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U.S. POLICY TOWARD AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS

May 27 – June 2, 2019 | , Czech Republic U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS The Congressional Program May 27 – June 2, 2019 Prague, Czech Republic

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Rapporteur’s Summary Matthew Rojansky ...... 3 U.S. Policy Toward Eurasia and the Role of the U.S. Congress Thomas Graham ...... 17 Getting America Off the Backfoot in Eurasia Evan A. Feigenbaum ...... 23 Does BRI Really Exist? Robert Daly ...... 29 ’s Rise as a Geo-Economic Influencer in Eurasia Philippe Le Corre ...... 39 It’s Time to Rethink ’s Foreign Policy Strategy Dimitri Trenin ...... 47 Is Russia a U.S. 'Adversary' or Just a 'Competitor'? Developing a Sustainable, Realistic U.S. Policy Towards Russia Nikolas K. Gvosdev ...... 59 The Russia-China Partnership in Eurasia and the Trans-Atlantic Response Stacy Closson ...... 65 China as a Copycat of the Practices of Russian Influence in Central and Eastern European Members of the EU and NATO Ivana Karásková ...... 69 How America Invented Cyberwar Emily Parker ...... 73 Conference Participants ...... 77 Conference Agenda ...... 79

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RAPPORTEUR’S SUMMARY

Matthew Rojansky

Director, The Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center

Seventeen Members of Congress survived wars and occupations, yet which met in Prague, Czech Republic May 27— has lost a great deal as well. Of some June 2, 2019 for briefings and discussions 150,000 Jews who were a central part of on U.S. interests, challenges and Czech life before War II, only 5,000 opportunities in Eurasia, a remain today—the vast majority killed in the encompassing much of the globe, most U.S. Nazi Holocaust, with many of the few allies, as well as major adversaries. This survivors (including the family of former meeting followed an Aspen-organized U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) conference approximately one year ago that fleeing Soviet occupation afterward. Having was focused principally on Russia in the survived and defeated two occupations in European theater, as well as a meeting the past century, Czechs feel justifiably earlier this year on U.S Policy toward China. proud of their more recent achievements: NATO and membership, Prague was a fitting backdrop for impressive economic growth, and economic these conversations in several key links with the wider world, including China. substantive respects. From its myth- shrouded founding over a millennium ago, The challenges faced in the Czech Prague has been a city at the crossroads of Republic today were likewise fitting European and Eurasian civilizations. Celtic, reminders of the broader themes of this German, Roman, Austrian, Polish, Russian gathering. The current government, and other rulers have held sway, whether despite its avowed commitment to Western from the ancient and lovely Prague Castle institutions, maintains warm and friendly on a hill overlooking the city (now the ties with both Russia and China—these official residence of the Czech President) or were very much in evidence from the from distant imperial capitals. The Czechs billboards in the airport arrival hall to the themselves have regained their lost droves of Russian and Chinese tourists in independence twice in the past century— the city streets. Moreover, nearly three and they credit an American President, decades after winning their independence Woodrow Wilson, for the vision to support and splitting from Slovakia in the so-called Czechoslovak statehood in the aftermath of “velvet divorce,” Czechs are still struggling the First . with fundamental questions about national identity, democracy, and their future as a In any given year, Prague itself small country in an increasingly fractious attracts more tourists than it has permanent and dangerous world. As a member of the residents—they flock to see a city whose Czech parliament told his U.S. colleagues, magnificent architecture has miraculously

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Prague’s European and Western choice has particularly focused on the related but been made, but that means Czech voters distinct challenges posed by Russia and have high expectations that their leaders China, which some called “near peer” cannot always match. adversaries of the . One scholar characterized the two as major Eurasian and Great Power challenges but said they should not be Dynamics: Why it Matters lumped together, since China is a rising The conversation began with power focused on the future, and hoping to important reminders about the truly global overtake the United States, while Russia is a scope of Eurasia, which 19th Century British declining power that seeks to bring the geographer called, “the United States down to its level. World Island.” It is a region with three Scholars explained that despite , one third of the world’s land some divergences, China and Russia could mass, seventy percent of its population, pursue a strategic alignment as long as sixty percent of gross domestic product both were committed to calm along their (GDP), and eight of nine nuclear weapons extended shared border in Central , and states. Thus, the scholar concluded, control both were more focused on projecting of Eurasia might well amount to power over power and influence outward, principally in the whole world, and this has given rise to a competition or confrontation with the United longstanding and bipartisan U.S. policy to States. Although Russia did not necessarily prevent any hostile power or group of offer a coherent or attractive future vision powers from occupying such a role. to its Eurasian neighbors, scholars Scholars also recalled that Eurasia explained, it had strong historical ties and has become considerably more political, military, economic and social interconnected in recent decades, and they leverage over many states in the region. urged members to think in terms of the China, while not yet seeking to project its region as a whole, rather than constituent full power in the direction of Russia and sub- or nation-states. This stove- , has begun to offer solutions to piping of regional expertise, policymaking the region’s geographic isolation from the and U.S. capabilities, one scholar lamented, high and the global economy by has limited the effectiveness of U.S. funding large-scale infrastructure diplomacy and defense strategy in Eurasia. construction. For instance, issues, which fall Members wondered whether a under U.S. Central Command, cannot easily Russia-China alignment of interests could be separated from South Asian or Central last long, in particular whether it could Asian Issues, which sometimes fall under outlast the regimes of and Xi U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, or even under Jinping, respectively. Scholars countered European Command if they involve Russia. that waiting for authoritarian leaders to Despite clear trend lines toward pass from the scene was not a basis for economic integration in Eurasia, security U.S. leadership in the region, and that such concerns are forcing difficult and often an approach would cede the initiative to fragmenting choices on the states in the and Beijing. region, including U.S. allies like and Members raised the question of South . Scholars and members were whether the U.S. had the necessary

4 capacity not only to push back against degree, scholars warned, this is already Russia and China, but to understand and taking place. engage with the disparate small and large Several members pointedly said that states of this enormous world region. their constituents just didn’t care about far Scholars confirmed that reductions in U.S. off problems and abstract questions about State Department staffing and assistance “world order.” Some resented extensive budgets had set U.S. foreign policy off and costly U.S. international commitments balance, with the much better funded U.S. at a time when the American middle class is military too often in the lead. Scholars suffering, while others saw China mostly as likewise recommended that Americans play an opportunity, bringing investment and to strengths like an attractive, innovative new jobs to U.S. communities. One U.S. economy, robust alliances, and high member challenged the group to question standards for trade and investment. Some the longstanding U.S. policy principle that sought to identify opportunity amid bringing other nations into a world trading adversity by focusing on what might be and investment system led by the United new, shared goals like adapting to climate States would help spread democratic and change, diversifying energy sources, free market values. Another member increasing opportunities for women, and worried that since elections in the United combatting proliferation of nuclear and States could flip policy priorities every two other weapons of mass destruction. or four years, it would be difficult or Others wondered whether U.S. impossible to compete with authoritarian sanctions, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act governments that have the ability to plan enforcement, and protection of intellectual and direct long term resources. property were actually effective tools in the Yet scholars challenged members to current environment. Scholars explained offer a clear, American vision for the future, that some U.S. regulations and punitive recalling the famous advice of 20th Century measures were seen as needlessly adding diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. costs, disadvantaging U.S. firms, and In his 1947 “X” article, Kennan wrote that ultimately eroding Americans’ strong the United States would be challenged to, position in the global economy. They said “create among the peoples of the world that other countries only sometimes care generally the impression of a country which about the moral or political basis for such knows what it wants, which is coping measures—they more often look just at the successfully with the problems of its internal bottom line. Scholars recommended a life and with the responsibilities of a world clearer, more targeted and more power, and which has a spiritual vitality transactional approach to sanctions—not capable of holding its own among the major just punishing states such as Russia for bad ideological currents of the time.” Indeed, acts, but setting forth step-by-step scholars and members agreed, that remains pathways for restoring normal economic the challenge for Americans today. ties. The alternative, they cautioned, was that Russia, China and others would China’s Interests and Objectives construct their own global trading and China presents both serious investment system that could circumvent challenges and opportunities, one scholar U.S. and European sanctions. To some explained. The U.S. discussion has relied

5 too much on “bogeyman terms” to describe Scholars agreed that transatlantic Chinese state champions like Huawei, and dialogue on China was essential, but that Beijing’s vaunted Belt and Road Initiative could not be put in a position of (BRI). A more balanced framing of the needing to choose in a zero-sum fashion issue would reveal that BRI is a jumble of between China and the United States. A disparate projects and trends, many of joint U.S.-European approach was seen as which preexisted and will surely outlast Xi the only way to limit Chinese-Russian Jinping. Besides lacking a specific strategy partnership from eroding the West’s or action plan for BRI, China has triggered interests, and from running the table on suspicion among many of its putative important issues like trade and cyber partners by demanding that those who security. accept Chinese investment also refrain from The discussion raised two opposing or criticizing China on sensitive fundamental questions that are now at issues like rights or the South China stake in U.S.-China relations, but have far . It is not only the United States that broader relevance to U.S. foreign and has concerns—many of China’s partners domestic policy. First, whether Americans fear the long-term environmental impact can and should seek to do significant trade, and the human costs of its model of fast which entails inevitable interdependency, development. with countries whose worldview and values Scholars explained that traditional we may reject or even consider to be U.S. allies in Europe increasingly view China threatening. Second, whether and how the as an economic powerhouse. Trade on a United States can attract meaningful levels daily basis between the EU and China now of investment in the modern globalized exceeds $1 billion, with $20-40 billion per economy if it keeps closed off some of the year in direct investment from China to the most attractive and dynamic sectors of its EU. Since China announced its Belt and economy considered “too sensitive” from a Road Initiative in 2013, European states national security perspective—especially have begun to formally embrace and echo information , infrastructure and Beijing’s about Eurasian energy. The session also underscored the integration, although most understand that reality that policymaking can no longer be they are primarily an endpoint in this conveniently divided into foreign and trading scheme, as a consumer market for domestic spheres—what happens in one Chinese goods. Some European leaders, has clear effects on the other. like the Czech Republic’s own President Members wanted to know, on the Milos Zeman, openly admire both one hand, how they could protect the U.S. and Vladimir Putin. Still, China lacks “soft economy from Chinese inroads, and, on the power” in Europe thanks to its poor other, whether China’s promises to pursue reputation on environmental issues and low more “clean, green and high quality pop culture penetration. Some European investment” would translate to an embrace states have joined with the United States in of U.S. standards. As one member pointed calling China a systemic rival, and calling out, China’s ability to invest in regions and out its unfair trade practices, while creating sectors of the U.S. that are hurting gives it new screening mechanisms for Chinese access and appeal, it is hard to argue that imports to the EU. this should be limited. Yet the long-term

6 trend is beginning to become clear, with pursue its path, especially when it is risks that the U.S. will lose its domestic producing and selling products at a discount capabilities to manufacture key to their real values that essentially transfers transportation and information . Chinese wealth to the United States and the Similarly, members worried that China’s rest of the world. success was really just a “race to the Russia’s Interests and Regional bottom,” but that for the U.S. government Influence to step in and tell businesses how to be more competitive was also not productive. Russia may not be a power on the rise like China, but it is very much in Scholars pointed out that some transition. Increasingly, Moscow no longer protections could be effective, especially if sees itself as the easternmost outpost of thought of as “high fences around small Europe, or even as of the former yards,” in a few key, narrowly defined areas Soviet space, but rather as “Northern of science and technology that may be so Eurasia.” This, scholars explained, is a sensitive for U.S. national security that they much more inward-looking Russia, but one should exclude foreign ownership and which is nonetheless one of greater participation. A clear area of concern is Eurasia’s three principle military powers. production of rare , where members and scholars pointed out that China now Regarding the other two powers, controls global supply, and that even ore Russia sees clear choices. Russia does not mined in the United States is exported to expect conflict with the United States to China for processing. But amid current abate any time soon, as it considers the tense trade negotiations with China, one status of a world power equal to but member warned, “it will get worse than independent from the United States as soybeans,” and asked, “what cost are we essential, and believes that Washington will willing to pay?” As China has come under never agree to that. While deterrence has greater U.S. pressure, a scholar explained, thus far prevented the U.S.-Russian its government-controlled media has confrontation from escalating to direct, all- become more nationalistic, and extols the out military conflict, this is a real and Chinese capacity to “eat bitterness”— ongoing risk factor for both sides, which apparently readying the Chinese people for both members and scholars described as a a long term battle of wills with the United “nightmare scenario.” The greatest danger States. now is around U.S. and Russian forces operating in close proximity in , where Other members countered that the as many as several hundred Russian solution should be much simpler. It cannot mercenaries were killed by U.S. air strikes be about restricting trade and adding more and artillery just last year, and where government regulation, but must rather be Russia has threatened retaliation for any about Americans stepping up and more future U.S. strikes on Russian bases or effectively competing with China on our personnel. own terms. Scholars echoed that a scolding tone toward China would do no good, and When it comes to Russia and China, that not all battles can be won the guiding principle for both sides is “never simultaneously—there are times to apply against one another, but not necessarily leverage, and other times to let China together.” Both Russia and China are

7 perfectly happy to see the other challenge Russia on the world stage, was nonetheless the United States for leadership on regional boycotted by most Western leaders. When or global issues, but neither seeks a full ’s kleptocratic government fell at alliance against Washington. Nor will either nearly the same time, Putin viewed Russian necessarily support the other on its own military intervention and annexation of challenges to the global rules—for example, as a necessary and urgent defensive Russia was silent when China deployed move against what he thought was the artificial islands in the , and beginning of another U.S.-backed regime China in turn has not recognized Russian- change operation. backed separatist states in the South However, as one scholar pointed or , or Russia’s out, Putin is in many respects less annexation of Ukrainian Crimea. Being the nationalistic than previous Russian and weaker power by nearly every measure, Soviet leaders. He does not seek to Russia seeks to embed China in reintegrate most of the former Soviet organizations where Russia’s close republics into the Russian Federation, and relationships with other Eurasian states like the current Russian elite is far more and Vietnam can play a balancing preoccupied with making money than with role. Thus, scholars explained, Russia will ideology or national greatness. That is why continue to engage actively with China but so many top Russian officials and oligarchs also with China’s regional rivals. siphon wealth out of the Russian economy Members and scholars exchanged only to buy real estate and move their views on Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, families to Europe, the Middle East, and whom many thought simply could never be even the United States itself. U.S. sanctions trusted after his aggressive actions against that have tried to target these individuals Russia’s neighbors, interference in U.S. have had some impact, scholars noted, elections and information warfare, and his however they warned that Russia will recent foray into Venezuela to back the always seek to strike back asymmetrically, discredited strongman Nicolas Maduro. playing to its strengths and exploiting U.S. Scholars explained that for Putin, Russia is vulnerabilities. already on a war footing. He views U.S. Members were not given a hopeful sanctions as an act of economic warfare, outlook for a time after Putin or the Putin and sees U.S. interventions in the post- system. Not only is Putin himself relatively Soviet space, the Middle East and elsewhere young and in good health, but he has over the past three decades as dangerous brought plenty of younger people who and destructive meddling, even as warning share his worldview into the government, signs of a U.S. plot to topple his own regime and almost any alternative system, whether in Russia. Opposing Washington globally is on the left or the right, has been discredited therefore a matter of self-preservation for by Russia’s historical experience over the Putin and his regime. past hundred years. Thus, scholars Nor does Putin see joining the West concluded, the basic structure of today’s as a viable path forward. Scholars noted Russia is likely to endure for some time. that the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, which Members nonetheless asked about cost Russia over $50 billion and was meant areas for potential cooperation and dialogue to be a coming out party for a resurgent with Russia. In Afghanistan, scholars

8 explained, U.S. and Russian interests are strongly against repeating 20th century aligned, moving toward some involvement thinking in a 21st century context. As for the Taliban in a power-sharing compared with the U.S.-Soviet contest for agreement, provided they neither expand regional and global influence in the Cold their territory nor provide a safe haven for War, Russia and China have more limited extremists to export terror abroad. U.S. aims, which are largely devoid of the kind of and Russian experts have already found ideological overreach that doomed the common ground on a wide range of Soviets. As a consequence, the relatively projects related to space, education, energy easy case for U.S.-led alliances and and even waste management. are partnerships during the Cold War is much especially hungry for practical exchanges harder to make now, when even close allies with Americans on the level of local do not necessarily see Russia or China as governance and problem solving. More inimical adversaries. exchanges, from parliamentary dialogues to Although Moscow and Beijing have youth programs would be beneficial, many differences and real limitations on scholars noted, because all these would their joint approach to Eurasia, they stress help more people from both sides to common interests and this positions the understand the way the other side thinks, China-Russia entente to outmaneuver and and to break down inaccurate stereotypes exceed United States influence among the and false mythologies about the other. states of greater Eurasia. Good examples While members reported that most of this phenomenon include Eurasian Americans feel positively toward Russians, regional institutions like the Shanghai they deeply dislike and distrust the Russian Cooperation Organization, where Russia and regime. Russia’s interference in the 2016 China have differing interests, but agree U.S. election, its bad record on human about posing a counterweight to the United rights, and its cheating on the Intermediate- States. Likewise, although Russia and range Nuclear Forces agreement are all China develop their conventional and cyber serious breaches that will take time to heal. weapons technologies separately, they Yet Russian culture enjoys fairly wide increasingly operate against common U.S. exposure in the United States—think of targets, and this may facilitate a gradual music, ballet, literature and even children’s convergence of aims between the two. cartoons (“Masha and Bear” is a Youtube When the U.S. imposed sectoral sanctions sensation) and fairy tales. Members and on Russian energy companies in 2014, scholars agreed that while they did not China shifted its gas import strategy from expect Moscow to offer an apology for any U.S.-sourced LNG to Russian pipelines. of its past actions, if it at least drew the Russians have even begun talking in terms lesson that election interference and attacks of a strategic alliance, and joint positions on on U.S. democracy had backfired, that foreign policy issues, such as a 2016 might be the basis to start talking to one declaration supporting “territorial another more productively in the future. sovereignty and nonaggression.” The June 2019 visit of Xi Jinping to Vladimir Putin’s U.S. Strategy, Allies and Resources native St. Petersburg may also offer an In considering the role of allies, object lesson for Americans who doubt the partners and resources in formulating a U.S. closeness of the two leaders. strategy toward Eurasia, scholars cautioned

