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Critique of Worldmaking»? Nelson Goodman’S Conception of Philosophy

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Critique of Worldmaking»? Nelson Goodman’S Conception of Philosophy Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 49, 2012 29-40 What is «Critique of Worldmaking»? Nelson Goodman’s Conception of Philosophy Lars Leeten Universität Hildesheim [email protected] Abstract The contribution examines Goodman’s conception of philosophy, in particular his remark that his project can be understood as a «critique of worldmaking». It is argued that, despite dealing with epistemological questions, the general theory of symbols and worldmaking does not answer them. Rather, it can be conceived as a practical conception comparable to Kant’s critique of reason or to Wittgenstein’s critique of language games, i. e., as a philosophy of world orient ation. It is claimed that Goodman himself could not artic ulate this dimension of his position appropriately as he kept using the language of epistemol- ogy. Yet many aspects of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted with in a non-epistemological frame. Keywords: Goodman; symbol theory; worldmaking; world orientation; world disclosure. Resumen. ¿Qué es la «crítica de la construcción de mundos»? La concepción de la filosofía de Nelson Goodman Esta contribución examina la concepción de la filosofía de Goodman, concretamente su afirmación de que su proyecto puede entenderse como una «crítica de la construcción de mundos». Se argumenta que, a pesar de tratar cuestiones epistemológicas, la teoría general de los símbolos y de la construcción de mundos no las contesta. Más bien se puede conside- rar como una concepción práctica comparable a la crítica de la razón de Kant o a la crítica de los juegos del lenguaje de Wittgenstein, esto es, como una filosofía de la orientación del mundo. Se defiende que Goodman no podría haber articulado esta dimensión de su postura de un modo apropiado puesto que siguió usando el lenguaje de la epistemología. Ahora bien, muchos aspectos de su pensamiento son mucho más claros si se interpretan en un marco no epistemológico. Palabras clave: Goodman; teoría de los símbolos; construcción de mundos; orientación del mundo; apertura del mundo. 30 Enrahonar 49, 2012 Lars Leeten Summary 1. Introduction 4. The language of representation 2. Constructionalism and the idea 5. Beyond representation of mapmaking References 3. Worldmaking as mapmaking 1. Introduction In Ways of Worldmaking, Nelson Goodman describes his philosophical project as a critique of worldmaking: «Worlds are made by making [...] versions with words, numerals, pictures, sounds, or other symbols of any kind in any medi- um; and the comparative study of these versions and visions and of their making is what I call a critique of worldmaking» (WW, 94). Elsewhere Good- man says that his «main under taking [...] is examination and compar ison of the ways we make what we make — call them versions or worlds as you like — and of the criteria we use in judging what we make» (MM, 43). — What does the label «critique of world­­making» exactly mean? What is the conception of philo sophy Goodman has in mind? And how do we have to interpret his general symbol theory if it is primarily a critique of world making? It is tempting to think that «critique of world making» is just a different label for «epi stemology», only that its scope is broader. One basic assumption of this article, though, is that Goodman is not engaged in epistemology at all, at least not in the usual sense. The question is not whether epistemology has to be conceived narrow or broad. Symbol theory is not so much a theory but rather a practical conception, a certain technique of thinking. This might seem rather far-fetched at first sight, as Goodman more than once emphasizes that a philosopher «is driven not by practical needs but by an impractical desire to understand» (PP, 169). Even though he discovers language practice as a fun- damental point of reference in his theory of induction (especially, FFF, 4.3- 4.4), he never takes into account the details of the pragmatic dimension of sign use and everyday language (Goodman, 1996, 205). His refusal to go into questions of ethical rightness (WW, 109, Fn. 1) only underlines a general lack of normative discussion in Good man’s work. Therefore one is inclined to perceive his «general theory of under stand ing» (R, 53) as a general theory of knowl edge, an extended epistemological con ception concerned with «under- standing or cog nition in all of its modes» (R, 4). Accordingly, rightness is taken to be Goodman’s epi stemo­­logical criterion, representing the standard to sep- arate acceptable from inacceptable world descriptions. Right ness takes the place of truth, only that it is, «unlike truth, [...] multi dimen sional» (R, 156). The expressions may have changed, but the project is still the same. Here, this perspective is called into question. Goodman, to be