The BRIDGE

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING

George M.C. Fisher, Chair Wm. A. Wulf, President Sheila E. Widnall, Vice President W. Dale Compton, Home Secretary Harold K. Forsen, Foreign Secretary William L. Friend, Treasurer

Editor-in-Chief George Bugliarello (Interim)

Managing Editor: Carol R. Arenberg Production Assistants: Penelope Gibbs, Kimberly West The Bridge (USPS 551-240) is published quarterly by the National Academy of Engineering, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20418. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C. Vol. 32, No. 1 Spring 2002 Postmaster: Send address changes to The Bridge, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20418. Papers are presented in The Bridge on the basis of general interest and time- liness. They reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the National Academy of Engineering. The Bridge is printed on recycled paper. © 2002 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

A complete copy of each issue of The Bridge is available in PDF format at http://www.nae.edu/TheBridge. Some of the articles in this issue are also available as HTML documents and may contain links to related sources of information, multimedia files, or other content. The Volume 32, Number 1 • Spring 2002 BRIDGE LINKING ENGINEERING AND SOCIETY

Editorial 3 Engineering and Homeland Defense George Bugliarello

Features 5 Reflections on the World Trade Center Leslie E. Robertson The lead structural engineer reflects on the rise and fall of the World Trade Center towers. 11 World Trade Center “Bathtub”: From Genesis to Armageddon George J. Tamaro The engineer who oversaw the construction of the World Trade Center “bathtub” describes the recovery efforts. 18 A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession Robert Prieto The events of September 11 challenged the future of our heavily engineered environment and the future of the engineering profession. 23 Homeland Security: Building a National Strategy Ruth David We need a planning process—rather than a static plan— to protect our homeland. 29 Bioterrorism: Threat and Preparedness Michael J. Powers and Jonathan Ban Policy makers and scientists must assess the probability of threats as well as the amount of damage they might do. 34 Cybercare: A System for Confronting Bioterrorism Joseph M. Rosen; C. Everett Koop; Eliot B. Grigg We need a system that will enable us to mobilize all of our health care resources rapidly wherever they are needed. 41 Cybersecurity Wm. A Wulf and Anita K. Jones Ensuring our cybersecurity will require long-term, innovative basic research.

(continued on next page) The BRIDGE

NAE News and Notes 46 Class of 2002 Elected 50 2003 Election Timetable 51 NAE Thanks Donors 56 The Safety of Our Water Systems 58 In Memoriam 58 Symposium and Workshop: Technologies for

Controlling CO2 Emissions 59 Calendar of Meetings and Events 60 NAE Newsmakers 60 Dr. Robert Cherry Joins the NAE as Fellow 61 Tom Ridge, Terrorism Experts Meet with News Executives

National Research Council Update 62 Military Know-how Can Help Protect Civilian Buildings from Attacks 62 Promoting Residential Broadband Internet Access 63 United States Bolsters Encryption Standards 63 Correction

64 Publications of Interest

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpet- The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National uating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engi- Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of neering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and tech- appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining nology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional char- a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scien- ter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own tific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. National Academy of Sciences. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, The National Research Council was organized by the National Acad- under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel emy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its adminis- and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge tration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal gov- general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become ernment. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engi- the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of neering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages edu- Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing ser- cation and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of vices to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies of Engineering. and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. 3 Editorial

Engineering and Much technology is already available that can immedi- Homeland Defense ately be brought to bear on these challenges. Other tech- Since time immemorial, nology needs to be developed urgently. But the tasks warfare has been shaped by must be prioritized in terms of risk. Not everything can technology and by the inter- be protected. This calls for a realistic assessment of what play of defense and offense. can be done, in the short term and in the long term, and The events of September 11 of the cost effectiveness of proposed measures in terms of have opened a new chapter the risks they address. in this saga. The question We must identify and concentrate our attention on of homeland security is not technological bottlenecks, such as adequate sensors, our George Bugliarello is chancellor of new. It has been addressed ability to inspect from a distance ships entering a harbor, in the context of the Cold and our ability to locate victims buried in rubble or guide Polytechnic University in Brooklyn, War and of potential threats a firefighter through smoke in the interior of a building. N.Y. from rogue nations. But the These are all engineering challenges of the first order. events of September 11 There is a huge need to provide training in the most focused national attention on the reality, urgency, and effective use of new technologies and to educate archi- hydra-like nature of the terrorist threats confronting the tects, engineers, urban planners, and infrastructure man- United States. A nation confident in its openness has, agers to the new realities. Things have changed. Cities, for the first time in its history, experienced terrorism on which in the past provided an element of protection to a large scale and must now prepare itself for the possi- their inhabitants, today, as in World War II, have bility of ubiquitous threats to its infrastructure and the become prime targets, but in a different way. The tallest lives of its citizens. Every citizen is now on the front line. buildings and the longest bridges, the pride of our cities We may never be able to prevent all attacks, but we and our society, are now magnets for attack. We need to can endeavor to reduce their probability and potential reevaluate the ultralight construction that made them consequences. Terrorist attacks present enormous engi- possible and economical and reconsider their design. We neering challenges in information gathering, in data also need to study the lessons we have learned from ter- mining, in sensing, in cybercommunications and rorist attacks here and abroad. For instance, one painful telecommunications, in the security of transportation lesson, made clear by the consequences of the concen- systems and water, energy, and food supplies, in the man- tration of telecommunications infrastructures in the agement of emergencies and the rapid evacuation of World Trade Center area in New York, is the need for people, in the design and retrofitting of structures, in fire- redundancies and decentralization. Another is the fighting, in identification technologies, and in reducing importance of wireless communications as alternative biohazards and other threats of mass destruction. This channels of communication. issue of The Bridge addresses some of these challenges and We need to consider not only how to protect our vital some of the vulnerabilities that have emerged since Sep- systems, but also how to restore them rapidly after an tember 11, which are heightened by the complex inter- event that we might not be able to avoid. In terms of dependencies of our infrastructural systems. risk and priorities, bioterrorism is far more insidious The engineering enterprise, which has built the than chemical terrorism and deserves a very high prior- sinews of an open and trusting society, must now help ity. So does, in our information society, the question of protect it from the insidious forces that want to destroy cyber security, as the penetration or interruption of our it. This will require that we rethink our ideas about engi- information networks by a determined adversary can do neering. For instance, in the design and operation of immense damage. Consider, for example, the cata- infrastructure, we need to consider not only capacity and strophic effects of a disruption to our financial system. reliability and cost, but also the ability to withstand ter- Another imperative is the safety of the supply lines that rorist attacks, or at least to mitigate their consequences. bring food, materials, and goods to our population from The 4 BRIDGE all over the globe, as well as from within the United mately of greater concern than false positives. But effec- States. At this moment, the U.S. Customs, the Food tive technologies can greatly reduce the inconveniences and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of caused by the latter. Agriculture can test only between 1 and 2 percent of the These enormous challenges will demand a continu- material that enters the country through harbors, air- ous dialogue between engineers and the larger commu- ports, and highways. nity and the development of new partnerships between As new technologies are being developed to address industry, government at all levels, universities, and these problems, we must remain extremely sensitive to research laboratories. Engineers are a key resource in our issues of civil liberty and privacy. By necessity, some response to the imperatives of homeland defense, as well approaches will require the surrender of some of our tra- as in keeping our economy strong and productive. ditional rights and changes in what we are accustomed to. For instance, the public must be educated to the fact that in the identification of terrorists or of the threat of a biological or chemical attack, false negatives are ulti- George Bugliarello The lead structural engineer reflects on the rise and fall of the World Trade Center towers.

Reflections on the World Trade Center

Leslie E. Robertson

The journey toward the design and construction of the World Trade Cen- ter began prior to 1960 when Minoru Yamasaki Associates was selected to design the Federal Science Pavilion, a key element of the Seattle World’s Fair; NBBJ was selected as the local architect. Having accomplished many structural designs for NBBJ, it was only natural that we would obtain the commission for the structural design of the Pavilion. That structural design, Leslie E. Robertson is a member of reflecting the very highest attainments of our profession, was creatively con- the NAE and director of design at ceived and executed by John V. Christiansen (NAE). Indeed, the Pavilion Leslie E. Robertson Associates, stands today as an example of the importance of fine structural engineering as it influences the overall architectural process. The entrepreneurship and R.L.L.P. skills of another of our partners, John B. Skilling (NAE), were instrumental in the development of the close relationship between our firm and that of Minoru Yamasaki and Associates; many wonderful projects were to follow. When Yamasaki was commissioned to design the World Trade Center in New York, he proposed that we be retained as structural engineers. Although his recommendation was influential, we were in competition with many New York firms that had more experience in high-rise design than we had. Although we worked hard preparing for our interview with the Port Author- ity of New York and New Jersey, we wouldn’t have obtained the commission without the presence and the skills of John Skilling. Once we had been awarded the commission, I moved from Seattle to New The 6 BRIDGE

York with a team of expert engineers—Wayne A. Brew- er (drawing production and coordination), Paul S.A. Fos- ter (towers), Ernest T. Liu (plaza buildings and below-grade structures), Jostein Ness (detailing), Richard E. Taylor (computers), and E. James White (construction technology). Professor Alan G. Davenport (NAE), on sabbatical from the University of Western Ontario, joined us to head the wind-engineering research group. Although I was the titular leader, the energies and talents of the entire team led to our successes. A list of the innovations incorporated into the World Trade Center would be very long. In the following pages, I describe just a few of the ideas and innovations con- ceived and developed by our team. Most, if not all, of FIGURE 1 Wind tunnel model of the World Trade Center towers. this technology is now a part of the standard vocabulary of structural engineers. of, and the wind-induced overturning moment from the The tubular framing system for the perimeter walls rooftop antenna (440 feet tall) was distributed to all resisted all of the lateral forces imposed by wind and columns in the building . . . adding additional redun- earthquake, as well as the impact loads imposed on Sep- dancy and toughness to the design. tember 11. Although we had used closely spaced Prefabricated structural steel was used to an unprece- columns in an earlier building, it was Minoru Yamasaki dented degree. Two examples will give you an idea. who proposed that we use narrow windows in the WTC Exterior wall panels three stories high and three towers to give people a sense of security as they looked columns wide were fabricated in Washington state. down from on high. Our contribution was to make the Floor panels 60 feet long and 20 feet wide, complete closely spaced columns the fundamental lateral-force- with profiled metal deck and electrical distribution cells, resisting system for the two towers. The tubular framing were assembled in New Jersey from components fabri- system also precluded the need for the customary cated in Missouri and elsewhere. 30-foot column spacing in interior areas, making We mounted a comprehensive program to determine column-free, rentable space structurally desirable. the design-level gradient wind speed for New York City. In support of Yamasaki’s design, during the construc- Data were collected from all available sources and incor- tion, before the windows were installed, I noticed that porated into an appropriate mathematical model. For people felt comfortable walking up to the outside wall, the first time, we were able to obtain full-scale measure- placing their hands on the columns to either side, and ments of the turbulent structure of the wind and com- enjoying the wonderful view. If the wind was blowing pare them with the turbulent structure obtained in a toward them, they would walk right up to the outside boundary-layer wind tunnel. This was done by mount- wall; however, if they felt even a trace of pressure from ing anemometers atop three high points in lower Man- a breeze from behind, they would at least hesitate before hattan and by making similar measurements on our walking to within five feet of the wall . . . and many wind tunnel model (Figure 1). The boundary-layer wind would not approach the wall at all. tunnel was further developed and used to predict the Another structural innovation was the outrigger space steady-state and dynamic forces on the structure and the frame, which structurally linked the outside wall to the glazing, as well as to develop the dynamic component of services core. This system performed several functions. wind-induced motion of the structure. Jensen and First, gravity-induced vertical deformations between the Frank, two brilliant Danish engineers, had discovered columns of the services core and the columns of the out- that surface roughness in the wind tunnel allowed them side wall were made equal at the top of the building; at to accurately predict wind pressures on farm structures. other levels, the differential deformations were amelio- We expanded this technology upward to 110 stories by rated. Second, wind-induced overturning moments were using a wind tunnel, constructed under the guidance of resisted in part by the columns of the services core, thus Dr. Jack E. Cermak, (NAE, Colorado State University), providing additional lateral stiffness. Finally, the weight designed to study the dispersion of gases emitted from SPRING 2002 7

tall stacks. Thus, for the first time, we were able to ana- that time, masonry was the standard enclosure for ele- lyze the steady-state and dynamic components of wind- vators, stairs, duct shafts, and other internal structures. induced structure deflections. The partition system eliminates the need for within- We designed motion simulators to determine accept- the-shaft scaffolding, which was the common practice, able levels of wind-induced structure motion. The sim- provides more smoke-proof stairs and shafts, and ulators measured the response of human subjects to improves safety on the job site. The shaft-wall com- lateral motions similar to those anticipated for the two pletely changed the nature of the structural system for towers. The accumulated data were used to establish the the two towers, making them the first of a new kind of criteria for an acceptable level of the swaying motion of high-rise building. the two towers. A computerized system was conceived and developed A viscoelastic damping system was invented and for ordering structural steel and producing shop draw- patented to ameliorate the wind-induced dynamic com- ings for structural steel, as well as the operation of digi- ponent of building motion by dissipating much of the tally directed tools, all directly from digital information energy of that motion . . . acting more or less like shock developed as a part of our design. absorbers in an automobile. With these dampers, we When the two towers were finished, the World Trade could control the swaying motion without having to use Center stood proud, strong, and tall. Indeed, with little large quantities of structural steel. This was the first time effort, the towers shrugged off the efforts of terrorist engineered dampers were used to resist the wind- bombers in 1993 to bring them down. The events of induced swaying motion of a building. A theory was developed for integrating the statistical strength of glass with the dynamic forces of the wind to predict the breakage rate of the glass of the exterior wall. Coupled with a testing program of actual glass samples, we were able to determine rationally the necessary thickness and grade of the glass. Another theory was developed to predict stack action and temperature- induced and wind-induced airflow within a high-rise building; an understanding of these airflows is crucial to controlling fire-generated smoke and reducing the ener- gy consumption of the building. A theory to predict appropriate “parking floors” for elevators was developed to minimize the oscillation of elevator cables, which oscillation is stimulated by the wind-induced, swaying motion of a building. Figure 2 is a comparison of the wind-induced dynamic components of the structure response of the two towers and of the Empire State Building. The two towers were the first structures outside of the FIGURE 2 Comparison of the wind-induced dynamic components of the structure military and nuclear industries designed to resist the response of the World Trade Center towers and the Empire State Building. impact of a jet airliner, the Boeing 707. It was assumed that the jetliner would be lost in the fog, seeking to land September 11, however, are not well understood by me at JFK or at Newark. To the best of our knowledge, little . . . and perhaps cannot really be understood by anyone. was known about the effects of a fire from such an air- So I will simply state matters of fact: craft, and no designs were prepared for that circum- The events of September 11 ended the lives of almost stance. Indeed, at that time, no fireproofing systems were 2,900 people, many of them snuffed out by the collapse available to control the effects of such fires. of structures designed by me. The damage created by the We developed the concept of and made use of the impact of the aircraft was followed by raging fires, which fire-rated shaft-wall partition system, which is now were enormously enhanced by the fuel aboard the air- widely used in place of masonry and plaster walls. At craft. The temperatures above the impact zones must The 8 BRIDGE have been unimaginable; none of us will ever forget the sight of those who took destiny into their own hands by leaping into space. It appears that about 25,000 people safely exited the buildings, almost all of them from below the impact floors; almost everyone above the impact floors per- ished, either from the impact and fire or from the subse- quent collapse. The structures of the buildings were heroic in some ways but less so in others. The buildings survived the impact of the Boeing 767 aircraft, an impact very much greater than had been contemplated in our design (a slow-flying Boeing 707 lost in the fog and seeking a landing field). Therefore, the robustness of the towers was exemplary. At the same time, the fires FIGURE 4 Combustion energy of fuel for various aircraft. raging in the inner reaches of the buildings undermined their strength. In time, the unimaginable happened . . . wounded by the impact of the aircraft and bleeding from the fires, both of the towers of the World Trade Center collapsed. Figure 3 shows the comparative energy of impact for the Mitchell bomber that hit the Empire State Building

FIGURE 5 Kinetic energy at impact for various aircraft.

FIGURE 3 Kinetic energy at impact for various aircraft. during World War II, a 707, and a 767. The energy con- tained in the fuel is shown in Figure 4. Considerations of larger aircraft are shown in Figures 5 and 6. The phys- FIGURE 6 Combustion energy for fuel for various aircraft. ical sizes of these aircraft are compared with the size of the floor plate of one of the towers in Figure 7. These and other potential targets. charts demonstrate conclusively that we should not and The extent of damage to the World Trade Center is cannot design buildings and structures to resist the almost beyond comprehension. Figure 8 shows an impact of these aircraft. Instead, we must concentrate overview of the site and the location of the various our efforts on keeping aircraft away from our tall build- buildings. We did not design the superstructures of ings, sports stadiums, symbolic buildings, atomic plants, Building 3 (Marriott Hotel) or of Building 7. Towers 1 SPRING 2002 9

are somehow separated. Thoughts of the thousands who lost their lives as my structures crashed down upon them come to me at night, rousing me from sleep, and inter- rupting my thoughts at unexpected times throughout the day. Those who were trapped above the impact floors, those who endured the intense heat only to be crushed by falling structure, are merged with those who chose to take control of their own destinies by leaping from the towers. The loss of the buildings is more abstract. The build- ings represented about 10 years of concerted effort both in design and in construction on the part of talented men and women from many disciplines. It just isn’t pos- sible for me to take the posture that the towers were only buildings . . . that these material things are not worthy of grieving. It would be good to conclude this journey in a positive mode. We have received almost a thousand letters, e-pis- tles, and telephone calls in support of our designs. The poignant letters from those who survived the event and from the families of those who both did and did not sur- vive cannot help but bring tears to one’s eyes. They have taught me how little I know of my own skills and how fragile are the emotions that lie within me. Yes, I can laugh, I can compose a little story . . . but I cannot escape. Do those communications help? In some ways they do; in others, they are constant reminders of my own limitations. In essence, the overly laudatory comments FIGURE 7 Comparison of the physical sizes of various aircraft with the size of the only heighten my sense that, if I were as farseeing and floor plate of one of the World Trade Center towers. and 2, which were totally destroyed, left behind utter chaos surrounded by towers of naked structural steel. The remaining steel towers were in some ways painful beyond belief, in other ways strangely beautiful. Build- ing 3 collapsed down to a structural transfer level designed by us. Fortunately, the people who sought refuge in the lobby of the hotel, which was located immediately below the transfer level, survived. Build- ings 4, 5, and 6 remained standing but were partially col- lapsed by falling debris; all three burned for about 24 hours. Although there was nothing special about the structural design of these buildings, the remaining struc- tures stalwartly resisted the impacts of the wrecking ball. Building 7, after burning for nearly 10 hours, collapsed down to a structural transfer level designed by us. The below-grade areas under Towers 1 and 2 were almost totally collapsed; in areas outside of the towers they were partially damaged or collapsed. In my mind, the loss of life and the loss of the buildings FIGURE 8 Overview of the World Trade Center site. The 10 BRIDGE talented as the letters would have me be, the buildings arduous journey. Dr. Alan G. Davenport (NAE) pro- would surely have been even more stalwart, would have vided invaluable knowledge, insight, and support; his stood even longer . . . would have allowed even more willingness to join us on this journey made many facets people to escape. of the design possible. Minoru Yamasaki and his team, Yes, no doubt I could have made the towers braver, particularly Aaron Schreier, and the office of Emery more stalwart. Indeed, the power to do so rested almost Roth and Sons produced a wonderful architecture while solely with me. The fine line between needless conser- making the entire process both fun and exciting. Richard vatism and appropriate increases in structural integrity T. Baum (NAE), of Jaros, Baum & Bolles, headed the can only be defined after careful thought and consider- HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) team and ation of all of the alternatives. But these decisions are taught me much about these systems. Joseph R. Loring made in the heat of battle and in the quiet of one’s provided full professional services as the electrical engi- dreams. Perhaps, if there had been more time for the neer for the project. dreaming . . . In conclusion, the events of September 11 have pro- Recognition must be given to the Port Authority of foundly affected the lives of countless millions of people. New York and New Jersey, who provided unparalleled To the extent that the structural design of the World support and guidance throughout the design and con- Trade Center contributed to the loss of life, the respon- struction of the World Trade Center. Their understand- sibility must surely rest with me. At the same time, the ing of the need to explore new avenues and break new fact that the structures stood long enough for tens of ground reflected their sound professional and technical thousands to escape is a tribute to the many talented posture. We could not have asked for a more competent, men and women who spent endless hours toiling over more responsible, or more involved client. The men and the design and construction of the project . . . making us women of our company who participated in the design very proud of our profession. Surely, we have all learned and construction are without parallel. Their talents, the most important lesson—that the sanctity of human energies, and good humor carried us through a most life rises far above all other values. The engineer who oversaw the construction of the World Trade Center “bathtub” describes the recovery efforts.

World Trade Center “Bathtub”: From Genesis to Armageddon

George J. Tamaro

My first experience with “slurry wall” construction1 was in Italy in 1964 when I was on a work/study assignment for the New York Port Authority. The Chief Engineer of the Port Authority at the time asked that I inspect and report to him on the use of the new technology. In 1967 the Port Authority assigned me to oversee the original construction of the World Trade Center (WTC) slurry walls. From that assignment I moved on to a nine-year career George J. Tamaro is a member of as a contractor constructing slurry walls and a 21-year career as a consulting the NAE and senior partner, Mueser engineer designing slurry walls around the globe. Back in 1964, I had no idea Rutledge Consulting Engineers. that my brief assignment in Rome would have a significant effect on my career and interests. This report describes the initial work on the WTC “bathtub” in the late 1960s and the recent work during the recovery.

