Issue 62 October 2019

Return voluntary, safe, dignified and durable?

plus mini-feature on: Towards understanding and addressing the root causes of displacement Forced Migration Review (FMR) provides a forum for the regular exchange of practical From the editors experience, information and ideas oluntary return in safety and with dignity as a durable solution to between researchers, refugees Vdisplacement has long been a core tenet of the international refugee and internally displaced people, regime. In the 23 articles on Return in this issue of FMR, authors explore and those who work with them. various obstacles to achieving sustainable return, some of which are It is published in English, Arabic, common to diverse situations of displacement while others are specific to Spanish and French by the certain contexts. Many of the authors discuss the need to guard against Refugee Studies Centre of the premature or forced return, and the risks that such return may entail. They Oxford Department of International also debate the assumptions and perceptions that influence policy and Development, University of Oxford. practice. The examples of good practice and the reflections on research findings presented in this issue are drawn from around the world. Staff Marion Couldrey & The issue also contains a mini-feature on Towards understanding and Jenny Peebles (Editors) addressing the root causes of displacement which has been prepared Maureen Schoenfeld (Finance to inform discussions at the first Global Refugee Forum in December 2019. and Promotion Assistant) This collection of articles written by authors from the UN, NGOs and Sharon Ellis (Assistant) academia aims to enhance collective understanding of some of the root Forced Migration Review causes of displacement. Refugee Studies Centre We would like to thank Jeff Crisp (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford Department of International Oxford) and Sarah Wansa (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Beirut) for their Development, University of Oxford, assistance as advisors to the feature theme, and Perveen Ali, Annabel 3 Mansfield Road, Mwangi and Emilie Wiinblad Mathez (UNHCR) for their assistance with Oxford OX1 3TB, UK the mini-feature. We would also like to thank Act Church of Sweden, [email protected] Refugees International, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung and UNHCR for their Skype: fmreview generous funding support for this particular issue. Tel: +44 (0)1865 281700 FMR 62 formats online at www.fmreview.org/return www.fmreview.org • Full magazine including mini-feature Disclaimer: Opinions in FMR do not • Editors’ briefing (headline analysis of the content) necessarily reflect the views of the • Digest (expanded contents list with QR codes/web links) Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or the University of Oxford. • Root causes mini-feature (separate booklet) Copyright: FMR is an Open Access All individual articles are available in PDF, HTML and podcast formats. publication. For details visit This issue will be available in English, Arabic and Spanish. (Unfortunately www.fmreview.org/copyright. we have not been able to secure sufficient funding to publish it in French as well.) For printed copies, please email us at [email protected].

Forthcoming feature themes in 2020 (see www.fmreview.org/forthcoming): ISSN 1460-9819 • Cities and towns (February) Designed by: • Trafficking and smuggling / Climate crisis and local communities Art24 www.art24.co.uk (double feature, June) Printed by: • Recognising refugees / mini-feature on Missing migrants (October) Fine Print Services Ltd Marion Couldrey and Jenny Peebles www.fineprint.co.uk Editors, Forced Migration Review

FMR 62 has been sponsored by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung with funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Front cover image: Federal Republic of Germany. Somali refugees in Dadaab, The content of this publication is the Kenya, setting out to return sole responsibility of Forced Migration to Somalia, 2016. Review and does not necessarily reflect UNHCR/Assadullah Nasrullah the position of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Forced Migration Review issue 62 • www.fmreview.org/return

Return 46 Minority return: the way home Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides 4 Shared obstacles to return: Rohingya and South Sudanese 48 Legal preparedness for return to Syria Daniel P Sullivan Martin Clutterbuck, Laura Cunial, Paola Barsanti and Tina Gewis 7 South Sudanese returns: perceptions and responses 52 Return to Syria after evading conscription Catherine Huser, Andrew Cunningham, Christine Ahmad Araman and Shaza Loutfi Kamau and Mary Obara 53 IDPs of East Beirut versus the Lebanese State 11 Return decision making by refugees Diala Lteif Chloe Sydney 55 Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur 13 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India: return or Zurab Elzarov integration? Amaya Valcárcel Silvela 58 Political and economic reintegration: key to successful return 16 Syrians in Germany: individuals’ reasons for Barbra N Lukunka and Peter de Clercq returning or remaining Ahmad Al Ajlan 60 Returns in complex environments: the case of South Sudan 17 Working with ‘stayee’ communities: learning from Babette Schots and Garth Smith Eritrea Georgia Cole Towards understanding and addressing the 19 Repatriation principles under pressure root causes of displacement Jeff Crisp 64 Preventing displacement, addressing root causes 23 Durable solutions for returnee children and the promise of the Global Compact on Stefanie Barratt, Marion Guillaume and Josiah Kaplan Refugees Volker Türk 26 Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul 68 Shifting power and changing practice to support locally led peace building 28 Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented Alex Shoebridge approach Zeynep Sahin Mencutek 71 Land and conflict: taking steps towards peace Oumar Sylla, Ombretta Tempra, Filiep Decorte, Clarissa 31 The politics of return from Jordan to Syria Augustinus and Ismael Frioud Julia Morris 75 Community-level conflict prevention and peace 34 Rethinking Somali refugee solutions in Kenya building in DRC and Somalia Peter Kirui and Suzanne Francis Wale Osofisan and Shuna Keen 36 Educating for return: Somali refugees in Dadaab 79 Gang violence, GBV and hate crime in Ochan Leomoi, Abdikadir Abikar and HaEun Kim Central America: State response versus State 38 Forced to return? Facilitated return of refugees to responsibility Myanmar Vickie Knox Yuka Hasegawa 82 The Palestinian refugee question: root causes and 41 A premature attempt at cessation breaking the impasse Hamsa Vijayaraghavan and Pallavi Saxena Francesca P Albanese and Damian Lilly 43 Repatriation with dignity 85 Resilience spaces: rethinking protection Kerrie Holloway Pablo Cortés Ferrández

Thank you to all FMR’s current and recent donors Act Church of Sweden • ADRA International • Catholic Relief Refugees International • RET International • Rosa Services - USCCB • Danish Refugee Council • Dubai Cares • Luxemburg Stiftung • Southern New Hampshire University Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein • ICRC • IDMC • Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation • Swiss • International Rescue Committee • IOM • Jesuit Refugee Federal Department of Foreign Affairs • UK Research and Service • Martin James Foundation • Mohammed Abu-Risha • Innovation/Global Challenges Research Fund • UNHCR • Open Society Foundations • Oxfam • Oxfam IBIS • UNOCHA • Women’s Refugee Commission

We would also like to thank those who have made individual donations. Even small donations help to keep FMR going, so please consider making a donation: www.fmreview.org/online-giving. 4 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Shared obstacles to return: Rohingya and South Sudanese Daniel P Sullivan

The common barriers to return in the cases of Rohingya refugees and South Sudanese IDPs prompt serious questions about how to ensure the safety and voluntariness of returns.

On 15 November 2018, several buses pulled majority having been forced to flee a campaign up at the Unchiprang camp for Rohingya of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar since August refugees in Bangladesh, organised as part 2017. Several hundred thousand Rohingya of a repatriation agreement between the remain in Myanmar’s Rakhine State with governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar. heavily restricted rights and restricted access The buses remained in the camps all day but to outside aid. Among these, more than 120,000 left empty. Not a single Rohingya refugee internally displaced Rohingya have been volunteered to return to Myanmar. The living in displacement camps in Rakhine State exercise was spoken of by Bangladesh and since 2012 in what the UN has described as UN officials as a successful demonstration deplorable conditions. While it is noteworthy of their commitment to voluntary return, that, as of the time of writing, the Government even though it resulted in a spike in of Bangladesh has not forced any Rohingya mental health difficulties among an to return to Myanmar, the pressure for such already highly traumatised population. returns is building. The events of 15 November Around the same time, political pressure 2018, and a similar exercise with similar results was building in South Sudan in favour of in August 2019, showed a willingness to push the return of internally displaced people returns to the brink, without regard to its (IDPs), despite serious concerns about damaging effect on the population in question. ongoing insecurity and the ability to provide Similar pressure for returns is playing out services safely in the proposed areas of in South Sudan, particularly for the nearly return. The seriousness of these concerns 200,000 IDPs living in Protection of Civilians was highlighted in late November when 125 (PoC) sites overseen by the United Nations women, many of them IDPs, were sexually Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The PoC assaulted over a period of just 10 days on sites have been described as both the UN’s their way to gather supplies or to reach food best idea and its worst idea in South Sudan. distributions near the town of Bentiu. On the one hand, they undoubtedly saved These are just two of a growing tens of thousands of lives as UN peacekeepers number of countries where political offered refuge to fleeing civilians in the midst pressure for forced or premature returns is of violence. On the other hand, the PoC sites growing. Similar dynamics are at play in were only meant to provide refuge for a few Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, days; more than five years later, they are rife Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria and Venezuela. With with crime, services are strained, and the shrinking space for traditional solutions population is largely idle and frustrated. to displacement (resettlement, integration A peace agreement signed in September and voluntary repatriation), there is an 2018 reduced violence in South Sudan and increasing risk of forced returns – returns sparked increased discussions of returns that fall short of international standards not only for those in PoC sites but also for of safety, voluntariness and dignity. the rest of the 1.5 million IDPs and some 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees who have Rohingya refugees and South Sudanese IDPs fled to neighbouring countries. In the PoC Today approximately one million Rohingya sites, in particular, discussions have shifted refugees live in camps in Bangladesh, the vast from caution to – as one observer told the Return 5 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

author – stepped-up efforts toward closure are established, displaced people often have of PoC sites being the “accepted reality”.1 no homes to return to. Nearly 400 Rohingya villages were damaged or destroyed during Common obstacles to return military ‘clearance operations’. Scores of remaining homes, mosques and other Ongoing insecurity: Interviews with recently buildings have been bulldozed, and non- arrived Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh Rohingya have been moved into former in February and April 2019 highlighted Rohingya villages.3 Likewise, in South Sudan continuing harassment, arbitrary arrest and many homes were destroyed in the fighting, forced labour in Myanmar, and revealed and housing, land and property concerns are that the Government of Myanmar is not only among the most common barriers to return failing to create conditions conducive to cited by IDPs. As one IDP said, “If I was told return but is actively pursuing policies that to go home now, I could not. My home has are making the situation more dangerous. collapsed [after being damaged] and been These policies include restrictions on looted.” As in Myanmar, there is an ethnic freedom of movement, limiting of access element in some cases, with homes that to aid, and building over former Rohingya have been abandoned by ethnic minorities villages. Fighting has broken out between a in Malakal and Juba being taken over by non-Rohingya ethnic armed group and the members of the dominant Dinka tribe. Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State where Rohingya refugees would be likely to Absence of services and livelihood return.2 Similarly, for South Sudanese in PoC opportunities: A third common barrier sites, ongoing insecurity is among the most to returns is the absence of services and cited reasons given for not returning. Pockets livelihood opportunities in proposed areas of instability remain and many people in of return. With Rohingya in Rakhine State the PoC sites fear ethnic targeting if they (particularly the north) still facing heavy attempt to return to the areas from which they restrictions on freedom of movement and were forced to flee. Finally, sexual violence access to aid, refugees recently arrived in remains a widespread risk in South Sudan. Bangladesh from Myanmar describe having been unable to leave their villages to access Destruction and confiscation of homes and fields, fish in rivers or go to nearby markets. property: Even if relative security and safety Rohingya in Bangladesh understandably ask if Refugees International Refugees

Rainy season in Rohingya camp, Bangladesh. 6 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

their lives upon return would be any different ‘go-and-see’ visits and has helped to facilitate from those of Rohingya who have been living flights to places of return for some IDPs but in camps in Rakhine State. The World Bank information about the potential closure of has proposed a US$100 million development PoC sites and IDP camps has been lacking. project in Rakhine State to increase livelihood Humanitarian workers in South Sudan opportunities but funding development have raised concerns including inconsistent without addressing ongoing discrimination use of intention surveys, lack of sufficient and movement restrictions risks reinforcing security- and conflict-sensitivity assessments the results of ethnic cleansing. and general lack of information sharing In South Sudan, a similar lack of services between UNMISS and humanitarian actors or livelihood opportunities in places of providing services in PoC sites. Updates to return is preventing people in PoC sites UNMISS’s mandate in March 2019 included from returning to their homes. UNMISS a call for close collaboration with NGOs and humanitarian actors have attempted to on the future of PoC sites but how this move services outside PoC sites in Bentiu will be implemented remains to be seen. and Wau, but with mixed results; such moves will only be successful when combined with Root causes: At the risk of overgeneralising, enhanced security in the area. Finally, as in a final key barrier to returns is the failure Rakhine State, efforts to provide services to address root causes. In the case of and livelihood opportunities in South Sudan the Rohingya this includes systemic must be done carefully to avoid reinforcing discrimination and the fundamental denial population shifts that have resulted from of citizenship and basic rights, rendering ethnic targeted violence and to avoid further the Rohingya effectively stateless. In disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities. South Sudan, a governing kleptocracy has fuelled ethnic divisions for personal Failure to include and inform potential gain, exacerbating underdevelopment. In returnees: Government and UN plans for both cases impunity for mass atrocities are returns too often lack transparency and holding back safe and voluntary returns. leave out the people most affected. This Failure to recognise and address these calls into question the true voluntariness of root causes will foil efforts to address returns and raises serious concerns about any of the barriers identified above. the imperative to ‘do no harm’. The events of 15 November 2018 highlighted this. With Recommendations no knowledge of who was included on the An essential first step is to acknowledge list of approved Rohingya returnees and no ongoing insecurity where it exists and details about how the returns would take to take specific steps to address it before place, the exercise resulted in general panic returns begin. Safety of returns must be in the camps and even suicide attempts. better assured, whether through improved Far from being a successful demonstration security assessments and conflict sensitivity of commitment to voluntary return, the assessments or closer engagement with exercise was a dangerous warning about the displaced communities, including through consequences of failing to involve and inform expanded use of ‘go-and-see’ visits. a refugee population. More broadly, Rohingya The common challenge posed by homes have not been included in agreements on having been destroyed or occupied could repatriation between Bangladesh, Myanmar be better addressed by drawing on existing and the UN, nor have the contents of those broader research and practice on housing, agreements been released publicly. land and property and applying it to the In South Sudan, efforts have been made to specific context of returns. This could address the barrier of lack of information but include ensuring housing, land and property a lack of transparency remains a challenge. laws and specialised courts are in place or UNMISS has carried out some successful included as part of peace agreements. Return 7 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

Provision of services and support for Failure to focus on the barriers to returns livelihood opportunities in areas of return and how to overcome them, and on the root will also be an important part of ensuring causes of displacement, not only risks causing sustainable returns but such efforts must harm to forcibly displaced populations but be underpinned by assessments of ongoing also risks setting up the conditions for future insecurity and discrimination. Providing displacement and additional suffering. services without security puts lives at risk Daniel P Sullivan and development without addressing ethnic [email protected] dislocation and restricted movement risks stoking social tensions and reinforcing Senior Advocate for Human Rights, Refugees the discrimination that leads to violence International www.refugeesinternational.org and displacement in the first place. 1. Sullivan D (2018) Displaced Nation: The Dangerous Implications of Finally, no return can be truly voluntary Rushed Returns in South Sudan, Refugees International bit.ly/RI-Sullivan-SSudan-2018 unless the potential returnees are sufficiently 2. Sullivan D (2019) Abuse or Exile: Myanmar’s Ongoing Persecution informed. Further, even when forced of the Rohingya, Refugees International returns do not ultimately take place, lack of bit.ly/RI-Sullivan-Rohingya-2019 transparency in the process can cause grave 3. McPherson P, Lewis S, Aung T T, Naing S and Siddiqui Z harm. Efforts should be made to ensure ‘Erasing the Rohingya: Point of No Return’, Reuters, 18 December 2018 bit.ly/Reuters-Rohingya-18122018 that return plans are transparent and that potential returnees are included in planning.

South Sudanese returns: perceptions and responses Catherine Huser, Andrew Cunningham, Christine Kamau and Mary Obara

Gaining insight into the experiences and perceptions of refugees can help ensure programming is better able to support refugees’ durable return and reintegration.

Between December 2018 and April 2019, national elections, originally scheduled Act Church of Sweden and the Lutheran for 2021, were also seen as an event that World Federation conducted a perceptions- would trigger returns. However, there focused study with South Sudanese refugees were a number of other elements as well. in northern Uganda (Moyo, Adjumani and Refugees were intently monitoring Lamwo), in Kenya (Kakuma) and in Ethiopia the more immediate security situation, (Gambella). Despite refugees’ widespread with scepticism about the peace process scepticism regarding the revitalised peace being partly due to the exclusion of some process in South Sudan, and the position of armed groups, which have continued the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) that the their campaigns of violence. Thus, the conditions for returns were not yet in place, cantonment of armed actors (that is, their the study indicated a strong desire among relocation into military garrisons) was an these refugees to return to South Sudan. important indicator. With many refugees South Sudanese refugees are carefully complaining that their properties had watching the situation within South Sudan. been forcibly occupied by armed actors, They pointed to several indicators they the demilitarisation of civilian spaces are monitoring to determine when return and properties was also highlighted. might be feasible. The peace process is key, They were additionally monitoring the with the return of former Vice-President status of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) Riek Machar to South Sudan (planned for sites within South Sudan. Under protection May 2019 but eventually delayed) having by the UN Mission in South Sudan, these PoC been the most immediate indicator. The sites were hosting some 190,000 internally 8 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

displaced people (IDPs) as of early 2019. In many cases, economic concerns over-rode In assuming that those inside were there perceptions of security risk. Refugees – because they were unable to leave safely, particularly those with formal education and refugees connected the continued presence professional skills – emphasised the strong of the PoC sites with continuing high levels pull of employment opportunities in South of risk. Furthermore, few believe that the Sudan (for example with non-governmental ethnic fracturing that has occurred within organisations – NGOs – and the Government the nation has been addressed. As such, of South Sudan), especially in urban centres, many raised ethnicity-based concerns, although these possibilities were again especially relating to the freedom to move weighed against strong security concerns. safely throughout their country. Others At the same time, the lack of viable emphasised the importance of developmental livelihoods within the refugee setting indicators, including access to good is fostering a sense of hopelessness and education, health care and livelihoods. apathy, especially among adult men and Refugees are meanwhile also weighing disenfranchised youth. This is reportedly the uncertainty about life back in South fuelling a growing substance-abuse problem Sudan against the violence, stresses and and even criminal behaviour. Some young economic challenges they face in their current people are also allegedly returning to South refugee settings. Refugees were generally Sudan to join armed groups, which risks convinced that if they were in their original propagating further cycles of violence. home environment, they could better meet Refugee youth see education and at least the essential needs of their families. employment opportunities as providing UNHCR/Catianne Tijerina

Gatdet, aged 11, ran from his home in South Sudan and hid in a river as armed men killed his classmates and relatives while others drowned. After fire destroyed his family’s tent in Kule refugee camp, in Gambella, Ethiopia, he now owns only this metal plane he made out of disused oil cans. “All my clothes were burned, the food, the cooking oil, the mattress, sheets, blankets, all gone. I am sad about everything we lost. I was going to school but all my books were burnt. I like planes as they move from place to place. I would like to go to many places, like America. I hope to go to South Sudan too because that is my country, but we left because the men with guns came.” Return 9 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

direction, without which they are more prone to-five-year period before significant returns to the above ‘distractions’. More broadly, would occur (linked to the forthcoming refugees in both Kakuma and Gambella elections in South Sudan). Those returning were adamant that their children will not to areas that saw heavy fighting (such as return to South Sudan until good education Upper Nile) expected to return more slowly, is available there. While refugees in northern probably initially to rural areas, with Uganda placed an equal value on education, movement to urban areas increasing only some complained about school-related costs as security and their confidence stabilised. and low-quality education services in the camps. This led them to consider returning Programming for durable returns as the more likely means of guaranteeing Insight into the refugees’ micro-level good education for their children. experiences, perceptions and analysis can be used to ensure that programming more Go-and-see visits versus permanent return effectively supports durable returns and Refugees talked about quite significant ‘yo- integration. There is, for example, a dogged yo’ movements back to South Sudan, often determination among refugees to educate for information gathering. For example, their children. The need to engage youth some undertook ‘go-and-see’ visits to and foster a sense of hope, whether through monitor the security situation first-hand. formal education, vocational training or Others periodically returned to check on employment opportunities, is also a well their property, assets and family members. recognised priority. Indeed, the stark Others were occasionally going back to consequences of failing to do so are easy collect assets (such as a cow) which they to imagine. Similarly, the need to foster could sell to support their family in the viable livelihoods and economic security camp. This begins to reflect an interim for the refugees is also not a new idea. stage or ‘grey’ period in which refugees Nevertheless, refugees repeatedly stated that move increasingly fluidly between the the magnitude and aims of NGO-supported camp/settlement and their places of return. income-generating activities continue to be Such movements were expected to become too small scale. Given that the return process gradually more permanent, depending on is widely expected to unfold over the next the circumstances within South Sudan. three to five years, there is scope and need for However, spontaneous ‘permanent’ more substantive engagement (for example returns were indeed happening at the time in vocational training) at the camp/settlement of the study. The first wave of returnees level to better prepare these refugees included those with employable skills for return to South Sudan as productive returning especially to urban centres. citizens ready to rebuild the nation. Similarly, many male youth returned to Responses should also incorporate a protect family homesteads. The planting more substantial cross-border or regional season was expected to spark even wider dimension. From the perspective of returns to rural areas. As mentioned, programming in camps/settlements, children and youth attending school are responses should be informed by the realities expected to be the last to return. People with of refugees’ places of origin. For example, special needs are likely to move according efforts to tackle sexual and gender-based to where they can get the best support. violence (SGBV) in the camps/settlements Such movements were expected to differ should be informed by an understanding of according to the circumstances in the place SGBV causes and attitudes in South Sudan, of refuge. For example, in anticipation of a which differ from the Ugandan context. relatively positive peace trajectory, those in Moreover, as many of the complex return northern Uganda saw return as relatively strategies that refugees are devising involve imminent, while those in Kakuma and the splitting of families between country of Gambella more typically estimated a three- refuge and return locations, it is important 10 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

that international actors ensure that their society. This underlines the need for a peace programmes in the refugee settlements/ agenda that starts at the individual level. The camps are well harmonised with responses refugees across the region then need to be in the places to which the refugees are drawn into the wider national peace process, expected to return in South Sudan; these because many viewed themselves as being responses should be strongly developmental outside the South Sudan peace process. in approach. Efforts should be made to ensure Indeed, such social change objectives maximum cross-border synchronisation. should be more proactively and deliberately This can be done in the education sector pursued. For example, schools can provide with curricula, standards, teacher training, an important platform for facilitating inclusion policies and so on. Vocational attitudinal shifts and promoting a sense training provided in refugee settings should of compassionate social responsibility. be informed by market studies conducted in Community-based structures designed to the places of origin. For example, refugees facilitate support for the most vulnerable in Gambella are calling for construction, in society, and to offer space for reflective plumbing and electrical training so they discussion, have also proven effective in can play a role in rebuilding their damaged fostering empathy and compassion, which cities. Such training should also include are essential for rebuilding social cohesion regionally recognised certification, thus and a sense of social responsibility. ensuring that graduates are able to market In all this, the restoration of individual their skills in other locations. While access to agency is critical. Many refugee respondents credit and savings institutions has long been alluded to a loss of confidence, doubting identified as a challenge, mobile financial their own agency and capabilities as a result institutions are beginning to function. of both the daily stresses of refugee life and These institutions, that currently provide their experience of war. Ensuring meaningful essential services to camp-based refugees, participation in refugee responses, however should be supported to operate across difficult this might be, can both reduce borders to ensure continuity. Such mobility dependency and help to reconnect people is extremely relevant in this grey period. with this sense of agency. Proactive efforts to However, a stronger commitment within foster a sense of well-being among individuals South Sudan to restore the conditions that and their communities is fundamental to allow for returns (for example, as stated supporting conflict-affected populations in in the Global Compact on Refugees), re-learning peaceful behaviour, in collectively including security conditions and essential envisioning a peaceful future, and in taking services at the very least, must be taken the necessary steps towards creating a on immediately. Indeed, these are the different kind of future for themselves. indicators that refugees are monitoring in Catherine Huser order to inform their return decisions. [email protected] Moreover, especially during this ‘grey’ Act Church of Sweden period, responses in the return locations www.svenskakyrkan.se/act/international should reflect a community-based approach and the Lutheran World Federation that includes local residents and returning refugees and IDPs, working holistically Andrew Cunningham in order to rebuild a sense of community. [email protected] Any such approach should also focus on Independent consultant restoring the psychosocial well-being Christine Kamau [email protected] of individuals and their communities, Independent consultant recognising the detrimental impact not only of their displacement but also of their Mary Obara [email protected] doubts about the feasibility of peaceful co- Independent consultant existence among South Sudan’s multi-ethnic Return 11 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return Return decision making by refugees Chloe Sydney

There are multiple factors influencing refugees’ decisions to return to their country of origin, not all of which reflect conventional wisdom.

The principle of voluntariness is a contrast, only 53.9% of the refugees who cornerstone of refugee return. At times do wish to return experience mistrust, narrowly interpreted to signify consent, and none report feeling threatened. voluntariness in fact implies a degree of autonomy in decision making – that is, the Socio-economic factors ability of refugees to freely choose when, Alongside physical security, a second piece and whether, to return. However, there is of conventional wisdom dictates that socio- only limited understanding of what actually economic conditions in both host countries influences refugees’ decision. Primary and countries of origin play an important data collected among 393 refugees and role in refugees’ decision to return. Results returnees from Iraq, Colombia and Myanmar, of the study seem to corroborate this. complemented by quantitative analysis Quantitative analysis reveals that the of refugee returns worldwide between proportion of returns is negatively correlated 1995 and 2015, allow for an examination of with life expectancy and GDP per capita what drives refugees’ decision to return, in the host country, suggesting that the or not, to their country of origin.1 likelihood of refugee returns decreases as life expectancy and GDP increase, and Security vice versa. Existing literature almost unanimously However, lived experiences of refugees contends that security in countries of origin may differ significantly from national is a paramount precondition for refugee averages of socio-economic well-being, return, and indeed the role of security is and returns can also take place from host particularly apparent in current discussions countries with higher standards of living if of returns to Syria. A quantitative analysis refugees are marginalised and excluded from of refugee returns in the period 1995–2015 their host community, unable to work, and tentatively suggests that conflict-related faced with an uncertain future due to lengthy deaths in countries of origin may indeed be refugee status determination procedures. negatively correlated with the proportion of Among returnees surveyed, poor living returns to that country. Reflecting this trend, conditions in their host country were the most of the refugees who wish to return to most common motivation for return (30.4%). their countries of origin say they will only According to community leaders in do so when there is peace. Yet while security Jordan, returns to Iraq are predominantly may well enable return, it is not necessarily motivated by lack of income-generating a motivating factor; among people surveyed, opportunities in Jordan. Meanwhile, only 16.5% of returning refugees and 19.6% of Iraqi refugees returning from camps in refugees wishing to return to their countries Syria report particularly difficult hosting of origin cited security improvements conditions. “We lived in a prison, not a camp. as the primary reason for return. They treated us like animals,” reported Willingness to return does appear to Dilshad, a returning Iraqi refugee. Staff of be correlated with refugees’ trust in their non-governmental organisations in Syria country of origin’s security forces. 67.9% made similar observations: “People are of refugees who do not wish to return returning because of course they want to do not trust the security forces, and a go home, but also because they are not further 20.6% feel actively threatened; in happy with the services and, perhaps more 12 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

importantly, because of the fact that they to their country of origin.3 These assumptions are virtual prisoners in the camps here.” resulted in a reduction in support from the international donor community, and Attachment and reunification therefore a decrease in food rations. In Conventional wisdom assumes that patterns practice, however, the refugees have only of return mirror security and socio-economic limited confidence in the peace process, well-being in host countries and countries and the pace of returns has been slow. of origin. However, evidence suggests Returns prompted by the pressures that refugees’ decision making may also of unmet basic needs are likely to prove be influenced by their attachment to their unsustainable. If refugees are returning countries of origin even in the face of socio- to their country of origin despite security economic challenges and ongoing insecurity. concerns because they are unable to sustain For example, following the peace agreement themselves in their host countries, there in Angola in 2002, rapid spontaneous returns is a strong likelihood that these returning took place. The international community refugees will find themselves further thought these returns premature. According displaced. Host States should ensure that to one Angolan returnee, “UNHCR explained refugees have sufficient access to livelihoods that there would be no food, houses or and assistance to prevent premature returns schools, and they also told us there would from contributing to vicious cycles of be a lot of mines. But even if we don’t have displacement. Some host States may believe it houses, and we don’t have food, and we is in their interest to encourage rapid return don’t have schools, we wanted to return to – but if premature returns lead to further our country because it’s our country.” 2 displacement, they are not the solution. Among the Iraqis, Colombians and Finally, there is a need to better Burmese surveyed, missing home was acknowledge the role of intangible factors reported as the main driver of return by including attachment to people and place. 28.7% of returnees and 23.2% of the refugees Understanding the complexity of decision who wished to return. Beyond attachment to making would improve stakeholders’ ability country, family reunification is a key driver to plan for return, support refugees and of return. The most common motivation returnees, and safeguard voluntariness. cited by refugees wishing to return to Chloe Sydney [email protected] their country of origin was reunification Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre with family and friends (33.9%). www.internal-displacement.org 1. All primary data collected by IDMC. Myanmar report Implications for policy and practice forthcoming. Reports on Iraq and Colombia online at: Most discussions of refugee returns focus bit.ly/IDMC-Sydney-Iraq-2018 on the importance of restoring security in bit.ly/IDMC-Sydney-Colombia-2019 countries of origin. Often, this is indeed 2. Harild N, Christiansen A and Zetter R (2015)Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, constraints, and lessons on addressing the development a precondition for return – but security challenges of forced displacement, Global Program on Forced improvements do not automatically result Displacement, p70–74. bit.ly/WorldBank-RefugeeReturn-2015 in returns. The international community 3. See Hasegawa Y ‘Forced to return? Facilitated return of refugees should not expect perceived milestone to Myanmar’ in this issue. achievements towards peace and security to result in large-scale returns but Could FMR support your funding bid? should rather plan for continued support FMR has been included in several successful and assistance to refugees abroad. programmatic and research funding bids to the Myanmar is a case in point. Following the mutual benefit of all parties. nationwide ceasefire agreement and electoral If you are applying for external funding, including success of the National League for Democracy FMR in your proposal (and budget) can enhance in 2015, it was widely assumed that refugees dissemination and impact of learning and results. Please email the Editors at [email protected] to on the Thai–Myanmar border would return discuss options. Return 13 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India: return or integration? Amaya Valcárcel Silvela

For Tamil refugees, considerations of sustainability affect their decision to remain in India or return to Sri Lanka. Their views and aspirations must inform planning for both integration and repatriation.

