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Animal Consciousness. Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul

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JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 370 Juhana Toivanen Animal Consciousness Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 370 Juhana Toivanen Animal Consciousness Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Historica rakennuksessa, H320 lokakuun 3. päivänä 2009 kello 12. Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä, in the Building Historica, Hall 320, on October 3, 2009 at 12 o'clock noon. UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2009 Animal Consciousness Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 370 Juhana Toivanen Animal Consciousness Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2009 Editors Jussi Kotkavirta Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/philosophy, University of Jyväskylä Pekka Olsbo, Marja-Leena Tynkkynen Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä URN:ISBN:978-951-39-3794-2 ISBN 978-951-39-3794-2 (PDF) ISBN 978-951-39-3669-3 (nid.) ISSN 0075-4625 Copyright © 2009 , by University of Jyväskylä Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2009 ABSTRACT Toivanen, Juhana Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2009, 369 p. (Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research ISSN 0075-4625; XXX)370) ISBN 978-951-39-3794-2xxx-xx-xxxx-x (PDF), 978-951-39-3669-3 (nid.) Finnish summary Diss. The present study investigates Peter Olivi’s (1248–98) conception of various aspects of animal consciousness from the point of view of philosophical psychology. Although the study pertains to animals, human beings are not excluded: according to medieval view, there is a strong psychological continuity between human beings and other animals. Thus, the subject matter of the present study includes those cognitive operations which are understood as being common to humans and other animals: perception, psycholog- ical functions which are attributed to the so-called internal senses, and certain types of self-consciousness. Each of the three parts of the study deals with one of these themes. Part one anal- yses Olivi’s intentional theory of perception and situates it into larger philosophical and historical contexts. Part two deals with Olivi’s view on the internal senses, which account for psychological functions that enable complex cognitive operations with regard to ex- ternal objects. These functions account for animals’ seemingly rational action, and they include imagination, memory, and estimative apprehension, i.e., evaluation of external objects with respect to the well-being of the percipient. Part three discusses types of self- consciousness, which Olivi attributes to animal soul. These include cognising one’s body as a part of oneself, and second-order consciousness of one’s cognitive activity. The result is a detailed study of certain aspects of Olivi’s thought. Olivi is consid- ered as one of the most important yet poorly studied medieval thinkers, and his role is especially important in philosophical psychology. The present study opens new ground by conducting a detailed investigation on Olivi’s thought and by examining aspects of medieval philosophical psychology that have hitherto received less attention. The most important results pertain to Olivi’s conception of intentional consciousness, his under- standing of the relation between conscious mind and the body, and to medieval under- standing of the similarity between human beings and non-human animals. The study is a philosophical investigation: it aims at philosophical understanding rather than historical exposition. Yet, as philosophical acuteness and historical accuracy go hand in hand in history of philosophy, the result can be described as philosophically informed and historically accurate study. Also the employed method combines philo- sophical conceptual analysis with methods of the science of history. The main sources include all the major philosophical works of Olivi that have been edited—most impor- tant works are Summa quæstionum super Sententias and Quodlibeta quinque. Keywords: Peter Olivi, history of philosophy, medieval philosophy, philosophy of mind, animal psychology, consciousness, internal senses, percep- tion, self-consciousness, intentionality Author Juhana Toivanen Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of Jyväskylä Supervisor Professor Mikko Yrjönsuuri Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of Jyväskylä Reviewers Professor Simo Knuuttila Department of Systematic Theology University of Helsinki Doctor Sylvain Piron L’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris Opponent Professor Henrik Lagerlund Department of Philosophy University of Western Ontario ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Conducting research on mediæval philosophy is a curious business. One has to read thousands of pages of age-old texts which are difficult to understand and of- ten very boring. One has to think quite a lot, and sometimes the ideas one thinks about are quite bizarre. One has to stare at the display and try to find a way of ex- pressing one’s thoughts in such a way that someone else might understand them. And one has to deal with the constant doubt that there may not be a point in the undertaking. Fortunately, there is a remedy that has given a sense and a reason for my research: the people to whom and with whom this book is written. Some of them have made the undertaking easier and meaningful by being co-operative and interested in my work; others have made my social life so interesting that I have been able to forget my work every now and then. First and foremost I would like to thank Mikko Yrjönsuuri who has shown me that to be a historian of philosophy is a respectable option for a philosopher. Had he not become a member of the staff of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, I had never realised that three areas of my interests—philosophy, history, and Latin philology—may in fact provide an opportunity for a career. Mikko is an expert who is always supportive and encouraging, and he has given me enough freedom to find my own way in the darkness of the Dark Ages. I am also grateful to my referees, Sylvain Piron and Simo Knuuttila, whose comments and suggestions helped me to give the final touch to this book. I did not take heed of all of their advices, although now when it is already too late to change anything I can see that I probably should have done so. I have not always found my work valuable and worth doing, and most of the time I have not felt confident in my capabilities of conducting it. These were the times when I was lucky to have inspiring colleagues and friends who have helped and supported me in various ways. Being able to talk about history of philosophy, being able to give vent to all the feelings a postgraduate must face when (s)he is writing a dissertation, and being able to discuss life, the universe, and everything—these possibilities have been invaluable for me. Thanks to Jari Kaukua, Vili Lähteenmäki, Mika Perälä, Susanna Niiranen, Taneli Kukkonen, Filipe Silva, Minna Koivuniemi, and all the colleagues in Jyväskylä and within the research units History of Mind, and Philosophical Psychology, Morality, and Pol- itics. Not to mention “Juha Mieto,” and a certain penguin. Two of my friends deserve a special mention: Mimosa Pursiainen and Ulla-Maija Matikainen, who have prevented me from climbing too high in the ivory tower of university phi- losophy and tried to convince me of the usefulness of looking at the stars instead. I hope that I have given you back even a tiny part of all I have received from you. Being a philosopher does not pay off financially, but it has given a living. It is obvious that without financial support I could not have devoted my time to accomplish this study. Thus, I want to express my gratitude to the leaders of the research units HoM and PMP for believing in me. They have made exceptionally long contracts and believed—almost without reason, it seems to me—that I will meet the hopes that are placed on me. A grant from Nyyssösen säätiö has made certain important things possible. I am indebted to Jessica Slattery for language editing and proofreading the present study; it goes without saying that the remaining mistakes are due to my stubbornness. During the first year of my postgraduate studies the library of my alma mater offended their own rules in my favour. I promised to thank them for their flexi- bility. Now the promise is delivered. I am not only a philosopher; I am a son, a husband, and a father as well. I am grateful to my parents, because they taught me to philosophise in the first place. Their philosophical attitude towards things they value in life, their fondness of discussion, and their unquestioning support in my choices—however stupid they may have been—have driven me to where I am. I am also thankful to my own family. Johanna, Katariina, and Irene have supported and loved me, and they have been patient with me almost all the time. They have also kept me in touch with the everyday life. Some things simply cannot wait, and sometimes it is not a good time and place to start philosophising. When a child is hungry, you feed her, and you think about ontological problems later. Finally, I would like to thank my grandfather who has taught me three things: First, given the opportunity one should try to become more than a pig farmer. Second, no matter what one ends up doing—be it farming pigs or writ- ing a dissertation on medieval philosophy—one should do it to the best of one’s abilities.
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