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Accounting Concealment/Distortion And, 97–99 Economic, 61–62 Suspicion and Secrecy Of, 92–96 Agencies Five-Year Plan

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Accounting Concealment/Distortion And, 97–99 Economic, 61–62 Suspicion and Secrecy Of, 92–96 Agencies Five-Year Plan INDEX accounting sophisticated conceptualization concealment/distortion and, 97–99 through, 56 economic, 61–62 subordinates’ diaries and, 47 suspicion and secrecy of, 92–96 agencies bargaining Five-Year Plan and, 175n, 175–76, control figures and, 21 187–91. defense production and, 104 See also commissions model for, 32 agriculture, 13, 69–71. national vs. industry interest and, control figures for, 16–22, 17 table, 22–24 19 table political influence and, 24 destruction of peasants’ farms and, bartering, 148–49 125–26 Beria, 164–66, 165–66n, 169 Bolsheviks, 40, 134 Five-Year Plan and, 176, 182 table bribery, 150–53 arbitrariness, 8 Bukharin, N. I., 40 archival research, 1, 6, 174. bureaucracy access from, 39 control of, 60 classified, 82 confirmations from, 9–10 canals, 115–16, 119. economy and, 63 incompetence of, 122–23 generalizations and, 7–8 military/economic value of, 121–22 Gulag, 9, 111–13 capitalism, 3, 168, 190 high administrative organizations cars, 26 and, 7 censorship, 1 KGB closed, 82 Central Committee, 7, 13, 135, 162. knowledge prior to, 35–39 annihilation of, 38 military, 9–10, 81–83, 86, 89, 97, decrees/directives of, 29, 43, 50–51 102, 110 decline of, 36 sector vs. level of society and, 9 dispatching of members of, 53 small organizations and, 7 economic oversight of, 30 ................. 8732$$ INDX 03-22-07 07:10:31 PS 194 Index Central Committee (continued) purging within, 36 Organization of Leading Party Or- recruitment for, 36 gans (ORPO) and, 54 self-criticism in, 168–69, 190 Politburo and, 39. separation of government and, 49–50 See also Communist Party serving purpose of, 4. Central Control Commission-Rabkrin See also Central Committee (TsKK), 41. concealment, 97–99 party discipline enforced by, 42, Congress of Soviets, 49 53–54. consumer, 12 See also Commission of Party Control control (KPK) commissions of, 53–55, 134–39 Central Executive Committee (TsIK), difficulty of, 56 49–50 problems of, 59 civilian resources control figures, 16–22, 17 table, 19 military vs., 90–93, 95–96, 110, 175 table. coal, 175, 176, 178 table bargaining over, 21–24 coercion, 57–59 Council of Labor and Defense (STO), collectivism, 11, 33, 36, 67, 114, 126 51–52, 55. commanding heights, 13, 24 Committee for Agricultural Procure- Commissariat of Finance, 9 ments and, 52 commissariats Council of Ministers, 27, 164, 165n, control of, 54–55 170. economic, 36, 50 ruling by, 11 increased investment desired by, 64, 66 Council of People’s Commissars, 6. specific economic issues by, 68 See also Sovnarkom; Council of Min- Commission for Hard Currency, 44 isters commissions courts control, 53–55, 134–39 lack of responsibility of, 137–38 Commission of Party Control. See KPK Moscow-directed criminal justice and, 133, 137 Committee of Reserves, 117 precedent principle of, 157 communication, 26–28. currency circulation, 73 ‘‘need to know’’ basis of, 79 currency reform, 77–78 Communist Party, 11. CVPSU, 50 changes in, 36 consolidation of government and, 59 deception decline of department’s powers in, Gulag, 126 44–47 managers and, 132 defeat of Left and Right of, 36, 40–41 military and, 84, 97–100 inner democracy of, 168–69, 190 decision making internal opposition in, 46–47 arbitrariness of, 8 limiting of staffing of, 13–14 collective, 41 military ruled by, 92 knowledge with, 52 obscuring of boundaries between gov- Politburo and, 41–43, 46 ernment and, 52–53 Stalin’s process of, 47–49 party congresses of, 160–61 power and, 38–39 party member discipline of, 135 decrees/directives, 27–29, 32, 43, 50– public events of, 2–3 52, 63 ................. 8732$$ INDX 03-22-07 07:10:31 PS Index 195 defective products, 142, 147 types of, 145–53. defense. See military See also managers Defense Commission, 44 economy defense production commanding heights of, 13, 24 bankruptcy and excess, 88 control of only large industry in, 13, bargaining in, 104 24 cash limits of, 99–101 currency reforms and, 77–78 civilian resources vs., 95–96, 102, economic accounting of, 62 110, 175 experimentation of flexibility in, 62 contractors for, 9 lower production costs of, 188–89 costs of repression on, 107–9 market economy vs., 12 distortion vs. concealment in, 97–99, market elements and, 62, 136–37 110 planning by value units in, 17 Five-Year Plan and, 183, 184–86 price fixing and, 74–75 table production capacity of, 168 forcing of information on, 96 purge of officials for, 75–76 Gulag and, 119 rationing in, 73–75 increase of, 84–86, 85 table 1 reform proposals and, 77–80 innovation essential to, 103–4 relative poverty of, 81, 109 inspection of, 101, 104 reserves for, 187, 187n local