Genesis The WTC complex consisted of seven buildings on a 16-acre site in low- er Manhattan. The deep basement (bathtub) portion of the site covers a four- city block (980 foot) by two-city block (520 foot) area some 200 feet from the east shore of the Hudson River (Figure 1). The deep basement occupies only about 70 percent of the 16-acre WTC site and is just west of the place

1 Commonly referred to as diaphragm wall construction in Europe. The 12 BRIDGE

of ground surface. The fills were placed into the river Pre-Colonial during various periods of development and consisted of High Water Line excavation spoil, demolition debris, marine construc- Colonial tion, abandoned vessels, lost cargo, and garbage. A maze N High Water Line (1767) of utilities and abandoned structures further compli- Old Bulkhead cated the ground conditions. Line Battery Park City Two short segments of the West Street wall projected Bulkhead World Financial Center 65 and 90 feet to the west to permit the slurry wall to World Trade Center Vesey St. cross over the PATH tunnels where the tunnel invert

1 WTC was buried in rock; the top half was covered with soil. At PATH tubes Tijger burned and sank here in 1614 that location, the slurry wall concrete could be cast

St. 2 WTC Liberty against the top of the cast iron tunnel rings and socketed ay

West West St. HUDSON RIVER roadw into rock on both sides of the tunnel, creating a water- B WTC Trinity Disposal Church tight seal at the crossing (Figure 3). Area The basement was bounded by a 3,500-foot long, Battery Park City Wall St. Landfill 3-foot thick slurry wall (perimeter wall) constructed from grade and socketed into rock located at depths of as much as 80 feet. In the 1950s, continuous under-

Battery ground walls were constructed using bentonite slurry as a temporary support for slot excavations in difficult soil conditions. Bentonite slurry is only slightly heavier than water. Early on, the Port Authority Engineering Depart- ment recognized that this technology would be suitable FIGURE 1 Location plan. for construction of a safe, economical deep basement in extremely difficult ground conditions. where the Dutch landed in 1614. The size and depth of The slots at the WTC were eventually filled with the deep basement and the alignment of the perimeter reinforcing steel cages that were assembled on site; each wall were dictated by several requirements: the con- cage weighed as much as 22 tons. The cages were con- struction of a new interstate commuter railroad (PATH) creted, using Tremie methods, to form 158 individual station parallel to the Greenwich Street east wall; sup- panels. Special jointing details were used to ensure port for an operating New York City subway tunnel watertight connections of the individual panels that located just outside the east wall; protection of the entry were used to form the perimeter. Each panel was approx- points of two 100-year old, 17-foot diameter PATH tun- imately 22 feet long. The slurry wall was installed in a nels on the east and west; and the foundation of the 12-month period ending in 1968. twin towers (WTC 1 and WTC 2) on bedrock within The next phase of construction required careful stag- the excavation (Figure 2). ing of the excavation and temporary support of the The geology of the WTC site varies from east to west. PATH tubes that traversed the site. To provide lateral On the east (Greenwich Street), 15 to 30 feet of fill cov- support of the wall as the excavation proceeded down- er as much as 20 feet of glacial outwash sand and silt, ward, 1,500 high-strength tendon tieback anchors were below which are 5 to 20 feet of glacial till/decomposed installed. Four to six tiers of tieback anchors were rock. The Manhattan schist bedrock is found at depths installed through sleeves (“trumpets”) in the slurry wall, of 65 to 80 feet. A knoll of quartzite rock intrudes into drilled through the soil using steel pipe casing, and then the site at the southeast corner. On the west (West drilled 30 to 35 feet into bedrock. Each anchor was Street), the fill is 20 to 35 feet thick and is underlain by grouted in place, tested, and locked off at 50 percent to 10 to 30 feet of soft organic marine clay (river mud). 100 percent of the design load. Tieback anchor capaci- Below the river mud is a 20-foot thick layer of glacial ties varied from 100 to 300 tons. About 55 additional outwash sand and silt and 5 to 20 feet of glacial anchors were installed to replace anchors that were till/decomposed rock. Bedrock is found at depths of 55 obstructed during drilling, damaged during installation, to 75 feet. Groundwater levels were within several feet or did not reach design capacity during testing. SPRING 2002 13

FIGURE 2 WTC site plan.

More than a million cubic yards of excavation spoil causing damage to the floors that were supporting the was carted to a disposal area across West Street and slurry walls. Fortunately, the walls themselves were not eventually incorporated into the landfill for Battery damaged, did not leak, and were able to span across the Park City. The southernmost building of the World damaged areas. Visual inspection of the walls in spring Financial Center is located on that portion of the land- 2001 revealed that the walls were in good condition. fill (Figure 4). The excavation phase required a year. Once the permanent basement floors were capable of Armageddon supporting the walls, the tieback anchors were deten- On September 11, 2001, terrorists again struck the sioned and the sleeves sealed. WTC complex, this time causing the collapse and The scale of the WTC project was unprecedented. destruction of the majority of above-grade structures This was only the third time slurry walls were used in the and the partial collapse of the below-grade structures. United States and one of the earliest uses of a large num- The limits of the bathtub and the condition of the ber of tieback anchors to such high capacities. The WTC below-grade structures were not immediately evident in basement was the most challenging foundation con- the aftermath of the attack. struction in New York up to that time and, for that mat- ter, up to the present (Figure 5). The Port Authority Initial Response exhibited great courage and foresight when it designed Immediately after the collapse, the New York City and oversaw the construction of the basement structure. Department of Design and Construction established a team of engineers and contractors to assist the NYC Fire Prelude Department in its search and rescue efforts. One group In 1993, terrorists detonated a bomb in the WTC base- of engineers, under the direction of Thornton-Tomasetti ment adjacent to a column of the north tower (WTC 1) Engineers (TTE), focused on the inspection of adjacent The 14 BRIDGE

FIGURE 3 Schematic view of slurry wall/PATH crossing at West Street. buildings while another provided advice on below-grade that could not be traversed by heavy equipment. The structures in the WTC complex, the World Financial locations of four 6-foot diameter water lines were also Center complex located to the west in the Battery Park identified. The Port Authority closed valves for two City landfill, the PATH tubes, and the New York City water intake lines shortly after the incident. The other subway tunnels. two discharge water lines could backfeed river water As heavy equipment (e.g., 1,000-ton cranes) began to arrive at the site, it became apparent that ground rules had to be established for the safe use of the equipment outside the confines of the basement, over major utili- ties, over access stairs to the PATH tubes and ramps, in the streets, and over structural platforms spanning open water. The use of this heavy equipment adjacent to the slurry walls or over the basement structure itself could cause the collapse of the slurry walls or any remaining basement structures. A collapse of the slurry wall would mean inundation from the nearby Hudson River. As a first step, Mueser Rutledge Consulting Engineers (MRCE) prepared cartoon-like sketches showing the location of below-grade structures outside the slurry wall FIGURE 4 Original PATH tube suspension system. SPRING 2002 15

into the basement during periods of high tide and had to be sealed as soon as possible. The sketches were pro- vided to the Fire Department and the contractors for use in placing rescue, construction, and demolition equip- ment. Weidlinger Associates subsequently prepared more detailed utility drawings for the contractors.

PATH Tunnels Concurrent with rescue work in New York, Port Authority engineers were investigating the condition of the PATH tunnels in Jersey City, New Jersey, where the Exchange Place Station, which was at an elevation 5 feet lower than the WTC PATH Station, had served as a FIGURE 6 Current PATH tube plug at Exchange Place Station in Jersey City. sump for fire water, river water, and broken water mains discharging into the bathtub. Inspection indicated that 3,000 gallons per minute were pumped from the north water in the tunnels between New York and New Jersey tunnel for a 12-hour period each day. Tests of the water had completely filled the north tunnel at the midriver were inconclusive as to the source; however, most was low point. Pumps were immediately put into action to believed to come from the vast amounts of water that keep Exchange Place Station from flooding. As much as were poured onto the debris to extinguish continuing fires. Within days, a 16-foot long low-strength concrete plug was placed in each tube as a seal in the event that the bathtub walls were breached and the tunnels fully flooded. The plugs were designed to withstand an 80-foot head of water pressure and will be removed once the slur- ry walls are fully secured (Figure 6). The Port Authority is currently preparing to remove the plugs in preparation for rehabilitation of the tunnels.

Damage Assessment MRCE began to compile information on the condi- tion of the slurry walls and the remaining basement structure as soon as below-grade access was possible. Teams of engineers, including MRCE, TTE, and Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA), and rescue personnel from FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fire Department, and the Police Department conducted inspections of all accessible below-grade areas. These teams reported on the condition of the slurry wall, the floor slabs, and the debris fields and judged whether the floor slabs and debris could safely support the slurry walls. MRCE compiled this information on damage assessment drawings showing the locations of stable and collapsed floors, as well as the location of dense debris fields. Those diagrams were used by contractors remov- ing the debris to prevent compromising the slurry walls; the drawings were used by MRCE in the design of the slurry wall resupport system. Figure 7 shows a typical FIGURE 5 Original excavation, WTC 1 steel core started, PATH tubes temporarily example of a damage assessment drawing for one of the supported while new station is constructed along Greenwich Street slurry wall. basement levels. The drawings showed that remnants of The 16 BRIDGE

than 10 inches toward the site. Backfilling of the south sector began as soon as it became safe to work in the area and the extent of the problem could be determined (Fig- ure 8). Slope inclinometers, survey points, and moni- toring wells were used to measure the behavior of the wall and the groundwater levels. Dewatering wells were installed to reduce water pressure on the walls, and instrumentation was installed to measure movements. The instrumentation showed that backfilling had reduced the rate of wall movement to the point that an upper tier of tiebacks could be installed to stabilize the wall. The contractor is currently installing the fourth level of tiebacks at that location in preparation for exca- vation to track level by March 2002.

NYC Transit Tunnels An inspection of the subway tunnels immediately east of the slurry wall indicated that the south half of the tunnel was either collapsed or had been pierced by a falling structure (Figure 9); the north half was rela- tively undamaged. Bulkheads were designed at both ends to prevent inundation of an adjacent section of FIGURE 7 Damage assessment drawing for Level B2. tunnel that was secure and operating. A more easterly subway tunnel was found to be almost undamaged and the existing floors continued to support the slurry walls was returned to service late in October 2001. New York in the northern sector of the site. LERA is currently City Transit has prepared contract documents for recon- reassessing the condition of the slabs in the northern struction and reopening of the line by October 2002. sector as a temporary support for the slurry wall and for their possible reuse in a reconstructed basement. In the center sector, the walls were supported by debris that varied from loose to compact. Along the south wall at Liberty Street, the majority of the wall was unsupported for most of its 60-foot height. Ultimately, tension cracks developed in Liberty Street immediately south of the wall, and the top of the wall moved more

FIGURE 9 Damaged subway tunnel.

Resupport of Slurry Walls The recovery of bodies, remains, and personal items, debris removal, and the excavation of residue continues under Fire Department and Police Department over- sight; when human remains are discovered, work is halted to ensure their dignified removal from the site. FIGURE 8 Backfill operations at Liberty Street. The abandoned “original” tieback tendons were SPRING 2002 17

inspected and found to be unsuitable for reuse. Replace- ment anchors, intended to be permanently corrosion protected are now being installed on the south half of the bathtub; these anchors will be tested to 400 tons and locked off at 300 tons. Because of the uncertainties about the support of the wall by debris and concerns about sudden loading of the wall as a result of the col- lapse of the lower level floors, tieback capacity of the top two tiers of anchors was set sufficiently high so that the anchor would not fail prior to development of the ultimate moment capacity of the wall. Tieback work is performed from inside the wall using crawler-mounted drills set on timber mats or from out- side the wall using “floating leads” extending over the wall. The floating leads are used where the working sur- FIGURE 11 Progress along the Liberty Street slurry wall showing the installation face is unsafe (Figure 10). (Excavating equipment has of the fourth-tier anchors. fallen several floors through the debris on two occasions.) for a segment of the Vesey Street wall where recent demolition has caused the collapse of formerly stable floors. More than half of the first phase anchors will be in place by the end of January 2002. As of January 2002, the slurry wall was found to be mostly intact, except for minor leaks at a few abandoned tieback seals and the upper portion of two panels at the south- east corner that were crushed by falling debris (Figure 12). FIGURE 10 Tieback installation with floating leads and crawler rigs. The estimated time of removal of all The current design requires one less tier of anchors at debris is less than each wall section than was used in the original con- one year. The Port struction. At several tiers, the replacement tieback Authority has indi- anchors will be placed either directly above or below cated its desire to abandoned anchors; at other tiers, the replacement restore interim PATH anchors will be remote from abandoned original service in the area of anchors. The first three tiers of anchors at the south wall the former station were in place, and work had begun on the fourth tier as once the slurry walls of January 2002 (Figure 11). First and second tier anchor are stabilized and the FIGURE 12 Damaged walls at Greenwich Street. installation on West and Greenwich Streets is proceed- debris removal is ing from south to north as debris is removed and work completed. Planning for a memorial and commercial space becomes available. Tiebacks will also be required and public buildings is under way. The events of September 11 challenged the future of our heavily engineered environment and the future of the engineering profession.

A 911 Call to the Engineering Profession

Robert Prieto

An attack on our nation . . . thousands dead . . . 20 percent of downtown office space in Manhattan damaged or destroyed . . . more than 40 percent of the subway system capacity to lower Manhattan disrupted . . . economic costs in New York alone of $100 billion. More damage in Washington, D.C., to the symbol of our military prowess. By any measure, the events that occurred on the clear blue-sky day of September 11 were horrific. Unlike Robert Prieto is chairman of the many other tragedies, all of these events were of man’s own making. Unlike board of Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc. many past events, both natural and man-made, the events of September 11 were attacks on an “engineered,” built environment, a hallmark of our soci- ety, which thrives on human proximity, connectivity, interaction, and open- ness. The very fabric of our “civil” society is tightly woven. As a New Yorker who grew up and worked in the city throughout my career; as chairman of Parsons Brinckerhoff, New York’s oldest engineering firm whose roots date back to 1885; and as cochair of the infrastructure task force established by the New York City Partnership in the aftermath of the attacks, I believe the 911 call of September 11 presented us with an unusual challenge, as well as an unmatched opportunity. Our response will say a great deal about the future of our heavily engineered environment (our cities), as well as about our profession. We must come to grips with necessary changes in the role of engineers and the needs of an engineered society. We must heed this call. SPRING 2002 19

What lessons can we learn from the attacks of Sep- direct, deliberate assault speaks well of our ability to tember 11 and their aftermath? What should we teach design critical infrastructure to resist attacks. The suc- those who follow in our footsteps? How should we define cessful resistance of the towers and the Pentagon in no “critical infrastructure” in the future? These are just a few way diminishes the human tragedy of that awful day. of the questions we must answer to meet history’s chal- As we move forward, we must learn what we can from lenge. We must return to the age-old fundamentals of these tragedies and, as we have in the past, we must education, namely the 3Rs. But in the highly engineered incorporate these lessons into future designs. With a environment of the twenty-first century, the traditional comprehensive understanding and broad distribution of 3Rs of reading, ‘riting and ‘rithmetic have been replaced these lessons, we can begin to address the larger conse- by resistance, response, and recovery. quences of the disaster. Not all of the damage was Critical infrastructure must be designed to resist incurred by high-profile buildings in New York and attack and catastrophic failure. Immediately after the Washington. Damage to surrounding infrastructure— attacks and the subsequent collapse of the World Trade transportation, electricity, and telephone—exceeded Center towers, some of the pundits suggested that high- (in economic terms) the damage to the buildings. The profile buildings and other critical infrastructure be very purpose of infrastructure—to tie development designed to stop airplanes. Simply put, this is utter non- together—in some ways limits its ability to resist delib- sense, a disservice to our profession and to society in erate attack. general. Unless we are prepared to live in an engineered environment that resembles the complex of caves in Afghanistan, we will not design buildings to stop planes. The challenge is to keep airplanes away from buildings The 3 Rs for the twenty-first and to root out those who challenge our way of life at the source. We must resist the urge to overreact in the century are resistance, short term. But that does not mean we should not make changes. response, and recovery. Every engineering disaster, whether natural or man- made, teaches us something. Sometimes the lessons that lead to a deeper understanding of the real challenges we The second “R” is response. The attacks left large por- face are only disseminated to a subset of our profession. tions of the transportation, electricity, and telephone Because our profession tends toward specialization, we networks that service lower Manhattan inoperable and often have difficulty translating lessons learned to a compromised the entire system. In the immediate after- broad range of disciplines and industry segments. Here math of the attacks, transit system operators modified is where the NAE could play an important role. The system operation to stop passenger flow into the affected academy could gather information on everything being area and remove trains that were already in the area. done, draw lessons from an incident, consolidate this Their timely actions prevented loss of life to transit pas- knowledge, and ensure that it is distributed to a wide sengers and workers, despite the subsequent destruction range of disciplines and industries. from falling debris. But then came an even more daunt- In New York on September 11, we saw the best of ing challenge—to reconfigure the transportation system engineering, not the failure of engineering. We saw two to meet the needs of the 850 businesses and 125,000 proud structures swallow two, maliciously guided planes, workers who were physically displaced when 25 million fully loaded with fuel. The structures not only endured square feet of office space was damaged or destroyed and impacts beyond their design basis, but also withstood to provide service to the more than 350,000 passengers the ensuing fires; they were not immediately over- to lower Manhattan whose commuting patterns were whelmed. The buildings were the first of the many disrupted. Herein lie some of the most valuable lessons heroes that died that day, but only after they had for our highly engineered environments. remained standing long enough for as many as 25,000 The first major lesson of September 11 is that infra- people to escape. This is the true testament to the structure and development are intricately linked. Although designers. In Washington, D.C., we also saw the best of infrastructure is the sine qua non of development and engineering. The Pentagon’s resistance to a large-scale, vice versa, we rarely appreciate their interdependencies The 20 BRIDGE until we must respond to a new paradigm, such as the can pay dividends that are not always apparent. aftermath of September 11. Along with the “localized” My argument for improving regional transit systems failure of “development” (the collapse of the World proved itself in the aftermath of September 11. The core Trade Center towers), there was localized failure of the capacity of the affected systems provided the flexibility attendant infrastructures (e.g., a subway line, the local for dealing with commuting patterns that had to be power grid, the PATH station at the World Trade Cen- modified overnight (literally); lines and stations outside ter, etc.). In response, we reconfigured regional devel- the immediately affected area were able to handle pas- opment (an estimated 29,000 employees working senger volumes exceeding those that a point A to B con- outside of New York City and another 29,000 tem- nection would have achieved. Several days after the porarily working out of other space in the city). We also attacks, I was gratified to receive a call from these same reconfigured our regional transportation network (e.g., government officials who now understood the impor- mandatory HOV into the city, increased ferry service, tance of core capacity. increased transit ridership at other river crossings, etc.). The infrastructure systems impacted by September 11 Analogous steps were taken for the utility and telecom- responded more or less quickly depending on their core munications networks capacities and the concentration of critical infrastruc- The second lesson of September 11 is that the core ture in the damaged area. Older, more mature systems capacity of infrastructure systems is essential. By “core responded better than many newer systems, which were capacity” I mean the degree of interconnectivity of the still heavily focused on building new connections and elements of a system, as well as the number of alterna- did not yet have as high a level of core capacity. This tive paths available (i.e., a system’s flexibility and redun- experience suggests that core capacity should be a crite- dancy). Sometime before September 11, I attempted to rion in the planning and implementation stages of new explain the importance of some planned improvements infrastructure. to our transportation system to government officials. I Core capacity is not just the extent of a system or the explained that these improvements would enhance the number of alternative system paths. It is also the intrin- core capacity of a well developed transportation net- sic quality of the system when it comes under stress. This work and would improve overall system reliability, avail- brings us to the third lesson of September 11—deferred ability, and performance. The benefits of these additions maintenance represents a real cost and a real risk. to core capacity would strengthen the overall system The history of engineering is marked by exciting breakthroughs, great works of master builders, and out- standing service. Regretfully, it is also marked by the sys- temic degradation of some of our greatest achievements. In large measure, the Society at large, and even some people in the engineer- ing profession, do not consider sustained maintenance capability of responding to as important as the creation of new projects. For many reasons, we have allowed some of our most complex sys- September 11 was the result tems to fall into disrepair thus compromising their level of good, timely maintenance. of reliability, availability, and safety. The problem is most apparent in failing rail systems in England and the United States, but deferred maintenance affects every element of infrastructure. and would go well beyond the benefits of adding a new Not too long ago, the New York City transit system system connection from point A to point B. Unfortu- was in urgent need of repair and maintenance. Out of nately, my argument for strengthening a complex sys- that crisis emerged a commitment to fund, reorganize, tem in the most complex, engineered urban rebuild, improve, and maintain the system to a well- environment in the world was largely lost. Traditional defined standard. To a large measure, the capability of project evaluation models have focused on the “value” responding to September 11 was the result of good, of new connections, ignoring their broader system-wide timely maintenance. Other elements of infrastructure implications. Improved reliability, availability, and per- with higher backlogs of deferred maintenance are strug- formance from added core capacity to a complex system gling to keep up. SPRING 2002 21

The fourth lesson of September 11 is that operational • developing a well documented system with clear and emergency response training is an integral element of interface points critical infrastructure response. Just as we factor con- • preplanning and rehearsing response and recovery structability reviews into our design process and main- scenarios for high-probability events (e.g., earth- tainability considerations into our construction details, quakes, hurricanes, floods) we must include operational training in our engineering of critical infrastructure. The many areas of exceptional But, to truly respond, even more will be needed—an performance in response to September 11 underscores effective response also requires a vision. Every aspect of the point. The events also revealed the need for new the engineered environment must be understood not scenarios. We must be prepared to respond to new only in terms of its past and present, but perhaps more threats in the form of weapons of mass destruction, higher risks of collateral physical and economic damage, and more extended response times. Training of first responders must be integrated with operational training On September 11, for infrastructure systems. We must also understand how first responder teams have evolved with our increasingly the engineering and engineered environment. The fifth lesson of September 11 is that the first construction industry responder team must include engineers and builders in addi- voluntarily reached out to tion to the traditional triad of fire, police, and emergency services. On September 11, the engineering and con- provide technical expertise. struction industry voluntarily reached out to provide technical and construction expertise. Although proto- cols were not firmly in place and this “fourth responder” had not participated in response training, the help of importantly, in terms of its future—how it will evolve; engineers and constructors has been critical. how resistance, response, and recovery can be built into From now on, response protocols in engineered urban the system as it expands; how it fits into the vision of the environments must incorporate this “fourth responder,” future; and what role it plays in the overall engineered and dedicated training facilities must reflect the unique environment. Effective recovery can only begin with nature of highly engineered environments and their this vision. infrastructures. Legislation must also be passed to The 3Rs—resistance, response, and recovery—can remove the risks that accrue to engineer “volunteers” provide a new framework for engineering our critical who are not covered by Good Samaritan statutes. infrastructure in the aftermath of September 11. But we The third “R” is recovery. Building in as much resis- must prioritize our efforts in terms of our most critical tance as makes sense from a risk-weighted, operational, needs. To put it simply, we must agree on what compris- and economic perspective enhances our ability to es critical infrastructure. Here, I confess my own predis- respond. We can provide core capacity, focus on relia- position to adopt a broad view of system behavior. In bility, availability, and performance, and reconfigure those terms, we can identify the following characteris- inherently resilient systems. But we must also plan for tics of critical infrastructure systems: the recovery of the capacity and service that was • Rapid failure would lead to a catastrophic loss of life destroyed. We must be prepared to restore the engi- (by rapid I mean relative to the consequences possible neered fabric, making it even better than it was. In as opposed to an absolute time scale). other words, we must engineer critical infrastructure for recovery in the following ways: • Failure or significant degradation would have un- acceptable economic consequences. • ensuring accessibility to the sites of critical infrastructure • Rapid failure would significantly undermine rescue and response efforts (e.g., if emergency operations • ensuring the availability of specialized construction centers were located in proximity to high-profile equipment, contracts, and materials targets). The 22 BRIDGE

• Significant degradation would significantly interfere engineering a proud profession. Engineers must design with recovery efforts. for the 3Rs, as well as for functionality, safety, reliability, Engineers must become the master builders of the maintainability, and sustainability. We cannot be con- twenty-first century. We must be systems thinkers, tent to play a secondary role in building our future. We determined visionaries, and political pragmatists must have a voice, and we must take risks. In short, we imbued with the ethics and integrity that have made must be leaders! We need a planning process—rather than a static plan—to protect our homeland.

