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On Moral Understanding

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On Moral Understanding COMMENTTHE COLLEGE NEWSLETTER ISSUE NO 147 | MAY 2003 TOM WHIPPS On Moral Understanding DNA pioneers: The surviving members of the King’s team, who worked on the discovery of the structure of DNA 50 years ago, withDavid James Watson, K Levytheir Cambridge ‘rival’ at the time. From left Ray Gosling, Herbert Wilson, DNA at King’s: DepartmentJames Watson and of Maurice Philosophy Wilkins King’s College the continuing story University of London Prize for his contribution – and A day of celebrations their teams, but also to subse- quent generations of scientists at ver 600 guests attended a cant scientific discovery of the King’s. unique day of events celeb- 20th century,’ in the words of Four Nobel Laureates – Mau- Orating King’s role in the 50th Principal Professor Arthur Lucas, rice Wilkins, James Watson, Sid- anniversary of the discovery of the ‘and their research changed ney Altman and Tim Hunt – double helix structure of DNA on the world’. attended the event which was so 22 April. The day paid tribute not only to oversubscribed that the proceed- Scientists at King’s played a King’s DNA pioneers Rosalind ings were relayed by video link to fundamental role in this momen- Franklin and Maurice Wilkins – tous discovery – ‘the most signifi- who went onto win the Nobel continued on page 2 2 Funding news | 3 Peace Operations Review | 5 Widening participation | 8 25 years of Anglo-French law | 11 Margaret Atwood at King’s | 12 Susan Gibson wins Rosalind Franklin Award | 15 Focus: School of Law | 16 Research news | 18 Books | 19 KCLSU election results | 20 Arts abcdef U N I V E R S I T Y O F L O N D O N A C C O M M O D A T I O N O F F I C E ACCOMMODATION INFORMATION - FINDING SOMEWHERE TO LIVE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy WARNING: Under no circumstances inshould the this University document be of taken London as providing legal advice. This document is intended to provide informal and general guidance to University of London students or staff, and students of the London Institute, who are seeking accommodation. ·While2004 the· University of London Accommodation Office (ULAO) has drawn upon the knowledge and experience of the ULAO staff, this document should not be relied upon as either accurate or exhaustive as at the date of publication. In the event of uncertainty over legal rights and obligations, the ULAO strongly urges you to seek legal advice from a Citizens Advice Bureau or legal advice centre. The University of London and the ULAO are not liable for any loss, damage, injury or death (however caused) suffered by you while living in private accommodation. WHO WANTS DECENT ACCOMMODATION WITH FEW HASSLES? · NEVER sign document, with which you do not agree or do not understand. Get it checked first. · If you cannot accept the terms and conditions of a tenancy agreement DON'T SIGN TO MOVE IN! (This also applies to living with a resident landlord where you might only have licence agreement). · If accommodation problems arise, don't carry on regardless - TALK TO YOUR LANDLORD/AGENT ABOUT IT. Some of the worst situations arise due to basic lack of communication between landlord and tenant. Always check your legal rights and obligations before threatening to go to court. · If problems occur with co-sharers, try and sort things out without delay before the situation gets bad. · The three big problems on which the ULAO has to give advice are: CONTRACTUAL – wanting to leave a contract, penalty clauses, etc. REPAIRS – leaking roof, boiler broken, etc. DEPOSITS – deductions on damage deposits, and non-return of a holding deposit. 1a TYPES OF ACCOMMODATION · Independent Hostels. · Bedsits in a property rented out individually; or lodging with a landlord. · Rented houses/flats shared by a group of students. · Self-catering accommodation provided by your College. · University owned, head leased flats/houses managed by the Property Management Unit (PMU). The properties are spread out across London, and range in size from 1 to 9 bedroom flats and houses. The first indication of properties becoming available will be known from June/July onwards. S E N A T E H O U S E · M A L E T S T R E E T · L O N D O N · W C 1 E 7 H U 1 Abstract I provide an explanation of moral understanding. I begin by describing decisions, es- pecially moral ones. I detail ways in which deviations from an ideal of decision-making occur. I link deviations to characteristic critical judgments, e.g. being cavalier, banal, coura- geous, etc. Moral judgments are among these and carry a particular personal gravity. The question I entertain in following chapters is: how do they carry this gravity? In answering the question, I try “external” accounts of moral understanding. I distin- guish between the ideas of