Beyond the quiet life of a natural monopoly:

Regulatory challenges ahead for Europe’s rail sector

Issue paper # 2 Competition and cooperation, organisations and markets: how to deal with barriers to entry and market power?

John Preston (University of Southampton)

October 2012

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Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) asbl rue de l’Industrie, 42 (box 16) – B-1040 Brussels ph :+32 (0)2 230 83 60 – fax : +32 (0)2 230 83 60 VAT BE 0824 446 055 RPM – [email protected] – www.cerre.eu

Table of content

About CERRE ...... 3 About the author ...... 5 Executive summary ...... 6 Introduction ...... 7 1. Barriers to Entry ...... 9 2. Practical Evidence ...... 12 On track competition ...... 12 Off track competition ...... 17 3. Theoretical Evidence ...... 24 4. Summary and Conclusions ...... 27 5. References ...... 31

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About CERRE

Providing top quality studies, training and dissemination activities, the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) promotes robust and consistent regulation in Europe’s network industries. CERRE’s members are regulatory authorities and operators in those industries as well as universities. CERRE’s management team is led by Dr Bruno Liebhaberg, Professor at the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles.

CERRE’s added value is based on: • its original, multidisciplinary and cross sector approach; • the widely acknowledged academic credentials and policy experience of its team and associated staff members; • its scientific independence and impartiality.

CERRE's activities include contributions to the development of norms, standards and policy recommendations related to the regulation of service providers, to the specification of market rules and to improvements in the management of infrastructure in a changing political, economic, technological and social environment. CERRE’s work also aims at clarifying the respective roles of market operators, governments and regulatory authorities, as well as at strengthening the expertise of the latter, since in many member states, regulators are part of a relatively recent profession.

This issue paper has been prepared within the framework of a CERRE Executive Seminar which has received the financial support of a number of stakeholders in the rail industry including CERRE members. As provided for in the association's by-laws, it has been prepared in complete academic independence. Its contents and the opinions expressed

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in the document reflect only the author's views and in no way bind either the CERRE Executive Seminar sponsors or any member of CERRE (www.cerre.eu).

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About the author

Prof. John Preston is Head of the Civil, Maritime and Environmental Engineering and Science Academic Unit of Southampton University. He was previously Director of Southampton’s Transportation Research Group and Head of the School of Civil Engineering and the Environment. His research interests in transport cover demand and cost modelling, regulatory studies, and land-use and environment interactions. His initial work concentrated on rail, but subsequent work has covered all major modes of transport. He is a member of the World Conference on Transport Research Society’s (WCTR) Scientific Committee, the Co-Chair of the WCTR Rail Special Interest Group, a Committee Member of the International Association of Rail Operations Research (IAROR) and of the International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport.

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Executive summary

The first three “European Railway Packages” have opened up freight and international passenger markets to competition. Achieving an open market in the case of national passenger rail markets is one of the main goals of the forthcoming 4th package, although several Member States have already implemented national level reforms.

This paper reviews the evolution of competition in and for rail services in Europe. It starts off by reviewing some of the economic characteristics of the railway industry and by examining the role of barriers to entry and exit and of reaction periods. Two main types of competition co-exist: in the market (open access) and for the market (franchising or competitive tendering). Recent practical and theoretical evidence is reviewed with respect to Europe in general and to Great Britain more specifically. A taxonomy of barriers is developed and is used to assess competition models based on open access passenger and freight services, competitive tendering and franchising. It is found that open access passenger services may be particularly problematic and are likely to be a niche activity. Franchising or tendering may be a more effective way of introducing widespread competition for passenger services. Open access freight services may be less problematic, but still face substantive barriers, particularly for international services. However, all competitive models may be threatened by mergers and acquisitions and the creation of monopolies.

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Introduction

The background to this paper is given by the four packages of railway reforms undertaken by the European Commission. The First Railway Package originated in 2001 and made provisions for open access competition in the international rail freight market, initially on the Trans European Rail Freight Network. The Second Railway Package was outlined in 2004 and extended rail freight deregulation to the whole network (realised in 2007). It also included directives for the harmonisation of safety requirements and certification, and for interoperability, as well as a regulation for the creation of a European Railway Agency (ERA) for safety and interoperability. The Third Railway Package was approved in 2007 and includes the liberalisation of international passenger services by 2010, the harmonisation of train drivers’ licences and the inclusion of passenger rights and freight service quality regulations. A fourth package of reforms is currently under consideration, with the emphasis on open access competition for domestic services. It also considers mandatory competitive tendering for public sector contracts, the harmonisation of regulation through the ERA and framework conditions concerning the independence of infrastructure managers and access to stations and facilities, through ticketing and inter- available ticketing.