Homeland Security: Building a National Strategy

Ruth David

On September 11, 2001, our nation was stunned by the sheer audacity of the al Qaeda terrorists. The devastation—human lives lost and symbols of our free society destroyed—left an indelible mark on the American psyche. In the aftermath we are left to rebuild our sense of personal safety and nation- al security even as we wage war against terrorism on a global scale. Although we were rightly horrified by the attacks, we should not have Ruth David, a newly elected mem- been surprised by the aggression. Osama bin Laden himself provided ample ber of the NAE, is president and warning; in a January 1999 interview, for example, he said “hostility toward CEO of ANSER, Inc., which includes America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God . . . . I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called the ANSER Institute for Homeland superpower that is America.” This was not empty rhetoric; bin Laden was Security. implicated in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 American embassy bombings in Africa, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. So—having been warned—why were we unprepared?

Before September 11 For the past decade, a steady parade of studies, task forces, and commissions have expressed growing concerns about threats to the American homeland. The 1997 National Defense Panel described adversaries who were willing to confront us at home—as well as abroad—using asymmetric techniques to The 24 BRIDGE counter our traditional military strengths. The panel September 11, 2001, homeland security had still not been also noted the growing importance of homeland defense defined. In short, there was a great deal of activity but as an element of national security (National Defense little progress toward resolving the core issues, which Panel, 1997). In 1999, the United States Commission will necessarily impinge on legacy missions—and on National Security/21st Century was asked to help bureaucratic turf. create a national security strategy appropriate to the emerging threat environment. In the commission’s The Aftermath Phase I report, published in September 1999, the num- September 11 provided a wake-up call to our nation. ber one conclusion was that “America will become Suddenly the debate about if versus when there might increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our home- be a catastrophic attack on our homeland was trans- formed to where next. The subsequent anthrax attacks made the threat of biological warfare real to the Amer- ican public and strengthened our collective resolve. On September 11, 2001, Even as the ruins of the World Trade Center continued to smolder, we mobilized our military to wage war “homeland security” against global terrorism. At the same time, homeland security—still unde- had still not been defined. fined—jumped to the top of the priority list for every branch of the federal government, many state and local governments, and even parts of private industry. On land, and our military superiority will not entirely pro- October 8, 2001, the President issued an Executive tect us” (USCNS, 1999). The final report, published in Order establishing the Office of Homeland Security January 2001, predicted that “a direct attack against with the mission “to develop and coordinate the imple- American citizens on American soil is likely over the next mentation of a comprehensive national strategy to quarter century” (USCNS, 2001). None of these reports, secure the United States from terrorist threats or however, conveyed a sense of immediacy—in spite of attacks.” In the Quadrennial Defense Review Report evidence to the contrary. released on September 30, the U.S. Department of I do not mean to suggest that we completely ignored Defense “restored defense of the United States as its pri- the asymmetric threat. However, the lack of urgency mary mission,” even as U.S. forces went on the offensive and the absence of a strategy limited our progress toward against global terrorism (DOD, 2001). The Federal Avi- the redefinition and transformation of our national ation Administration took immediate action to security apparatus. Although our military capabilities strengthen airport security. The Federal Bureau of Inves- have improved significantly in the past few decades, our tigation restructured its headquarters to increase its forces have remained optimized for traditional warfight- focus on the prevention—rather than the investigation— ing—on a foreign battlefield—against a known enemy. of terrorist attacks. The anthrax attacks provided an The mountain of reports describing the asymmetric additional impetus to the nascent bioterrorism program threat from various perspectives offered piecemeal, and in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services often conflicting, solutions. When confronted with new and heightened concerns in the U.S. Department of demands, organizations that were overcommitted Agriculture. Organizations with the words “homeland already inevitably called for new resources. A plethora security” in their titles suddenly cropped up throughout of working groups and task forces were established sole- government and industry. Legislation was introduced, ly to bridge the fault lines between agencies. The and budgets were augmented—all before we had devel- national security lexicon expanded to include new oped a strategy or defined our priorities. terms, such as weapons of mass destruction, weapons of If we fast-forward to the first anniversary of our wake- mass effect, chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear/ up call, it is easy to imagine two potential—and equally explosive, cyberterrorism, and critical infrastructures. undesirable—outcomes. Given the vast number of vul- But after nearly a decade of debate, protecting our nerabilities inherent to our free society, and given the homeland from asymmetric threats was still not a absence of clearly established national priorities, we primary mission for any part of our government. On could easily spend billions of taxpayer dollars and make SPRING 2002 25

little meaningful progress toward protecting our home- world of evolving threats and thinking enemies. It must land from future terrorist threats or attacks. Alterna- provide a strategy for communication so we can share tively, if Osama bin Laden fades from the scene and we information—what we know and what we don’t experience no additional catastrophic attacks, we could know—with American citizens as well as operational declare success, turn our attention to other national communities. A national strategy will be supported— issues, and continue to let entrenched bureaucracies but not replaced—by a comprehensive budget plan that prevail—thus allowing the current patchwork of orga- aligns resources with national priorities. An effective nizational strategies to substitute for a national strategy. strategy for homeland security will inevitably alter the To avoid these mistakes, we should learn from the missions of many existing organizations—and most past. After winning the Cold War, we failed to retool likely will require the creation of new organizations our national security establishment for the emerging with new missions. Building such a strategy will be asymmetric threat environment even though the need hard—but we must do it. We can no longer afford was discussed ad nauseam. In the aftermath of Septem- either the lowest common denominator solution that ber 11, we heard the usual calls to investigate the orga- too often emerges from fully coordinated efforts or the nizational failures that had permitted the attacks. Instead patchwork of point solutions contributed by individual of looking for culprits, we should consider it a failure of agencies. national strategy, policy, and will. The bottom line is Perhaps the greatest initial challenge will be defining that we—collectively—failed to heed well documented success. What is the ultimate goal of the homeland secu- concerns; we did not make the tough decisions neces- rity mission? How will we define success? Are we sary to defend our homeland effectively. We should not defending America—the nation—or protecting every assume that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network individual American from every conceivable terrorist are the only ones with the ability or desire to use asym- threat? If we set the bar too high, the resource require- metric weapons; history is replete with examples. Nor ments will be unaffordable and the loss of personal free- should we assume that large oceans and friendly neigh- doms untenable. If we set it too low, American citizens bors, even when backed by military power, can provide may lose confidence in the government’s ability to pro- sanctuary from asymmetric threats. September 11 tect the nation from terrorism. If we fail to answer the should be example enough. To protect our nation we question, we will have no context for making decisions. must also defend our homeland.

Planning Developing a strategy will be hard—and implement- ing it will be even harder. A national strategy for ensur- Federal control will have to be ing the security of our homeland will engage players ceded to exploit inherently who have not been part of our traditional national security apparatus—such as Health and Human Ser- distributed authority and to vices and the Department of Agriculture. The strategy must bridge the gap between foreign intelligence and leverage the knowledge and domestic intelligence authorities and policies—recog- resources of other stakeholders. nizing that geographic boundaries are not absolute in an era of global markets and coalition warfare. Federal control will have to be ceded to exploit inherently distributed authorities—as well as to leverage the Once we have defined success, we must identify inter- knowledge and resources of other stakeholders. A com- im outcomes against which progress can be measured. prehensive national strategy must link federal, state, This will require that we define priorities against which and local strategies and integrate the strategies of pri- resources can be allocated, as well as responsibilities vate corporations who own much of our nation’s criti- against which performance can be evaluated. These are cal infrastructure. It should include an education and the basics of any good strategy. But a definition in the training program that supports the adaptation of oper- context of homeland security presents a formidable chal- ational strategy as well as tactical preparedness in a lenge because of the scope of our national objectives, the The 26 BRIDGE diversity of the potential threats, and the fragmented capabilities that address all phases of the strategic cycle. ownership of both resources and responsibilities. The spectrum of asymmetric options includes biolog- ical, chemical, unconventional nuclear or radiological, Strategic Framework cyber, and enhanced conventional weapons—and is Ensuring the security of our homeland is inherently a limited only by our adversaries’ imaginations (ANSER, multidimensional problem. A relatively simple frame- 2001). We cannot hope to protect every building from work would include three dimensions—national objec- a truck bomb or every public event from a biological tives, potential threats against which we are defending, release; nor can we afford to inspect every item that and the operational entities that will implement the crosses our borders. For some threats, our focus will nec- strategies. essarily be on the latter part of the strategic cycle—deal- A comprehensive strategy for homeland security must ing with the aftermath. We must, however, think encompass all phases of the strategic cycle. Therefore, through the spectrum of possibilities and make con- the national objectives must be deterrence, prevention, scious decisions about the defenses we will implement, preemption, crisis management, consequence management, as well as how we can improve our capability of miti- attribution, and response (ANSER, 2001). The ultimate gating the impact of a catastrophic attack. And our abil- goal, of course, is to deter future attacks—by convincing ity to attribute an attack, coupled with the will to the enemy that their efforts will be unsuccessful and/or respond, must be apparent. that our response will be both immediate and devastat- The strength of our nation is based on the distribu- ing. But our traditional deterrence model is inadequate tion of authority and power among federal, state, and in a world in which suicide missions are common, com- local governments, the free market that is the basis of mercial objects can be used as weapons, attacks can be our economy, and the personal freedom and privacy launched anonymously, and adversaries may occupy no afforded to every citizen. Responsibility for protecting sovereign territory that can be held at risk. Therefore, our homeland is distributed across a range of diverse organizations—complicating the development and implementation of a national strategy. How can we ensure that related fragments of information are fused to create national—versus local—situational awareness? We must protect our How can we create the excess capacity that would be homeland, but we must needed to respond to a biological attack in a market- driven health care system? How can we identify terror- also protect the strengths ists living among us without infringing on the privacy of our citizens? We must defend our homeland, but we of our nation. must also protect the strengths of our nation. The goal should be a national strategy—not a federal strategy—a synergy of the actions of individual organi- although maintaining our nuclear and conventional zations at all levels, ensuring that gaps are filled, con- military power is vital to our nation’s security, we must flicts are eliminated, and overlaps are minimized. The also bolster our security with a national policy and three-dimensional framework in Figure 1 may help to defense capabilities that explicitly address asymmetric visualize the inherent complexities of the challenge. threats to our homeland. In short, this will mean we Within each subcube, we have a national objective, a must implement strategies to prevent the acquisition or threat category, and operational entities with varying delivery of asymmetric weapons, to preempt attacks responsibilities. Although operational responsibilities already in motion, to limit the impact of an attack will not be uniformly distributed, a comprehensive through crisis and consequence management, to attribute national strategy must assign missions and authorities an attack to the perpetrator as well as the ultimate spon- within each space. sor, and to respond immediately with the full force of our military and/or legal establishments. Deterrence will Implementation be most effective if our intent is made clear through If we try populating the framework with current orga- policy and our ability is underpinned by operational nizations and assigned missions, we can get an idea of SPRING 2002 27

weapons, it may be difficult to detect an attack. Cyber- Asymmetric Options terrorists can hide their preparations in a background of hacker noise, can operate from safe havens far from the point of attack, and can choose from a variety of failure modes—some of which may be indistinguishable from common system failures. The slow-motion aspect of bioattacks, coupled with their similarity to natural out- Enhanced Conventional breaks of disease, will complicate early detection and, Deterrence Unconventional Nuclear Radiological therefore, our ability to mitigate the consequences—as Prevention Biological well as to ensure positive attribution. Crisis and conse- Preemption Chemical quence management strategies designed for an explo- Cyber Crisis Management sion cannot equip us to deal with a biological attack. We Consequence Management must analyze each threat category separately across the Attribution Federal State Local Private full range of objectives to identify situations that require

National Objectives Response Operational Entities unique capabilities. To build effective defenses, and to ensure our ability to mitigate the impact in case of an attack, will require FIGURE 1 Strategic framework for homeland security. that we identify likely targets for each threat category. Potential homeland targets include large gatherings of the lack of coherence in our current state. Fault lines people, symbolic facilities, and critical information or created by legacy missions appear not only at subcube infrastructures—including industries that underpin our boundaries, but also within each space. We cannot national economy. It is readily apparent that the possi- effectively define a strategy for meeting one national bilities are endless—and equally apparent that we can- objective in isolation any more than a single organiza- not hope to imagine every potential attack. But too tion can define its strategies in isolation. often we focus our resources on preventing a recurrence The strategic cycle is a continuum rather than a set of discrete objectives, and success will depend on the of the last attack rather than imagining the next one. sharing of information around the entire cycle. At any Recent terrorist attacks—and attempted attacks— given time, we will be working to deter and prevent demonstrated significant creativity on the part of our future attacks on our homeland; the insights gained will adversaries; but our nation’s capacity for innovation can provide useful information for the consequence man- provide a formidable basis for the development and evo- agement community as it prepares for potential future lution of a national strategy. What we need is an on- attacks. Knowledge acquired through a preempted going process that includes imagining attack scenarios, attack may inform national response and help deter drafting strategies that span the cycle of national objec- future attempts. In other words, the boundaries between tives, and independent gaming to test the efficacy of foreign and domestic intelligence authorities, as well as strategies. Over time, this approach will yield increas- between national security and homeland security, will ingly robust national strategies; the challenge will be to create additional fault lines that must be bridged. create new scenarios continually to keep us one step Each threat category introduces its own complexities ahead of our adversaries, who will be observing us and for various parts of the strategic cycle. It will be difficult learning from our actions. to prevent an adversary from acquiring or delivering an But even the best strategy will be worthless unless it asymmetric weapon—particularly when the weapon can is implemented. Therefore, we must also develop a be constructed from commercially available compo- national playbook—a living playbook—to guide the nents and our own infrastructure can serve as a delivery activities of diverse operational entities. Just as no sports system. Prior to September 11, few people would have team can be fielded without practicing, our homeland included commercial airliners on the list of asymmetric security teams must participate in exercises to build rela- weapons; even fewer would have called our U.S. Postal tionships and institutionalize processes, thereby creat- Service a weapon delivery system. In some instances, ing an end-to-end capability. In the aftermath of the particularly if we are talking about biological or cyber September 11 attacks, it became clear that some federal The 28 BRIDGE authorities, some local authorities, and some private meet a broad spectrum of potential threats. These strate- companies all had fragments of information related to gies must define people, processes, and technologies—in the attacks; but we had neither processes nor relation- military terms, training, doctrine, and materiel—and ships in place to construct an operational picture until must clearly assign responsibility and accountability to it was too late. The same thing could happen if a bio- appropriate operational entities. The strategies must be logical attack were launched against us. Our nation has accompanied by measurable outcomes and clear metrics never confronted a deliberately introduced contagious and must be supported by a comprehensive budget plan pathogen, but we know that a biological warfare attack that aligns resources with responsibilities. is unlikely to obey traditional public health models that But we must not stop there. We are facing a world in predict the spread of infectious disease. Therefore, our which agility defeats bureaucracy. We need a planning ability to mitigate the consequences of such an attack process—rather than a static plan—to protect our will depend in large measure on our having exercised in homeland. Only by continually adapting our plans to advance contingency plans to keep our society func- new threat scenarios and exercising those plans can we tioning. Plans and exercises cannot cover every possible hope to defend ourselves against evolving threats and attack, but they will, over time, create a robust capabil- thinking enemies. As Dwight Eisenhower aptly said, “In ity for protecting our homeland. preparing for battle I have always found that plans are The question that continues to plague the govern- useless, but planning is indispensable.” ment is who is in charge. The answer must be—it depends. Even at the federal level, there is no way to reorganize References so that a single individual—apart from the President— ANSER. 2001. A Primer on Homeland Security: Strategic would be in charge for every conceivable situation. In Functions, Threats, and Mission Areas, by Randy Larsen addition, much of the responsibility for homeland secu- and Dave McIntyre. Available online at: . government. We must not let our desire for hierarchical DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 2001. Quadrennial command and control become our Achilles heel. Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Depart- Through ongoing scenario development, planning, and ment of Defense. exercises, we can, over time, find an answer to the ques- National Defense Panel. 1997. Transforming Defense: Nation- tion. But it is likely to be it depends. al Security in the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. Conclusion USCNS (United States Commission on National Security/ We have never lived in a risk-free world—and a com- 21st Century). 1999. New World Coming: American prehensive national strategy for homeland security will Security in the 21st Century. Available online at: not change that. We must aim for success—deterrence of . future terrorist attacks—but prepare for failure. We must USCNS. 2001. Road Map for National Security: Imperative build strategies for each phase of the strategic cycle to for Change. Available online at: . Policy makers and scientists must assess the probability of threats as well as the amount of damage they might do.

