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Proquest Dissertations INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. 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UMI' Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Art)or, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 THE METAPHYSICS OF CLASSICAL LOGIC: SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM, QUASI-REALISM AND LOGICAL REVISIONISM DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Joseph Roy Salerno, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1999 Dissertation Committee: Approved W Robert Kraut, co-adviser Neil Ten nant, co-adviser /t /I ^p^AdviserJ-^A dviser Stewart Shapiro Co-Adviser Department of Philosophy UMI Number: 9941424 UMI Microfonn 9941424 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microfonn edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 © Copyright by Joseph Roy Salerno 1999 ABSTRACT The project is to demonstrate important connections between our metaphysical views and the logical principles we endorse. For example, acceptance of the principle that every proposition is determinately true or false commits us to certain “meta­ physical realist” views about the existence of mind-independent facts. Conversely: acceptance of certain metaphysical views (e.g., “irrealist” views that deny the exis­ tence of certain kinds of facts) necessitate rejection of certain logics in favor of others. Current debates offer several views about the relation between logic and meta­ physics. “Semantic anti-realism,” says that truth is essentially constrained by possible knowledge: that is, that all truths are knowable, and that once this is acknowledged, we must revise classical logic. The arguments for this view are not compelling; I suggest that Dummett and others do not provide a precise enough account of the relation between logic and semantic anti-realism. My main positive contribution is a revised formulation of the purported connection. It establishes, in a way that others have not, that semantic anti-realism does issue a demand to revise our principles of logic. Another form of anti-realism suggests that certain indicative statements (e.g., statements of moral appraisal) serve not to represent facts, but rather to express sentiments. Such “irrealist” metaphysical views (Simon Blackburn’s expressr.dsm in ethics, for example) are said to be compatible with classical principles of inference. ii I argue that this is a mistake: despite Blaxrkbum’s “quasi-realist” attempts to show that the expressivist can consistently accept the Excluded Middle, the expressivist cannot consistently endorse the possibility of unknowable moral truths. So this form of metaphysical irrealism (viz., rejection of “moral facts”) entails an important form of semantic anti-realism (i.e., that all truths are knowable), and therefore, shares the its consequences for logical revision. One general result is that various metaphysical theories necessitate radical revi­ sions in our inferential rules. Another result is that endorsement of classical logic implies acceptance of various forms of metaphysical realism (some of which rule out “projectivist” or “expressivist” theories). Upshot: our logic really does, in some important sense, guide our metaphysics, and vice versa. m For Daniel IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For being invaluable sources of ongoing discussion, insight and guidance, I am deeply grateful to Neil Tennant, Robert Kraut and Stewart Shapiro, a team of meta­ physicians that I will truly, truly miss. A special thanks goes to Sarah Pessin, Andrew Pessin, Hope May and Michael Russo, who have been great friends and even greater sources of inspiration over the yeêirs, to Jyllian Tricot for her selflessness, love and understanding, and to my parents and wonderful sisters, Jackie and Holly, for their perpetual love and support. Great thanks are also due to many others who have contributed in one positive way or another to my fulfilling graduate career and/or my professional endeavors, including Debra Blickensderfer, Robert Batterman, Jon Cogbum, Jon Curtis, Justin D’Arms, Jill Dieterle, Daniel Farrell, Richard Gamer, Kevin Giordano, Brenda Grosse, Mehran Habibi, Risto Hilpinen, Saii Johari, A1 Lent, Ty Lightner, Karrie Mills, Pierluigi Miraglia, Calvin Normore, George Pappas, Diana Raffrnan, George Schumm, Mark Silcox, Allan Silverman, Marshall Swain, James Summerford, William Taschek, and Crispin Wright. Daniel Kolak opened to me the door to philosophy. To him this manuscript is dedicated. VITA 1970 ...................................................................Bom - Livingston, NJ 1992 ..................................................... B.A. William Paterson. University, Wayne, NJ 1995 ...................................................................M.A. The Ohio State University 1993-1999 .........................................................Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS Instructional Publications A Companion for Lovers of Wisdom^ with H. May and M. Russo (Wadsworth, 1997). FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy VI TABLE OP CONTENTS Page A bstract ........................................................................................................................ ii Dedication.................................................................................................................. iv Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... v V i t a ........................................................................................................................... vi Chapters: 1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 1.1 Some Philosophical P roblem s............................................................ 5 1.2 Radical Alternatives to Realism ......................................................... 10 1.3 The Project........................................................................................... 12 2. SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM AND LOGICAL REVISION.......................................................................... 18 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 18 2.2 Restriction On A Meaningful Semantic D e b a te .............................. 20 2.3 Dummett’s Argument for Logical Revision ....................................... 22 2.4 Wright’s Argument for Logical R ev isio n .......................................... 25 2.5 Revising the Logic of Logical R evision ............................................. 29 2.6 Some Problems, Old and N ew ............................................................ 32 2.6.1 The Fitch Paradox of Knowabüity ......................................... 32 2.6.2 The Problem of Not Knowing .................................................. 34 2.6.3 The Problem of Shared Content ............................................... 35 2.6.4 The Problem of Godelian O p tim ism ...................................... 37 2.7 Appendix: Summary of Semantics, Rules, Theses and Results . 41 vu 2.7.1 Sem antics ........................................ 41 2.7.2 R u le s .......................................................................................... 41 2.7.3 Theses and Main Results ........................................................ 42 3. NON-FACTUALISM AND QUASI-REALISM............................................. 44 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 44 3.2 Projectivism ......................................................................................... 44 3.3 Quasi-Realism ....................................................................................... 49 3.4 When is Quasi-Realism Successful? .................................................... 51 3.4.1 The Consistency Constraint ..................................................... 51 3.4.2 The Conservativism Constraint ............................................... 52 3.5 The Problem of Normativity ................................................................. 53 3.6 Peircean Limits, and Improved
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