It is not the purpose of this paper to give a detailed review of these reforms. This is given elsewhere (see, for example, Holvad, 2009). Instead, the starting point to this paper is earlier work on barriers to entry in the rail industry (Nash and Preston, 1992). This is partly of historic interest. Although there had been reforms in North America, with deregulation in the US in 1980 and liberalisation in Canada in 1987 (Grimm and Rogers, 1991), reforms in Europe were in their infancy, although Sweden had begun on its path to reform (in 1988) and the European Commission had passed the ground breaking directive 91/440. Aside from the three railway packages outlined above, key subsequent developments have included the corporatisation and partial deregulation of (DB - Germany) in 1994 and the privatisation of the system around 1996/7, resulting in some open access operations. Our initial perspective on barriers to entry will be presented in section 2. Building on Preston (2009), Section 3 will review the practical evidence and section 4 the theoretical evidence that has emerged as the reform process has progressed, particularly in Europe. In section 5, we will attempt to summarise, using

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some of the some of the findings from the McNulty review, and we will draw some tentative conclusions that might form the basis for future discussions.

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1. Barriers to Entry

Nash and Preston (1992) highlighted three main features of railway economics that might be considered constants. The first is the high degree of fixity and sunkeness of infrastructure costs. The second is the economies of density that stem, in part, from these high fixed costs and are exacerbated by the indivisibilities of the infrastructure. The third is the multiproduct nature of the industry, serving a network of origins and destinations and a range of passenger and freight services. This leads to a large number of common costs which are difficult to allocate between products and it also leads to the possibility of network economies of various types.

As a result of these ‘constants’ the conventional view was that the rail industry exhibited sub-additive costs, with marginal cost pricing not covering costs. It was therefore, using the terminology of Berg and Tschirhart (1988), a strong natural monopoly that required unitary ownership at the network level and, in order to prevent private monopoly abuses, either public ownership or control. But this viewpoint was already under fire for a number of reasons. First, econometric studies of the costs and productivity of North American railroad operations indicated that there were constant returns to scale with respect to firm size for all but the smallest railroads (Caves et al, 1985). This indicated that rail operations were not a natural monopoly even if rail infrastructure was. This broad finding has been confirmed by subsequent worldwide studies, albeit with some evidence that there may be greater scope for increasing returns in Europe (Pels and Rietveld, 2003). Secondly, there was long standing theoretical evidence that public ownership leads to X-inefficiencies (Liebenstein, 1966) which seems to have been confirmed for railways by a suite of subsequent studies, often using data envelopment analysis (or variants thereof), that indicated excessive governmental control led to inefficiencies (see Merkert et al., 2010, for a review). Third, evidence on economies of scope, although mixed, suggested diseconomies for the joint operation of passenger and

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freight service (Kim, 1987, Preston, 1996). Fourth, the theory of contestable markets provided ‘an uprising in the theory of industry structure’ (Baumol et al., 1983) by suggesting that natural monopoly did not automatically justify public ownership and control. Contestability theory suggests that, under certain conditions, a firm will act efficiently irrespective of the number of firms in the market, as the threat of potential competition will provide the necessary incentives. The key condition is that there are no barriers to entry and exit, and this in turn requires there to be minimal sunk costs. Clearly, this does not apply to rail infrastructure but might be applicable to rail operations.

However, even operations have some barriers to entry. Rolling stock has a long life, a high degree of asset specificity and a poorly developed second hand market, whereas terminals, depots, maintenance facilities and retail outlets all have elements of sunk costs. The solution to this, in Great Britain and elsewhere, has been vertical separation. Terminals, depots and maintenance facilities have been divested and regulated contracts established. Similarly rolling stock can be leased from private companies (as in Great Britain) or be provided by public bodies (as in tendering in Sweden). Ensuring fair access to retail facilities, information and ticketing systems and computer reservation systems can be more problematic (Pyddoke, 2011).

These tangible barriers can be re-inforced by less tangible barriers. Innocent barriers relate to what Button (1988) refers to as economies of experience, relating to management and staff training and user familiarity, that may give incumbents an advantage in competitive situations. Established firms may also have preferential access to capital, given their trading record. These innocent barriers might be reinforced strategically. Marketing might be used to promote brand loyalty, reinforced by branded ticketing and product differentiation, although regulation can be used to ensure inter- availability of tickets. Reputational effects may also be important, with incumbents

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reacting strongly where entry occurs and developing strategies to blockade entry, not least by filling key infrastructure paths. Developing a tough reputation may be correlated with size. Larger firms may be able to withstand competitive battles longer than smaller firms, as they have greater financial resources (‘deeper pockets’) and access to cheaper capital than smaller firms. Anti-trust policies to prevent predatory behaviour become important in such instances. Economies of density arise not only from better utilisation of fixed track but also from the operation of longer trains, more direct services and (for freight) less marshalling (Keaton, 1991), leading to an expectation that for network services there may be a minimum efficient scale and hence there may still be some size effects in operations.