Sri Lankan Tamil refugees have arrived in decision about whether to return or remain, the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu at however, depends on a number of factors. various times. Some arrived 30 years ago, others at the peak of the Sri Lankan civil Access to information: It is vital that return war in the mid-2000s. Currently more than decisions are well-informed. At present 62,000 Tamil refugees live in 107 camps spread the Indian government shies away from throughout Tamil Nadu, and just under 37,000 informing refugees about the situation refugees live outside the camps. Although in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, however, some refugees are entitled to residence visas and Sri Lankan organisations put forward work permits, prolonged life in the camps excessively optimistic information for their does not lead to resilience and empowerment, own political purposes. The most accurate and these refugees consider themselves in information for refugees may come from limbo, belonging neither to Sri Lanka nor to their relatives who remain in Sri Lanka. One India and unable to get on with their lives. refugee described how: “We are connected Tamil refugees – especially youth – wish to be to our relatives; some are internally disassociated with the label of ‘refugee’, which displaced persons. My son is telling me to they feel would improve quality of life for come back but not now, after some time.”2 them, their families and their communities. There is also a paucity of credible research There are two sustainable long-term on the aspirations of the different populations options available to Tamil refugees in India: who live in the camps. For example, it is repatriation or local integration. Resettlement thought that the so-called Plantation Tamils – is no longer an option since the UN Refugee descendants of tea plantation labourers in the Agency (UNHCR) appears now to prioritise central hill areas of Sri Lanka – would mostly other groups of refugees with greater like to stay in India, although more research is protection needs. Some refugees wish to stay needed on this topic. A survey of the different in India in order to try to secure citizenship populations, who were displaced at different there; others express the desire to return to times, combined with more consultation with Sri Lanka – but only when conditions improve. refugee leaders in the camps, would enhance In Sri Lanka, divisions and resentment researchers’ understanding of the aspirations between the two main ethnic communities and intentions of these different groups. have their roots in discrimination and some of these discriminatory practices Return of belongings: Currently, the are still prevalent. Tamil refugees express repatriation offered by UNHCR is by air uncertainty and fear regarding their and includes a baggage allowance of only ability to earn a living, access land and 60kg. For some, this alone is a reason not to find security if they return to Sri Lanka. return since they have accumulated many Since 2014, in the absence of a tripartite belongings after years in exile. Many refugees agreement between UNHCR and the would be ready to return to Sri Lanka if governments of India and Sri Lanka, and a ship could be provided to carry their at the request of the refugees, UNHCR belongings as part of the repatriation process. has been facilitating – but not actively encouraging – the voluntary repatriation of Access to land: Some refugees find upon refugees from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka.1 The their return that their land has been 14 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 UNHCR/Gemunu Amarasinghe

Sri Lankan Tamil returnee clears the plot of land that she received from the government on her return. occupied by others, including by the Sri returnees that unless they have sufficient Lankan government and military, as in capital and the capacity to start a business, Mullaitivu where returnees from India it would be better to delay their return. as well as internally displaced people are struggling to reclaim their land from Access to education: Another concern is armed forces, and in 2017 protested for the uncertainty refugees have about the three months against this occupation. prospects for their children’s education. For example, refugees would like their children Access to livelihoods: Refugees who have to finish their education in India, since undertaken skills trainings programmes opportunities for access to higher education while in displacement recount how this in Sri Lanka seem unfavourable for Tamils. has helped them to become self-reliant, There are three universities in the north courageous, confident and collaborative, and of Sri Lanka, which are far away from the some indicate that these trainings motivate homes of many returnees and, while many them to help others. Many refugee women Sinhalese Sri Lankans are admitted, Tamils report that skills training has enabled them face ethnic discrimination. Only those Tamil to escape the cultural expectation that returnees who can secure support from women will remain in the home. One woman abroad are able to access higher education explains how she broke with this tradition: for their children in private institutions.

“I borrowed 200 rupees from my neighbour and Security and the monitoring of safety started a small shop with four glasses and a block conditions: According to UNHCR, every of stone which served as a table. In one day I refugee who returns through facilitated earned 400 rupees, and so I started re-investing. repatriation, as well as those who go back I now have a grocery shop at the entrance of the spontaneously but who register with UNHCR, camp, which is worth 80,000 rupees. The greatest should receive one year of protection challenge for me has been to become, and to be monitoring.3 Despite this, returning refugees accepted as, an independent woman.” – particularly those who fled the atrocities towards the end of the war in 2009 – have But refugees also share their fears about expressed fear for their safety, including fear returning with no prospects for earning a of being seen as having connections to the livelihood. They have been warned by other Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Return 15 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

Recommendations education in formal or informal settings. There are many subtleties that need to be Local and international organisations, in considered in either a repatriation or an collaboration with religious and community integration plan. For these to be understood, leaders, can build trust and promote the actors involved must listen more closely reconciliation not only between Tamil and to the refugees’ hopes, fears and aspirations Sinhalese communities but also between which, alongside international standards returnees and host communities. The issue governing return, can then help shape a of land ownership should also be given framework of response and principles of priority. A supranational body – bringing action. Only then will the refugees be able to together donors and UN agencies – needs return in dignity and safety. The following to persuade the Sri Lankan government recommendations summarise some of the to give land back to returnees in order to actions that would contribute to this. avoid tension and potential conflict.4 UNHCR should act as a consultant to the The security situation for Tamils in Sri Indian government to assist it in formulating Lanka has certainly improved but the Indian a strategic plan to grant citizenship to those government and donor governments should refugees who wish to remain and integrate in encourage the Sri Lankan government to India. Many of the refugees, particularly the further improve security conditions and Plantation refugees, wish to become Indian reduce discriminatory practices. UNHCR citizens in order to avoid becoming stateless. should systematically monitor the protection By granting citizenship, the Indian central of returnees, including their access to land and state governments could close the refugee and livelihoods – which if unaddressed can camps in Tamil Nadu, saving the government be a source of potential tension and yet has US$17 million annually – money that could the potential to be the basis for a real and be invested in helping refugees to set up sustainable solution. It should also ensure small businesses in order to facilitate their that the rights of returnees are respected integration, and these development schemes and that safety and non-discrimination are could also benefit local Indian communities. assured when accessing social services. In collaboration with the Sri Lankan If coordination is made a priority and government and the NGO community, UNHCR these multiple viewpoints are considered, should also create a responsible repatriation then refugees will be able to build a better life plan that addresses physical security and for themselves and their families, whether access to land and livelihoods opportunities, they choose to remain in India or opt to return. and facilitates reintegration into and continuity Amaya Valcárcel Silvela [email protected] of education (including higher education). This PhD candidate, Instituto Universitario de Estudios would include the recognition of qualifications sobre Migraciones (IUEM), Pontifical University of and accreditation of teachers and students who Comillas www.comillas.edu have been educated in India. Skills training 1. UNHCR (2016) Sri Lankan Refugee Returnees in 2015 opportunities for youth, including boys, www.unhcr.org/en-lk/5bbb31064.pdf need to be increased. Young refugees need 2. All quotes come from interviews conducted by the author with information on employment opportunities in refugees (not named, for security reasons). Sri Lanka, and skills training programmes 3. UNHCR (2016) Sri Lankan Refugee Returnees in 2015 need to be reoriented from traditional skills www.unhcr.org/en-lk/5bbb31064.pdf to build competency in computing, health, 4. As was done in Rwanda. See Bruce J (2007) Drawing a line under the crisis: Reconciling returnee land access and security in postconflict education and other such sectors. And those Rwanda, HPG bit.ly/ODI-Bruce-2007 refugees who are planning to return should be helped to identify where they can access good training opportunities in Sri Lanka. FMR podcasts Access podcasts of all articles in this The need for reconciliation should be issue at https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series integrated into all programmes and activities (search for ‘forced migration review’). undertaken in Sri Lanka through peace 16 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Syrians in Germany: individuals’ reasons for returning or remaining Ahmad Al Ajlan

Syrian refugees in Europe are not one homogenous group but are individuals and families from different parts of Syria who have different experiences in exile and different expectations around return.

Research undertaken with Syrian refugees than seven when they arrived – seems to in Germany suggests that those refugees be the most difficult. These children have who were employed in Syria – particularly integrated fully into the host education by the government – are more likely to system and cannot read or write Arabic. return than others.1 This is particularly so In some cases, refugee children can only for those who are older than 40, because they speak the dialect of their parents (and not tend to have more difficulty than younger the standard Arabic language used in Syrian refugees in learning the language of their schools) while others cannot even speak their host society and finding a job to match parents’ dialect. In reality, many of them their level of education. Furthermore, those identify more as citizens of the countries who are able to return to their former jobs where they now live, not of the country can more easily resume their lives in their where their parents came from. It will be home countries. This group of refugees difficult for them to return to Syrian society also feels more uprooted from their culture and its education system. If categorised and yearns to regain their former lives. simplistically as Syrians due to the citizenship However, it may be harder for other Syrian of their parents, they are likely on return to refugee groups to return voluntarily and with Syria to struggle with their studies and feel dignity. For instance, according to the Federal alienated. This will be in contravention of Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany the Convention on the Rights of the Child, almost three quarters (73.8%, 532,799 especially General Comment 6: “States shall persons) of asylum seekers in Germany in not return a child to a country where there are 2016 – including Syrians – are younger than substantial grounds for believing that there is 30. Most of them have received education a real risk of irreparable harm to the child.”2 and training in Germany and have learned Syrian refugees in Europe are not one German; many are earning good salaries and homogenous community, and applying feel integrated into German society. Yet none one undifferentiated return policy to them of their qualifications will be of use to them all will be harmful to many, especially in Syria. This group of refugees is therefore children and less educated younger unlikely to want to return. Many of these refugees. Considerations of people’s life young Syrian refugees who are now earning stage and circumstances in exile need to be in Germany would, by Syrian standards, better understood and taken into account have been considered to be poorly educated, in order to ensure appropriate, voluntary, and would have had very difficult lives even sustainable solutions to their displacement. before the war, often doing hard physical Ahmad Al Ajlan [email protected] work in construction or agriculture. After Researcher, Institute of Interdisciplinary enjoying safety, social and health insurance, Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld and – most importantly – dignity in Germany, University www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg they are unlikely to choose to return to Syria. 1. See Al Ajlan A (2019) ‘Older Refugees in Germany: What Are In terms of voluntary return with dignity, the Reasons for the Difficulties in Language-learning?’, Journal of the situation of refugee children – especially Refugee Studies bit.ly/JRS-AlAjlan-2019 those born in Germany or who were younger 2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6 (2005) www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx Return 17 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return Working with ‘stayee’ communities: learning from Eritrea Georgia Cole

Better understanding of the perceptions and living conditions of the communities into which returnees will arrive may facilitate better integration of those returning from displacement.

In the Eritrean context international returnees’ reintegration often rests on organisations, governments and academics whether they successfully negotiate with have placed increasing emphasis on the ‘local power holders’ for legitimacy, rights, importance of diaspora engagement in opportunities and acceptance.1 The ability peace- and State-building operations, and willingness of all citizens to positively and on population return as a catalyst for engage with this process are critical. development. The prevailing economic Furthermore, research on how and and political situation at the point of why to support refugee host communities return is seen as a critical determinant of indicates that humanitarian concerns whether diaspora groups can return and around displacement and mobility must successfully re-engage in home country not be considered in isolation from politics. UN documents championing the broader development agendas, which return of qualified nationals to Eritrea, and have traditionally provided more space as revealed by my own conversations with for social and societal perspectives. staff promoting such projects within the Within this sphere, host communities are country, have thus prioritised approaches a vital constituency in their own right. that maximise diaspora satisfaction and ensure that State-run institutions can absorb Political, practical and ethical challenges these individuals. What these documents Eritrean ‘stayees’ did draw considerable rarely consider, however, are how the attention in the 1990s and early 2000s when approaches they advocate might affect the hundreds of thousands of refugees who population resident in Eritrea – or how the had fled during the country’s liberation social landscapes into which individuals will struggle and its 1998–2000 border conflict arrive, and the nature of relations between with Ethiopia returned, the majority citizens inside and outside Eritrea, might without international assistance. They shape the efficacy of return operations. returned to areas where the violence and These resident communities are often destruction had been most acute, and where viewed in purely instrumental ways. How, for the local population was surviving amid example, can they be encouraged to facilitate unexploded ordnance, razed farmland and the smooth reintegration of returnees? How decimated infrastructure. Nonetheless, can they be incentivised to make space for the returnees’ reintegration progressed returning refugees and internally displaced without significant tensions.2 Key to this was people (IDPs) to engage in processes of that neither the returnees nor the stayees peace building, national reconstruction criticised the others’ conduct, either during and reconciliation? And how can they the fighting or upon return. Mutual bonds be sensitised to see returnees’ success as of solidarity and goodwill were strong, as positively correlated with their own? were perceptions of each group as bringing Bringing this population back into the opportunity. There was also a strong focus picture first requires the adoption of on meeting the needs of the population that frameworks that acknowledge the full array had remained in Eritrea, due to both the of actors involved in return processes. post-liberation government’s commitment Empirical work has highlighted that to ensuring human security for all Eritreans 18 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

and an intellectual community whose respondents felt that the opportunities work on Eritrea drew significant attention and resources accorded to the diaspora – to this frequently overlooked dynamic. including savings, business connections, Recent research with Eritreans in work experience and good-quality higher its capital Asmara and in the diaspora, education – may allow the population in however, reveals a host of factors that may exile to monopolise the most lucrative jobs complicate future return, and that highlight and opportunities in a liberalised Eritrea. the political, practical and ethical reasons An opposing but parallel concern related for placing greater emphasis on the situation to how the country will economically of the ‘stayee’ communities.3 First, the and socially assimilate some of the new population that now resides outside Eritrea generation of Eritrean refugees if they is composed of groups with very different choose to return. Many left to avoid national histories, including refugees and migrants service, which meant leaving Eritrea who did not return to Eritrea when it gained before completing school. Even those independence, second- and third-generation with professional skills have struggled Eritreans, and individuals who have claimed to find work that has matched their asylum in the post-independence period. qualifications due to restrictive migration Their differing political sympathies have a and asylum policies in exile. It is unclear considerable impact on their relationship how the country will accommodate this with Eritrea and its government, and on how population, whose wealth and educational the population within the country – in itself profiles have been stunted by exile. politically heterogeneous – relates to them. The majority of people in Asmara harbour Peacebuilding and reconciliation deep disappointment with the country’s Additionally, opposition factions within the ruling party and those individuals who population in exile appear to have developed continue to support it. They consider that ideas about the country’s political future actions by members of the diaspora who that support but do not necessarily include support the government – actions such as the diverse views and experiences of those staging international rallies in praise of the within the country. Following the 2018 peace People’s Front for Democracy and Justice deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and its (PFDJ), Eritrea’s ruling political party, failure to translate into substantive political and sending money to the government reform, there has been a renewed fervour through its diaspora tax4 – have helped among the opposition diaspora to begin to sustain this regime. Interviews in planning for a post-PFDJ Eritrea. These Asmara have revealed that individuals groups have discussed how to expedite the are concerned about the return of the ruling party’s decline and how to prepare pro-government diaspora because of the for the period of political transition that returnees’ political views and the perceived would follow. Calls have been made to inflexibility with which their views are held. organise professional associations, to write Second, although people in Asmara legal codes to anchor the country during noted that the return of the diaspora might transition and then serve as antecedents for a give rise to certain economic, political new legal system, and to identify individuals and emotional benefits, there was some in the diaspora who could assume leading trepidation that these would be at the expense roles in a post-PFDJ political system. of the country’s current entrepreneurial class. The challenge nonetheless lies in Given restrictions on freedom of movement how to reconcile the aspirations of these for those who remain in Eritrea (including diasporic opposition groups with those difficulties in gaining the exit visas needed to who remain inside the State’s borders. capitalise on scholarships and jobs abroad), Dominant representations of Eritrean clear hierarchies of access exist between citizens as being cut off from political debate those within and outside the country. My and good-quality higher education have Return 19 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

contributed to a sense that the population embraced by international organisations within the country can agitate politically and donors because of a recognition that the but not necessarily articulate an alternative impacts of displacement are not only felt by political programme. The result has been those on the move. Assistance and support that certain diaspora initiatives appear are therefore being made available to host distanced from the ideas and aspirations communities as well as to displaced persons of citizens within Eritrea about political in the hope of boosting general development change and the parts they wish to play in opportunities, reducing possible friction that. Processes of return have tended to focus and expediting integration. Adopting such on supporting and ensuring the political models in the country of origin may yield enfranchisement of repatriating populations, similar benefits at the point of return. while taking for granted that the ‘stayees’ Georgia Cole [email protected] enjoy a degree of political representation. Research Fellow, Margaret Anstee Centre for In places like Eritrea, this approach may Global Studies, Newnham College, University of compound the marginalisation already Cambridge experienced by those within the country. www.margaretansteecentre.org/dr-georgia-cole Prioritising the views and experiences 1. Polzer T (2009) ‘Negotiating Rights: The Politics of Local of returnees over those of the population Integration’, Refuge, 26(2), 92–106 who have remained does little to establish bit.ly/Polzer-Local-Integration-2009 the conditions of dialogue, inclusion 2. Kibreab G (2002) ‘When refugees come home: the relationship and mutual respect that are integral to between stayees and returnees in post-conflict Eritrea’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20(1), 53–80 successful peacebuilding and reconciliation. bit.ly/JCAS-Kibreab-2002 Programmes of return should ensure that 3. For example, see Cole G (2019) ‘Systemic ambivalence they do not create hierarchies by assigning in authoritarian contexts: The case of opinion formation in resources to either group based solely on Eritrea’, Political Geography, 73, 28–37 www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629818304360 institutionalised categories of vulnerability 4. Eritreans outside the country are required to pay 2% of their – such as refugee or returnee. Practically, incomes to the Eritrean government in order to access State ‘whole-of-society’ approaches are increasingly services.

Repatriation principles under pressure Jeff Crisp

The laws and norms established by the international community to ensure that organised repatriation takes place in a way that protects the rights of refugees are increasingly being violated.

In June 2019, the Associated Press news While Bassil went on to say that agency reported that “the Lebanese there should be a gradual return for authorities are making their most aggressive those willing to go back, just two days campaign yet for Syrian refugees to return later the Lebanese army threatened to home…. they have had enough of the burden destroy the homes of some 25,000 refugees of hosting the highest concentration of living near the border town of Arsal, refugees per capita in the world.”1 Explaining ostensibly because they were in violation the country’s position, Foreign Minister of government regulations that forbid Gebran Bassil has argued that most Syrians Syrians from erecting concrete structures. remain in Lebanon for economic rather than Responding to these events, a UNHCR protection reasons, noting that there are half a spokesperson stated that “this situation million Syrians working in Lebanon in breach adds to the financial burden of refugees, at of labour laws who are not being repatriated. a time when we know most of them live in 20 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

poverty”, and said that the agency would charged with representing the interests and provide those affected with new building concerns of the refugees and with ensuring materials such as tarpaulins and wood.2 that the process of return is conducted Such disturbing developments are with full respect for their human rights. by no means confined to Lebanon. The Fourth, the international community has international community has established agreed that UNHCR should actively promote a longstanding set of laws and norms that and encourage the return of refugees only in are intended to ensure that repatriation situations where fundamental changes have takes place in a way that protects the taken place in their countries of origin. This rights of refugees. In practice, however, would normally be signified by, for example, host and donor States, sometimes with the a change of government, democratic elections, involvement of the UN, have increasingly the presence of a UN peacebuilding operation acted in ways that violate those rights. and the restoration of the rule of law. Fifth, over the past three decades the Laws and norms international refugee regime has assumed Over the past 70 years the international much greater responsibility for refugees community’s approach to refugee repatriation once they have returned. According to has been codified in a number of documents. UNHCR, repatriation must be linked to These include: the 1951 Refugee Convention; reintegration and be sustainable in nature, regional instruments such as the 1969 meaning that returnees should be able Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee to exercise their full range of economic, Convention; a series of Conclusions on social, civil and political rights, including International Protection from the UN Refugee that of establishing secure livelihoods.4 Agency (UNHCR) Executive Committee Finally, States and UNHCR have agreed (known as ExCom Conclusions); and on the need to pursue a comprehensive UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation: International approach to durable solutions, involving a Protection handbook.3 These documents set combination of voluntary repatriation, local forth a series of underlining principles. integration and third-country resettlement. First, the OAU Convention states that “the In any refugee situation, all three solutions essentially voluntary character of repatriation should be pursued, the balance between them shall be respected in all cases”; in other being determined on a case-by-case basis. words, refugees must be able to make a free and informed choice about returning to their Repatriation realities country of origin, and must not be subjected The principles of refugee repatriation to any physical, material or psychological are thus quite clear. But to what extent pressure to leave their country of asylum. have the standards agreed by the Second, repatriation must take place international community been respected in a safe and dignified manner. Refugees in practice? Regrettably, the historical must not be coerced, physically forced to record has been patchy, and in the move or have their security threatened. contemporary context these standards They must be able to return at their own are coming under mounting pressure. pace, without being separated from family Despite its declared commitment to a members and, as the UNHCR handbook comprehensive approach with respect to states, should be “treated with respect and durable solutions, the international refugee full acceptance by their national authorities”. regime has increasingly regarded repatriation A third repatriation principle concerns (normally but not necessarily on a voluntary the need for repatriation movements to be basis) as the optimal and preferred outcome. effectively coordinated, usually through the It is not difficult to explain why. Host States establishment of Tripartite Commissions in developing regions of the world do not involving the host State, country of origin want the indefinite presence of refugees and UNHCR. In this context, UNHCR is on their territory, and in most cases are Return 21 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

adamant that refugees should not be given the option of local integration. Donor countries are keen to bring an end to protracted refugee situations and expensive long-term

assistance programmes, while McConnell UNHCR/Andrew countries of origin are often eager to bolster their legitimacy by demonstrating that their exiled citizens are prepared to vote with their feet by returning to their homeland. As for UNHCR – an agency Afghan refugees at a UNHCR repatriation centre in Nowshera, near Peshawar, Pakistan, in 2018. funded and governed by States, and thus Voluntary Return programmes in which highly sensitive to their concerns – it became they are provided with financial incentives a prime objective to get as many refugees to go home. Needless to say, this has sent a home as possible, thereby demonstrating strong message of support to host countries the organisation’s usefulness to its primary in developing regions that wish to ensure the stakeholders. Thus the 1990s were declared departure of the refugees on their territory. by High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako States now insist that repatriation should Ogata to be “the decade of repatriation”, while take place much more quickly after refugees in the 2000s the organisation began setting have arrived in a country of asylum, even annual and even monthly repatriation targets if there has not been a fundamental change for some of its larger country programmes. of circumstances in their country of origin. In this context, the notion that repatriation In November 2017, for example, Bangladesh, should be strictly voluntary, safe and Myanmar and key UNHCR donors such as dignified in nature has been increasingly set the European Union began to examine the aside by actors in the international refugee options for repatriating 700,000 Rohingya regime, with varying forms and degrees of refugees, just four months after they fled coercion being used to trigger and sustain atrocities in their homeland and at a time mass repatriation movements. Such was the when large-scale displacement was still case with respect to the return of 200,000 taking place. Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Similarly, the last two years have Myanmar in the early 1990s, the repatriation witnessed a growing international effort of some 350,000 Rwandan refugees from to plan and prepare for large-scale refugee Tanzania in 1996, and the so-called ‘orderly returns to Syria, despite the Assad regime return’ of 40,000 Burundian refugees remaining in power, the continued presence from Tanzania in 2012. More recently, of its Russian and Iranian allies in the the repatriation of Afghan refugees from country, and the widespread prevalence Pakistan and Iran and of Somali refugees of violence and human rights abuses. from Kenya have all entailed various Serious questions have been raised with types of intimidation and coercion. These respect to UNHCR’s role as an intermediary in include reductions in assistance levels, the repatriation negotiations and as the guardian threat of camp closures, and day-to-day of refugee rights. Under pressure from host harassment by government officials. and donor States, the organisation has looked The last decade has also witnessed for new ways to encourage and promote mounting efforts on the part of industrialised returns, including the payment of sizeable States to return refugees and asylum repatriation grants to refugees who receive seekers to their countries of origin, either by only limited amounts of assistance and many means of deportation or through Assisted of whom have accumulated substantial debts. 22 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

There is also evidence to suggest that comprehensive and diversified approach to UNHCR has failed to sufficiently engage durable solutions. This will entail the more with and understand the concerns of systematic identification of situations in refugees in the context of return. This was which at least part of the refugee population demonstrated most starkly in November might benefit from local integration. It will 2017, when the organisation signed a secret also require an effort to find new resettlement Rohingya repatriation agreement with the places to fill the gap left by the significant government of Myanmar.5 More generally, cuts recently made by the US government the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees makes to its quota. New solutions will need to be clear UNHCR’s position that “voluntary devised and alternative pathways established. repatriation is not necessarily conditioned These may include self-reliance initiatives on the accomplishment of political that fall short of full local integration; solutions in the country of origin”.6 Given humanitarian visas and corridors; family all these developments, it is therefore not reunion and labour mobility programmes; surprising that Lebanon feels free to engage educational scholarships; and regional in bilateral discussions with Damascus freedom of movement arrangements. and Moscow about the return of refugees Third, the repatriation process should to Syria, and to complain about UNHCR become much more participatory and obstructiveness when the organisation inclusive. While it is unlikely to be an easy suggests that conditions in Syria might not task, UNHCR should try to convince States yet be amenable to large-scale repatriation. of the need to establish Quadripartite Commissions, in which refugees are granted a Policy and programme responses form of structured representation. To facilitate The forces that have undermined the this approach, which has never been tried in established principles of refugee repatriation the past, the agency should also examine the are deeply entrenched and seem highly ways in which such representation might be unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable most effectively and equitably organised. future. There are a number of steps, however, Fourth, after decades of discussion, the that could be taken to halt (and hopefully World Bank and other development and even reverse) the deterioration in repatriation financial actors have recently become much standards that has been witnessed in more enthusiastically engaged with refugee recent years. issues – initially in those countries First, UNHCR should uphold the principle neighbouring Syria but now also in other that repatriation must be voluntary, safe locations such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia. and dignified, and based on the premise This involvement is not without danger. of fundamental and lasting changes in the On one hand, there is a risk that the country of origin. The organisation has a clear involvement of development actors will not responsibility in this respect, and must do so be as extensive or sustained as many other even if this complicates its relationship with stakeholders currently hope and expect it host and donor States. If the organisation is to be; on the other hand, there is a risk that put under pressure to engage in a repatriation the humanitarian sector will regard the operation which does not meet the standards engagement of development actors as a set out in its own voluntary repatriation panacea to its chronic difficulties, especially handbook, it must either decline to do so or funding gaps and short-term programme be completely transparent about the nature cycles. of and rationale behind its involvement. However, at the same time the shift Second (and in this respect the Global towards a more developmental approach Compact on Refugees might have a valuable promises to have several important role to play), there is a need to move away advantages. It could reduce the economic and from the notion of repatriation as the environmental pressures felt by countries preferred outcome and to revert to a more and communities that host large numbers of Return 23 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

refugees, thereby reducing their propensity Jeff Crisp [email protected] to press for involuntary and premature Research Associate, Refugee Studies Centre, repatriations. It could provide refugees with University of Oxford www.rsc.ox.ac.uk and more secure livelihoods and better living Associate Fellow in International Law, Chatham standards in their countries of asylum, House enabling them to plan and prepare for their 1. Associated Press ‘In Lebanon, Syrian refugees face new pressure eventual repatriation, should they choose that to go home’, 20 June 2019 bit.ly/APN-20062019-Leb option. And if applied to countries of origin 2. Naharnet, 12 June 2019 www.naharnet.com/stories/en/261366 where a fundamental change of circumstances 3. UNHCR (1996) Handbook – Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection bit.ly/HCR-VolRep-1996 has taken place or is in progress, a 4. UNHCR (2008) ‘UNHCR’s role in support of the return and developmental approach could provide reintegration of displaced populations: policy framework and returnees and resident populations alike with implementation strategy’ www.refworld.org/pdfid/47d6a6db2.pdf an opportunity to rebuild their lives and re- 5. www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya- establish their relationships, thereby ensuring idUSKBN1JP2PF 6. UNHCR (2018) ‘The Global Compact on Refugees’, section 3.1 that repatriation is sustainable in nature. para 87 bit.ly/GCR-2018

Durable solutions for returnee children Stefanie Barratt, Marion Guillaume and Josiah Kaplan

Durable solutions frameworks for measuring progress towards sustainable return and reintegration fail to specifically consider children’s different needs and experiences.