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As several members pointed out, putting limits on commitments to close Americans may not have a lot of choice allies, let alone more distant partners. about whether Russia and China cooperate Among the latter, some states may be more with one another, and whether they have willing to engage in showdowns with powerful instruments they can use to powerful rivals if they believe they will enjoy advance their interests—“carrots and U.S. support, and this can become a sticks.” As long as direct military slippery slope, leading to direct U.S. confrontation with either country is confrontation with Russia or China. unthinkable, the United States will have to Scholars also cautioned that a hard- come up with better ways to compete, and nosed assessment of the costs of U.S. cannot just stand over Eurasia wagging its partnerships and alliances was especially finger about bad behavior. We are no necessary, given that the United States longer “the biggest kid on the block,” as could soon lose its ability to fund deficit one member put it, and so we cannot pick spending by printing U.S. dollars, as the fights with everyone at the same time and world gradually shifts away from the dollar expect to win. Another member compared as the dominant reserve currency. In this current ineffective U.S. leverage to the sense and others, there is a strong strong steps taken after the Soviet invasion correlation between the strength of U.S. of Afghanistan in 1979, including a ban on society, democracy and the economy at grain exports on which Moscow depended, home and the ability of Washington to and a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics. project power in Eurasia. This, both members and scholars Members expressed divergent views agreed, gives Americans all the more on the current U.S. administration’s efforts reason to think hard about strengthening to encourage NATO allies to meet their our vital friendships in Eurasia. Together, target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, the U.S. and its traditional European and however scholars recalled that this has been Asian allies are far stronger than Russia and U.S. policy going back several China. But, scholars and members administrations, and has long been a source cautioned, these relationships are drifting of frustration for Democratic and Republican away from where they should be. presidents. To turn that drift around, scholars When approaching allies, scholars suggested, Americans need to be crystal suggested, Washington should seek to clear about our strengths and weaknesses persuade rather than coerce, and may have and to be thoughtful about the language we to be ready to act unilaterally if it cannot use at home and abroad. Americans also secure support for policies that run counter need to clearly measure and honestly to allies’ interests. In some cases, it may discuss the real costs of various policy simply be impossible to persuade allies to options. Members and scholars shared the join the United States in confrontation with view that U.S. strengths include the Eurasian neighbors. For example, while capacity to innovate, and to offer attractive India (a close partner, if not an ally) was partnerships that respect the interests and prepared to support Washington on the freedoms of other countries. However, sanctioning Iran, once a major energy some noted, Americans often have difficulty supplier, it could not be expected at the turning down requests for assistance, or same time to join U.S. sanctions on Russia,

10 its main longstanding supplier of defense would any country want to waste its limited technology and hardware. resources on a new arms race? Similarly, although members worried Ultimately, members agreed, allies about EU dependence on imports of Russian and partners look most of all to the United gas and criticized the North Stream II States for leadership, and so it is preferable pipeline project now under construction for Washington to have a clear strategy and between Russia and , scholars speak with a united voice. Episodic reminded them that even during the Cold responses to individual countries and issues War, the U.S. and its closest European allies would compound the problem of stove- disagreed about Soviet gas imports. piped resources already discussed. Scholars Europeans have long argued and many still suggested creating a non-partisan believe that energy trade is a two-way commission to review U.S. policy and street, and that Russia has strong incentives develop a long-term American strategy for not to use gas as a political weapon. Eurasia. Such a commission would not only underscore cross-cutting U.S. interests Members and scholars agreed that requiring a “whole of government” any policy that appeared to “appease” approach to advance, but would have a China or Russia in hopes of encouraging better opportunity of looking forward, and better behavior would be anticipating developments instead of counterproductive. Yet participants debated playing catch up. A clear American vision, exactly where to draw the line between members agreed, would not only mobilize reasonable accommodation and allies and partners, but would help them unacceptable behavior. This can be remind their constituents why the U.S. role especially problematic for poorer developing in the world is important to Americans at states, for example in the former Soviet home. region, which lack a strong national consensus in favor of Western political New Technologies and Evolving values, and whose leaders often pursue Threats: Cyber, Social, Media, and “multi-vector” approaches to extract Information Operations maximum benefits from ties with each Scholars characterized the new and major Eurasian power. Some members evolving threat landscape in Eurasia as one argued for patience, suggesting that it is that lacks clear lines, whether between simply not possible to expect some friend and foe, between offense and countries in transition to make full and defense, or even between concrete action irreversible commitments, such as to NATO and mere acquiescence. By comparison, membership—when the process is rushed, the existential threats of the Cold War were they warned, conflict can result. less complicated—Americans knew that if a Some members raised the question major nuclear attack was launched, it had of global challenges, in particular nuclear to have come from the , and non-proliferation and climate change, which vice versa. Today, warfare in the cyber and they suggested could be shared priorities information spheres is highly decentralized, for the United States, traditional U.S. allies, and often entirely invisible. and even Russia and China. Given the Under these circumstances, how can mounting costs of climate-driven adaptation the United States protect itself? Although and disaster response, they asked, why

11 deterrence against state attacks may still China offers an economic lifeline not subject play an important role, it may be difficult to to Western political pressure. China has attribute any attack quickly enough to tended to engage with establish such deterrence, a problem that is primarily at the leadership level, whereas compounded in an environment rife with Russia has been more effective in reaching disinformation. As one scholar reminded out to populations in the region directly participants, the United States was first to through its broadcast and social media “cross the Rubicon” of cyber warfare with fronts. As time goes on, though, Moscow the 2006 “stuxnet” attack on computer- and Beijing are increasingly pursuing the controlled centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear same strategies, building on what gets facilities, which remained concealed for results. months before it was accidentally Members expressed concern about discovered, having spread to commercial the vulnerability of U.S. companies and the computer systems. In this respect, economy as a whole to Russian, Chinese or Washington has also exploited deniability other cyber attacks. They noted that most and the fog of cyber war. of their constituents had little idea what was Other nontraditional security going on, and how quickly the threats were challenges include the leveraging of growing. When queried about whether the economic, political and social influence to same technology that created dangerous try to shift a country’s policy priorities, offensive cyber tools could offer defensive whether from above (political leaders) or solutions, experts said that there would below (society at large). This has been a always be a pendulum of offense and particularly acute problem in Central defense, but that the range of potential Europe. The region’s economy is growing impacts was now much broader than ever fast and it remains far more economically before, with particular vulnerability to interdependent with, for example, Germany critical infrastructure in the United States, than with China (by a factor of more than because it is such a highly connected, 100 to 1). Yet Central Europe has recently information-intensive economy. begun to lean toward Beijing and even Scholars and members agreed that toward Moscow, despite its troubled history Russia had attempted to use cyber weapons with Russia. to interfere in past U.S. elections, including The reasons for this shift are 2016 and 2018, however scholars cautioned complex, and the politics varies from that there would almost never be a country to country, scholars explained. In “smoking gun” pointing to state-directed the Czech Republic, for example, President attacks. Instead, they explained, disparate Milos Zeman views his Chinese and Russian non-attributable attacks are on the rise, counterparts as attractive models for strong while potentially vulnerable voting leadership, a key to his popularity, infrastructure is spreading rapidly. Some especially among poorer rural voters. In members suggested the solution might be Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orban to go back to “paper and pencil” ballots or has turned away from pro-Western reform to disconnect critical electoral systems from and toward authoritarian-leaning the Internet altogether. Others noted that nationalism, Russia has influence through the worst forms of Russian interference had nuclear and oil and gas contracts while nothing to do with voting machines, but

12 with social media, where Americans’ own bipartisan atmosphere, a departure from deep partisan divisions and negative Congress today, where leadership seems campaigning empowered fringe voices more focused on scoring points against the regardless of their origins. other side than getting things done together. As one member put it, “we have Asked by members whether the met the enemy, and he is us.” Another nightmare of a full-scale cyber war could be pointed out, “if we can’t settle the D-R split averted by signing a cyber treaty with in Congress, how can we deal with China Russia, China and others, scholars and Russia?” suggested that would be difficult because of problems with attribution and because member recounted three basic U.S. has historically not wanted to accept rules for being effective in Congress. First, constraints on its own offensive cyber always be willing to compromise on policy, weapons. Further complicating matters is but never on principle. Second, find out that in the cyber sphere, unlike nuclear or what the other side most needs, and make even conventional weapons, it would be sure they get it. Third—the Golden Rule— impossible to include all the potentially treat others the way you would want to be relevant actors in a binding agreement, treated. If we follow these rules, the because there are very low barriers to entry member said, we can probably get to in cyber competition. agreement around 80 percent of the time. Another member decried the “tyranny of At the same time, one scholar the urgent” on Capitol Hill, while another cautioned, building up U.S. cyber defenses pointed out that the day-to-day business of in the absence of any formal understanding legislation leaves no room for strategic with Russia and China might be counter- thought. productive if it signals to these other powers that the United States seeks to be in Members were inspired by and a position where it can launch cyber attacks frequently repeated the line from Kennan’s at will and remain protected from any 1947 “X” article that America needed to retaliation. Fundamentally, a member once again solve problems at home, lead responded, there just is not enough trust with vision, and demonstrate “spiritual between major powers to avoid cyber vitality” amid competing ideological competition and even conflict, so a more currents. Some reported that they already dangerous future in this area looks saw opportunities going forward for inevitable. Other members agreed with this bipartisan cooperation on cyber security, assessment, and called for more work by social media and election security, Congress and the administration to improve especially in the fast-closing window before U.S. cyber defenses and resiliency. the 2020 election. Others suggested that joint work would be possible on trade, Policy Discussion recognizing the political sensitivities for Members started from the premise each member, depending on his or her that the discussions were far more constituency, but also stressing the productive and in-depth than their typical importance of U.S. trade ties for solidifying experience of committee hearings in alliances, especially with NATO countries Washington. A big part of that, some and close U.S. allies in . noted, was the friendly, frank and open

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Members were encouraged by sword. One member pointed out that bipartisan agreement on U.S. values in the competition is natural, and recalled the world, and some suggested this as a way to fears Americans felt about Japanese counter disinformation—by increasing competition in the 1980s. Rather than transparency and openness, not by limiting becoming paranoid about Russian energy or restricting information flows, including exports to Europe, the member argued, the Internet. The more transparent why not pursue an “all of the above” energy Congress can make the financial and strategy at home in the United States, to advertising side of politics, some said, the maximize affordable energy production of harder it will be for foreign interests to all kinds? exploit our open society. This, they argued, Members also recognized the basic was a better counterpoint to Russian and difficulty of persuading or coercing Russia Chinese attempts to nationalize and control or China to accept U.S. positions on issues the Internet than for Americans to do the that both we and they consider central to same. Other members suggested the need our national security. Some suggested that for broader civics education to help ensure new and broader efforts are needed to that future generations of Americans would bring cyber and information warfare under be sophisticated consumers of news and the umbrella of international law, along the information, regardless of the source. lines of the Geneva and Hague conventions Members were also in broad that restrict attacks on civilians, and forbid agreement about the importance of U.S. the use of certain inherently indiscriminate allies, and of alliances built on shared weapons like poison gas. Members were values and shared contributions. While not persuaded that China would be ready to members also concurred that U.S. allies in join in trilateral nuclear arms control with Europe deserve respect, support and the United States and Russia, or that Russia appreciation, there was disagreement on and the United States could agree to extend the right approach to achieving a more the current New START agreement limiting equitable sharing of the costs among them. deployed strategic nuclear weapons. One member pointed out that the U.S. has Members cautioned against always increased its defense spending during the framing policy toward Eurasia as Trump administration by as much as the competition with Russia and China. They entire German defense budget, and asked reminded their colleagues that cooperation whether it really made sense for Americans will be necessary to confront some obvious to spend 4% of GDP principally to defend common challenges like climate change, allies that don’t invest at least the same mass movement of people, radicalization, amount. and others. They worried that information In search of specific action items to coming to Capitol Hill and the United States strengthen the U.S. position in Eurasia, in general is so heavily filtered that members turned to energy, and agreed that Congress often has collective blind spots while low energy prices will reduce Russia’s about the ways in which people around the power and influence in the region, the U.S. world think about these problems. is now also a price-sensitive energy Finally, while they conceded that the producer and exporter. Thus, they U.S. foreign policy process puts the White conceded, energy really is a double-edged House in the driver’s seat on many key

14 questions, members endorsed a consistently would encourage the White House to fill strong role for the legislative branch of many still vacant national security and government. Active oversight and foreign policy appointments, especially U.S. involvement through hearings, deliberation ambassadors around the world and debate is essential. Members said they .

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS

Thomas Graham

Managing Director, Kissinger Associates

Since the United States emerged as America’s access to Central Asia, as it a great power at the end of the 19th facilitates the advance of China’s Belt and century, a core strategic tenet has been to Road Initiative. It limits America’s options in prevent an accumulation and concentration dealing with North Korea. Russian arms of power by a hostile state anywhere in the sales to China enhance the latter’s military world that could pose a mortal threat. That capabilities with advanced weapons systems danger has loomed largest in Europe and it is not yet capable of producing on its East Asia, the world’s two most advanced own, such as the S-400 air defense system industrial regions besides . and the Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jet. Easier The United States fought two world wars and more reliable access to Russia’s and prosecuted a cold war in the twentieth abundant natural resources east of the century to keep those regions free of Urals, especially crude oil, fuels China’s domination by a hostile power. Similarly, robust economic growth. Beyond Eurasia, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russia and China increasingly coordinate United States has sought to prevent the re- their policies to thwart U.S. initiatives in emergence of a threat of Soviet dimensions international fora, most notably the UN in the heart of Eurasia. That is why the Security Council, where each holds a veto. United States has supported the Together, they pose a mounting challenge independence and territorial integrity of the to the U.S. global position. former Soviet states, or “geopolitical In its most recent worldwide threat pluralism” in Eurasia, as assessment, the U.S. intelligence once put it. community warns that “China and Russia Today, the burgeoning Russo- are more aligned than at any point since the Chinese partnership threatens to dominate mid-1950s, and the relationship is likely to both East Asia and the heart of Eurasia. strengthen in the coming year as some of Calm along their long common border their interests and threat perceptions allows China and Russia to concentrate converge, particularly regarding perceived greater resources in challenging the United U.S. unilateralism and interventionism and States in East Asia and the Western Pacific, Western promotion of democratic values and in Europe and the Middle East, and human rights.” Their competition with respectively. The partnership constrains the United States, it notes, “cuts across all

17 domains, involves a race for technological Nevertheless, the Kremlin retains a and military superiority, and is increasingly remarkable capacity to mobilize the about values.” country’s resources for its purposes, as the Russian state has throughout history; Nevertheless, while the witness Russia’s impressive capabilities in administration’s National Security Strategy cyberspace. The mobilization might come identifies Russia and China as revisionist at the expense of the socio-economic powers and strategic competitors, it makes welfare of the overall population, and that little of the challenge posed by their ever might engender discontent, but rarely does closer alignment. Quite the contrary: its a leader emerge who can muster this policies — especially the punitive sanctions discontent to mount a serious challenge to and effort to isolate Russia diplomatically the regime. As a result, Russia has and its assertive trade policies toward China consistently punched far above its weight — have arguably reinforced that alignment. on the global stage — Russia’s current high- Meanwhile, Russian President Putin and his profile position in the Middle East is a case Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, extol in point. There is little indication that this relations that “have never been better.” situation will change in the next decade, What explains Washington’s even in a post-Putin Russia. complacency? In part, it grows out of the Likewise, other than its vast prevailing assessment that Russia is a territory, Russia is indeed a meager declining power and, as such, only a short- presence in East Asia. Its population east term nuisance to American interests. In of Baikal numbers slightly more than 7 part, it is a consequence of the dismissal of million, whereas there are over 130 million Russia as an Asian power. And, in part, it is Chinese just across the border in Northeast a result of a misreading of current Russo- China, 70 million Koreans, and 120 million Chinese cooperation and an entrenched Japanese. Russia’s Far Eastern provinces conviction that historical, psychological, account for a mere 1 percent of the gross political, and other points of friction regional product of preclude a sustainable, long-term, strategic (including , the two , alliance. and Japan as well). Despite Putin’s There is a kernel of truth in these insistence that the development of the views, but they overlook critical conditions Russian is a national priority, that render Russo-Chinese alignment a progress has been slow. growing challenge to the U.S. position on But the important consideration is the Eurasian landmass. To start, Russia not the size of Russia’s population or does indeed face long-term secular decline productive capacity; it’s the treasure of as a consequence of demographic natural resources in and the Russian deficiencies and lagging technological Far East that China can tap to fuel its robust advance. Even official projections have the economic growth and expansionist Russian economy growing at less than 2 ambitions. Roughly three-quarters of its percent a year out to 2030, a rate that lags imports from Russia are natural resources, projections for the United States, not to including crude oil, which alone accounts for speak of China and India. over half. The share of natural resources will only grow when the energy of Siberia