Bioterrorism: Threat and Preparedness

Michael J. Powers and Jonathan Ban

Prior to the anthrax mailings that followed the terrorist attacks of Septem- ber 11, much of the criticism about planning and preparedness for bioterror- ism attacks had been focused on the mismatch between the assessments of the threat and the size and structure of the planned response. Many analysts had criticized plans for overemphasizing worst-case scenarios and under- Michael J. Powers emphasizing more probable middle- and low-casualty attacks. Most worst- case scenarios involved the release of a military-style biological agent in aerosol form near an urban center; everyone exposed to the pathogen would become severely ill, and many would die; casualties would number in the tens or even hundreds of thousands. Scenarios involving contagious pathogens, such as smallpox or plague, were even more worrisome. Outbreaks involving such pathogens evolve over time, and unless appropriate measures are taken, the numbers infected and the size of the affected geographic area would expand exponentially. The anthrax mailings were not the mass-casualty bioterrorism many had expected. Although the military-grade anthrax agent was highly sophisti- cated, it was delivered in a relatively unsophisticated way—through the mail Jonathan Ban system. As a result, there were relatively small, localized incidents that led

Michael J. Powers and Jonathan Ban are research associates at the Chemical and Biological Arms Institute in Washington, D.C. The 30 BRIDGE to a limited number of illnesses and deaths. The inci- assessment methodologies to take into account all of the dents aroused significant fear and disruptions but not factors comprising the threat. Single-factor threat mass casualties. Based on these attacks, some analysts assessments, for example, focus either on the terrorists’ have suggested that terrorists would not be able to motivations and objectives or on the hypothetical orchestrate mass-casualty attacks using biological effects of a biological weapon, but they do not indicate weapons. Others have considered these attacks as which scenarios are plausible or their comparative like- demonstrations of terrorists’ ability to acquire high- lihood. Consider, for example, a terrorist attack involv- quality anthrax, thus crossing an important threshold. ing smallpox, which is often cited as the worst-case Because those responsible for the mailings did acquire scenario for several reasons. First, smallpox is a highly (whether they also manufactured the agent remains contagious disease. Second, the population has little or unclear) high-grade anthrax agent but did not dissemi- no immunity to the disease. Third, even with large nate a sufficient quantity to produce mass casualties, stockpiles of smallpox vaccine, given our highly mobile both arguments are correct. life style, it would be difficult to contain an outbreak. We must, however, keep this threat in perspective. Despite the catastrophic effects of a smallpox attack, the probability of such an attack is extremely low, especially Assessments of bioterrorist compared to the probability of other scenarios. First, smallpox as a naturally occurring disease has been erad- threats have either been icated. Second, the virus that causes smallpox is known to exist in only two high-security laboratories—one in unfocused or narrowly Atlanta at the Centers for Disease Control and one at focused on single factors. the Vector Laboratories in Siberia, Russia. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for a terrorist to acquire the smallpox virus. Moreover, the effects of a smallpox attack would be uncontrollable and, therefore, could The anthrax mailings brought to public attention also affect the terrorists and their supporting con- a recurring problem in national security planning: stituencies. If we look at all of these factors, we must expectations of future developments are often vastly conclude that a smallpox attack is a potential contin- different from what actually occurs. Therefore, rather gency, even, perhaps, the most damaging potential con- than planning for a narrow range of least-likely, high- tingency, but the probability of occurrence is very low. consequence contingencies or focusing only on addi- Nevertheless, smallpox has received the lion’s share of tional mailborne anthrax attacks, we must plan for a attention and has drawn attention away from the wide variety of future incidents—including incidents that range of other agents that could be used. cause mass casualties and mass disruption. In fact, plan- Rather than focusing on vulnerability to a particular ning for a variety of more likely, middle- to low-casualty organism or looking to history to determine what is to incidents, while simultaneously being prepared for low- come, policy makers and scientists must recognize that probability, high-consequence incidents is perhaps the the bioterrorist threat is not unidimensional. We must most significant challenge facing planners. The corner- consider four key elements of the threat: the who (the stone of preparations for future bioterrorist incidents, actor), the what (the agent), the where (the target), and regardless of their nature or scope, must be a national, the how (the mode of attack). The impact of a bio- but not necessarily federal, public health system capable terrorist attack will be determined by the interaction of of detecting, assessing, and responding to a broad variety these components. The more casualties bioterrorists of contingencies. seek to inflict, the more difficult it will be for them to assemble the necessary combination of these compo- The Challenge nents. Thus, the level of risk declines as the level of Assessments of the bioterrorist threat are often either desired casualties increases because the attack scenario unfocused or narrowly focused on single factors. The becomes less likely. mismatch between threat assessments and preparedness For a number of reasons, including technical difficul- efforts can be explained partly by the failure of threat ties and the absence of motivation, a catastrophic SPRING 2002 31

with biological weapons, the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks have shown a willingness to inflict mass casualties. Meanwhile, the rapid development of biotechnology and the diffusion of expertise in this field may lower the technical bar over time.

Preparedness To date, the driving factor in planning and prepared- ness has been meeting the threat of catastrophic casual- ties, without regard for its low probability. However, in Probability of Casualty Figures Casualty our view, the relationship between the probability of Occurrence occurrence and the consequences should be the basis for Number of Viable setting policy. Because financial resources are finite, pol- Options icy makers will have to make difficult choices. Should the focus be on promoting preparedness for a single bio- logical agent, or should we invest in measures that pro- mote preparedness for a variety of agents and scenarios? FIGURE 1 Assessing the bioterrorist threat. Every dollar spent preparing for a specific agent, such as building stocks of smallpox or anthrax vaccine or pur- bioterrorist event is not the most likely contingency. chasing antidote for botulinum toxin, is a dollar that Only the release of a very contagious or very high- cannot be spent on preparedness for other organisms. quality agent by a highly efficient dissemination tech- Given the variety of combinations among actors, agents, nique could result in thousands or more casualties. In targets, and dissemination techniques, a public health reality, the number of pathways open to terrorists that system must be capable of rapidly and accurately detect- would result in catastrophic numbers of casualties are ing and assessing a large number of bioterrorism scenar- few, and those that do exist are technically difficult. The ios and addressing most contingencies. Rather than number of technical pathways for producing a low- to limiting planning and preparedness to a narrow range of mid-range bioterrorism incident are more numerous, less catastrophic scenarios, planning should be based on technically challenging, and more suited to the motiva- developing the capability of effectively and efficiently tions and constraints of traditional concepts of terrorism. responding to a variety of bioterrorist contingencies. In Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the bioterrorism our judgment, the emphasis should be on building capac- “threat envelope.” As the pyramid illustrates, the higher ity in the public health system. one moves on the casualty axis, the lower the probabil- Many people assume that preparing for high-end ity of occurrence and the number of viable options. attacks will also provide a capability of responding to Thus, the terrorist is left with relatively few, and very middle- and low-range attacks. Consider, for example, challenging, contingencies for inflicting mass casualties. the contents of the national pharmaceutical stockpile. Despite the low probability of a catastrophic bioter- In the wake of the recent anthrax attacks, the Centers rorist attack, there is still ample cause for concern. We do for Disease Control plans to expand the national phar- not know how “massive” an attack would have to be to maceutical stockpile and accelerate the procurement overwhelm the response system, instill fear and panic, or of vaccines. The bioterrorism preparedness budget cur- cause serious political or economic fallout. Although rently being debated in Congress includes approxi- many terrorists will not be interested in using biological mately $509 million for the procurement of smallpox weapons or will not be able to do so, two categories of vaccine, enough to vaccinate nearly every U.S. citizen. nonstate actors—those with relationships with national Although focusing on such high-end attack scenarios governments and those outside the traditional scope of simplifies planning and preparedness by narrowing the governmental scrutiny—warrant particular attention. range of contingencies, it also introduces a substantial The uncertainties surrounding bioterrorism will remain, degree of risk that the public health and medical system and although terrorists have yet to demonstrate the will be unprepared for more likely, but less drastic con- sophistication required to carry out large-scale attacks tingencies. Furthermore, smallpox vaccine is useless The 32 BRIDGE against all other agents, including anthrax, botulinum an act of bioterrorism may be ineffective or too late. As toxin, tularemia, and brucellosis. Therefore, we run the the recent anthrax incidents have shown, awareness and risk of neglecting other measures that could be used to assessment capacities, particularly epidemiological and meet a wide range of contingencies. We must strike a laboratory capacities, can be quickly overwhelmed. better balance between hedging our defenses against These capabilities, which were critical in assessing the high-end, mass-casualty events and building a “system of risk of anthrax exposure, were slow to complete an systems” capable of addressing both a wider range of assessment of risk despite knowing that an attack had bioterrorist contingencies and natural outbreaks of occurred. The nature of future bioterrorist attacks may infectious disease. not be as readily apparent as the anthrax mailings have been. More covert attacks would place additional strains on the public health system to detect the attack, diag- nose the agent and illness, and determine the scope of A national surveillance exposure and future course of the illness. system to provide an early Surveillance Early detection will be critical to saving lives. The warning of outbreaks sooner a bioterrorist event is detected, the sooner an assessment of the event can be completed, and the soon- of disease will be critical er medical care can be administered to those exposed. In to our preparedness. the case of contagious diseases such as smallpox or pneu- monic plague, detecting an outbreak early is essential to containing the outbreak. People today are incredibly mobile, commuting in and out of urban centers on a daily basis and traveling all over the world regularly. A System of Systems Failure to detect an outbreak of a contagious disease There is no silver bullet to meet the bioterrorist chal- early could result in its rapid spread. lenge. Preparedness cannot be focused on a single tool A national surveillance system to provide an early for addressing the problem but must be on a system of warning of unusual outbreaks of disease, both natural systems that integrates a broad range of activities. The and intentional, will be a critical component of our pre- nation’s public health resources—surveillance systems, paredness. This system will depend on an information epidemiological expertise, and laboratory networks— infrastructure that includes electronic data networks must be integrated with health care, emergency man- connecting local public health departments and area agement, law enforcement systems, and others, and all health care providers and providing regular analyses of of these must be connected by a system for sharing infor- the data for the presence of unusual trends that could mation and communicating across sectors. indicate a bioterrorist attack. Additional sources of data Bioterrorism differs from other types of mass-casualty that could provide an early indication of a bioterrorist terrorism (e.g., chemical, radiological, or nuclear terror- attack include spikes in flu-like symptoms, over-the- ism) in that it would impose heavy demands on the pub- counter drug sales, or absenteeism. The crucial element lic health and health care systems, which would be will be a robust information infrastructure for collect- called upon to mitigate and ameliorate the conse- ing, analyzing, and sharing information from all of quences of an attack and to assist the law enforcement these sources. community in gathering criminal evidence. Thus, we must build medical management capacities—including Epidemiology stockpiles of vaccines, antibiotics, and other supplies Epidemiologists play an important role in surveillance and systems for rapidly distributing these materials— and detection. They routinely monitor disease trends and a system connecting the “front-end” awareness and and take appropriate measures to meet potential public assessment capacities to the “back-end” of the bio- health threats. Epidemiologists will also be critical in terrorism response system. Without robust capabilities determining the scope of the exposure to a bioterrorist for early detection and rapid assessment, the response to agent once it has been detected. Typically, they trace SPRING 2002 33

the outbreak back to its source, determine who was in Building Response Capacities the exposed area at the time of release, and recommend Any response system must have built-in flexibility so medical management measures. Because of the labor- it can respond appropriately to a large-scale or small- intensive nature of epidemiology, which depends scale event. Flexibility will require effective awareness largely on interviews and analyses of disease trends, state and assessment tools that provide information on the departments of health will have to hire and train staff to nature of the attack so the response can be tailored be aware of natural outbreaks of disease as well as the appropriately. Local and federal responses should be wide range of bioterrorist agents. based on a tiered, scalable approach commensurate with Laboratory Requirements the scale of the attack.

Public health laboratories also play a critical role in Conclusions the detection and assessment of bioterrorist incidents. Building and sustaining the public health system of A spike in requests for culture analyses from physicians systems described here will require sustained investment could indicate an unusual outbreak of disease. Once an in people, technology, and materials. Adequate numbers attack has been detected, laboratories will be critical in of trained public health and medical personnel will be identifying the biological agent released. During the necessary to monitor the nation’s health on an ongoing anthrax mailings, laboratories were called upon to deter- basis, operate and maintain the network of public health mine which people in the proximity of the contami- laboratories, investigate and analyze unusual outbreaks nated mail had been exposed and to assist law of disease, and provide preventive and therapeutic med- enforcement in gathering forensic evidence for prose- ical care for natural and intentional outbreaks. Building cuting the perpetrator(s). Upgrading laboratory capac- this system will also require investments in several key ity by expanding advanced diagnostic capabilities, technologies, including the technologies for an elec- increasing the range of bioterrorist agents that can be tronic information infrastructure that can link federal, identified at state and local laboratories, and making state, and local public health departments, hospitals, diagnostic exams faster and more accurate will be criti- clinics, physicians’ offices, and other medical care cal to an effective preparedness system. providers into a national public health network. Other Information and Communication technologies will be necessary to increase the speed and The underpinning for all of the components of an throughput of public health laboratories. An effective integrated detection, assessment, and response system system of systems will also require adequate stocks of will be a robust information infrastructure. Surveillance, antibiotics, vaccines, and medical supplies—at both the epidemiology, and laboratory capacities for meeting the national and local levels—to ensure that adequate treat- bioterrorist challenge will all depend on a robust infor- ment is available. mation infrastructure. Information technology could be Creating and sustaining investments in people, tech- used to exchange procedural guidelines prior to a bio- nology, and materials will require strong partnerships terrorist event, provide a mechanism for compiling and between federal, state, and local governments, each of analyzing data on disease trends from different sources, which will provide key capabilities in the public health share information during an event and lessons learned system of systems. The role of the federal government after an event, and provide training for all constituen- will be to provide funding to support local and state pre- cies. In addition, accurate and timely information will paredness and to take the lead as system integrator. A be the backbone of the decision making process in times strong partnership between the public and private sec- of crisis and will provide credible and consistent infor- tors—especially private health care institutions like mation to the general public to reduce panic. Bolstering hospitals and private-practice physicians—will also be and integrating existing information infrastructures to important. The private sector should play a role, respond to bioterrorism will require expanding our tech- although the private sector cannot be expected to assist nological infrastructure, as well as improving human in planning for the mass distribution of medications or and social understanding of how the infrastructure can to maintain surge capacities for unlikely contingencies. be most effective. That task will fall to state and local governments. We need a system that will enable us to mobilize all of our health care resources rapidly wherever they are needed.

Cybercare: A System for Confronting Bioterrorism

Joseph M. Rosen; C. Everett Koop; Eliot B. Grigg

Everything is not okay. On September 11, the realm of possibility suddenly expanded to include the unthinkable, and we were reminded that there are Joseph M. Rosen people who are willing and able to inflict massive civilian casualties in the United States. Moral repugnance is no longer a sufficient deterrent. Septem- ber 11 also demonstrated that we cannot rely on prevention. We must be pre- pared to respond to a whole host of catastrophic contingencies. The anthrax scare shortly thereafter introduced us to the threat of deadly biological agents. We were lucky this time, but 12 nations are known to pos- sess, or are suspected of possessing, offensive biochemical weapons. The char- acteristics that make biological devices unwieldy as weapons of war—such as silence, incubation time, and uncontrollability—make them effective options C. Everett Koop for bioterror. Biological agents differ from their chemical and nuclear counter- parts in a number of important ways: (1) they are easy to conceal; (2) if they are contagious, infected people can spread the disease; (3) the first responders exposed are likely to be health professionals rather than the traditional emergency personnel; (4) the longer an epidemic goes unrecognized and

Joseph M. Rosen is an associate professor of plastic and reconstructive surgery and an adjunct professor of radiology, Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center. C. Everett Koop is senior scholar and Elizabeth DeCamp McInerny Professor of Surgery at the C. Everett Koop Institute, Dartmouth College. Eliot B. Grigg is a teaching intern in the Thayer School Eliot B. Grigg of Engineering and research assistant, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College. SPRING 2002 35

undiagnosed, the more difficult it is to control its effects. everywhere have either never been vaccinated against A well executed dispersal of an infectious pathogen the disease or have only partial immunity from vaccina- would have devastating effects, and the psychological tions that were administered decades ago. Historically, fallout and panic would be even worse. the fatality rate from outbreaks of smallpox has been As long as we value our personal freedoms, intelli- about 30 percent, but it is higher among the unvacci- gence and law enforcement will never be perfect. In any nated. Smallpox vaccine has been out of production for case, although preventive measures are necessary, they 30 years, and the government is not sure how far its can never be sufficient—no one can anticipate every reserve of 15 million doses can be diluted. There is no contingency. In addition, because the intelligence com- proven, effective, specific treatment for smallpox. munity operates covertly, it can do little to allay popu- lar fears or restrain panic. To meet this threat, we need a new strategy that brings together our command, com- munication, and control technologies. We must be able As long as we value our to mobilize all of our health care resources rapidly wher- ever the threat appears, even if it appears in many places personal freedoms, simultaneously. During a crisis, there is no time to invent a response. We must be prepared, and right now intelligence and law we are not. enforcement will never Threats be perfect. Six biological agents are most suitable for “weaponiza- tion”: plague, tularemia, botulinum (toxin), the hemor- rhagic fevers, anthrax, and smallpox. Three of the six, plague, the hemorrhagic fevers, and smallpox, can be Current Level of Preparedness transmitted from person to person. We will briefly dis- In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Sub- cuss two of them—anthrax and smallpox—as examples. committee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Anthrax is caused by a bacterium, Bacillus anthracis. Education and Related Agencies, Tommy G. Thomp- Infection can be manifested in three different forms: son, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and inhalational, cutaneous, and gastrointestinal anthrax. Human Services, described our preparedness for a bio- The mortality rate of occupationally acquired cases of logical attack: anthrax in the United States is 89 percent. A 1993 Let me characterize our status this way: we are pre- report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology pared to respond … [September 11] is the first time our Assessment estimated that between 130,000 and 3 mil- emergency response system had been tested at this lion deaths could follow the aerosolized release of 100 kg extreme level, and it responded without a hitch . . . We of anthrax spores upwind of the Washington, D.C., were prepared to move rapidly to contain and treat any area—lethality matching or exceeding that of a hydro- problematic disease . . . Our response encouraged me. gen bomb (OTA, 1999). The military has a vaccine for It should encourage this committee and the Congress. anthrax, but current supplies are limited, production And it should encourage the American public that we capacity is modest, and sufficient quantities of vaccine do have the ability to respond. cannot be made available for civilian use for several years. Depending on the strain, anthrax usually responds However, Thompson also noted, “Granted, we did not to ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or penicillin. However, find any signs of bioterrorism.” anthrax exposed to less than lethal levels of any of these The first sizeable simulation of a national response to a antibiotics is capable of developing resistance. biological attack took place in May 2000. The exercise, Smallpox, a disease caused by the variola major virus, named TOPOFF because it involved top officials from all was declared eradicated from the world as a naturally levels of government, involved a simulated, covert dis- occurring disease in 1997. Routine vaccinations were dis- persal of an aerosol of plague at the Denver Performing continued in the United States in 1972 and in the rest of Arts Center that was discovered three days later when the world by 1979. Thus the vast majority of people plague was first diagnosed among a wave of flu-like cases The 36 BRIDGE that cropped up in the Denver health care system. present significant ethical, political, cultural, opera- On Day 1, a diagnosis of plague was confirmed by a tional, and legal challenges (ANSER, 2001). state laboratory and the Centers for Disease Control Both simulations were based on the assumption that (CDC). By Day 2 there was a state-wide shortage of current stores of antibiotics and vaccines would be effec- ventilators and antibiotics. A federal “push pack” with tive against the biological agent. However, a group of antibiotics and other medical supplies arrived later that researchers in Australia recently demonstrated that this day, but transporting them from the Denver airport assumption may no longer be valid. In an attempt to pro- proved to be problematic. On Day 3 the state borders of duce a contraceptive vaccine for mice using the mouse- Colorado were closed, but the question of feeding the pox virus, scientists discovered that “virus-encoded IL-4 four million inhabitants had not been thoroughly not only suppresses primary antiviral cell-mediated addressed. By the end of that day, overwhelmed by the immune response but also can inhibit the expression of influx of patients, medical care in Denver was begin- immune memory responses” (Jackson et al., 2001). In ning to shut down. On Day 4 there were an estimated other words, the trial substance not only made the dis- 3,700 cases of plague and 950 deaths. At that point, the ease more virulent by suppressing the immune system, simulation was terminated. According to Thomas V. but also rendered the vaccine ineffective. Inglesby, M.D., senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins The results of these and other experiments are wide- Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, “There were ly available because, unlike the work of nuclear physi- ominous signs at the end of the exercise. Disease had cists or cryptographers working on national security, the already spread to other states and countries. Competi- work of biologists is not regulated. As more and more tion between cities for the national pharmaceutical bioengineered bugs are created and tested, information stockpile had already broken out. It had all the charac- about the science (e.g., genomic data) and equipment teristics of an epidemic out of control.” (e.g., DNA sequencers and synthesizers) used to create such organisms is becoming increasingly accessible. Considering the malign uses of data generated in legiti- mate projects, health care and defense experts are rais- We have been lucky so far, ing questions about this easy accessibility. Before we begin to regulate access to data, however, someone must but luck cannot be the determine which data are potentially dangerous (Aldous, 2001). foundation for a public In short, we are not prepared to respond to a biologi- health policy. cal attack. We have been lucky so far, but luck cannot be the foundation for a public health or national security policy. We must seriously rethink the way we approach the whole notion of responding to a biological attack. The next major simulation, in June 2001, called Dark Winter, involved a simulated outbreak of smallpox in The Response Oklahoma City. During the 13 days of the exercise, the Four major challenges were revealed in the TOPOFF disease spread to 25 states and 15 other countries. and Dark Winter exercises: (1) inefficient decision mak- According to the ANSER Institute for Homeland Secu- ing (officials participated in conference calls with 50 to rity, the lessons learned from this exercise were: (1) an 100 people, which was highly inefficient and led to sig- attack on the United States with biological weapons nificant delays in action); (2) lack of coordination of could threaten vital national security interests; (2) cur- emergency management (the absence of predetermined rent organizational structures and capabilities are not guidelines led to chaotic attempts at interagency com- well suited for managing a biowarfare attack; (3) there munication); (3) lack of priorities and logistics for allo- is no surge capability in the U.S. health care and public cating resources (problems were encountered in health systems, the pharmaceutical industry, or the vac- accepting and distributing federal resources at the local cine manufacturing industry; (4) dealing with the media level); and (4) security (especially at health care facili- will be a major, immediate challenge for all levels of ties, for enforcing a quarantine). government; (5) containing the spread of disease will In a real emergency officials will need real-time SPRING 2002 37

information tools that enable them to collect informa- warfare agents. ENCOMPASS created a database of tion and analyze it rapidly. The primary elements of patient health records and matched spikes in certain an effective response to a biological attack must in- clinical symptoms with specific geographic areas. At the clude: (1) detection/diagnosis; (2) quarantine/security; inauguration, it detected a seasonal “outbreak” of the flu (3) resource mobilization/allocation; (4) panic manage- (Pueschel, 2001). ment/media relations; and (5) command and control.