Clearly barriers to entry and exit are less significant in providing rail operations than in providing rail infrastructure, but there do appear to be some. Contestability requires hit and run entry to be feasible. An entrant must be able to operate in the market for even a short period of time and then profitably exit. Any sunk costs will reduce this possibility. If the incumbent is able to react quickly, then the scope for hit and run entry is further reduced. It seems likely that in the rail industry secret entry is unlikely. The incumbent will have been forewarned about the possibility of entry and may be able to react quickly. The combination of some barriers to entry and exit and short reaction periods would seem to reduce the threat of actual and potential competition. The extent to which this in turn reduces efficiency is then an empirical issue. However, it seems likely that any entry is likely to be at a small scale. A possible exception is the freight industry, where there can be secret long term deals between shippers and carriers, and where own-account operation provides a source of new entrants.

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2. Practical Evidence

In the previous section, it has been shown that there are a number of possible barriers to entry in the rail industry over and above legal prohibitions. In this section we review the evidence when rail markets have been opened up to competition, either by forms of open access (competition in the market – or on track competition) or through various forms of contracting-out (competition for the market – or off track competition). These two forms of competition will be discussed in general terms and with specific reference to developments in Great Britain.

On track competition

Railways were initially envisaged as open access facilities with head-on competition between service providers (Lardner, 1850). However, concerns about safety quickly resulted in railways being largely developed as vertically integrated monopolies at a route level but with significant competition between these route-based companies. Over time, competition from other modes reduced the scope for internal competition and led to the rationalisation of duplicated routes and the merger of railway companies. In most countries of the world rail services became a state-owned monopoly but, as we have seen above, this has been reversed over the last thirty years or so (see also Gomez- Ibanez and de Rus, 2006).

Although route competition has remained a feature in a number of countries, particularly Japan (Mizutani, 1994), direct on the tracks competition between rail operators has been limited, especially for passenger services. For example, in Great Britain the 1993 Railways Act promised open access competition between passenger rail operators. In the event, regulatory intervention heavily moderated competition up to 2002. Nonetheless, some open access competition has emerged in Britain with three passenger train operators having entered the market (Griffiths, 2009). There has been

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open access competition in passenger rail markets elsewhere – most notably Germany where open access has been permitted since 1999. Over the first decade, there were around 10 instances of entry of which four were still operating in 2009, centred on Berlin (Séguret, 2009), but accounting for less than 1% of services.1 The liberalisation of long distance passenger services has seen the incumbent operator Deutsche Bahn (DB) withdraw from secondary markets, with some 23 medium sized cities losing long distance train connections between 1999 and 2009. Entry continues with Investor Railroad Development Corporation introducing a Hamburg – Cologne (HKX) service in July 2012, whilst the MSM Group announced in August 2011 that it would enter on two routes at the end of 2012 (DB, 2012). When permitted, niche competition has emerged in other rail markets such as St Petersburg - Moscow in Russia (Dementiev, 2007). The Netherlands has had some experimentation with open-access, most notably the ultimately ill-fated Lovers Rail services (1996-1999), with the Dutch government subsequently favouring off-the track competition (van de Velde, 2009). Other recent entrants within EU domestic markets in 2011, including Westbahn (in which SNCF has a 26% shareholding) in Austria (on the Vienna-Innsbruck route) and Regio Jet in the Czech Republic (between Prague and Havířov (with one service extended to Žilina (Slovakia)), whilst LEO Express expect to start operations between Prague and Ostrava in December 2012. In Italy, Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV), with a 20% stake held by SNCF, began operating on two routes in April 2012 (Turin – Salerno and Rome – Venice), despite the failure of Arenaways on the Turin – Milan route in the previous year. Liberalisation is Sweden was completed in 2010 and has seen entry by Veolia, Tågkompaniet (owned by Norges Statsbaner) and Skandinaviska Jernbanor. Cross entry from the tendered market seems an important factor.

1 These were the night ferry service from Berlin to Malmo, the InterConnex service between Leipzig and Rostock (via Berlin), Vogltand – Berlin and Harz – Berlin services.

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International passenger competition has so far been limited. The Air France and Veolia partnership has failed to develop (and indeed Veolia have subsequently teamed up with TrenItalia to provide Thello night services), whilst DB’s plans to operate on Frankfurt – have been delayed by rolling stock acquisition. The development of the international market has involved a number of collaborations, including , Lyria and , and the establishment of Railteam, and it is likely that these collaborations will evolve.