mobilization assignments for, 86 special interests and, 64 mistrust and, 103–7 stable finance and, 73 Stalin’s hands-off approach to, 68 nonreplication of foreign technology stop/go, 72 and, 107–9 supplies for, 187 scientists, innovation and, 102–3, trial-and-error with, 11 103n, 106–9 wartime meltdown of, 100 suspicion, secrecy, accounting and, Eismont-Tolmachev group, 46 92–96 Ezhov, N. I., 47 tariffs on U.S. weapons and, 99 value of money and, 83, 99–101 failure World War II costs of, 85 table 1, 89. system vs. administrators and, 12 See also military falsification, 4–5, 7, 10 dekulakization. See terror famine, 71, 126 dictator, 37. Fifth Five-Year Plan, 7. control figures, Gosplan, and, 18–20, as agenda at XIX Party Congress, 169 32 approval of, 171, 191 Gosplan vs., 33 chronological process of, 171, mandatory self-interest of, 33 172–73 table, 174 priorities of, 25, 32. defense budget and, 183, 184–86 See also Stalin table dissension, 44 Gosplan and, 171, 172–73 table, 175–76, 177–82 table, 183, Economic Council, 55 184–86 table, 187 economic crimes Gossnab and, 172–73n, 176, 177–82 managers and, 133–34, 139, 140–42, table, 187–88 153 growth of industry in, 183 ................. 8732$$ INDX 03-22-07 07:10:31 PS 196 Index Fifth Five-Year Plan (continued) specific economic issues by, 68 Ministry of Finance and, 171, 172–73 specific production targets of, 25, table, 176, 177–82 table, 188–89 176, 177–82 table, 183 physical targets of, 176, 177–82 table, staffing of, 14 183 statistics, military, and, 96–98 preparation of, 169–71 transportation opposition by, 24 Five-Year Plan, 7, 51, 160. Gossnab (State Supply Committee), 7, economic commissariats vs. NKVD 171, 175. and Commissariat of Defense and, Five-Year Plan and, 172–73n, 176, 50 177–82 table, 187–88 exaggerated expectations of initial, formation of, 175n, 175–76 19–20, 22 Gosplan vs., 175n, 187–91 versions of, 18–19, 19 table government food central control of, 53–55 rationing of, 73–74 consolidation of party and, 59 control in commissions in, 53–55 GARF, 82 institutions of, 50–53 general secretary, 38, 40, 44 militarization of, 53 Geneva disarmament negotiations, 84 political vs. administrative realm of, Germany, 88. 52–53, 56 See also Nazis; State Planning Com- publications and, 1–3 mission; World War II reforms/improvements in, 74 Gosplan (State Committee for Material grain collection, 69–71 and Equipment), 7–8, 64–65, Great Purge, 67 175n. Great Terror, 31, 57–59, 164. balancing of resources by, 16 purpose of, 117–18 bargaining and, 31 Gulag chairman of, 46 determination of use of, 114–15 complaints within, 14n dismantling of, 128 Five-Year Plan and, 19–20, 51, 171, economy and, 112, 118–19, 124–25 172–73 table, 175–76, 177–82 effect on labor market by, 128–29 table, 183, 184–86 table, 187, incompetent projects of, 123–24 189–91 inefficient use of technology by, 127 Gossnab vs., 175n, 187–91 inmates of, 114 industry vs. national interests for, large-scale special projects of, 115– 22–24 17, 119–22 local interaction with, 31 OPPU/NKVD and economics of, ministries and, 132 124–25 Ministry of Finance and, 190 population in, 112, 116, 117–18 planning of, 11, 15, 169 repression/deaths in, 118, 126 Politburo implementation by, 13 scams in, 126–27 price reforms by, 74–75 uneconomic costs of, 125–27 purge of, 15, 164, 165–66n workable size of, 112 raising of investment budget by, 21 reforms and, 76 heavy industry, 19–20, 23, 29, 62, 64, restraint of investment budget by, 19– 74, 170, 176, 177–82 table, 183, 20, 66–67 187. ................. 8732$$ INDX 03-22-07 07:10:32 PS Index 197 faulty calculations by, 146 Kazak Regional (Party) Committee, 26 military rivalry with, 90–93, 95, 110 Khrushchev, N., 37–38, 164 statistics of, 17 table, 98 Kirov, S. M., 10, 38, 41, 55 Korolev, 106–7, 108 independent thinking, 21–22 Kosygin, A. 164 industrial ministries, 46. KGB, 82 control figures for, 16–22, 17 table, KPK (Party Control Commission), 6–7, 19 table 54, 134. bargaining by, 31–32 controllers of, 144–45, 145n national interests vs. interests of, courts and, 137–38 22–24 expulsion from party by, 154–55 Politburo implementation by, 13 imprisonment and, 154 resistance of specific targets by, 25 interrogation ability of, 132 staffing of, 14 less punishment for elite, 137, 155 industrialization, 159 managers, economic wrongdoing and, inflation, 20, 72–73 135–36 information, 3–4. nonuniform punishment by, 144–45, accuracy of, 5–6 157 governmental public events as, 3 party discipline vs. punishment and, publications and, 3–4 self-criticism and, 3 135, 138–39 suppression of, 4 party-state authorities punishment by, intervention, 25–26, 32–33 153 invention (research) penalties against managers by, 9, 142– distrust of, 102–3, 103n, 106–7 46, 149, 150, 153 implementation of, 106 potential excusing of wrongdoings by, nonreplication of foreign technology 142–44 and, 107–8 pragmatic vs.
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