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Dilemmas of Objectivity SOCIALEPISTEMOLOGY , 2002, VOL. 16, NO . 3, 267–281 Dilemmas of objectivity MARIANNE JANACK Objectivityis a virtuein most circles.As weevaluateour students (even those we don’t like)we tryto be objective. As wedeliberateon juries,we tryto be objective about the accused and thevictim, the prosecutor and thedefence. As wetoteup theevidence for and againsta certainposition or theory, we try to separate our personal preferences fromthe argument, or we try to separate the arguer (and ourevaluation of him/ her) fromthe case presented.Sometimes we do wellat this,sometimes we do lesswell at it,but we recognize something valuable intheeffort. Considerthe following cases inwhich objectivity or its failure is at issue: (1)A professorgives his favourite student an Ainaclass inwhichthe student has done onlymediocre work. (2)A scientistoverlooks evidence that would call intoquestion a theorythat she has goneout on alimbto defend,and has investedmuch timeand energyin pursuing. (3)A scientistskews data inorder to bolster support for a favouritepolitical cause. (4)A particularphilosophy journal, which does not use a blindreview process, only publishesarticles written by men. (5)A memberof a trialjury questions evidence presented in atrialbecause it conicts withracist stereotypes. Some ofthese invocations of objectivity imply that a separationshould exist between thesource or origin of the theory or argument and theargument itself. Some imply thatour deliberations should be answerable only to ‘ theevidence’ or ‘ thefacts’ and notsimply to our own preferences and idiosyncrasies.Some implythat our emotionsor biases (broadly understood to include emotions) should not interfere withour reasoning. Inits ontological guise, the appeal toobjectivity is a wayof appealing to the way thingsare, or to the world as itis independently of our desires about howwe want it tobe. So, while it might seem reasonable to think of objectivity as an epistemic virtue,the term also carriesmetaphysical overtones. It would seem to be an uncontroversialepistemic virtue premised on a fairlycommon-sense realism: there is awaythe world is, and theway the world is isin principle distinguishable from the way we wish it were. Author : MarianneJanack is Assistant Professorof Philosophy atHamiltonCollege in Clinton, NY,13323, USA.She teachesclasses in epistemology,philosophy of scienceand feminist philosophy .She ispresently workingon alongerproject on rationalityandfeminist theories of emotion. Social Epistemology ISSN0269-1728 print/ISSN1464-5297 online # 2002 Taylor &FrancisLtd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI:10.1080/ 0269172022000025624 268 MARIANNEJANACK Theconnection between objectivity and truthhas beenan importanttool for feministand otherlibratory projects, but failuresof objectivity are not always or onlyepistemic failures. The claim thatthere is still sexism in the world can only bedenied by someone who fails to be objective. This is a failurethat has two differentand separableaspects to it. It is an epistemicfailure, in so faras it seemsto involve a wilfulavoidance of evidence that is all tooclear (that women ofall racesstill suffer the greater burden of social ills like poverty, spousal abuse, discriminatorypay practicesand discriminatoryhiring practices, for example, and enjoyfewer of the social goods likefreedom of self-determination, respect, etc. thando men).It is also an instanceof a theoryor claim thatfails to correspond tothe facts. That is, this case involvesboth bad reasoningand falsehood.Would sound reasoning(we’ ll call thisobjectivity r)have guaranteedcorrespondence to reality (call this objectivity c)?Notnecessarily, buthad our claimant been objective r she mighthave beenmore likely tobe objective c.Yet, as we all know, objectivity c doesnot require objectivity r—peoplecan getthe facts rightaccidentally (i.e.by guessing) orthrough faulty reasoning. Objectivity c is notsecured byobjectivity r, and objectivity r is neither necessary norsuf cient forobjectivity c. Comparethis situation, however, to the situation described in (4)above. Of course,it ispossiblethat no women write articles that are as good as thosewritten by men, and so thelack ofpublishedarticles by women is dueto the inferior quality of articleswritten bywomen, but thefact that the review process is notblind leads oneto suspect that the qualityof the manuscript is notthe only factor being used in the evaluations. We think thatit seems unlikely that all themanuscripts submitted by women would be unacceptableby the journal’ s standards,unless, of course, the author’ s sexenters into theevaluation either implicitly or explicitly. Let’ s say thatthe author’ s sexis explicitlyconsidered in the evaluation process, that in fact the journal is dedicated to