Cybercare Cybercare, a new concept that takes advantage of the Cybercare can be best new technologies, would be able to address all of these elements from the systems level to the specifics. thought of as cyberspace The U.S. Department of Justice tasked the Institute for Security Technology Studies (ISTS) at Dartmouth Col- plus health care. lege to make recommendations for planning a response to bioterrorism as part of its grant to study emerging ter- rorist threats. In January 2001, ISTS organized a confer- Laboratories around the country are trying to develop ence that generated recommendations to strengthen and a portable detector that can diagnose field samples. The supplement public health infrastructure and formulate a Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of national response plan to a terrorist attack. The plan Technology (MIT) is developing a microchip combined would integrate a number of emerging technologies that with mouse B cells to detect individual pathogens collectively became known as “cybercare” (Rosen and (Pescovitz, 2000). Efforts are under way to increase the Lucey, 2001). speed, sensitivity, and cost-effectiveness of such a detec- Cybercare involves telemedicine, telesurgery (Mad- tor. Other laboratories are also experimenting with hani, 1997), telementoring, and distance learning sys- innovative detection/diagnosis devices. tems. It also includes virtual reality simulators, At the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, a augmented reality (Blackwell et al., 1998), datafusion, combined approach called RAPID will be used. The sys- computer patient records, clinical information systems, tem, which was developed by the U.S. Air Force in con- and software intelligent agents. Cybercare can be junction with Idaho Technologies, is a web-based thought of as cyberspace plus health care, a way of surveillance system that analyzes patient records and uses creating an entirely new environment for health care 50-pound, backpack-sized portable laboratories to ana- at a distance. lyze field samples using polymerase chain reaction tech- Detection/Diagnosis. There are two basic ways of nology (Ault, 2001). Someday, large databases managed detecting a biological attack. The first is to analyze epi- by intelligent software agents may be used to predict demiological data; the second is to analyze biological attacks before they happen (Graham-Rowe, 2001). samples in the field. The first was tested at President Quarantine/Security. In the event of a sizeable bio- George W. Bush’s inauguration in January 2001. A attack, some form of quarantine will be necessary. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency major obstacle to imposing a quarantine is political, but (DARPA)-developed software program, known as even if it can be imposed, it will be difficult to enforce. ENCOMPASS (the enhanced consequence manage- Robots could be used for surveillance and, possibly, for ment planning and support system) was used to track enforcement (although we have a long way to go cul- the health conditions of all individuals who were turally for this to happen). Once a quarantine has been treated at area military treatment facilities, Veterans imposed, cybercare will be the most effective way of Affairs medical clinics, civilian hospitals, and first aid bringing in and managing outside resources as will be stations between January 10 and February 4 in Wash- discussed in the next section. ington, D.C., and surrounding counties. Participating Resource Mobilization/Allocation. In June 2001 health care personnel filled out brief forms when seeing another conference was held by ISTS on logistics and patients to note whether they showed any of seven spe- interagency communication in response to a hypothet- cific symptoms or complaints that might be indicative of ical bioterror attack in Hanover, New Hampshire. As outbreaks of illnesses, such as those caused by biological Figure 1 shows, resource mobilization was the primary The 38 BRIDGE

7000 doctors can only offer palliative care and support ther-

6000 apy, patients could reasonably remain at home. Ideally,

5000 remote monitoring could be done by robots, which could bridge the virtual and physical worlds. 4000 Resources Required A robot manipulated remotely could also distribute 3000 Local Resources Responders vaccines or gas masks. A company in Massachusetts,

2000 Federal & State iRobot, has developed robots that can be controlled Resources 1000 over the Internet and outfitted with cameras, as well as

0 an array of sensors. One model, the Cobalt 2, could rev- 01234567891011 Day olutionize videoconferencing by adding the control- lable, physical presence of a robot. Telepresence, as it is FIGURE 1 Assessing the bioterrorist threat. called, enables a remote user to interact with and manipulate a distant environment as though he were challenge. The black line represents the estimated physically present (Lanier, 2001). requirement for personnel in response to a biological incident involving 5,000 casualties infected with tularemia. Although available local resources (dashed line) would respond quickly, they would fall far short of the need, and they would rapidly become less effective from burnout. State and federal resources (gray line) would begin to reach the scene one to two days later. A severe shortage of resources during days five through eight would essentially preclude an effective response and would result in misery and chaos. The late-arriving state and federal personnel could deal with the horren- dous aftermath but would not be involved in the direct response. The aftermath might be comparable to the result of an instantaneous nuclear explosion, and the mounting chaos would unfold before the eyes of the world on CNN for four or more days. Thus, overcoming FIGURE 2 Cybercare system illustrating multiple clinics providing care remotely. the shortfall in resources in days five through eight would be critical to responding effectively to a biologi- Robots are already being tried in search-and-rescue cal incident. Keep in mind that tularemia is not even a operations. Immediately after September 11, 18 experi- contagious agent (Rosen et al., 2001). mental robots were brought to New York from the Uni- The cybercare system would work on a one-to-one versity of South Florida to be used at the World Trade level, bringing together local providers in the affected Center. Although they did not locate any survivors, the areas and distant experts. At the same time, it would work on the highest level, enabling emergency workers to gain control over a large-scale disaster as quickly as possible (Figures 2 and 3). The system would provide real-time simulators for determining, on the run, the best options for deploying available resources. As the TOPOFF exercise showed, it can be much easier to get resources to an area in need (e.g., from Washington, D.C., to the Denver Airport) than to distribute the resources effectively. In the event of a smallpox attack, remote monitoring will be important. To minimize the spread of infection, patients should be isolated in their homes or other non- hospital facilities whenever possible. Considering that FIGURE 3 Telesurgery via satellite using haptics and robotics. SPRING 2002 39

robots were small enough and durable enough to go require a new interface—a three-dimensional virtual places humans and dogs could not go. The robots were space, such as a datacube, perhaps (Figure 4). This same armed with a variety of sensors for locating survivors interface would enable the remote manipulation of the (e.g., heat sensors). In addition, the robots were expend- hot zone. Over time, some parts of the cybercare system, able (Trivendi, 2001). such as robots and intelligent software, would become In a biological crisis, whatever actions can be per- increasingly autonomous. formed remotely should be for several reasons. First, a remotely operated performer can move resources rapidly because it moves through virtual rather than physical space. Second, the operator can simultaneously call upon a large pool of resources regardless of time or place. Finally, the human operator avoids the risk of exposure to the hot zone. As artificial intelligence and other tech- nologies improve, robots will become increasingly cap- able and autonomous. Panic Management/Media Relations. This is the only element of the response to a biological attack that would be largely outside the realm of cybercare. How- ever, to prevent panic outside of the hot zone, the pub- lic must be told what steps are being taken and assured that the situation is (or soon will be) under control. This can be done with effective information gathering and FIGURE 4 Command and control with a virtual datacube. dissemination. To prevent panic within the hot zone, remotely operated robots could perform crucial tasks Command and control would coordinate the activities and minimize rescuer exposure. of competing federal, state, and local agencies, in addi- Command and Control. This is the most important tion to facilitating individual doctor-to-patient remote and complex element of the cybercare system. Indeed, it interactions. Therefore, like the rest of the cybercare sys- is the brains of the whole operation. Cybercare is a tem, command and control would be somewhat decen- matrix that combines a number of different technolo- tralized. The cybercare system would not dictate specific gies in a telecommunications space. Ideally, a seamless connections; rather, it would facilitate intracontinental connection would be maintained between information connections. By condensing time and space, it would technologies connected to the physical world through make possible a faster, broader, more coordinated, and robotics and information technologies connected to the ultimately more effective response to an attack. virtual world. In a cybercare system, these two worlds would be different ways of expressing information tech- The Future nologies, either locally or at a distance. Most of the technologies described so far are either In the cybercare model, sensors would gather infor- available today or will be in a few years. As the system mation from many sources, including robots, software evolves, virtual reality will become the preferred mode agents, human agents, medical records, epidemiological of interaction and will be more closely coupled with data, and resource data to name a few. The information physical reality to create a hybrid, augmented reality. would be conveyed in many forms: voice, data, video, or When telepresence is replaced by teleimmersion, a user a combination of the three. The network ferrying the will have difficulty distinguishing between the local and data must be flexible, redundant, expandable, largely remote environments. The ultimate goal is not to wireless, and allow for high bandwidth; the massive remove humans from the loop but to enable humans to amount of incoming data must be processed continually. use their time and abilities efficiently and to protect To avoid information overload, the data would be fil- them from harm. Robots will become more integrated tered by intelligent software as well as faster-than- into normal society. They might, for example, be hung real-time simulations that could predict the outcomes of on walls, much like fire extinguishers, and, in an emer- certain actions. Manipulating the mass of data will also gency, deploy automatically and act completely The 40 BRIDGE autonomously. Whole cities might someday be covered DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v414/n6861/full/414237a0 in millions of sensors the size of dust particles. Eventu- _fs.html&content_filetype=pdf>. ally nanotechnology will change the rules once again. Ault, A. 2001. Olympics Rapid Response System. Wired 9(11): 4. Also available online at: . We don’t mean to minimize the institutional barriers Blackwell, M., F. Morgan, and A.M. DiGioia III. 1998. Aug- that will have to be overcome for cybercare to become mented reality and its future in orthopaedics. Clinical a reality. As Secretary Thompson said after Septem- Orthopaedics and Related Research 354: 111–122. ber 11, public health is a “national security issue.” The Graham-Rowe, D. 2001. Intelligence analysis software could decentralization of health care delivery will be good for predict attacks. Available online at: . U.S. government. At a similar time in history, Winston Jackson, R.J., A.J. Ramsay, C.D. Christensen, S. Beaton, D.F. Churchill, deeply troubled by England’s lack of prepara- Hall, and I.A. Ramshaw. 2001. Expression of mouse inter- tion for World War II, said, “The responsibility of min- leukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses isters for the public safety is absolute and requires no cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resis- mandate. It is in fact the prime object for which gov- tance to mousepox. Journal of Virology 75: 1205–1210. Also ernments come into existence.” available online at: . els of casualties by spreading a contagious disease or Lanier, J. 2001. Virtually there. Scientific American 284(4): 66–75. Also available online at: . met with a health care system prepared to respond to Madhani, A. 1997. Design of Teleoperated Surgical Instru- worst-case scenarios and provide the surge capacity we ments for Minimally Invasive Surgery. Doctoral thesis, will need in hours, not days. A cybercare system would Massachusetts Institute of Technology. protect the health of Americans, protect our economy, OTA (Office of Technology Assessment). 1999. Proliferation and, ultimately, protect our way of life. The creation of of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk. OTA- this new system will require a large-scale project that ISC-559. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing will certainly be expensive—but not as expensive as Office. Also available online at: . up for in future savings. A cybercare system would take Pescovitz, D. 2000. Bioagent chip: a sensor to detect a biolog- advantage of our strengths and could be developed ical warfare attack in seconds. Scientific American 282(3): rapidly if we start now. 35. Also available online at: . developed for a cybercare system would greatly improve Pueschel, M. 2001. DARPA System Tracked Inauguration for the delivery of everyday health care. Reaching a remote, Attack. Available online at: . remote, rural site, and the technologies for a cybercare Rosen, J., and C. Lucey, eds. 2001. Emerging Technologies: system would greatly increase access to health care. Recommendations for Counter-Terrorism. Hanover, N.H.: Whether it is designed to respond to a nuclear, chemi- Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth Col- cal, or biological attack, a natural disaster, or simply to lege. Also available online at: . cybercare will be our future health care. Rosen, J., R. Gougelet, M. Mughal, and R. Hutchinson. 2001. Conference Report of the Medical Disaster Conference, References June 13–15, 2001. Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth College. ANSER. 2001. Dark Winter: Summary. Available online at: Also available online at: . ~engg005/MedDisaster/>. Aldhous, P. 2001. Biologists urged to address risk of Trivendi, B.P. 2001. Search-and-rescue robots tested at New data aiding bioweapon design. Nature 414: 237–238. York disaster site. Available online at: . Ensuring our cybersecurity will require long-term, innovative basic research.

Cybersecurity

Wm. A. Wulf and Anita K. Jones

Although the nation is at great risk from cyberterrorism, we have virtually no research base on which to build truly secure systems. Moreover, only a tiny cadre of researchers are thinking deeply about long-term solutions to this problem. If the problem were merely a matter of implementing techniques that are known to be adequate, this might not be a serious issue. But the Wm. A. Wulf truth is that we do not know how to build secure computer systems. The only model widely used for cybersecurity is the “perimeter defense” model—which is demonstrably fragile. In fact, for deep theoretical reasons, it is impossible to guarantee that a perimeter-defense system will ever work! To be sure, many immediate problems of cybersecurity can be handled by implementing or enforcing known “best practices”—such as patching software each time a new attack is successful. But solving the fundamental problem will require long-term, innovative basic research. No one knows how vulnerable we really are because the most costly attacks have not been made public. But we are probably a lot more vulnerable than we’d like to be, and maybe more vulnerable than we can survive! Financial cybersystems have been attacked but have not disclosed damage and losses in Anita K. Jones order to preserve an image of their integrity. Military systems have also been

Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. Anita K. Jones is a member of the NAE and the Lawrence R. Quarles Professor of Engineering and Applied Science at the University of Virginia. The 42 BRIDGE attacked, but the most serious attacks have not been dis- every aspect of modern life, and a serious attack could closed. (It has been reported, however, that more than cripple any system, including systems used for an emer- 60 percent of military computers have been compro- gency military deployment, health care delivery, and the mised [GAO, 2001].) We know that national defense generation of electrical power. computers and networks use the same software and hard- The worst-case scenarios are chilling. Consider a ware as the general public—and thus are subject to the really sophisticated attack on our financial systems. same kinds of attacks. In addition, they are a juicy target We’re not talking about a simple virus, or even the theft for sophisticated, state-sponsored intruders who want to of funds; we’re talking about the incapacitation or determine our military preparedness. destruction of parts of an infrastructure on which all To exacerbate things, our legal system prevents the commerce depends. Just imagine a month, a week, or exchange of information about attacks, thus preventing even a day in which no checks are cashed or salaries one organization from learning from the experiences of deposited, no stocks are traded, no credit card purchases others. In anticipation of Y2K problems, Congress are honored or loans processed—in short, a day on passed special legislation enabling corporations to which all commerce comes to a halt. exchange information (and limit liability). But no such But the bottom line is that we don’t know. Publicly legislation has been passed to permit the exchange of reported attacks have been relatively unsophisticated cybersecurity information. Other laws—laws to protect and, although annoying, have not had dire conse- civil liberties, for example—prohibit the exchange of quences. The unreported attacks have been more serious, information among some government agencies. but the details have not been made known to the pub- Although this is an admirable goal, it does make cyber- lic—or, in some cases, even to the responsible public offi- security more difficult. cials. Potential attack scenarios are even worse—but the The bottom line is that no one knows exactly how probability that they will happen is simply not known. vulnerable we are! We can get an idea of the magnitude Our critical systems have many vulnerabilities, rang- of the problem, however, from public information. The ing from errors in software to trusted, but disgruntled, 1997 Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastruc- employees to low-bid software developers outside the ture Protection focused on cybersecurity, although the United States. But the problem goes much deeper. In commission’s charter included power, water, communi- many cases, attackers have found clever ways to com- cations, financial, and other infrastructures. In its bine two or more features of a system in ways the design- report, the commission found that “all our infrastruc- ers had not foreseen. In these cases, undesirable behavior results from correctly implemented software. In addition, software vendors have found that the public is not will- ing to pay for security. Buyers do not choose more secure National defense products over less secure ones, especially if they must pay a premium for them, so venders have not invested in computers are a juicy security. But the overriding, fundamental source of vul- nerability is that we do not have a deep understanding target for sophisticated of the problem or its solution; and little if any research state-sponsored intruders. is being done to develop that understanding. How prepared are we to respond? There are different answers for the short term and the long term, and to some extent there are different answers for the military, tures [are] increasingly dependent on information and the private sector, financial institutions, and other com- communications systems …. [that] dependence is the munities. Unfortunately, the only short-term solution is source of rising vulnerabilities, and therefore, it is where to keep putting our fingers in the dike—to patch holes we concentrated our efforts” (Presidential Commission in systems as we discover them. To be effective, this on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). In other requires that every member of a vast army of system words, all forms of infrastructure are so vulnerable that administrators and users be vigilant. Alas, the evidence the commission decided to all but ignore other vulner- shows that widespread vigilance is extraordinarily hard abilities. Information technology has become crucial to to achieve. SPRING 2002 43

Equally unfortunate, the Internet is essentially a First, like the Maginot Line, it is fragile. In WWII, monoculture—almost all of the computers connected to France fell in 35 days because of its reliance on this it are IBM compatible. Because they use a single operat- model. No matter how formidable the defenses, an ing system and set of applications, a would-be attacker attacker can make an end run around them, and once only has to find a vulnerability in any part of the system inside, can compromise the entire system. Second, the to attack the vast majority of computers connected to model fails to recognize that many security flaws are the network. That is why attacks all seem to spread so “designed in.” In other words, a system may fail by per- rapidly. forming exactly as specified. In 1993, the Naval One of the principal findings of the Presidential Com- mission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was that research and development are not adequate to support infrastructure protection. For historical reasons, no sin- The perimeter defense gle federal funding agency has assumed responsibility for supporting basic research in this area—not the Defense model is dangerously, Advanced Research Projects Agency, not the National even fatally, flawed. Science Foundation, not the U.S. Department of En- ergy, and not the National Security Agency. As a result, only relatively small, sporadic research projects have been funded, and the underlying assumptions on cyber- Research Laboratory did an analysis of some 50 security security that were established in the 1960s mainframe flaws and found that nearly half of them (22) were environment have not be questioned. When funds are designed into the requirements or specifications for cor- scarce, researchers become very conservative, and bold rect system behavior! Third, a perimeter defense cannot challenges to the conventional wisdom are not likely to protect against attacks from inside. If all of our defenses pass peer review. As a result, incrementalism has become are directed outward, we remain vulnerable to the legit- the norm. Thus, no long-term cybersecurity solution has imate insider. Fourth, major damage can be done with- been developed, or even thoroughly investigated. out “penetrating” the system. This was demonstrated by Four critical needs must be met to improve cyber- the distributed denial-of-service attacks on Yahoo and security: other Internet sites two years ago. Simply by flooding the system with false requests for service, it was rendered • the need for a new model to replace the perimeter incapable of responding to legitimate requests. We can defense model be grateful that so far denial-of-service attacks have • the need for a new definition of cybersecurity been directed against Internet sites and not against 911 services in a major city! Fifth, the Maginot Line model • the need for an active defense has never worked! Every system designed with a Mag- • the need for coordinated activities by cyber- inot Line-type notion of security has been compro- communities, legal system, and regulatory systems mised—including the systems the authors built in the 1970s. After 40 years of trying to develop a foolproof sys- A New Model tem, it’s time we realized that we are not likely to suc- Most research on cybersecurity has been based on the ceed. Finally, the perimeter defense cannot work for assumption that the “thing” we need to protect is deep theoretical reasons. Unfortunately, we don’t have “inside” the system. Therefore, we have developed enough space here to explain. Suffice it to say that “firewalls” and other mechanisms to keep “outside” replacing the perimeter defense model of computer attackers from penetrating our defenses and gaining security is long overdue! access to the thing and taking control of the system. This perimeter defense model of computer security— Redefinition of Cybersecurity sometimes called the Maginot Line model—has been The second critical need for cybersecurity is to re- used since the first mainframe operating systems were define “security.” The military definition of security built in the 1960s. Unfortunately, it is dangerously, even emphasizes controlling access to sensitive information. fatally, flawed. This is the basis of the compartmentalized, layered The 44 BRIDGE