18 gas pipeline into China comes on line later of great powers based on spheres of this year. influence; China, which has benefitted greatly from the rules-based current order, Finally, it is true that Russo-Chinese appears more inclined to reshape the cooperation continues to fall short of the balance in its favor. Finally, the United soaring rhetoric of Putin-Xi summits. Their States is radically more important to bilateral trade may have risen sharply to Chinese economic and security interests $108 billion in 2018 (from under $65 billion than Russia is. Beijing is not about to in 2015), and China may now be Russia’s sacrifice its complex and delicate largest trading partner. But Russia does not relationship with the United States to rank among China’s top ten trading defend Russia against U.S. reactions to partners, and U.S. trade with China is nearly what Beijing sees as ill-advised, overly seven times larger. On foreign policy aggressive Russian behavior (e.g., in matters, China has been reluctant to Georgia or Ukraine). support Russian adventures in Europe — it refused to follow Russia in recognizing the Nevertheless, the United States independence of Abkhazia and South should be concerned by the rapidity with Ossetia, which Russia stripped away from which the two countries have been building Georgia in 2008, and it has not recognized their partnership since the eruption of the Russia’s incorporation of Crimea in 2014. Ukraine crisis and the collapse of Russia’s The Russian and Chinese-led Shanghai relations with the West and the damage Cooperation Organization1 remains more a their close alignment has done, and can talking shop than a forum for concrete continue to do, to U.S. interests in the short cooperation, in large part because Russia is to medium term. Even if unsustainable in focused on security arrangements in Central the long term, their partnership emboldens Asia while China is more interested in Russia to challenge U.S. interests globally, commercial penetration. and it provides China with resources to mount a longer-term strategic challenge. It It is also true that there are serious is already shifting the geopolitics of Eurasia obstacles to the formation of a Russo- to America’s disadvantage, as China’s power Chinese strategic alliance, including and ambitions grow, to the consternation of historical antagonism lingering from Russia’s our allies and partners in the region, exploitation of China in the 19th and 20th including India, Japan, and South Korea, all centuries, Russia’s disinclination to play the of which are seeking ways to constrain junior partner over the long run, and China. Russians’ anti-Chinese racial prejudices. Moreover, while both countries might chafe U.S. Policy at perceived U.S. global domination and In these circumstances, how should prefer a multipolar world, their views on the the United States pursue its interests? proper world order diverge significantly. How does it address the challenge of Russo- Russia appears intent on overturning the Chinese strategic alignment? current order and replacing it with a concert

1 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally established in 2003 to address regional security issues. The six original members are China and Russia, plus , , Tajikistan, and . India and Pakistan joined in 2017.

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To begin with, it makes little Russia plays different roles from the strategic sense to pursue policies that drive standpoint of U.S. interests at opposite ends Russia and China closer together without of the Eurasian landmass: In Europe, it is a due consideration to mitigating the challenger; in East Asia it could be a partner downsides of their increased cooperation. in forging a stable regional balance that The most graphic example is the U.S. effort favors U.S. interests. U.S. partners and to punish Russia with ever harsher allies in the Indo-Pacific region are already sanctions and to isolate it diplomatically actively courting Russia as a partner in because of its “malign activities.” While counterbalancing China. The United States having little noticeable impact on Russian should be engaging with them in conduct, this effort has not only driven maneuvering Russia into a position that Russia ever more tightly into China’s advances U.S. interests. One practical way embrace but has also weakened it in ways to do that would be to invigorate a set of that have enabled China to pay less for the triangular dialogues among experts and benefits it receives from Russia. eventually among officials — U.S.-India- Russia, U.S.-Japan-Russia, U.S.-South This is not to argue that the United Korea-Russia — to encourage favorable States does not need to resist Russian regional balances of power across Asia. violations of international norms in Ukraine or its egregious interference in elections. It Finally, the United States needs to does mean that the United States should set an achievable goal. Contrary to some consider the China factor and seek to thinking in Washington, turning Russia and mitigate the risk of stimulating closer Russo- China against one another is an impossible Chinese alignment. In the current task. Russia has no interest in a circumstances, a more limited, better confrontational relationship with a dynamic targeted set of sanctions, coupled with the neighbor, which would require it to devote renewal of more normal diplomatic relations immense resources to the defense of and a concerted effort to overcome Siberia and the , as it was domestic political dysfunction and division, compelled to do during the second half of would prove more effective in resisting the Cold War. Similarly, friendly relations Russia without encouraging a further with Russia have eased China’s commercial consolidation of Russo-Chinese ties. penetration of regions all along Russia’s Indeed, by offering Russia the hope of periphery, particularly in Central Asia, but finding a strategic counterbalance in the also in Europe, amidst the growing U.S. West, such an approach would likely resistance to the Belt and Road Initiative. attenuate Russia’s ties with China and Nor should the U.S. goal be to enhance its bargaining position on both contain China, another impossible task in strategic and commercial matters. the globalized economy that undergirds Second, it pays to look at Russia in a American prosperity. Rather, the U.S. global context, and not simply through the should strive to bolster the bargaining prism of Europe and the Middle East, as position of all the countries along China’s Washington tends to do (a tendency that is periphery, including Russia, so that deals reinforced by the bureaucratic structure of with China, in both the commercial and the the national security agencies, which places security realm, are more balanced and less Russia and Europe in the same division). exposed to Chinese exploitation. In the end,

20 creating regional balances of power across of its critical regions by hostile powers and the Eurasian landmass remains the most advancing American interests, as it has promising way of avoiding the domination been for the past 150 years.

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22

GETTING AMERICA OFF THE BACKFOOT IN EURASIA

Evan A. Feigenbaum

Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Eurasia is changing dramatically but “Economic Asia” have taken on distinct the United States is losing the plot. This is dynamics: the former remains trans-Pacific, happening in spite of the Bush with the United States still at its center, but Administration’s efforts to promote regional the latter is increasingly pan-Asian, more connectivity between South and Central diverse, complex and multifaceted — and Asia, the Obama Administration’s “pivot” or with China, even amid its economic “rebalance” to Asia, and the Trump slowdown, as a major driver of the action. Administration’s more assertive stance In “Security Asia,” the United States toward China in nearly every region of the remains an essential strategic balancer, vital world. to stability. Its alliances and forward- Washington is losing the plot deployed military presence continue to because it has failed to adapt quickly or provide comfort and security to nearly every sufficiently to three important and country in Eurasia except China, Russia, and accelerating trends. All three are closely Iran. connected to the rise of Chinese power. And By contrast, in “Economic Asia,” the all are altering the international order to American role, while growing in absolute which the United States has been terms, is receding in relative terms as Asian accustomed. economies increasingly act as a source of A Tale of Two Asias … demand, products, capital and trade for one another. Indeed, as Asia becomes more The first of these trends is the integrated— including Central and South growing collision between economic Asia where U.S. trade and investment have integration and security fragmentation. been less pronounced than in East Asia— For much of the postwar period, economic interaction with the U.S. will Asia’s dominant security and economic comprise a diminishing share of nearly orders were tightly interconnected, with the every major Asian economy’s overall trade United States acting as the principal and investment. provider of both security- and economic- related public goods. Put bluntly, this is no longer the case. “Security Asia” and

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Pan-Asian Regionalism … American policymakers make much in speeches today about indebtedness to A second trend is the persistence China and the potential for Beijing to exact and growth of pan-Asian ideas, pacts and a steep price in exchange for its loans. But institutions that do not include the United the International Monetary Fund (IMF) itself States. These ideas will persist, and some of was hardly popular in Asia not long ago. them will cohere, regardless of American Many in the region, especially in Southeast views and preferences. Asia, reacted badly when Washington In East Asia, these trends have deep refused to bail out Thailand in 1997, just roots. It is fashionable, for example, to three years after bailing out . And for ascribe efforts to build a pan-Asian many Asians, the most enduring image of economic and institutional architecture to the crisis is a photograph of IMF managing rising Chinese assertiveness (or, more director Michel Camdessus standing, arms precisely, to Chinese ambition). But that is crossed over a seated Indonesian president just one part of the story. In fact, Suharto, his head bowed, as he was contemporary Asian regionalism—the desire compelled to sign onto the IMF’s terms for to forge at least some cohesion out of the financial support. region’s enormous diversity—has deep The biggest takeaway is that when roots. It has found expression across Asia, Washington absents itself (or merely shows in many countries, and over several disinterest in the region’s concerns), Asians decades. will grope for their own solutions. Japan, for instance, is a close U.S. This is precisely what happened with ally, suspicious of the rise of Chinese power, the TPP after American withdrawal. The and has a strong trans-Pacific identity. Still, U.S. frequently argues that Asia will pay a Japan’s bureaucracy has incubated a variety big price for failing to confront China. of pan-Asian ideas, especially with respect Actually, the U.S... stands to pay a far to monetary integration. Before there was steeper price for creating, and then the Beijing-backed Asian Infrastructure abetting, a vacuum. It is no surprise that Investment Bank, there was Japan’s the eleven remaining TPP parties completed proposal of an , which the agreement without Washington: for all helped give rise to today’s Chiang Mai their tensions with one another, forging Initiative of bilateral currency swaps among agreement on pan-Asian rules beats both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries. “Chinese” rules and no rules. In the 1990s, the U.S. could squash And today, as Asia’s such incipient regionalism. But relative become more integrated, we are likely to power balances have changed considerably see more cross-fertilization between since then. Worse, the U.S. withdrawal from Russian-promoted institutions and pacts, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has Chinese-promoted institutions pacts, and fueled perceptions across Asia of American cross-regional institutions and pacts that are protectionism. Viewed through this frame, expanding their memberships and elements Beijing’s proposal of the AIIB (and probably of functional coordination. other ideas yet to come) cannot be so easily squashed since they lie squarely in a longer For one, although the United States pan-Asian tradition. bulks large in the global economy, it is, in

24 relative terms, not so large as it was in Asian money is also looking for yield and for 2008, and much less than in 1998. The project finance opportunities across Asia. 2008 financial crisis book-ended a “Historical Asia” Reborn … tumultuous decade, arriving almost precisely 10 years after the Asian crisis and The third trend, and perhaps the adding fuel to Asian debates about most important, is the reconnection of overreliance on Western economies by disparate sub-regions of Eurasia into a more dampening growth in the region’s traditional integrated strategic and economic space. export markets. As Asia has emerged from Unless Washington adjusts to this more the 2008 crisis, debates have intensified integrated Asia, and soon, the U.S. could about the utility of an intra-regional hedge, find itself much less relevant in each of its or cushion, against continued or future constituent parts. volatility elsewhere. The “Asia” that will exist in 2035 is But that is not all: Where G7 likely, in important strategic and economic economies were once disproportionately the aspects, to more closely resemble the demand drivers for Asian exports, the other historical norm that predated America’s foot now wears the shoe in a growing arrival, not the world to which Americans number of sectors. Asian economies today have grown accustomed since 1945. are more than traders; they are builders, Take China’s Belt and Road. It is lenders, investors and, in some areas, a widely viewed as an attempt to foster growth engine – for example as consumers dependence on China’s economy across of U.S. corn and soybeans (for their animal Eurasia, with potential strategic and even feed), pork (for their tables) and natural gas military effects. And there is something to (for their power plants). Asia is, as well, a that argument. Still, Beijing is succeeding, source of capital, not just a capital recipient. in part because it is borrowing and adapting Then there is simple geopolitics: ideas long advocated by others, including Asia’s emerging powers, including India and the United States. China, are less content to live in perpetuity Ironically, in the 2000s, the other with an architecture largely built by the foot wore the shoe. Instead of the U.S. West. This explains, at least in part, why condemning China’s Belt and Road Initative India, despite its deep ambivalence and (BRI), it was Beijing that bombastically suspicion of Chinese power, has joined both condemned Washington as a “schemer.” the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank America’s “crime”? Daring to envision a and the BRICS Bank as a founding member. “Greater Central Asia” and making efforts to And then there is China, whose connect Asia’s sub-regions through foreign and economic policies are infrastructure, policy coordination, and converging in unprecedented ways. With project finance. foreign exchange reserves still larger than This context strikes me as very the nominal gross domestic products of important. The regrowth of economic India, South Korea and Thailand combined, connections across Asia’s disparate sub- the export of capital has become an regions is a function of the choices, actions extension of Chinese foreign policy. China is and capabilities of many states, including not alone: Japanese, Korean and other Japan, South Korea, and India. It is not a Chinese invention, did not begin only in

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2013, and did not spring from Chinese development of high-speed rail for Indian President Xi Jinping like Athena from the Railways. head of Zeus. Indeed, China was part of Then there is the sheer this connectivity effort even before it “Asianization” of Central Asia, which owes launched the BRI, breaking Russia’s as much to the retreat of Russian economic monopsony on Central Asian oil and gas power and relative ebbing of Moscow’s with pipelines from Kazakhstan and primacy as it does to the arrival of Chinese Turkmenistan, an onshore production trade and capital. sharing agreement in Turkmenistan, and dozens of projects around the world. In short, the “challenge of China’s new activism”—Russia’s is, in my view, Why do others’ efforts matter? The more peripheral—is more complex than the Asian Development Bank and the World BRI being some sort of binary counterpoint Bank, for instance, have undertaken to the United States. Rather, we need to longstanding efforts on roads and power enlarge our framing of the strategic lines in Eurasia. The ADB’s Central Asia problem: Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program (which happens to include China) The United States risks being has been promoting six connectivity marginalized by an organic process through corridors—”linking the Mediterranean and which numerous Eurasian states, including East Asia”—for two decades. And it is no but not limited to China, are reintegrating coincidence that “linking the Mediterranean East, Central, and through the and East Asia” sounds much like Beijing’s direction of trade, capital flows, sloganeering on behalf of the BRI. infrastructure, and new pan-Asian pacts and agreements. More often than not, this is Here is another example from my happening without American involvement. own experience: The Bush Administration actually reorganized the State Department Gradually, but inexorably, the region around a connectivity concept in 2005, is becoming more Asian than ‘‘Asia-Pacific,’’ when it moved the countries of Central Asia especially as Asian economies look to one out of a westward-facing European bureau another, not just the trans-Atlantic West, into an Asian-facing bureau that included for new economic and financial India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During arrangements; more continental than sub- those years, Secretary of State Condoleezza continental, as East and South Asia become Rice and her team developed a variety of more closely intertwined; and, in its U.S.-backed ideas for regional infrastructure continental west, more Central Asian than integration, most of them premised on Eurasian, as China develops its western leveraging the strengths of the international regions and five former Soviet countries financial institutions and the ongoing efforts rediscover their Asian roots. of many partners. Insufficiently, in my view, the U.S. This included Japan, whose role response to this has mostly been to remains notable—it has been , not complain about the Belt and Road. Even Beijing, which is playing the dominant role without the Belt and Road, the U.S. was in project finance in India, for example, already increasingly out of the picture. including building the Delhi-Mumbai And the Chinese-Russian entente— Industrial Corridor, the Delhi Metro and the not an “alliance,” but a working

26 partnership—complicates the picture for the power, especially in Asia, is to be more United States even further. successful at bolstering America’s own power, presence, initiative, role, Whining Isn’t Competing … relationships, and arsenal of military, Washington can and must do better. economic, and technological tools. And it For one thing, American can best do this in concert with other policymakers need greater discretion and partners who have stepped into the vacuum better judgment about when and where to created by U.S. absence, disinterest, pick their fights. In the case of the AIIB, for protectionism, and worse. example, the U.S. went to the mat, That is why the recent Trump contesting a Chinese initiative in a Administration effort to coordinate functional area where existing structures infrastructure priorities among the U.S. and were clearly insufficient and the U.S. itself Japan and the U.S., Japan, and India is so offered no distinctive model. It turned welcome. So, too, is a development finance China’s proposal of a multilateral bank into reform bill making its way through Capitol a bilateral test of wills but without the Hill, which aims to make it easier for U.S. leverage to stop Beijing from moving firms to manage and mitigate risk in tough forward. Worse, Washington badly misread business environments. the sentiment of some of its allies. To compete in geopolitics—as in Here are some final takeaways: sports, business, and life—one needs to One, like Don Quixote tilting at actually compete. Washington has to windmills, it is futile for the United States to outperform the Chinese competition, not try to write China out of Asia’s story. And just belittle and whine about it. this would be true of any China, not just Xi There is certainly a deep suspicion Jinping’s assertive and nationalistic China. of Chinese intent across Asia today. But I One reason for this is cartographic: have seen enough from every sub-region of China borders every sub-region of Asia— Asia to know that the U.S. will not get far Northeast, Southeast, Central, and South. by telling third countries that they should The United States does not. Neither does forestall deepening their economic any other big Asian player. relationships with China. For nearly every country, and especially the smaller ones, Another reason is financial: even if that is an impractical choice, and therefore China cannot ultimately deploy the billions will be rejected. of state-backed project finance it has pledged to the Belt and Road, it can still And that is not all. Trashing China’s drop plenty of meaningful money into initiatives while failing to counter and countries all over Asia where the United compete with them signals other capitals States and its firms are largely invisible. To that their countries are of little interest to reject and battle against every instance of the United States on their own terms. Their China’s effort to foster connectivity, then, takeaway will surely be that the United would require Washington to fight both States pays attention to them only in the geographic and economic gravity. context of its strategic competition with China. That is a poor message indeed. A more realistic way to counterbalance the spread of Chinese

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The recent U.S. approach, whether Ultimately, at the political level, to BRI or to AIIB, risks inviting Washington spends far too much time comparisons, both implicit and explicit, playing defense against Beijing across between what Washington is offering and Eurasia—and to a much lesser extent, what Beijing is offering. The U.S. is against Moscow in Central Asia. diplomatically challenged and commercially As Asia becomes more integrated, weak in around two-thirds of the Eurasian the U.S. will become progressively less continental landmass—including many relevant in many parts of the region—in countries in Central Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, in most of South Asia except mainland . Sadly, then, the India, and in , as comparison will often benefit Beijing not noted above. Washington. Within a generation, Americans And in responding to BRI, at least, it could find their firms at a competitive is important when designing U.S. policies disadvantage in a part of the world that will not to compare American apples to Chinese constitute as much as half of the global oranges, much less to Russian pears and economy. Americans could become Iranian peaches. America isn’t China. For bystanders to the economic and strategic instance, it doesn’t have state-backed firms dynamics quickly reshaping this region. that it can leverage through billions channeled through state-backed policy The fact is, China is going to banks. continue proposing greater Eurasian initiatives like the Belt and Road. So the So Washington should be better U.S. needs to get off its back foot and onto leveraging its uniquely American the initiative. strengths—technology, innovation , STEM education, connections The U.S. can work with China but to the global capital markets, best in class that needs to happen in the broader context services and other firms, and so on. of strategy and policy in Asia. And this includes leveraging the many initiatives and It will be harder to deploy that partnerships from Japan to Singapore that leverage in the context of messages that also aim to promote economic expansion say “America First.” American business and connectivity—and thus, by extension, remains crucial, especially in East Asia. U.S. deal with Chinese and Russian power and companies have invested more than $200 the effects on U.S. interests of the Beijing- billion into the ten ASEAN countries of Moscow entente. Southeast Asia alone. But what is at stake is not just business but rules, norms, The key is to play to uniquely standards, and strategic momentum. American strengths—but then multiply them by leveraging these non-American partners.