sure, uses the vocabulary of epistemology and he starts with the problems of epistemol- Nelson Goodman's Conception of Philosophy Enrahonar 49, 2012 31 ogy. Still, many elements of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted in a frame beyond epistemology. His philosophy is done more justice if one presupposes that it does not answer to epistemological questions. In order to show this, I will first examine some of Goodman’s early general con sider ations on philo sophy, in particular the idea of constructional systems (2). Second, I will try to develop my thesis in the context of his later philoso- phy of symbols and worldmaking (3). Finally I will come back to the question of epistemology (4) and try to give an alternative account of what «critique of world making» might mean (5). My claim will be that this label points into the direction of a practical reflection comparable to Kant’s critique of reason or to Witt gen stein’s critique of language games, i. e., as a philosophy of world orient ation and world disclosure under the conditions of finiteness — a claim which, of course, does not include a «truth about Good man», but only suggests a certain way of ca tegorization. 2. Constructionalism and the idea of mapmaking Goodman’s philosophical work contains many issues from quite diverse fields like ontology, logic, epistemology, symbol theory and aesthetics. It would be difficult to extract his conception of philosophy from this starting point. So what does he say about his notion of philosophy? In the final chapter of Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sci­ ences, under the heading «A Reconception of Philosophy», we find the idea of a three-staged undertaking that starts with the examination of symbols, then turns to their constitutive meaning for world dis closure, and finally results in a revision of philosophy (R, 164). The consider ations of Languages of Art, then, could be the first step of a project that continues with Ways of Worldmaking, and ends with the outline of a new notion of philo sophy. This notion, though, is presented as a certain epi stemological position called «constructionalism» (R, 166). In the follow ing, I claim that Good man’s thinking implicitly suggests a much more radically revised conception of philo sophy. Indeed, the label «epistemology» is misleading here, as the philosophy of worldmaking should better be interpreted as a conception presupposing a primacy of practice. In order to show this, though, we have to go back to The Structure of Appearance and Problems and Projects. One of the main motives in Goodman’s early work is his repudiation of the ideas of certainty and immediacy. The position that becomes apparent in The Structure of Appear ance seems to be the result: Goodman obviously rejects any epistemological founda tion alism in favor of an epistemological stance called pheno menalism. But the second sight shows that things are slightly more complicated. Goodman does develop a phenomenalistic system in his early work. Yet this does not mean that he supports phenomenalism as the right system of epistemology. Indeed, in the introduction to The Structure of Appear­ ance it is underlined that the frame of the con ception is the theory of construc- tional systems which includes strong relativist and pluralist assumptions, in 32 Enrahonar 49, 2012 Lars Leeten particular the assumption that phenomenalism is only one of many possibilities of reconstruction (SA, il-l). His con ception must not be taken as an immediate expression of Good man’s philo so phical standpoint. He does not want to explain the world or give a fundament to knowledge. His aim is to systematize knowledge. The phenomenalist conception is rather an example of the philo- sophical stance Good man takes. From the view point of the phenomenalist theory, the basic assumptions of this position are part of a meta theory (Hell- mann 1977, xxvi f and SA, l). What we have to ask, then, is what this metatheory, namely the theory of constructional systems implies. Goodman develops this theory in the first part of The Structure of Appear ance. A constructional system is a system of construc- tional definitions, i. e., of definitions «introduced for explanatory purposes» (SA, 3). Unlike a notational definition, a constructional de finition defines everyday or pre system atic ex pres sions while preserving their original interpretation. It serves to clarify the presystematic domain by reaching both economy (a reduc- tion of primitive terms) and a systematic order (SA, 47f). «To economize and to systematize are the same» (SA, 48). In order to serve this purpose, a con- structional de finition does not only have to fulfill formal requirements: «A con struc tional de finition is correct — apart from formal considerations — if the range of application of its definiens is the same as that of the definiendum. Nothing more is required than that the two expressions have identical exten- sions» (SA, 3).
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