(confidential, secret, top secret) classification of infor- information available on the Internet and the speed of mation. A somewhat broader definition of security used modern computers, it has become all but impossible to in the computing research community includes two anticipate how information will be combined or what other notions: “integrity” and “denial of service.” inferences can be drawn from such combinations. Integrity implies that an attacker cannot modify infor- Different information sets stored in the same com- mation in the system. In some cases, medical records puter must be protected differently. The new model of for instance, integrity is much more important than cybersecurity should be appropriate to the context of the secrecy. We may not like it if other people see our user applications for which that information is used. medical records, but we may die if someone alters our The simple model of a “penetration” attack does not allergy profile. Denial of service means that the attack- reflect these realistic security concerns. Hence, analyz- er does not access or modify information but denies ing the vulnerability of a system in terms of the perime- ter defense model is unlikely to reveal its true vulnerabilities. The line between sensitive and Active Defense The third critical need for cybersecurity is for an nonsensitive information is active defense. Not all experts agree, but based on our experience over the past 30 years, we have concluded often blurred in cyberspace. that a passive defense alone will not work. Effective cybersecurity must include some kind of active response—a threat or a cost higher than the attacker is users a service provided by it. This relatively unsophis- willing to pay—to complement the passive defense. ticated form of attack can be used against phone sys- Developing an active defense will be difficult because tems (e.g., 911), financial systems, and, of course, identifying the source of an attack is difficult. The prac- Internet hosts. Because more than 90 percent of mili- tical and legal implications of active defenses have not tary communications are sent via the public telephone been determined, and the opportunities for mistakes are network, attackers might seriously disrupt a military legion. The international implications are especially activity, a deployment say, simply by tying up the phone troublesome. It is difficult, usually impossible, to pin- lines at appropriate bases and logistics centers. point the physical location of an attacker. If it is in Practical definitions of security must be more sophis- another country, a countermeasure by a U.S. govern- ticated than the simple privacy, integrity, and denial of ment computer might even be considered an act of war. service formula, and they must be tailored for each kind Resolving this and related issues will require a thought- of entity—systems for credit cards, medical records, ful approach and careful international diplomacy. We tanks, flight plans, student examinations, and so forth. desperately need long-term basic scholarship in this area. The notion of restricting access to a credit card to indi- viduals with, say, secret clearance is nonsensical. Other Coordinated Activities factors, such as the timing, or at least the temporal order, Any plan of action must also involve a dialog on legal of operations, correlative operations on related objects, issues, the fourth critical need for cybersecurity. At least and so on, are essential concepts for real-world security. two kinds of issues should be addressed soon: (1) issues (It used to be said that the best way to anticipate major raised in cyberspace that do not have counterparts in U.S. military operations was to observe any increases in the physical world; and (2) issues raised by place-based pizza deliveries to the Pentagon). assumptions in current law. The first category includes The military concept of sensitive but unclassified everything from new forms of intellectual property (e.g., information has a counterpart in the cyberworld. databases) to new forms of crime (e.g., spamming). Indeed, the line between sensitive and nonsensitive Issues of particular interest to this discussion are rights information is often blurred in cyberspace. In principle, and limitations on active countermeasures to intru- one must consider how any piece of information might sions—indeed, determining what constitutes an intru- be combined with any other pieces of information to sion. Issues raised by place-based assumptions in current compromise our security. With the vast amount of law include many basic questions. How does the SPRING 2002 45

concept of jurisdiction apply in cyberspace? For tax pur- Achieving these goals will require a guarantee of sus- poses (e.g., sales taxes), where does a cyberspace trans- tained support over a long period of time as an incentive action take place? Where do you draw the line between to researchers to pursue projects in this area. national security and law enforcement? How do you In the past few months, members of the House Sci- apply the concept of posse comitatis? ence Committee have held hearings1 on the state of Not all of these issues are immediately and obviously research on cybersecurity and have introduced three related to cybersecurity. But cyberspace protection is a acts that would provide initial funding for basic research “wedge issue” that will force us to rethink some funda- through the National Science Foundation and the mental ideas about the role of government, the rela- National Institute of Standards and Technology.2 tionship between the public and private sectors, the Although these initiatives are heartening, their full balance between rights of privacy and public safety, and impact will not be felt for a decade or more. Historically, the definition of security. policy makers have not continued to support research The security of our information infrastructure and with such long horizons. However, in the aftermath of other critical infrastructures will be a systems problem, September 11, we are hopeful that Congress is now as well as a significant research challenge. We believe ready to provide stable, long-term funding for this high- that a particular government agency must take on the risk research. mission of revitalizing research in cybersecurity with the following objectives: References GAO (General Accounting Office). 2001. Combating Ter- • the development of wholly new methods of ensuring rorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism information system security Program. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office. • the development of a larger research community in Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec- cybersecurity tion. 1997. Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government • the education of computer system and computer sci- Printing Office. ence majors in cybersecurity at the undergraduate level, which would eventually improve the state of the practice in industry

1 1 For the text of written testimony by Wm. A. Wulf, see the NAE web- site under “News & Events/National Academy of Engineering Counterterrorism Activities.” 2 H.R. 3316 Computer Security Enhancement and Research Act of 2001, H.R. 3394 Cyber Security Research and Development Act, and H.R. 3400 Networking and Information Technology Research Advance- ment Act. The 46 BRIDGE

NAE News and Notes

Class of 2002 Elected

In February the National Aca- University of Minnesota, Min- hydrodynamics and fluid structure demy of Engineering (NAE) elected neapolis, “for important contribu- interaction in the design of harbor, 74 members and 7 foreign associates. tions on the phase behavior of coastal, and offshore structures.” This brings the total U.S. member- polymer blends, particularly block Morris Chang, chairman and ship to 1,857 active members and copolymers.” chief executive officer, Taiwan Semi- 250 members emeriti, and the num- James A. Brierley, chief micro- conductor Manufacturing Company, ber of foreign associates to 158. biologist and chief research scien- Taipei, “for contributions to the Election to the NAE is one of the tist, Newmont Mining Corporation, integrated circuit industry, the cre- highest professional distinctions Englewood, Colorado, “for recog- ation of the pure-foundry business that can be accorded an engineer. nizing the potential of high- model, and the enabling of the Academy membership honors those temperature biomining and for fabless semiconductor industry.” who have made “important contri- innovative industrial biomining Douglas M. Chapin, president butions to engineering theory and practices.” and director, MPR Associates, Inc., practice” and those who have C. Jeffrey Brinker, senior scien- Alexandria, Virginia, “for improve- demonstrated “unusual accomplish- tist, Inorganic Materials Chemistry ments in reliability and the preven- ment in the pioneering of new and Division, Sandia National Labora- tion and mitigation of core damage developing fields of technology.” A tories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, accidents in nuclear reactors world- list of newly elected members and “for outstanding contributions to wide.” foreign associates follows, with their the science of sol-gel processing and Andrew R. Chraplyvy, director, primary affiliations at the time of the invention of porous materials lightwave systems research, Bell Lab- election and a brief statement of with controlled structure.” oratories, Lucent Technologies, their principal engineering accom- Andrew Brown, Jr., director of Holmdel, New Jersey, “for contribu- plishments. engineering, Delphi Automotive tions to the development of high- Systems, Troy, Michigan, “for the capacity optical fiber communication New Members effective planning and integration of systems.” Rakesh Agrawal, chief engineer, large-scale, highly diverse research Joseph M. Colucci, president, process synthesis, Air Products and and engineering activities.” Automotive Fuels Consulting, Inc., Chemicals, Inc., Allentown, Penn- Joe C. Campbell, Cockrell Family Clarkston, Michigan, “for leadership sylvania, “for contributions to the Regents Chair in Engineering, Uni- at the ‘fuel/vehicle system’ interface development and worldwide imple- versity of Texas at Austin, “for con- leading to improved automotive fuel mentation of high-efficiency and tributions to the development of and vehicle quality and reduced high-purity cryogenic and noncryo- high-speed, low-noise avalanche emissions.” genic gas separation processes.” photodiodes.” Ross B. Corotis, chair, Depart- William F. Banholzer, vice presi- Michael J. Carey, technical ment of Civil Engineering, Univer- dent, global technology, GE Plastics, director, FrameWork Development sity of Colorado, Boulder, “for the Pittsfield, Massachusetts, “for break- Division, BEA Systems, Inc., San application of probabilistic model- throughs in stealth materials and Jose, California, “for contributions ing in design, new methods of relia- contributions to the isotope effect in to the design, implementation, and bility assessment and optimization solid-state physics and for business evaluation of database systems.” of structures, and innovations in leadership.” Subrata K. Chakrabarti, presi- engineering education.” Frank S. Bates, professor and dent, Offshore Structure Analysis, Henry Cox, chief scientist and head, Department of Chemical Inc., Plainfield, Illinois, “for major senior vice president, ORINCON Engineering and Materials Science, contributions to the field of Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, SPRING 2002 47

“for outstanding contributions to Farouk El-Baz, professor and industrial ecology, particularly for the performance of U.S. Navy director, Center for Remote Sens- improved methods of life-cycle sonars and the development of ing, Boston University, “for select- analysis.” undersea acoustic superiority.” ing the landing sites for the Apollo William H. Hansmire, principal, John H. Crawford, director of missions and for pioneering methods Jacobs Associates, San Francisco, microprocessor architecture, Intel of discovering subsurface freshwater California, “for pioneering leader- Corporation, Santa Clara, Califor- from space observations.” ship in the integration of the design nia, “for the architectural design of Robert E. Fontana, Jr., research and construction of tunneling pro- widely used microprocessors.” staff member, IBM Almaden jects, including the first design-build John C. Crittenden, Presidential Research Center, San Jose, Califor- demonstration project for the U.S. Professor, Department of Civil nia, “for contributions to micro- Department of Transportation.” and Environmental Engineering, fabrication techniques for the Ronald K. Hanson, chair, Depart- Michigan Technological University, manufacture of thin-film storage ment of Mechanical Engineering, Houghton, “for the development devices.” Stanford University, Stanford, Cali- of theory and the application of Howard Frank, dean, College of fornia, “for the development and processes for removing toxic organic Business and Management, Univer- application of innovative laser diag- compounds from air and drinking sity of Maryland, College Park, “for nostics and sensors in the fields of water.” contributions to the design and combustion, chemical kinetics, and Edward L. Cussler, Institute of analysis of computer communica- power conversion.” Technology Distinguished Professor tion networks.” Alan J. Heeger, professor, Insti- of Chemical Engineering, Univer- Robert W. Galvin, chairman of tute for Polymers and Organic sity of Minnesota, Minneapolis, “for the Executive Committee, Motorola, Solids, University of California, pioneering research on membrane Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois, “for lead- Santa Barbara, “for cofounding the transport in chemical and biochem- ership in the commercialization of field of conducting polymers and for ical separation and for inspiring innovative electronics technologies pioneering work in making these teaching.” and for advancing the principles of novel materials available for tech- Ruth A. David, president and Total Quality Management.” nological applications.” chief executive officer, ANSER, Jacques S. Gansler, professor and Martin E. Hellman, professor Arlington, Virginia, “for pioneering Roger C. Lipitz Chair, Center for emeritus of electrical engineering, the use of digital information tech- Public Policy and Private Enterprise, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali- nologies for testing, simulations, School of Public Affairs, University fornia, “for contributions to the the- information processing, and telecom- of Maryland, College Park, “for pub- ory and practice of cryptography.” munications for high-capacity, high- lic and private leadership in the U.S. W.S. Winston Ho, professor, reliability applications.” Department of Defense and major Department of Chemical and Mate- Robert E. Dickinson, professor, contributions in teaching missile rials Engineering, University of Ken- earth and atmospheric sciences, guidance and control systems.” tucky, Lexington, “for the invention Georgia Institute of Technology, Fred W. Glover, professor of and commercialization of novel sep- Atlanta, “for pioneering contribu- systems science, Leeds School of aration technologies and the devel- tions to a wide range of topics in Business, University of Colorado, opment of new theoretical models atmospheric dynamics and earth sys- Boulder, “for contributions to opti- for membrane separations.” tem modeling.” mization modeling, and algorithmic Berthold K.P. Horn, professor, Bonnie J. Dunbar, assistant direc- development, and for solving prob- Department of Electrical Engi- tor for university research and affairs, lems in distribution, planning, and neering and Computer Science, NASA Johnson Space Center, design.” Massachusetts Institute of Technol- Houston, Texas, “for personal leader- Thomas E. Graedel, professor of ogy, Cambridge, “for contributions ship and significant contributions to industrial ecology, Yale University, to computer vision, including the solution of engineering design New Haven, Connecticut, “for out- the recovery of three-dimensional problems in human space flight and standing contributions to the engi- geometry from image intensities.” to on-orbit operations.” neering theory and practice of Roland N. Horne, professor and The 48 BRIDGE chair, Department of Petroleum concepts for modeling coupled Bernard S. Meyerson, IBM fellow Engineering, Stanford University, chemical and physical phenomena and vice president, IBM Thomas J. Stanford, California, “for inno- in engine combustion and high- Watson Research Center, Yorktown vations in the development of temperature flows.” Heights, New York, “for the devel- techniques for the testing and opti- Kenneth H. Keller, director, Cen- opment of low temperature epitaxy mization of petroleum reservoirs.” ter for Science, Technology, and Pub- of SiGe for the fabrication of hetero- Edward E. Horton, president, lic Affairs, and professor of chemical junction, bipolar, integrated circuits Deepwater Technologies, Houston, engineering and materials science, for telecommunications.” Texas, “for innovative contributions University of Minnesota, Minneapo- A. Stephen Morse, professor of to the development of systems and lis, “for leadership in applying quan- electrical engineering, Yale Univer- structures for oil drilling and pro- titative engineering analysis to sity, New Haven, Connecticut, “for duction in very deep water.” vascular transport and artificial organ contributions to geometric control Evelyn L. Hu, professor, electri- design and in public policy.” theory, adaptive control, and the cal and computer engineering, Uni- Chung K. (Ed) Law, Robert H. stability of hybrid systems.” versity of California, Santa Barbara, Goddard Professor, Department of Brij M. Moudgil, professor of “for contributions to the processing Aerospace and Mechanical Engi- materials science and engineering, of semiconductor structures and neering, Princeton University, and director, Engineering Research devices.” Princeton, New Jersey, “for prolific Center for Particle Science and Klavs F. Jensen, Lammot duPont and outstanding contributions to the Technology, University of Florida, Professor of Chemical Engineering understanding of the fundamentals Gainesville, “for advances in min- and professor of materials science of combustion processes and theory eral processing through innovations and engineering, Massachusetts and their applications in propulsion in selective polymer and surfac- Institute of Technology, Cambridge, systems.” tant coatings and for professional “for fundamental contributions to David M. Lederman, president leadership.” multiscale chemical reaction engi- and chief executive officer, ABIO- Gérard A. Mourou, A.D. Moore neering with important applications MED, Inc., Danvers, Massachusetts, Distinguished University Professor to microelectronic materials process- “for designing, developing, and of Electrical Engineering and ing and microreactor technology.” commercializing heart failure assist Computer Science, University of James T. Kajiya, assistant director and heart replacement devices, and Michigan, Ann Arbor, “for the of research, Microsoft Corporation, for leadership in engineering science introduction of the chirped pulse Redmond, Washington, “for contri- education.” amplification technique enabling butions to formal and practical meth- Mark J. Levin, chief executive high-intensity lasers.” ods of computer image generation.” officer, Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Cherry A. Murray, senior vice Adib K. Kanafani, Edward G. and Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, “for president, physical sciences research, John R. Cahill Professor of Civil contributions to animal cell bio- Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technolo- Engineering and chairman, Depart- process scale-up, and for entrepre- gies, Murray Hill, New Jersey, “for ment of Civil and Environmental neurial leadership in biotechnology, seminal work on order-disorder tran- Engineering, University of Califor- specifically genomics.” sitions in colloidal systems, and for nia, Berkeley, “for significant contri- Bede Liu, professor, Department leadership in bringing new concepts butions to national and international of Electrical Engineering, Princeton from research to production.” air transportation, development of University, Princeton, New Jersey, Thomas M. Murray, Montague- U.S. research on intelligent trans- “for contributions to the analysis Betts Professor of Structural Steel portation, and the education of and implementation of digital signal Design, Virginia Polytechnic Insti- transportation professionals.” processing algorithms.” tute and State University, Blacks- James C. Keck, Ford Professor of Alan G. MacDiarmid, Blanchard burg, “for leadership in developing Engineering Emeritus and senior Professor of Chemistry, University criteria for floor serviceability and lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, “for major contributions to structural- Technology, Cambridge, “for devel- the codiscovery and development of steel design engineering practice.” oping innovative, widely used new conductive polymers.” Gordon C. Osbourn, senior SPRING 2002 49

scientist and team leader, vision “for contributions to microwave and resulting in improved performance science, pattern recognition, and laser technologies and the medical and pollution control.” multisensor algorithms, Sandia applications of these technologies.” David W. Thompson, chairman National Laboratories, Albu- Murray B. Sachs, Massey Profes- of the board, president, and chief querque, New Mexico, “for originat- sor and director, Whitaker Biomed- executive officer, Orbital Sciences ing the field of strained-layer ical Engineering Institute, Johns Corporation, Dulles, Virginia, “for superlattices and related structures, Hopkins University, Baltimore, technical leadership in the concep- which has led to revolutionary Maryland, “for contributions to the tion and realization of small, flexible advances in electronics and opto- understanding of the neural encod- launch systems and spacecraft.” electronics.” ing and signal processing of complex Moshe Y. Vardi, professor, Christos H. Papadimitriou, sounds and for leadership in bio- Department of Computer Science, chairman, Computer Science Divi- engineering education.” Rice University, Houston, Texas, sion, Department of Electrical Engi- Edmund O. Schweitzer III, pres- “for contributions to the formal ver- neering and Computer Science, ident, Schweitzer Engineering Labo- ification of hardware and software University of California, Berkeley, ratories, Inc., Pullman, Washington, correctness.” “for contributions to complexity “for technical innovation in power Kenneth L. Walker, vice presi- theory, database theory, and combi- system protection and technology dent, Specialty Fiber Devices Busi- natorial optimization.” transfer leading to the commercial- ness Unit, and chief technical Neil E. Paton, chief technology ization of products in the electric officer, Network Cable Systems, advisor, Liquidmetal Technologies, power industry.” Lucent Technologies, Somerset, Lake Forest, California, “for contri- William A. Sirignano, professor New Jersey, “for innovation and butions to the development of of mechanical and aerospace engi- leadership in the fundamental advanced aluminum and high- neering, University of California, understanding and process develop- temperature alloys for aerospace Irvine, “for contributions to the sci- ment for optical fibers and fiber applications.” ence and technology of spray com- devices.” P. Hunter Peckham, professor of bustion systems for propulsion.” Warren M. Washington, senior biomedical engineering, Case West- Richard M. Stallman, president scientist and head, Climate Change ern Reserve University, Cleveland, and founder, Free Software Founda- Research Section, National Center Ohio, “for developing implantable tion, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, neuroprostheses to restore move- “for starting the GNU project, which Colorado, “for pioneering the ment and independent function to produced influential, nonproprietary development of coupled climate paralyzed individuals.” software tools, and for founding the models, their use on parallel super- Stephen M. Pollock, professor free software movement.” computing architectures, and their and past chair, Department of Indus- Subra Suresh, professor and head, interpretation.” trial and Operations Engineering, Department of Materials Science and Elaine J. Weyuker, technology University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Engineering, Massachusetts Institute leader, AT&T Labs-Research, Flor- “for contributions to the education, of Technology, Cambridge, “for the ham Park, New Jersey, “for contribu- science, and analysis of public and development of mechanical behavior tions to software testing, reliability, private sector operational systems.” theory and experiment for advanced and measurement and for the devel- Buddy D. Ratner, professor and materials and applications and for opment of mathematical founda- director, Engineered Biomaterials demonstrating fruitful new avenues tions for software testing.” Center, University of Washington, for structural study.” Donald C. Winter, president and Seattle, “for contributions to the Rodney J. Tabaczynski, direc- chief executive officer, TRW Systems, understanding of the surface inter- tor, Powertrain and Vehicle Reston, Virginia, “for pioneering con- actions of biological molecules and Research, Ford Research Laboratory, tributions to high-powered laser tech- cells with medical implants.” Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, nology and defense applications.” Arye Rosen, distinguished mem- Michigan, “for major contributions M. Gordon Wolman, professor, ber, technical staff, Sarnoff Cor- to the understanding of processes Department of Geography and poration, Princeton, New Jersey, in internal combustion engines Environmental Engineering, Johns The 50 BRIDGE

Hopkins University, Baltimore, ences and Engineering, and professor Department of Computer Science, Maryland, “for outstanding contribu- of systems engineering, The Aus- Princeton University, Princeton, tions in fluvial processes, water tralian National University, Can- New Jersey, “for contributions resources management and policy, berra, “for contributions to system to software and to programming and environmental education.” and control theory and for interna- languages.” Stephen Wozniak, Unuson Cor- tional leadership in promoting engi- Maria-Regina Kula, professor poration, and cofounder, Apple neering science and technology.” and director, Institute of Enzyme Computer, Inc., Los Gatos, Califor- J. David Embury, professor, Technology, Heinrich Heine Uni- nia, “for the invention and develop- Department of Materials Engineer- versity Düsseldorf, Jülich, Germany, ment of the first mass-produced ing, McMaster University, Hamilton, “for contributions to the under- personal computer.” Ontario, Canada, “for outstanding standing and practice of enzyme- contributions to fundamental structure/ based chemical processes and Foreign Associates mechanical-property relations of protein separations.” Hiroyuki Abe, president, Tohoku materials and their applications.” University, Sendai, Japan, “for out- Vladimir E. Fortov, academician Norbert Peters, professor, Center standing contributions in the ex- and vice president, Russian Acad- for Turbulence Research, Stanford traction of geothermal energy and emy of Sciences, Moscow, “for pio- University, Stanford, California, leadership in the development of neering research of hot, dense matter “for contributions to the field of nondestructive evaluation and elec- under extreme conditions, and for combustion modeling of turbulent tronic packaging techniques.” reforming and energizing engineer- flames and the development of Brian D.O. Anderson, director of ing in Russia’s civilian sector.” chemical kinetic mechanisms for research, School of Information Sci- Brian W. Kernighan, professor, hydrocarbon oxidation.”