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DOES BRI REALLY EXIST?

Robert Daly

Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, The Wilson Center

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is as much smoke & mirrors as steel & concrete, but it drives discussion of Eurasian integration.

The Question partner of most nations in Asia and has a growing presence in , the It is absurd to challenge the reality , and the , all of which of what China calls the Belt and Road Beijing now claims are within BRI’s purview. Initiative (BRI). These are real, important dynamics. (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has pledged up to $1 trillion in loans for BRI But all of them preceded the launch infrastructure projects in Eurasia and . of BRI in 2013. Eurasian infrastructure A project of such scope and ambition, which integration is a complex, organic would cost four to eight trillion dollars if phenomenon that dates at least to the end realized and which some seventy of the Cold War. If BRI is shorthand for countries—including over half of the linked Eurasian infrastructure, it is not Xi’s European Union—have “endorsed,” must be “idea” (although it is his acronym). China an established fact. Aren’t frantic U.S. would be Eurasia’s economic lodestone of headlines and the energy which American even if Xi had never mentioned BRI and leaders spend in attacking BRI proof of its China’s economic influence will expand even existence? if he never mentions it again. The growth rates of China’s trade with Europe and the The 21st century may indeed see the rates of its lending and investment in beneficial integration of Eurasia through Eurasia have not increased, moreover, since infrastructure. Should a continental network BRI was announced. China’s actual BRI of ports, airports, highways, and rail lines expenditures in the region have slowed take shape, China will undoubtedly play a since 2016. So what real difference does major role in financing and constructing a BRI make? Does it offer anything new portion of it. China’s infrastructure lending beyond packaging and pageantry? Why use in the region is high; its trade with the EU BRI rhetoric rather than plain language, like and Africa is increasing; Chinese China’s overseas infrastructure lending? corporations, small businesses, and speculators are found throughout the region; and China is the leading trading

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Suspicion of BRI hype is stoked by has inspired global thinking on Beijing’s refusal to provide any serious infrastructure investment and a growing list accounting of BRI projects and by the fact of American allies are choosing access to that, six years in, the would-be largest Chinese wealth over American warnings. undertaking in human history has no Rollout and Strategy blueprint, no plan. This deficit is glossed over by Beijing and usually ignored by In 1904, Halford Mackinder said that foreign governments hungry for China’s whichever nation ruled the “World-Island” largesse, but it is the most dubious aspect of Africa, Asia, and Europe would of Xi’s “vision.” It doesn’t take a civil “command the world.” He thought that engineer to understand that any genuine future World-Island hegemons would attempt to build an infrastructure network emerge from Eastern Europe, but, in 2013, spanning three continents would require an Xi Jinping declared that China would be the international, multi-year, feasibility study engine of Afro-Eurasian integration. and planning process comprising —to pick a Unveiling the scheme that would become few key factors—demographics, BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan, Xi said that environmental impacts, financing, security, “more than 2,100 years ago (China’s) geography, legal integration, technological imperial envoy Zhang Qian was sent to standards, and projections of future Central Asia twice to open the door to demands and industrial capacity. None of friendly contacts between China and Central this work has been done. Nations which Asian countries as well as the “endorse” the Belt and Road are not signing transcontinental Silk Road linking East and onto a master plan. Again, there is no plan; West.” In October of 2013 he told the there is only the prospect of financing. Xi Indonesian parliament that “Southeast Asia explains away this oversight by likening BRI has since ancient times been an important to a Chinese landscape painting in which hub along the ancient Maritime Silk Road.” the artist lays down bold, un- The era of BRI diplomacy had begun. representational strokes that form the Some Chinese analysts claim BRI backbone of the composition, then fills in was provoked by the Obama details later, when he figures out what he administration’s Rebalance to Asia. They wants. Xi says this with a welcoming smile, trace Xi’s strategic thinking to a 2012 article but his goal is to dazzle and silence foreign by Peking University’s Wang Jisi. Wang critics with Orientalist hooey. The artist in pointed out that, to the east, China’s naval his analogy is like a surgeon who makes options and sea lines of communication random incisions all over the patient’s body were challenged by (1) The Malacca and promises to provide a diagnosis and Dilemma: Japan, Taiwan, and the littoral cure somewhere down the line, when the states of the , , and mood strikes. form a geographic chain that How should American policymakers makes it possible to bottle China up in the respond to the Belt and Road’s ambition Western Pacific; and (2) the U.S. Pacific and ambiguity? A review of China’s grand Command and America’s Asian alliances. strategy and the BRI’s brief history indicate While the United States is an obstacle on that Washington has over-reacted to the China’s maritime borders, Wang noted, it is initiative, but should take no comfort in not a factor when China looks west across BRI’s many failings. BRI is incoherent, but it Central Asia, to Europe. Through BRI’s

30 westward thrust, Xi hopes to employ China’s ground. Deep pockets and can’t foreign exchange reserves, the construction overcome the uneven development, political capacity of its State Owned Enterprises and cultural diversity, age-old hatreds, and (SOEs), and the lending power of its state- daunting geography of the World Island. run banks to break out of the Malacca China has already written off bad loans in at Dilemma and build networks that guarantee least fifteen African and Pacific countries. If China’s supplies of energy, food, and it doesn’t change its lending practices, natural resources. The “New Silk Roads” are China may create one hundred Venezuelas also likely to increase regional dependence along the Belt and Road. on, and political deference to, Beijing. China What does this have to do with the doesn’t conceal the self-interest woven into historic Silk Road? BRI. As a People’s Daily manifesto put it in 2018: “The world needs China … That Almost nothing. Xi’s claim that creates broad strategic room for our efforts Zhang Qian “opened the transcontinental to uphold peace and development and gain Silk Road” and that something called the an advantage” (emphasis added). “ancient Maritime Silk Road” ever existed is false. The term “Silk Road” was coined in In its broad outlines, BRI makes 1877 by a German geographer to connote strategic sense for China. If it were pursued the historic phenomenon of Eurasian trade. carefully—in collaboration with international It did not refer to a particular route because experts and stakeholders and in accordance there wasn’t any; trade occurred along with global best practices—BRI could help myriad shifting paths that crisscrossed China meet its goals while spurring Eurasia. Some led to China, but pre- continental development. But BRI as modern Eurasian trade was not Sino-centric, managed to date threatens to turn Eurasia nor was it a gift from China to the rest of in history’s largest white elephant breeding the world. Xi’s mythologizing of the Silk

Countries which have endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative, from Wikipedia

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Road, furthermore, elides the fact that Will Beijing use BRI to extend its soldiers traveled the same routes as technology, cyber censorship, and salesmen. Zhang Qian’s mission was not to surveillance regimes? establish a free trade regime — Eurasian BRI seeks to build a digital silk road commerce began millennia before he was across Eurasia and to harmonize standards born — but to convince nomads to ally with that increase commerce. A Sino-centric China in a war against Turkic tribes in what Eurasian digital network, in which Chinese is now province and Central Asia. firms like Huawei and ZTE have major Suspicious Minds stakes, will make it easier for China to collect the World Island’s data. As China Because BRI is as vague as it is builds out its techno-surveillance state and grandiose, and because China’s foreign social credit system, and as its capacity to policy has been increasingly assertive under censor the Internet expands, concern is Xi Jinping, Chinese, American, and third- growing that China will leverage its country observers have raised doubts about economic influence and technological BRI’s goals, methods, and feasibility since dominance to extend these domestic its inception. The major critiques are as practices. follows: Is BRI a stealth means of attaining overseas Goals assets? Are there political conditions for BRI loans? The U.S. characterizes BRI as “debt Nations that depend on China trap diplomacy.” The accusation is that economically tend to support Chinese policy China knowingly makes unrepayable loans positions. Laos and Cambodia prevent to poor, corrupt nations and then seizes ASEAN from expressing Southeast Asian assets when debtors default. Something like concerns over China’s militarization of this occurred when China built and later artificial islands in the South China Sea. In took over the Sri Lankan port of April of 2019, Greece, which has endorsed Hambantota, although there is no evidence BRI and whose port of Piraeus has that China planned to seize the port from flourished since China took over its the outset. BRI does make large loans on management, criticized the European secret terms to poorly-governed countries Commission’s labelling of China as a with bad credit, but an April 2019 study by “systemic rival.” has not joined BRI, America’s Rhodium Group found that, to but when the Turkish Foreign Ministry called date, Hambantota is the only case of its China’s detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang a kind. China usually deals with bad loans by “great shame for humanity,” China’s writing them off or renegotiating them on Ambassador to Turkey made the link terms more beneficial to borrowers. between China’s lending and its political Will BRI be used to project Chinese power? agenda clear, saying: “Criticizing your friend publicly everywhere is not a constructive Armies travel by rail as readily as approach. If you choose a non-constructive exports and aircraft carriers can use the path, it will negatively affect mutual trust same ports as container ships. China’s and understanding and will be reflected in Maritime Silk Road, which is purportedly commercial and economic relations.” about commerce, maps closely onto the

32 ports the Chinese navy needs for a push stimulus. The solution is to make BRI loans into the Indian . to Eurasian neighbors and require them to use the borrowed funds to hire Chinese Does BRI aim at establishing China’s construction companies through closed currency as an international reserve tenders. currency rivalling the dollar? Methods That was the claim made to the author in a private meeting in Washington Opacity: Most BRI Memorandums Of in 2017 by economists from the Chinese Understanding and contracts are not made Academy of Social Sciences. public and there is evidence that some deals entail onerous costs and repayment Is the goal of BRI to create a revisionist, terms and require that projects be planned Sino-centric system that legitimizes CCP and built by Chinese companies. The practices? Chinese-funded railway link between Within China, BRI is overseen by the Budapest and Belgrade, for example, Communist Party’s Leading Group for awarded most of its contracts to Chinese Advancing the Development of One Belt, corporations through a closed bidding One Road. The CCP has set up courts in process that violated EU rules on open Shenzhen, Xi’an, and Beijing to adjudicate tenders. BRI disputes. Xi Jinping has enshrined BRI Corruption: in the nation’s constitution and has so expanded its scope that it has become a Malaysia, , and the shorthand for China’s foreign policy. BRI is have all accused China of bribing now inseparable from Xi’s other pet their national leaders to win their approval phrases: The China Dream, The Great of unaffordable BRI loans. These charges Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, the were brought after elections removed the Party Leads Everything, the Community of allegedly corrupt incumbents, underscoring Common Destiny. It has also become part the threat that normal, democratic political of Xi’s personality cult; at a Beijing volatility can pose to BRI projects. As Adrien conference in 2017, a Chinese foreign policy Zenz, of the European School of Culture and analyst claimed that Xi’s BRI vision “could Theology in Korntal, Germany, put it: not only guide the peaceful development of “Beijing has traditionally influenced the human race, but will benefit non-human politically and economically weaker nations animal species and plants as well.” by inducing ruling elites to trade selfish short-term gains for their nations’ long term Is BRI an indirect subsidy to Chinese SOEs? interests.” Beijing cushioned the domestic Energy and the environment impact of the 2008 financial crisis through a massive state-financed infrastructure Many BRI projects are fueled by expansion program. But China is now built coal—fired power plants. A Duke University out, as evidenced by the ghost cities study found that nearly 70% of the energy scattered across the country and vacant for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor redevelopment projects like the Binhai New projects comes from coal. China has built Area in Tianjin. China now needs overseas 14 coal-powered BRI projects in Indonesia markets for the SOEs and the labor force alone. A 2019 study by the U.S. Institute for that grew explosively during the years of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis

33 found that China funds more than ¼ of all for infrastructure development in the coal-fired power plants under development region. outside of China, many of them under the China’s economy is cooling down BRI umbrella. China’s Gross Domestic Product Feasibility growth is gradually slowing, due partly to Land versus sea government policy—Beijing wants, slower, more sustainable, high quality growth—and Trains are faster than container partly to factors the government can’t ships. It takes 45 days to ship goods by sea control. Chinese critics of BRI have always from Chongqing to Duisburg, but only 13 asked whether it made sense for the days by rail. But shipping is much cheaper country to invest so much in overseas and transportation experts doubt that development when dire poverty and Eurasian rail networks will ever be able to economic disparity remain pressing compete with ocean transport on cost. Most problems within China. Future popular BRI rail routes receive Chinese government support for BRI within China cannot be subsidies of $3,500 to $4,000 per trip for a guaranteed. 20-foot container to create the illusion of economic efficiency. Blowback BRI investment is slowing BRI’s international reception, which was mixed from the outset, grew steadily The American Enterprise Institute’s worse after then-U.S. Secretary of State China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) Rex Tillerson labelled China a “predatory estimates that China’s BRI investments in lender” in October 2017. As noted, the first half of 2018 dropped 15 % from Hambantota became the poster child for the same period in the previous year and this claim, even though its experience was that, based on the number of transactions not representative. The United States, and total committed capital 2018 would look , and Mexico have been resistant to a lot like 2015. BRI’s charms since 2013, as have India, BRI’s capacity is out of synch with its Japan, and, until signed an MOU with ambitions China in April 2019, the G7 nations. More According to CGIT, BRI lending will worrisome for China than the grumbling of not hit its promised level of $1 trillion until known competitors has been rumblings of well into the 2020s. The Asian Development discontent, the cancelled projects, and the Bank, meanwhile, estimates that the “gap” requests for renegotiation from within the in needed Asian infrastructure spending is BRI fold. Malaysia, Myanmar, the Maldives, $800 billion annually and that the Asian Kenya, and even Russia, Kazakhstan, and portion of BRI alone requires $8 trillion in Eastern European nations have expressed investment between 2010 and 2020. If doubts publicly or privately. The record to these estimates are even roughly accurate, date suggests that BRI nations judge it is clear that China’s lending capacity, Beijing’s intentions not by its lofty rhetoric, welcome as it often is, does not make China but in light of their own experience, the World Island’s infrastructure savior. The interests, and vulnerabilities. They are most that can be safely said is that China enticed by China’s deep pockets, but significantly increases the funds available

34 unconvinced of its good will and fearful of Chinese people, a reconsideration of BRI’s its broad influence. goals, methods, and messaging had become essential by the end of 2018. Developed nations are beginning to Chinese analysts had begun to ask why BRI respond to BRI with more than name- wasn’t more like the Asian Infrastructure calling. In July 2018, the U.S., Japan, and Investment Bank (AIIB), a development announced a partnership to invest bank founded by China which had rapidly in infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, where won over foreign skeptics with its all three are long-established traders and transparency, cooperative spirit, and expert investors. The EU unveiled similar plans a governance. BRI, in contrast, seemed few months later. In October, 2018, rushed, undefined, and ill-disciplined, even Congress passed the Better Utilization of to Chinese economists. It was telling, Investments Leading to Development Act therefore, that China signaled its receptivity (BUILD) to “facilitate the participation of to criticism by dispatching the esteemed private sector capital and skills in the President of the AIIB, Jin Liqun, to give an economic development of countries with interview to the Financial Times in early low- or lower-middle-income economies.” 2019. Jin said, “Chinese leaders definitely BUILD created the International have picked up the message. You cannot go Development Finance Corporation and on and on putting money in, without taking authorized it to allocate up to $60 billion to a review of what’s going on, to rebalance” make loans or loan guarantees and acquire … “China is fully aware of debt sustainability equity or financial interests in development in spite of the critical comments by some projects as a minority investor. By providing people.” technical assistance, insurance, and reinsurance to private sector and sovereign It was widely assumed that the entities, BUILD hopes to facilitate promised “rebalance” would be unveiled “sustainable, broad-based economic growth, when Xi Jinping hosted his second Belt and poverty reduction, and development”… Road Forum in Beijing from April 25 to 27, “achieve clearly defined economic and social 2019. Five thousand international delegates development outcomes”… build “public and thirty-seven heads of state, including accountability and transparency,” and follow leaders from Italy, Switzerland, and “high standards of transparency and Portugal would attend. A large foreign press environmental and social safeguards.” In corps and global Chief Executive Officers other words, BUILD challenges developing were also on hand to learn about Belt and nations to weigh the quality of western Road 2.0. lending against the much greater quantity The forum was a bit of a bust. No and ready availability of Chinese funds. Its new lending targets were announced, principles vs. resources. although Beijing said it signed new deals BRI 2.0 worth $64 billion over the course of the week. Delegates said the event was too These critiques, and the challenge tightly choreographed, yet poorly planned. from other lenders, made an impression in Journalists were corralled, with little notice, Beijing. Because BRI is Xi’s signature to an out-of-town press conference at which foreign policy project, and because Xi uses Xi Jinping took no questions. In his foreign “endorsements” to signal China’s speeches, Xi was low-key. He stressed that strength and global benevolence to the