There has also been substantial open access entry in the European freight market. For example, in Germany almost 300 companies held licences to operate freight services in 2007, although only around 160 were actually operating services (Slack and Vogt, 2007). Entry has included ‘own-account’ carriers (such as Rail4Chem, subsequently taken over by SNCF) and other ‘flag carriers’ such as TX Logistik (part of the TrenItalia Group) and SBB Cargo (Switzerland). Nonetheless, a number of barriers remain, as evidenced by the failure of Ikea Rail. Another phenomenon has been the development of international rail freight operators, most notably the merger of the German state operator DB Cargo with the Dutch operator NS Cargo to form Railion in 2000. Subsequent acquisitions occurred in Demark, Italy and Switzerland. DB Logistics further expanded in 2007 with the takeover of EWS in the UK (and its French subsidiary Euro Cargo Rail) and of the Spanish combined transport operator Transfesa. In 2009 Railion was renamed DB Schenker Rail. Other takeovers have occurred such as Rail Cargo Austria’s acquisition of MAV Cargo (Hungary). An important observation is that competition has focused on trainload freight, with the less lucrative wagonload freight being left with incumbent operators. The European freight market has also featured a number of collaborations, including the European Bulls Rail Freight Alliance and the Xrail alliance.As indicated above, open access competition in Britain has been moderated by the Office of Rail Regulation. In the first phase of moderation, open access competition was restricted to origin and destination pairs that constituted less than 0.2% of a franchisee’ revenue – effectively

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limiting competition to where franchises overlapped (see Shaw, 2000). In the second phase, which operated up to 2002, franchisees could register revenue flows and could only face competition on 20% of registered flows but all unregistered flows would be open to competition. In the third phase, from 2002 onwards a more case by case approach has been adopted where services have to demonstrate that they are not primarily abstractive. It appears that the relevant threshold is that generated traffic needs to be at least 30% of abstracted traffic (Griffiths, 2009). So far there have been three instances of open access competition. These are Hull Trains, which has been operating services between Hull and London via the East Coast Main Line since 2000; Grand Central which has been operating services between London and Sunderland, also via the East Coast Main Line, since 2007 and between London and since 2010; and Wrexham, Marylebone and Shropshire Railway (WSMR), which operated services between Wrexham and London between 2008 and 2011. These niche operators have already undergone some ownership changes. Hull Trains were acquired by First Group in 2003, WMSR by DB in 2008 and Grand Central by in 2011 (itself part of DB since 2010). Three open access proposals have been rejected: a Grand Central service between Preston and Newcastle via and ; a Hull Trains service between Harrogate and London and a Platinum Trains service between Aberdeen and London. Alliance Rail is developing a series of proposals to provide a series of services on the West Coast Main Line, mirroring to some extent the developments on the East Coast Main Line. Currently non-franchised operations 2 account for 0.1% of passenger journeys, 0.7% of passenger revenue 0.7% of passenger kms revenue and 1% of train kms on the national network (ORR, 2011).

2 Also include Heathrow Express.

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Table 1 Open Access Services Summer 2009 Franchisee’s Open access Franchisee Open access trains per day trains per day super off peak Off peak return return London – 1 (19) 7 £85 £69 Hull London – 0 (23) 3 £105 £71 Sunderland

Table 1 shows some data for the two most established open access operators both of which are providing direct services to London from cities on the East Coast of with populations of around 250,000 that have traditionally been poorly served by rail. The franchised operator in the main provides indirect services via Doncaster in the case of Hull and via Newcastle in the case of Sunderland. It can be seen that compared to these franchised services, the open access operator only provides 27% of service in the case of Hull and 12% in the case of Sunderland. However, headline fares for the open access operator are some 18% lower in the case of Hull and 32% lower in the case of Sunderland. This has resulted in large increases in demand. Rail travel between London and Hull has grown by some 60%, whilst on the non-competed Grimsby to London route growth has only been around 10%. In terms of revenue, the first four Hull Trains services were estimated to have a generation to abstraction ratio of 0.7:1. Another feature of open access services is the high percentage of passengers on the main flows travelling on dedicated tickets – well above the 10% threshold used by the Competition Commission (2005) and in some case above 50%.

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Table 2 Economic Benefit of Open Access Services (£m) Hull Trains Grand Central PV 5 years PV 10 years PV 5 years PV 10 years Economic 47.3. 96.9 18.4 38.2 benefit Net financial 29.1 45.4 15.5 24.3 cost Net Present 18.1 51.5 2.9 14.0 Value Benefit Cost 1.62 2.13 1.19 1.57 Ratio Source: MVA, 2009.

Table 2 shows that there appears to be a strong economic case for both the Hull Trains and Grand Central services, with a 10 year benefit:cost ratio in excess of 1.5 for both services. However, it also suggests that the commercial case could be limited, especially when abstraction from the incumbent is taken into account, which is evidenced by the withdrawal of the Wrexham, Marylebone and Shropshire Railway.