2003 Election Timetable

2002 June 7 December 6–7 February 20 DEADLINE for receipt of reference Committee on Membership meet- forms for new nominations for mem- ing at the Beckman Center, Irvine, Nomination packets available from bership in 2003 California the NAE Membership Office July 3 April 12 2003 Member Comments packets mailed January 3 DEADLINE for receipt of revised to all members 2002 nominations and reference Ballot book mailed to all active July 31 NAE members materials for candidates eligible for DEADLINE for receipt of Member membership in 2003 January 30 Comments materials DEADLINE for receipt of ballots May 10 October 5 February 14 DEADLINE for receipt of new nom- Peer Committee meetings in Wash- Class of 2003 election press release inations for membership in 2003 ington, D.C. and 2004 election Quick Reference Guide mailed SPRING 2002 51

NAE Thanks Donors

create a national prize for innovation the media to help shape the nation’s in engineering and technology edu- response to terrorism. We are also cation. Bernie’s gift is a major com- grateful to Ruben Mettler for sup- ponent of our nascent program in porting our collaboration with the engineering education. Because Foundation for American Commu- young, well trained engineers are nications (FACS), which conducted essential to the continued technical a valuable media-relations training and economic health and progress of session at this year’s Annual Meet- our nation, the NAE has taken a par- ing. Earlier this month, FACS and ticular interest in improving engi- the NAE cosponsored a one-day Sheila E. Widnall neering education. In response to conference for managing editors of growing concerns about the steady newspapers, radio, and television The National Academy of Engi- decline in engineering enrollments, stations throughout the eastern neering has just ended the best fund- the NAE hopes to ensure the vitality United States. raising year in its history. On our way and currency of the engineering edu- In the next six months, every to a 2001 goal of $18 million, the cation enterprise. NAE member will be asked as part NAE received new gifts of more than Private philanthropy is also of the National Academies cam- $15.4 million from members, friends, allowing us to increase our program paign to consider making a multi- and corporations on our way to a activities without adding large num- year pledge to the NAE. I encourage campaign goal of $65 million. bers of permanent staff. This year, you to begin thinking now about the Since September 11, private phil- Thomas V. Jones provided funds for potential impact your gift could anthropy has become more impor- a new fellowship in the NAE Pro- have on the NAE and the national tant to us than ever. The NAE has gram Office, allowing us to recruit engineering enterprise. I hope you drawn on unrestricted funds to con- an outstanding senior executive to will join me and many other NAE vene a closed meeting of policy lead one of our new initiatives. With members in becoming part of the experts and to initiate programs in Tom’s gift, and an accumulation of Academy’s Golden Bridge Society, advance of specific government other donations, endowment funds, which recognizes members who con- requests. We have also continued to and contract funds, we now have tribute $20,000 or more. work on other important projects, seven fellows and senior scholars. Wm. A. Wulf, the NAE Council, including new programs in engi- These experienced professionals are and I do not make these requests neering education, energy policy, providing leadership in programs lightly. To increase the NAE’s impact public and media awareness, and related to Department of Defense and visibility, we must have funds to health care delivery. None of these R&D, advances in nanotechnology, support self-initiated program activi- programs would be possible without the role of ethics in engineering, ties, and we must create an endow- the generous donations of 462 NAE new approaches to risk manage- ment to support future activities. We members to the Annual Fund in ment, and counterterrorism. thank you for your contributions in 2001. (Contributors are listed on Another program supported by 2001 and look forward to your con- pages 52–56.) New gifts for NAE contributions from NAE members is tinuing support in 2002. programs totaled $551,000. Our goal the Public Understanding of Engi- for 2002 is to increase that figure to neering Program. Drawing on a grant at least $600,000, with 30 percent of from the Elizabeth and Stephen D. NAE members participating. Bechtel, Jr., Foundation, we hired The largest gift (and the largest our first media and public relations gift in the National Academies cam- specialist, Randy Atkins. Randy is Sheila E. Widnall, NAE Vice President paign) in 2001 was a $10 million already making sure that the NAE is Institute Professor commitment by Bernard Gordon to providing engineering expertise to Massachusetts Institute of Technology The 52 BRIDGE

National Section 8 Section 2 Rosette Society Academy of Jordan J. Baruch Dane A. Miller Members and friends who Engineering George B. Rathmann contributed $5,000 or more $100,000 to to the National Academies Section 3 2001 Private $999,999 in 2001 Section 1 W. Kenneth Davis Contributions Robert C. Forney Section 1 William F. Ballhaus, Sr. Gerald D. Laubach Holt Ashley Because of the disruption in Thomas V. Jones Michael P. Ramage Norman R. Augustine mail service in Washing- Ruben F. Mettler Warren G. Schlinger Daniel J. Fink ton, D.C., the NAE is still Robert H. Wertheim Robert J. Hermann receiving gifts with Octo- Section 4 Section 2 Thomas V. Jones ber, November, and Decem- Edgar J. Garbarini ber 2001 postmarks. If you Alejandro Zaffaroni Ruben F. Mettler Charles J. Pankow George E. Mueller mailed a gift and have Section 3 Ivan M. Viest not been included on this Jack S. Parker William L. Friend list, please contact the Section 5 Allen E. Puckett Development Office at Section 5 C. Gordon Bell Eberhardt Rechtin Brian H. Rowe 202-334-2431 or giving@ John A. Armstrong Erich Bloch H. Guyford Stever nationalacademies.org. A Anita K. Jones Lewis M. Branscomb Peter B. Teets final version of this list will Kenneth H. Olsen Section 6 Robert H. Wertheim be available later in 2002. Wm. A. Wulf William F. Allen, Jr. Sheila E. Widnall Golden Bridge Society Section 7 E. Linn Draper, Jr. Edward Woll Harold K. Forsen The Golden Bridge Society C. Kumar N. Patel Section 2 recognizes the generosity of John W. Landis Section 8 Dane A. Miller current members who have Section 7 Van C. Mow made cumulative contribu- Robert A. Pritzker Kenneth G. McKay Leo J. Thomas tions of $20,000 or more, as Section 11 Morris Tanenbaum well as planned gifts of any Section 3 Richard M. Morrow Gary L. Tooker size made prior to January William L. Friend 2002. This list is organized by Section 12 Section 8 Gerald D. Laubach gift level. George M.C. Fisher Robert A. Charpie Michael P. Ramage Simon Ramo W. Dale Compton Warren G. Schlinger $1,000,000 or more Donald N. Frey Arnold F. Stancell $20,000 to $99,999 Trevor O. Jones Section 1 Section 4 Section 1 Charles E. Reed Norman R. Augustine Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr. William A. Anders Henry M. Rowan Harry E. Bovay, Jr. Section 3 Holt Ashley Section 10 Charles J. Pankow Arnold O. Beckman Daniel J. Fink Robert J. Eaton Ralph Landau Richard L. Garwin Section 5 Simon Ostrach James N. Krebs John A. Armstrong Section 4 Jack S. Parker Section 11 Lewis M. Branscomb Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr. Allen E. Puckett Thomas D. Barrow Gerald P. Dineen Section 7 Eberhardt Rechtin Charles M. Geschke Brian H. Rowe Section 12 Bernard M. Gordon Anita K. Jones Robert C. Seamans, Jr. William W. Lang William R. Hewlett* Robert E. Kahn H. Guyford Stever Robert M. White Gordon E. Moore Wm. A. Wulf Sheila E. Widnall

* Recently deceased SPRING 2002 53

Section 6 Bradford W. Parkinson Section 7 Richard P. Simmons William F. Allen, Jr. Courtland D. Perkins Frederick T. Andrews Johannes Weertman E. Linn Draper, Jr. Theodore H.H. Pian David K. Barton Julia R. Weertman John W. Landis Robert C. Seamans, Jr. John M. Cioffi Albert R.C. Westwood Malcolm R. Currie Section 7 Section 2 Section 10 C. Chapin Cutler Edmund Y.S. Chao Francois J. Castaing Bernard M. Gordon Delores M. Etter Robert M. Nerem Stephen H. Crandall Donald R. Scifres Thomas E. Everhart George B. Rathmann Edward E. Hagenlocker Gary L. Tooker G. David Forney, Jr. Hardy W. Trolander Kenneth E. Haughton Joseph W. Goodman Section 8 Daniel I. C. Wang Yao Tzu Li Paul E. Gray Jordan J. Baruch Frederick F. Ling Section 3 Hermann K. Gummel Robert A. Charpie Simon Ostrach David A. Hodges Robert A. Pritzker Andreas Acrivos Donald E. Petersen Thomas Kailath Henry M. Rowan Charles R. Cutler Frank E. Pickering James U. Lemke Robert C. Forney Bernard I. Robertson Section 9 Lester C. Krogh John G. Linvill George A. Roberts Gerald D. Laubach James G. McGroddy Section 11 Dale F. Stein John P. Longwell William J. Perry Thomas D. Barrow James F. Mathis Dennis J. Picard Harry M. Conger Section 10 Walter L. Robb Joseph E. Rowe Thomas V. Falkie David Japikse William B. Russel William G. Shepherd Douglas W. Fuerstenau Section 11 John J. Wise Raymond S. Stata William A. Griffith Gunter Stein Michel T. Halbouty Richard M. Morrow Section 4 Andrew J. Viterbi G. Frank Joklik Section 12 Clyde N. Baker, Jr. Paul K. Weimer Jack E. Little George M.C. Fisher Paul H. Gilbert Eugene Wong John Neerhout, Jr. Delon Hampton Samuel C. Florman Section 8 Franklin M. Orr, Jr. Theodore C. Kennedy Robert M. Sneider Paul A. Allaire Charter Society Charles C. Ladd Richard J. Stegemeier Donald C. Burnham Members and friends who Thomas S. Maddock John E. Swearingen W. Dale Compton contributed between $1,000 James K. Mitchell Lee L. Davenport Section 12 and $4,999 to the National Norman A. Nadel Michael Field Academies in 2001 Richard J. Robbins Clarence R. Allen Alan M. Voorhees Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. Harold Brown Section 1 James F. Lardner James J. Duderstadt Section 5 Malcolm J. Abzug William L. Maxwell Dean Kamen Laurence J. Adams Paul Baran Donald E. Procknow Ronald K. Leonard Richard E. Adams Barry W. Boehm Linda S. Sanford John R. Moore Oliver C. Boileau Ruth M. Davis Maxine L. Savitz William F. Powers Robert F. Sproull James R. Burnett Section 9 Simon Ramo Joseph V. Charyk Willis H. Ware Ernest T. Smerdon Craig R. Barrett Hsien K. Cheng Section 6 Lance A. Davis Friends Steven D. Dorfman Roy H. Beaton Raymond F. Decker David R. Heebner Richard Atkinson Philip R. Clark Mary L. Good James N. Krebs Kristine Bueche Harold K. Forsen Doris Kuhlmann-Wilsdorf Hans W. Liepmann Robert W. Galvin John G. Kassakian Frank W. Luerssen Alan M. Lovelace James F. Hichman Chauncey Starr Robert D. Maurer John L. McLucas Louise Stever Henry E. Stone Rustum Roy Norman F. Parker Willis S. White, Jr. The 54 BRIDGE

Other Individual Robert Plonsey Paul C. Jennings Cordell Reed Donors John T. Watson James O. Jirsa Neil E. Todreas Members and friends who William D. Young Herbert S. Levinson Alvin W. Trivelpiece Robert C. Marini Gregory S. Vassell contributed up to $999 to the Section 3 National Academies in 2001 Bryant Mather John J. Vithayathil John E. Anderson Hudson Matlock Harvey A. Wagner Section 1 John L. Anderson Charles C. Noble J. Ernest Wilkins, Jr. Lew Allen, Jr. P.L. Thibaut Brian Daniel A. Okun Bertram Wolfe Neil A. Armstrong Nai Y. Chen Charles R. O’Melia Section 7 Irving L. Ashkenas Morton M. Denn Karl S. Pister Franklin H. Blecher Seymour M. Bogdonoff James R. Fair Jerome L. Sackman Robert C. Gunness Esther M. Conwell Alan C. Brown Reuben Samuels Sheldon E. Isakoff Douglass D. Crombie Robert P. Caren Henry G. Schwartz, Jr. Edward G. Jefferson Nicholas M. Donofrio Earl H. Dowell Hsieh W. Shen James R. Katzer Irwin Dorros Robert E. Fischell Franklin F. Snyder Riki Kobayashi Dean E. Eastman George J. Gleghorn Kenneth H. Stokoe II Johanna M.H. Peter Elias* David G. Hoag James M. Symons Levelt Sengers Alan B. Fowler George W. Jeffs Robert V. Whitman Paul G. Kaminski Edward A. Mason Charles A. Fowler Don R. Kozlowski Walter G. May Section 5 Elmer G. Gilbert Paul A. Libby Alfred Saffer Fernando J. Corbato Jerrier A. Haddad Peter W. Likins William R. Schowalter Edward A. Feigenbaum Robert C. Hansen Robert G. Loewy Shirley E. Schwartz Robert S. Hahn David C. Hogg Hans Mark Reuel Shinnar Aravind K. Joshi Amos E. Joel, Jr. Russell G. Meyerand, Jr. Charles R. Wilke Barbara H. Liskov Howard S. Jones, Jr. Angel G. Jordan Angelo Miele Section 4 Joel Moses Joseph Miller John R. Rice Ivan P. Kaminow David P. Billington Rene H. Miller Mischa Schwartz Jack S. Kilby Wilson V. Binger Steven J. Wallach Humboldt W. Leverenz Dale D. Myers Jack E. Buffington James G. O’Connor Ralph A. Logan George Bugliarello Section 6 William H. Pickering John C. McDonald L.G. Byrd John G. Anderson Anatol Roshko Kenneth G. McKay Jack V. Christiansen David H. Archer William R. Sears Alan L. McWhorter Frederick J. Clarke Wm. H. Arnold Maurice E. Shank David Middleton John L. Cleasby John W. Batchelor Irving T. Waaland James J. Mikulski G. Wayne Clough Manson Benedict John D. Warner Albert Narath Richard A. Conway W. Spencer Bloor Marshall I. Nathan A. Thomas Young Don U. Deere Ben T. Zinn James D. Callen Jacques I. Pankove Albert A. Dorman Frederick J. Ellert R. Fabian W. Pease Section 2 Carroll H. Dunn Ralph S. Gens Robert H. Rediker James B. Bassingthwaighte John W. Fisher Charles H. Holley Walter A. Rosenblith J.H.U. Brown Gerard F. Fox Richard T. Lahey, Jr. Steven B. Sample Thomas F. Budinger E. Montford Fucik Thomas H. Lee* Roland W. Schmitt Lewis S. Edelheit Theodore V. Galambos Ludwig F. Lischer William F. Schreiber James Gillin Ben C. Gerwick, Jr. Harry Mandil Freeman D. Shepherd Adam Heller William J. Hall James J. Markowsky Arnold H. Silver Donald L. Johnson Donald G. Iselin Warren F. Miller, Jr. Jack M. Sipress Raphael Katzen Jeremy Isenberg Peter Murray Simon M. Sze Wilfred D. Iwan Robert B. Jansen * Recently deceased * Recently deceased SPRING 2002 55

Lewis M. Terman William R. Prindle Section 12 Bechtel, Jr., Foundation Charles H. Townes Nathan E. Promisel David Atlas Berwind Corporation Max T. Weiss Rangaswamy Srinivasan Ken Austin The Boeing Company Irwin Welber Edgar A. Starke, Jr. Arthur B. Baggeroer The Buffalo News John R. Whinnery Robert H. Wagoner Floyd Dunn Concepts NREC, Inc. Robert M. White Consolidated Edison Section 8 Helen T. Edwards Robert A. Frosch Company of New Jack L. Blumenthal Section 10 John H. Gibbons York, Inc. Geoffrey Boothroyd H. Norman Abramson Carl W. Hall Cummins, Inc. Don B. Chaffin Ronald J. Adrian DaimlerChrysler Robert P. Clagett Howard R. Hart, Jr. William G. Agnew Corporation Ralph L. Disney Eugenia Kalnay Charles A. Amann Delphi Automotive John S. Foster, Jr. Max A. Kohler Louis F. Coffin, Jr. Systems James Hillier William W. Lang James W. Dally The Dow Chemical Joseph M. Juran Robert C. Lanphier III George J. Dvorak Company Eugene S. Meieran Louis J. Lanzerotti Fazil Erdogan E.I. du Pont de Nemours M. Eugene Merchant Margaret A. LeMone Nancy D. Fitzroy & Company Gerald Nadler Christopher L. Magee Ronald L. Geer Duke Energy Corporation George L. Nemhauser Duncan T. Moore Werner Goldsmith Eastman Kodak Company Joseph H. Newman Richard K. Moore William A. Gross GE Fund F. Stan Settles Stuart O. Nelson Carl G. Langner General Electric James M. Tien Wesley L. Nyborg Robert W. Mann Company Paul E. Torgersen Frank L. Parker Roberta J. Nichols General Motors Howard S. Turner J. Randolph Paulling Ronald F. Probstein Corporation William L. Wearly Emil Pfender Allen F. Rhodes Japan Science and Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. Owen M. Phillips Jerome G. Rivard Technology Corporation Robert J. Serafin Section 9 Warren M. Rohsenow Lockheed Martin Herman E. Sheets Ascher H. Shapiro Corporation Hubert I. Aaronson Charles P. Spoelhoef Peter G. Simpkins Lucent Technologies, Inc. John C. Angus Richard G. Strauch The Marmon Group, Inc. Donald J. Blickwede Beno Sternlicht Gerald F. Tape Microsoft Corporation Harvey Brooks Charles E. Taylor Valerian I. Tatarskii Harry G. Drickamer Motorola Foundation Charles M. Vest Wilford F. Weeks Edith M. Flanigen Ohio University Raymond Viskanta Robert M. White Norman A. Gjostein Phillips Petroleum Section 11 David A. Woolhiser Julius J. Harwood Company Siegfried S. Hecker Frank F. Aplan Friends Raytheon Company John P. Hirth Grigory I. Barenblatt Matthew Scott Cottle Stratford Foundation William J. Koros Robert F. Bauer The Teagle Foundation, Alan Lawley Robert R. Beebe Corporations, Foundations, Inc. William J. MacKnight Lawrence B. Curtis and Other Organizations Texas Utilities Company David W. McCall George J. Hirasaki American Electric Power TRW Inc. Bruce S. Old William C. Maurer Company, Inc. United Technologies Harold W. Paxton Thomas K. Perkins AT&T Corporation Corporation Alan W. Pense Henry H. Rachford, Jr. AT&T Foundation Verizon Foundation R. Byron Pipes Robert J. Weimer Elizabeth and Stephen D. Xerox Corporation The 56 BRIDGE

The Safety of Our Water Systems Excerpts from Testimony before the House Science Committee

What elements of the water system chemicals, even if not directly are most vulnerable to physical damage, harmful, could cause panic and great and how can we protect them? Dams economic disruption. Who would and aqueducts and pumping stations want to consume water to which that capture and convey water over low levels of lead or cyanide had long distances are especially vulner- been added? Biological agents, and able to physical damage. But even especially their toxins, could be water supplies taken from rivers or harmful at very low levels. Fewer lakes may be vulnerable if intakes than 10 spores or protozoan oocysts are damaged. The control of access of some pathogens could cause Richard G. Luthy to critical components of water sup- infection; thus, small volumes of ply systems is likely to be much dif- these agents in concentrated form Richard G. Luthy is a member of the NAE, the Silas H. ferent for systems located in parks could contaminate very large vol- Palmer Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineer- and public places than for systems in umes of unfiltered water. ing at Stanford University, and chair of the National remote areas. In the last 20 years, Surface water systems and systems Research Council Water Science and Technology Board. we’ve fenced and locked facilities that rely on groundwater, especially and covered reservoirs, but we will water from carbonate or other Since the sad events of September need more than that to prevent aquifers in which the water resi- 11, we now question the vulnerabil- intentional acts. Some aqueducts are dence times are relatively short, are ity of our water systems to deliberate hundreds of miles long, and protect- all vulnerable. Elevated portions of attack or sabotage. In the past, the ing them will be especially challeng- distribution systems, as well as pres- vulnerability of our water systems to ing. Our water supply systems have surized conduits without backflow natural disasters received greater been designed to withstand natural valves are vulnerable to the intro- attention than vulnerability to disasters, and in-place systems for duction of chemical or biological deliberate acts. Our vulnerability monitoring and responding to nat- agents. Even a nontoxic substance concerns are compounded by the ural disasters could also serve as could cause fear and anxiety if it fact that many components of our platforms for intrusion sensors and caused a taste or odor. water systems are aging and in need quick responses to intentional dam- of repair, replacement, or upgrading. How can we detect chemical or bio- age. The distribution system will be This is not a new state of affairs, but logical agents in the water supply sys- more difficult to secure. Although it in the context of September 11, we tem in time to take corrective action? potentially affects a smaller popula- are looking at the infrastructure of We need better monitoring to pro- tion, fear and anxiety can be caused our water systems in a new light and vide an early warning of the pres- even without mass exposure. thinking about how to protect them ence of chemical or biological from intentional acts. The funda- What chemicals, biological agents, agents in the water supply. Water mental mission of water systems is to or toxins would do the most to harm supplies are monitored routinely for protect human health and ensure human health and be most disruptive? a small number of contaminants economic well-being. So despite What points in the water supply, water and much less frequently for a large recent events, we should not act pre- treatment, and water distribution sys- number of contaminants. However, cipitously. We must carefully con- tem are most vulnerable to the release conventional laboratory methods sider new approaches to ensure the of such agents? Because of the very are time consuming and require security of our water systems and, at large volumes of water being han- skilled analysts. Therefore, prob- the same time, to enhance their reli- dled, many believe that truckload lems arising from intentional acts ability and capability. Some of the quantities of toxic chemicals would might not be detected until chem- key issues that need to be addressed be necessary to cause harm. How- ical or biological agents had entered are outlined below. ever, small quantities of toxic a treatment plant, or worse, a SPRING 2002 57

distribution system (some large conditions. Mutual aid pacts could safeguards in converting wastewater cities, notably San Francisco and be made for water supplies, labora- to potable water. These systems do New York City, have no treatment tory resources, operating assistance, not depend on one process but on other than disinfection). and repair response. several processes in a train that pro- Much can be done to improve This systems approach, often vide backup protection. We could this situation. Most analytical called regionalization, requires coop- extend the multiple barrier concept equipment is highly automated and eration on a regional (often water- to create a series of hurdles to help us could probably be made more shed) basis. Historically, because the cope with chemical and biological autonomous with new technologies. water supply industry is fragmented, agents. These barriers could be The chemical industry and some of not much attention has been paid to extended from the water treatment the national laboratories are devel- designing for interconnectedness, plant to include the distribution sys- oping “chemical analysis on a chip” except after the fact in cases of tem and the point of use. Multiple for hand-held, portable, chemical chemical spills or natural disasters. barriers, such as storage capacity, analysis systems and “canary on a Greater interconnectedness would enhanced treatment systems, and chip” for detecting hazardous com- lead to greater stability and flexibil- mutual aid, would allow the means pounds in the workplace. With ity; systems with standby networks and time to address a problem. modifications, these systems might are less vulnerable to upset than Are our water supply systems vul- be used for the routine monitoring monolithic entities. If a local water nerable to cyber attack? Historically, of water supplies for a broad spec- supply system were sabotaged, alter- concerns about the safety of water trum of compounds, both known native water supplies could be supply systems have been focused and unknown. With innovations in brought in while the damaged sys- on natural phenomena. However, immunoassays and nanotechnolo- tem was flushed or repaired. today almost every component of gies, we could provide rapid screen- In the arid west, separate water water supply systems is highly auto- ing for chemical and biological supply systems are in place for agri- mated, including the electronic agents. But all of these technologies culture and domestic use. Because so control of water pumping and stor- need much more development to be much more water is used for agricul- age, control of water treatment free from interference in natural set- ture than by municipalities, the agri- operations, and regulation of water tings. In addition, we should make cultural water supply or groundwater transmission. Although these opera- use of time-tested methods, like systems could be interconnected tions are backed up by manual con- increased chlorine demand, taste with domestic systems to augment trols, great damage could be done if and odor, turbidity, and other mea- the domestic supply in an emer- the automated control or the elec- sures, which are useful surrogate gency. Many questions, both techni- tric power for these systems were lost indicators that could be used in con- cal and institutional, would have to for a period of time due to cyber junction with new procedures. be answered. attack. Electronic security and How can water supply system oper- What changes in system operations emergency power backup capabili- ations be reconfigured to increase the or new technologies could protect ties will require careful analysis and interconnectedness of water supplies against chemical or biological agents? possible reengineering. and potable water distribution systems? We must think about new ways of Top priority should be given to Interconnectedness is provided by supplying and treating water. Exam- protecting physical storage struc- conduits by which water can be ples include the installation of tures that serve large populations transferred from one supply system robust standby treatment systems, and that would be very difficult to to another. If one component of the for which we will need new tech- replace, to ensuring water quality water supply system is lost, other nologies and augmented conven- through better monitoring and new water supplies could be put on line tional technologies. Fortunately, treatments, and to incorporating to transfer water through standby advances in membrane, sorptive, the concept of multiple barriers. conduits. Similarly, water distri- and oxidative technologies can be All of these are crosscutting issues bution systems could be intercon- brought to bear. For water reuse, a among disciplines and institutions. nected so that one locality could fundamental design paradigm is to Designing effective solutions to key help another under emergency install multiple barriers to provide problems will require broad-based The 58 BRIDGE

studies that include university and water supply, treatment, and distri- research programs must be orga- government research establish- bution systems, a $50 million pro- nized and rigorously administered, ments, professional organizations, gram annually for several years including an independent peer practitioners, operators, and advice would be a minimum for engineer- review process, to ensure that the from groups like the National ing analysis and problem solving, best research is pursued and the best Research Council. Considering the scientific development, and reeval- results are obtained. The needs are range of threats to our nation’s uation of water policies. New too great for us to do otherwise.