In 2017, over 68 million people were forcibly return a child to a country where there are displaced, over half of whom were below substantial grounds for believing that there is 18 years of age; in that same year, close a real risk of irreparable harm to the child.”1 to 670,000 refugees and 4.2 million IDPs Returnee children should enjoy, among returned to their places of origin. Despite other factors and without discrimination, robust legal conventions and frameworks access to safety, an adequate standard of protecting children’s rights during and living, livelihoods, housing, documentation after return, it is clear that countries around and access to justice as part of any durable the world are failing to uphold them. solutions and sustainable reintegration. Furthermore, few actors gather child-specific Commitments made by the international data or follow up on child returnees, which community towards enabling such rights, makes it difficult to understand how – however, are only as good as the ability to and where – returnee children are being verify progress towards achieving such failed, and how to address these failures. conditions. Tools to measure and analyse Children have distinct vulnerabilities both progress towards sustainable return and physically and in terms of their psychosocial reintegration have been developed, with well-being, and often have less opportunity common criteria defined by the Inter- to express their own agency in decision Agency Standing Committee (IASC), but making around migration choices. These existing guidelines and frameworks do age-specific vulnerabilities can compound not contain indicators specifically tailored the already considerable risks faced by all to measure the needs of children. returnees. In recognition of their particular To address this gap, Save the Children needs, and complementing Article 33 of the has developed a new set of child-specific 1951 Refugee Convention regarding non- indicators to complement existing return refoulement, the Convention on the Rights of and reintegration frameworks including, the Child (CRC) indicates: “States shall not importantly, a new mental health and 24 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

psychosocial safety dimension, focusing identity, a functional judiciary, and freedom on children’s rights to play and socialise, of movement. Compared with non-displaced their agency, their mental health and the children, they also experience higher levels availability of professional support.2 Applying of separation from families or guardians. this framework, Save the Children and Returnee children also face comparative Samuel Hall conducted research in 2018–19 disadvantages in the provision of mental to ascertain the situation faced by children health support, although the impact of this returned to four contexts: Syria, Iraq, gap on their psychological development is Somalia and Afghanistan.3 What emerges insufficiently measured or understood at is a somewhat bleak picture: returnee present. Returnee children are consistently children are slipping through the cracks, unable to access a nurturing and supportive with little attention paid to their needs and social network or safe play environment. little information collected about them. Many child returnees face psychosocial challenges which pose fundamental risks to Data and gaps their well-being, and professional support for In the four return contexts examined, these challenges is scarce to non-existent. the lack of physical safety that was a root cause of people’s initial displacement Implications remains largely unchanged. Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan are marked by Knowledge and evidence gaps: Our research indiscriminate violence, and physical abuse highlighted the pervasive lack of data and of children is common. Available evidence standards regarding return and reintegration reviewed in our research indicates that conditions for children worldwide, and an returnee children are more likely than urgent need for investment in improved non-displaced children to experience data collection systems. In particular, we detention and trafficking – particularly in found a dearth of age-disaggregated data. Syria and Iraq. Data disaggregated by age Existing research on returned children is and migration background do not exist generally limited and anecdotal. The absence regarding key indicators for physical safety, of such reliable data makes it impossible to including child marriage and child labour. establish baselines and measure progress Children who are unable to return to in determining when and where children their original dwellings and are forced and their families have successfully instead to live in temporary shelters or reintegrated in their countries of origin. urban slums often struggle to access safe This in turn limits accountability, and poses water and sanitation compared with non- challenges for those actors, including non- displaced children. Comparatively lower governmental organisations (NGOs) and nutrition indicators (among all returnees) government ministries, who should act as are frequently a result of returnees’ inability duty bearers for children. Without better to access agricultural land. Health care data, designing and implementing effective is in a dire state across all four return programming for the safe return and, in contexts, with high infant mortality and particular, the sustainable reintegration of low vaccination rates, but health-related children is difficult. Conversely, the evidence data disaggregated by age and migration gap challenges the ability of governments status are not routinely collected. In contexts and other stakeholders to credibly claim where access to education is generally that conditions for the safe and dignified low, returnees face added difficulties such return of children are, in fact, in place. as their inability to cover school fees or their lack of identification documents. Basic protection standards are not in place: In all four locations, returnee children We see children returning to environments appear to suffer clear comparative that do not enable them to fully access rights disadvantages in access to legal safety, legal guaranteed in the CRC, including the right to Return 25 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

protection, education and health care. In other to data that can realistically be collected domains such as physical and material safety, in challenging real-world displacement available data point to many similarities contexts. This methodological discussion between returnee and host children. This lack requires collaborative engagement between of differences, however, cannot be invoked displacement-mandated stakeholders, to justify the return of children if a return academia and the wider research community. context remains unsafe in the first place. It is essential to view returns as a process, not a single event, and to guarantee the Lack of sustainable support post-return: rights of children through the entire return Many returning countries perceive their legal journey. A lack of adequate support can responsibility as ending when children arrive have impacts measured not just in years but in their country of origin. There is limited in decades, which in turn has substantial communication between actors involved long-term implications for the wider country, in returns, such as migration agencies, regional and even global contexts. Framed embassies, government authorities and in this sense, supporting preparation NGOs in countries of return. Finally, benefits before and sustainable reintegration after provided to voluntary returnees (such as in- return is a necessity – not just an ‘add-on’ kind support) are often given at the family to established returns programming. level, not necessarily benefiting children. At the same time, we must recognise that millions of displaced people routinely Lack of pre- and post-return support: Our self-organise their returns – and that such findings also draw attention to a broader returns often take place before safe and lack of focus and investment of resources conducive reintegration conditions exist on for both pre-return support and longer-term the ground. The decisions made by these post-return reintegration support within ‘spontaneous’ returnees are driven by a the broader returns debate. This gap is complex mix of inter-related motivations. A manifested, in part, by a widespread lack clear research priority here is understanding of accountability relating to the absence the role of children in complex collective of adequate measurement of reintegration decision-making processes, and the impact outcomes, and by the insufficiency of these decisions have on their well-being. existing standards to guide rights-based Stefanie Barratt returns and reintegration work. [email protected] Data Standards and Analytics Pillar Lead Recommendations Children should not return until the Marion Guillaume standards for their safe and dignified returns [email protected] can be met. Mechanisms must be in place to Children and Youth Pillar Lead set standards and measure progress, to ensure Samuel Hall http://samuelhall.org that children and their families are achieving durable solutions following their return. Josiah Kaplan Migration-mandated actors and child [email protected] protection agencies must work together Senior Research Advisor, Migration and in establishing minimum standards for Displacement Initiative, Save the Children rights-based child returns and reintegration. International www.savethechildren.net Moving beyond recognition of this point, 1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 6 however, the real work involves addressing www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx 2. Save the Children (2018) Durable Solutions for Children Toolkit practical, technical questions of how to bit.ly/Save-DurableSolutionsToolkit further develop and gain support for 3. Save the Children/Samuel Hall (2018) Achieving Durable implementation of indicators for measuring Solutions for Returnee Children: What do we know? progress towards child-friendly returns bit.ly/Save-SamuelHall-returnees-2018 environments. These indicators must relate 26 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul

Analysis of return practices in Lebanon reveal challenges to voluntary, safe and dignified return.

As the Assad regime regains control in most equilibrium between Muslims and Christians. parts of Syria, Syrian refugees are under As soon as the Assad regime seemed to increasing pressure to return from have gained the upper hand in Syria’s war, neighbouring countries including Lebanon. Lebanon’s key political figures rushed to Analysis of the complex political landscape call for the return of Syrian refugees and and of current return practices, however, promoted return by applying harsher shows that much needs to be done to ensure containment measures. Municipalities and Syrians can return voluntarily in safety the GSO started enforcing stricter laws that and dignity. have significantly restricted Syrians’ access Although Lebanon continued its visa-free to employment and housing, and have policy for Syrians in the initial stages of the reduced their livelihood opportunities. war, the tension between political parties and Lebanon’s political parties agree that between Syrians and the local population displaced Syrians should return but there is rapidly intensified. Some municipalities no consensus around which actors should began imposing curfews on Syrians as early facilitate the process, the timing of such a as 2014 and Lebanon has increasingly applied process, and under what conditions return harsher border management policies. In ought to take place. In recent years, a deep January 2015, Lebanon terminated its visa- division regarding whether or not the free policy and instructed the UN Refugee government should facilitate returns while Agency (UNHCR) to stop registering Syrian normalising its ties with the Syrian regime refugees. The government’s General Security has paralysed negotiations over a unified Offices (GSO) largely continued to allow refugee return plan. Competing positions are women and children to obtain residency largely the result of Lebanese actors’ varied permits free of charge if they had UNHCR geopolitical agendas relating to the war in refugee certificates but required men to sign Syria. Parties that have seen the 2011 uprisings a pledge not to work in Lebanon. The GSO as an opportunity to dismantle the Assad has applied these practices inconsistently but regime perceive coordination with the regime in general the only way for men to obtain a on refugee return as bolstering its position, residency permit has been to have a Lebanese while those Lebanese actors that have sided sponsor (kafeel). Applying for a residency with the Syrian regime perceive coordination permit through a sponsor costs US$200 per with Syrian authorities as a signal to the year for each person over 15 years old in the international community that the regime has family.¹ Difficulties in obtaining documents indeed regained control over its territory. and paying fees have pushed the majority of Syrians residing in Lebanon into illegality. Channels for return Displacement from Syria has upset Within this climate, small-scale returns to Lebanon’s multi-sectarian political system Syria have been taking place through a variety which governs its 18 different communities. of channels, facilitated by a proliferation of Political parties have not been able to develop formal and informal Lebanese actors. Syrians a unified response either in relation to Syria’s can apply for return – pending approval conflict or to asylum policy making. Some from the Syrian government – at registration Lebanese factions have stressed that the centres across Lebanon that are coordinated presence of Syrian refugees, who are mostly by the GSO. As criteria for approving Sunni, changes Lebanon’s demographics pending applications remain mostly opaque, and threatens the fragile power-sharing however, human rights organisations have Return 27 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

decried the secrecy under which such claims Syria’s so-called safe zones in coordination are processed. To encourage applications with the GSO and municipalities. for return, the GSO has formulated some Informal actors such as local committees incentives such as revoking the ‘exit’ fees and religious actors close to the Syria– that potential returnees must pay if they Lebanon border have also initiated small- previously had any period in which they scale returns, liaising with Lebanese political did not have residency permits in Lebanon. parties and networks on both sides of the According to the GSO, around 170,000 border. The European Union and UNHCR Syrian refugees have so far ‘voluntarily’ have warned against all return operations, returned.2 At the border, the GSO stamps noting that conditions in Syria are still not each passport to state that its owner is banned conducive to return, and insisting that returns from returning to Lebanon for a period of must be voluntary and take place in safety time that is often unknown to refugees. and dignity. However, they have not been Some political parties have also set able to influence realities on the ground. In up their own committees to study refugee 2018, Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs return conditions and process applications. accused UNHCR of seeking to dissuade Although these committees may coordinate refugees from returning and of encroaching with the GSO, they form networks which offer on Lebanon’s sovereign decision making. alternative pathways to repatriation. In July UNHCR has been informally monitoring 2018 Hezbollah (a Shia political party that had returns at border crossings although it already in 2017 coordinated the repatriation has no authority to intervene. There is no of thousands of Syrian refugees) established other independent monitoring at borders to a return programme with contact centres ensure that returns are indeed voluntary. and task forces across Lebanon where return procedures were explained to refugees and Prospects for return their cases studied. In 2018 the Free Patriotic On 13 May 2019 the GSO issued a statement Movement, the largest Christian party in that all Syrians who entered Lebanon parliament, created its own local refugee irregularly after 24 April 2019 would be return committee to inform refugees about deported, in contravention of the principle return pathways and facilitate returns to of non-refoulement. Recent reports show that Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR were forced to sign voluntary return forms, and at least three returnees were detained upon arrival in Syria.3 Moreover, UNHCR/Diego Ibarra Sánchez the 13 May decision imperils those refugees who were already living in Lebanon and who had entered the country irregularly. Those who do not have official proof of entry before April 2019 are at risk of being deported at any time. Despite the myriad Syrian refugees inspect the flooding in Dalhamiya informal settlement camp in Lebanon following challenges that Syrian heavy storms in January 2019. More than 150 informal sites were affected, putting 70,000 refugees at risk. “We cannot sleep at night. It has been three days like this,” said one woman. 28 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

refugees face in Lebanon, their imminent Tamirace Fakhoury return still appears unlikely. In a recent study [email protected] conducted in various parts of the country,4 Associate Professor of Political Science and none of the interviewees was planning to International Affairs and Director, Institute for return. The most cited reasons were military Social Justice and Conflict Resolution, Lebanese conscription for men in the family, lack of American University http://sas.lau.edu.lb housing and employment in places of origin, Derya Ozkul [email protected] feelings of being settled and/or invested in Research Officer, Refugee Studies Centre, Lebanon, single women’s lack of child custody Department of International Development, rights in Syria, and refusal to live under University of Oxford www.rsc.ox.ac.uk the Assad regime. Lebanon needs to devise longer-term protection mechanisms for Syrian 1. Waived officially in 2017 but inconsistently in practice. 2. Human Rights Watch ‘Lebanon: Syrians Summarily Deported refugees; the current push for their return from Airport’, 24 May 2019 bit.ly/HRW-24052019-Lebanon will only increase the deprivation suffered 3. Human Rights Watch ‘Syrians Deported by Lebanon Arrested at by refugees and compromise Lebanon’s Home’, 2 September 2019 bit.ly/HRW-02092019-Syrians-deported adherence to human rights instruments. 4. Comprising 30 in-depth interviews by Derya Ozkul in 2019.

Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented approach Zeynep Sahin Mencutek

Turkey’s approach to encouraging refugees to return to Syria risks jeopardising the safety and voluntariness of such returns.

Turkey’s initially welcoming approach when migration agency, cites Turkey’s 2013 Law the first Syrian refugees began arriving in on Foreigners and International Protection early 2011 was justified by the government and the Temporary Protection Directive of as a temporary emergency response to a 2014 – both of which state that DGMM will humanitarian crisis. From mid-2014, however, provide in-kind and monetary support to as the numbers continued to rise, and with those who apply for voluntary return – as no apparent end in sight to the Syrian the basis for the legal framework around crisis, the Turkish government adopted a returns. Legally speaking, the DGMM is more restrictive approach. This includes expected to cooperate with the authorities a temporary protection status for Syrians in countries of origin, as well as with other that permits access to education, health public institutions and agencies in Turkey, and social services, and the labour market, international organisations and civil society. and – since mid-2016 – some support for In practice, the only cooperation DGMM has limited integration and voluntary return. formalised is with other Turkish State actors. Research shows, however, that its fragmented It has signed no bilateral or multilateral returns framework calls into question the readmission or tripartite agreements to safety and voluntariness of such returns.1 facilitate Syrian returns, which would require the involvement of the UN Refugee Agency The returns framework (UNHCR) and Syria’s current government. Although Turkey has put in place formal DGMM is legally required to seek a means by which Syrians can apply to return, formal application from returnees, via the approach as a whole is fragmented. provincial branches, and the voluntary return Its Directorate General of Migration paperwork must have four signatures: from Management (DGMM), the principal national the returnee, a State officer, a translator Return 29 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

and a UNHCR officer – or, if the latter The Turkish government has also financed is unavailable, a representative from an a unilateral post-conflict reconstruction authorised non-governmental organisation agenda. Turkish agencies, cooperating (NGO). Currently, UNHCR has elected with local Syrian actors, have provided not to be involved in returns and so services in camps for internally displaced Turkish Red Crescent representatives are Syrians and rebuilt hospitals, schools, signing voluntary return paperwork.2 mosques, universities and other In the densely Syrian-populated infrastructure in Syrian towns. Many Turkish Esenyurt municipality in Istanbul, the State agencies have established branches municipal authorities organised a return across the border to provide services, and campaign in 2018 whereby 3,724 Syrians the Turkish government has started to returned. For 2019, the municipality widely publicise that Syrian cities under has a target of returning 25,000 Syrians. Turkey’s control are safe places for return. After arrival at the border, returnees are Against this backdrop, in the summer assisted by two Turkish agencies working of 2018 both civil society organisations and inside Syria, who escort returnees to refugees from Syrian cities – mostly from cities under Turkey’s military control. Afrin – reported having received telephone calls from Turkish State agencies who Encouraging returns informed them about the return option, The first tactic currently deployed to the improvement of security conditions, encourage returns is to facilitate temporary and the reconstruction of infrastructure ‘go-and-see’ visits of up to three months, in cities under Turkish control. During during religious festivals, whereby refugees that same summer, Turkey announced can assess conditions in Syria and check on plans to close all refugee camps within a their vacated properties. If they wish, they year. The refugees from the closed camps can choose to remain in Syria. During this found themselves facing two options: period, the DGMM does not cancel their either moving to big Turkish cities, where protection status, only revoking their status housing is expensive, or returning to Syria. if Syrians fail to return within the permitted Turkish pro-government media outlets period. Considerable numbers of returns have widely covered Syrians returning. occurring under this strategy indicate its Each returnee trip has been the first news efficiency. According to government sources, item, and the media – including Turkey’s in 2017 40,000 Syrians – some 15% of those official news agency – has presented these who made go-and-see visits – remained, returns as something to celebrate. and in 2018 57% of the 252,000 Syrians undertaking go-and-see visits remained. Challenges of the Turkish approach These substantial rises in returns also There has as yet been no large number of reflects Turkey’s north-west Syria policy. returns from Turkey to Syria, and those Turkey legitimised two unilateral cross- returns that have taken place have been border operations: Operation Euphrates primarily on an individual case-by-case Shield (August 2016–March 2017) and Olive basis. However, evidence shows that the Branch (ongoing from 2018) on the grounds number of spontaneous returns is growing. of fighting terrorism and of defence against Turkey’s practice of go-and-see visits during attacks from the Syrian Kurdish People’s religious festivals is welcome, as are its Protection Units (YPG) and ISIS militants in efforts to enhance security, stability and Syria. The international community, however, infrastructure in north-west Syria. Despite has seen these operations as belligerent this, however, there are several concerns and a violation of Syrian sovereignty, about Turkey’s unilateral approach, its although it has taken no real action to stop strategy of providing restricted protection the military incursions and Turkey now while encouraging return, and the controls the border and north-west Syria. principles that it ignores during returns. 30 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

First, Turkey has started to encourage returns premature because of conditions in returns although Syria is still not safe. Syria and instead favour local integration Despite occasional ceasefires and de- options. And UNHCR is not carrying escalation zones under Turkish, Russian out its traditional role of ascertaining the and Iranian control, fighting and violence voluntary character of return and ensuring continue across Syria. People lack access that accurate and objective information to basic public services and sustainable on conditions in the country of origin is livelihood opportunities. UNHCR has communicated to refugees. This raises asserted that Syrian conditions are not questions about the extent of DGMM’s safe for returns. This is, most probably, compliance with the voluntariness principle why UNHCR has not become involved in and the transparency of its procedures. The returns from Turkey. Moreover, it is not EU has also not funded any project for the clear whether Turkish authorities fully return of Syrians, although it – along with brief returning refugees about possible IOM – does fund capacity building for the risks. Once they have returned, Syrians repatriation of non-Syrian irregular migrants. cannot re-enter Turkey since signing the Fourth, there is no evidence of the voluntary return forms means waiving provision of any post-return assistance, all claims for asylum protection and and Turkish authorities such as DGMM makes legal re-return impossible. have no means of tracing what is Second, returns do not seem fully happening to returnees in Syria. voluntary. The precarious situation of Fifth, the encouragement of returns has Syrians in Turkey, marked by the lack of full- consequences for refugee–host community scale protection, exploitative employment relations, creating an expectation among conditions, and the loss of hope in their Turkish host communities of immediate future, pushes them to return. In mid-2019, returns. This increases locals’ prejudice the situation deteriorated further when the towards Syrians and thus threatens the provincial authorities of Istanbul – where already fragile protection afforded to the more than half a million Syrians live – started refugees. Moreover, government and to conduct more street and workplace raids to opposition parties’ heightened discourse check people’s registration. Syrians without about returns, particularly during election the proper paperwork are being returned campaigns, is of concern to refugees because to the Turkish provinces where they are they are afraid that forced repatriations registered. Meanwhile, the international will follow. media has reported that some Syrians For those convicted of crimes and have been forced to sign voluntary return anyone alleged to have any links to terror forms and have been deported to northern groups, individual forced returns via Syria. Hate speech against Syrians has deportation do happen. Activists report that increased, as local people blame them for irregular migrants, including Syrians, who unemployment and economic problems. It are captured by the Turkish coast guard or is clear that while some Syrians are excited police forces when trying to irregularly cross about the voluntary return options, the into Greece are first detained in removal return plans of the majority are contingent centres and then deported. And some on the correct conditions in Syria – security, Syrians apprehended by police during raids stability, a new regime, reconstruction of have been handed deportation orders and, infrastructure, and sustainable livelihoods. after signing voluntary return forms under Third, Turkey operates returns duress from State officers, are repatriated unilaterally, although the DGMM asserts to Syria.3 NGO representatives and lawyers that it is working in collaboration with the have confirmed that these returns have been UN and the European Union to facilitate taking place, which they deem a violation returns. However, representatives of these of individual rights and the voluntariness organisations in Turkey appear to consider principle. The DGMM does not provide Return 31 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

exact numbers of non-Syrian irregular coordination among all stakeholders, should migrants, nor of Syrians deported because of be undertaken well before returns begin. criminal activity or supposed terror links. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek The case of Turkey demonstrates that [email protected] what is needed is a multi-actor, collaborative Research Fellow, Centre for Global Cooperation approach to return that complies with Research, University of Duisburg-Essen internationally agreed principles. Host www.gcr21.org and Swedish Research Institute countries like Turkey cannot be permitted Istanbul to adopt their own interpretation of what voluntariness, safety and dignity mean. This article is written in a personal capacity. Host States should be warned when they 1. The research on which this article is based was funded by the do not comply with legal and normative RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project–Horizon2020 (#770564) and was written provisions concerning refugee returns, during the author’s fellowship at the Kate Hamburger Kolleg/ and stability and safety should be at the Centre of Global Cooperation Research at the University of forefront of decisions about returns. Further, Duisburg-Essen, Germany. UNHCR should not disassociate itself from 2. Gokalp Aras N E and Sahin Mencutek Z (2019) ‘Border Management and Migration Controls in Turkey’ Working Paper, ongoing premature return practices. Instead, Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond the approach of a host country should Project (#770564, Horizon2020) be refugee-centred, evidence-based and www.respondmigration.com/publications-1 3. HarekAct ‘A New Nightmare: Picked Up In The Aegean And effective. Moreover, careful preparation Returned To Syria’, 24 June 2018 bit.ly/Harekact-24062018-Aegean for reintegration in the home country, and

The politics of return from Jordan to Syria Julia Morris

Return preparedness of Syrian refugees has become a prominent issue in Jordan, but the prospect of return raises numerous concerns.

An estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees border crossing in October 2018, the Jordanian currently live in Jordan, of whom three government has publicly announced that it quarters are calculated by non-governmental does not support Syrians returning at the organisations (NGOs) to plan to return to present time.1 But while no formal returns Syria at some point in the future. Repatriation programmes have been initiated between should be based on a free and informed the two countries, return preparedness decision with the full commitment of the has become a prominent issue in Jordan.2 country of origin to the reintegration process. Syrian returnees, however, face the prospect Barriers to return from Jordan of returning to an authoritarian regime Unlike in other host countries from which that has little interest in supporting their Syrian refugees are returning, ‘go-and- reintegration. Moreover, given the continued see’ visits are not possible for refugees in active conflict, guaranteeing any measure of Jordan. In the case of Jordan, UNHCR does security for returning refugees is difficult. not have the infrastructure in place, nor the There have been significant numbers of arrangements with the Syrian and Jordanian spontaneous returns since the beginning governments, to facilitate the trips. The of the conflict. However, the Jordanian Jordanian government has maintained a government and affiliated agencies have so semblance of diplomatic relations with Syria far taken no measures to facilitate large-scale but not when it comes to arranging go-and-see formal voluntary returns. On the contrary, visits. Furthermore, the very idea of a go-and- despite the reopening of the Jaber–Nasib see visit is questionable given the continuing 32 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

insecurity inside Syria, and whether in fact their sustainable integration or return. refugees would be able to visit and return. While Jordan is a relatively liberal country, Under Syrian law, Syrian men between the LGBTIQ+ refugees have still been found to ages of 18 and 42 must serve in the military face protection risks, discrimination and or risk imprisonment or forcible conscription. abuse.4 Understanding these contexts is Most conscripts have been kept in the army essential when planning voluntary returns indefinitely since the conflict began, and strategies, if return is to be a durable solution. raids by the authorities on neighbourhoods and homes in search of wanted conscripts A culture of disorientation and reservists have become common. The The success of a formal returns project Assad regime has also utilised State media depends on refugees having complete and religious leaders to promote the image information about the situation but rumours of those serving in the army and their hamper the ability of many to make informed families as honourable, while depicting decisions. Social media platforms such as deserters in pejorative terms. A similarly WhatsApp and Facebook have enabled people negative image is projected of Syrians to find out the extent of devastation from who left the country during the conflict, family, friends and neighbours. However, the and many fear reprisals due to perceived constant barrage of information about the cowardice or disloyalty to the regime. situation and whether or not it is advisable Since the start of the conflict, rape and to return led many refugees to speak to me sexual violence have become a widespread of overwhelming feelings of disorientation. tactic used by the Assad regime and rebel For example, in April 2018 the Assad factions. Sexual violence in the Syrian government passed a property law, Law conflict has been faced by both women and No 10, which gave residents just 30 days men alike. While women and girls often to prove their property ownership in so- bear the burden of greater sexual violence, called redevelopment zones that are largely substantial evidence has also come to light in the areas of the country which rebelled of the systematic use of sexual violence and against the Syrian government after 2011. torture on adult men and boys, particularly The law enables authorities to confiscate in Syrian detention centres.3 For women property without compensating the owners and men, sexual violence is often made or giving them an opportunity to appeal. invisible, partially from a deep social stigma In November 2018, following international of speaking out about it, which obfuscates pressure, President Assad issued an accountability. In other post-conflict amendment giving Syrians a year to return situations, restorative justice methods and claim their property. However, many have been used to hold actors accountable refugees are unclear as to which is the real and to promote long-term reconciliation. deadline, and the majority lack identification If accountability and reconciliation or property registration documents to strategies are to take root in Syria, they make the claims in the first place. Another must take these factors into account. widespread claim – so far unfounded – is LGBTIQ+ refugees also face specific that Law No 10 allows Iranian companies barriers to return. Many have encountered (which have financial aspirations in Syria) to levels of persecution within and outside Syria expropriate the property of Syrians in exile. that are higher than those they experienced These chaotic conditions, frequent policy pre-conflict. Under Syrian law, engaging in changes, and circulation of misinformation homosexual activities carries a sentence of on social media have created a high level up to three years’ imprisonment. LGBTIQ+ of anxiety and uncertainty. This is one area refugees also frequently have more difficulty where humanitarian organisations have in finding work and accessing familial focused their energies, working to monitor the and social networks ­­– both in and outside returns situation, reduce information gaps, their home regions ­­–­ which can support and advocate to encourage the Assad regime Return 33 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

to take these concerns into account. The attitudes towards refugees have altered over International Rescue Committee, for example, the years, as the Syrian population has added has been developing its staff’s social listening to substantial numbers of Palestinians, Iraqis, and social media management skills in order Yemenis, Sudanese and Somalis from earlier to be able to identify misinformation and displacements. In public discourse, Syrians support effective communication for refugees are often scapegoated for the scarcity of planning to return. resources and are consequently increasingly At the same time, humanitarian being regarded as objects of blame and organisations face challenges in implementing suspicion. The reopening of the border has formal voluntary returns. UN agencies and coincided with the widespread sentiment some civil society actors are active in Syria among the Jordanian public that Syrians but, even though the border is open, no cross- have overstayed their welcome in Jordan. border service work is permitted at the present So long as there remains a question mark time for organisations providing pre-existing over return in safety, host countries should services to Syrian refugees in Jordan. Instead, not provide push factors to incentivise refugee humanitarians will probably be negotiating return but rather should continue with with the Assad regime and Russian private forms of local integration, such as through sector actors to facilitate repatriation support. facilitating education, employment and training. The sectors in which Syrian The politics of ‘voluntary’ return refugees in Jordan can obtain employment The Jordanian government has received have already been called into question as immense financial aid from the European part of the much criticised Jordan Compact. Union since the start of large-scale By not including vital professions such displacement to Jordan. Humanitarian as medicine, education and engineering practitioners I spoke with report that the among those sectors, the Jordan Compact reason why Jordanian officials have not prevents refugees gaining experience in publicly lobbied for a returns project as such sectors, which are critical to rebuilding government policy is partially as a result of Syria. International and local NGOs are doing this aid funding tied to refugee integration impressive work in offering university places in Jordan. However, as the conflict has and skills training to Syrian refugee youth, continued, Jordan has encountered donor and Syrian refugees have set up a wide range fatigue, and international investments of innovative businesses in Jordan. One have begun to drop. With these possible Syrian businesswoman, for example, supports threats to funding, many humanitarian over 100 Syrian women on flexible contracts practitioners are questioning whether (some working from home) to produce soaps the Jordanian government might indeed and textiles through a refugee women’s soon consider encouraging returns. cooperative, selling the products online Lebanon, like other major host States in and through social media. Yet many Syrian the region, has already taken questionable refugees still find their movements restricted steps to promote return to Syrian refugees. and employment ambitions curtailed. Portable displays explaining the logistics It is in everyone’s interests that host and benefits of returning to Syria have countries make refugees welcome. Above cropped up across the country in an effort all, the voices of refugees must be listened to encourage refugees’ return. Meanwhile, a to if return and integration projects are generally oppressive culture towards refugees to be successful. Restrictive, needlessly makes sustaining a decent livelihood next complicated, xenophobic policies that limit to impossible. In these circumstances, the refugees’ movement and access to work idea of return being voluntary is difficult opportunities and basic services may drive to take seriously. These developments have spontaneous returns to a country that is not sparked new debates in Jordan with respect safe. By guaranteeing that refugees can return to its own Syrian refugee population. Social in safety to their host country, or move to 34 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

another country if they choose, more people 2. Based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in February and March 2019 in Jordan with Syrian refugees and with Jordanian might engage in sustainable and voluntary and international NGOs. Morris J (forthcoming) ‘Manufacturing return, and help create a Syria for the future. Landscapes: The Politics and Practices of the Jordan Refugee Compact’, Refuge Julia Morris [email protected] 3. Chynoweth S (2017) “We Keep it in Our Heart” – Sexual Violence Assistant Professor of International Studies, Against Men and Boys in the Syria Crisis, UNHCR University of North Carolina Wilmington www.refworld.org/docid/5a128e814.html 4. UNHCR (2017) Building Capacity for Protection of LGBTI Persons https://uncw.edu/int/morrisj.html of Concern – Jordan www.refworld.org/docid/5a38dfe64.html 1. Al-Khalidi S ‘Jordan’s PM appeals for more aid as most Syrian refugees set to stay,’ Reuters, 20 February 2019 https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1Q9290

Rethinking Somali refugee solutions in Kenya Peter Kirui and Suzanne Francis

Amid uncertain return conditions, the repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya risks leading to instances of forced return. Alternative avenues, such as local integration, should be explored.