Off track competition

Off track competition, in the form of competitive tendering (where the operator typically provides the rolling stock) and franchising (where the rolling stock is typically provided by a third party) is more common in the passenger rail industry than on track competition (Thompson, 2006). In Europe, the pioneers were Sweden, where competitive tendering for local services began in 1990 and was extended to regional services in 1993. This model has also been adopted in countries such as Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands and further afield in countries such as Kazakhstan (Sharipov, 2009). The EU’s subsequent intention was for a widespread roll out of competitive tendering but this met opposition from some member states and Regulation 1370/2007 merely required clear and transparent contracts. In Latin America, urban and suburban services were privatised through concessions, with the

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Buenos Aires commuter network in Argentina being transferred to the private sector in 1992, as was the Rio de Janeiro Metro and commuter services (Flumitrens) in Brazil in 1997/8. These arrangements build on similar models in the United States where commuter rail services have been contracted out in cities such as Boston, Baltimore/Washington, Chicago and Los Angeles (Preston et al., 2001) and have been extended to other urban rail systems, most notably in Melbourne, Australia (Kain, 2006). However, contracting out of long distance passenger rail services is relatively rare. The main exception is Great Britain where all passenger services were franchised in 1996/7, with five out of 25 Train Operating Companies being particularly focused on long distance services (Cross Country, East Coast Mainline, Great Western Mainline, Midland Mainline and West Coast Main Line).

The evidence of competition for the market in Great Britain is relevant here. There have been three rounds of franchising (see also Preston, 2008), with the fourth just commencing. The first round, organised by the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, was undertaken between 1996 and 1997 and based in the main around seven year net cost contracts, with minimum service levels specified and around 50% of fares regulated. An important exception was the West Coast Main Line where a 15 year franchise was let, as the infrastructure was to undergo an upgrade to permit 200 km per hour tilting Pendolino trains, an upgrade which was only completed in 2008.

The second round, associated with the Strategic Rail Authority, saw some eight franchises re-let. Initially the focus was on longer franchise for 20 years in which the operator was given greater commercial freedom. In the event only two such franchises were let – for the urban services centred on (Merseyrail) and for Chiltern Rail. The rest of the re-let franchises were in response to the financial meltdown in the industry that resulted from the Hatfield accident in 2000 and the subsequent failure of Railtrack and some 13 of the 25 Train Operating Companies (Nash and Smith, 2006).

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Thompson (2006) notes that of these 13 failures only two were long distance operators whose holding company (Virgin Trains) had been affected by the delays and cost over- runs on the West Coast Main Line Upgrade. Partly as a result of these franchise failures, there was a switch back to more tightly specified, shorter franchises.

The third phase of franchising – run by the Department for Transport (DfT) since 2005 – saw 10 further franchises re-let. A feature of this round was that the distinction between long distance intercity franchises and suburban and regional franchises has become blurred, with the Great Western incorporating the former Thames (London commuter services out of Paddington) and Wessex (regional services in the South West) franchises. Similarly, the Midland Main Line franchise was merged with some regional services to form East Trains. Another feature of the third round was the cap and collar incentive regime which shared commercial risk between the franchisor and the franchisee. This typically meant that after the first four years of the franchise contract have passed 50% of any fares revenues in excess of 102% of the TOC’s original forecasts are shared with DfT; DfT makes a contribution equivalent to 50% of any revenue shortfall below 98% of the TOC’s original forecast; and for any short fall below 96%, DfT’s contribution increases to 80%. This revenue risk-sharing mechanism is intended to constrain overzealous bidding, something that was a particular feature towards the end of the first round (see Preston et al., 2000). However, it may encourage backloading in which bids are more aggressive in later years when the risk sharing comes into force. The fourth round has just commenced, but has already faced problems, with Virgin mounting a legal challenge to the award of the West Coast franchise to First Group (Modern Railways, 2012).

One initial concern about off track competition was that it may not prove to be very competitive (Preston, 1996). This has not proved to be the case given that the privatised bus companies have been heavily involved in bidding from the start, whilst interest from

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international organisations has grown so that currently organisations from France, Germany, Hong Kong and the Netherlands have stakes in franchised rail operators. In the first phase there were an average 5.4 bids per franchise. This has reduced slightly so that there were 4.2 bids per franchise in the second phase and 3.8 bids per franchise in the third phase. There is some concern that high bidding costs may be deterring entry. These were estimated at around £5 million per bidder in 2006 (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2006), whilst Virgin have estimated the cost of their most recent bid as £14 million. Concerns over high (and increasing) bidding costs are also a concern in Germany (DB, 2012)