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BRI would henceforth only support “high while lending responsibly makes China just quality” projects that were “clean,” meaning another medium scale creditor with no zero-tolerance for corruption, and “green,” great political, technological, or normative or environmentally responsible. Other than influence. No wonder Xi had so little to say the usual blandishments about the virtues in April. of development, cooperation, and win-win America’s Irrelevance? projects, that was it. There was no BRI 2.0—just a promise to do things better. And yet, for all of its shortcomings, Structurally, the BRI “rebalance” echoes Xi’s enthusiasm for BRI is growing, even in Anti-Corruption Campaign, which promises and Latin America. Many to weed out all the bad guys and govern BRI partnerships and projects are proposed well, but which never seriously asks how not by China, but by under-developed the absolutely essential Communist Party nations that have much to gain and allowed corruption to become an existential nowhere else to turn. It is too soon to draw threat in the first place. conclusions about the quality of most BRI- invested projects or to know whether all of China’s Dilemma this infrastructure will someday form a It is likely that Xi was silent because transcontinental network. The rough BRI, now six years old, faces a success of BRI, on average and over the developmental dilemma of China’s own course of several decades, cannot be ruled making. The problem was hinted at in Jin out. Regardless of the scope or nature of Liqun’s Financial Times interview, in which China’s role, the integration of the World he said that AIIB planned to lend only $4 Island through infrastructure could be one billion in 2019 due to a “dearth of investable of the greatest boons to humankind in this projects” that “meet the bank’s criteria for century. And where would that leave the fiscal, social, and environmental United States? sustainability.” Policy Recommendations That is a stunning admission. AIIB is American should not aim at far more cautious and professional than undermining BRI. Instead, the United States BRI, but as Exhibit A in China’s bid for should use the Chinese and worldwide global governance, AIIB is no less desire for high-quality Chinese investments, ambitious. Yet even Jin Liqun and his together with an enhanced American colleagues can identify only $4 billion in development program, to shape China’s bankable projects in Asia in 2019. How evolution as a constructive provider of likely is it, then, that the $64 billion in new global public goods. Through diplomacy, the lending that Beijing committed to during the strengthening of alliances, and its own BRI Forum will go to projects that are truly lending, the U.S. might flip the script: rather high quality, clean, and green? than being the means by which China builds China’s BRI lending cannot possibly dependency and deference in Eurasia, BRI meet global standards and be the vehicle could become the medium through which for creating a Sino-centric Eurasian order. It China incorporates global norms. Despite cannot be both responsible and glorious. the legitimate concerns about the program The contradiction seems insoluble. Lending detailed in this essay, BRI could prove to be for glory breeds suspicion and blowback, more about the integration of China than

36 the Sinification of Eurasia. Even partial • Enhance funding for the BUILD Act and success would validate this strategy. other development vehicles. • Prioritize competition with China by The United States should: strengthening America’s Eurasian and • Tone down rhetoric that demonizes African partnerships. BRI. It is unconvincing to much of the • Encourage Eurasian and African nations world and, because it draws attention to launch a serious planning process for to America’s declining foreign aid, it World Island integration. China should makes America look whiney and weak. have a major role in the process, but • Avoid using China’s propagandistic should not lead it. descriptions of BRI. China is not • Do not ask other nations to pick sides recreating the Silk Road and it doesn’t between the U.S. and China, but cast a have a plan for the integration of harsh spotlight on illiberal and Eurasia. American policymakers can ineffective Chinese practices whenever bend the conversation by referring to they emerge. “What China calls its Belt and Road • Encourage Eurasian and African nations Initiative,” or, simply say, “China’s to uphold their own laws and best foreign infrastructure lending.” practices when working with China. No • Show the world how it’s done by quarter need be given to “the Chinese investing in a modern American Way,” if it conflicts with local ways, infrastructure system that incorporates outside of China’s borders, emerging technologies and benefits all • Encourage qualified American and third socioeconomic classes in the cities, country companies to bid on high suburbs, and rural areas. Pay for it. Do quality infrastructure projects in Eurasia it soon. and Africa, even if they are financed by • Join the Trans Pacific Partnership to China. improve the standards of trade and demonstrate America’s economic commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

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CHINA’S RISE AS A GEO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCER IN EURASIA

Philippe Le Corre

Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Introduction know now, not just domestically, but in most parts of the world. Over the past decade, China has become central to the world economy. On the world stage, China has Building on its economic successes, it is become a strong player in institutions such increasingly becoming central in world as the United Nations and the World Bank. politics. China is now more ambitious, It has developed strong bilateral relations aiming to establish itself as a regional as with most countries around the world, with well as a global power. In his report to the the exception of a handful of nations still Chinese Communist Party’s 19thh Congress recognizing Taiwan diplomatically. Around in October 2017, President Xi Jinping stated the world, Chinese diplomats have been that, by 2050, China will have “become a incredibly active, with the Ministry of global leader in terms of composite national Foreign Affairs receiving a 15 percent strength and international influence”. budget increase in 2018, to help project Despite a growing internal debate in China Chinese diplomacy and soft power about the country’s international positioning throughout the world. In the six years of in the context of a confrontational tone with President Xi’s rule, the MFA budget has the United States, Xi believes he has the doubled to Rmb60bn ($9.5bn). power to realize these ambitions. In 2018, While it has created quasi- he chaired an important foreign policy institutional initiatives (such as the Asian meeting in Beijing, which reaffirmed the Infrastructure Investment Bank; BRICS notions of “foreign policy with Chinese Bank; and Silk Road Fund), China is willing characteristics” of “diplomacy of socialism to use the existing international order to with Chinese characteristics”, and redefined continue to take a bigger role on the the concept of a “global community of multilateral stage. common destiny”. China stepped up its overseas China’s rise has been driven by presence a decade ago by increasing its economic development, starting with the outbound investment. One of its key- launch almost exactly forty years ago of policies is to increase its footprint in Deng Xiaoping’s “open-door policy”, which developed economies, where it can acquire made China the economic powerhouse we technologies, brands and management

39 skills, as well as access to major markets aiming at creating a new, massive economic such as the . platform. According to the China global The BRI is also there to demonstrate investment tracker established by the China’s will to “help others” by building American Enterprise Institute, since 2005, infrastructures and to relaunch the world the total stock of overseas Chinese economy through its own initiatives. Some investments is approaching $1.8 trillion experts have noted that China’s foreign aid worldwide. China’s overseas investment is conditional and helps to rally diplomatic spree has reached numerous developing support and provide political benefits to economies where Beijing has been looking Beijing as well as some of the local elites in for natural resources but is now expanding recipient countries. As China entered an its business activities locally by building important phase of its political development public buildings, railways, roads, energy after the 19th Party Congress, heading to projects and other infrastructures. From the party’s 100th anniversary (2021) and Africa to Latin America, it is hard not to the 100th anniversary of the founding of notice China’s massive presence. For the the People’s Republic of China in 1949, it is past six years, many of these projects have worth pointing out that the country’s been encompassed within a major China-led economic rise is already challenging undertaking called the Belt and Road traditional geopolitics, despite a “clear Initiative, launched by Xi Jinping himself in divergence of views about how threatening 2013 and initially aimed at building or this might be to traditional U.S. dominance rebuilding infrastructures across the and agenda setting”. In April 2019, Beijing Eurasian . hosted its second BRI Forum in the presence of leaders from all continents, The plan highlights that the scope of among them many European leaders mostly the initiative will extend well beyond from the Eastern and Southern parts of infrastructure construction. For example, it Europe. includes efforts to promote greater financial integration and use of the Chinese currency An exporter of influence (the yuan, or RMB) by foreign countries, In many parts of the world, China’s create an “Information Silk Road” linking presence is taking place through economic regional information and communications channels but Beijing has, in addition, technology networks, and lower barriers to become an exporter of political influence. cross-border trade and investment in the Through some of its most vocal region, among other initiatives. With the representatives, it is increasingly presenting broader BRI definition brought forward in itself as an alternative to the Western 2017, some analysts have described China’s democratic model, leading numerous ambition as “higher, more aggressive and Western analysts to call China a “revisionist” opportunistic due to the relative decline” of power. Perhaps “disruptive” might be a American power. Although only officially better way to qualify it as China’s strategy supported by just one of the leading G7 “is actually one of portfolio diversification, world economies (Italy, since March 2019), not the replacement of institutions and the BRI is gaining visibility, and often strong system” according to my Carnegie support from local authorities. Beijing is Endowment colleague Evan Feigenbaum. Still, Beijing’s narrative has had an impact

40 on a number of governments around the As China’s inroads into Europe are world – a majority of them classified as increasing, it is worth addressing the “illiberal”: (Egypt, , Ethiopia, Turkey, question of China’s growing geo-economic Pakistan, the Philippines, for example. What influence, and perceptions of its influence in is newer and perhaps unprecedented is European countries, especially in Southern China’s growing influence in European Europe (Italy, , Portugal, Greece, countries such as Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Malta), but also in Eastern and Central Macedonia, Montenegro, Hungary, the Europe where China has been gathering Czech Republic, Portugal, Cyprus and countries in a format called “16+1”. Since Greece, to name just a few. Cases of April 2019, it has been rebranded “17+1” Chinese political interference in Australia with Greece as an additional member. Other and have been reported members include 11 members of the during the year 2017, and speak for European Union (Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, themselves: from donations to Australia’s Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the three largest political party during elections to the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, use of local Chinese communities in order to Greece); and 5 non-EU members (Serbia, push certain agendas, increased ties Bosnia-Herzegovina, , North between China-backed cultural/media Macedonia, Montenegro). It is worth adding activities and local political groups have that a large part of the Chinese investment been covered in various articles. In Europe, has been targeting the Balkan countries reports have been more subdued and which do not need to follow EU regulations. somewhat less substantiated, although it is They remain relatively isolated due to the hard to deny the reality of Chinese lobbying 1990s war. They are close to the and search for influence, notably in Brussels EU, but not members yet, making it easier at the heart of European Union institutions. for Chinese businesses to operate. For the past two years, the subject Some key questions include the of China’s geo-economic assertiveness has following: Does China’s economic weight, attracted a lot of attention within policy and whether in trade or investment, lead to scholarly communities. For example, there some political impact on receiving is a growing discussion in Europe about countries? Is China’s governance model China’s interest in sectors such as energy, translating into major changes in foreign transport, port and airport facilities, and societies? Do local political elites care about especially information and digital pleasing or offending China? Does Beijing’s technology, which would lead to a stronger political weight affect some countries’ influence within European societies. In foreign policy decisions? Central Asia, Chinese aid and presence are Some of these countries started not often viewed positively in the local being Chinese strongholds in the aftermath discourse, with concerns including of the 2008 financial crisis, others are part governance, the environment, labor issues, of the Chinese “plan”, whether it is the BRI corruption and mass migration from China. or an overall growing presence on the In practical terms, local governments play a European continent to counter-balance the key role in influencing the public’s complexities of the U.S.-China relationship. perception of China, but in the end old China has already succeeded in creating a clichés often die hard. narrative: In Prague or in Athens, political

41 elites and media talk about China in a way Unlike Russia, which has notoriously that never happened in the past twenty been interfering in the democratic systems years. As part of these new links, local of several countries (United States, business communities engage with Chinese Germany), China’s influence is more opaque companies. Journalists travel to China, and discreet. Still, lobbying may be an mostly on paid journeys. Citizens take English-American word, but the Chinese Mandarin-language courses at schools and have certainly made it theirs. Like many universities, Confucius institutes or cultural other powers, China is now using new ways centers; sometimes, political parties are to push its agenda: not just in the economy, encouraged to conduct dialogues with units but also through the media, culture, think- of the Chinese state or the Chinese tanks, academia, sport and even the local Communist party, not to omit the many Chinese communities and Chinese students organizations that are asked, by the regime, through Scholar and Student Associations. to engage with foreigners. It goes from the Many of these entities are placed under Chinese People’s Association for Friendship organizations such as the Chinese People’s with Foreign Countries to the Association of Political Consultative Conference or the Chinese Journalists, branches of the All- International Liaison department of the China Women’s Federation, business Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which are associations, state media such as the instrumental in the propagation of the People’s Daily or CCTV, think-tanks such as regime’s messaging. the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, The Czech Republic: China’s Friend or research centers, universities, sport China’s Foe? federations, museums and so on. In most cases, we have noticed an increased activity One of Central Europe’s fiercely over recent years. independent nations-post 1989, the Czech Republic, had been known as a staunch Besides the economy (in many advocate of human rights. Following the fall Eastern European countries, figures of the Wall and democratization demonstrate a clear rise), there is a across the region, the election as the growing Chinese presence in the form of nation’s first president in 1992 of writer and “soft power” and sometimes of political former dissident Václav Havel led Prague to influence (“sharp power”). The number of become the center of human rights and presidential and ministerial visits, for democracy activism in Central Europe. “We instance, is a good case in point. Although were considered a model of the Velvet relations between China and each country revolution, especially on human rights. At differ greatly based on historical bilateral the same time, we had communist ministers relations, data collected through this in our government” recalls former Havel research, including interviews with local adviser Petr Kolar. Liu Xiaobo, the actors and analysts has led us to list them imprisoned Nobel peace prize winner who as “new friends” of China. In most cases, died in 2014 was inspired to write his there are also evidences that their foreign Charter 08 declaration based on the Czech policy decisions have been influenced by a dissidents’ Charter 77. rising Chinese economic presence which has led governments to align with Beijing on As Beijing wearingly watched issues ranging from human rights to the developments in Eastern Europe in 1989, South China sea. Czech relations with China became cool and

42 distant. Every year, the highly popular Havel safely out of sight”. “It became outright hosted fellow Nobel Prize winners including grotesque when much of central Prague the Dalai Lama and former leaders of the was cordoned off in what amounted to the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy movement largest scale police operation since 1989. in Beijing. On Chinese Central Television Despite having formal diplomatic (CCTV), Zeman declared that the Czech relations with Beijing, Havel even hosted Republic had had poor relations with China Taiwan Premier Lien Chan in 1995, leading due to the “submissive attitude of previous relations with the PRC to an all-time low. governments towards the U.S. and the EU”. Such an invitation would be considered In 2016, as CEFC rose to world prominence unacceptable by China today. Prague even when it was revealed it purchased a $9.1 supported Taiwan’s re-entry in the United billion stake in the Russian state-controlled Nations, before committing, under Beijing’s oil giant Rosneft, Jianming was made an pressure, to the “one China policy” in 1996. honorary economic adviser to the President, a rare honor for a foreigner. Havel’s successor Václav Klaus attempted to improve relations, and While it has the word “Energy” as travelled to Beijing in 2009. But it was part of its name, CEFC was mainly a current president Miloš Zeman who financial company, which has been at the orchestrated a complete 360° change. He core of many Czech business projects. This met President Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2014, included a 15 percent ownership of J&T then was the only western leader to attend Financial Group; a 49.9 stake in the Czech Beijing’s military parade in September 2015. Republic’s private airline Travel Service; Zeman’s entourage also started engaging Czech brewery group Lobkowicz; the with Chinese potential investors, especially Prague soccer club Slavia Praha; the a man called Ye Jianming, chairman of national airline; as well as real estate in China Energy Company Limited (CEFC central Prague such as the Florentinum Energy), who claimed strong connections office building. But no significant with China’s top leadership. The driving investments in energy have taken place. forces for the CEFC connection have been In March 2018, according to media former Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdík, reports, Ye was arrested in China, “raising former Foreign Minister Jan Kohout and eyebrows in Prague”. Martin Hala, who has former Prime Minister Petr Nečas, all been tracking Sino-Czech relations over the members of the Social Democratic Party. In past several years, noted that two envoys of 2016, a carefully staged state visit by Xi the Czech president (Vratislav Mynar and Jinping took place in Prague, giving China a Martin Nejdely), were then told in Beijing unique platform in a country not considered that “CEFC would effectively be taken over an ally. Martin Hala, a China-hand by the Chinese state, together with its commentator noted that the visit was “full Czech acquisitions”. A Chinese State-owned of symbolism, much of it unintended. A company, CITIC has technically taken over quarter of a century after 1989, Prague CEF Europe, the Czech-based unit of CEFC, citizens were treated to a spectacle eerily but much uncertainty remains. As reminiscent of the old, communist-era mentioned by another commentator, it is staged events. The organizers made sure not just investment that is at stake: it is that potential trouble-makers were kept also the credibility of the President’s office.

