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Human Rights Watch All Rights Reserved HUMAN RIGHTS ALL ACCORDING TO PLAN The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt WATCH All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1661 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org AUGUST 2014 978-1-62313-1661 All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Map .............................................................................................................................................. I Summary and Key Recommendations ........................................................................................... 1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 22 I. Background ............................................................................................................................ 25 Mass Killings of Protesters ...................................................................................................... 25 Mass Arrests ......................................................................................................................... 26 Restrictions on Freedom of Expression, Assembly, and Association ........................................ 28 II. The Dispersals at Rab’a al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares ...................................................... 31 Forcible Dispersal of the Rab’a Sit-in ....................................................................................... 33 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 33 Nasr Street, Tiba Mall (East Entrance) ............................................................................... 35 Anwar al-Mufti Street (Parallel to East Nasr Street, Behind Tiba Mall) ................................ 43 Nasr Street, Manassa (West Entrance) ............................................................................. 46 Tayaran Street, Republican Guard (North Entrance) ........................................................... 51 Tayaran Street, Manufiya Building (South Entrance) .......................................................... 52 Central Rab’a Square (Rab’a Hospital, Mosque, & Surrounding Structures) ....................... 59 Killings of Protesters ........................................................................................................ 77 The Death Toll ................................................................................................................. 82 Dispersal of the al-Nahda Square Sit-in .................................................................................. 86 Dispersal at Mustafa Mahmoud Square ................................................................................. 92 The State’s Justification for the Dispersals ............................................................................. 94 Government Planning ............................................................................................................ 98 August 14 Attacks on Churches and Police Stations ............................................................... 104 III. Other Mass Killings of Protesters ........................................................................................ 108 July 5: Five Protesters Killed outside the Republican Guard Headquarters .............................. 108 July 8: Sixty-one Protesters Killed outside the Republican Guard Headquarters ...................... 112 July 27: Ninety-five Protesters Killed outside the Manassa Memorial ...................................... 121 August 16: One Hundred Twenty Protesters Killed in the Ramses Square Area ........................ 130 IV. Legal Standards and Accountability ..................................................................................... 140 Freedom of Assembly and Use of Force ................................................................................. 140 Crimes against Humanity ...................................................................................................... 142 Command Responsibility ...................................................................................................... 144 Investigations and Accountability ......................................................................................... 147 Access to Medical Care ......................................................................................................... 149 Egyptian Law on the Use of Force and Firearms ...................................................................... 150 V. Authorities’ Response: Denial and Impunity .......................................................................... 152 Denial of Wrongdoing ........................................................................................................... 152 Failure to Provide Information on the Dispersal ..................................................................... 155 Fact-Finding Commission ...................................................................................................... 157 National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) ............................................................................ 159 The Need for Accountability .................................................................................................. 162 International Response ............................................................................................................. 162 VI. Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 165 To the Egyptian Government ................................................................................................. 165 To the Interior and Defense Ministries ................................................................................... 166 To the Public Prosecutor ....................................................................................................... 167 To the Post-June 30 Fact-Finding Commission ....................................................................... 168 To UN Member States ........................................................................................................... 168 To UN Security Council .......................................................................................................... 169 To UN Human Rights Council ................................................................................................. 169 To the Arab League ............................................................................................................... 170 To the African Union ............................................................................................................. 170 Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 171 Appendix I: Letter to Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy ................................................................... 172 Appendix II: Letter to Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim ......................................................... 174 Appendix III: Letter to Defense Minister Sidki Subhi .................................................................. 178 Appendix IV: Letter to Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat .......................................................... 181 Appendix V: Follow-up Letter to Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry .............................................. 184 Appendix VI: Follow-up Letter to Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim ......................................... 186 Appendix VII: Follow-up Letter to Defense Minister Sidki Subhi ................................................. 187 Appendix VIII: Follow-up Letter to Public Prosecutor HLsham Barakat ......................................... 188 Map I AUGUST 2014 | HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2014 1 In July and August 2013, many of Egypt’s public squares and streets were awash in blood. On July 3, 2013, the military deposed Mohamed Morsy, Egypt’s first elected civilian president and a high-ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood, on the heels of massive popular protests against Morsy calling for early presidential elections. Over the course of the following two months, Muslim Brotherhood supporters organized two large sit-ins in Cairo and smaller protests across Egypt to denounce the military takeover and demand the reinstatement of Morsy. In response, police and army forces repeatedly opened fire on demonstrators, killing over 1,150, most of them in five separate incidents
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