The signing of a Tripartite Agreement (TA) on refugees in Dadaab pose a security threat voluntary repatriation is intended to signal to Kenya, through collaboration with or an end to refugees’ long wait to return home. sympathising with Al-Shabaab. Proponents of However, difficult questions surround what this argument claim that the Dadaab refugee constitutes normality in the home country, camps have become training grounds for and whether conditions have improved Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab, to allow for a dignified return. Somali and launch pads for attacks on Kenyan refugees in Kenya have found themselves soil. This claim currently lacks substance facing these questions following the signing as no Somali refugee has been successfully of a TA in November 2013 between the prosecuted on terror-related charges. This governments of Kenya and Somalia and allegation is further challenged by human the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).1 rights organisations such as Human Rights While Kenya leads calls for repatriation, Watch and Amnesty International who UNHCR, Somalia and donor States also claim that this scapegoats Somali refugees.2 favour repatriation. Because UNHCR is Secondly, GoK claims that Somalia is now a often overstretched in catering for millions safe place to which to return. This is difficult of refugees globally, and tends to focus to substantiate as many parts of Somalia on emergent refugee situations, there is a are still unreachable and inhospitable, and tendency to view repatriation as the best Al-Shabaab remains capable of launching solution. For the Government of Somalia, massive attacks on civilians – as witnessed repatriation of its citizens strengthens the in the Mogadishu bombings of October legitimacy of the Somali government at 2017 that claimed more than 500 lives. home and abroad. Somalia has, however, Return to some parts of Somalia is therefore insisted on phased returns without deadlines premature. In cases where return has as it systematically builds State capacity. occurred, returnees have had to negotiate For other donor States, repatriation means new access to land, as some of it had been the gradual end to providing funding. occupied or claimed by others since they left. The Government of Kenya (GoK) has cited The TA has been placed under sharp a number of reasons behind its rationale for scrutiny, with several questions emerging. the repatriation of Somali refugees. The most Do returns that take place under the TA prominent reason provided is that Somali remain voluntary even when GoK threatens Return 35 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

to close the Dadaab camps, as it has done on several occasions? Does the TA represent the general feelings or thoughts of Somali refugees about return? Although refugees may not be

directly involved in negotiating and UNHCR/Sarah Hoibak writing TAs, their informal participation is critical if they are to embrace TAs and voluntarily return. The question of whether the State of origin is capable and willing to handle the mass return of Somali refugees is also important. Establishing the answers to these questions will determine whether repatriation is likely to be a success and will help safeguard against premature return. Premature and involuntary returns are by no means confined to Kenya. Syrian refugees in Europe, for example, all face the possibility of premature and involuntary return. Only 1% of Somali refugees have access to resettlement to a third country, making this an option with very limited viability. Local integration could, however, potentially complement return and resettlement and may be particularly effective for Somali refugees who have been living in the Dadaab camps for more than two decades – and who may therefore find it easier to

integrate in Kenya than in Somalia. It In Ifo Camp, Dadaab, a tailor has a thriving business altering rectangular may also be a better option for young mosquito nets into conical nets, the preferred shape in the camp. adults who have been educated and socialised in Kenya and have probably known – none alone is adequate to address the Somali no other place as home. If permitted by the refugee situation but instead they must be government, local integration could enable pursued concurrently, not least in order to Somali refugees to establish productive guard against the threat of forced return. livelihoods. The protracted refugee situation Peter Kirui [email protected] and the reliance of the Dadaab camps on Assistant Lecturer, History and Government, humanitarian assistance could be alienating University of Eldoret www.uoeld.ac.ke a potentially productive refugee population from meaningful participation in the socio- Suzanne Francis [email protected] economic development of Kenya. And while Programme Leader for Politics and International local integration may be a source of potential Relations, University of Chester conflict with local populations (especially www1.chester.ac.uk and Honorary Associate when resources are limited), careful Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal planning and progressive introduction could 1. www.refworld.org/pdfid/5285e0294.pdf offer an alternative to Somali refugees. 2. See for example Of the three durable solutions – www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/afr520032014en.pdf repatriation, local integration and resettlement 36 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Educating for return: Somali refugees in Dadaab Ochan Leomoi, Abdikadir Abikar and HaEun Kim

Finding a ‘durable’ solution for Somali refugees in Dadaab means ensuring they have the knowledge, capacity, confidence and qualifications required for meaningful, lasting return.

In 1991, with the outbreak of civil war in However, although the programme is in place, Somalia, refugee camps were established there are few incentives to return to Somalia. around the small border town of Dadaab Refugees who did return reported that in north-eastern Kenya. Since then, Dadaab lack of food and basic services made it nearly has become the location of one of the world’s impossible to survive or to re-establish their largest and longest-standing protracted lives. They also found that the quality of refugee situations. At their peak the camps shelter and education was not as high as hosted over half a million refugees. As of they had anticipated. In areas controlled by July 2019, there are over 211,000 refugees, Al-Shabaab, movement was restricted, and the of whom 96% are Somali, the majority of general insecurity created fear.3 Despite these whom were born or grew up in the camps.1 reports, in May 2016 the Kenyan government As ‘non-citizens’ the Somali refugees announced plans to expedite the repatriation do not have State protection, and their of Somali refugees and to close down the mobility and employment rights are camps. Two months after this announcement, constrained. Threats, kidnappings and UNHCR made an appeal for funds to violent attacks perpetrated in Kenya by the relocate all non-Somali refugees – and those Somalia-based militant group Al-Shabaab who were in the course of the resettlement has fostered an attitude of distrust and fear process – from the Dadaab camps to Kakuma towards these refugees, whom the Kenyan refugee camp in the north-west of Kenya, as government accuse of being infiltrated by well as to support voluntary returns from the group. Caught between the violence Dadaab to Somalia. While UNHCR and the and instability of their homeland and a host Government of Kenya insisted that returns nation unwilling to integrate them, refugees would be voluntary, the mass relocation of in Dadaab have been compelled by lack of non-Somali refugees sent a clear message other options to remain in the camps. to the Somali refugees who remained in camps that were soon to be closed. Kenya’s repatriation programme In November 2013, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Using the Tripartite Agreement as the legal framework, a voluntary repatriation programme was established in December 2014 which took an incremental approach to return, beginning by providing funds and resources to support those who choose to return, and progressing to formal returns UNHCR/Assadullah Nasrullah supported by UNHCR.2 Somali refugee students in Dadaab, Kenya. To understand why we have pixellated part of this image, please see www.fmreview.org/photo-policy. Return 37 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

Although voluntary repatriation may international NGOs, or starting their own be a desirable solution to displacement, schools. The opportunities they are able to there are questions as to how durable return find in Somalia enable them to build skills could be under these conditions. The cash to become civil servants and future leaders incentives offered through the repatriation of the nation while enjoying sustainable programme have led to many members of the livelihoods. With education, refugees are host community (who may not be refugees able to see themselves as agents of change. but are ethnically Somali) obtaining the By investing in the minds and capacities of US$200 offered and then returning to Kenya, refugees, we are investing in individuals often using the funds to establish small-scale who will return to rebuild and transform businesses. More significantly, Kenya’s push civil society in a post-conflict nation. for repatriation of refugees to a post-conflict There is a generation of youth who have nation that is still affected by violence, forced grown up in the camps, attended school recruitment, and weak education and health and, through programmes and scholarships infrastructure has resulted in refugees run by non-governmental organisations, returning to the Dadaab camps or becoming earned academic qualifications at primary, internally displaced within Somalia. secondary and post-secondary levels. Following the push for voluntary With their academic qualifications, they repatriation, the Kenyan government closed see opportunities for meaningful and its Department of Refugee Affairs, which sustainable employment with international oversaw the registration of new refugees. NGOs and a re-established government The current government entity charged with to rebuild civil society – employment displaced persons – the Refugee Affairs that would not be possible in Kenya.5 Secretariat – is not authorised to register In order to facilitate long-term, safe and people in Dadaab, and new arrivals and dignified return, we propose that, rather returnees are also no longer registered by than repatriation programmes, what is UNHCR. As a result they cannot access needed is the investment in meaningful ration cards and other resources and capacity building of refugees through services. Unregistered asylum seekers are education and recognised qualifications. even more vulnerable when they lack access Ochan Leomoi [email protected] to food and lack status and while such an approach may reduce official numbers it Abdikadir Abikar [email protected] ignores the reality of people’s needs. Master of Education candidates through the Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) Education: cultivating capacity for return Project, refugee teachers, and York University To rebuild conditions for peace in a post- program mentors working in Dadaab conflict society, the best investment is in the people who are seeking to return to rebuild HaEun Kim [email protected] their nation. Since December 2014, there have Program Administrator, BHER Project been over 84,000 refugees from all walks www.bher.org of life who have returned to Somalia under 1. UNHCR Kenya (2019) ‘Operational Update: Dadaab, Kenya July UNHCR’s repatriation programme.4 The 2019’ bit.ly/UNHCR-Dadaab-July2019 majority of those refugees who have worked 2. UNHCR ‘New procedures set for Somali refugees to return home voluntarily from Kenya’, 11 November 2013 in Dadaab schools as teachers and those who bit.ly/UNHCR-Somali-return-2013 have earned scholarships and degrees wish 3. Human Rights Watch ‘Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to to return to Somalia in order to rebuild their Somalia’, 14 Sept 2016 bit.ly/HRW-involuntary-Kenya-2016 lives and serve their home countries. We 4. bit.ly/UNHCR-Somali-volrep-July2019 have seen several graduates of the Borderless 5. As refugees do not have the right to work in Kenya, they can only work as ‘incentive workers’, who are paid a fixed low wage, Higher Education for Refugees Project return typically a fraction of what a Kenyan national would be given for to Somalia to find work they could not obtain working in the same position. in Kenya – in finance or government, with 38 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Forced to return? Facilitated return of refugees to Myanmar Yuka Hasegawa

Despite recent political developments in Myanmar and difficult conditions in Thailand, there has been widespread and deep-seated reluctance among refugees to participate in the official facilitated return mechanism.

In early 2016, the conflict in Myanmar of the State-building process, not the end appeared to be in a state of transformation. of it. There were many reforms needed and The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement meanwhile the delicate balance of power was signed in October 2015 and the new between the civilian government and the government came into power in April 2016. military had to be negotiated at all levels. On The areas of return in the south-east of the a day-to-day basis, there was some confusion country were enjoying a period of relative over how authorities’ decision-making stability. It was presumed, therefore, that processes functioned. In the face of these refugees in nine refugee settlements in complexities, the authorities and the EAOs Thailand would be anxious to return home. did not prevent the return of refugees but In 2016, the governments of Myanmar and nor were they ready to actively promote it. Thailand put in place a facilitated return The refugees themselves – who are from mechanism, with the support of the UN Karen and other ethnic groups from south- Refugee Agency (UNHCR), but it has failed to east Myanmar – did not push to return, generate any significant return momentum, either. There was some excitement over the and only 729 refugees out of a population political changes happening in Myanmar of 100,000 have opted to participate so far.1 but, for many refugees, the prospect of return was vague and they were reluctant to give Stakeholder attitudes up the limited freedoms available to them in One could argue that the return of refugees the temporary shelters in Thailand without would have signified peace and the genuine more concrete evidence of the benefits of political will of the authorities and the return. Many refugees had been resettled ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to from Thailand to a third country, and hope move beyond conflict. This could also have persisted among those who remained – been an opportunity for the government to even though resettlement had been phased demonstrate its ability to provide protection to out – that they too would be resettled. minority groups. However, the government, The refugees made major decisions military and EAOs did not necessarily collectively, rather than individually; consider the official return of refugees as there was a general tendency to follow an immediate priority. Many stakeholders their leaders who, in turn, were usually were sceptical of the speed of the political influenced by the political positions of the negotiation process, through which the return EAOs. The refugees in general had little of refugees may eventually be realised. motivation to participate and take a role The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in State development and peace building. was signed by only eight of the 15 EAOs. As Many thought that the authorities in such, this Agreement and the subsequent Myanmar had not demonstrated sufficiently Pyidaungsu Accord (which laid out 37 that they would welcome their return. The agreed points towards a peace process) did refugee leaders were hesitant to fully shift not provide a solid platform for a return their advocacy activities into Myanmar, process. With the inauguration of the new and some of them were not willing to lead government, Myanmar entered a new phase the return but wanted rather to be the Return 39 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

last people to return. The refugees also The real obstacles to return envisioned return in groups, which had Focus group discussions on return and the effect of inhibiting individual decisions reintegration conducted in Myanmar in 20163 to return. Overall, the refugees showed highlighted five areas of deep-seated concern no urgency to return to Myanmar. among refugees (and other stakeholders) about the refugees’ potential return: The role of the international community The main stakeholders – the refugees, the Physical safety and security: With no authorities in Myanmar and EAOs – did not progress in the peace process, returning think that the time was ripe for return in refugees could still be caught up in 2016 and 2017 but some in the international violence in the areas of return, while community thought that it was indeed the the return of refugees could trigger an right time to develop and foster a return increase in crime and unrest. Refugees also momentum among the refugees. At that expressed concern about the dangers posed time, there was no particular pressure from by unmarked and uncleared landmines. the Government of Thailand, which was Citizenship documents: For those who do instead ready to respect a transitional period not possess such documents (especially in politics, State structure and peace in those with ‘problematic profiles’, such as Myanmar before refugees would be expected those who had been, or were suspected of to return. Significantly, however, key donors having been, engaged in rebel or criminal began expressing their intention to curtail activities, and those of ethnic and religious funding for NGOs providing assistance in 2 minorities), it takes a considerable leap the temporary shelters in Thailand. This of faith to place sufficient trust in the became a cause for major concern among authorities to apply for them, especially both the refugees and the NGOs, threatening as the authorities or others could use the their very survival. Some NGOs voiced their citizenship documents or the process of concerns about the pressure placed on the obtaining them as a tool for discrimination. refugees to return through the cutting of assistance. Others thought that the shifting Land tenure: The refugees’ homes may of assistance from the shelters in Thailand to have been destroyed or confiscated. New the return areas of Myanmar was legitimate, houses will need to be built (and land especially given that some organisations found for this) for returning refugees, and based in Thailand regularly supported the rebuilding and restitution will also be areas of potential return across the border. required. Ownership of land in Myanmar The overall context in Myanmar was not in general is complex and is becoming a conducive to the full-fledged promotion of cause of new conflicts. return with safety and dignity, especially Basic services: Much of the rural in light of the Rohingya crisis in 2017, returnee areas are conflict-affected and but those external actors who favoured have suffered long years of neglect and repatriation argued that there should, at underdevelopment; return areas lack least, be a mechanism to accommodate those basic services, such as health, education, refugees who wished to return voluntarily. electricity and roads. Refugees also express UNHCR took on responsibility for concerns linked to broader minority rights the preparations for facilitated returns, issues, for example the limited use of and the first facilitated return took place minority languages in education. in October 2016. However, even given Livelihood opportunities: New jobs or the reduced assistance in the shelters industries are needed in the returnee areas. and the cash incentives provided, only The economy of south-east Myanmar relies a small number of refugees have opted heavily on remittances from those working to return, indicating that the refugees’ abroad, mainly in Thailand. concerns are not all about assistance. 40 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

Many of these concerns were discussed refugees can make to State- and peace- in the focus groups but they reflect the building but more could have been done to main challenge of reintegration – human enable refugees to trust the authorities and security. Addressing this needs to be part to cultivate refugees’ awareness of their role of a longer-term State- and peace-building in the State- and peace-building processes. strategy, but no visible roadmap for Fourth, the international community reintegration has emerged and the enormity needs to consider a more comprehensive of the task ahead may explain why many approach that places return within the context refugees cannot see return as a reality. of peace and development. The international Trust underlies human security. The community played a role in encouraging the facilitated return mechanism requires a return and helping to establish the facilitated returning refugee to deregister from the return mechanism, in accordance with the refugee database and the assistance lists in principle of assisting refugees who voluntarily the shelters; his/her name is then submitted wish to return with safety and dignity. Given to the Governments of Myanmar and the importance refugees place on human Thailand for clearance. With little trust in security and peace building, however, there is the authorities, the refugees consider official a need for longer-term development in order return risky and prefer anonymity. Between to improve the conditions in return areas. 2012 and 2017, an estimated 18,000 refugees4 The decision to return is complex, have returned unofficially to Myanmar. Some influenced by both push and pull factors. The of those who signed up for facilitated return slowness to return in the case of refugees also chose ultimately to return unaided. from Myanmar suggests that certain In order to help trust be built, the political and human security conditions refugees called for goodwill gestures from and progress in peace building must be in the authorities and EAOs to demonstrate place to generate a return momentum. The their commitment to peace, to reducing international community may help maximise tensions, and to mitigating community-level the existing momentum but cannot create it. prejudice. Instead, there were significant Yuka Hasegawa [email protected] delays in the Myanmar government’s UNHCR Assistant Representative in Turkey; processing of the list of refugees’ names former Senior Field Coordinator in Myanmar submitted for facilitated return, which 2015-17 has not helped to reduce the mistrust. Several points can be learned from The views expressed here are the author’s own this case-study of facilitated return. and do not necessarily represent those of First, the facilitated return mechanism UNHCR. was neither part of the peace process 1. According to UNHCR, 71 people were facilitated in their return framework nor did it reflect refugees’ to Myanmar in October 2016, another 93 in 2018 and 565 in 2019. strong will to return; it had more to do 2. The Border Consortium (2017) 2017 Annual Report with responding to externally generated bit.ly/BorderConsortium-AnnualReport-2017 3. UNHCR (2017) ‘UNHCR Report on Return and Reintegration pressure for the return of the refugees. Workshops in Southeast Myanmar’, January 2017. About 500 Second, the decision to return was people from different stakeholder groups and the international not simply a question of assistance and community participated in the discussions. incentives (even though there was some 4. See endnote 2. demand for larger return packages and for assistance in the returnee areas). Much of the refugees’ concern was, in thematic listings fact, around the need for human security – from physical security to access to More resources on Return: To access citizenship documents and livelihoods. a listing of previous FMR articles and Third, the decision to return may be issues focusing on Return, see linked to the potential contribution that www.fmreview.org/thematic-listings Return 41 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return A premature attempt at cessation Hamsa Vijayaraghavan and Pallavi Saxena

There are many lessons to be learned from UNHCR’s controversial – and ultimately reversed – decision to end refugee status for Burmese Chins in India and Malaysia.

Ethnic minority groups, including the Chin, standards are met when a cessation procedure Shan and Karen, have been fleeing Myanmar is initiated; in this instance, there were glaring since at least as early as 1988 because substantive as well as procedural errors. of severe oppression and persecution. One of the guiding principles which Those fleeing had been subjected by the determine the application of the cessation Burmese national military to forced labour, clause is that the developments in the country arbitrary arrest/detention, custodial torture, of nationality or origin which purport to extrajudicial deaths and sexual slavery. evidence change of a fundamental nature The Chin in particular arrived in India must “be given time to consolidate before and Malaysia in large numbers and, while any decision on cessation is made”. A the vast majority have since been resettled situation that – as in Myanmar – continues to third countries (including Australia to show signs of volatility is not by and the US), around 35,000 Chin refugees definition stable, and cannot be described remain in these two countries. Given as durable. In fact, this clause should only that neither country has signed the 1951 (as noted in the guidelines) come into Refugee Convention and neither has a play when changes have taken place that formalised refugee protection regime, this address the causes of displacement. group of refugees has relied on the UN Moreover, peace agreements following Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to provide legal conflicts that have involved different ethnic status and documentation, and health and groups need enhanced scrutiny, since education services. However, UNHCR progress towards genuine reconciliation announced in June 2018 that it would be can prove difficult in such cases. Further, ending the refugee status of Chin refugees in assessing the potential durability in India and Malaysia with effect from of the change, the success of practical 31 December 2019, citing as a reason the developments such as voluntary repatriation, “improvement in conditions” in Chin and the experience of returnees, should State since the installation of a nominally be given considerable weight, as should civilian national government in 2010. reports from independent observers. In this case, UNHCR did not provide Cessation guidelines any evidence that any of the aforementioned In making this announcement UNHCR criteria had been met. As a new democracy, referred to the policy as “ending refugee the political changes Myanmar has undergone status” and facilitating “voluntary cannot be described as enduring. The repatriation”; the term ‘cessation’ was not Burmese national military continues to used. However, the policy clearly drew upon enjoy unhindered access to Chin State and Article 1C of the 1951 Refugee Convention, to the neighbouring Sagaing Region (where which defines the circumstances under Chin minorities also come from) and recent which refugee status will cease to apply and, reports indicate that there are continued by so doing, the announcement amounted clashes between it and the Arakan Army (a effectively to a declaration of a cessation of non-State armed group) in the southern part refugee status. That being said, however, of Chin State. In fact, the UN’s own human the policy did not meet the requirements rights expert on Myanmar has expressed relating to cessation as outlined by UNHCR alarm at the escalating violence in northern itself.1 International law requires that certain and central Rakhine State and Chin State.2 42 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

The UNHCR guidelines also state consultative process, NGOs working with that “Cessation should … not result in Chins in India were not consulted before the persons residing in a host State with an policy was announced, and its announcement uncertain status”. However, in this case came as a surprise and a shock to both the the governments of Myanmar, India and community and all those working with them. Malaysia offered no confirmation about In other such situations, UNHCR has documentation for the Chin community organised ‘go-and-see’ visits to allow refugees and nor did UNHCR intimate what the opportunity to verify for themselves that documents the community would receive the situation in their home country makes once their refugee status ceased. return viable. While UNHCR eventually The guidelines also state that: “[C]hanges indicated that such a visit was being explored in the refugee’s country of origin affecting in the Chin context, it never materialised and, only part of the territory should not, in in any event, would not have been useful principle, lead to cessation of refugee status”. since travel documentation issues mean Given the state of affairs in neighbouring Chin refugees could not have participated. Rakhine State, which continues to produce Further, the focus of the visit was stated as a steady exodus of Rohingya refugees, and being limited; conditions of safety, security in Kachin State where conflict is ongoing, and human rights – which are of primary UNHCR’s decision that it would be safe for concern to refugees – would not be covered. Chins to return is particularly perplexing. Moreover, notification interviews (in which Furthermore, UNHCR refused to comment refugees were asked to indicate whether on the safety of return to areas other than they would accept or challenge the decision Chin State (even to Yangon), disregarding the to cease their refugee status) had already fact that a lack of freedom of movement in commenced, and the outcome of any go-and- the country of origin demonstrates that the see visit could not have been made available changes are neither fundamental nor durable. to refugees in time to inform their decision. The guidelines indicate the critical factor as to whether the refugee can “effectively Lack of information re-avail him- or herself of the protection of UNHCR’s messaging to the community his or her own country”, clearly highlighting indicated that the repatriation policy was that access to basic infrastructure and based on an improvement in conditions livelihoods are essential constituent parts of in Chin State, conditions that had been restoring effective protection. Such effective “carefully assessed” by UNHCR. However, protection, they go on to acknowledge, is UNHCR made no move to share information more than physical security or safety; it on how this conclusion had been reached. The must also encompass effective governance, little material that was eventually provided a functioning law and justice system, and was on general access to health, education sufficient infrastructure to enable rights to and documentation, without mention of be exercised. The guidelines point out that other relevant elements such as safety, an important indicator of the protection security, infrastructure and extent of military/ situation is the general human rights paramilitary activity in returnee areas. situation in the country of origin – and Chin refugees were also given negligible the Myanmar government’s recent human information about the return support rights record leaves much to be desired.3 UNHCR would provide. UNHCR gave no Furthermore, UNHCR’s policy failed to indication that it would offer an enhanced meet a number of the necessary procedural package for vulnerable groups, and also elements required for the declaration of categorically stated that it would be unable cessation, as outlined in these guidelines. to provide continued assistance to refugees For example, although the guidelines state upon their return and that they would have that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to contact local NGOs in Myanmar. This runs and refugees should be included in the counter to the agency’s own guidelines and Return 43 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

practice on repatriation and reintegration, situation where there are no viable options which stress the importance of continued for repatriation, integration or resettlement UNHCR involvement in the longer term. – as is the case for the vast majority of Chins in India and Malaysia – goes against the Lessons from the attempt protection mandate of UNHCR. Finally, UNHCR persisted in the implementation UNHCR-led repatriation must be voluntary of the policy for nine months, expending rather than mandated; to say that return is considerable time and resources and causing the only option, and that those choosing much anxiety. In March 2019, however, and to remain would face the loss of UNHCR not least as a result of months of tireless protection, is inimical to giving refugees advocacy by the Chin community, civil a choice and, had the policy gone ahead, society and others, UNHCR finally agreed would surely have constituted refoulement. that Chin refugees require continued Hamsa Vijayaraghavan [email protected] international protection, and withdrew the policy.4 Pallavi Saxena [email protected] The abandonment of the attempt to strip Migration and Asylum Project (M.A.P), Delhi a group of its already fragile status, in a www.migrationandasylumproject.org climate that is already hostile to refugees, 1. UNHCR (2003) ‘Guidelines on International Protection: holds many valuable lessons. First, it is Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the imperative to remember that the cessation 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the “Ceased Circumstances” Clauses)’ clause is meant to guide host States who www.refworld.org/docid/3e50de6b4.html decide to repatriate a refugee group to do so 2. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Myanmar: in a manner that is humane and responsible, UN expert expresses alarm at escalating conflict, calls for civilian and that ensures their dignity. For UNHCR to protection’, 18 January 2019 bit.ly/OHCHR-Myanmar-180119 set this process in motion is unprecedented 3. See Human Rights Watch World Report 2019 – Myanmar: Events of 2018, 17 January 2019 and, in this case, fundamentally uncalled www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burma for, given that neither of the host countries’ 4. UNHCR ‘UNHCR says ethnic Chin refugees may require governments nor the government of continued international protection as security situation worsens in Myanmar called for such action. Second, Myanmar’, 14 May 2019 bit.ly/UNHCR-Chin-Myanmar-140519 to propose withdrawing protection in a

Repatriation with dignity Kerrie Holloway

The Rohingya in Bangladesh and Syrians in Lebanon have different expectations of what repatriation ‘with dignity’ would entail.

The requirement for voluntary repatriation repatriation as ‘the free and voluntary return to be conducted ‘with dignity’ has appeared of refugees to their country of origin in safety consistently in humanitarian policies and and dignity’. Neither document, however, guidelines since the late 1980s. The Guiding explicitly states what repatriation with dignity Principles on Internal Displacement launched means in practice, and debates continue over in 1998, for example, state that internally the conditions needed for a dignified return. displaced persons (IDPs) should be allowed ‘to Dignity is shaped not only by culture but return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, also by people’s experiences and expectations to their homes or places of habitual residence’. both prior to and during displacement. In its 2004 Handbook for repatriation and Repatriation of affected populations who reintegration activities, the UN Refugee Agency fled warfare, such as Syrians in Lebanon, (UNHCR) gives the definition of voluntary and those who fled persecution and 44 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

discrimination, such as the Rohingya in Bangladesh, will necessarily look different. Over the past year, repatriation has been increasingly promoted as a solution to the refugee situations of UNHCR/David Azia UNHCR/David both Rohingya and Syrians. Based on fieldwork undertaken in two principal host countries, Bangladesh and Lebanon, between March and August 2018,1 it would appear that there are four main conditions that need to be in place for repatriation to take place in dignity. Repatriation must be culturally and contextually specific; it must not be the result of a false choice between an undignified displacement or an undignified return; it must not lead to further internal displacement once people return; and it must involve the displaced in every stage of the process. Research by the ODI found that all four conditions are currently lacking in the proposed

repatriations of the Rohingya and Syrians. Rohingya refugees make their way down a footpath during a heavy monsoon downpour in Kutupalong refugee settlement, Cox’s Bazar Culturally and contextually specific district, Bangladesh. For the Rohingya in Bangladesh, dignity was out of five people saying they would not overwhelmingly a social concept grounded return until it was safe to do so. Many also in mutual respect, whereas for Syrians in mentioned the need for guarantees that Lebanon dignity was more often an individual returnees would not face retribution for concept centred on individual rights. fleeing, for refusing to fight, or for failing For Rohingya interviewees in Bangladesh, to support the winning side. As one man repatriation with dignity must include explained: “The most important condition citizenship and mean having the same for dignified repatriation is security. I want rights as other citizens in Myanmar – to see security for me and my family.” neither of which they had previously Dignified repatriation, then, must be enjoyed. As a 40-year-old man stated: highly contextualised. Indeed, in these two “Our dignity is our ability to be free in cases, Rohingya interviewees often stated our home and have the citizenship card. that they felt dignified repatriation did Without it, how can we feel dignity?” not exist, as they did not expect Myanmar Displaced Syrians in Lebanon who would ever agree to give them citizenship, fled civil war, however, rarely mentioned whereas Syrian interviewees were more citizenship, rights or access to services. Many hopeful and anticipated returning to of the Syrians interviewed said that prior to their country of origin – but only once their displacement they had led comfortable the war is over and it is safe to do so. lives enjoying political participation and free health care and education. Despite currently Dignified displacement being denied the same rights as Lebanese People should not face the false choice of citizens and having no access to free health ‘choosing’ to return home as their only escape care or education, these issues were rarely from an undignified situation. Many Syrians mentioned when speaking about repatriation. described this dilemma, noting that their Instead, the aspect that mattered the most dignity would be reinstated only when they to them was security, with more than four return home. One man explained that if there Return 45 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

was safety in Syria, desired return with dignity. In Myanmar, he would be “ready approximately 125,000 Rohingya IDPs remain to live in a tent on the in Central Rakhine, displaced since fleeing dirt” in order to leave violence in 2012 and forced to live in 36 camps Lebanon and no longer or camp-like settings, surrounded by barbed- be treated unjustly. wire fences with no freedom of movement By contrast, or access to basic services. In Syria, there although they do are approximately 6.2 million IDPs living in not have freedom of collective sites and makeshift settlements. movement, education Understanding the conditions or work, a number of IDPs in the country of origin and of Rohingya in communicating those conditions accurately Bangladesh explained and impartially to refugees contemplating that they preferred return would allow them to make a more to live in camps in informed decision about the likelihood Bangladesh instead of of being able to return in dignity. returning to Myanmar because they are Involving the displaced free to practise their Finally, and most importantly, the affected religion – one of population must be consulted and involved the main ways they in their own repatriation. Rather than the conceptualise dignity. current tripartite commissions involving At least in Bangladesh, they said, they UNHCR and the governments of the countries are safe from religious persecution and of refuge and origin, there are those who would get a Muslim burial. However, if advocate for quadripartite commissions, the Bangladesh government’s proposal to which would also include representatives relocate them to Bhasan Char (a small silt from the displaced population to help island off the coast of Bangladesh) goes judge whether return is both safe and ahead, the Rohingya, like the Syrians, will voluntary.2 In the case of both Rohingya also be presented with a false choice; neither and Syrians, the necessary conditions for return to Myanmar nor relocation to an repatriation, as expressed by the displaced isolated island will uphold their dignity. population, are inherently political. For Aid agencies and human rights advocates the Rohingya, meeting those conditions must strive to create and maintain dignified would require changes to citizenship laws; conditions in displacement, through for the Syrians, it would involve a peace listening to what displaced people need process and, for many of them, changing the and want and through partnering with political regime. Quadripartite commissions others in the development, peacebuilding could communicate with the displaced and advocacy sectors to encourage host populations, confirming the conditions governments to create and maintain an necessary for dignified return, and work enabling environment for refugees. with the government in the country of origin to ensure these conditions are in place. Further displacement Kerrie Holloway [email protected] For repatriation to be dignified, acceptable Research Officer, Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI social, political and economic conditions www.odi.org must exist in the country of origin, and the status of IDPs from these populations should 1. HPG’s Dignity in displacement project www.odi.org/projects/2916-dignity-displacement-rhetoric-reality be resolved. Otherwise, those returning to 2. Crisp J and Long K (2016) ‘Safe and voluntary refugee destroyed homes or to continued persecution, repatriation: from principle to practice’, Journal on Migration and for example, may find themselves internally Human Security, 4(3): 141–147. displaced and thus unable to secure the https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241600400305 46 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Minority return: the way home Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides

Studying cases of successful minority return may help determine what policies could help other potential returnees.