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received a nationwide Chinese license in 2014 to operate its Home Credit services in China. According to a recent report, Kellner had received lobbying help from CEFC associate Jaroslav Tvrdík. These awkward developments, especially with regard to President Miloš Zeman Figure 1: Czech Republic Imports from China was U.S.$20.47 Billion during 2017,according to the United Nations COMTRADE database and his entourage, have on . prompted a debate about “the wisdom of tying the country’s Zeman has made significant ideological future to mysterious Chinese entities and to concessions to Beijing after cozying up to the Communist regime in Beijing” according CEFC, raising questions of heavy-handed to Hala who argues that CEFC’s main Chinese political influence in the central investments in the Czech Republic “weren’t European country”. economic, they were about buying up the loyalty of Czech officials”. Despite the President’s strong will, leading to the country’s foreign policy shifts, Chinese investments in the Czech Republic remain minimal. From almost nil, bilateral trade has been increasing: In 2016, Czech exports to China climbed to $1,921 billion (1.19 percent of total Czech exports) but Chinese exports to the Czech Republic amounted to $17,770 billion (12.66 percent of total Figure 2: Czech Republic Survey. When it comes to foreign direct Investments, who would you like them to come from? (author’s Czech imports), underlining a survey, 2018) massive deficit between the two nations. Tourism from China has been Regional context increasing, with three direct flights from It is hard to separate the Czech case Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu - and a fourth from the regional context. Since 2010, one, Kunming, is being finalized. The Czech Central and Eastern European (CEE) agency for investment promotion, Czech countries –all former members of the Invest, estimates in 2017 that China had Socialist Bloc- have become important to become one of the top five foreign investors the Chinese strategy. Enter the already in the Czech Republic, but few actual mentioned 16+1 format (now 17+1 with projects have been executed. Actual data Greece’s recent arrival). and figures remain sparse. On the Czech side, the PPF group, led by Petr Kellner, Almost all countries of the region are part of this group, set up by China to

44 increase relations with former members of their own or their close neighbors; in fact, the Soviet Bloc. the ones who possess a holistic knowledge of all of them are the Chinese Having become full members of the representatives”. European Union since 2004, many of these countries have felt chastised by the EU and During the latest 16+1 summit in Germany during and after the 2008 - April 2019 in Croatia, Premier Li Keqiang debt crisis. Several governments, including promised to buy “more products from those of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Eastern and Central Europe” but some Republic have also been unhappy with the dismissed this as “déjà vu”. Chinese imports ways the EU handled the 2016 Syrian are less than 10% of Chinese exports from refugee crisis; above all, they needed cash and to the region – and there has been no which led a number of local politicians to sign of significant improvement. welcome and encourage Chinese Chinese Soft Power and Influence in investments in infrastructures. Although the Czech Republic EU has for the past fifteen years pumped large amounts of money into the region, it President Miloš Zeman who is also come with “strings attached” (ie with strict considered pro-Russia and has opened the competition rules and transparency door to Chinese investors, was re-elected as requirements) in the form of grants. Czech president for a second term, albeit Chinese loans tend to be more difficult to with only a slight margin. The Czech track down, therefore favored by less President has limited powers but he principled businessmen and politicians. benefited from a long and convenient status quo situation in Parliament. What is China aiming at with CEE? Increased influence and presence, leverage Thanks to a favorable environment on European institutions for those member- under Zeman’s presidency, China (through states and potential impact on the EU for CEFC) has increased its presence. The aspiring members in the Balkans. It may President’s office and several ministries also be testing its own political model of have been supplied—for free—with tablets state capitalism in Eastern European and smart phones by the Chinese relatively adolescent institutions. By and telecommunication company Huawei, large, it is looking at building a coalition of without much of a public debate ever taking country friends on the world stage, of which place. The Czech-China Chamber of CEE is a key-part. Unlike in Central Asia and Commerce, for example, is chaired by the Caucasus, it is unlikely that Russia will CEFC’s Jaroslav Tvrdík, a former minister. interfere in China’s plans in Eastern Europe. Several think-tanks have hosted Belt and What matters here is China’s “symbolic Road-related conferences, including a power”: “China creates the list of the CEE newly-formed “Sino-Czech Center for countries that comprise the region, Cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative” exercising the power to arbitrarily which held its first forum in 2017. consecrate boundaries of the CEE region as Numerous politicians and journalists have comprised by the countries only China had paid trips to China. But the economic considers part of the region. Moreover, impact of Zeman’s policy orientations have inside the 16 + 1, the CEE representatives so far failed to materialize. In fact, many of know very little about countries other than the CEFC investments never took place. It

45 certainly gave a bad name to Chinese investors, and state-owned CITIC (which have taken over most of CEFC assets) is now struggling to get back to a normal state of affairs. There is hope that Prague is getting back to be a center of democratic thinking. Previously part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, then of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic is surrounded by bigger European democracies such as Germany and Poland, but remains a proudly independent member of the European Union. Unlike Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Czech elites have been mainly pro-Western. In power since July 2018, the government of prime minister Andrej Babiš has been more cautious vis-a-vis China. For example, he announced Prague would be preventing Huawei from building the Czech Republic’s 5G network. It came as a surprise to Beijing, but the Chinese leadership should have remembered that Prague is the city of democratic hero writer-turned president Václav Havel that, thirty years ago, took a prominent role in the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

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IT’S TIME TO RETHINK RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

Dimitri Trenin

Direcor, Carnegie Moscow Center

A broad public discussion on Moscow’s foreign policy goals and objectives is long overdue. International issues are affecting the interests of Russian society as a whole more and more, making it necessary for private citizens to take a greater interest in their country’s conduct abroad, especially in the single continental space that is Greater Eurasia. It has been just over five years since structures on terms acceptable to Russia the Ukraine crisis began, drastically (plan A)2 and the reintegration of the post- reorienting Russia’s foreign policy and Soviet space with an eye to creating a destroying the two main pillars of Russia’s Russian-led power bloc (plan B).3 Soon post-Soviet course in just a few months:1 thereafter, the hope of forming a close Moscow’s integration into Western alliance with China (plan C) faded, too.4

1 The Ukraine crisis worked as a catalyst, rather than the cause, of these changes. Russia’s relations with the West had been progressively strained since 2011; attempts at deep politico-economic and military integration with the former Soviet republics had been receiving a pushback, not least from Ukraine itself, well before 2014. In both cases, integration failed due to the rejection by Russia of U.S. leadership over it, and the rejection by the ex-republics of Russia’s would-be dominance. 2 Iterations of plan A included Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1989 vision of a “common European home”; then Russian president ’s proposals in the 1990s for a comprehensive partnership with the United States and European countries; President Vladimir Putin’s 2001 speech on Russia’s “European choice” and subsequent talk as prime minister of “,” a space of economic cooperation from to ; and then president ’s 2010 proposals for a Euro-Atlantic security space and a common Russia–NATO missile defense system. In practical terms, Russia joined the in 1996; concluded partnership agreements with the EU in 1997 and NATO in 1997 and 2002; and became a member of the Group of 8, or G8, in 1998. 3 Putin has made serious attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (1999) and the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and (2009) were established for this purpose, with the latter institution eventually transformed into the Eurasian (2015). A manifesto on Eurasian integration was unveiled in a 2012 Izvestiya article by Putin: Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya sosredotachivayetsya—vyzovy, na kotorye my dolzhny otvetit” [Russia focuses: Challenges that we must respond to], Izvestiya, January 16, 2012, https://iz.ru/news/511884. 4 See the following remark by a famous Chinese political scientist, Yan Xuetong, to a Kommersant journalist: “I do not understand why Russia does not insist on forming an alliance with China.” Quoted in Mikhail Korostikov, “‘Ne ponimayu, pochemu Rossiya ne nastaivayet na formirovanii alyansa s Kitayem’”

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Today, Russia’s relations with the West are down a path already taken by the rest of characterized by alienation and the former Soviet states. confrontation. Post-Soviet states regard Russia has thus lost strategic Russia as at worst a hostile power and at partners in not only the West but also its best a pragmatic partner, accepting at most own neighborhood. Geopolitically, it is elements of integration. Relations with isolated yet free. Modern Russia has many China, for their part, are increasingly close, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The Russian mostly to Beijing’s benefit.5 economy is trailing behind a dozen others. All of this has forced Russia to Russia’s scientific and technical capabilities, pivot—not to the East, but to itself. Such a once among the world’s most powerful, lag step is entirely logical. Post-Soviet far behind those of current leaders in developments have made clear that Russia scientific and technical innovation. Yet will not accept U.S. global leadership, a Russia remains able to think and act stance that necessarily closes the door to its globally. If Russia’s internal contradictions integration into Western-led structures. It are resolved in a constructive way—and this has also become clear that the United is a big if, given the scale and complexity of States does not intend to tolerate an the tasks ahead—the country can still play independent Russian foreign policy, while an important and positive role in the world the EU does not intend to tolerate Russia’s in the late twenty-first century. domestic political order. This has not only The geopolitical goals Russia has set put the issue of Russia’s integration into the for itself explain its current predicament. expanded West to rest but also created The foreign policy of post-Soviet Russia has conditions for the return of great-power long been characterized by a mismatch of rivalry and a clash of values. means and ends. As a result, Moscow has in The first quarter-century after the practice found itself constantly reacting to Soviet collapse saw the former Soviet the actions of opponents and focusing on republics pass through the first stage of tactical moves. This approach has enabled building new independent states. The some victories, but it is also a major cause Ukrainian revolution of 2013–2014 resulted of the present crisis in relations between from the desire of the Ukrainian elite, Russia and both the West and other post- supported by the West, to finally break the Soviet states in general and the geopolitical ties binding Kiev to Moscow. Moscow’s catastrophe of 2014 in particular. Russia’s forceful response to events in Ukraine, in leaders—its future ones, if not its current turn, forced its two closest partners, Belarus ones—will have to reevaluate its geopolitical and Kazakhstan, to accelerate their situation and take inventory of Moscow’s movement away from Russia and head foreign policy goals and the strategies by which it will achieve them.

[“I do not understand why Russia does not insist on forming an alliance with China”], Kommersant, March 17, 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3243633. 5 China, whose economic, financial, and technological power are much superior to Russia’s, has managed, since 2014, to gain access to Russia’s energy resources and more sophisticated military technology. Given the U.S.-led sanctions against Russia, it is also poised to exercise more influence on Russia’s financial system and its choice of technological platforms.

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Russia’s leadership is often blamed It would be a mistake to consider for the country’s lack of a coherent foreign this a temporary situation and expect an policy strategy. That is not entirely fair. eventual return to pre-crisis conditions and, Reestablishing Russia as a great power, of with it, reconciliation with the West and/or course, is a major strategic goal, which has the successful reintegration of the post- just been achieved. Other stated objectives, Soviet space. Take U.S.–Russia relations, such as creating a full-fledged Eurasian which have since 2014 deteriorated to the Union or, just before it, working with the EU point of active confrontation. There is no to build a Greater Europe, are unrealistic reason to believe that this will change with and exceed Russia’s capabilities. With the election of a new U.S. president in 2020 international issues affecting the interests of (or 2024) or even regime change in Russia. Russian society as a whole more and more, The question is one of principle: either it is time for a broad public discussion about Moscow admits defeat and agrees to what Russia’s main foreign policy goals and resume playing by the rules set by the objectives should be and how they should United States, or Washington recognizes be implemented, a national conversation Moscow’s right to promote and protect its the present article seeks to jump-start.6 interests in the world, however the Kremlin defines them. A compromise is theoretically Countries, unlike people, do not possible, but one thing is clear: there will be migrate. But they can change their borders no return to the 1990s or early 2010s in and foreign policy orientation. Politically, U.S.–Russia relations. today’s Russia belongs to neither Europe nor Asia. The former borderlands of the Likewise, there will be no return to Soviet Union and, before it, the Russian “business as usual” with Europe, whose Empire have gained independence and relations with Russia began to deteriorate statehood; today, they vary in terms of years before the Ukraine crisis as a result of friendliness toward Russia. Russia does not seemingly incompatible values. Today, belong to any regional political and Russia mistakenly dismisses European economic communities and lacks the countries as little more than U.S. satellite capacity to build its own bloc. It does not states and as such considers problems in belong to any geopolitical or ideological EU–Russia relations merely an outgrowth of “family” and, on a political map of the Russia’s troubled relations with the United world, it stands apart. The “Russian world,” States. Its attempts to build a “Greater much spoken of at the time of the Ukraine Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok on the crisis, is essentially a cultural, linguistic, and basis of common interests have failed, while partly religious phenomenon, not a Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s concept geographical entity. This is the core of of a “common European home,” introduced Russia’s soft power, but thinking of it in in a speech before the Council of Europe in hard-power terms only destroys it. 1989, has long since lost all relevance.7

6 See the following findings for evidence to this effect: Levada Center, “Rossiya- Zapad” [Russia–the West], May 14, 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/05/14/rossiya-zapad-2/. 7 Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Putin: Plädoyer für Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,” [Putin: Plea for Economic Community], November 25, 2010, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/putin-plaedoyer-fuer- wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-von-lissabon-bis-wladiwostok-1.1027908.

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Indeed, the divide between Russia have established their independence, but and Europe is deeper than you think. For they have remained neighbors of the former three centuries, beginning with the rule of metropolitan power. The Russian Federation Peter the Great, Europe played the role of is located in Northern Eurasia, a single Russia’s mentor, model, and sole source of continent extending from Portugal to modernization. But by the beginning of the Chukotka. The Mountains have never twenty-first century, there had emerged posed an insurmountable physical barrier new sources of investment and technology, for Russians, and China’s political and including Asia, while Europe’s social model geoeconomic advance westward via the increasingly highlighted not only the One Belt, One Road project since 2013 has continent’s achievements but also its broken down any remaining walls between problems. Russia grew tired of European Asia and Europe. Eurasia has long been mentorship, and political cooperation with understood by historians to comprise those the EU lost its value in light of the bloc’s territories that belonged first to the Mongol inability to act as an independent strategic and then to the Russian empires and, player on the world stage. finally, to the Soviet Union. Now, thanks to the development of economic and cultural At the same time, a process of ties, as well as modern communications, a disintegration—of not only the empire but single continental space is being formed also the historical core of the Russian within its natural limits. This space, which state—has become irreversible. Ukraine’s serves as Russia’s geopolitical break with Russia in political, economic, neighborhood, can be dubbed Greater cultural, and even spiritual terms precludes Eurasia. any possibility of their integration.8 Under different circumstances and at a different To be sure, the main routes linking pace, Belarus is moving in the same the East and West of this vast continent direction, a post-Soviet republic that is have historically run south of Russia. Still, slowly transforming into a full-fledged East Russia is not on its periphery. Geopolitically, European state. The Eurasian Economic it neighbors numerous countries, from EU Union (EEU), for all of its usefulness, has member states in the west to China and not become the center of power in Eurasia Japan in the east and Turkey and Iran in that Moscow had hoped would emerge.9 It the south. For a country that touches three is an interest-based association with limited and borders Norway and North goals and limited capabilities to pursue Korea alike, such a high degree of physical them. It appears that the “Little Eurasia” of contact with the outside world opens up the —and later the USSR— exceptional opportunities, even if Russia is has been lost to history. neither the center of Greater Eurasia nor a “bridge” between civilizations. Russia stands alone, but it is not an island. The country’s former borderlands

8 A landmark event in this respect was the founding of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in December 2018 and the granting of autocephaly by a tomos (decree) the following month. 9 Vladimir Putin, “Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Evrazii—budushcheye, kotoroye rozhdayetsya segodnya” [New integration project for Eurasia—the future that is born today], Izvestiya, October 3, 2011, https://iz.ru/news/502761.