An interesting case study is provided by the East Coast Franchise, the core of which provides intercity services between London King’s Cross and Leeds/Edinburgh. Table 3 gives some basic data. In the first round of franchising, the winning bid for this franchise was from Great North Eastern Railways (GNER), a subsidiary of the shipping company Sea Containers. This service required some £65 million of subsidy in the first year of operation falling to zero subsidy in the seventh year. Given the relatively good performance of GNER and uncertainties following Hatfield a two year extension was negotiated, prior to refranchising in 2004. The incumbent operator put in a robust bid which involved paying a premium of £50 million in the first year, rising to £219 million in the tenth year, indicating some backloading. However, the trade press indicated that the incumbent’s bid was only a little higher than the second highest bid. This bid was accepted and GNER started operating its renewed franchise in May 2005. However, this bid was quickly overtaken by a series of events. GNER had not anticipated the upsurge in fuel costs that occurred in 2005/6, revenue was hit by the 7th July 2005 bombings in Central London and entry by an open access operator, Grand Central, would abstract some revenue from GNER, particularly at . To confound matters, GNER’s parent company was also in financial difficulties. It quickly became clear that GNER could not meet its premium payments and there were still three years before the cap and collar

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scheme came into force. In December 2006, GNER entered into a Management Agreement with the DfT, based on an incentive if revenue growth exceeds an agreed target. Almost immediately, the process of re-letting the franchise was begun.

Table 3: The East Coast Franchise Date Started Expected PVNP PVNP Duration 1st year Final year (£m) (£m) GNER April 1996 7 years 651 0 GNER May 2005 10 years (50) (219) National Express Dec. 2007 7 ¼ years 7 (311) PVNP = Present Value of Net Payments. Figure in brackets denote premia paid. 1Out-turn. Source: Preston and Root (1999) and www.dft.gov.uk

The bids for these were submitted in June 2007 and the award announced in August. The winning bid came from the National Express Group, who began operations in December 2007. Again the bid was a robust one. Although for the first year of operation a subsidy of £7 million was required this would quickly convert into a premium of £311 million some seven years later – again indicating backloading. There was some concern that National Express was buying in work, given that it had lost a number of franchises (including Central, Midland Mainline and Scotrail), but the trade press also indicated that National Express was not the highest bidder. Once again the bid was overtaken by events. Given the credit crunch, the 10% per annum revenue growth on which the bid was predicated was unlikely. In the light of this, and problems with the parent company, in July 2009, National Express East Coast announced that it would only be able to meet it contractual obligations up to the end of 2009. Mindful of evidence that re- negotiations would lead to cost increases of the order of 23-28% (Smith and Wheat, 2009), the Government fulfilled its earlier commitment not to negotiate and prepared to exercise its operator of last resort powers, a role it had previously exercised for South East Trains (formerly operated by Connex) between 2003 and 2006. National Express

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East Coast surrendered a £32 million performance bond and, in combination with accumulated losses, faced an exposure of some £100 million. The costs to the DfT were estimated to be £250 million in termination costs and between £330 and £380 million in revenue foregone (Oxera, 2012, based on House of Common, 2011). Since November 2009, the East Coast franchise has been operated by Directly Operated Railways, a Government subsidiary, although there are advanced plans to return the franchise to the private sector in 2013.

One of the dangers of contracting-out is related to the gaming behaviour that can occur. In particular, there is the practice of low-balling in which bidders post an initial high bid in the belief that they can then re-negotiate or chisel on the offered level of quality. The performance regime for railways in Britain (with financial penalties for poor reliability and overcrowding) largely precludes the latter option. Re-negotiation is a high risk strategy, and one that might involve a loss of reputation, but is predicated on at least three points. First, the private sector is gambling that no Government could afford to let the railways (or a part of it) go bust. Second, in circumstances of a likely franchise failure, re-negotiations may be less costly (and speedier) than re-franchising. Third, the private sector is assuming that in any re-negotiations it will exhibit better negotiation skills (and be able to devote more resources to this task) than the public sector. In so doing, it may be assisted by information asymmetries. There is some evidence that low- balling occurred in the first round of franchising, albeit it unsuccessfully in the case of Connex, but perhaps with more success in the case of the original Virgin franchises. Thompson (2006) notes that low-balling has been a feature of rail franchising elsewhere, particularly in Australia and Latin America. In the third round of franchising, low-balling does not seem to be effective given the Government’s firm stance on no renegotiations, implementation of cross-default provisions and recovery of a performance bond. However, the failure of the East Coast franchisee twice in three years is obviously a cause for concern and suggests that there are still problems with the winner’s curse.

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Options might involve: moving from net subsidy to gross cost contracts (as has occurred for the London Overground franchise) but this would weaken operator incentives to grow revenue; introducing flexible length contracts which terminate once a franchisee has made its premium payments in PV terms – in effect a variant of the least present value of revenue approach advocated by Engel et al. (2001); or modifying the cap and collar regime. The Government has gone for the latter option, introducing a new mechanism entitled the Gross Domestic Product Adjustment, but has also more than tripled the financial guarantees required from the winning bidder. It has been noted in the trade press that the successful First Group bid for the West Coast franchise has a backloaded premium profile that is very similar to National Express’s East Coast bid, with both assuming revenue growth in excess of 10% per annum (Modern Railways, 2012). However, recently mistakes in the bid evaluation process have been detected and the award to First Group has been withdrawn. The withdrawal of tenders is also an issue elsewhere. For example, in Germany three tenders for a total of 14.2 million kilometres were withdrawn in 2012 because of funding issues (DB, 2012).

