Career Patterns in the Soviet Bureaucracy, 1917-1941

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Career Patterns in the Soviet Bureaucracy, 1917-1941 FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH "Career Patterns in the TITLE: Soviet Bureaucracy, 1917-1941" AUTHOR: J. Arch Getty William Chase CONTRACTOR: University of California, Riverside PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: J. Arch Getty COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 628-3 DATE: January 10, 1986 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH Edward L. Keenan Suite 304 Chairman, Board of Trustees 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Vladimir I. Toumanoff Washington, D.C. 20036 Executive Director (202) 387-0168 INTRODUCTORY NOTE This paper is an interim progress report at the end of two years of a three year project intended to: (1) assemble, test, and disseminate a computerized data bank of biographical and career information on approximately 30,000 Soviet Government and Party officials over the period 1917-1941; (2) analyze the structure and operation of the Soviet bureaucracy in that period. Preliminary findings are presented here, and the authors hope to present a Final Report analyzing changes in the bureaucracy in late 1986. Thereafter the full data bank will be made available to the scholarly community and general public by deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science Research (at the University of Michigan) and the State Data Bank at the University of California, Berkeley. The project is being funded jointly by the National Council, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Fund for the Eighties BOARD OF TRUSTEES: George Breslauer; Herbert J. Ellison; Sheila Fitzpatrick; Edward A. Hewett; David Joravsky; Edward L. Keenan (Chairman); Andrzej Korbonski; Herbert S. Levine; Leon S. Lipson (Vice Chairman); Paul Marer; Daniel C. Matuszewski; Alfred G. Meyer; Marshall D. Shulman; Vladimir I. Toumanoff; Richard S. Wortman SUMMARY Despite the significant number of studies of aspects of the Soviet state and Communist Party bureaucracies in the inter-war period, few works employ aggregate analysis as a means of examining and understanding the overall patterns, behaviors, relationships and internal structure of these bureaucracies during this formative period. This study, which is based on a partially completed data bank containing officeholding and biographical data of Soviet bureaucrats, applies aggregate analysis to selected aspects of bureaucratic practices and behavior from 1925 to 1931. The years 1925, 1927, 1929 and 1931 were chosen for analysis and data were drawn primarily from Vsia Mo3kva, the Moscow city directory. For substantive and methodological reasons, this analysis is restricted to three issues: (1) multiple officeholding and persistence (conversely turnover) as examples of aggregate behavior; (2) the extent and nature of "family circles"; and (3) the structure of the Central Committee. Because the data base on which this analysis is based is only partially completed, this is not a full-scale study of the state and party bureaucracies but rather a series of diagnostic probes and systematic observations. Given the well-known shortage of competent and politically reliable administrators in the 1920s and early 1930s, one might expect multiple officeholding to be common. Yet an analysis of multiple officeholding by national and RSFSR party and state bureaucrats reveals that it was, in fact, quite uncommon — less than 20% held more than one office. Although the exception among all officeholders, multiple officeholding by the bureaucracies' top leaders was somewhat more frequent. Nonetheless, more than 93% of the top leaders held only Page 2 one or two offices simultaneously. Despite the rarity of multiple officeholding, the proportion of officials and especially top leaders who held more than one office grew steadily between 1925 and 1931. One of the most striking features of the USSR and RSFSR bureaucracies during this period is the startling low level of persistence and high rate of turnover among officials — only 11% of officials in selected USSR state agencies and 5% in selected RSFSR agencies held their position for six years. Among those agencies' leading personnel the persistence rate was comparable — 14% and 4% respectively. Precisely why the persistence rate among RSFSR officials was so low is unclear, but one possible explanation can definitely be eliminated — RSFSR officials were not moving into USSR-level positions. The RSFSR commissariats were not a training ground for USSR offices; on the contrary, the two were separate career tracks. An examination of biannual turnover rates revealed that turnover was high (64%) in 1925-1927, lower (43%) in 1927-1929, and highest (77%) in 1929-1931. Although political purging (i.e. of Left and Right Oppositionists) accounts for some of the turnover, it was considerably less significant than structural factors. One fact is incontestable — high rate of turnover meant that the vast majority of bureaucrats, including top leaders, were new to and inexperienced in their jobs. The result was undeniably confusion, inefficiency, and dysfunctional behavior. One can not help but wonder how a bureaucracy in chaos managed to govern effectively. To reduce the inefficiency which turnover bred, one might expect that top bureaucratic leaders brought with them to their new positions a coterie of experienced, competent and reliable administrators, a Page 3 "family circle". But the evidence clearly indicates that family circles were virtually unknown until 1929, and even during 1929-1931 were few in number and usually very small. In some cases, personal secretaries comprised the entire "family". These circles, even the largest ones, were especially small given the population at risk. In those family circles which did exist, the members' experience suggests that the circles were primarily functional rather than political in nature. Our examination of the Central Committee reveals that, unlike the low rate of persistence within state agencies, persistence among Central Committee members was several orders of magnitude higher. In fact, the Central Committee during 1925-1931 was fairly stable. Demotions from or within the Central Committee were nearly always related to factional/oppositional membership rather than structural changes. Robert Daniels' finding that the Central Committee was selected from bureaucratic constituencies is correct. Despite it3 remarkable structural consistency, two constituencies within the Central Committee received preferential treatment when it came to promotions during this period — regional party secretaries and Vesenkha (Supreme Council of National Economy) presidium members. The rise of the regional party secretaries during this period was probably related to the process and regional needs of collectivization. To ensure the successful implementation of that policy, it was necessary to give regional secretaries more power. The increased importance of Vesenkha presidium members undoubtedly reflected the Central Committee's increased concern with implementing it3 newly adopted economic policies, especially industrialization. The Page 4 promotion of both Vesenkha and regional party secretaries suggests that the structural arrangements of the Central Committee depended on economic goals and policies rather than on the whims of Stalin or others in selecting members. Introduction Analyses of the Communist Party and Soviet state bureaucracies during the interwar years are common to Soviet studies. Historians and political scientists have published numerous works which inform readers about the formation, evolution and structure of these bureaucracies. While all such studies focus on bureaucracy to understand the structure of power, they utilize a variety of approaches. Some seek to demonstrate the role of the bureaucracies in the formation of totalitarianism, others come to the subject armed with interest group theory, and still others employ traditional political narrative. Irrespective of the approach used, all these studies of necessity focus to some extent on structure. Yet most confine their analyses to content and behavior, usually the membership and behavior of one or, at best, a few agencies. Another approach is to analyze the overall structure of the bureaucracy. One need not be a Straussian to recognize that structure is important in its own right. This study will not argue that the Communist Party's or the Soviet state's bureaucracy was a determining factor in anything. Rather it emphasizes structure as a research strategy which seeks to expose aggregate patterns. Aggregate analysis is relatively new to Soviet studies. Few works exist which deal with overall patterns, behaviors, relationships and internal structure of the party and state bureaucracies during their formative years. Yet aggregate analysis of selected aspects of officeholding can provide some answers to longstanding questions and raise new questions about these bureaucracies. This paper confines itself to the period 1925-1931 for both Page 2 substantive and methodological reasons. These years span a period of profound political importance and major upheavals in Soviet society associated with the fall of a moderate political leadership, the rise of Stalin, the collectivization of agriculture, the end of the New Economic Policy experiment in market socialism, the beginnings of planned industrialization, and a cultural revolution. In one way or another, the party and state bureaucracies were affected by and
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