A Defense of Intellectualism: Will, Intellect, and Control in Late Thirteenth-century Philosophy by Michael Szlachta A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Michael Szlachta 2019 A Defense of Intellectualism: Will, Intellect, and Control in Late Thirteenth-century Philosophy Michael Szlachta Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2019 Abstract The question of whether our volitions are caused by the activity of our cognitive powers was the subject of tremendous controversy for medieval philosophers. By answering in the affirmative, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas of Sutton and Godfrey of Fontaines, the so-called intellectualists, face what I call the Problem of Control. If my wanting some object is caused by my apprehending it as good through some cognitive act, then it seems that I am not able to will otherwise than I do. For to will otherwise than I do, it would be necessary that I apprehend some other object as good. If, however, I am not able to will otherwise than I do, then I do not seem to have control over my actions. But if I do not have control over my actions, then I do not act freely, since having control over one’s actions is necessary for acting freely. My dissertation addresses the Problem of Control. I first argue that Thomas Aquinas’s notion of “perfect cognition of the end” gives the intellectualists the resources to explain how a human being has control over her actions. Second, I argue that Aquinas does not adequately explain a central feature of his intellectualism, namely, how the will “moves itself” to the exercise of its act, and discuss how the “self-motion” of the will is addressed by Thomas of Sutton and Godfrey of Fontaines. Third, I consider whether the control that a human being has over her action when she has perfect cognition of the end of that action is the kind of control that matters for free will. ii I argue in the affirmative by defending the intellectualist claim that having perfect cognition of the end is what makes human beings free. In general, scholars have neglected intellectualism and praised the philosophical innovations of so-called voluntarists such as John Duns Scotus. But I show that intellectualism is worth careful attention, for although they were very much criticized by their contemporaries, the intellectualists have a more plausible understanding of the relationship between volition and the activity of our cognitive powers, and of human free will. iii Acknowledgments First and foremost, thank you to Martin Pickavé for his patience and his guidance these past years. I would also like to thank Peter King and Deborah Black (for teaching me what I know about medieval philosophy), Stephen Dumont (for our discussions about intellectualism and voluntarism), Peter Eardley (for comments, advice, and support), Peter Hartman (for helping me make sense of some issues in Chapter 3), Mark Johnson (for feedback on some parts of Chapters 1 and 2), Francesco Pica (for our very many helpful conversations), Alexander Pruss (for comments on a very early version of Chapter 2), David Sanson (for comments on some parts of Chapters 4 and 5), Michael Siebert (for comments on an early version of Chapter 5), the members of the Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, the participants in the uOttawa Summer Conference in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (for feedback on some parts of Chapters 2 and 5), the graduate students in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and anyone else who has helped me along the way. iv Table of Contents Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1 The Intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas ............................................................13 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................13 2 What Is the Will’s Relationship to the Intellect ...................................................................15 3 What Does It Mean That the Will Is Passive? .....................................................................21 4 How Does the Intellect Move the Will? ...............................................................................25 5 Does the Will Move Itself? ..................................................................................................32 6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................39 Chapter 2 Thomas Aquinas on Control ...............................................................................41 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................41 2 A “Conditional” Power for Opposites? ................................................................................44 3 Human Beings, Brute Animals, and Power for Opposites ...................................................48 4 Control and Power for Opposites .........................................................................................51 5 Two Sorts of Control ............................................................................................................56 6 Perfect Cognition of the End ................................................................................................59 7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................69 Chapter 3 Intellectualism after Thomas Aquinas I – Thomas of Sutton ..........................72 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................72 2 Specification, Exercise, and Self-Motion .............................................................................77 3 The Doctrine of the Will’s Twofold Self-Motion ................................................................79 4 The Plausibility of Sutton’s Intellectualism .........................................................................91 5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................98 v Chapter 4 Intellectualism after Thomas Aquinas II – Godfrey of Fontaines ................100 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................100 2 “Extreme” Intellectualism ..................................................................................................101 3 The Problem of Control ......................................................................................................110 4 Passivity, Activity, and Intentionality ................................................................................118 5 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................124 Chapter 5 A Defense of Intellectualism .............................................................................126 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................126 2 An Intellectualist View of Free Will ..................................................................................128 3 The Motivation for an Intellectualist View of Free Will ...................................................133 4 A Problem for an Intellectualist View of Free Will ...........................................................140 5 Degrees of Freedom? .........................................................................................................148 6 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................151 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................152 Bibliography .........................................................................................................................164 vi Introduction Why do I want something? Presumably, I want it because it is good, or rather, appears to me to be so. But not everything that I want appears to me to be good the same way. I want to work at home this morning, for example, because I think that it would be good for me to work someplace that’s comfortable, and my home is such a place. But I also want to work at the cafe down the street because I think that it would be good for me to work someplace that serves coffee, and the cafe does so. Why might I want to work at one place rather than the other? Perhaps I have a very urgent deadline to meet. I deliberate about where to work and judge that, since I would be more productive if I were to work at the cafe rather than at home, I should do that. That is, all other things being equal, I think that it would be good for me to work at that place where I will be more productive. I want to meet this very urgent deadline, and thus, I want to work at the cafe rather than at home. My wanting to work at home, my wanting to work at the cafe, and my wanting to work at the cafe rather than at home each stand in some relation to a cognitive act. It is on account of my believing that it