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3. Theoretical Evidence

Rail competition, where it occurs, is likely to be small group in nature. Market demand is often too thin to support a large number of operators, whilst there may be some economies of scale and density that limit the optimum number of firms in rail markets (see, for example, Smith and Wheat, 2009). These assumptions seem to have been confirmed by much of the practical evidence above. The relevant industry structure is therefore that of oligopoly competition. Classical models assume competition occurs either in the price dimension (Bertrand competition) or in the service dimension (Cournot competition). The conventional wisdom is that where capacity is difficult to increase (e.g. rail) competition will be of the Cournot type but where capacity can easily be increased (e.g. bus) competition will be of the Bertrand type (Quinet and Vickerman, 2004, page 263). However, this ignores demand side aspects. The urban rail market has turn-up-and-go characteristics which mean that passengers will tend to board the first train to arrive. Price competition is more effective in book-ahead markets such as long distance rail services. Indeed price competition was a strong feature of the competition between British Coachways, National Express and British Rail in the early 1980s (see Douglas, 1987). However, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that with appropriate quantity pre-commitment (which is likely to be the case in rail) Bertrand and Cournot competition can be equivalent.

To date, we have seen little practical evidence of head-on competition. Instead we need to rely on theoretical models. Economic models of competition in rail have focused on the development of route based models in which the impacts of particular timetables (schedules) are examined and have some similarities with the dynamic schedule-based approaches developed by others (Wilson and Nuzzolo, 2004). An example is the PRAISE (PRivatisation of Rail SErvices) model (see Preston et al., 1999, 2002). A similar

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modelling approach was adopted by SDG (2004) in modelling rail competition on the Brussels-Cologne and Madrid-Barcelona routes.

It is possible to generalise the results of these computer simulations. A generic version of the PRAISE model was developed for the Strategic Rail Authority (Whelan, 2002) and meta-analysis of model runs has been undertaken to determine reaction functions. These results indicate that in Great Britain with prevailing track access rates, head-on competition is not commercially feasible, even if sufficient capacity was available. However, cream skimming entry with train movements focussing on the peak times and directions of travel and/or niche entry through various forms of product differentiation could be commercially feasible, particularly if there was regulation to ensure inter- availability of tickets. Modelling results indicated that inter-availability could make entry profitable but at the expense of the profitability of the incumbent. Furthermore, modelling suggested that competition would lead to service withdrawal from thinner markets (in this case lightly used intermediate stops) and a concentration on thick markets - a phenomenon also observed in the deregulated express coach market (Cross and Kilvington, 1985) and in the German passenger rail market (Séguret, op cit.).

By contrast, the work in Sweden indicated that with lower track access charges, head-on competition was commercially feasible on the busiest routes, although it might not be technically feasible because of capacity constraints. However, such competition was not desirable because it led to too much service, at too high fares, compared to the welfare maximising configuration which involved substantial fare reductions on the busiest route. An interesting feature was the importance of competition between parallel routes. If the slower route was subsidised so that fares and frequency were set at the welfare maximising level then a profit maximising monopolist on the fast route would probably produce at a fares:frequency combination that was close to the welfare maximum. Competition was not found to be feasible for thinner routes in Sweden.

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The overall conclusion from models of this type is that competition in rail markets, where it occurs, is not characterised by oligopoly (either of the Cournot or Bertrand type) but is likely to take the form of oligopolistic competition of the type described by Salop (1979) and Novshek (1980). This will involve too much service at too high fares, but also with spatial and temporal bunching.

The finding that competition in rail markets does not generally enhance welfare requires numerous qualifications. The first is that it is assumed that firms are already cost efficient. Where this is not the case, competition may be a powerful tool to promote cost efficiency and incumbent inefficiency could trigger large scale entry. The second is that dynamic efficiency is ignored. There may be an argument that competition promotes innovation, particularly with respect to product differentiation. A third, and related point, is that uniform pricing is assumed, at least for individual segments. Competition may particularly promote innovation in pricing, stimulated by technological developments in delivery channels such as the internet, smart cards and mobile telephony. As a result modelling work is now focusing on intra-modal and even intra- firm competition between ticket types (Wardman and Toner, 2003).

Theoretical work on off track competition is more limited but Preston et al. (2000) have speculated that rail franchising might be thought of as an independent private value auction in which the number of bids leads to an increase in the price of the winning bid. Stated Preference experiments indicated that other drivers of the winning bid price included contract length, exclusivity and the degree of price-setting and service-setting freedom. The competitive nature of franchising in Britain may explain the high prices that have occurred, although theory suggests that as the variance of the bid distribution increases the winning bid should reduce. However, there is no evidence to date of such learning behaviour. Increased availability of bid value distributions might be helpful here.