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Although it has distanced itself international affairs it once was, with its politically from modern Europe, Russia “sphere of influence” now limited to the de should not turn away from it or from the facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the global West as a whole; it should not seek Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, to become Asian or try to form an anti- and, with caveats, Transnistria. Fourth, American alliance with China. Far from tellingly, none of Russia’s EEU partners or or Asians, Russians have their Collective Security Treaty Organization own face; far from the “West of the East” or (CSTO) allies officially recognize Moscow’s the “East of the West,” Russia stands apart. claim to Crimea, and, in the UN, Russian It is absolutely contrary to Russia’s interests initiatives enjoy less support than anti- for Moscow to retreat into itself and embark Russian measures. Finally, Russian culture on a quest for autarky—the path of the and language have ceased to be the soft- USSR, but from a worse starting point. power assets they were in the Soviet era. Even after its messy divorce from Also, in qualitative terms, Russia’s Russia, Ukraine remains an important twenty-first century role in international neighbor with which Russia will have to affairs is a shadow of its twentieth- or even rebuild its relations, one way or another. nineteenth-century self. Russians will have Moreover, Moscow must take into account to proceed from this reality, not fond the mistakes it made in navigating Russo- memories of the past. Great-power status is Ukrainian relations in its relations with less the whim of Russian rulers and more a , whose break with its eastern necessity for a traditionally lonely country neighbor does not necessarily have to result and a critical condition for its survival. in a hostile relationship. Foregoing abrupt Today, Russia can still claim the status of a pivots, Moscow should stabilize the great power, but in a different sense than country’s foreign policy by striking a balance before, with Russia no longer a hegemon or between East and West on the one hand a world leader. Nevertheless, Russia is one and the developed North and the of the few countries in the world that developing South on the other. In the instinctively refuses to submit to others’ future, Russian strategists will need a 360- hegemony, dominance, or leadership. Both degree vision consistent with Russia’s new Russian political elites and Russian society place in the world. as a whole value Russia’s sovereignty above the benefits, economic and otherwise, of Russia’s society and its political elite ceding sovereignty and are able to defend have traditionally perceived their country to Russia’s sovereignty by political and military be a great power, an assumption that must means—a rare thing in international affairs. be reconsidered—not in the sense of Indeed, few other states are prepared to dropping the notion altogether, but in terms stake out such a position to preserve their of what it has come to mean today. First, freedom of action. Russia is no longer the country it used to be in terms of both its size and its capabilities. However, autonomy in international Second, it cannot be forgotten that in terms affairs and the moral authority that comes of population and gross domestic product, with it are insufficient for Russia. It is Russia ranks ninth and thirteenth in the obvious that Russia will succeed in winning world, according to the World Bank. Third, respect around the world only if it is able to Russia is no longer the role model in fully realize its human potential in all areas:

51 economy, science, and technology, and the transportation infrastructure; scientific, social and cultural spheres. It is equally technological, and intellectual capital; an important to adhere to proclaimed values, extensive and experienced diplomatic and especially legal ones, both at home and on intelligence apparatus; and some capacity the world stage. In the meantime, the to project soft power. domestic basis of Russian foreign policy None of this matters, however, if must be substantially updated and Russia’s economic and political system does bolstered. not fundamentally change in such a way Great-power status, more than just that man-made obstacles to economic and an end in itself, is inextricable from the role technological development are removed. that one seeks to play on the world stage Today, Russia’s political elite almost and the ambitions of a country’s leadership. exclusively serves the narrow interests of The principal foreign policy objective of any the administrative and moneyed elite, respectable government is to ensure one’s hindering the emergence of a functioning security and create an external environment state that is observant of legal and ethical conducive to economic growth at home. But norms. In such conditions, Russia will that is not enough. A great power must continue to grow and develop more slowly have some kind of mission. Russia’s mission than its immediate neighbors in Greater could be to maintain the world’s geopolitical Eurasia, making the road ahead harder— balance and strengthen security in various and longer. If and when Russia’s internal parts of Greater Eurasia and the continent situation changes, the Russian people must as a whole in a way that is consistent with be prepared to seize the opportunity. Yet international law and involves the Russians should not wait to begin discussing combination of skillful diplomacy and the the principles on which their country’s proportionate use of military force. foreign policy should be based. The overarching goal of Moscow’s I propose the following such foreign policy for the foreseeable future principles. Russia must act abroad should be turning Russia into a modern, pragmatically, primarily to promote or developed country while avoiding excessive protect its interests; it should not attempt to dependence on leading players in Greater impose a given political system or Eurasia, such as China, the EU, and the international order on other countries or United States. At the same time, it should regions of the world. It should have no strive to slowly but steadily normalize its permanent allies or enemies, save (in the economic and other ties to the West and latter sense) extremist and terrorist groups. actively pursue cooperation with Asian and It should maintain working relations with all Middle Eastern nations. major players, whatever their ideology or political system and however mixed their Russia’s leadership has significant, history of relations with Russia. though not unlimited, resources at its disposal in making foreign policy. These It should not impose its values on include Russia’s permanent seats on the UN others or engage in nation-building abroad, Security Council and other international and it must respect others’ established organizations; a strategic nuclear deterrent values and customs and tolerate all and modernized conventional armed forces; religions. It should respect the legitimate energy and other natural resources; security interests of others and be prepared

52 to take them into account. Finally, it should following formula: Russia and China must renounce any claim—which is at the same never act against each other, but they do time a burden—to domination, be it of not necessarily always have to act as one, individual states or regions or of the world thereby guaranteeing that neither power as a whole. These principles should underlie will stab the other in the back while Russia’s future conduct in Greater Eurasia; refraining from imposing constraints on how what Moscow’s strategy could (and should) the two states interact with the rest of the look like in relation to Greater Eurasia’s world. Russia and China are both major individual states and regions is explored powers, even if their economic, political, below. and military resources and advantages differ. They must maintain a certain For Russia, the most important distance from each other; otherwise, friction country in Greater Eurasia is China. becomes inevitable. Moscow and Beijing Considering the circumstances— have many reasons to enhance their confrontation with the United States and collaboration in numerous fields, even if it is alienation from Europe—it is critical for premature to talk of forming a military Russia to avoid becoming China’s sidekick. alliance. Such an alliance, even if its It would be a bitter irony if, having rejected formation were possible, would not be in the role of a junior partner to the United the interest of either country. Neither power States, Russia accepted the role of a would feel stronger; instead, both would Chinese tributary state. With this goal in resent being constrained and clash over mind, Moscow’s strategic tack with respect questions of leadership. to Beijing could be the facilitation of further Chinese involvement in multilateral Although Russia will continue to institutions. cede ground to China economically, it is still possible for Moscow to maintain and even In the political sphere, one such expand its advantages and in doing so institution is the Shanghai Cooperation make the Sino-Russian relationship more Organization (SCO). It is in Russia’s interest balanced. This applies to not only energy to turn the SCO into the world’s primary and other natural resources but also deliberative body on security issues in agriculture and, at least for the time being, continental Asia. Russia, which boasts more certain technologies, civilian and military military, diplomatic, and intelligence alike. Russia also has the potential to expertise than any other SCO member develop transport infrastructure linking state, can play a key role in this process. In China and East Asia to Europe by air, land, the economic sphere, a permanent forum and sea, that is, the Northern Sea Route. for EEU-China dialogue could be created to link the One Belt, One Road project to Moscow, and its relations with Russia’s Eurasian integration efforts. Beijing, can only benefit from Russia’s Meanwhile, security issues and economic development of business ties to other cooperation can be discussed, and action leading countries, such as Japan and South taken, within the framework of the Russia- Korea in East Asia; India and the ASEAN India-China (RIC) group, which brings countries in South and Southeast Asia; together three leading continental powers. Germany and the EU as a whole; and, of course, the United States. In the escalating In its bilateral relations with China, rivalry between the United States and Russia should continue to adhere to the

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China, Russia should pursue its own in their efforts—to move to Russia and interests instead of becoming a pawn in obtain Russian citizenship, an arrangement China’s game. Indeed, such is the approach that is preferable to Russia’s covert support taken by Beijing, whose appetite for risk for quasi-state entities like Donetsk, dwindles whenever it is thrust into Luhansk, and Transnistria; beneficial to Moscow’s confrontation with Washington.10 Russia demographically; and conducive to the implementation of the Minsk Relations with Europe must be agreements and the creation of an reimagined. Russia will no longer attempt to atmosphere favorable to the improvement embrace, let alone emulate, its neighbors to of relations with Europe. the west. For their part, some EU member states will oppose the achievement of good- As for Ukraine itself, Moscow should neighborly relations with Russia, being dial down its domestic propaganda, historically hostile to Moscow and of the abandon the mistaken notion that Russia view that it is a permanent threat to their and Ukraine are fraternal nations, and treat independence. Absent changes in this Ukraine as just another neighboring state. respect, Russia and Europe will remain The stabilization of relations with Ukraine economic and technological, but not should be made a long-term strategic goal political, partners. In the future, Russia of Russian foreign policy, one that can be should focus its diplomatic efforts on those achieved by letting return to Kiev’s European states it has alienated over the control and, following negotiations, securing years, an endeavor presupposing, among Ukrainian recognition of Russian sovereignty other things, mutual recognition of over Crimea, at which point Russia’s differences, mutual pledges not to interfere European borders will once again be fully in each other’s internal affairs, and mutual recognized by the whole of the international respect. community. Such goals cannot be achieved At the same time, Russia should not without at best the resolution and at worst go out of its way to erode the EU’s (and the de-escalation of the war in eastern NATO’s) anti-Russian consensus by Ukraine. There is no change in leadership in appealing to individual member states or Kiev favorable to Russia, “grand bargain” their leaders. Such efforts have backfired with Washington, or political settlement on spectacularly, and Russia should refrain the basis of the Minsk agreements coming. from interfering in Europe’s internal affairs, Instead, Moscow must accept that Donetsk even if the United States does not do the and Luhansk belong to Ukraine and will same. Indeed, it is of fundamental inevitably be reintegrated into that country. importance that Moscow avoid shooting Those in eastern Ukraine who have a itself in the foot by fueling European fears special bond with Russia or fear persecution of Russia. Moscow’s vehement opposition to by the Ukrainian authorities should be given NATO expansion has damaged Russia’s the opportunity—and materially supported national interests no less than NATO

10 For example, Russian companies are denied loans if there is a risk that Chinese commercial interests in the United States may be damaged as a result. See Mikhail Korostikov, Anatoly Dzhumailo, Ksenia Dementyeva, Oleg Trutnev, and Anatoly Kostyrev, “Novoye kitayskoye predubezhdenie” [New Chinese prejudice], Kommersant, October 24, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3779051.

54 expansion itself, while its practice of Europe, it is becoming one of Greater threatening those European countries that Eurasia’s principal centers of power. Russia host U.S. troops and military assets has led should strive to deepen its already Europeans to seek U.S. security guarantees privileged relationship with India in every rather than break with the United States. way possible and pursue cooperation in EU enlargement, for its part, poses a cutting-edge fields, where India has made challenge to but does not threaten Russia. great progress. Japan, a U.S. ally, is more Russia’s practical goal should be to autonomous in international affairs than transform the RIC group, which remains a Europe. As such, it has joined the West in purely ceremonial body, into a permanent imposing sanctions on Russia since 2014 yet policy coordination mechanism on key has continued to push for the resolution of issues of security, stability, and the Kuril Islands dispute and sought to development in continental Asia. A prevent a Sino-Russian axis. Although functioning RIC would give Russia the Moscow does not need Tokyo to serve as a opportunity to soften the rivalry between its counterweight to Beijing, the development two most important Asian partners and of Russia in general and its Far East in strengthen its own position as an particular would benefit from improved experienced (and benevolent) mediator. relations with Japan thanks to the island The RIC, having become the core of the nation’s scientific and technological prowess SCO, can act as a leader in stabilizing the and, of course, Japanese investment in region and preventing and resolving its Russia. armed conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan. That said, the signing of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan and the Moscow, however, must accept resolution of the Kuril Islands dispute is a India’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign precondition for the enhancement of Russo- policy that is not centered on Russia. For Japanese cooperation and the economic and geopolitical reasons, New transformation of Russo-Japanese relations Delhi will continue to deepen relations with from those between “distant neighbors” to Washington—ties that are no cause for those between good ones.11 Such a panic in Moscow, which should focus on solution, if and when it is reached through developing its own foreign relationships, not diplomacy, will have to be “ratified” by the undermining those of the United States. Russian and Japanese publics.12 The countries of Northeast and Russia and India have had a nearly Southeast Asia, especially the highly trouble-free partnership for seventy years. developed South Korea, interest Russia Today, India is rapidly increasing its primarily as economic partners. On the economic weight, building up its military Korean Peninsula, Russia seeks increased strength, and becoming more active in contacts and especially economic international affairs. Along with China and cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang,

11 Hiroshi Kimura, Rossiya i Yaponiya: dalekiye sosedi [Russia and Japan: Distant Neighbors] (2002). 12 Dmitri Trenin, “Kurilskii obshchestvennyi dogovor” [The Kuril social contract], Vedomosti, January 22, 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2019/01/22/792039-dogovor.

55 anticipating that a thaw will create main regional partner in these economic opportunities for Russia. It organizations. accepts North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a The South Caucasus, like Central reality and understands it as serving the Asia, interests Russia primarily from the purpose of deterring the United States. point of view of security. Moscow’s security When it comes to the interests, however, have changed denuclearization of North Korea, it makes considerably over time: nowadays, Russia is sense for Russia to continue to let the preoccupied with terrorism and extremism, United States, North Korea, China, and not international rivalry, be it with major South Korea lead the way. This, of course, regional powers, such as Iran and Turkey, does not preclude Russia from interacting or with the United States. Still, Russia and cooperating with all relevant parties, cannot leave unresolved the protracted including Japan, as it should do, with an eye armed conflicts between and to preventing war from breaking out in the , Georgia and Abkhazia, and immediate vicinity of the Russian Far East. Georgia and South Ossetia. Moscow has always recognized In the first case, Russia has long Taiwan as part of China and favored China’s managed to maintain relations with both gradual and voluntary unification along the belligerents; with the help of other world lines of the handover of Hong Kong while powers, it has prevented the fighting from considering the matter an internal Chinese resuming and escalating. In the case of one. An armed conflict between Beijing and Georgia, with which Russia went to war in Taipei, especially one in which the United 2008, Moscow has openly sided with the States is militarily involved, is clearly not in breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Russia’s interest, but Moscow would have Ossetia. However, Moscow cannot neglect no reason to, and should not, intervene its relations with Tbilisi, and it should take should one break out. Indeed, its main goal steps to improve them, such as by offering should be to avoid being drawn into such a visa liberalization (or, even better, visa-free war and remain unbiased whatever the travel); jointly ensuring stability on the issue of contention in East or Southeast border; and promoting dialogue between Asia. Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians. Stable relations between the three The countries of Central Asia, belligerents would open the door to a joint including , and the South search for a mutually acceptable solution on Caucasus are direct or close neighbors of territorial and border disagreements. Russia. Some are EEU and CSTO member states. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Iran and Turkey are among the Tajikistan cooperate with Russia in Middle East’s main players. It makes countering terrorism and extremism through sense for Russia to maintain close working the CSTO, whereas Uzbekistan works with relations and, in some areas, enter into Russia in these areas bilaterally. Russia has partnerships with them. However, since a vital interest in the stability of the their strategic interests differ dramatically, countries of Central Asia—especially Russia should expect nothing more than Kazakhstan, which, thanks to its location, situational alliances with Tehran and size, and EEU and CSTO membership, Ankara, even as it does its best to keep deserves to be treated by Moscow as its them at peace with one another. For its

56 part, Israel—a technologically advanced instability and terrorist and extremist country in which a significant segment of threats, the kind against which Russia has the population has Russian roots—has acted by militarily intervening in Syria. legitimate security interests to which Russia Russia’s strategic objectives with is sympathetic and interests that overlap respect to the Arab states should include with Russia’s. joint efforts to ensure Russia’s security, Russia would gain from Iran’s assisting the strengthening of regional accession to the SCO, whose status as security by acting as both mediator and continental Asia’s leading security defense partner, coordinating steps in organization would be reinforced as a energy policy with major oil and gas result. Turkey, an SCO observer state as exporters, and attracting Arab investment in well as a U.S. ally and a NATO member the Russian economy. Egypt and Saudi state, should be included in SCO efforts as Arabia will remain Russia’s principal much as possible. More generally, the geopolitical and geoeconomic partners, maintenance of a friendly relationship with respectively, in the , while Syria Turkey will continue to be of strategic will remain its main military outpost in the importance to Russia given Ankara’s role in region. the Caucasus and its control of the Black The Arctic, in the context of global Sea straits. warming, is for the first time becoming Russia is right to consider Iran a another geopolitical facade for Russia. The major Middle Eastern power and a Northern Sea Route linking Asia and Europe potentially important economic partner. To is becoming more and more active and, in be sure, Iran’s geopolitical ambitions in the the Arctic, Russia directly interacts with region divide it from Russia, but Moscow’s other littoral states: the United States, commitment to preserving the Iran nuclear Canada, Denmark, Norway, , deal is a matter of principle, as it opposes , and . Despite the fact that nuclear proliferation, especially in the most of them are NATO member states, Middle East. Russia should do what it can to Russia must minimize its militarization of bring about the normalization of relations the Arctic and leverage regional cooperation between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbors as a platform for improving its broader and the formation of a security system in relations with said countries. the Gulf region. In the event of military Asian countries—China, Japan, conflict between Iran and its foes—chief South Korea, and even India—are also among them the United States, Israel, and increasingly interested in the Arctic, a Saudi Arabia—Russia should remain neutral development serving Russia’s interests. and seek a quick end to the war. After all, Moscow’s strategic goal should be As the heart of the Muslim world—a to turn the Northern Sea Route into one of community to which Russia’s millions of the world’s most important trade routes and Muslims belong—the Arab states have an use this waterway for the development of interest in the peaceful coexistence of Russia’s northern regions and the Far East Muslims and non-Muslims, especially insofar as its security and sovereignty are Orthodox Christians, in Russia. However, it not jeopardized. In the Arctic, as in the Far must be kept in mind that the Arab world East and Siberia, the more international has in recent years been the source of partners Russia attracts, the better

57 positioned it will be—in this case, on its necessitating serious reflection and a broad northern and eastern flanks. public discussion. The ensuing debate should reexamine Russia’s role in the world, These rather general observations its relations with global and regional players do not detail a full-fledged alternative to as well as its nearest neighbors, what Moscow’s current foreign policy. The exactly Russia’s main foreign policy goals contours outlined above are geographically and objectives should be, and, finally, confined to the perimeter of the Eurasian Russia’s global prospects in the twenty-first macro-continent. They almost entirely leave century. out the , as well as Africa and . The main purpose of the present Today, foreign policy—not just in paper has been to emphasize the need for a Russia but throughout the world—is broad strategic design in Russian foreign designed by narrow circles of policy making, which in practice often decisionmakers. Ultimately, the choices they resembles a decidedly tactical and make affect everyone, which is reason operational art. enough for private citizens to take a greater interest in their country’s conduct abroad. Russia’s geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally in recent years,

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IS RUSSIA A U.S. 'ADVERSARY' OR JUST A 'COMPETITOR'? DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE, REALISTIC U.S. POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

Nikolas K. Gvosdev*

Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security U.S. Naval War College

When one examines post-Soviet do so cooperatively wherever possible, but Russian foreign policy, and particularly by use of both conventional and during Putin’s tenure as prime minister and nonconventional force whenever necessary. president, a number of objectives become Thus, Moscow has been prepared to engage apparent. First and foremost, Putin believes both in conciliatory and hostile behavior that the general settlement that emerged at with Western countries, sometimes even the end of the Cold War was predicated on simultaneously, in pursuing its objectives. Russian weakness, and so a key policy Russia has economic weaknesses objective has been to renegotiate, if and a brittle political system, but U.S. policy possible, and revise, by force if necessary, must be predicated on the assessment that, some of its provisions. Russia has despite these problems, the Kremlin has consistently sought to maintain its position sufficient resources and capabilities at its as one of the agenda-setting countries of disposal to remain an active player in global the world; to secure Russia’s freedom of affairs for the foreseeable future. Moreover, action not only on the global stage but also the objectives summarized above reflect a in terms of its domestic governance; and, consensus view of the Russian elite, so that as much as possible, to recreate a “zone of even Putin’s departure from office whether privileged interests” across the by choice, by mortal causes or by an Eurasian/post-Soviet space. Russia seeks to

* Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair of economic geography and national security at the U.S. Naval War College, and holds non-residential fellowships at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. The views expressed in the paper are personal opinions only and do not reflect any official position of the U.S. Navy.