Displaced people may return home after long return and live as a minority in their former periods of absence despite the presence of place of residence. Finally, the informal hostile local authorities and opposition from association of neighbours in exile can have new occupants or settlers in their old homes. a key role in organising and facilitating What underlies these difficult decisions? rural returns, and displaced people from Studying cases of successful voluntary return areas which experience high rates of return might lead to a better understanding of which are more likely to return themselves.2 institutional arrangements and policies could Even after decades have passed and help potential voluntary return as well as people have re-established their lives how to help communities in displacement. elsewhere, a significant percentage of people With this possibility in mind, we analysed aspire to return, especially to areas in which several cases of forced migration followed there are many people of the same ethnicity. by large-scale voluntary minority returns In Cyprus, about a third of Greek Cypriot (or intentions to return) among Bosnians, IDPs surveyed in 2016 said they never thought Cypriots and ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Our of returning, even in the case of a negotiated research combined qualitative fieldwork with peace settlement; another third said they only large-scale surveys focusing on ‘minority rarely or sometimes thought about it; and returnees’ (that is, displaced persons another third said they were always thinking returning to an area now under the political about it. Given that a reunited Cyprus will control of another ethnic group). Our research be a federation with Greek and Turkish has been driven by an attempt to understand Cypriot constituent states, we presented how, in the wake of ethnic cleansing and two scenarios to potential returnees. When genocide, communities struggle to restore a asked how likely it was for them to return multi-ethnic environment and reintroduce and live in their pre-1974 home under Greek positive majority–minority relations. Cypriot administration in the next three years, nearly 60% said it was likely or very What minority returnees share likely. When asked the same question but Our findings suggest that gender, age and under Turkish Cypriot administration, education are the principal factors that numbers dropped to just over 22%.3 affect the likelihood of individual return of minority returnees. In Bosnia and in Turkey’s How to support returnees Kurdish region, those with a high level of Based on our research, we have some education and permanent employment in the suggestions about the kind of policies and place of exile are less likely than others to institutional arrangements that are most return.1 For example, while young, educated likely to facilitate return, especially among women are very unlikely to return, elderly those who are less inclined to return. The men with a low level of education are very presence of international security forces and likely to do so. Forced migrants are also more the removal of war criminals from positions likely to return if they have memories of of power have certainly helped to facilitate positive pre-conflict inter-ethnic relations and return in Bosnia. Furthermore, in Bosnia if they still see their pre-conflict residence as and in Turkey’s Kurdish region, the return of ‘home’. Data from Bosnia and Cyprus also property (houses and land) or compensation show that internally displaced persons (IDPs) for its loss or destruction definitely facilitated who are less nationalistic are more likely to returns: for example, Kurdish returnees Return 47 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

who receive State compensation are three In Cyprus, contrary to received wisdom, times more likely to return, after taking almost twice as many non-displaced Greek other factors into account. And allowing Cypriots as IDPs were absolutely determined displaced people to vote remotely in the to reject a future peace plan, despite the local elections in their pre-war place of IDPs often being portrayed as less willing residence was a very important facilitator to reach a compromise. Similar research of the revival of local political power in among Palestinians suggests that refugees several Bosnian cases of successful mass are more likely to accept a peace plan than minority return, such as Kozarac and Drvar. non-displaced Palestinians, indicating similar In addition, well-organised associations trends even in more polarised environments.6 of neighbours in exile have clearly provided coordination, enhanced a sense of security, A future research agenda and recreated some sense of community While our research on minority return after return in Kozarac and Drvar.4 As has produced several important findings, the differences in the experiences and we have so far failed to answer some key the minority return rates of Bosniacs and questions that might inspire future research. Bosnian Serbs imply, if the political leaders First, our individual-level findings indicate of an ethnic/religious community openly elderly family members (especially men) and consistently support the return as are most in favour of return while younger ‘patriotic’, displaced people are more likely family members (especially women) are to return and reintegrate successfully. The most opposed to it. However, we do not have case of Bulgaria is particularly instructive the data necessary to understand how and (and counterintuitive) following the why family members with divergent views voluntary return of approximately 40% arrive at a certain collective return decision, of displaced Turks in the post-Zhivkov hopefully without a painful split in the family. era. Their return was encouraged by the Second, while we know young educated European Union during Bulgaria’s accession women are the least likely to return, we talks but it was also Bulgaria’s inclusive are unable to tell whether this preference is political institutions (specifically its use the result of greater educational and paid of proportional representation in national employment opportunities in the place of exile elections) which incentivised coalitions or may be a consequence of the desire to avoid and allowed the Movement for Rights and returning to a patriarchal rural community. Freedoms – the political party formed by Third, as the majority of successful the Turkish community following Bulgaria’s cases of mass return have been to mono- transition to democracy – to become pivotal ethnic villages and townships, it is unclear in elections and to play an active role in all what policies are needed to facilitate mass critical legislative processes in parliament.5 minority returns to urban areas, and thus Finally, to ensure returns are sustainable, to recreate multicultural cities. Evidence local economic development and economic on the small number of urban minority opportunities for the returnees need to returns suggests the importance of creating be planned well in advance and provide a multi-ethnic police force and enforcing support after return. In addition, potential non-discriminatory hiring practices; rural returnees seem to be more likely to support returnees are more self-sufficient, for example peace agreements if those agreements by relying on their own land to produce food, ensure their property rights and/or access while urban returnees may depend on the to fair compensation in accordance with willingness of others (i.e. the ethnic majority) international standards such as the Pinheiro in order to get jobs and secure a lifelihood. Principles or precedents set by the European Fourth, our research has so far failed to Court of Human Rights. More importantly, measure the impact of different war-time the general portrayal of IDPs and refugees as contexts (such as the regional intensity of radicalised groups needs to be challenged. violence, local mortality rates and the level 48 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

of housing destruction) or to collect time- Neophytos Loizides [email protected] specific data (such as completion of education) Professor, School of Politics & International that would explain why return might take Relations, University of Kent place at an early rather than late stage. www.kent.ac.uk/politics/staff/canterbury/ While we now understand what worked loizides.html in some cases of difficult minority returns, 1. Stefanovic D and Loizides N (2017) ‘Peaceful Returns: Reversing we advise against generalising our findings Ethnic Cleansing after the Bosnian War’, International Migration 55(5): 217–234; Stefanovic D, Loizides N and Parsons S (2015) to other post-conflict contexts without first ‘Home is Where the Heart Is? Forced Migration and Voluntary testing them through similar surveys. For a Return in Turkey’s Kurdish Regions’, Journal of Refugee Studies voluntary, sustainable and successful return 28(2): 276–296. 2. Metivier S, Stefanovic D and Loizides N (2017) ‘Struggling for process, it is crucial to allow displaced and Within the Community: What Leads Bosnian Forced Migrants people to voice their key concerns, trade- to Desire Community Return?’, Ethnopolitics 17(2): 147–164. offs, priorities and intentions. They are the 3. See Psaltis C, Cakal H, Loizides N and Kuscu I (2019) ones who have to find the strength and the ‘Internally Displaced Persons and the Cyprus Peace Process’ International Political Science Review courage to face the difficult path back home. (DOI: 10.1177/0192512119872057) Djordje Stefanovic 4. Sivac-Bryant S (2016) Re-Making Kozarac. London: Palgrave Macmillan. [email protected] 5. Loizides N and Kutlay M (2019) ‘The Cyprus Stalemate: Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Opportunities for Peace and Lessons from Turkish-Bulgarian Criminology and Gender Studies, University of Ethnic Relations’ in Heraclides A and Cakmak G A (Eds) Greece Adelaide https://researchers.adelaide.edu.au/ and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation. Routledge. profile/djordje.stefanovic 6. Communication with Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin based on data from http://pcpsr.org/en/node/731

Legal preparedness for return to Syria Martin Clutterbuck, Laura Cunial, Paola Barsanti and Tina Gewis

Preparation in terms of legal rights is crucial for Syrian refugees who are planning to return.

There can be few more difficult and complex refugees in Jordan and Lebanon suggest decisions for refugees than if and when to that the following elements are key to return home after a long period in exile. When protecting the legal rights of returnees. such a decision is taken, however, refugees should be supported to ensure that they are Legal identity and civil documentation: ‘legally prepared’ for return. This means Returnees need to be able to prove their being aware of their rights, obligations and legal identity, status, nationality and entitlements in both host country and country family lineage. Lack of legal and civil of origin and having the necessary support documentation may directly hamper the and documentation to be able to claim their possibility of crossing the border and will rights and navigate the challenging road affect returnees’ enjoyment of a number of home. This is a fundamental component human rights. It also increases their exposure of any returns framework, as set out in the to protection threats upon return, including Comprehensive Protection and Solutions restrictions on freedom of movement, risk Strategy for Syria drawn up by the UN of arrest, detention, trafficking, sexual Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which highlights exploitation, child marriage, family the need for physical, material and legal safety separation and statelessness. Under- or as an integral aspect of any durable return.1 undocumented refugees face significant The experiences of the Norwegian hurdles to accessing education, health Refugee Council (NRC) in its work on services and humanitarian and development durable solutions options for Syrian assistance. Examples from Syria discussed Return 49 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

in a previous issue of Forced Migration unable to obtain a travel document. Moreover, Review show the importance of knowledge even once across the border, refugees may of the different laws and procedures for be prevented from returning to their former obtaining documents in both the country host countries to complete required birth of origin and in different countries.2 or marriage registration procedures. Authorities in host countries have demonstrated some flexibility in simplifying Family separation: Most refugee crises these civil documentation issues. For example, give rise to a variety of complex family Jordanian authorities have declared amnesties unification issues as families are separated under which informal marriages have been and split across countries. Complicating formalised without penalty, while courts factors include when family members go have accepted proof of parental identity via missing, marry in host countries or have alternative documentation such as a UNHCR children born in different countries. Over asylum-seeker certificate or residency card, 10,000 Syrian children are estimated to or have accepted photocopied rather than have fled the country as unaccompanied original documents.3 Similarly, Lebanon minors. Refugee women whose husbands has shown some degree of responsiveness are missing and presumed dead in Syria through time-limited amnesties on late face uncertainty as to whether or not they birth registration. However, major gaps can legally re-marry in host countries, or remain in access to documentation. claim inheritance rights, without having formal proof of their husband’s death that Border crossing: In order to return home, is recognised under Syrian law. Child refugees require a valid passport, travel marriage is used by many Syrian parents document or accepted form of identification. of teenage daughters as a negative coping Syrian refugees can use their national mechanism. However any children of such identification card for travel between Syria underage marriages cannot be registered and Lebanon but legal exit from Lebanon in Jordan or Lebanon in the absence of a requires legal residency – something only formal marriage certificate, regardless of approximately one quarter of Syrian refugees where the marriage took place. Depending have because of the prohibitive cost and on when refugees left Syria as well as their complex procedures involved. Furthermore, age when arriving in Jordan or Lebanon, an estimated 100,000 Syrian refugee youth in individual members of the same household Lebanon aged 15–18 are unable to apply for may possess varying forms of identification legal residency because they do not have a and face different hurdles in obtaining their Syrian national identification card or personal documents, all of which may increase the civil extract, such as written confirmation likelihood of family separation, including of their legal identity and status, both of across borders. Patterns are emerging of some which must be obtained from Syria.4 While family members returning to Syria, with Lebanese authorities have exempted some others staying behind in host countries. categories of returnees from paying the fines associated with irregular stay, this does not Housing, land and property (HLP) rights: apply to all and some may receive a re-entry As housing has often been damaged or ban.5 Others exiting without proof of formal destroyed during conflict, finding shelter residency may be detained or face problems and ensuring security of tenure are key at the border. Seventy-five per cent of Syrian considerations for refugees contemplating refugees in Jordan do not hold a passport, return.6 Surveys conducted in Syria highlight although a laissez-passer authorising one- that the protection of property, assets or land way return to Syria can be obtained for US$25 is a key motivating factor for return. The from the Syrian embassy. Nevertheless, an lack of adequate housing, and other housing- estimated 7% of Syrian refugees in Jordan related concerns such as disputed property are completely undocumented and may be ownership, are cited by large numbers of 50 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 NRC/Hussein Amri NRC/Hussein

Mohammed lives in Irbid in Jordan, in a rent-free apartment provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Urban Shelter project. Here he is talking with NRC staff about the process of acquiring civil documentation: “I had to get a new marriage certificate issued, after 17 years of being married, in order to process documents for my children and be able to register them in schools.” Syrians living in Jordan as obstacles to their documents – and be aware that even leases, return.7 NRC surveys conducted in Jordan utilities bills, building permits or court orders indicate that only 20% of refugees possess may be of important evidentiary value in HLP documentation for Syria such as land protecting rights. Finally, Syrian refugees titles and deeds. Syrian women face particular in Jordan and Lebanon should be informed challenges in protecting their HLP rights about the procedures for obtaining a power because of a discriminatory legal framework of attorney from outside Syria, which may which limits their inheritance rights, and be necessary if selling or leasing property because of historical and traditional roles in Syria or if claiming inheritance rights. related to ownership rights – which can be further complicated by a lack of marriage, Settling legal and administrative matters in divorce and death documentation. host countries: Following an extended period Roughly one third of all Syria’s current in a host country, refugees must resolve a legislation and regulations relevant to HLP range of associated legal and administrative rights have been passed by Syrian authorities issues before they can return home. They since the start of the conflict, so it is of vital must finalise housing arrangements, importance that Syrian refugees are kept up terminate leases, retrieve bonds and deal to date with developments that may affect with any disputes. Employment relationships their property rights. They should also must be terminated and outstanding retain copies of their HLP documentation wages and entitlements (such as social both in hard copy and in digital form in security payments) recovered. Parents must order to safeguard against future loss of obtain educational certificates for their Return 51 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

children to facilitate school enrolment in to a complete package of information and Syria. Syrian refugees typically have high assistance, including about their legal rights levels of household debt, which may also and responsibilities when returning. NRC’s need to be dealt with prior to return. experience in refugee movements in other contexts, such as Kenya/Somalia, the Great Access to rights and entitlements in the Lakes and Lake Chad Basin, highlights country of origin: Refugees’ knowledge the importance of providing accurate of procedures in their country of origin information, legal support in obtaining may be limited, particularly in a rapidly documentation, and contact details of changing context such as Syria and given organisations who may be able to assist in their often long absence. Positive recent both host and country of origin. Such an changes by the Syrian government to raise approach can prevent premature returns the legal age of marriage from 15 to 16 years, and ensure that refugees are able to access for example, may have consequences for assistance and mitigate risks upon return. the validity of marriages of those under 16 Martin Clutterbuck [email protected] which were entered into under Lebanese Regional Advisor, Information, Counseling and law. Some refugees will require assistance Legal Assistance (ICLA) Programme, Norwegian to access humanitarian assistance and Refugee Council (NRC) Middle East Regional government services, schools, health care Office and other rights and entitlements. They must be able to apply for lost or missing civil Laura Cunial [email protected] documentation from government registries ICLA Specialist, NRC Syria and have the chance to correct wrong Paola Barsanti [email protected] information. And, as returnee legal issues ICLA Specialist, NRC Jordan will often straddle borders, cooperation agreements between host countries and Tina Gewis [email protected] countries of origin (with the necessary ICLA Specialist, NRC Lebanon resources to support them) will be critical. Norwegian Refugee Council www.nrc.no

1. UNHCR (2018) Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: Providing legal support to returnees Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria The cumulative effect of the civil https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63223 documentation gap means that Syrians are 2. See also Clutterbuck M, Cunial C, Barsanti P and Gewis T (2018) ‘Establishing legal identity for displaced Syrians’, Forced Migration growing increasingly reliant on dangerous Review issue 57 coping mechanisms, including the use of www.fmreview.org/syria2018/clutterbuck-cunial-barsanti-gewis fraudulent documents, adoption of false 3. UNHCR/NRC (2019) Uncertain Futures: Legal and Civil identities and payment of bribes. More must Documentation, Housing, Land and Property and challenges to return for Syrian refugees, p6, 29–30; UNHCR (2017) ‘Ensuring birth be done by authorities to facilitate access to registration for the prevention of statelessness’, Good Practices documentation and to provide the necessary, Paper – Action 7 bit.ly/UNHCR-birthreg-2017 updated information they require. Host 4. NRC Lebanon (2019) ‘Legal Residency for refugee youth in countries and countries of origin should Lebanon’, Briefing Note, February 2019 5. General Directorate of General Security ‘Regularization for exit prioritise the issuance of documents, ensure regulations’, 1 August 2018 (Arabic only) the existence of effective and accessible www.general-security.gov.lb/ar/news/details/558 procedures, and make available legal support. 6. See also Sonmez S, Murray S and Clutterbuck M (2018) Legal aid providers can play a complementary ‘Protecting property: the Iraqi experience’, Forced Migration Review issue 59 role by advising refugees of their options, www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples20/sonmez-murray- helping them access documentation, and clutterbuck advising them on laws, procedures and 7. Samuel Hall (2018) ‘Syria’s Spontaneous Returns’, p12 requirements on both sides of the border. bit.ly/SamuelHall-Syria-spontaneous-return-2018; UNHCR and NRC (2018) ‘Uncertain Futures; Civil In order to ensure that refugees are in a Documentation, HLP and barriers to return for Syrian refugees’, position to make the best-informed decision p7, 37; UNHCR/iMMAP (2018) ‘Intentions and Perceptions of about their options, they must have access Syrian Refugees in Jordan’ 52 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Return to Syria after evading conscription Ahmad Araman and Shaza Loutfi

Syrian refugees who have evaded military service face barriers to return which call into question the viability and sustainability of other refugee returns.

The evasion of conscription has emerged as one but there are numerous stories of such men of the primary reasons for which young men choosing to return to Syria, despite great risk, over the age of 18 have fled Syria. It is also one because they have been unable to secure family of the primary reasons they cannot return. With reunification in countries of asylum. Decisions the Syrian government promoting instances around return pose other dilemmas that of return as a validation of its stability and affect the whole family. For example, refugee authority, and with increasing international women and children may either choose to stay pressure for refugees to return, this issue could displaced with their husband/father/son be a useful angle through which to assess the or to return to Syria without them, which readiness of Syria to offer its people sustainable – quite apart from the emotional impact of return. It begs the question: if these men separation – may expose them to greater risk cannot return safely, should the international on their journey and even when back in Syria. community encourage others to do so? A number of countries do not consider A 2014 decree stipulates that military-aged evasion of military conscription alone to be men (including the growing number of young grounds for granting refugee status for Syrians, men who have reached the age of service despite the overwhelming evidence of risk outside Syria) who are unwilling to serve upon return for this group and an analogous but who wish to return to Syria must remain case in Eritrea. There, a 2016 UK appellate outside the country for at least four years and tribunal found that refugees of conscription age pay an exemption fee of US$8,000. The same would face persecution and abuse if returned decree also requires men over 42 years old (that to Eritrea. This ruling led to an amendment is, who are above the age of military service) to the UK’s immigration policy and provided who have not served to pay an exemption fee further evidence that the treatment of men of the same amount – in general, an impossible who return having evaded conscription sum for refugees. Estimates indicate that up prevents them returning in safety and therefore to 75% of Syrian refugees wish to return1 but gives grounds for their continued asylum. issues around military conscription prevent a sizeable group of refugees who would otherwise Granting amnesty voluntarily return from doing so. The numbers In an attempt to address such concerns, in are indeed considerable: as of 19 September October 2018 Syria issued an unprecedented 2019, UNHCR had registered 1,866,881 male decree granting amnesty to all military service Syrian refugees aged between 18 and 59.2 violators, on the condition of their physical Evasion of military conscription interacts surrender to a military office – within four with other factors that affect decisions both to months for those inside the country and six flee and to return. Numerous studies identify months for those outside. Although many family, friends and social networks to come expressed distrust of the decree, a great second only to safety and security – which number of people submitted their names. includes the risks of military conscription However, they then found themselves back and risks faced on return following evasion on conscription lists in as little as seven days, – in such decisions. Although it is difficult after the government exploited a loophole in to confirm numbers, reports estimate that the decree. This reflects the perpetuation of thousands of refugees returned to Syria in 2018 the status quo not only of the last eight years and early 2019. There are no concrete numbers of conflict but also of the conditions that of how many military-aged men returned, precipitated and triggered the crisis in 2011. Return 53 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

To avoid this happening again, and to across Syria in order to determine national support sustainable return, a successful, compliance with the amnesty comprehensive amnesty in the Syrian a targeted strategy of State-sponsored context would need to include: community cohesion activities to mitigate dismissal of past crimes related to military possible backlash against those who did service evasion and desertion not serve exemption from future military service a gradual discharge of those who have (including any civil alternative), either served their required term, alongside a unconditionally or by instituting a range of benefit levels for the men and their reasonable exemption fee families to honour those who served. a ‘grace period’ that is long enough to Ahmad Araman [email protected] ensure true voluntary return in conditions Humanitarian Field Coordinator in Syria of security and dignity – or no period specified at all Shaza Loutfi [email protected] Until recently Program Officer, US Institute of release of all individuals currently under Peace in Iraq investigation or imprisoned as a result of military service evasion and desertion 1. UNHCR (March 2019) Fifth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria permission for international authorities to https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68443.pdf observe and document returnee situations 2. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

IDPs of East Beirut versus the Lebanese State Diala Lteif

This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Taif agreement that formally ended the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990. Three decades later, some communities remain internally displaced because of the actions of the State.

The eastern tip of Beirut, commonly labourers lived in cramped wooden and tin known as Quarantina, is a lower-income shacks. The slum dwellers included a mix of neighbourhood bordered by the Beirut Armenian, Kurdish and Palestinian refugees River to the east and encircled by the port who lived in close proximity to rural Lebanese to the west and north. During the late 19th and Syrian migrant labourers. The addition century a nomadic Sunni tribe of Arab cattle of these new populations to the Arab al herders settled in Quarantina and began Maslakh had, over the years, transformed the operating a slaughterhouse along with weekly neighbourhood into a predominantly Muslim livestock and meat markets (although land quarter within Christian eastern Beirut. ownership was only formalised under the The displacement of the population French Mandate between 1920 and 1943). of Quarantina was the first major forced Due to their association with this trade, the removal to take place during the Lebanese residents later became known as Arab al Civil War. Fuelled by confessional and Maslakh – Arabs of the Slaughterhouse. political motivations, the militia of the The slaughterhouse and its by-product Christian right-wing forces attacked the industries needed quick access to labourers, neighbourhood in January 1976 – part of a and migrant labourers and refugees flocked larger plan to divide the country and capital to the area in search of livelihoods. In the into distinct confessional zones. Eastern years leading up to the Lebanese Civil War, Beirut was meant to become Christian and the neighbourhood had earned a reputation this predominantly Muslim neighborhood for being a slum, where an estimated 30,000 stood in the way. This event, known as the 54 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

Quarantina massacre, led to 1,500 deaths and allowing their rightful owners to return.² displaced those who remained. Due to its But no such measures have been adopted to strategic location, Quarantina was turned into address the occupation by the armed forces. the military headquarters of the local militia No politician or public figure has dared to and a large majority of the buildings owned take an official stand, and the Arab Al Maslakh by the original inhabitants were destroyed or have thus had to attempt the delicate task repurposed by the occupying forces as bases of negotiating with an apparatus of the for their operations. Locals estimate that 500– Lebanese State on their own, to no avail. 600 families were affected by the displacement. Cabinet decision No 322 was meant to Today, a small percentage of this regulate the process of reconstruction but population, those whose properties were not also make it more accessible by reducing entirely destroyed or repurposed during the building permit fees and other legal costs war, have been able to return to their homes – but the first clause of the decree excludes (around 40 plots). Most of these families said city dwellers from these new facilities.³ This the modest compensation paid by the Ministry has affected all IDPs in Beirut and more of the Displaced was insufficient and required particularly the remaining Arab Al Maslakh. supplementary personal funds. The remaining Faced with the high cost of building permits 80% of the population have not been able to and other related fees, those whose buildings return due to specific State-imposed obstacles. had not been destroyed by shelling and fighting have had to resettle in substandard State-condoned protracted displacement conditions (40 land plots) while many others Despite the Taif Agreement’s clear statement have not been able to return at all due to the of the right of every citizen to return to their irreparable damage done to their property place of displacement, the text fails to address or its complete destruction (50 land plots). specific scenarios such as the Quarantina The longer this status quo is maintained, case. The complete return of the Arab Al the greater the challenges. Since the Maslakh community is today prevented by, situation arose more than 30 years ago, first, the continued presence of the Lebanese the affected families have grown and Armed Forces on their private property and, multiplied, creating a more complex web second, cabinet decision No 322 issued in 1994 of claimants. Today, many of Quarantina’s which explicitly excludes cities from a special original land owners have died, leaving exception to building regulations for IDPs. several dozen heirs to share ownership of The Lebanese army, acting in the name one parcel or split the increasingly smaller of the State and in an effort to reassert its portion of the value of the property. sovereignty over the territory, took over Reasons for the dispossession of the different Quarantina bases but showed Quarantina’s refugees and migrant workers are no intention, as time passed, of relocating multiple, and are compounded by economic its troops. The local population was then interests in prime property. Together they are faced with the difficult task of negotiating responsible for the deplorable current situation property reclamation with a State entity. In of the Arab Al Maslakh community which exists the words of one of their spokespersons: “We in a state of protracted internal displacement shifted from a scenario of illegal occupation with long-frustrated hopes of return. by militiamen to a legal one imposed by Diala Lteif [email protected] the State.”1 Three decades later, the army Department of Geography and Planning, still operates bases on around 75 plots of University of Toronto www.utoronto.ca privately owned property, preventing these 1. Private communication, 18 January 2019. individuals from claiming their land. 2. Assaf G and El-Fil R (2000) ‘Resolving the issue of war At the conclusion of the war, the Ministry displacement in Lebanon’, Forced Migration Review issue 7, 31–33 of the Displaced dealt with civilian/private www.fmreview.org/land-and-property-issues/assaf-elfil squatting by paying a relocation fee to families 3. Law 322, issued on 24/3/1994, Section 1. The Arabic text of the law in return for vacating private property and can be found at bit.ly/Lebanon-Law322. Return 55 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur Zurab Elzarov

IDPs in Darfur continue to face difficulties in securing a durable solution to their displacement. Recent developments may offer new hope for some, but complex challenges remain.

