A Thesis Entitled Knowledge, Truth, and the Challenge of Revisability
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A Thesis entitled Knowledge, Truth, and the Challenge of Revisability: A Critique of Actor-Network Theory by Evan L. Hale Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy _________________________________________ Dr. Madeline Muntersbjorn, Committee Chair _________________________________________ Dr. James Campbell, Committee Member _________________________________________ Dr. John Sarnecki, Committee Member _________________________________________ Dr. Patricia R. Komuniecki, Dean College of Graduate Studies The University of Toledo May 2012 Copyright 2012, Evan Lamont Hale This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no parts of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author. An Abstract of Knowledge, Truth, and the Challenge of Revisability: A Critique of Actor-Network Theory by Evan L. Hale Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy The University of Toledo May 2012 Abstract I am concerned in this thesis with a relatively narrow subject matter which has the potential to be brought to bear on numerous philosophical endeavors, from metaphysics to ethics to political science. Of necessity, I will only deal with a few of the possible applications/derivations. The subject matter in question is the revisability of knowledge, the fact that we can know p at one time and know not-p at another. In Chapter 1, I will establish the truth of this claim and consider its relevance to the question of truth in general. If knowledge is revisable, does that mean truth is? I ultimately answer yes, after considering various popular alternatives. In Chapter 2, I extend the analysis to the potential revisability of ontology itself. Whereas the first chapter considers the relation of knowledge to truth with that of truth, the second chapter considers the relation of truth to reality. This discussion will involve a brief historical survey of modern representationalism, the philosophical view that the subject represents the external world internally. Representationalism is ultimately iii rejected in favor of William James’ radical empiricism, which can handle a revisable ontology and, when coupled with his pragmatism, the revision of truth. Chapter 3 will treat what I take to be the most significant application of knowledge/ontology revision today: actor-network theory (ANT). Relying mostly on the work of Bruno Latour, I will show how ANT is a contemporary sociological application of James’ more psychologically-oriented radical empiricism. I will display some of the strengths and weaknesses of ANT, and point toward work, both metaphysical and epistemological, that needs to be done in the future if we are going to understand better the import of revisability in our sciences and our lives. iv Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v List of Tables ................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii 1 Three Intuitions ....................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Knowledge Is True, or Genuine Knowledge Is of What Is True ...................... 5 1.3 Knowledge Is Subject to Revision .................................................................... 6 1.4 The Truth Is Not Subject to Revision……………………………….. ............ 11 1.5 The Messianic Theory of Truth, the “Approximation” Theory of Knowledge, and Their Inevitable Fallout……………………………………… .......... 14 1.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 19 2 William James’ Rejection of the Representational Subject .................................. 21 2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 21 2.2 Descartes: An (Ir)Rational Reconstruction ..................................................... 22 2.3 Locke and the Submersion of Judgment ......................................................... 27 2.4 The Primary Purpose of Primary Qualities ..................................................... 30 2.5 Berkeley Shifts the Grounds of Stability......................................................... 32 2.6 Kant’s Ptolemaic Revolution .......................................................................... 34 2.7 Empiricism Radicalized .................................................................................. 39 v 2.8 Imagination and Error ..................................................................................... 46 2.9 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 53 3 Actor-Network Theory and Historicity ................................................................. 54 3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 54 3.2 Actor-Network Theory and Practice ............................................................... 57 3.3 Experiences and Actants ................................................................................. 61 3.4 ANT Infraphysics………… ............................................................................ 67 3.4.1 Multiple Drafts Ontology ................................................................. 70 3.4.2 Throwing Away the Social Ladder .................................................. 72 3.4.3 The Weak Reading of ANT ............................................................. 74 3.4.4 The Strong Reading of ANT ............................................................ 79 3.5 Conclusion: Empirical Metaphysics? .............................................................. 82 References ......................................................................................................................... 87 vi List of Tables 3.1 A Comparison of Experiences and Actants........................................................... 65 vii List of Figures 2-1 James and the Paper Externally Related ............................................................... 44 2-2 James and the Paper Internally Related................................................................. 45 3-1 Pasteur and the Microbes Externally Related ....................................................... 69 3-2 Pasteur and the Microbes Internally Related......................................................... 69 viii Chapter 1 Three Intuitions 1.1 Introduction Intuitions about knowledge and truth vary widely. Accounts of how knowledge can be obtained and justified, for instance, range from internalist to externalist, foundationalist to coherentist, and so on. The truth of propositions or ideas can be an issue of correspondence to an external reality, coherence with other statements or ideas, or simply pragmatic workability. These intuitions and epistemological positions have implications for the relation between truth and reality and are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The focus in this chapter is a set of three quite plausible intuitions that might be even more basic, insofar as they focus on the relation between truth and knowledge. The following intuitions have played a significant, if sometimes tacit, role in many, if not most, philosophers’ theories of knowledge: A) Knowledge is true, or genuine knowledge is of what is true; B) Knowledge is subject to revision; C) The truth is not subject to revision. There is a tension, if not an outright paradox, in accepting all three intuitions at the same time. Combining B with C, we create the meta-intuition, “Knowledge is subject to revision while truth is not” (which puts a lot of weight on the word “genuine” in A). 1 Hardly any philosophers would think it natural to argue that genuine truths can be altered. For these reasons, only a handful of epistemologists would reject A or C. There are those who would reject B. These writers adhere to what Hans Rott calls the stability thesis (Rott 2004, 329): “A belief α is a piece of knowledge of the subject iff α is not given up by S [the subject] on the basis of any true information that S may receive.” This position rejects B in favor of keeping C. I will explain shortly why B needs to be taken seriously, and the stability thesis rejected, if we are to take science seriously. Furthermore, I will argue that C needs to be rejected, and the truth rendered mutable, if knowledge is going to bear any meaningful relation to present evidence. A precisely defined truth might be a factual occurrence assigned to a specific spatio-temporal region. For example, “My dog buried a bone in my backyard on Sunday, November 13, 2011.” And it could naturally be argued that our knowledge of such truths can come and go. For example, I might hear from my friend that he saw my dog burying the bone in the backyard on the date in question. But then he might later recant, as part of a bizarre epistemological