosophical position, according to which, rather than beings its enemies, rationalism and human situatedness are free will’s greatest allies. 5 Acknowledgements This work is dedicated to my parents, Matthew Panagiotou and Vicky Kolintza, and my partner Stella Antoniou. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof Tom Stoneham. He gave me the benefit of the doubt at a time few were willing to and even fewer did. His support throughout the years, his willingness to discuss a wide range of philosophical topics and his emphasis on logical precision have made his contribution to my intellectual development, indispensable. Without any reservation, I can proudly call him ‘teacher’. More than anyone, he knows the gravity that this term has. Second, I wish to express my gratitude to several members of faculty, the administrative staff at the Department of Philosophy, as well as other PhD researchers at the University of York. Special thanks go to members of faculty for whose courses, I taught seminars and with whom we collaborated for administrative tasks. In alphabetical order, they are Dr Stephen Everson, Dr David Ingram, Dr Chris Jay, Dr Nick Jones, Dr Barry Lee, Prof Mary Leng, Dr Christian Piller and Dr David Worsley. Special thanks go to Dr Janet Eldred for providing me with moral support throughout these years. On several occasions, one of them crucial for this thesis, she was willing to listen to what troubled me and offered her advice in a manner that shows she did and does care. Third, I want to thank my friend, John Blechl. He has always been there for me and our philosophical discussions have always been breaths of fresh air. Finally, I want to thank Prof Derk Pereboom (Cornell University) and Prof Alan Thomas (University of York) for agreeing to examine this thesis. 6 Author’s declaration I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References. 7 Introduction This thesis defends libertarian free will. Its goal it to show that free will is a necessary requirement of substantive rationality –the ability to think and act in light of reasons- and our ability to know things to be the case. Various arguments have been given to that effect which are loosely called ‘transcendental’ and build on the insight that beings capable of reasoning must have a kind of freedom. Nevertheless, they are frequently argued for in a Kantian manner. Such a Kantian treatment of the argument seems to me to be quite restraining when it comes to claims about free will, due to the status of ontological claims in the context of critical philosophy. They are reduced to claims about how we must perceive the world; not how the world is. To do so would be to violate the very tenets of the critical project, according to which, pure reason cannot give us knowledge when it escapes the domain of sensible intuitions. It seems to me though, that those in the business of making ontological claims, such as claims about free will, do seem to make claims of a sort that Kantianism is in tension with. Precisely for that reason, I aim to reframe the insights of such arguments in a rationalistic framework which is more suitable to incorporate ontological claims about reality, among its confines.
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