The conflict in Darfur, which erupted Hassabo Abdelrahman announced the in 2003, resulted in widespread human government’s determination to put an rights violations and the displacement end to displacement in Darfur before 2017, of a large number of people throughout suggesting that IDPs choose between the region. The conflict has destroyed two options: either to return to their infrastructure, damaged social cohesion places of origin or to settle in their area and community stability, and seriously of displacement, with IDP camps to be curtailed employment and livelihood security. converted into residential areas. Similar As confidence was eroded, investment in announcements were made by other high- much-needed development of the region level politicians, including President Omar also diminished. According to the Sudan al-Bashir in November 2017. In August 2016, 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview,1 some there had been reports of an intention survey 1.6 million internally displaced people having been distributed by the Humanitarian (IDPs) in Darfur are registered as living Aid Commission (part of the government’s in camps. The UN and partners estimate Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs) among that a further 500,000 displaced people live the displaced, providing them with a third in host communities and settlements. option, that of resettling in a third location.3 Political progress was made with the IDPs across Darfur voiced their rejection signing of the Doha Document for Peace of the government’s plans regarding the in Darfur (DDPD)2 in May 2011 between closure of IDP camps, arguing that no the Government of Sudan (GoS) and some voluntary return to their places of origin of the armed opposition groups. Progress would be possible in the absence of a regarding return and other durable solutions comprehensive peace agreement that provides across Darfur, however, remains limited, for security, stability, justice and access to given continuing hostilities and insecurity; basic services, compensation and land rights. the resulting protracted displacement of IDPs have maintained that the conditions are large numbers of IDPs poses a continuous not in place for them to begin a new life in challenge to satisfying their basic needs their areas of origin or to settle sustainably and maintaining an adequate standard of elsewhere. Furthermore, many of the IDPs living, and puts significant pressure on are now accustomed to living in an urban urban infrastructure. Durable solutions environment and would expect a similar to displacement need increasingly to be level of services in their places of origin. explored – solutions based on the principles It is important to understand in this of voluntariness, safety and dignity, and context that working towards durable which focus on enhancing communities’ solutions means diminishing gradually the capacity for self-reliance, supporting needs and vulnerabilities of displacement- livelihood opportunities in areas of voluntary affected communities, while strengthening return, and addressing the burden on their capacities, skills and resilience. The urban and rural absorptive capacity. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) National authorities have primary Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs responsibility for developing and identifies three options to achieve this goal, implementing a durable solutions strategy. which are underpinned by the principles In December 2015, Sudan’s Vice-President of voluntariness, safety, dignity and non- 56 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

discrimination: 1) return of displaced persons camp-like settings since the outbreak of to their place of origin or habitual residence; the conflict, and the majority of displaced 2) local integration in areas where displaced people (especially young people) have persons have sought refuge; and 3) settlement become increasingly urbanised. Local elsewhere in the country.4 However, the integration has been occurring over the last mere return, local integration or settlement few years despite the lack of direct external of IDPs elsewhere in the country are not support. Although people continue to necessarily durable solutions. The options receive humanitarian assistance, they also must be feasible, viable and enduring. participate in the local labour market, trade The role of the UN–African Union Mission in local commercial markets and access basic in Darfur (UNAMID) and the humanitarian services such as education or health care for community in the first instance is likely themselves or their children, and use other to be to support IDPs to make a voluntary community infrastructure, such as legal and informed decision about their future. courts. This has prompted local authorities However, displaced people cannot make in several locations to include displaced a voluntary and informed choice unless populations in their urban planning, as they have an accurate understanding of the for example in Nyala, South Darfur. conditions on the ground and understand Despite the political focus on returns, the implications of each option. Similarly, local integration is the reality for many UNAMID and humanitarian organisations displaced people, with evidence indicating cannot plan for and support IDPs effectively that families will continue to integrate without having some understanding of further into local communities as they their intentions. Gaining more information aspire to urban livelihoods and to living on displaced people’s intentions is nearer to basic services compared with those therefore a key first step in delivering available in areas of origin. That said, there effective support for durable solutions. is likely to be some fluidity between returns and local integration; families may decide Option 1: Return to pursue both at the same time. Better According to the Humanitarian Needs information and up-to-date profiling of IDP Overview, about 386,000 returnees have camps and residents will help to predict voluntarily returned to their places of future trends and to inform programming. origin across Sudan, including Darfur. These returns have been a mixture of Option 3: Resettlement permanent and seasonal movements, with There have been fewer cases of recorded some people moving back to areas of origin resettlement in Darfur than of either return temporarily for livelihoods purposes. or local integration. So far, the only major The experience of those who have resettlement initiative has been in Sakaly, returned permanently so far, however, calls South Darfur, where the State Ministry into question the overall sustainability of of Urban Planning and Nyala South returns. Many people have reported facing Commissioner were planning to allocate significant challenges in rebuilding their lives, plots of land to the Sakali IDPs currently including a lack of adequate basic services living in the suburbs of Nyala town. They and livelihoods opportunities. Moreover, for have also allocated land to 1,614 households some people, disputes over land ownership from Al Serif IDP camp and integrated have been a critical issue; in some returns them with the Nyala community. A further areas, land has been settled by others since 1,800 IDPs from the same camp will be the original displacement took place. given plots of land. In practice, it is probable that some portion of these cases – which Option 2: Local integration on the face of it would appear to be return The majority of displaced people have or local integration initiatives – involves resided in peri-urban or urban camps or some form of resettlement. Given the Return 57 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

issues over land mentioned above, some national institutions, it is the Government returnees have migrated to the general of Sudan that has the primary responsibility vicinity where they once resided but not to to address internal displacement by the original house or village. Meanwhile, protecting and assisting IDPs and by those displaced people who have pursued creating conditions conducive to safe, local integration often move outside camp durable and voluntary solutions in Darfur. settings to other surrounding urban areas. The 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan The government and some bilateral for Sudan5 states that about 1.86 million donors have built houses for returnees in what people in Sudan, including Darfur, will they call ‘model return villages’, primarily either continue to live in a situation of through one-off financial commitments. For protracted internal displacement or be example, such villages have been established newly displaced. As in recent years, some in Fasha Beliel and Baba Beliel in South returns and local integration of displaced Darfur, funded by Kuwait and Qatar; in Karti people are expected to continue. In the and Aru in Central Darfur, funded by Saudi meantime, in August 2019 high-level officials Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and from the UN and African Union told the in Habila Kanari and Borta in West Darfur, UN Security Council that the installation funded by the League of Arab States and of Sudan’s new transitional government Saudi Arabia. However, the experience of presents an opportunity to restore long-term such projects has raised questions around stability in Darfur.6 To this end, resolving their sustainability, particularly regarding internal displacement (and preventing issues of land ownership and continuing future displacement) is inextricably linked to investment and maintenance. The alternative achieving lasting peace and stability. On one concept of ‘service hubs’ is attracting hand, unresolved problems of displacement attention, where common facilities or utilities may cause instability and thus threaten are built close to several return communities, peacebuilding efforts. On the other hand, providing access to basic services in close durable solutions, particularly return, cannot proximity to where returnees reside, thereby be achieved for IDPs as long as there is a benefiting from economies of scale. lack of security, property is not restored, and conditions for sustainable solutions are Way forward not in place.7 The new Sudanese authorities Under the 2017–19 Integrated Strategic will therefore have a difficult and complex Framework, UNAMID and the UN Country task as substantially increasing support for Team (UNCT) agreed that the planning durable solutions in Darfur will require of durable solutions for displaced people expanding basic services, enhancing security should be conducted through an area-based and rule of law in areas of return, enabling approach. At the beginning, joint work sustained access to affected people, and focused on three pilot areas: Abu Shouk and addressing the root causes of the conflict. Al Salam in North Darfur, as a model for Zurab Elzarov [email protected] durable solutions for IDPs in urban areas, Chief of Joint Operations Centre, UNAMID and Um Dukhun in Central Darfur, which https://unamid.unmissions.org has a focus on IDPs and refugee returnees in a rural context. UNAMID and the UNCT/ The views expressed here are the author’s own Humanitarian Country Team’s Durable and do not necessarily represent those of UNAMID. Solutions Working Group helped develop 1. bit.ly/Sudan-HumanitarianNeeds2018 tools for monitoring durable solutions, 2. bit.ly/DPDD-en including the gender and human rights 3. The results of this survey have not been shared with UNAMID aspects, and the sustainability of the (re) or the UN Country Team (UNCT). integration of displaced populations. 4. www.unhcr.org/50f94cd49.pdf Nevertheless, despite the efforts of UNAMID 5. bit.ly/Sudan-HumResp-2019 and UNCT in collaboration with relevant 6. www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13929.doc.htm 7. https://brook.gs/2ktYPwZ 58 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019 Political and economic reintegration: key to successful return Barbra N Lukunka and Peter de Clercq

Refugees and IDPs require national and international actors to make concerted efforts to ensure that they are successfully reintegrated into the economic, social and political landscapes of their countries of origin.

The triggers for displacement often reflect fragility) is often the reason why individuals, a rupture in the relationship between families and communities fled their homes the State and its citizens, signifying the in the first place. The successful return State’s inability to fulfil its obligations to and reintegration of refugees and IDPs – protect its citizens from violent conflict. to regain their place as full members of Mending this relationship is crucial, and society with equal access to basic rights and political reintegration of refugees and services as other citizens – requires a re- internally displaced persons (IDPs) is engineering of the State–citizen relationship. fundamental to successful reintegration. Burundi and Sudan offer good This involves including individuals in the examples of addressing such challenges political landscape of their countries of in refugee and IDP return processes. origin through enabling them to interact with the government, to be included Burundi in decision-making processes and not Since gaining independence in 1962, Burundi to be made invisible or be impeded has experienced repeated episodes of ethnic from accessing local authorities. violence between the majority Hutu and Return is a difficult process, especially minority Tutsi populations. With the advent if refugees have been in exile for prolonged of stability following a peace agreement periods of time or were born in displacement. brokered in 2000 and the re-election in 2010 of During their time in displacement, conditions Pierre Nkurunziza as president, Burundian and structures will have changed or been refugees returned from neighbouring redrawn in the country of origin. In some countries in large numbers – over half a cases, refugees are seen as foreigners by million between 2002 and 2011. Upon their their home communities. IDPs, on the return, however, returnee refugees claimed other hand, can face a slightly different that they felt invisible in the eyes of the reintegration challenge. Although they authorities. They felt that they had been have not left their national territory, they erased from the political landscape and have often been rendered invisible, or at that this, and the abuse of power by some times are seen as undesirable and have been in authority, was having an impact on their marginalised. They live in conditions that livelihoods and their access to land. Women resemble and are sometimes worse than those in particular faced considerable challenges experienced by refugees, and live in fear given that by law they could not inherit land.1 of exploitation, violence and human rights In 2015, the situation in Burundi abuses. Both groups often face discrimination deteriorated and the country risked relapsing and exclusion from host communities as into violent conflict. President Nkurunziza well as local and national authorities. indicated that he would run for a third term, A State’s violations against its citizens, which was disputed by various sections of especially violations committed by its the population. This led to government forces security apparatus, breed distrust among targeting those who opposed the president; the population, including returnees. State human rights violations were widespread persecution (particularly in contexts of and more than 400,000 Burundians have Return 59 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

fled the country since

2015 (mainly to Tanzania, RSC Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo).2 What the Burundian situation reveals

is that, despite the elections UNHCR/Benjamin Loyseau of 2010, the political process was incomplete. Returnees expressed a sense of invisibility upon return; they felt that they were not heard or able to talk to authorities and that opportunities, especially economic opportunities, were dependent on Burundian refugees fleeing violence in 2015 are transferred to a ferry that will bring them to political affiliation. These Kigoma, Tanzania (and thence to Nyaragusu refugee camp). were indications that the political gains of natural resources as well as changing that Burundians, including returnees, and power relations and dominance by groups the international community believed supported by the government in Khartoum. Burundi had made were unsustainable. In addition, the long duration of displacement coupled with the limited Sudan prospects for return and absence of viable The Darfur region in western Sudan has rural livelihoods meant displaced and traditionally been a vast expanse where returning refugees had little opportunity nomadic and farming communities co- other than to adopt urban lifestyles and existed and interacted. As a result of livelihoods. As very little effort was population migrations and climate change, made by authorities to develop economic the relationship between the various groups opportunities around the cities, most of has turned increasingly tense and prone the displaced ended up in the informal to conflict. Over time, as a result of the sector, at most times indistinguishable increasing domination of the government in from the urban poor. Recent calls for Khartoum by northern Arab tribes, native social justice and inclusion may trigger the administrative mechanisms were dismantled necessary attention by local, regional and and there was increased repression of the national authorities to their situation. non-Arab tribes who engaged in agriculture. The conflict in Darfur started in 2003 Recommendations and resulted in mass internal displacement. The situations in Burundi and Sudan Darfur was re-shaped into a largely urbanised illustrate that refugee and IDP return is context with three major cities: El Fasher, a multidimensional process requiring El Geneina and Nyala. Nyala, for instance, attention to the economic, social, political which is now the third largest city in and psychological aspects of return and Sudan, tripled in size as a result of the mass reintegration. The success of return is displacement. Some efforts were made by the linked to political processes. The holding Sudanese authorities – with support from of elections and semblance of stability do the international community – to support the not, however, guarantee sustainable return return and reintegration of IDPs in areas of unless displaced people are given a voice. origin but the prospects for return as a larger- It is important to focus on ensuring that scale durable solution were always limited the political and economic reintegration due to changing realities linked to scarcity of refugees and IDPs is factored into any 60 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

peace building and post-conflict State outcomes do not leave out the peace-building formation. The return of refugees and IDPs elements. Successful reintegration of should be seen as fundamentally linked returnees requires that peace and political to the relationship between the State and processes should not only focus on formal its citizens and any return process should political processes and institutions but should therefore be accompanied by social and also include returnee and local communities. national dialogue efforts to encourage Barbra N Lukunka [email protected] reconciliation, inclusion and participation. Peace and Security Officer, International Individuals should be given a substantive Organization for Migration www.iom.int platform to air their grievances over aspects such as the delivery of services and access Peter de Clercq [email protected] to opportunities being reserved for certain Visiting Professor, School of Governance, political constituencies. Furthermore, University of Witwatersrand www.wits.ac.za confidence building between a State’s security The views expressed are those of the authors apparatus and the population should be and do not necessarily reflect the views of the a key and deliberate focus. Transitional authors’ institutions. justice mechanisms should be set up to 1. For a more about the challenges of refugee return in Burundi ensure accountability for crimes committed, see Lukunka B N (2018) ‘“They Call Us Witches”: Exclusion and including sexual and gender-based violence. Invisibility in the Burundian Returnee Reintegration Process’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology https://psycnet.apa. Such mechanisms should include a facility org/record/2018-39059-008 and Lukunka B N (2017) ‘The Romance for displaced people to reclaim their rights of Return: Post-exile Lives and Interpersonal Violence over Land in Burundi’ in Buckley-Zistel S and Krause U (Eds) Gender, (including to property and land). And the Violence, Refugees international community should ensure www.berghahnbooks.com/title/Buckley-ZistelGender that efforts to coordinate humanitarian and 2. Human Rights Watch ‘Burundi: Events of 2017’ development work to bring about collective www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/burundi

Returns in complex environments: the case of South Sudan Babette Schots and Garth Smith

Humanitarian agencies must be extremely cautious about how they support returns and relocations to ensure that they avoid causing harm or allowing humanitarian assistance to be instrumentalised by political actors.

South Sudan has been in the grip of civil involuntary returns, often all within the war since 2013 and has witnessed instability, same geographic area. In addition, while violence and human rights violations across some of those returning are doing so to the country. Many South Sudanese have their former homes, many are relocating to fled, and there are now approximately 1.5 areas where they may have never previously million internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived or have not done so for many years. and over 2.2 million refugees in neighbouring In 2019 the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) countries. Since the signing of the peace has been analysing IDP and cross-border agreement in September 2018, numbers of movement flows from Sudan. Securing refugees and IDPs returning to areas of quantitative data remains extremely difficult habitual residence or areas of origin have but consolidating data from various sources been rising. The situation remains complex, does highlight that numbers of persons however, with multiple push and pull factors returning are increasing, particularly and concurrent spontaneous, facilitated and within specific areas of South Sudan. Field Return 61 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

assessments in areas of return, however, have and road from neighbouring countries or highlighted that some of those returning are IDP sites. Some repatriating South Sudanese in fact people who have been secondarily have also reported receiving transportation displaced – re-displaced either as a result assistance from international and national of a lack of services in their area or country private sector companies operating close to of refuge, or as a result of localised conflict the border regions. Conversely, however, some in their displacement location. Significantly IDP leaders within PoCs have encouraged deteriorating conditions in Sudan and a lack those residing in the camps to remain there of access to even basic health services, food and to resist returns efforts, potentially to or water, for example, have often been cited cement the leaders’ political leverage. as reasons for people returning to South To further add to the complexity, people Sudan. Similar patterns have also been are often moving back, or their return being seen within the country, with IDPs being facilitated, to areas where service provision displaced due to a lack of access to services or access to basic coping mechanisms and returning to their areas of former is extremely limited. Discussions with residence in search of services, rather than returning or relocating IDPs, for example, because they believe it is safe to do so. have highlighted that movement flows Such instances generally cannot be (including humanitarian-facilitated returns) considered to meet the international have been to areas where food insecurity is definitions of fully informed and voluntary at emergency levels (IPC Phase 42) or where returns. However, it is important to note there are significant risks of intercommunal that international humanitarian and South violence or which lack basic food, water and Sudanese understandings of voluntariness health services. Discussions with returnees and safety may differ significantly; in and relocated men and women have also recent field research in areas of high highlighted that, while the signing of the returns and population movement, the peace agreement was a contributing factor, majority of returnees considered themselves the main drivers for their decision to move to have returned voluntarily, yet over were overwhelmingly push factors, such 80% indicated that their transport was as inadequate living conditions, lack of provided by a political actor and many access to livelihoods and limited safety cited push factors in their displacement and security in their area of displacement, location as the primary reason for return. leaving them with few options. Moreover, over half immediately entered displacement camps in search of services Applying the IASC Framework rather than returning to their former area The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions of residence. Crucially, dynamics differ for IDPs is the widely recognised benchmark significantly by location, and it is essential for return of IDPs, and states that return and that generalised analysis is not applied to all relocation must be voluntary, safe, dignified areas of the country as this will undermine and informed. In a context where human contextualised provision of assistance. rights violations are continuously committed In addition to ‘spontaneous’ (that is, against civilians, whether displaced or unassisted) return, some of these movements not, and where service provision across are being facilitated – some on a voluntary the country remains almost universally basis, some with a risk of coercion, further below SPHERE standards, it is difficult for complicating the situation. Since late 2018 humanitarian and development agencies to and 2019, humanitarian UN agencies and determine the nature of the conditions in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) which return happens. Moreover, discussions have facilitated returns from Protection of on returns within humanitarian leadership Civilians (PoC) sites1 in Juba, Bor and Wau. circles and coordination bodies have often South Sudanese government or opposition risked assuming a homogeneity among groups have also facilitated returns by air returnee populations, failing to reflect the 62 Return FMR 62 www.fmreview.org/return October 2019

need for different methods and levels of for stability and finding a durable solution – assistance depending on whether return issues that have been seen in this particular is assisted or spontaneous or on the push context in previous years. Primary research and pull factors at play. There is a risk that has already identified, for example, reports simplistic narratives around return ignore of returning men and boys being forcibly the realities and complexities on the ground recruited by non-State actors. In addition, the and instead direct funding and programming significant lack of housing and land rights for to people based on their return status rather displaced populations, and particularly for than their humanitarian needs. This is women, risks significantly exacerbating inter- particularly true given that local actors have community tension where new populations in some cases inflated return numbers or occupy land or property that was once actively encouraged returns as a method of occupied by the returning population. accessing increased international assistance. A lack of attention to such issues was Where returns are considered to be recognised as a failure of previous returns spontaneous, it is essential – in order not to and reintegration processes in 2005 and cause harm – that any assistance is based on 2016. Unfortunately, the distinction between an analysis of the reasons and circumstances providing needs-based services and of the movement and considers the local encouraging returns remains extremely conflict and political dynamics affecting difficult to identify, particularly given the integration into the receiving community. pervasive lack of services in South Sudan The UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) or southern parts of Sudan. Such lack of has stated that South Sudan is not yet ready services means that virtually any service for large-scale facilitated returns, and in provision risks creating a pull factor. August 2019 issued a guidance note on this In instances of facilitated or assisted matter. Humanitarian agencies must respect return, similar challenges exist in applying this, and ensure that people can return internationally recognised standards. PoC and relocate on their own, having access to sites are clearly an ineffective method of relevant information to make an informed providing long-term humanitarian assistance, decision. Previous cases have shown that and protracted displacement is highly rushing assistance can create a false sense undesirable. In some instances those living of security and optimism which exacerbates within PoCs have expressed a desire to return conflict drivers and undermines the potential to their places of origin or residence and Danish Refugee Council Danish Refugee

Refugees returning from Sudan to northern South Sudan, June 2019. Return 63 FMR 62 October 2019 www.fmreview.org/return

requested assistance to do so; current returns such instances is agreed by the HCT in in such instances have been facilitated by advance, that the process for assessments humanitarian agencies and UNMISS. Such and decisions is transparent and fully requests for assistance to return present documented to ensure accountability in the highly complex issues for humanitarian future, and that it recognises the complexity actors, however, particularly where IDPs and nuances of the situation on the ground. actively request assistance to return to their Within South Sudan, various agencies are homes but where there is evidence that such working to develop an operational framework return may be unsafe or undignified or have that will integrate and contextualise the implications that lead to harm either for the IASC principles for use in South Sudan, individuals or the wider population in the and that all humanitarian and development area. IDPs requesting to return may also lack actors can sign up to and – most importantly adequate and reliable information about the – fully adopt. The aim is that this can be safety situation and services available in their applied throughout the country, led by the area of return. Displaced ethnic minority Advisory Group on Solutions. The operational groups and women, meanwhile, express a framework provides guidance on solutions, particular desire to return home, due to the following national and international legal risks of violence, including gender-based frameworks and minimum standards violence, in their place of refuge. They know for analysis and decision making; it also however that their original homes have been establishes an accountability mechanism destroyed or occupied, that the chances of around actors’ responsibilities. Thorough recovery and restitution are slim, and that protection and context analysis needs to be safety risks are still prevalent; rushing to conducted both in the area of displacement provide support to returnees therefore risks and in the potential area of return prior to increasing the marginalisation of minority any decision making around solutions. The groups, particularly if conflict-sensitive involvement of IDPs, returning refugees gender analysis and community engagement and other affected communities is crucial and participation are not thoroughly applied. throughout this process, and must not be Where displaced people have their own impeded by political, programmatic and means to travel, it is easy to support the other diverging interests. Bringing the principle of their freedom of movement. voices of displacement-affected populations Where they lack the basic resources to return, to the forefront of discussions would however, and assistance from humanitarian improve accountability and reduce the agencies is the only way that they may be likelihood of putting people at further risk. able to return, there is a difficult balance Babette Schots [email protected] to strike between supporting their choice Protection Coordinator and avoiding the potential of causing harm. Humanitarian agencies should be very Garth Smith [email protected] wary of thinking they know better than the Country Director South Sudanese people whom they serve by Danish Refugee Council, South Sudan choosing not to assist such return requests but https://drc.ngo/ evidence has also shown that some of those who have made what they consider to be an The views expressed in this article are the informed and voluntary decision to return authors’ own and do not necessarily represent and have been assisted by humanitarian the views of their organisation. agencies to do so have immediately been 1. Established by UNMISS to provide short-term protection to put at risk in their area of return, and have civilians. sought humanitarian assistance along with 2. Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) describes the severity of food insecurity on a scale of 1–5, where famine is classified as other displacement-affected communities. Phase 5. http://fews.net/IPC As a result, it is essential that the process for deciding when and how to assist in 64 action. To do this, it was noted, we should To we should it noted, was action. do this, prompt into mechanisms warning early transform to and of displacement, triggers and drivers able to detect better order be to in States, all and organisations, regional and international UN, all of the agenda the governance on displacement putting would require This causes. root address to and prevention prioritise to community international for the need the acknowledged root causes and their complexity. their and causes root of understanding abetter be must point starting The actors. of range awide by engagement and approach aholistic requires causes root its addressing by displacement Preventing causes of displacement’. causes root addressing and ‘Understanding theme the on focused Challenges Protection on Dialogue Commissioner’s High annual 2015, eighth December the In Refugees on Compact Global the of promise the and causes root Preventing addressing displacement, Volker Türk www.fmreview.org/return Introduction from theHighCommissionerfor Refugees Towards andaddressingtheroot causesofdisplacement understanding Filippo Grandi, HighCommissionerfor RefugeesFilippo Grandi, Refugee Forum inDecember2019. of displacementandto inform discussionsonprotection andsolutionsatthefirst Global This specialmini-feature willseekto enhanceourcollective understanding oftheroot causes for solutions,as well asto avert new displacement. to buildpeaceandsecurity,and inefforts isessentialifwe areto fullyleverage opportunities reinvigorate these.Embeddingactionto addressdisplacementinbroader development efforts, including through development andprivate sector to engagement,provides avitalopportunity on Refugees, withitsemphasis onmobilisingabroad rangeofactors andinstruments, to understand andaddresstheseareby nomeansnew.Efforts Yet theGlobalCompact action to tackle thesecomplex root causes. to preventdisplacement callsnot onlyfor politicalefforts andresolve conflictsbutalso for protracted, thechallenges generallydeepen.Asaresult,securingsolutionsto forced factors arealsocontributingto broader populationflows. Andasdisplacementbecomes governance, inequitable development outcomes,poverty andclimate change. Thesesame –areinvariablyand persecution underpinned by arangeofdeepercausesincludingpoor Refugee crisestoday areincreasinglycomplex; theimmediate drivers –conflict,violence Mini-feature on: Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding

1 Those gathered gathered Those and the need for a holistic approach. approach. for a holistic need the and phenomenon of the complexity the recognise displacement are not addressed, flight flight addressed, not are displacement of drivers such Where degradation. and change or environmental authoritarianism, inequality, severe industries, extraction trade, of law, arms rule the of the breakdown the violations, rights human serious from emanate they whether conflict, and violence fuel that factors overlapping often and underlying the address to imperative it is world displaced, the forcibly around people 70.8 million arecord With challenge. aformidable is displacement Addressing the root causes of causes root the Addressing October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 challenge. Enhanced coherence between between coherence Enhanced challenge. development and a humanitarian both is Displacement impact. maximises and complementarity advantage, enhances comparative and expertise of mandates, respect in of labour, Adivision rights. human of defence and promotion the alongside empowerment, and cohesion social to contribute that initiatives and strategies joint actor. one It of any requires remit sole change. climate of or effects adverse disaster with interacted has or violence conflict where situations in movements cross-border to witness borne has history Recent of concern. people other and for refugees including change, climate of consequences of the seriousness the (UNHCR) recognises Agency Refugee UN the difficult, remains displacement specific to change climate linking definitively Although actors. international of most agenda the on now firmly is and of displacement, driver arbitrariness. and anarchy chaos, from preparedness and stability justice, it separates essential: of law is rule the Maintaining addressed. be could how this and lead displacement, to or could leads right human for each of respect how alack examining it worth would be regard, this In exile. in live to forced and uprooted be will people less the respect, this in we make advances more The assured. be law to were humanitarian international as well as rights human international with compliance if minimised, at least impacts avoided, or their be could of displacement instances Many Preventing displacement of displacement. causes root the address donors), bilateral to and organisations regional States, (including others with advocate, to but instead mechanisms coping these on restrictions or enable promote to not is action ofrole humanitarian The for survival. option viable only the be it may Indeed, or community. individual by the exercised mechanism self-protection apreventive, often –is borders international crossing entails this when – including October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding It is evident that prevention is not the the not is prevention that It evident is a also is change Undeniably, climate Paper do ‘addressing’. on OECD Working Arecent we as ‘understanding’ on emphasis much as reconstruction. post-conflict in engage do –to to so safe it is when home countries their to return to of whom would like – most refugees equip and position better can development actors and humanitarian humanitarian-development-peace nexus. humanitarian-development-peace of the operationalisation advocate for the development programmes. many in attention more much needed fragility and conflict of drivers main and economy political the understanding that It observed case. the not fact in was this where instances several highlighted report The help lead stability. to and actor, improve governance a legitimate as State for the support would help reinforce ‘quick on wins’, afocus with programming, joint through actors diplomatic and defence development, humanitarian, joining that assumption the from started often efforts that It for over noted years. 30 countries refugee-producing biggest of the one Afghanistan, like countries conflict-affected and fragile in actors by international activities Engaging with affected communities communities affected with Engaging livelihoods. and education in investing also broadly, more rights while human law and of rule the and specifically, equality gender promoting include and of long standing, and understood well are Some prevention. to contribute and support to UNHCR for points of entry anumber are There The roleofUNHCR their lived experience of displacement. experience lived their toand appreciate place, first the in flee to them forced that factors the comprehend fully to refugees, from learn to need the is important No less causes. root address to efforts headway our in make to we are if prioritise and in we invest must that resource-intensive process but it is a process and atime- is evidence, through learning and causes, root its and displacement economically and socially. Contextualising –politically, changed has context the discussion, anew not is this Although In all our interventions, we place must interventions, our all In Despite the challenges, we should strongly strongly we should challenges, the Despite 2 reviewed evaluations of stabilisation of stabilisation evaluations reviewed www.fmreview.org/return 3

65 66 example, the #IBELONGexample, the campaign. for through, pursuing is UNHCR which displacement, and forced of conflict cause root particular one of addressing means peace. gap towards the bridge to helping thereby elements, armed of demobilised reintegration the supporting and justice to access securing as such contexts, post-conflict in return voluntary sustainable promoting in elements essential other are there negotiations, peace in heard are particular, women in and communities, displaced of voices the that ensuring to addition In lives. their affect that decisions in people stateless and of displaced participation the enable to intended is and approach based acommunity- promotes policy Diversity and Age, Gender The UNHCR’s programmes. of centre very at the is individuals and many indicators of the positive momentum momentum positive of the indicators many Over the next two years, they expect to plant – with the refugees – 20,000 trees in and around the site. site. the around and in trees – 20,000 refugees the 2019. –with plant to January in expect project they years, two areforestation next the Over started Federation World Lutheran and Company Life Land Nigerian partners its and 56,000 UNHCR hosting of impact refugees, the and warming global to due deforestation critical faces Cameroon in Minawao of region the As UNHCR/Xavier Bourgois www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Ending statelessness is an effective effective an is statelessness Ending 4 There are are There some of the worst humanitarian consequences consequences worst humanitarian of the some help mitigate to can planning contingency and systems warning early through violence. gender-based prevent to strategies and protection, child on projects building capacity- and training displacement, internal on policy development of law and the supporting through responsibility State promoting to contribute we can where areas of anumber outlines system) also cluster the within IDPs (primarily with engagement its on UNHCR’s outset. the guidance from impoverishment of upheaval and risk the mitigate can displacement internal to responses early and borders, international across displacement later potential forecast Conventions. Statelessness the to accessions further laws and nationality to reforms including area, this in place taking is that Alongside prevention, better preparedness preparedness better prevention, Alongside help can displacement internal Monitoring October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 1967 Protocol focus on the rights of refugees of refugees rights the on 1967 focus Protocol nexus. humanitarian-development-peace aforementioned the for implementing framework aconcrete provides GCR the and other relevant frameworks. relevant other and Development for Agenda Sustainable 2030 the with line in of origin countries to assistance development provide to need the highlights It also non-discrimination. and freedoms, fundamental and of law, rights rule human law, the international Charter, UN of the basis the on conflict resolve and prevent to efforts of international importance the It underscores actors. peace development and humanitarian, political, among cooperation improved to and situations, refugee of large triggers and drivers the to address efforts early to by States commitment a clear It represents situations. refugee protracted and of refugees movements large-scale both address to sharing responsibility predictable 2018. (GCR) December Refugees on in Compact the Global of affirmation the was as imperative, of this acknowledgement 2016 aclear September was in States Member by UN Migrants and Refugees New for York of the adoption Declaration universal The situations. refugee to approach proactive and comprehensive concerted, a need we debates will public toxic and fragmentation overcometo isolationism, we are If dimensions. but global regional only not on take that have consequences displacement of drivers andother conflicts how violent We repeatedly have seen The GlobalCompactonRefugees emergencies. into deteriorating situations critical prevent to start the from place put in be could systems arrivals, of new numbers large to responses humanitarian for funding predictable and early ensure to avoided. we amechanism had if been Or have could trauma and of chaos deal great a increase, to starting were numbers when 2015 in Mediterranean the across of refugees arrivals the to responses European guided action joined-up and planning contingency violence. hadexample, andFor of conflict October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The 1951 Refugee Convention and its its 1951 and Convention The Refugee The GCR aims to ensure equitable and and equitable ensure to aims GCR The 5 Indeed, Indeed, [email protected]. information pleasecontactPerveen Ali Commissioner for Protection. For more function asUNHCR’sAssistantHigh This contributionwas written inhisformer Secretary-General Coordination intheExecutive OfficeoftheUN for StrategicAssistant Secretary-General Volker Türk of displacement. causes root manifold the and address conflict prevent to collaboration substantive and for strong scope considerable is there mind, in this With action. in solidarity of concept the epitomising –all citizens private and society civil sector, private the donors, emerging institutions, financial international the including actors, of new arange from issues refugee on engagement strong witness to we continue times, difficult these in even yet, strategy. And evolved aresponse has into containment and reduced, being is space asylum rise, the on is nationalism populist when at atime challenges inherent 2019. the We recognise December in Forum Refugee Global first the lead-up to the in this mobilise to stakeholders other and States with closely working is UNHCR and will, of political mobilisation the on depend will implementation successful multilateralism. a pathway enhanced to chart we will hope which and address, does GCR the that aspect akey is this cooperation; international on guidance significant offer do not but they of States obligations the and Session, para8–9www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf Global CompactonRefugees, General Assembly, Seventy-third 5. ReportoftheUNHigh CommissionerforRefugees,Part II 4. www.unhcr.org/ibelong/ reduce need,riskandvulnerability. capitalising onthecomparative advantages ofeachsector to agencies areencouragedtoworktogethermore cohesively, and peaceactors.UNhumanitarian,development and peace – referstotheinterlinkagesbetween humanitarian,development 3. Thehumanitarian-development-peace nexus–or‘triplenexus’ https://doi.org/10.1787/de7e6a13-en Development Co-operationWorkingPapers, No40 from evaluations in Afghanistan asacountryoforigin 2. Morrison-MétoisS(2017) http://bit.ly/HCRDialogue2015 Understanding andaddressingrootcausesofdisplacement 1. HighCommissioner’s DialogueonProtectionChallenges(2015) However, as the GCR is non-binding, its its non-binding, However, is GCR the as Responding toRefugeeCrises:Lessons www.fmreview.org/return , OECD