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4. Summary and Conclusions

The recent McNulty review undertaken in Britain for DfT and ORR provides some useful data on market shares in key European markets, as shown by Table 4. This has been supplemented by data from the 2011 Liberalisation Index (IBM, 2011). This Table shows that in all five countries sampled the dominance of the market leader is greater in the passenger than the freight market, reflecting the greater deregulation in the latter as a result of both European and national legislation. It is also clear that the leading operator is much less dominant in Great Britain than any of the other four countries in both the passenger and freight markets. This is in part due to ownership changes and the privatisation of the state owned British Rail in the mid-1990s. It may also reflect the role of comprehensive franchising in the passenger market rather than open access and/or limited competitive tendering. This is also reflected by the Herfindahl Index of market concentration, calculated as around 0.64 for the German passenger market but only 0.16 for Great Britain. The Liberalisation Index indicates that France is the least liberalised market and Sweden the most liberalised, which in the latter case reflects recent reforms.

Table 4: Market Share of Dominant Operator (for 2008/9) Passenger Freight Liberalisation Dominant Operator Dominant Operator Index France 100% 85% 612 Germany 80% 75%* 842 Great Britain 26% 51% 865 Netherlands 86% 66% 815 Sweden 82% (71%) 61% (85%) 872 Source: Civity, 2011, except * which is based ondata for 2009 in DB(2012). Shares based on passenger kms or tonne kms. Figures in parentheses for Sweden are based on revenue.

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It should be noted that the findings in Table 4 are continuing to evolve. For example, in France, SNCF’s share of the freight market reduced from 85% in 2009 to 71% in 2011, with the number of railway holding safety certificates for freight traffic increasing from 9 in 2009 to 21 in May2012 (SNCF, 2012). The number of railway undertakings which hold safety certificates for passenger operations was only 1 in 2005, but 6 by May 2012. In Germany, although entrants’ share of the long-distance market remains at 1%, the share of regional rail services (measured in terms of train kms) has increased from 20% in 2009 to 24% in 2011. Entrants’ share of the German freight market also continues to increase and reached 26% in 2011 (DB, 2012). DB Netz report that DB’s share of train- path kilometres has reduced from 83% in 2009 to 79% in 2011.

Our overall findings are summarised by Table 5. We find that open access passenger rail services, although growing, are still largely limited to niches, such as peripheral services that have been neglected by the incumbent. Some head-on competition is beginning to emerge but remains limited. This may be because there are a range of barriers to entry which are particularly exacerbated when the incumbent operator is not fully separated from the infrastructure authority. This has been claimed to be a reason for the failure of Arenaways in Italy and a factor in the long planning periods for new services (e.g. there was a period of three years to introduce HKX’s services), although rolling stock availability and certification are also an issue. These barriers are further re-inforced by a range of intangible barriers, both strategic and innocent. As open access entry is small scale, the entrants may be particularly vulnerable to takeovers from incumbent operators. High infrastructure charges may be a particular barrier to entry in high speed markets, although rolling stock access can also be problematic. Whilst open access freight operations do have some tangible and innocent intangibles barriers, reaction periods can be longer and as a result there is more competition, although

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monopolisation through takeovers remains a risk. For both international passenger and freight services, lack of interoperability remains a barrier.

Table 5: Summary of Findings Barrier Open Open Franchising Competitive Access Access Tendering Passenger Freight Tangible Infrastructure ● ● Rolling Stock ● ● ● Depots ● ● ● Terminals ● ● Retail ● Ticketing ● Intangible - Size ● Strategic Reputation ● Intangible – Experience ● ● ● ● Innocent Brand Loyalty ● ● Capital ● ● ● Reaction Period Short Medium Long Medium Extent of Competition Limited Moderate High High

Overall, it is concluded that open access passenger services may be particularly problematic and in the main are likely to be only a niche activity, although NTV is likely to be an important test case in this respect. The fourth package proposals for the harmonisation of regulation and for framework conditions concerning the independence of infrastructure managers and access to stations and facilities, through ticketing and inter-available ticketing could help eradicate some of the problems that entrants such as NTV have highlighted. However, where infrastructure authorities are seeking to cover fixed costs, high access charges are likely to limit the scope for profitable entry.

Franchising or tendering may be a more effective way of introducing widespread competition for passenger services, but is not without its own problems, such as the limited role of the private sector in service definition in tendering and strategic bidding

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behaviour in franchising. Open access freight services may be less problematic, but still face substantive barriers, particularly for international services. However, all competitive models may be threatened by mergers and acquisitions and the creation of monopolies, whilst cartelisation may also be a risk.

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