a person and a life. The idea of a life essayed is of a network of relations to others. The character of those relations, e.g. friendship, is the object of our understanding of ourselves and our lives. I argue that one’s understanding of oneself conditions the context of decision-making. I elaborate one way of making moral under- standing answerable to truth using Plato’s metaphysics in the Philebus. Truth is valued and truth is essential to the independence of the moral such that seeming right and being right are distinct. However, truth is neither primary nor exhaustive of morality, because we have additional distinct resources for morally judging others. I turn instead to an “internal” account of moral understanding to answer the question regarding the personal gravity of moral criticism. Using Winch’s work on universalizabil- ity and fellowship, I argue that our conception of others must be sufficient to reflect their individuality within our moral understanding. Second, using Gaita’s work on remorse and the lucidity of self-reflection, I argue that the truth about ourselves and the wrong we do others can arrest and constrain our moral understanding and our authority. Moral understanding operates in a social milieu: argument, conversation and rational- ity. Arguments are grounded in meanings with primary (shared) sense, but solicit agree- ment in secondary sense—of what is similar, of what follows. Meaning in the secondary sense can be necessarily practical, creating practical necessities within points of view. Accounting for the consequences and understanding of disagreement is identified as pressing. An original contribution is the idea of critical authority. One’s articulation of moral meaning is controlled via the critical authority expressed using critical vocabulary. Accepting another’s critical authority is based, in differing domains, on our relation to them, e.g. friendship, trust, fellowship. The nature of inter-personal relations are delim- ited by the critical authority characteristic of those relations. Critical authority explains the independent and personal force of moral criticism. To be intelligible depends on accepting some critical authorities, though I allow for the intelligible repudiation of morality in some circumstances. Wronging someone is ex- plained as denying his critical authority, thus denying his relation to oneself, and thereby undermining his place in the moral world. The consequence of wrongdoing is the disinte- gration of the moral world. I defend against Nagel’s realism and Korsgaard’s constructivism. Both are committed to judging individuals but their accounts of morality undermine the intelligibility of the personal gravity of moral criticism. Developing the idea of Moral Consensus, I defend myself against the related charge of relativism. 2 Table of Chapters Acknowledgments 13 1 Introduction 14 2 Moral Thinking by Decision 41 3 Persons, Lives and Context 73 4 Truth, Order and Moral Understanding 101 5 Cognition, Possibility and Individuality 133 6 Determination, Error and Authority 169 7 Rationality, Argument and Conversation 203 8 The Nature of Moral Criticism 240 9 The Ground of Moral Criticism 267 10 Realism, Relativism, Consensus and Dissidence 300 11 Concluding Remarks 335 Afterword 340 Bibliography 341 A Translated Materials 352 B Additional Diagrams 354 Index 358 Author Index 361 3 List of Tables 1.1 Structure of Investigation by Chapter . 38 2.1 Focus of Type z Judgments . 68 2.2 Focus of Type y Judgments . 68 2.3 Focus of Type x Judgments . 69 4.1 Anatomy of Instantiated Harmony . 120 4 Analytical Table of Contents Acknowledgments 13 1 Introduction 14 1.1 What is the question? . 14 1.2 What is the answer? . 14 1.3 How does it say it? What kind of answer is it? . 16 1.4 What is the argument? . 21 1.5 What is the method? . 24 1.6 What are the limitations? . 35 1.7 What is the structure? . 37 1.8 Summary . 39 2 Moral Thinking by Decision 41 2.1 Morality and its relation to moral psychology set out; practical reason model criticized as too narrow and inadequate. 41 2.2 Examples of considered rather than automatic decisions as paradigms of moral thinking; reflective deliberation deprecated in this analysis. 45 2.3 Sketch of the ways in which the person to whom a question is addressed in decision making change the nature of the question, implicating a person or not. 48 2.4 Notion of options and assessment of merit introduced; decision-making ide- als introduced; idea of determining merit elaborated; merit of options as- sessed by reference to considerations. 50 2.5 Five kinds of deviations from a decision-making ideal in the assessment of considerations described. 52 2.6 Four kinds of deviations from a decision-making ideal in the outcome of decision-making described; discussion of the mistake in the idea of revealed preference.
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