67 68 conflict and a willingness on the part of external actors to cede control to local actors. actors. local to control cede to actors of external part the on willingness a and conflict localised of dynamics the of awareness agreater both requires peace sustainable Building to other contexts of displacement. of displacement. contexts other to adapted be can discussed ideas of the Many efforts. sustained led, locally enable better can actors of external support the how on and development programming, and humanitarian across integrated be can outcomes prevention conflict and how on peace-building practice, good and faced challenges on reflect to opportunities Uganda offer in refugees Sudanese South by led efforts Peace-building tensions. or exacerbating causes root addressing effectively either in role instrumental have an can assistance humanitarian populations. host and refugee between and communities refugee within tensions of risk the increase can displacement, of protracted situations in communities host and refugee both on placed strain the by exacerbated dynamics, these between interplay The narratives. political certain reinforce to used be can turn in which level, regional and at alocal communities host and refugee between relations in door.next conflict the in have astake also country host the in interests or political private instances, many In links. social and economic political, broader as well as ties, or religious ethnic share often countries these proximity, to geographic In addition fleeing. are refugees countries the with borders share of whom majority the by 15 countries, hosted world’s consistently of the most are refugees Sudan), and South and Afghanistan (Syria, countries three from come refugees of all half More than surroundings. new their into transplanted are fleeing are they conflict the from tensions underlying and dynamics the that finding often by conflict, homes their from world’s driven of the are majority refugees The building peace led locally support to practice changing and power Shifting Alex Shoebridge www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding In this context, development and development and context, this In reflected often are dynamics These possible violence, it is also important to to important also it is violence, possible or mitigate prevent to act and communities between differences recognise to critical it is While tensions. community perpetuate and harden to served has this time, Over lines. community along divided geographically subsequently were refugees settlements, refugee some out broke in violence localised When war. civil country’s the in reflected lines fault ethnic to blind were settlements refugee of location geographic the about decisions At first, community. refugee Sudanese South the among tensions addressing towards approach counterproductive and haphazard a to led has overlooked. Uganda, this In or underplayed either is populations community host and refugee the both to relate they as dynamics conflict understanding of importance the that means needs possible. as soon as assistance deliver to imperative the with contexts conflict-affected of complexity the balancing of difficulty sheer due the to part in response, humanitarian in marked especially is concepts these to paid attention of practical lack The practice. standard currently is than dilemmas these grapple with to done be can more much However,intervention. conflict-sensitive no perfect is –there over others groups certain to and access influence of resources, transfer the preferences –which assistance of development/humanitarian nature inherent Given the required. adjustments operational and programmatic of the terms in conclusion logical their to taken and terms practical into translated rarely but are logframes and documents programme proposals, project in cited frequently are concepts The devices. rhetorical to reduced often are sensitivity conflict and of Do No Harm concepts The Going beyondtherhetoric The impetus to respond to humanitarian humanitarian to respond to impetus The October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 themselves. themselves. communities refugee within dynamics conflict the compound turn in which feel, refugeesuncertainty and marginalisation the increases This government. central the from treatment preferential and aid order attract to in population refugee leverage the community host of the how parts in reflected then are tensions These divide.² centre–periphery the and inequality around perceptions exacerbating society, of Ugandan elements different between dynamics conflict reinforced has Uganda northern in living refugees Sudanese South to assistance how humanitarian objective). primary their as reduction have conflict programmes all (where conflict of drivers address deliberately and directly SDG 16 in –to outlined –as aspiration the with it ends And objective). primary aprogramme’s to change any without (but commitments and frameworks policy and operational existing within stability and peace to of contributing goal the to progresses It Committee. Assistance Development OECD’s of the Principles States Fragile the ‘avoid to by injunction harm’, required as minimalist the with starts framework This of Ambition. Spectrum the called framework guiding auseful developed has Sudan South afterthought. an as or seen assumed simply be cannot and design, programme into built be to need goals Such cohesion. social increasing to contribute to and together communities bring to abridge as serve to assistance of humanitarian potential the comprehend October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding A number of studies have demonstrated have demonstrated of studies A number in initiative in Conflict Aid Better The A refugee from South Sudan in northern Uganda wears a T-shirt which reads: Peace, Truth, Fairness. Truth, Peace, reads: which aT-shirt wears Uganda northern in Sudan South from A refugee UNHCR/Khaled Kabbara 1 where international humanitarian actors have actors humanitarian international where episodes In dynamics. these to blind often Uganda is in population refugee Sudanese South the to assistance humanitarian building. peace and prevention conflict to contribute to seeking efforts for those just not assistance, for any point starting the be must This settlement. refugee of the circumstances the on evolve how they depending and conflict, Sudanese South wider the in those to relate dynamics of howknowledge these including of a settlement, area a certain within or settlement, arefugee within dynamics hyper-localised of the understanding nuanced have a actors humanitarian development and that critical it is context, this In deaths. to cases some in and and/or violence unrest wider to leading escalated, have quickly or disputes events innocuous seemingly that meant has tensions of such presence the in Uganda, settlements refugee across varying While Sudan. South inside parties conflict the with associations or perceived real from derived often refugees, between conflicts manifest and latent both also are there Sudan, Unfortunately, as in many contexts, contexts, many in as Unfortunately, South in of conflict nature Given the www.fmreview.org/return 69 70 when external actors take a ‘back seat’. a‘back take actors external when achieved be can that impact the demonstrate Uganda in community refugee Sudanese South the among efforts building peace and community. aparticular with engagement or of presence have along history which actors development or humanitarian those even actors, by external matched be cannot that networks and points entry legitimacy, possess by contrast, level peacebuilders, Community- efforts. peace-building advance to required flexibility and dynamism the hinder and –undermine manner appropriate an in provided not is support –if equally can they support, useful provide can donors (NGOs) other and organisations non-governmental international agencies, UN as such actors external While community. the within or conflict disputes resolving for or platforms approaches capacities, mapimportantly,existing to and, conflict of perceptions own their understand to communities with engaging with beginning approach sequenced and agradual require also efforts Such conflict. by affected community the from actors by local led are they if sustained and effective be only can causes root to address Efforts Letting localactorslead concluded. have been activities project after exchange and of interactions deepening the facilitate to need the and beforehand, groups between trust build to need the overlooks also This conflict. exacerbate actually –can –contact interaction rushed, is process the or if designed appropriately not are interventions if instances, some In outcomes. lead peace-building to will alone interaction that assumption the on based often too all are activities or livelihoods education through together communities different from refugees to bring efforts hand, other the On fractures. these calcify to served only has this time, Over misunderstanding. or tension triggering issues underlying the address to together them bring to seeking than rather groups, of separating approach the taken have often they communities, refugee within conflict to respond to sought www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The various locally led conflict prevention prevention conflict led locally various The community level, and supporting platforms platforms supporting level, and community at peacebuilding in engaged others and of refugees movements and networks supporting way through is One building. peace led locally conducivemore truly to support provide can actors external ways that are there wane, to unlikely is that atrend is projects. for specific funding on reliant an organisation of confines go the beyond that fluid ways dynamic, in engage to capacity undermine CBO/NGO may ultimately registered a become to Incentives efforts. peacebuilding and prevention conflict led community- to relation in aconundrum poses donors, it humanitarian development and from funding access to organisations led refugee- for facilitating important is this While responses. refugee-led enable to calls policy global with line in step akey as seen (CBO), organisation a community-based register to right the includes This protection. and education livelihoods, to access granting of rights range awide enjoying refugees with country, host refugee generous most the perhaps as recognised widely Uganda is setting. agiven in environment policy the is efforts peace-building led locally constraining ‘failure’. ‘success’ and both from learning to –open of reality messiness the embraces which process iterative an to open be and directing, than rather accompanying, be increasingly should but they roles important play can actors External outcomes. building peace- positive to contribute to likely more are they that engagement community generate to likely and appropriate are which actions identify to freedom have the peacebuilders local when but precisely it is unstrategic and haphazard appear could supported activities to increase awareness of peace processes. forums community creating and or sport; practices cultural shared education, through engaging communities; their in managers’ or ‘conflict mediators as women serve to and youth supporting communities; between and within of conflicts resolution non-violent and mediation enhance to communities different from leaders with engaging include: Examples While the ‘NGO-isation’ of civic activism activism of civic ‘NGO-isation’ the While or enabling either factor Another of range the perspective, From one October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 to intensify with the growing pressures of pressures growing the with intensify to return through a project that addressed the complexity of issues around land tenure. tenure. land around issues of complexity the addressed that aproject through return sustainable asafe, making in assisted been have Iraq in Yazidis displaced of Thousands identity. and ethnicity on based competition and land, public and resources of natural use illegal and mismanagement by investors, appropriation land), land of the most own people (where wealthy afew asymmetry power corruption, conflicts, land-related manage to inability government governance, land are: weak displacement) (and conflicts violent cause issues land where contexts in exist that elements contributory key of the Some of conflict. causes other overlaps with explosiveit when becomes that one conflict, of cause acommon is over land Competition Land and conflict:taking steps towardspeace others World and the Bank with causes, root addressing when problematic particularly is This piecemeal. and short-term contained, –self- ‘projectised’ becoming risk solutions way, and problems this In both of working. ways standard and ‘brand’ organisation’s an to attached perceptions community shift to still harder it is and practices, seized. be to opportunities for unforeseen made, be to and adjustments for iterative allow milestones broad on based approaches open-ended logframes, and outcomes predetermined having than Rather aftermath. the in community the in reflection and dialogue ongoing ensure to 2018 June in but also erupted Nuer which and Dinka between violence deadly resolve to only not helped initiatives building peace- led to locally support settlement, Rhino In causes. root to address efforts community-led way of empowering avaluable been has initiatives peace-building refugee-led to grants Uganda, providing in community refugee Sudanese South of the context the In lines. community across actors connect which organisations) (rather than Oumar Sylla,Ombretta Tempra, ClarissaAugustinus FiliepDecorte, andIsmaelFrioud October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding It can be hard to ‘unlearn’ institutional institutional ‘unlearn’ to hard be It can 1 And competition over land is likely likely is over land competition And food insecurity, migration and urbanisation. and migration insecurity, food increased growth, population change, climate https://oxfamibis.dk Peacebuilding Advisor, Oxfam IBIS(Denmark) Alex [email protected] seat. driving the in efforts led putto locally engagement long-term and iterative sustained, requires that challenge along-term is This over time. sustained be can that practices and capacities reinforces and action, and making decision community-led empowers lines, organisational across cuts that movements and individuals to funding pooled through including support, predetermined not yet predictable sustained, providing includes This encouraged. be should that others are avoided, be should there practices such While activists. of peace ‘NGO-isation’ or positioning unsustainable the and raised expectations community the given counterproductive, be may indeed projects Short-term conflict.³ of patterns transform to decades two at least it takes that suggesting www.pathwaysforpeace.org Inclusive Approaches toPreventing Violent Conflict 3. SeeWorldBank/UnitedNations(2018)Pathways forPeace: Settlements Political EconomyandConflictDynamicsinUganda’sBidibidiRefugee 2. SeeforexampleEuropeanUnion(2018)ContestedRefuge:The 1. p5http://bit.ly/CSRF-toolkit-2017 living in the Iraqi governorate of Nineveh of Nineveh governorate Iraqi the in living of Yazidis 1970s population the alarge In waves of evictions. recent two experienced group, ethnic Yazidis, aminority Many Yazidis innorthernIraq with governments. governments. with will political and trust building in and return, sustainable recovery, facilitating in and building peace in instrumental be can insecurity land around issues addressing how illustrates Iraq in Yazidi villages in The example of an approach taken taken approach of an example The , p5http://bit.ly/EU-ContestedRefuge-2018 www.fmreview.org/return

2

71 72 Data collection relating to Yazidis’ property claims, Sinjar, Iraq. Iraq. Sinjar, claims, property Yazidis’ to relating collection Data public infrastructure was damaged or looted. damaged was infrastructure public of the proportion alarge and destroyed, or down burned were homes by ISIS, 6,000 or seized demolished systematically were Yazidi settlements Yazidis. Unoccupied 250,000 estimated an including flee, to forced were people 3,300,000 to. Some relocated been Yazidis had many where district, Sinjar attacked they August in and of Nineveh, capital the took over Mosul, fighters ISIS 2014, June In townships. collective new the in of ownership certificates given they leave, to forced were nor were they land for the compensation receive not did They townships. collective to land ancestral their from relocate to regime by the forced were if Yazidis’ homes were rehabilitated, their their rehabilitated, were homes Yazidis’ if that theory the on based was project The in 17 villages to benefit benefit to 1,312 households. 17in villages working challenges, these address to Sinjar property. over conflict and occupation, of secondary risk of tenure, insecurity continuing is there documents property official and system administration of aland absence the in and displaced, still are people complex. Many remains 2017,in Sinjar in situation the

UN-Habitat www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding UN-Habitat supported a project in in aproject supported UN-Habitat Mosul from of ISIS withdrawal the Since 4

3

in regard to land administration. administration. land to regard in of municipalities capacity the strengthen to term longer the in preparing while documents, land initial deliver and claims map property houses, rehabilitate to was priority immediate people, the displaced of return sustainable the order facilitate to In documents. land with rights occupancy secure first and needs immediate to respond to –but instead project of the phase later for a planned –astep titles property full establish to not therefore was objective initial continuum of land rights approach. rights of land continuum a one, using incremental an was approach project’s the Iraq, in documents ownership land formal obtaining of difficulty the to Due reduced. displacement of future risk the and prevented would be rights land over conflicts sustainable; more be would return their and of origin area their to return voluntary their encourage would this protected, rights land their and and verified, identified claims property The project used two main tools: aGIS tools: main two used project The Tools andmethods information technology called the social social the called technology information ageo- on based is database survey. The property and land ahousing, and database October 2019 5 The The 6

FMR 62 FMR 62 which were signed by the authorities. authorities. by the signed were which occupancy’, of ‘pre-certificates prepare to it possible was process this Through evidence. as used also was years for several plot the on household’sof the occupation authorities by local confirmation addition, In claims. the of the validity confirm verbally to held were meetings Community buildings. and/or land of the occupancy previous their of evidence as bills) (for example, utility documents or alternative informal provide to asked and interviewed were members community and beneficiaries Potential adjudication. requiring claims tenure land no contested were there that and claimants by the owned were for rehabilitation planned houses that ensure and rights occupancy property. and land to access and inheritance to relating practices cultural laws and of Iraq’s challenging background the against women’s address to rights land required is However, action broader children. including (STDM) model domain tenure of the households, both male and female, female, and male both households, of the members of the names the all included issued certificates occupancy the priority. Further, given were women, pregnant by young and by widows led those including households, Female-headed house. of the owner the as names gave heads their household female few and survivors, male the among divided is property traditionally as inheritance, to access Yazidi women have limited rights. property to access of inequitable impact follow up activities. the facilitate to and houses, damaged and claimants help identify to authorities local with conducted also were Discussions people’s vulnerability. assess and damaged, been had houses whose households identify project, the about people local order inform to in IDP camps and villages out in carried were activities mobilisation Community authorities. local and members help of community the with undertaken survey (HLP) property and land housing, a through collected was information The informal. is tenure land where and system administration land operating an lacking area an Yazidis in of the claims and rights land October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The project emphasised gender and the the and gender emphasised project The The STDM was used to ascertain ascertain to used STDM was The 7 to map the map to the helping to prevent future displacement. displacement. future prevent to helping thereby and security economic greater creating for returnees, trainings skills the-job on- offered and opportunities, employment economy, local created of the recovery the supported process rehabilitation the during of employment returnees the with combined companies of over construction private 40 use The occupants. legal the as members community and authorities by local validated been had claimants the once started only by UN-Habitat. kept was a copy occupants; and municipality the to given were certificates of the Copies signatures. have, and occupants the of rights what type explaining text claimants, of the names family, plot, the aphoto of the map of the a includes certificate the on information The claims. the protects and supports signature authorities’ local The Habitat. UN- and witnesses two municipality, the authorities, local claimants, by the signed was which occupancy, of certificate final the on included map was validated final, The UN-Habitat. and authorities local neighbours, claimants, by the validated The work undertaken strengthened local local strengthened work undertaken The ownership. legal registering titles land full of recognition the toward step first asignificant were rehabilitation technical and project. of the success the to important was that will political demonstrated this involvement government’s in local the and claims, land their support to certificates recognised officially given been had time Yazidis first the was authorities). This local and sub-districts governorates, (in counterparts government with closely coordinate to essential was it Sinjar in situation humanitarian and political complex security, the to Due Engaging andbuildingpoliticalwill which to base the issuing of certificates. of certificates. issuing the base to which on criteria development of common and grievances of property-related management the including rights, land in trained were The provision of certificates, mapping mapping of certificates, provision The Technical rehabilitation of houses of houses rehabilitation Technical then and marked were Plot boundaries Throughout all this, local leaders leaders local this, all Throughout www.fmreview.org/return 73 74 rights, prevention of conflict over land, and land, over of conflict prevention rights, land and tenure of social understanding authorities’ local and members’ authorities. national and regional with data rights land Yazidis’ and STDM tool of the use advocate to for the them helped It claims. overlapping on arbitrate to and claims unsubstantiated reject to them helped away that in issues tenure land on strengthened was authorities local the and leaders local between relationship The living here.”QunafQasim,returningresident. certificates confirming wearetheresidentsand it. UN-Habitatprovideduswithoccupancy “This was ourland.We hadbuiltourhouseon land. over conflict and occupation secondary evictions, future prevented and of origin, areas to return dignified and safe voluntary, the it fostered essence, In houses. damaged by rehabilitating housing adequate to right the supported It certificates. land issuing of Yazidis through rights land the It enhanced authorities. by local recognised officially were claims their that and houses of their owners real the as acknowledged were returnees that ensuring by conflict of land-related prevention the to contributed It of results. a number had project The Preventing futureconflict titles. full to certificates the upgrading on work facilitate to project another funded has UN-Habitat system. registration land broader the into certificates upgrade these how to exactly about underway currently are governorate. Negotiations wider the to certificates the extend to UN-Habitat wanted and rights land Yazidis’ of the evidence as certificates these accepted government central the that clear 2018 it became onwards However, project. from this Yazidis under the to issued been had that certificates land the would accept they whether unclear was 2017 it October in area of the control direct titles. full into certificates the transform eventually to of Justice Ministry the with secured was agreement apreliminary and administration, land to relation in capacity www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The intervention increased community community increased intervention The took of Iraq government central the After Ombretta Tempra Unit Leader Oumar Sylla over land. –competition displacement of cause root acritical addressing in partnerships of multi-stakeholder and of government levels of different roles the it demonstrates And resilience. community recovery, build and economic and peacebuilding prevention, conflict returns, voluntary support and encourage can activities community-level and led locally support that tools land how practical showsin It decades. time first for the tenure of Yazidis security the give to forged was returnees. of the security economic the and area’s recovery the economic It supported rehabilitation. for house standards technical Consultant Ismael Frioud Consultant [email protected] Clarissa Augustinus UN-Habitat Deputy Director, New York LiaisonOffice [email protected] Filiep Decorte Human Settlements Officer www.gltn.net 7. Developed byUN-Habitat andtheGlobalLandToolNetwork satellite technology. 6. GeographicInformation System,usinginformationdrawnfrom customary landrightsinthecountry. that catersforthewholespectrumofformal, informaland incorporates theseintoalandinformationmanagement system approach workswithwhatisalreadyinplace andtheGIS settlements, whichmaybelegalornotlegal. Thecontinuum groups, includingpastoralistsandresidents ofslumsandother undocumented, formalandinformal,forindividuals and incorporates tenurerightsthatarebothdocumented and 5. Thisinclusive, pro-poor,gender-responsive approach upgrade thelandcertificatesintoMosulregistry. UN-Habitat/GLTN. TheUShasgiven furthersupportsince2018to 4. FundedbytheGovernment ofGermanythroughtheUNDPand Prevention andPeacebuilding bit.ly/GLTN-Land-and-Conflict-2018 IIRR (2018)LandandConflict:LessonsfromtheFieldonConflict to SupporttheReturnofYazidis inSinjar’, inUN-Habitat/GLTN/ 3. FrioudI(2018)‘Iraq:SocialTenure andHouse Rehabilitation Nations andLandConflict. 2. UN(2019)GuidanceNoteoftheSecretary-General,TheUnited of Land and Conflict for Peace Buildingbit.ly/root-cause-analysis-land 1. UN-Habitat/GLTN (2017)HowtodoaRootCause Analysis This case study shows how political will will shows how study political case This www.unhabitat.org [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 recommendations. and lessons useful offers and approach this reflects Somalia and DRC in programme led nexus’. ‘triple of thethrough humanitarian-development-peace the A perspective locally displacement of causes root the to address need the of recognition growing is There focuses on positive peace as opposed to to opposed as peace positive on focuses ends. political narrow serve to identities clan and of ethnic utilisation the and making; decision in participation unequal goods; public other and services information, to of access inequality include: DRC, these and Somalia In conflicts. violent potentially into causes structural transform that those are drivers immediate The functions). basic its perform to capacity example, State (for of penetration 3) and crisis culture); political and system political of the nature (for example, the of representation crisis elites); among 2) of competition nature the and composition of ethnic/tribal nature the (for example, of identity 1) crisis crises: three with associated are DRC, and these Somalia In lead violence. to isolation but do in not conflict to contribute drivers structural The of conflict. drivers immediate and structural the tackling and understanding design: programme’s the informed concepts key Three (DRC) Somalia. and of Congo Republic Democratic the in of displacement causes root of the some implemented. and designed was Programme funded Sida- the that context this It within is solutions. durable hence and displacement protracted with associated issues the tackle to framework a provide could ‘triple nexus’) the as (known actors peace development and humanitarian, between coordination better that consensus emerging an is involved. There are that factors interwoven complex and the given displacement, to solutions durable find to struggled has industry aid the years, the Over building Community-level conflict prevention and peace Wale Osofisan andShuna Keen October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Secondly, the programme explicitly explicitly programme Secondly, the on focuses Firstly, programme the address to seeks programme This 1 Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding and Peacebuilding Prevention Conflict in DRC and Somalia and DRC in that keep them safe in their communities communities their in safe them keep that in ways conflict by affected people support to attempt an is programme of the heart At the positive peace The programme:rootcausesand both the DRC and Somalia components. components. DRC Somalia the and both of strategies implementation and design the inform helped findings The solving). problem in instrumental be (and people can connect or of tension) sources (and people are divide either that society in elements those is, – that locations project ‘dividers’ in ‘connectors’ and specific by identifying approach Do No Harm a incorporated We also strategies. mitigation and of risk areas priority order highlight to in knowledge partners’ local our on drawing assessment, baseline of the part as analysis context. this included We conflict/displacement the and programme the between relationship the addressing on focuses that Analysis Sensitivity aConflict requires violence into relapse a preventing while of conflict peace. positive promote to points entry as of Mogadishu, Hawland Wadaag districts Karaan in justice to access we use Somalia Twa) and in and (Bantu Tanganyika, in groups ethnic for two services health to access In equitable DRC, use we conflict. of violent causes proximate and structural away at the chip remove to or gradually aim peace positive build to Activities institutions. management conflict and public weak and exclusion, injustices, social violence, based gender- abuses, rights human grievances, deep-seated as such –factors violence of structural removal the about is peace Positive violence. physical of direct, cessation the to refers Negative peace peace. negative Thirdly, dealing with the root causes causes root the with dealing Thirdly, www.fmreview.org/return

75 76 are representative of both ethnic groups. groups. ethnic of both representative are that platforms community rejuvenating and Twa by creating the Bantu and between of conflict causes root the tackles It Province. Tanganyika in zones health Kalemie and Nyunzu in initiatives health to access and building peace through groups Twa and Bantu ethnic from of people participation inclusive and well-being resilience, strengthening to contributes programme the Here Paix. et Justice de la Diocesaine Commission organisation, based identifying and solving local problems. local solving and identifying and conflict, mitigating inclusion, and accountability for improving agents sustainable and effective appropriate, most and positioned best the are actors Local society. civil and actors, government local especially bearers, duty and members community include Partnerships projects. of both implementation and methodology design the to integral is ownership Local nexus: triple of the spirit the embody that activities following the by supporting so lives. It does their affect that decisions the influence to empower them and www.fmreview.org/return

to holddutybearersaccountable. knowledge ofcommunities(rightsholders) services, whileincreasingthecapacityand responsible forprovidinghealthandjustice the capacityofdutybearerswhoare on strengtheningsystemsanddeveloping Local governance and rule oflaw:focusing around healthandjusticeservices. groups indecision-makingprocesses dialogues, andthatincludemarginalised cohesion suchasintra/inter-community implementing activitiesthatpromotesocial Local peacebuildingandsocialcohesion: or risksdeveloping thatneed. either inneedofhumanitarianassistance, where asignificantpartofthepopulationis accessibility ofhealthservicesinareas and improvingtheaccountability delivery, providinglegalassistance humanitarian needthroughdirectservice Humanitarian action:respondingto Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding In DRC In , we work with a local faith- alocal , we work with sustainability. In addition, community community addition, In sustainability. and ownership implementation, local strengthening councils, district two the affiliations. of clan voices, irrespective all of inclusive are that action for collective develop to strategies communities support to and by citizens services justice of safe use increase to strives it also trial; a fair to right the protect they that so providers service by justice change behavioural to achieve works project the Specifically in a way.non-violent disputes and conflicts manage and prevent to authorities local and members of community capacities the and systems justice to access strengthen It– Hawl works to Wadaag Karaan. and districts two with partnership in working is Somalia in programme The system. justice transparent and of afair administration and management the including services, basic provide to capacity of State lack the is displacement and of conflict cause Somalia Central and vaccinated. be to children their bringing are more at many home, and than rather centres, health the in birth give to Twa now choosing women are mistreatment. and discrimination fearing avoided, previously had they services Twa more Many now using are services. health local the in, trust of, and awareness building villages, their in sensitisation accessed. and reestablished be can services health which through conditions the create to helping areas, project the to populations displaced and of security return the enabled has militias, local with advocacy,including committees’ The trust. rebuilding for essential been has committees mixed recovery. promote Having and peace build to collaborating are members and Bantu community Twa committees, these Through committees. health and peace local onto elected and mobilised have been volunteers community of underinvestment, decades and infrastructure, and cohesion community poverty, damaged extreme The programme works closely with with works closely programme The South across and Mogadishu, In out workers carry health Community experienced has which Nyunzu, In in general, a key akey general, in

October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 Community meeting with local committee members, Democratic Republic of Congo, March 2019. 2019. March Congo, of Republic Democratic members, committee local with meeting Community to build social cohesion between conflicting conflicting between cohesion social build to and approaches peacebuilding organise to which around platform viable and point entry highlighting. worth are particular in lessons year, three second programme’s now, and cycle, the in programme the into built are research and Learning practice. peace-building and prevention conflict for lessons valuable some generating is programme the stages, early its in still While Implications forpolicyandpractice responsibilities. and roles agreed on based accountability promotes This justice. to access and management conflict on government local and communities between communication regular help generate planning action mitigation conflict community-based and platforms dialogue forums, stakeholder as such activities Participatory trial. afair to right the promote to providers service justice informal and formal of both willingness and capacity the build and with engage to sought has project the systems, justice customary and traditional informal in trust for and preference community’s the and Mogadishu. in of conflicts nature of the analysis initial the involved –were in groups youth and women from –including representatives October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Service delivery has proven to be a useful auseful be to proven has delivery Service Recognising Somalia’s legal pluralism pluralism Somalia’s legal Recognising we highlight five. we highlight of which policies, and practices partners’ implementing their for and donors dynamics. and realities of local understanding evolving an to response in adapted of being capability the with supported, and resourced properly be to need processes Such approaches. No Harm of Do use and analysis sensitivity conflict regular demands This dynamics. conflict of local understanding deep requires impartiality maintaining while institutions of participation. costs offset to adequate requires also this resourcing excluded; for the participation to barriers and inequalities address to and dynamics power intergroup understand to necessary it is successfully, cohesion To social build problems. local solving in communities between cooperation demonstrating trust, build to helped has This processes. making decision- local in representation minority Twa women and promoting ethnic in factor akey DRC, been in for example, has grassroots. at the voluntarism through action collective and for collaboration potential huge is There approaches. led locally and for sustainable essential is delivery service for accountability and institutions informal and State local Strengthening groups. The above have clear implications implications above have clear The local supporting and Identifying committees volunteer the Working with www.fmreview.org/return