publishingarticles written only by men. Would thisbe a failureof objectivity? Not necessarily;it might be fairly explicit sexism, but notnecessarily a failureof objectivity,since the reviewers do notclaim tobe impartial; in this instance they simplydo notwant to publish articles by women. Were we to question their motivationfor this stance, we might eventually encounter a failureof objectivity— thatis, the justi cation for this practice might ultimately lead us back toa failureof objectivityon the part of the publishers. The beliefs upon which the practice is based mightbe subject to the same criticismsdetailed in the case ofthe sexism-denier describedabove. But thesimple fact that a journaldoes not publish articles by womendoes not lead totheconclusion that the journal is notobjective. Yet,if the reviewers claim notto be using sex as acriterionof evaluation, yet are implicitlydoing so, then I thinkwe have something more like a failureof objectivity. If,that is, the reviewers claim thatthey will publish all and onlythose articles they judgeto be well-argued, for instance, and measureup tocertain standards of scholarship(e.g. carefully researched, well-written, etc.) then the implicit operation of sexas awayof evaluating quality seems to be a signicant failure of objectivity. But isitthe same kindof failure as thatdescribed in the case ofthe sexism-denier? There seemsto be a certain‘ familyresemblance’ but noshared characteristics here. Case 4 seemsto be a case inwhich a certaintenet of informal reasoning has beenviolated: namelythat an argumentis valid independently of who offers it. While this seems to bea canonof good reasoninggenerally, it is different from the canon of good reasoningthat would have us lookat all theevidence available for a certainclaim. Objectivityin this sense is something more like impartiality with respect to the source DILEMMASOFOBJECTIVITY 269 ofan argumentor position, and itis atenetwe learn(or teach) in informal logic classes. Yet,the demand thatwe look for all theevidence for or against a givenposition is a much moregeneral and unreective epistemic practice— one in which, in fact, the reliabilityor credibility of a claimantmight enter as an importantpiece of evidence. 1 Ina similar,yet slightly different case, if one of our colleagues were to give the studentshe liked grades thatfailed to re ect the quality of their actual work,we wouldthink that his objectivity as ajudgewas compromised. Under these circumstances,we would want to say thathis personal attachments had interfered withhis professional judgment, and whilehe might not be epistemically culpable, wewould probably thinkthat he was morally culpable. Take, for instance, the case inwhich the professor in question gives in ated grades towork he knows to beinferior. This seems to be a moral failing,rather than an epistemicfailing. Doesthe analysis change if we tweak the story a bit?Consider the more likely scenarioin which the professor’ s evaluationof the student’ s workis in uenced by hispersonal attachments. Does this constitute a differentkind of failure of objectivity?It does seem to be different from the scenario in which the professor knowinglygives his favourite students better grades thanthey deserve. But inthe case inwhich the professor ltershis evaluations through his personal attachments,the areas of moral and epistemicculpability become murkier. We mightbe tempted to say thatin this case thefailure is more epistemic than moral,yet it seems that in ascribing epistemic culpability we would need to assume thatthe professor could reasonablyhave disentangled his personal preferencesfrom his belief-forming processes. And it’ s notclear that our beliefs and theprocesses by which we go about formingthem can beso easilyseparated intothe ‘ true’and the‘ subjectivelyenhanced’ . Considera variationon this scenario: instead of giving his favourite students better grades thantheir work warrants, he perversely gives them worse grades. He might do thisbecause, he reasons, he knows these students so well,he likes them so much and heknows that receiving a bad grade ona paperwill compel themto work much harderthan they would have if they’ d gottena mediocregrade. He might thinkthat they will respond to a lowergrade byre-doubling their efforts, and will vastlyimprove their papers as aresult.He might also judgetheir work more harshlybecause he knows what they are capable ofat theirbest— that is, his beliefsabout thequality of his favourite students’ work would, in this case, also be lteredthrough his personal attachments. The point I wishto make hereis thatit is not just that the evaluation is lteredthrough personal attachments that makes ita failureof objectivity, but ratherthat the consequences of such attachmentsis a certainkind of evaluation. The case inwhich
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