In Memoriam

THEODORE A. BURTIS, 79, chusetts Institute of Technology, research, publications, and pedagog- retired chairman, Sun Company, died on 7 December 2001. Dr. Elias ical innovation. Inc., died on November 7, 2001. Mr. was elected to the NAE in 1979 for Burtis was elected to the NAE in pioneering work in the field of infor- GEORGE R. JASNY, 77, retired 1984 for his contributions to the mation theory and leadership in vice president, Technical Opera- development of moving-bed catalyst electrical engineering education. tions, Martin Marietta Energy systems and the management of Systems, Inc., died on November large-scale energy programs. WILLIAM H. HUGGINS, 82, 30, 2001. Mr. Jasny was elected to professor emeritus, Johns Hopkins the NAE in 1983 for significant PETER ELIAS, 78, Webster University, died on August 11, contributions to national defense, Professor of Electrical Engineering, 2001. Dr. Huggins was elected to the advances in uranium enrichment, emeritus, and senior lecturer, NAE in 1970 for his contributions and energy development through Department of Electrical Engineer- to electrical and biomedical engi- the effective technical management ing and Computer Science, Massa- neering through radar and systems of complex engineering programs.

Symposium and Workshop: Technologies for Controlling CO2 Emissions

The Kyoto Accords would require address these concerns, the NAE CO2 reduction technologies, the that the United States reduce its will hold a symposium and work- economics of reducing CO2 emis- emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) shop, April 23–25, 2002, on current sions, and the potential uses of new to below 1990 levels, which would and emerging technologies that and emerging technologies for devel- require substantial reductions in oping nations. The workshop will could help reduce CO emissions or energy consumption. Because of 2 include breakout sessions to examine even remove CO from the atmo- concerns about the economic effects 2 alternatives in more detail. For more of meeting this requirement, the sphere. On the first day, speakers in information contact: Dr. Brendan United States decided not to the forefront of the field will cover P. Dooher ([email protected]; 202- become a signatory to the treaty. To the global and political context of 334-1251). SPRING 2002 59

Calendar of Meetings and Events

January 15 Governing Board Executive February 11–12 Committee on Diversity in the March 18 NAE Regional Meeting Committee Engineering Workforce Secure Electricity for January 17 Symposium on Mandate for February 12 Governing Board Executive Twenty-First Century America Technological Literacy Committee University of Wisconsin- Madison January 23–24 Forum on Diversity in the NAE/ASEE Engineering Deans Engineering Workforce Colloquium April 9 Governing Board Executive Irvine, California February 19 2002 NAE Awards Dinner and Committee January 24–25 Committee on Diversity in Presentation Ceremony April 12 NAE Regional Meeting the Engineering Workforce Union Station, Washington, Frontiers in e-Learning Irvine, California D.C. University of Arizona, Tucson January 28 Engineering Education February 22 NAE Regional Meeting April 12–13 STS and Globalization Research Retreat Sensor Networks for Health Conference Care, the Environment, and April 23–25 Complements to Kyoto: January 29 Finance and Budget Homeland Defense Committee Technologies for Controlling University of California, San CO Emissions February 4–5 NRC Governing Board Diego 2 April 27–30 2002 NAS Annual Meeting Irvine, California March 1–3 U.S. Frontiers of Engineering February 5 NAS/NAE Council Dinner Symposium April 30 Finance and Budget Irvine, California (rescheduled from September Committee Conference Call February 6 NAS/NAE Officers Breakfast 13–15, 2001) May 22 NAE Regional Meeting NAS/NAE Council Meeting Irvine, California Engineering Thin Films at the Irvine, California March 5 NAE Regional Meeting Nanoscale Engineering a New Century North Carolina State February 6–7 NAE Council Meeting University, Raleigh Irvine, California University of Texas at Austin February 8 NAE National Meeting March 12 Governing Board Executive All meetings are held in the National Academies Frontiers of Engineering: Committee Building, Washington, D.C., unless otherwise noted. Gilbreth Lecture Series Irvine, California The 60 BRIDGE

NAE Newsmakers

Anil K. Chopra, Johnson Profes- mineral engineering over a period to meet President Jiang Zemin. sor of Civil Engineering, Univer- of many years and for inspiring On November 5, 2001, Jack H. sity of California at Berkeley, was researchers in the field. Westbrook, president and principal awarded the 2001 ASCE Norman Nick Holonyak, John Bardeen consultant, Brookline Technologies, Medal for “Evaluation of NSP to Chair Professor of Electrical and received the Albert Sauveur Estimate Seismic Deformation: SDF Computer Engineering and Physics, Achievement Award for 2001 from Systems,” which was judged the University of Illinois, received the ASM International. Dr. Westbrook best paper published in an ASCE 2001 Frederic Ives Medal/Jarus W. was honored for his “contributions journal. Quinn Endowment, the Optical calling attention to intermetal- James W. Cooley, a retired Society of America’s most presti- lic compounds as a new class of researcher, IBM Thomas J. Watson gious honor. engineered materials and advancing Research Center, was named the James Padilla, group vice presi- scientific understanding of their recipient of the 2002 IEEE Jack S. dent, Global Manufacturing, Ford behavior, particularly their mechan- Kilby Signal Processing Medal. Dr. Motor Company, received the ical properties, constitution, and Cooley was recognized for his pio- Brillante Award. Mr. Padilla was defect structures.” neering work on the fast Fourier recognized for exceptional contri- C.P. Wong, Regents’ Professor of transformation (FFT) algorithm. butions to the Hispanic community Douglas W. Fuerstenau, profes- by individuals, corporations, and Materials Science and Engineering, sor in the Graduate School, Depart- universities. Georgia Institute of Technology, ment of Materials Science and Ponisseril Somasundaran, direc- received the 2001 IEEE Educa- Engineering, University of Califor- tor, NSF/IUCR Center for Surfac- tional Activities Board Meritorious nia, Berkeley, was recently awarded tants and La Von Duddleson Krumb Achievement Award in Continu- an honorary degree of Doctor of Professor, Columbia University, was ing Education. Dr. Wong was recog- Engineering (Tekn. Dr. [h.c.]) by the keynote speaker and honorary nized for exemplary and sustained Luleå University of Technology in chair of the International Sympo- contributions to continuing edu- Sweden. He received this distinc- sium on Nanomaterials and Tech- cation in polymer materials for tion for his unique achievements nology held in Beijing, China, in July electronics packaging and intercon- in research and development in 2001. During his stay, he was invited nections worldwide.

Dr. Robert Cherry Joins the NAE as Fellow

Dr. Robert Cherry began a year- worked for a number of years in long fellowship with the NAE Pro- industry with Arco Chemical Com- gram Office in early December. He pany and Exxon Research and Engi- comes to the NAE from the Idaho neering Company. He holds a B.S. National Engineering and Environ- and M.S. from Massachusetts Insti- mental Laboratory (INEEL), where tute of Technology and a Ph.D. from he conducted research on methane Rice University, all in chemical hydrates, hydrogen production from engineering. diesel fuel, and biological conver- At the NAE, Dr. Cherry will sions for the treatment of several develop and direct a project to Robert Cherry types of industrial waste. explore the environmental and glob- Prior to that, Dr. Cherry was on al consequences of using bioenergy as the faculty at Duke University and an alternative to fossil energy. SPRING 2002 61

Tom Ridge, Terrorism Experts Meet with News Executives

enforcement, and medical activities. Governor Ridge stated, “The best way to protect America is to push the perimeter as far out as possible and to provide as much time and distance as possible to detect, dis- rupt, and prevent.” The afternoon was devoted to ses- sions on different means of terrorist attack and their relative risks. Mar- garet Hamburg, M.D., vice president for biological programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative and for- mer New York City health commis- sioner, provided background on anthrax, smallpox, and the pre- Wm. A. Wulf, Governor Tom Ridge, and Jack Cox paredness of the medical communi- ty for bioweapons attack. The On December 6, 2001, engineers, NAE President Wm. A. Wulf media, she said, are in a unique posi- scientists, and researchers gathered then described the vast array of tar- tion to investigate and publicize the in Washington, D.C., to brief news gets, weapons, and delivery systems readiness of public health agencies executives on the targets and mani- available to terrorists. He concluded and other first responders in their festations of terrorism. The purpose that once the most likely attack sce- local communities. of the gathering, “Terror and Home- narios had been identified, the According to NAE member land Defense: Bringing the Stories nation could effectively prepare for Richard Garwin, Ph.D., Philip D. Home,” was to promote accurate and the most destructive ones. The NAE Reed Senior Fellow for Science and effective reporting on terrorism- is sponsoring a year-long study Technology at the Council on For- related issues. Governor Tom Ridge, headed by Alvin Trivelpiece, Ph.D., eign Relations in New York, the director of the White House Office NAE member, and former director of most likely form of nuclear attack of Homeland Security, was the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to would be a “dirty bomb.” Although keynote speaker. The conference analyze the risks and complex conse- the number of casualties from such was cosponsored by the NAE and quences of various means of attack an attack would be low, especially the Foundation for American Com- on critical infrastructures. compared to the number from a bio- munications (FACS). Baruch Fischhoff, Ph.D., professor logical attack, it would generate a Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh of engineering, Department of Social high level of persistent fear. Burke Chair and Senior Fellow, and Decisions Sciences, Carnegie Jeffrey Hunker, Ph.D., dean, H. Strategic Assessment, of the Center Mellon University, showed that John Heinz III School of Public Poli- for Strategic and International assessing the real risks of terrorism cy and Management, Carnegie Mel- Studies, began the conference with will require examining complex, lon University, described cyber- a sobering look at the history and interrelated events. His psychologi- attacks, cybersecurity, and the loom- motivations of terrorists. Cordes- cal research has shown that no mat- ing threat of cyberwar. He pointed man said U.S. military, law enforce- ter how disturbing the situation, the out that because no one really under- ment, and emergency response public responds better to the truth stands how interconnected our sys- teams must be prepared to defend than to a lack of information. tems are, it is nearly impossible at this against asymmetric attacks but must Governor Tom Ridge emphasized point to predict how we would be also acknowledge that this problem the importance of technology in affected if one system (e.g., an energy can never be completely eradicated. coordinating intelligence, law grid) were attacked. The 62 BRIDGE

NAE member Jeremy Isenberg, tion measures available to engineers, dees engaged the speakers in a lively Ph.D., president and CEO of Weid- such as wrapping concrete columns panel discussion on the particulars linger Associates in New York, in steel and coating windows with a of how the media could identify showed how computer models can film to prevent flying shards. Most and cover important terrorism- now accurately predict the effects of buildings are designed to meet bud- related issues. As the conference blasts on buildings. Isenberg also get requirements, not to withstand showed, engineers can contribute described structural defenses against explosions. vital expertise to help the media bombs and some of the blast mitiga- As the day ended, the 50 atten- inform the public. National Research Council Update Military Know-how Can Help Protect Civilian Buildings from Attacks

The U.S. Department of Defense military community and buildings. purposes, design and site considera- (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction The report calls on DTRA to take tions, and budgets, hazard mitigation Agency (DTRA) Blast Mitigation the lead in communicating research measures should be tailored for each for Structures Program was estab- results on blast effects and innova- building. The arrangement of non- lished by Congress in 1997 to iden- tive techniques for protecting structural features should also be tify and implement engineering against them. The report also urges taken into consideration. methods that could protect lives by the federal government to set up NAE members on this committee reducing bomb damage to buildings. rapid-response teams to collect med- were Mete A. Sozen, Purdue Uni- In a review of the program, the ical information about injuries, ill- versity; W. Gene Corley, Construc- National Research Council recom- nesses, and casualties that result tion Technology Laboratories, Inc.; mends research activities and meth- from bombing attacks and to estab- Robert P. Kennedy, RPK Structural ods of transferring the findings to lish a database for storing and ana- Mechanics Consulting; Eugene the building industry. lyzing the data. Sevin, independent consultant; and The study recommends that Because it may be very costly to Charles H. Thornton, Thornton- DTRA share the results of its construct or retrofit buildings to Tomasetti Engineers. The full text of research and testing program with withstand explosions, the committee the report, Protecting People and civilian engineers, architects, and suggests that blast-resistant features Buildings from Terrorism: Technology builders, as well as with other fed- be part of a larger strategy to protect Transfer for Blast-Effects Mitigation, eral agencies. To date, DOD’s efforts buildings from a variety of hazards. is available online at .

Promoting Residential Broadband Internet Access

A recent report by the Committee policy makers will have a better devices in the home. on Broadband Last Mile Technology understanding of what forms of gov- A central finding of the report is recommends that the federal govern- ernment intervention, if any, will be that local efforts to bring broadband ment support new initiatives to bring necessary. Broadband promises to services to more homes should be broadband Internet access to U.S. provide consumers with advanced strongly encouraged. Local govern- homes rather than pursuing prema- capabilities, such as electronic ments could encourage businesses to ture policies that could inhibit the health care applications, real-time enter the market by forming partner- market. The committee concludes participation in meetings via com- ships with them to install fiber-optic that once the market takes shape, puters, and more interconnected cables. Local public agencies could SPRING 2002 63

work with communities and area kinds of services offered, would Tech Broadband Institute; John M. institutions to stimulate demand for, avoid the technical problems and Cioffi, Stanford University; David and the use of, broadband. other problems associated with the D. Clark, Massachusetts Institute of The report favors competition unbundling of copper lines, and Technology; and Paul E. Green, Jr., among facilities-based service would reduce the disincentives for Tellabs, Inc. (retired). The full text providers for the long term for sev- established providers to innovate eral reasons. A competitive market and expand their services. of the report, Broadband: Bringing would require less government regu- NAE members on the committee Home the Bits, is available online at lation than mandated unbundling, were Nikil Jayant (chair), Georgia .

United States Bolsters Encryption Standards

A 1996 National Research Coun- boosting the international competi- security for individual transactions, cil report, Cryptography’s Role in tiveness of U.S. companies. Accord- such as electronic cash withdrawals, Securing the Information Society, con- ing to the U.S. Department of e-mails, and online shopping. cluded that the widespread use of Commerce, tough federal encryption NAE members Samuel H. Fuller, cryptography would benefit the standards adopted in December 2001 Analog Devices, Inc., and Willis H. nation in many ways: by providing will protect electronically transmit- Ware, RAND Corporation, were better protection from crime and ter- ted government, financial, and per- members of the study committee. rorism for banking and telecommu- sonal data. The new standards, The full text of the 1996 report is nications networks, by providing which are expected to be widely used available at .

Correction

In the winter 2001 issue of The was conducted by the Committee on Isakoff, Engineering R&D Division, Bridge, an NRC report, Analysis of Review and Analysis of Alternative E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Compa- Engineering Design Studies for Demili- Technologies for the Demilita- ny (retired); Frederick J. Krambeck, tarization of Assembled Chemical rization of Assembled Chemical ExxonMobil Research and Engineer- Weapons at Pueblo Chemical Depot, Weapons: Phase II. NAE members ing Company; and Stanley I. Sand- was incorrectly attributed. The study on the committee are Sheldon E. ler, University of Delaware. The 64 BRIDGE

Publications of Interest

The following reports have been stages of development. The commit- Air Force; request that Congress published recently by the National tee concluded that GEIS is an appro- extend the pilot program for revital- Academy of Engineering or the priate DOD response to NSTC-7 izing the service laboratories by at National Research Council. Unless and to the threat of emerging infec- least three years; and work to enact otherwise noted, all publications are tious diseases. With increased sup- targeted modifications of Civil Ser- for sale (prepaid) from the National port, and some refinements, the vice rules that directly affect the Academy Press (NAP), 2101 Con- program has the potential to meet, quality of the S&T workforce. stitution Avenue, N.W., Lockbox or even exceed, the requirements of Paper, $18.00. 285, Washington, DC 20055. For NSTC-7. Paper, $36.25. more information or to place an Technically Speaking: Why All Americans order, contact NAP online at Review of the Future of the U.S. Aero- Need to Know More About Technology. or by phone space Infrastructure and Aerospace Engi- Cell phones . . . air bags . . . geneti- at (800) 624-6242. (Note: Prices neering Disciplines to Meet the Needs of cally modified food . . . and the quoted by NAP are subject to change the Air Force and the Department of Internet are all emblems of modern without notice. Online orders receive a Defense. This report recommends life. Most people would be hard 20 percent discount. Please add $4.50 that an Air Force deputy chief of staff pressed to know how we would func- for shipping and handling for the first position be established with primary tion without them. They would book and $0.95 for each additional responsibility for overseeing all Air have even more trouble, however, book. Add applicable sales tax or GST Force scientific and technical explaining how they work. The if you live in CA, DC, FL, MD, MO, resources; the new deputy chief of United States is riding a whirlwind TX, or Canada.) staff would be the advocate for fund- of technological change that has sig- ing science and technology require- nificant, far-reaching social, eco- Perspectives on the Department of ments and would ensure that nomic, and other impacts. It seems Defense Global Emerging Infections Sur- adequate funding is budgeted annu- that the faster we embrace new veillance and Response System: A Pro- ally. Other recommendations address technologies, however, the less we gram Review. Presidential Decision the issues of technical personnel, understand them. In this new, Directive NSTC-7 declared that expenditures and investments, the technology-dependent world, an national and international capabili- establishment of partnerships with understanding of the nature and ties for the surveillance, prevention, industries and universities and their implications of technology is a mat- and response to outbreaks of infec- faculty members, and the reform of ter of responsible citizenship. Tech- tious diseases were inadequate to Civil Service rules for scientific and nically Speaking: Why All Americans protect the health of U.S. citizens technical personnel. Paper, $18.00. Need to Know More About Technol- and called for a robust national poli- ogy provides a blueprint for bringing cy to improve these capabilities. Review of the U.S. Department of us all up to speed on the role of tech- NSTC-7 directed many U.S. federal Defense Air, Space, and Supporting nology in our society, including the agencies, including the U.S. Depart- Information Systems Science and Tech- distinctions between technology ment of Defense (DOD), to take nology Program. This report recom- and science and technological liter- action. In response, DOD estab- mends that the Air Force continue acy and technical competence. The lished the global emerging infections to: increase its investment in sci- report provides an overview of the surveillance and response system ence and technology (S&T) to subject, highlights specific issues of (GEIS) in 1997. In April 2000, the twice its FY01 level; take action to concern, and three case studies— Institute of Medicine convened a strengthen S&T representation and air bags, genetically modified foods, committee to evaluate the progress advocacy at the corporate policy and the California energy crisis. of GEIS, which is still in the early and decision-making level of the Paper, $19.95.