International Rescue Committee 77 78 conflict and displacement. displacement. and conflict of violent causes root of the some addressing on afocus with elements peace positive incorporate to designed streams funding joint using crises, for protracted solutions driven locally supporting toward tailored endeavours. peace-building development and from humanitarian separate deliberately to tend which environments, conflict-affected in streams by donor funding driven be can siloes These siloes. in operate to and organised be to tends still community aid the although siloes, do in live people not grassroots At the of intervention. areas these between synergies of the importance the emphasise they that extent welcome the to are nexus triple the to and durable to solutions commitments and peace-building work. Bargain Grand peace-building and development humanitarian, between siloes alone. methods quantitative than results and dynamics peace-building into insight deeper us give can analysis quantitative with –combined anecdotes and storytelling of –including analysis qualitative Rich counted. be can counts that everything not that recognise to important itoutcomes, is peace-building measure to instance, For analysis. and research appropriate in invest should displacement induced conflict- to durable solutions on working by Sida’scase our in approach. exemplified as vital, are management project adaptive such to and openness flexibility Donor design. project the to adaptations informed then which change, of theory context-specific own its needed instead project country each that realised team project the research, field baseline following and DRC Somalia, and in project of the phase inception the During of change. theory global ageneric, on based was project of the design initial the that fact due was the we to faced challenge One for adaptation. allow and cycle programme the into learning build that approaches flexible more by supporting this facilitate can donors programming; led locally and adopt context-responsive explicitly to partners www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Fourth, funding mechanisms should be be should mechanisms funding Fourth, Third, it is important to break down the the down break to important it is Third, community aid the within those Second, implementing require should donors First, 2

hosted-iasc/ 2. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain- 1. Swedish InternationalDevelopment Cooperation Agency political will from the grassroots upwards. grassroots the from will political and cohesion social building elite, the among will of political lack the counterbalance to dynamic peace-building development and apro- build to have potential project Sida-funded the like Initiatives local. the DRC beyond impact the have to positive in building peace community-led for local elites. and authorities national among will political limited often and failure state is DRC, there the where in challenging particularly is This will. political and plans mitigation conflict and development owned locally and nationally of implementation and existence the on relies actors by international planning term longer- Effective efforts. peace-building local on impact and shape levels at higher interests and actors events, because least work, not peace-building in challenges key the of one is efforts national and provincial broader to building peace local Linking Beyond thelocal Wale Osofisan International Rescue Committee Peacebuilding Senior Frameworks andLearningManager– Shuna Keen [email protected] Technical Unit Senior Technical Director (Acting), Governance way that builds trust and ensures impartiality. ensures and trust builds way that a in participation inclusive ways support to identify to and dynamics, local and structures of role local the understand to actors building peace- external on incumbent it is successful, be to solutions peace-building sustainable For impartiality. and neutrality maintaining while actors, peace development and local with partner to and building, peace driven locally in engage to actors for humanitarian possible it is that demonstrates project this Finally, our experience in implementing implementing in experience Finally, our Nonetheless, there is huge potential huge potential is there Nonetheless, [email protected] www.rescue.org October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 their root causes. causes. root their to address failed have responses State but LGBT+ people against crimes hate and violence gender-based violence, gang by America Central in caused is displacement Significant causes of violence and displacement. displacement. and of violence causes root the for addressing responsibility State’s the as well – as country another in protection international claim to ability people’s in factor –akey State ofrole the the order demonstrate to in critical is understanding This causes. the address and crimes such prevent citizens, their protect to failure by States’ enabled is violence this NTCA in state, functioning anormally in acts individual considered be would indeed violence such Although systematic. and widespread are region the in actors State region. the in of violence manifestations other to no doubt extend discrimination and inequality of impunity, causes root the (SOGI). Nonetheless, identity gender or orientation sexual of their because people against (GBV) violence and violence gender-based violence, gang acts: individual considered be normally would that acts on focuses article This causes. root its tackle to or inability unwillingness by States’ and impunity and corruption by entrenched perpetuated is and repression, state to megaprojects from contexts, different in of actors by arange change. climate of effects the and repression, political and corruption inequality, and poverty by worsening compounded actors, non-State and State by both perpetrated violence fleeing people with multi-causal, are for displacement Reasons lacking. remain of mobility causes root the to but responses situation of the visibility 2018 have increased October ‘caravans’ since in travelling people of movements Large displacement. significant (NTCA) America of Central Triangle Northern The America: State versus response State responsibility Gang violence, GBV and hate crime in Central Vickie Knox October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Acts of violence perpetrated by non- perpetrated of violence Acts perpetrated is NTCA the in Violence 1 continues to be affected by affected be to continues become “abecome mode of communication”. has and normalised is violence which in have asituation to led impunity frequent shut up and –and ver,of hear –see, oír ycallar rule the of violence, levels high persistently neighbourhoods and battles territory.over battles and neighbourhoods their in violence rising inequality, and insecurity of effects economic the violence, of fear of ageneral because fleeing others and rise, levels risk personal when measure as a pre-emptive fleeing others risk, immediate and threat atargeted from reactively fleeing risk’, people some with GBV, femicide. and violence sexual world widespread the and in rates murder highest of the some has and insecurity and violence endemic from suffers NTCA The causes Violence, displacementandrootsocial reports the crime. This is likely to mean mean to likely is This crime. the reports victim the if member, especially by a gang perpetrated is violence the if increased are displacement after persecuted of being risks The apprehended. have been not assailants their because displacement in persecuted and pursued be flee,to however,may still forced Those who havefor people offended. apunishment or as members gang other to amessage as rivals, against vengeance as femicide and violence sexual extreme use gangs Street adolescents. and girls of exploitation and abuse sexual the and prostitution forced trafficking, human as groups), well as criminal and members community members, family by partners, (perpetrated violence sexual and violence family violence, partner intimate violence, domestic includes This borders. across and internally both girls, for women and Gang violence creates a‘continuum of creates violence Gang GBV is a major trigger of displacement of displacement trigger GBV amajor is www.fmreview.org/return

These These 2

3

79 80 is compounded by fear of stigma, reprisals reprisals of stigma, by fear compounded is reluctance this violence, sexual and crimes hate violence, of gender-based For victims agents. State or coerced by corrupt gangs to leaked being of information fear by the amplified is this and reprisals fear violence of gang Victims experienced. or crime of violence type the from stem also can reluctance This protection. effective provide to the authorities in of confidence lack and system justice and police of the mistrust including factors, several on based is which examined. be must nature multi-causal its NTCA, the in violence and of displacement cause aroot as of role impunity the understand order to In prosecuted. not are crimes most and region the in endemic is Impunity intersectional Impunity: endemic,multi-causaland of work or emigration. because absent are who parents or having breakdown by family heightened may be vulnerability This reasons. protection and strategy, for economic survival a as activities criminal involved in becoming to vulnerable people make of opportunities alack and Poverty communities. marginalised in services and presence State of effective absence the people, and of young exclusion and marginalisation social and economic political, the ofpoverty, opportunities, lack in employ roots have they deep violence and violence. GBV SOGI and with violence gang of intersections the to and of gangs machoism extreme the to contribute also stereotypes and gender attitudes patriarchal These them. drive that attitudes discriminatory and patriarchal the eliminate to State’sthe failure from stem both of SOGI grounds on violence or support. of protection lack the given country, but leave to have the no option LGBT+ Many they feel people entities. State and members gang communities, and families by their perpetrated persecution flight. cross-border trigger may then and whole family their to extend will risk the www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Firstly, there is a reluctance to report, report, to areluctance is Firstly, there control territorial the and gangs Street and girls women and against Violence andLGBT+ violence flee people and the possibility of violence within them. within of violence possibility the and relationships of same-sex of recognition lack a and document, identity their on given that from gender adifferent be to who appear help to people refusal the violence, domestic of for victims of shelters by alack hindered also is Reporting by police. or derided re-victimised often are who do report those and assailants, their from violence more and displacement of people from these locations. locations. these from of people displacement greater to consequently and areas rural unaffected previously in violence increased in results order avoid to this in raids, areas rural to Salvador El relocate in gangs as addition, In flee. to forced being are minors individual and whole charges), families criminal harsh less attract they because and raids, during members as gang identified be to likely less are minors (because children ever younger recruit gangs As Honduras. Salvador and El both in displacement provoked further have that consequences adverse had instead have they indeed, problem; the resolve to have failed gangs to responses States’ States’ disregardforrootcauses need for international protection. for international need people’s go –and they where and goes – who patterns its affects and displacement to contributes protection and response effective an provide to failure States’ groups. of certain vulnerability the increasing and justice to access undermining eroded, further is authorities in people’sand trust flourish can crime which in impunity directly. people abuse and extort themselves may or by gangs, infiltrated and corrupted have been agencies enforcement programmes. support survivor and protection witness of effective by alack aggravated is this All inefficient. and lengthy often are place, they do take investigations When investigated. and processed not or simply refused may be reports authorities, the to reported are crimes When cases. volume of sheer capacity, the and and of resources alack institutions, weak including justice, delivering in challenges This all contributes to a cycle of acycle to contributes all This law and entities State Thirdly, practical significant are Secondly, there October 2019

FMR 62 FMR 62 have enabled it to remain free of gangs. free it remain to have enabled Salvador El that in Berlín in municipality and community between cooperation dedicated and Project, Prevention Violence and Crime Salvador El the in used strategies prevention violence family-based neighbourhoods), (one poorest of Honduras’ Hernández Rivera in programme outreach a youth Sula, Pedro of San parts some in Violence Cure as such programmes intervention include These areas. other in for replication hold potential that developments localised campaigns. attitude-changing and programmes policy, by solid social supported developments legislative and institutional plus crimes) GBV hate and (including manifestations its all in of violence view abroad-ranging require will butkey this is causes root LGBT+ Tackling population. the against crimes GBV hate drive and that attitudes patriarchal and discrimination deep the or by remedying violence gang drive that inequality and marginalisation poverty, the by tackling either of violence, causes root the address to failures persistent States’ in apparent particularly is this and lacking severely are strategies Prevention State responsibility causes. root their and of violence manifestations broader the address to failing people, while of young marginalisation the and authorities the in of trust lack the aggravate further approaches These members. gang about information divulge to forces security from pressure fleeing areas gang-controlled in living people with of power and abuse and harassment State arbitrary fleeing people young with displacement, caused also has displacement. into forces security of the members some forced has police and gangs between enmity increased Meanwhile, reintegration programmes for former gang gang for former programmes reintegration and education, programmes, for social called Nayib has Bukele, president, incoming Salvador’s El implemented. be to still are these although commitments, recent October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Nonetheless, there have been promising promising have been there Nonetheless, itself response State repressive The There have also been some promising promising some been have also There 4 esns”. person LGBTI and lands, their of losing at risk persons workers, traders, transport girls, and of women risks specific the address “developto and prevent to strategies committed has Honduras regionally), known it is as Framework (MIRPS, Solutions and Protection Regional Comprehensive the Under violence. gang prevent to members, 5. www.globalcrrf.org/crrf_country/honduras/ bit.ly/ElSalvador-crime-prevention Salvador CrimeandViolence Prevention Project Adaptation inSanPedro Sulabit.ly/CureViolence2016; TheEl 4. See:CureViolence (2016)ReportontheCureViolence Model Salvador bit.ly/IDMC-ElSalvador-2018 reframing internaldisplacementcausedbycrimeandviolenceinEl Displacement MonitoringCentre(2018)AnAtomisedCrisis: www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean/knox andInternal people fleeingCentral America’, 3. SeeKnoxV(2017)‘Factorsinfluencingdecisionmakingby Honduras in2018. society organisationswhomIinterviewed inElSalvador and 2. Thisexpressionwas usedbyafewrepresentatives ofcivil El Salvador, GuatemalaandHonduras. 1. Also knownasNorthernCentral America, comprising consultant University ofLondonandindependentresearch Refugee Law, SchoolofAdvanced Study, Lecturer inInternational HumanRightsLaw and KnoxVickie [email protected] reality. becomes rhetoric that ensure to needed are commitment regional and will Ultimately, political more northwards. travelling from people prevent to measures security be to US continue the and Mexico from responses reality in of migration, causes root the tackle to response develop aregional Obrador, López to Manuel Andrés president, Honduras. in violence State and repression political increasing given challenging more the –all commitment political and social and work multi-agency significant require • Follow usonTwitter or Facebook •  •  •  Options for accessingFMR Despite pledges by Mexico’sDespite new www.fmreview.org/request/alerts at Sign upfor email alerts (search for ‘forced migration review’) https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series Listen podcastsat to FMRarticle HTML orPDFformat: www.fmreview.org issue Read eachFMRissueonline,eitherthefull in PDF format or individual articles in in PDFformat orindividualarticles 5 Achieving this, however, would this, Achieving www.vickieknox.com www.fmreview.org/return Forced MigrationReview

81 82 imperative. more the all this make altogether issue refugee Palestinian the to dismiss attempts Recent question. refugee Palestinian to the key to any solution be will law international applying objectively and displacement Palestinian of causes root the Acknowledging possibility to become Israeli citizens. Israeli become to possibility the offered not –were Israel what became in who remained Palestinians the –unlike they as stateless made them and homes original their to return their prevented that policies laws and Israeli by subsequent sealed was 1948, around refugees of whom became (Palestinians). other of the majority vast the for exile and dispossession determination, self- to right of the denial the and (Israel) group for one statehood in 1948in resulted that awar into escalated Palestine Mandate of British land over the by immigrants) constituted largely one and indigenous groups two of (one aspirations conflicting the when century, 20th early the to back date They unaddressed. continue they as over time grown has impact their and refugee situation in the world the in situation refugee protracted longest-standing and largest – the displacement of Palestinian ‘root causes’ The impasse the breaking and causes root question: refugee Palestinian The parties under the auspices of the UN and and UN of the auspices the under parties the between negotiation Years of political implemented. ever been has resolutions of these none question, refugee of the settlement just a achieve to need the affirmed frequently has Council Security the and compensation, with along homes, their to return to right refugees’ the reaffirming of resolutions hundreds adopted has refuge. found world Arab they where the of parts other some 1967), in since but also (occupied Gaza and West Bank the in rule Israeli under only not of rights, loss and poverty of discrimination, degrees varying experience to of whom continue many of Palestinians, displacement waves of further significant numerous, have been 1948 there Francesca PAlbaneseandDamianLilly www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The fate of the Palestinians, 750,000 750,000 Palestinians, fate of the The While the UN’s General Assembly UN’s Assembly the General While 1 – are complex –are 2 Since Since 3

successive generations of refugees. assisting and by registering problem the the debate is that UNRWA that debate is the overshadowed over time has that argument Amisleading situation. their resolve to ways debate the on legal the distorted have question refugee Palestinian of the Organization. Liberation Palestine by the of Israel recognition as such developments key notwithstanding either, advances any to led have onward ultimately not Accords Oslo and Conference Madrid the from negotiations bilateral and regional then the Palestinian refugee issue unaddressed. unaddressed. issue refugee Palestinian the left law, has this of international application principled the ensure to States by Member support of effective lack the with Along internationally. perceived is plight refugees’ way these the and compromise to ability parties’ the both have affected displacement of Palestinian causes root the obscure to en masse denationalisation and of compensation, lack restitution, of property lack of return, prevention self-determination, of –lack nature protracted continuing, or its displacement original the of either causes’ ‘root the acknowledge even to will political of lack the is challenge difficult most The but not. it is insurmountable, as presented often is question refugee Palestinian The Unlocking solutions the plight of the Palestinian refugees. refugees. Palestinian of the plight the end to solution a for finding responsible remain States Member UN action. such for asubstitute nor be solution political of a lack for the blamed be either cannot of millions, dignity and survival the to instrumental been has which aid, This Divergent narratives about the origins origins the about narratives Divergent 4 ‘perpetuates’ ‘perpetuates’ . Efforts . Efforts October 2019 5

FMR 62 FMR 62 the Indo-China war), Central America, the the America, war), Central Indo-China the (after Asia from experiences Comparative respected. rights fundamental have their and dignity and safety in lives their rebuild to allowed be must Palestinians individuals, uprooted any Like rights. basic of their respect without often and exile a protracted in themselves find of whom also thirds two almost refugees, by other faced those from different markedly have been not refugees by Palestinian faced problems the respects other in that always not it appreciated is However, case. Palestinian the to importance of fundamental are elements These continue. 1967 in occupied Israel that territory the in dispossession and displacement Palestinian and unaddressed, remain exile of their causes root entity, the administrative and apolitical as 1948 exists no longer in leave to behind forced were refugees imperative. is refugees of the rights the on the debate re-centring in UN the lead by firm A them. polarised 2019 June further in has US government by the announced century’ ‘deal of the promulgation of the the and apart further have been never Palestinians the and of Israel positions The of success. chance process, whenever it resumes, has more political the that so acceptable, and fair is what towards feasible’ ‘politically what is beyond help move discussions it can question, refugee Palestinian of the complexity the settle by itself law cannot international the parameters of international law. of international parameters the by guided be and parties, power of the in asymmetry the and of politics constraints the from detached be for solutions search the that would imply, approach and foremost, first solutions. towards process of the part as rights of human protection the and of law rule for the respect with together approach, of amulti-stakeholder relevance the highlight instruments these And situations. refugee protracted in including solutions order achieve to in causes root eliminate to efforts of States’ importance the underscore Refugees on Compact 2018 the and Global Migrants and Refugees October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding The homeland that the Palestinian Palestinian the that homeland The For Palestinians, applying such an an such applying For Palestinians, 2016The New for York Declaration 6 While While automatically allow the refugees to realise realise to refugees the allow automatically would however, not, identity. This national of a sense nurture to and self-determination to right the realise to Palestinians allow it would as solution, logical the would be 1967 the along borders State Palestinian sovereign fully independent, an that argue Many for Palestinians. determination of self- principle the respecting foremost and first implies This rights. collective to law pertaining rights human international and resolutions UN applicable including law international with politics reconcile to process would help objectivity. ensure a such leading UN the Having countries. Arab within regard this in misperceptions address and Israel with compromise foster help may also This foreigners. second-class –as or –often citizens – second-class –at best as exile and of dispossession decades after restored dignity and identity collective their see help Palestinians may This ever since. have experienced they of rights denial enduring the and displacement of Palestinian ‘root causes’ the around narrative historical objective an acknowledging it requires First, implications. of practical would have anumber case refugee Palestinian the in response of reparations. forms various – through awhole as community the and individuals both may have affected that damage and loss psychological and moral the third, and, and/or compensation; restitution – through of income) or loss (damage of property or loss displacement of the consequences material the second, or resettlement; integration local of repatriation, choices of voluntary acombination –through displacement original by the created status refugee the first, addressing: multidimensional, been typically has response international the crises refugee other In compromise. political and principles of legal application of the acombination through found be can problems refugee complex, protracted to solutions that Mozambique)to suggest (from Angola Africa in countries various and Timor Yugoslavia, East Iraq, former Second, any solutions proposed need need proposed solutions any Second, amultidimensional such Applying www.fmreview.org/return 83 84 Israel must must Israel happen However, to for this parties. by both agreed numbers in Israel to return enables aresolution until countries host in remain or State Palestinian anewly established in up residency take to refugees would allow compromise Afair compensation. and return including claims, historic unfulfilled their protection and does not affect the historic historic the affect not does and protection of international cessation implies only status law, refugee ending international under fact, In Israel. vis-à-vis claims their relinquishing would require return than other solutions any of acceptance that States host Arab their and refugees Palestinian among belief persistent the unpacking necessitates approach an such Meanwhile, of return. right this recognising of importance the undermine not does safety) their and nationals of Israeli expense the at would be not return their (even though Israel to return to Palestinians allowing to obstacles political and practical are there that fact The solutions. voluntary for alternative options the limited however, also has return, to right refugees’ the of Israel’s denial firm compensated. be and foropt resettlement could return to willing not refugees those that do but also so could neighbours” their with at live peace and homes their to return to “wishing refugees those that established 194 resolution Assembly 1948,in General example,For no different. is question refugee Palestinian The combined. strategically be can and other complement each can they voluntary, all are they exclusive; provided not mutually are resettlement) and integration local repatriation, (voluntary solutions durable different the that considers UNHCR rights. individual to pertaining practice law and refugee international with refugees for Palestinian solutions the aligning means also question refugee Palestinian claims. related pursue to possible be it will at which point for the preserved be should records historical relevant compensation, and To restitution facilitate Jerusalem. East including West and Bank, Strip Gaza of the www.fmreview.org/return thematic listings thematic Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding Third, applying international law to the law the to international applying Third, first first relinquish its occupation occupation its relinquish displacement, seewww.fmreview.org/thematic-listings. previous FMRissues thataddress theroot causes of More resources onRoot causes: authors’ organisations. authors’ does not necessarilyrepresenttheviews ofthe iswritten capacityand inapersonal This article www.unrwa.org Chief ofProtection Division,UNRWA Francesca PAlbanese settlement. asustainable lead to not will of justice principles basic ignoring Politics rejected. be should and instability further may lead to region the in for peace search the in secondary as question refugee the Palestinian law.dismiss to efforts Recent international in grounded action political principled and robust requires question refugee Palestinian the to solution lasting and date. to Ajust lacking been sadly has rhetoric, beyond issue, refugee the resolve resolutions. UN various out in set already law as international under entitled are Palestinians which –to compensation and restitution) (including of return rights Damian Lilly University www.georgetown.edu International Migration(ISIM),Georgetown Affiliated Scholar, Institute for theStudyof The StatusofPalestinian RefugeesinInternationalLaw Palestinian refugees,see Albanese FPandTakkenberg L(2020) 6. FormoreontheapplicationofNYD/GCR frameworkto bit.ly/Albanese2018-PalestineStudies Challenges’, CurrentIssuesinDepth ‘UNRWA andPalestine RefugeeRights:New Assaults, New refugee lawandpracticeisdiscussedin Albanese FP(2018) 5. ComplianceofUNRWA’s registrationsystemwithinternational Gaza Strip,providingeducation,healthservicesandjobs. Lebanon, Syria,theWest Bankincluding EastJerusalem,andthe the NearEast(UNRWA), established1949, operatesinJordan, 4. TheUNReliefandWorks Agency forPalestine Refugeesin bit.ly/GenAssResolution194 3. SeeforexampleGeneral Assembly Resolution194,para11 stateless underinternationallaw. determination –rendersGazaStripandWest Bankresidents indispensable elementtotherealisationofrightself- citizenship. Lackoffullsovereignty oftheStatePalestine –an masse tothosedisplacedin1948),themajorityremainwithout istheonlycountrythatgrantedit they ‘relocated’(Jordan 2. WhilesomePalestinians mayhave acquiredcitizenshipwhere Central BureauofStatistics,December2018. refugees’ withUNRWA andlive intheNearEast.Palestine refugees, some5.4millionofwhomareregistered‘Palestine 1. Outof13millionPalestinians morethanhalfareconsidered In sum, the political will to effectively effectively to will political the sum, In [email protected] To accessalistingof [email protected] , InstituteforPalestine Studies. October 2019 , OUP.

en

FMR 62 FMR 62 secondary displacement in displacement in informal Colombia. settlements secondary and protracted of causes root the confronting way of effective amore as emerging are communities and host of IDPs urban to capacities building approaches Collaborative living in conditions of structural poverty. of structural conditions in living 3,657 – people – 1,011 around families, 73% some of households with infrastructure, and services of housing, alow quality has de Florida la Altos home country. their in crisis the who have fled Venezuelans 12,300 by at least swelled been also has people of displaced number IDPs. The 50,000 around By July 2018, hosting was authorities. Soacha local by the ‘illegal’ considered is municipality of the cent per Forty-eight of Bogotá. vicinity the in cities of the largest people, the million one of approximately amunicipality Soacha, in aneighbourhood is de Florida la Altos three children in Altos de la Florida, Colombia) (Yomaira, wholives withherhusbandand this hillbecauseofthecostlivingincity.” Bogotá. In2014we startedtobuildourhouseon again in2012,duetothegeneralisedviolence, fled totheurbanareasofBuenaventura andthen Orientales toChocóin2005.Threeyears laterwe “I was displacedbyparamilitariesfromLlanos The lack of basic services and infrastructure infrastructure and services of basic lack The attempts). eviction faced has neighbourhood the (and indeed of home ownership proof no official with of tenure, security lack Households neighbourhood. of the nature ‘informal’ due the to community vulnerable as a Florida la Altos de haveUNDP identified (UNHCR) and Agency Refugee UN The displacement Informality: arootcauseofurban settlements. –informal access can they that places only the in shelter seek they and areas, (IDPs)people rural from come displaced internally 87% of these estimated An opportunities. economic and protection assistance, seek families where cities towards displacement followed by further often is violence or generalised conflict by armed caused displacement Colombia,internal In protection rethinking spaces: Resilience Pablo Cortés Ferrández Pablo Cortés October 2019 Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding 1

Altos de la Florida, September 2018. 2018. September Florida, la de Altos challenge. The lack of political will, the the will, of political lack The challenge. asignificant is violence and high, are rates Homicide actors. armed for non-state target it a make presence authority of local absence the and location physical settlement’s planning. urban their into neighbourhood the by incorporating and built been already have that homes those by approving settlement the legalise to refuse planners city’s the yet vulnerabilities, reduce to done be can what limits settings urban of these nature informal The centres. health primary no are there and akindergarten, to access lack children 300 water, around drinking mains to Few have access vulnerability. people’s increases Florida de la Altos in Pablo Cortés Ferrández Informality combined with the the with combined Informality www.fmreview.org/return 85 86 and siloed approaches. Poorly integrated Poorly approaches. integrated siloed and responses short-term promotes This violence. by exacerbated environment, social cohesive less and of aweakened limitations the within have work to actors peace development and humanitarian, settlements, urban informal In Resilience spaces:aprotection approach investigated. Florida de la Altos in research what our is this and interventions, development and humanitarian undermine to continues settings urban in arising challenges to responding in of experience lack their However, contexts. urban in responding in interest their have increased actors peace and development humanitarian, years, recent In International aid:underminingresilience population. of the 30–40% IDPs represent de Florida, la Altos segregated spatially and socially In refuge. seek people displaced in which and places flee people which from places time same the thus at are settlements Informal risks. protection similar with settlement informal another in arrive to only violence urban dueto settlement informal the flee to forced IDPs Urban are urban. inter- and intra-urban both displacements, urban new lead to of insecurity levels high and areas urban informal these in of communities vulnerabilities structural political will, both locally and nationally. nationally. and locally both will, political astrong requires this addressed; be to are displacement secondary ensuing and of integration of lack causes the if necessary is authorities local and sector humanitarian State”. of the intervention integral the requires and insufficient is cooperation “international that found evaluations project Previous intervention. any of effectiveness the involved reduce of coordination lack and consultation limited the and undermined, is cohesion development. Social and action humanitarian gap between the increases and participation community replaces aid of provision but protracted families, arrived for newly particularly essential, is assistance Emergency aid. external on dependency over- caused 2001 has since response www.fmreview.org/return Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding In the settlement, a protracted emergency emergency a protracted settlement, the In 3 Far greater collaboration between the the between collaboration Far greater 2

number of young people involved). people of young number of the 180 because (called Crew group breakdance the with students as started who neighbourhood the from people Juvenil’s young Florida are leaders Service. Refugee Jesuit the and Agency), Kairós Refugee (the by UNHCR UN supported be to continues and initiative aUNICEF from –emerged empowerment through comes protection that is approach –whose Juvenil Florida process. aresilience-building itself it is issues, neighbourhood with deal to empowered being community the through and committee the convening leaders local With sustainable. more response humanitarian order make to in sector public the and authorities the community, the organisations, among synergies build groups. football and theatre breakdance, neighbourhood’s by the created organisation community ayouth Juvenil, Florida and workers; humanitarian and associations IDP residents, leaders, community between meeting afortnightly de Impulso, Comité settlement: informal the in spaces’ ‘resilience grassroots of two creation the in resulting de Florida, la Altos in projects various through introduced been has approach an Such capacities. leadership supporting and cohesion; social strengthening opportunities; labour and economic education, creating of intervention: areas three through approach capacity-building abottom-up with approach protection atop-down combines framework The capacities. local by strengthening also but needs urgent by addressing only not recovery and assistance combining protection, to approach acomplementary as developed were spaces’ ‘Resilience dignity. in live to people supporting to committed be should communities. IDPs host and of both vulnerabilities longer-term the reduce to aim should and integrated, and collaborative be must Interventions crises. complex urban address to capacity have limited responses a ‘New Way of Working’ to bridge this a ‘New Way this bridge to of Working’ for call the and development divide and humanitarian the to responses strongest The Comité de Impulso works to de Impulso Comité The aid humanitarian Beyond survival, Resilience has emerged as one of the of the one as emerged has Resilience October 2019 4

FMR 62 FMR 62 A FMR International Advisors Jeff Crisp Jeff Nina MBirkeland Lina Abirafeh and resilience depend on this ability to to ability this on depend resilience and Sustainability authorities. local advocate with to tools networking social use to them capacity, by facilitating and coordination and leadership, management their developing by organisations community-based and NGOs national and local of both leaders work empower to they programming; and planning in municipalities and authorities local include and providers, aid national and local with collaborate to have sought They systems. national and local replace than rather strengthen to working have been sustainability. and connectivity complementarity, displacement: to responses urban in essential as recognised increasingly are which criteria three on is here five to years). focus The (three term medium to short the in vulnerability and risk reduce to aims counterparts, local and national with collaboration in actors, development and work of humanitarian joint the de Florida, la Altos In divide. Independent consultant Council RefugeeNorwegian University Lebanese American dvisors serve inanindividualcapacityanddonot serve necessarilyrepresent dvisors October 2019 FMR has a huge and diverse readership. IfyouFMR hasahugeanddiverse readership. write, they willread. •  •  • Thinkaboutwhatyou have learnedorexperienced that would beofmostuseto other FMRreaders the globalagendasthataffect thelives ofdisplacedpeople.Perhaps you could: have learnedintheirwork, sothatothers canlearnfrom them.Thesevoices mustbeheard inorder to influence the experiences andinsightsof We strive to includeawidevariety ofvoices inFMRto helpensure thatpolicymakingandprogramming reflect Who isheardthroughFMR?Areyou? Towards and addressing the rootcauses ofdisplacement understanding In Altos de la Florida, international actors actors international de Florida, la Altos In for articles –we’llfor provide articles feedback andadvice Look atourguidancefor atwww.fmreview.org/writing-fmr authors andsendussuggestions your reachandbuildwritingconfidence Consider co-authoring…‘buddying’withother localactors canbroaden and/orpractitioners Khalid Koser Lucy WKiama Hastie Rachel Matthew Gibney GCERF HIAS Kenya Oxfam Refugee StudiesCentre displaced people. We alsoencourage Centre Associate, Internal DisplacementMonitoring Researcher, H2020PRUV project; Research [email protected] FerrándezPablo Cortés displacement. of urban causes root the addressing in factor akey represents turn, in protection, This of protection. instrument an as of resilience construction the on based is de Florida la Altos in taken approach The capacities. national and local of strengthening the on and collaborate www.youtube.com/watch?v=lF5fTRROURE 4. www.youtube.com/watch?v=X116JtL7v_U; Econometría SA,p19 programa “Construyendo SolucionesSostenibles-TSI”’, 3. EconometríaConsultores(2016)‘Evaluación externadel Marie Skłodowska-CuriegrantagreementNo691060. Horizon 2020researchandinnovation programmeunderthe group discussions.Theprojectreceived fundingfromtheEU in-depth interviews,threesocialcartographies,andfocus in Altos delaFlorida,comprising211householdssurveys, 98 2. Thisarticleisbasedonaresearchprojectimplemented2015–18 desplazamiento forzadoenColombia 1. CNMH(2010)Unanacióndesplazada.Informenacionaldel Kathrine Starup Steven Muncy Erin Mooney Danish Refugee Council Services International Services Community andFamily Capacity/ProCap UN Protection www.internal-displacement.org topractitioners write aboutwhatthey

their institutions. www.fmreview.org/return ’, p38bit.ly/29uyNzv

Richard Williams Richard Emilie WiinbladMathez Independent consultant UNHCR

87 UNHCR/Vivian Tou’meh

A Syrian man who fled Aleppo has returned to his house and re-opened his restaurant, despite the whole building having been damaged by fire during the conflict. “I inherited the restaurant from my grandparents, who sold grilled lamb here to visitors for over 50 years.” Many Syrians have returned to damaged homes in neighbourhoods without power or water and with schools and hospitals reduced to rubble.

FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION ONLY www.fmreview.org/return