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Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sectionssmall overlaps.with Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for aity photographs or illustrations ^>peaiing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 Nonn 2eeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313.'761-4700 800.'521-0600 Order Number 9517097 Russia’s revolutionary underground: The construction of the Moscow subway, 1931—1935 Wolf, William Kenneth, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1994 UMI 300N.ZeebRd. Ann Aibor, MI 48106 RUSSIA’S REVOLUTIONARY UNDERGROUND: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOSCOW SUBWAY, 1931-35 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By William K. Wolf, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1994 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Allan K. Wildman Eve Levin (jÂÂu, _____ Adviser John A. Rothney Department of History VITA July 23, 1958 ............... Born - Chateauroux, France 1982 .......................... B.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1987 .......................... M.A., Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS VITA .............................................................. ii INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1 CHAPTER I The Moscow Subway Debate ............... 14 CHAPTER II Start of Construction and Its Problems 54 CHAPTER III Komsomol Recruitment to Metrostroi . 117 CHAPTER IV Komsomoltsy and the "New Regime" . 170 CHAPTER V The Pursuit of Bolshevik Tempo and Its Consequences .......................... 238 CHAPTER VI Frantic Finish and a Grand Opening . 298 CONCLUSION .............................................. 352 POSTSCRIPT .............................................. 358 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 371 1X1 INTRODUCTION Beyond simply meeting the transport needs of Muscovites, the lavishly ornate Moscow subway served for more than half a century as a showcase of Soviet socialism. From its opening in 1935 the Moscow Metropolitan (or "Metro," as it is popularly known) by virtue of its beauty and comfort was proclaimed to be the "world’s best subway," superior to the comparatively dismal subways of the capitalist West. Akin to underground palaces, the Metro’s spacious stations are replete with marble-clad columns, electric light chandeliers, colorful tile mosaics and a multitude of other forms of lavish decoration. Highlighting the Metro’s beauty and comfort, the Soviet government pointed to the Metro as tangible proof of socialism’s commitment to the welfare of the masses. Moreover, Soviet citizens were encouraged to believe that as beautiful and comfortable as the Moscow Metro was, so too would their lives be once communism was achieved in the USSR. The Metro became, in effect, a Soviet icon. Although the Metro is widely known for its beauty and efficiency, the story of its creation has remained obscure, clouded by base rumor and exaggerated praise. This 1 2 dissertation is meant to remedy this situation by providing a balanced historical portrait of this remarkable transportation system. I originally planned this study as a analysis of how and why the Metro was used to promote socialism, but in the course of my research I discovered to my surprise that the construction of the Metro’s first line was a fascinating story in and of itself. In the end, I decided to shift my focus from why to how the Metro was built. Despite this shift in emphasis, the dissertation does contain a discussion of the protracted debate over whether or not to build a subway in Moscow, and it ends with a brief analysis of how the Metro was used to promote socialism. This dissertation does not, however, constitute a cultural history of the Moscow subway, nor does it deal in a comprehensive or sophisticated manner with the architecture or decorative art of the Metro. The specific focus of this dissertation is the construction of the first line of the Metro (now known as the "Red Line") which was built between 1931 and 1935. For this reason, this work constitutes a case study in the Soviet industrialization process. Although in size and importance the Metro was similar to other giant projects such as Dneprostroi, the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, and Magnitostroi, the Metro was not typical of other stroiki in that it was built primarily without foreign expertise and machinery. Work on the Metro was started in late 1931, two 3 or more years later than most of the other stroiki, by which time the Soviet Union had exhausted its hard currency reserves through wholesale purchases of foreign technology. Dire financial straits, therefore, forced the Soviets to build the subway largely with their own resources, using their own wits. Given the circumstances, the Soviets could have been forgiven for delaying the construction of the Metro. In 1931 labor and building materials in the USSR were in extremely short supply. Construction machinery was nearly impossible to obtain. Worst of all, Soviet expertise in subway construction was virtually non-existent. Despite their unpreparedness, however, the Soviets, on their own, set out to build a subway anyway. And as if this were not already challenge enough, the Soviets brashly resolved to make their Metro the best subway in the world and to build it in record time! Such ambitions were the height of audacity. In effect, the Soviets were putting into practice S.M. Kirov’s boast, "Technically it may be impossible, but we will do it in a Bolshevik manner. In essence, the construction of the Metro was much like the Soviet collectivization of agriculture: it was begun without the necessary groundwork being laid and was implemented at a whirlwind pace. Given their unpreparedness, one can argue that only the Stalinists would have undertaken to build a subway in Russia in 1931 and 4 ultimately have succeeded just a few short years later. In this sense I agree completely with the observations of S.A. Sokolin, one of the men who directed the Metro’s construction: Under different conditions, in a different country I think it would have been impossible to accomplish such a big job with people lacking expertise, with people unfamiliar with the work, with people who had never seen a subway. This could have been accomplished only by us.2 Whether or not it made sense to try to build a subway under these conditions, of course, is a different matter. In any event, the end result of the Soviets’ engineering audacity was arguably the "world’s best Metro," a wonder to behold even more than half a century after its completion. These dazzling results, however, were achieved at an appalling cost: fantastic sums of money spent, labor allocations on a Pharoanic scale, great destruction to buildings along the subway route, widespread injury and sickness among Metro workers, and a tremendous waste of effort due to an overly hasty work schedule. In short, the whole affair reminds one of the Soviet struggle during the Second World War. Ultimately the Soviets achieved a brilliant victory, but at a staggering price. This dissertation explains how the Soviets, starting from scratch in 1931, managed to attain the great victory that the opening of the Metro in 1935 represented. It also details the costs. Historiography of the Moscow Metro In the English language there is no scholarly article or monograph devoted to the history of the Moscow Metro. This is not surprising given the paucity of historical studies on the giant construction projects of the Soviet industrialization period. Recent scholarship on this era has focused on labor, social, and cultural histories, rather than studies of how individual projects were conceived and then realized.3 The one notable exception to this rule in monograph form is a history of the Dniepr Dam project.* In addition, a very few published articles exist on the stroiki as well.s Also there is one unpublished dissertation focusing on an individual stroika.^ The most detailed information in English on the history of the Moscow Metro can be found in popular biographies of the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Lazar Kaganovich, both of whom were intimately involved in the construction of the first line of the subway. These biographies typically devote a chapter or less to the subject of the Metro, emphasizing negative aspects of the project such as the use of forced labor or the high incidence of fatalities in tunnelling accidents. Although there is some truth to such accounts, they are based primarily on rumor and innuendo, not verifiable sources. Such works are largely anti-Soviet 6 polemics, relics of the Cold War era when it was fashionable in the West to condemn all things Soviet.? In contrast to the English language materials, literature on the history of the Moscow Metro in the Russian language is abundant. Despite the great number of works in Russian on the Metro, however, very little of scholarly value has been written.