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Intellectualism in Aristotle Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 12-1978 Intellectualism in Aristotle David Keyt University of Washington, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Keyt, David, "Intellectualism in Aristotle" (1978). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 87. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/87 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. INTELLECTUALISM IN ARISTOTLE David Keyt University of Washington 1978 I When Aristotle returns to the topic of happiness at the end of the Nicoma­ chean Ethics (X.6-8) presumably to give us his final and best thoughts on the matter, he says that perfect happiness (he. teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity (the�retik� energeia), that happiness and contemplation (theoria) are coextensive, and that the life of reason (ho kata ton � bios), also called 1 the philosophic or theoretical life (I.5.1095bl9, �.E. I . 4. 1215bl-2, �passim), is the happiest life (X. 7.1177al2-18, 1178a4-8, 8.ll 78b7-32). He goes on to say that the life in accordance with the other excellence (ho kata tl!'n allen areten bios)--namely, the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue, elsewhere called the political or practical life (I. 5. 1095bl8, Pol. VII. 2.1324a40)-­ is the second happiest life (X. 8.1178a9-22). An'd he draws a sharp contrast between the activities that characterize the two lives: theoretical activity is leisured, aims at no end beyond its elf, and is loved for its own sake whereas practical ac­ tivity is unleisured, aims at an end (other than itself), and is not chosen for its own sake (X. 7.1177bl-26). As for the relation between the two sorts of activ­ ity, Aristotle implies that practical activity is merely a means to theoretical activity: " •••we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order that we_ may have peace" (X. 7 .1177b4-6). These remarks raise a major and well-known interpretive problem about Aris­ totle's· ethical ideal. and his conception of the best life for a man, for they seem to conflict with things he says earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere. They seem to conflict, in particular, with his account of the distinction between making (poiesis) and doing (praxis) and with the conclusion of the function argu­ ment. In distinguishing making and doing, Aristotle says that "the end of making is something different from the making, but not the end of doing; for good action (eupraxia) itself is� end" (VI.5.1140b6-7); and in arguing that the goodness of an action is unlike the goodness of a product of. one of the arts, he insists that for an act to be good it must be chosen for its own sake. The goodness of a pro­ duct of one of the arts (a shoe or a statue) is a quality of the work itself; but, Aristotle argues, the goodness of an act is not a quality of the act itself. Orte must also consider the agent's state of knowledge, his motive, and his character. For an act to be good it must be done with knowledge, it must be chosen and chosen for its own sake, and it must issue from a stable character (II.4.1105a26- b9). This account of good action appears to directly contradict Aristotle's statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that practical activity, in contrast to theoretical, aims at an end (other than itself) and is not chosen for its own sake. The conclusion of the function argument is that "the good for man turns out to be activity of·soul in accordance with virtue (kat' areten), and if there are sev­ eral virtues, in accordance with the best and most final" (or "tnost complete", teleiotatc§n)(I. 7.1098al6-'18). There are two interpretations of teleiotate arete. v v Dм E¤ ȣ%м м ΃dм tFʑ̥ гм Ȥ΄ '΅ Ĝ ȥ@Άʒм м м Пp Ɯ ͮȦм Oм ǟ м м qTEv ȧ6Ɲм Рŝ?ʓmŞм Ǭ¥̾gF ij м #ȨſÑм ¬Kм ˔%м ǭм ̿·ęм ! м ̂˕ ̃Lм м ΈǮм %Ήм Ί>м LJ̀ƞǯ<Йм ³ǰм &ȩ#м nм dм -´м $ ̄ʉм (м ̧́Dž м p м 8)Ɵм м Ơϭ<Ȫ*˖ Aм м ΋̅ `@! 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