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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Setting a New Beginning in US-Muslim Relations President Obama and the Arab Awakening Lilli, Eugenio Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 30. Sep. 2021 PhD Thesis Department of War Studies King’s College London Setting a New Beginning in US-Muslim Relations: President Obama and the Arab Awakening Eugenio Lilli 2 To my mom and dad, without whose continued support this project would not have been possible 3 Table of Contents Table of Contents 3 Abstract 5 PART ONE 1. Introduction 7 1.1 Studying Foreign Policy 19 1.2 Structure and Methodology 27 PART TWO: US FOREIGN POLICY 2. US Foreign Policy Rhetoric 35 2.1 Public Rhetoric and Foreign Policy 35 2.2 US Exceptionalism 38 2.3 Example Versus Action 48 2.4 The Dark Side of the Creed 56 2.5 The Myth of US Innocence 60 2.6 Final Remarks 69 3. US Foreign Policy Practice 71 3.1 The Process of US Foreign Policymaking 71 3.2 The US National Interest 77 3.4 US Foreign Policy Practice toward the Greater Middle East since WWII 83 3.5 First US Interest: Middle Eastern Energy Resources 83 3.6 Second US Interest: Containment 88 3.7 Third US Interest: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 93 3.8 US Fourth Interest: Special Relationship with Israel 98 3.9 Final Remarks 102 4 PART THREE: THE ARAB AWAKENING 4. Egypt: the Last Days of the Pharaoh 105 4.1 US-Egyptian Relations prior to 2011 105 4.2 The Egyptian Uprising and US Response 107 4.3 Continuity or Change 119 5. The Kingdom of Bahrain: a Troubled Ally 121 5.1 US-Bahraini Relations prior to 2011 121 5.2 The Bahraini Uprising and US Response 125 5.3 Continuity or Change 135 6. Yemen: It’s Counterterrorism, Stupid! 137 6.1 US-Yemeni Relations prior to 2011 137 6.2 The Yemeni Uprising and US Response 140 6.3 Continuity or Change 150 7. Libya: a Convergence of Interests 153 7.1 US-Libyan Relations prior to 2011 153 7.2 The Libyan Uprising and US Response 156 7.3 Continuity or Change 167 8. Syria: the Risks of Change 169 8.1 US-Syrian Relations prior to 2011 169 8.2 The Syrian Uprising and US Response 172 8.3 Continuity or Change 185 PART FOUR 9. Findings and Implications 188 9.1 Research Findings 188 9.2 Implications for the United States 208 Bibliography 219 5 Abstract Early in his presidency, Barack Obama announced that setting a new beginning in US-Muslim relations would be a top-priority of his administration. To what extent did President Obama’s foreign policy actually represent a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign policy toward the Muslim world, and especially toward the Greater Middle East? This research assesses change or continuity in the foreign policy of the United States toward arguably one of the most geo- strategically important regions of the world. To provide an exhaustive answer to our research question, we undertake a study of US foreign policy at three different levels: foreign policy rhetoric, foreign policy practice, and the relationship between the two. First, we demonstrate that US rhetoric has been consistently influenced by the time-honored idea of national exceptionalism and its foreign policy spin-off, the myth of innocence. Second, with regard to US practice, we argue that the national interest is a multifaceted concept and a fundamental driver of foreign policy. We also identify the core national interests that have traditionally informed US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East: access to the region’s energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the special relationship with Israel, and democracy promotion. Third, we show that US Middle East policy has often been characterized by a noticeable disconnect between foreign policy rhetoric and foreign policy practice. Finally, we analyze President Obama’s Middle East policy to assess whether it represented a significant break with the tradition of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. In order to do that, this research focuses on the transformative events that upset the region in 2011, and especially on a comparative analysis of the first Obama administration’s response to the popular uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. 6 PART ONE 7 Introduction Hope and change. These words have been the trademark of the Barack Obama administration since the days of its electoral campaign. In what became known as the Yes, We Can Speech, presidential candidate Obama declared: “Yes, we can, to justice and equality. Yes, we can, to opportunity and prosperity. Yes, we can heal this nation. Yes, we can repair this world. Yes, we can.” Besides characterizing Barack Obama’s statements, ideas of hope and change also dominated campaign ads, bumper stickers, t-shirts, and pins. The leitmotif of the Obama team’s public rhetoric was one emphasizing its willingness to represent a turning point from the previous George W. Bush administrations.1 On 4 June 2009, standing before a predominantly Muslim audience at Cairo University, Egypt, President Obama stated: “I am honored to be in the timeless city of Cairo […] We meet at a time of tension between the United States and Muslims around the world […] [T]ension has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim- majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam […] This has bred more fear and mistrust […] This cycle of suspicion and discord must end […] I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect.”2 The Cairo Speech will probably be remembered as the most famous example of President Obama’s public commitment to set a new beginning with the Muslim world. However, Obama’s public outreach to Muslim communities started before his signature speech in Cairo. In January 2009, during his Inaugural Address, the US president had already notified Muslims that the United States would “seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” After that, two months later in Ankara, while addressing the Turkish Parliament, President Obama declared: “The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam […] We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, 1 Barack Obama, “Yes, We Can Speech,” January 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/politics/08text- obama.html?pagewanted=all. 2 Barack Obama, “Cairo Speech,” June 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all. 8 and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree.” Upon taking office, the US president had openly committed his administration to mend the (mis)perceptions existing between the United States and the Muslim world. The primary goal of this research is to investigate whether the first Obama administration succeeded or not in setting a new beginning in US-Muslim relations. More to the point, we are going to assess the extent to which President Obama’s foreign policy represented a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign policy toward the Muslim world.3 In Cairo, along with promising to set a new beginning, Obama also acknowledged that previous US foreign policies toward the Muslim world had spawned fear and mistrust and had generated a cycle of suspicion and discord. The findings of two different 2007 survey polls showed the degree of suspicion and discord that existed at the time between Americans and Muslims around the world. The first survey, on Muslims’ attitudes toward the United States, revealed that an average of 75.5 percent of respondents in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia (four predominantly Muslim countries) had a negative view of the US government; 79 percent of respondents thought a US foreign policy goal was to weaken and divide Islam; and 64 percent believed that the United States wanted to spread Christianity in the Middle East.