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BRITISH EMBASSY, No. 12 (10113/1/55) CAIRO. SECRET January 24, 1955. EIPU Sir, i With reference-to your circular despatch No. 078 of the 9th of September, 1953, I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary, arranged chronologically, of the principal events which occurred in Egypt during 1954 and also to offer my comments on the main trends. '2. The year was remarkable both for the efforts displayed by the men of the regime and for the results achieved. In the field of foreign affairs, after prolonged and arduous negotiations a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was found in the Agreement of the 19th of October and a promising beginning was subsequently made in establishing confidence and promoting co-operation between the two Governments. At home the position of the regime was consolidated by the elimination of General Neguib; who, though nominally the Leader of the Revolution,;had become the rallying point of elements hostile to it, and by the paralysing blows dealt to the Moslem Brotherhood, the only remaining political force capable of organised opposition. The regime also survived some ill-conceived attacks on it by the political assassin. Although it increased the already large number of its enemies and made few friends, it founa itself at the end of the year master of the situation, though facing with some understandable hesitation the major problems of political evolution and economic progress. The members of the Council for the Revolutionary Command, all of whom bef9re the end of the summer had assumed ministerial responsibilities, shewed surprisingly few \signs of strain or fatigue. Colonel Nasser emerged as '.the dominant figure in the Council: his self-confidence and his sense or mission increasing with experience, while the modesty of his manner did not suffer in the process. Unfortunately he continued for his .../countrymen The Right Honourable . Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., M.P., etc., etc., etc. f1 1 1 Frr^> ^Tl l / ^^>S~7f5" \nzia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BC~"R£P»ODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION countrymen to be on the whole an unsympathetic figure and even the attempt on his life did little to enhance his popularity for any length of time, while the intensive publicity accorded to him by the Government propaganda machine from May onwards failed to endear him to the masses, , ' 3 ' The conflict within the Army Movement between authoritarian and democratic ideals and the less conscious struggle between those of Western and Islamic Socialism, which were referred to in my review of the events of 1953 (paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 14 of the 18th of January. 1954) developed with unexpected rapidity in the first months of 1954. That of Islamic Socialism. as represented by the Moslem Brotherhood, came to a head in January with the arrest of Hodeibi and several hundreds of his followers. That of a return to constitutional forms and political life was raised in an acute form by General Neguib in March. Both, however. remained unresolved until the autumn. The Brotherhood's leadership was then destroyed and the lavement as a whole disorganised, and, with the deposition of General Neguib the prospect of an early return to parliamentary government receded further into the future. Though there was much personal sympathy for the General, his _ disappearance from the political scene caused hardly a ripple in Egypt itself: it was recognised either as^an uSortunate necessity or as the inevitable consequence of his own shortcomings, according to the sympathies 01 r^ The regime's efforts to find a successor t*»* Oowo^ll' ttor t&f y% Coauikn^ M*}*Mi « . so Tfce elimination ! Atajor Khaled Uohieddin and his socialist influence left the Council!ideologically more homogeneous. It was inevitable however that there should be differences, at least of emphasis, on matters of policy. Tho principal issue appears, understandably enough to navo been that of political evolution, in regard to which Wing Commander Gamal Salem (supported by his brother) .../was - 3 - was more apprehensive of the results of parliamentary rule than Colonel Nasser. Differences between the impetuous Salem brothers on the one hand and Colonel Nasser and his immediate supporters, General Amer and Wing Commander Boghdady and even the rest of the Council for the Revolutionary Command on the other, extended to other fields also. In particular Major Salem's handling of the Sudan, his approach to Arab problems and even his appreciation of the Palestine question were not entirely to the satisfaction of his colleagues. Nevertheless Colonel Nasser appeared to recognise that the regime could not afford a further crisis for the time being and that, however serious the disadvantages of a Minister of National Guidance who could not control his own tongue or of a Deputy Prime Minister who saw every issue in absolute terms of principle, he could not do better, at least in the short