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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA Thomas Aquinas and The THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy © Copyright All Rights Reserved By Therese Scarpelli Cory Washington, D.C. 2009 Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge Therese Scarpelli Cory, Ph.D. Director: John F. Wippel, Ph.D. This dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of Thomas Aquinas’s theory of self-knowledge, examining each of the four kinds of self-knowledge he identifies: (1) actual perception of one’s existence (actual self-awareness); (2) habitual self-awareness; (3) apprehension of the soul’s nature; and (4) the judgment of this apprehension in light of divine truth. Broadly speaking, it contends that Thomas is attentive to experienced phenomena and provides precise and thoughtful analyses of phenomena such as bodily consciousness, implicit and explicit awareness of oneself as subject, unified perception of the self as a single subject, and scientific knowledge of the soul’s nature. Moreover, his explanation of self-knowledge is consistent with the principles of his general theory of knowledge, while it also takes into account the unique characteristics of an act of knowledge wherein the knower is the known, and integrates both Augustinian and Aristotelian principles. Thus Thomas’s comments on self-knowledge constitute a carefully nuanced doctrine with significant implications for both his theory of knowledge and his explanation of human subjectivity. The first chapter examines the doctrine of two of his main sources, Augustine and Aristotle, while placing special emphasis on the way that difficulties of interpretation of texts in both these thinkers helped shape Thomas’s own conception of self-knowledge. It then reviews chronologically his major texts on self-knowledge, while examining them for possible doctrinal developments and highlighting significant systematic problems for consideration in the thematic discussions of the following chapters. The second chapter analyzes in detail the first type of self-knowledge—the soul’s awareness of its individual existing self, focuses on the problem of its content and the mode in which it is achieved, and argues that according to at least one definition of “intuition,” Thomas is defending a theory of intuitive self-awareness. The third chapter investigates the second type of self-knowledge—the soul’s habitual self-awareness through its own presence to itself—and argues for the existence of a Thomistic account of implicit actual self-awareness. The fourth chapter examines the third and fourth kinds of self-knowledge and reviews F.-X. Putallaz’s argument that reditio completa constitutes a fifth type of self- knowledge. Lastly, the fifth chapter studies the implications of Thomas’s theory of self- knowledge for his view of human nature. It returns to the commentaries on the De anima and Liber de causis to argue that habitual self-knowledge is essential to immaterial being, and that Thomas’s discussion of habitual and actual implicit self-knowledge constitutes a psychological approach to the nature of human personhood which complements his much better-known metaphysical definition of personhood. This dissertation by Therese Scarpelli Cory fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by John F. Wippel, Ph.D., as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D., and Gregory Doolan, Ph.D., as Readers. ____________________________________ John F. Wippel, Ph.D., Director ____________________________________ Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader ____________________________________ Gregory Doolan, Ph.D., Reader ii To David iii ἐδιζησάµην ἐµεωυτόν —Heraclitus, fr. 101 . nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est: ut ubi sit quod sui non capit? Numquid extra ipsum ac non in ipso? Quomodo ergo non capit? Multa mihi super hoc oboritur admiratio, stupor apprehendit. Et eunt homines mirari alta montium, et ingentes fluctus maris, et latissimos lapsus fluminum, et Oceani ambitum, et gyros siderum, et relinquunt se ipsos . —St. Augustine, Confessiones iv CONTENTS Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................................ix Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................xi Introduction A. Why Study Aquinas’s Theory of Self-Knowledge?..................................................................1 B. Status quaestionis and Structure of the Present Work...............................................................3 C. Thomas’s General Theory of Knowledge .................................................................................9 1. Knowledge of Material Objects...................................................................................9 2. Knowledge of Immaterial Substances........................................................................17 D. Procedural Observations .........................................................................................................22 Chapter I: Historical and Textual Sources for Thomas’s Theory of Self-Knowledge Introduction..................................................................................................................................25 A. Historical Sources for Thomas’s Doctrine ..............................................................................25 1. Augustine..................................................................................................................25 2. Aristotle....................................................................................................................37 B. The Texts.................................................................................................................................45 1. A Preliminary Set of Distinctions: Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences ......... 47 a. An early division of self-knowledge b. Towards the standard Thomistic division of self-knowledge 2. A Fourfold Doctrine of Self-Knowledge: De veritate , q. 10, a. 8 ............................56 3. Knowing the Soul Through Itself: Summa contra gentiles , bk. 3, ch. 46.................61 4. Knowing the Soul Through its Act: Summa theologiae Ia, q. 87, a. 1 .....................66 5. Knowing Oneself as Other Things: In De anima , bk. III .........................................71 6. Returning to One’s Essence: Super Librum de causis , propositions 7 and 15 .........77 7. Analysis of Historical Development in the Texts ......................................................86 a. The basis for self-knowledge in human nature b. Classification of phenomena c. Problem group #1: mechanisms of self-knowledge d. Problem group #2: self-familiarity and permanent self-knowledge v Chapter II: Actual Self-Awareness: Perceiving That I Exist Introduction..................................................................................................................................98 A. The Content of Self-Awareness ..............................................................................................99 1. Indistinct Knowledge and the Twofold Operation of the Intellect.........................100 a. The problem and a path to its solution b. A theory of indistinct knowledge c. Indistinct knowledge and the knowledge of essence and existence 2. Making Sense of Self-Awareness...........................................................................120 B. On Intuitive Cognition...........................................................................................................126 1. General Definition of Intuition...............................................................................126 2. Intuitive Perception of the Soul..............................................................................130 C. The Mode of Self-Awareness................................................................................................134 1. The Nature of the Act.............................................................................................134 a. Intellectual vision b. Perception, intuition, experience: non-discursive intellection of ones c. The non-discursivity of self-awareness 2. The Genesis of the Act ...........................................................................................150 a. Directness: the pre-discursivity of self-awareness b. The immediacy of self-awareness c. The presence of the soul to itself in an act of self-awareness D. Concluding Comments..........................................................................................................171 Chapter III: Habitual Self-Awareness: The Meaning of Selfhood Introduction................................................................................................................................175 A. The Presence of Habits..........................................................................................................180 1. An Exploration of Presence....................................................................................180 2. Intellectual Habits as a Kind of Presence ...............................................................184 a. Thomas’s doctrine on habits b. Intellectual memory B. Habitual Self-Awareness as Ontological Identity .................................................................198
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