term, than make do with the material at hand. At the same time the influence of the two brothers almost certainly decreased towards the end of the year. ' • - • • • | 6, Within the Army the Council for the Revolutionary Command claims to have fimproved its position. Though the bulk of the officer strength probably remained essentially neutral, the Council for the Revolutionary Command succeeded, by a policy of eliminating doubtful elements and of giving promotion on the basis of merit, in increasing the. numoer of its supporters and thereby its hold on the Armed Forces as a whole. Similar tactics with the Police paid good dividends also. 7. In the country at large an effective, if dangerous weapon was forged out of the syndicates (invariably subservient to a strong government in this country) and organised labour largely replaced the student body as the political spearhead. The National Guard also proved its value in times of internal crisis. An effective discipline was imposed .on the Universities (critics of the regime among teaching staff and students alike who < showed their hand during the March crisis having been removed) and a new student organisation - with what results is not yet known - was launched. Except in the matter of the syndicates, the success of the Liberation Rally was however limited, and the regime was still unsupported by anything approaching a mass movement or an electioneering machine when 1955 dawned. It is doubtful whether the Land Reform, though it weakened the opposition, won .../much -4 - much positive support for the regime in the countryside. The disruption of the Moslem Brotherhood, though if. • welcomed by the minorities, particularly the Copts and even by educated and westernised Moslems, perplexed the Moslem masses, large numbers of whom, including many stable elements, had joined the Brotherhood for purely religious reasons. f; I: 8. Nevertheless, the number of responsible people who either recognised the outstanding achievements of the regime or realised that, if the Army Movement \^>-. failed, worse might come in its place, probably "..)!' increased. There was also widespread appreciation in responsible circles of the regime's earnest endeavours to remain free of corruption, and somewhat grudging Kfl, recognition of its financial and economic policy which enabled the recovery achieved in 1953 to be maintained, and also of the remarkable, if expensive, efforts of the Minister of Municipal Affairs (Wing Commander tin Boghdady) to provide much needed amenities in the capital and at the same time to give work to some unemployed. The substantial American economic aid, which was made available and accepted shortly after the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.and the advantages in terms of Unitea Kingdom-Egyptian trade which v/ere expected to derive from the Agreement itself v/ere held to'offer prospects of increased economic prosperity 'in the coming year. 9. As regards foreign affairs, and in the first instance Anglo-Egyptian relations, the signature of the Heads of Agreement in July brought about a marked improvement in the atmosphere. Following the conclusion of the Agreement itself relations between this Embassy and the Egyptian (kjvemoent/ including it/0 officials, became as friendly and confident aa tb^v had been, with few exc^ions. <x>^ *# the preceding period, am contacts with utwt**%,~z-\... Egyutians were reemsed t0.-t236;cfcvioB3 v&l\&? ^/f/^£*, Turtles. The prospect of t&* vi^lt ot & l^U^ "&zz* itissibn early t£d3 year TSSS -Cleaned. tot£ ~: ^ ^ Gcvem5£T3t srd ceasaescisl clrelss. **rf- "f-r-r.^-zL. G-C'V6PE3!!tHIIu SxSCWcd. in Qsaling iaita itlon of tz>£ A,- restored in the area ana IDC ..,/confined f - 5 - -A2< . M ,, ^ -" U721P I | | | | I l I I I 1.1 • ifiHT - MOT TO afWRODUCEO PHOTOGRAPHICALLY MITHOUT PERMISSION 1 " • - 6 - 12. Egypt's relations with Turkey reached their nadir early in the year following the "expulsion of the Turkish Ambassador. After the signature of the Heads of Agreement in July, a gradual improvement set in and by the end of the year relations were more cordial than . they have been for many years. Egyptian and Iraqi leaders thus came to the same conclusion that an understanding with Turkey was essential and differed only in method, the Egyptians favouring an informal rapprochement and the Iraqis something more specific. The rapidity of the change in the Egyptian attitude is remarkable, particularly when the difficulty experienced in including the reference to Turkey in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is remembered. 13. Egypt's record in .the Sudan was unfortunately far less satisfactory. Major Salah Salem's unscrupulous handling of tne problem and in particular his open interference in favour of one faction, the National Unionist Party, continued, though by the end of the year the Major had learnt much and, alarmed at a prospect of political and administrative collapse in the Sudan, was prepared to abate his earlier ideas of "unity" between the two countries.

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