59 internal political upheaval, will not change In theory, U.S. policy vis-à-vis this trajectory. Indeed, Russia is already Russia should be grounded in the twin undergoing a generational transition in its requirements of deterring and/or reversing political elite and its military leadership. Russian actions which we object to or which Retirement of Russian “boomers” and their threaten our interests (or those of our replacement by the Russian equivalents of allies) while simultaneously engaging to find “Generation X” and “first-wave” Millennials areas of mutual concern where a are bringing new faces into the Russian cooperative approach produces positive establishment. Yet this post-Soviet outcomes for both parties. We identify generation shows little interest in returning Russia as a “near-peer competitor” based to the 1990s paradigm: of a Russia seeking particularly on the reality that Russia is one inclusion in the Western world under the of the few countries which can credibly conditions set by the Euro-Atlantic world for project power beyond its immediate border, admittance. especially military power. Russia's near-peer status is based on its population, military- While Russia’s outlook looks more industrial complex and resource problematic after 2030—and a black endowments, which guarantee that even if event1 could collapse the sources of the Russia faces long-term problems, it will Kremlin’s power even before that point—it is remain a major international actor for the neither prudent nor strategic to base U.S. next several U.S. presidential policy on the hope that negative trends administrations. In dealing with near-peer might force Russia to change its course or competitors, there are two strategic to be more amenable to end domestic and choices. foreign policy actions which draw U.S. ire. As a result, Russia, in its current position, Russia has moved from a 1990s has the ability to reject U.S. preferences, to position of seeking inclusion with the West accept U.S. punishment within acceptable into a position of a competitor, so this loses, as well as to raise costs for the dilemma will not be solved by expecting United States in other areas. It is certainly a Russia to resume the position it took during competitor—and U.S. policymakers must the Yeltsin administration. The question also decide whether or not Russia is an now is whether the competition for adversary, and, if so, the level of threat it geopolitical influence and geo-economic poses to U.S. interests. As Dimitri Trenin of advantage that defines the Putin approach the Carnegie Moscow Center notes: “The and is likely to be carried on by his question is one of principle: either Moscow successors is manageable within an overall admits defeat and agrees to resume playing cooperative framework. If it is not, there by the rules set by the United States, or are implications for U.S. policy—which Washington recognizes Moscow’s right to would require the United States to decide promote and protect its interests in the how much of its time, resources and world, however the Kremlin defines them.” attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other

1 A “black swan” event, based on the definition provided by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, is an event which comes as a surprise but also has a major, disruptive effect in the world. Taleb has argued that trying to predict and prepare for black swan events is a risky strategy, and that it is best to develop robust, resilient capabilities that can meet a variety of possible negative scenarios.

60 challenges can be spared U.S. attention). It terms of how far Berlin, , , also returns us to the question of whether Jerusalem, New Delhi, Seoul or Tokyo will the primary driver of U.S. strategy in go in terms of punishing or isolating Russia. Eurasia for decades—to prevent a Most U.S. partners have a simultaneous rapprochement between Moscow and policy of trying to sanction Russian Beijing that incentivizes Russia and China to misdeeds while attempting to incentivize cooperate more with each other against the future cooperation. What has been clear, United States—should remain operative. however, is that our key partners have Finally, the U.S. political establishment must made it clear they are reluctant to continue tackle whether the goal is to try and deter to take any steps that might collapse the (or compel) Russia to change course, or to Russian economy altogether. Thus, the push for the removal of Russia as a major United States must weigh the costs of power by moving beyond deterrence and applying stronger third-country sanctions on “compellence”2 to provoke or accelerate partners whose companies and banks factors that would lead to a decline in continue to do business with Russia. Russian power. Put broadly, the two The Mayflower Group, a bipartisan directions for U.S. policy towards Russia is group of experts, former officials and to turn a near-peer competitor into a near- business figures, has, for the last two years, peer partner; the other is to turn a near- been grappling with this very dilemma. On peer competitor viewed in adversarial terms the one hand, Russia’s size, geopolitical into a non-peer competitor. position and military capabilities mean that In formulating a U.S. strategy, the United States does not have the luxury matters are complicated because America’s of selective engagement and punishment, major international partners do not share a enacting penalties against Moscow that common strategic assessment of Russia. carry no costs or risks for the United States. Russia matters differently to the U.S. than it At the same time, the need to sustain does to Germany, France, Italy, Israel, strategic stability in the relationship with India, Korea or Japan. U.S.-Russia relations another major nuclear power does not can be characterized by a narrow but strong mean that the United States must meekly focus on a few key strategic issues of global submit to all of Russia’s demands. importance. Unlike most key U.S. allies, the The Mayflower Group proposed U.S. is capable of strategic autarchy, is reorienting U.S. policy towards Russia along energy independent, and is far less a 3-C paradigm: cooperate, compete and economically connected with Russia. U.S. confront. In other words, the United partners in Europe, the Middle East and Asia States—and by extension the West—must have more in-depth economic relationships be able to shift along the 3-C scale, with Russia, depend on Russia for energy, safeguarding cooperation, for instance, in or see Russia as an important player in those areas that are vital to both countries regional affairs who cannot simply be (e.g. nuclear non-proliferation) while sanctioned or ignored. There are limits in

2 “Compellence” is a term invented by Thomas Schelling in 1966 to move beyond the concept of deterrence (preventing someone from doing something that you object to you by threatening punishment) to encompass using pressure to get another actor to do something the other side would rather not do.

61 creating ground rules for areas where the including more U.S. government support for two countries will compete (for instance, in research and development of hydrocarbon energy sales around the world). Most substitutes as well as continuing to develop importantly, the United States must be non-traditional sources of hydrocarbons and prepared to confront Russia—but to do so the infrastructure necessary for transporting with a clear understanding of the costs and them to overseas customers. To be consequences. successful, such a strategy would require environmental and regulatory tradeoffs as For instance, Russia has a strategy well as a retreat from free-market for creating a new normal in the Eurasian orthodoxy to allow for greater U.S. space, particularly in the basin. government subsidization of projects and The United States needs to decide how prices. much of a threat Moscow’s revision is to U.S. interests (such as whether a settlement Another key example is that partners in Ukraine which creates a more around the world can only sustain so many decentralized country threatens U.S. sanctions regimes. India, for instance, is equities). It must weigh the means and attempting to comply with U.S. sanctions on ways it wishes to employ to deter the Iran by reducing its oil purchases, and also Kremlin, raise costs for Russia, or does not wish to fall afoul of U.S. incentivize a change in course. restrictions applied to Venezuela. This, however, requires India to maintain its At the same time, we must keep energy relationship with Russia. Similarly, lines of communication open. Current laws Japan, wanting to ensure that Russia does and regulations that limit the opportunities not fall completely into the Chinese orbit in for contact with the next generations of East Asia, has limits as to how far it will cut Russian leadership, as well as a sentiment Russia off from investment, particularly in that engaging in meetings and dialogue is the Russian Far East. The U.S. also needs to somehow conveying a sign of endorsement weigh how much it is willing to do to get or seal of approval on the part of U.S. partners to accept its preferred course of officers and officials to Russian behavior action vis-à-vis Russia. and policy, put the U.S. at a disadvantage. In order to be able to understand where One step moving forward would be possibilities for cooperation might exist, but to create a new bipartisan commission on also to better assess how U.S. deterrent U.S. national interests and Russia, which and compellent efforts are faring, more would present a comprehensive analysis of contact, not less, is needed. options for Russia policy. One of the concerns of the Mayflower Group has been Moreover, in formulating Russia the reactive, episodic nature of U.S. policy policy, it is important to consider to Russia, usually in response to specific implications for foreign and domestic events (election interference in 2016, policies that might otherwise seem deployment of forces in Syria, etc.) with unrelated to Russia. For instance, measures adopted without reference to an diminishing Russia’s clout in international overall strategic framework both towards energy markets requires a more Russia and towards U.S. foreign policy as a comprehensive approach to U.S. energy whole. production that runs up against both Republican and Democratic objections—

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When policy is developed in an begin to contemplate much more stringent episodic factor, it does enough to irritate penalties or are prepared to sacrifice even the Russians (and sometimes our allies) but areas of beneficial cooperation in order to measures taken in isolation weaken the punish the Kremlin. This begins to move us deterrent impact and has contributed to a into lose-lose territory. feeling in the Kremlin that penalties Having a commission allows for a 3- imposed by the United States, while C approach, guided by a sober assessment annoying, are survivable. As a result, the of costs and consequences, to break this Putin team takes America’s less dysfunctional cycle. It provides a way to seriously than it should—and assumes that take advantage of openings to improve the continuation of hostile action (such as relationship but to stand firm against hacking or poisonings) can continue with Russian challenges to U.S. interests and manageable consequences. In turn, Russia’s values. behavior inflames American politicians who

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THE RUSSIA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP IN EURASIA AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RESPONSE

Stacy Closson

Adjunct Professional Lecturer, School of International Service, American University

Introduction bridge between them, they are at odds as to what ends this bridge serves. This When we consider Eurasia, we must presents a situation in which they divide up realize the potential challenges and the responsibilities to conquer their opportunities from a growing Russia-China individual ends. partnership. Russia is a threat to norms of democracy and capitalism. China is a They have different ideas about growing source of economic development Eurasian regional institutions. While the for Europe and Eurasia, albeit not always a Russians want the lawful or transparent one. Together, Russia and the Silk Road Economic Belt to unite, and China are working together to divide China conducts policy via bilateral and conquer, to multiply their force, and to agreements with Central Asian states re-order international relations. To address instead. This has a lot to do with the fact this, the trans-Atlantic alliance must be at that they have different ideas about the center of our broader Eurasian regional globalization of trade. Russia wants to policy. Europe’s Southeast is geographically remake existing blocs as part of a new a continuum of Eurasia for western globalized architecture. For example, produced hydrocarbons. NATO ensures Russia has pushed the expansion of the regional security. The trans-Atlantic China-Russia created Shanghai Cooperation partnership must manage the roles of Organization to include India and Pakistan, Russia and China in the broader Eurasian as well as reaching into Southeast Asia. landscape and ensure our mutual interests China, on the other hand, wants a new form are secured. of globalization—connecting trade blocs that already exist without geographical Russia-China in Three Frameworks boundaries—and picking up smaller states We can think about the Russia-China that do not wish to belong to blocs. Finally, partnership in three frameworks: divide and they have different ideas who dominates in conquer, force multiplier, and a re-order of what areas. Russia has insisted on retaining international relations. the military and political spheres in Eurasia. While there is Russia-China strategic However, as China’s trade, finance, and convergence on the role of Eurasia as a investments double that of Russia’s in

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Central Asia, this has eroded Russia’s engaged in direct actions to prop up a control, including China’s securitizing the friendly regime. Tajik-Afghan border. The third framework to understand Another example of the divide and the Russia-China partnership is their conquer partnership is in Russia’s Arctic coordinated effort to re-order international Region. Indeed, China is not a titular state relations, starting with the United Nations. of the Arctic, and Russia prefers that the This is not new; in 1997 they presented a decision making body be the Arctic Five ‘Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and (Canada, Denmark-, Norway, the Establishment of a Order’ to Russia, and the United States). Russia the United Nations General Assembly. opened up investments in its Arctic minerals Russia tows the broader agenda of limiting and hydrocarbons to China and has the role of the Security Council in protecting supported exporting them East through the individual rights, particularly in crimes Russian controlled Northern Sea Route. against humanity, the “Responsibility to But, there seems to be a limit to their Protect” doctrine, and invoking Chapter VII cooperation as further Chinese investments of the Charter to intervene on behalf of in an Arghangelsk port and a railway are on persecuted citizens. For the better part of hold. two decades, their statements accompanying vetoes or abstentions have The second framework to contained the same pro-sovereignty anti- understand how Russia and China work intervention discourse. Meanwhile, China is together, by design or default, is as a force working to lead in south-south multiplier. In the security sphere, Russia development. China has become the and China are both developing weapons of second-largest contributor to the United cyber, Weapons of Mass Destruction Nations peacekeeping budget and the third (WMD), space and counter space, disruptive largest contributor to the regular budget. technologies, information control, and China is successfully lobbying for its transnational organized crime. Russia and nationals to obtain senior posts in the China are sharing information on cyber and United Nations Secretariat and associated counterintelligence in the West. And, they organizations with the goal of blocking have increased their joint military exercises criticism of its own system but also to erode and steamed together in the . norms, such as the notion that the They also multiply their efforts to counter international community has a legitimate western-norms. This dynamic is most role in scrutinizing other countries’ behavior apparent in Eastern Europe and the on human rights and to advance a narrow Balkans, where long-standing Russian definition of human rights based on efforts to discredit democracy and the economic standards. Both China and Russia European Union exist in tandem with major have lobbied to cut funding for human infrastructure investments from China. rights monitors and to kill a senior post Finally, China and Russia are capitalizing on dedicated to human rights work. the rising tide of nationalism and discourse about sovereignty to portray Western The Director of National support for democratic institutions as Intelligence’s World Threat Assessment in foreign influence that must be resisted. In January 2019 had a section on a combined the case of Venezuela, they are jointly Russia and China threat. It read: “Russia

66 and China are likely to intensify efforts to practical trans-Atlantic policy in several build influence in Europe at the expense of areas. U.S. interests, benefiting from the economic The first area is economic policy. fragility of some countries, transatlantic China’s economy is multiple times that of disagreements, and a probable strong Russia’s and is growing. China may provide showing by anti-establishment parties.” leverage to European states, through This appears to be an assessment that investments, trade, and opportunities to Russia and China will act as a force balance or counter Russia. The United multiplier. However, during the Director’s States could support some Chinese testimony before the Senate Select investment in Europe, while assisting Committee on Intelligence, he said that European institutions in ensuring business they pose different threats: China is trying interests and legal frameworks are to outmatch capabilities and Russia is trying enhanced. A dialogue among American and to confuse and obfuscate. This appears to European experts could establish be an assessment that they will divide and boundaries for the Belt and Road Initiative conquer. projects through a more official framework Policy Implications than has occurred to date. There are very practical drivers in The second area is security policy. Russia-China’s partnership. They both need Chinese engagement in Europe and Eurasia Europe to succeed economically. Three out could make Russia more hesitant to take of the four major Chinese Silk Roads go military action, as it did in Georgia in 2008 through Eurasia to Europe. Russia remains and Ukraine in 2014. If China had bigger dependent on the European market to sell financial interests in states such as hydrocarbons to sustain its GDP, and Kazakhstan or the Balkans, maybe Russia Chinese investments in hydrocarbon would be less willing to harm Chinese production since the 2014 Western interests. Chinese leaders have never sanctions. openly endorsed Russia’s takeover of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Likewise, the At the same time, China is not next time there is a crisis in Central Asia, interested in allowing Russia to drag it into China could step up and support an political quarrels with the West. This international peacekeeping operation, includes not violating Western sanctions on where Russia remains reluctant to Russia in banking and investing. China is operationalize the Collective Security Treaty the European Union’s second-largest trading Organization, despite requests. partner after the United States, and the European Union is China’s top trading The third area is energy security. partner. China has a history of picking up projects and making a success of them where Russia The United States and Europe share has failed. Whether Kazakh oil or Turkmen an interest in seeking greater Chinese gas, Chinese interests were able to take participation as a constructive international stagnant projects and turn them around, player, contributing more readily and building new pipelines into its territory. capably to the alleviation of global China could gain a greater percentage of challenges. This could allow for a more interest in Central Asian energy resources and consider it profitable enough to send

67 them West to Europe through the southern BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and corridor, lessening Europe’s dependence on South Africa) to serve as an observer or to Russia. Or, China could invest in Iranian send a representative. gas development and build pipelines to Conclusion Europe. If China is supplied from Russia and its High North with the resources it An effective policy presumes a needs, this could alleviate China’s insecurity healthy and united trans-Atlantic alliance. over southern maritime transit routes. However this has been damaged by a series of policy turns by the United States. These The fourth area is regional security. include the U.S. Administration’s choice to Broadening regional security contacts engage in trade wars with the European through dialogue might be a good first step. Union, withdrawal from the Intermediate Russia is uneasy about China militarily in Nuclear Forces agreement with little ways China does not worry about Russia. European consultation, consistent public The United States could initiate a dialogue chastising of European states on defense among Russians, Europeans, and Americans spending, unilateral withdrawal from the on activity in the High North. In Eurasia, nuclear agreement with Iran and the European Union could engage in talks subsequent withdrawal of Iranian energy with the Eurasian Economic Union. Another export waivers raising oil prices, and the is for the European Union and the United announcement to leave the United Nations States to engage in a dialogue with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the

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CHINA AS A COPYCAT OF THE PRACTICES OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE EU AND NATO

Ivana Karásková

China Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs; founder and coordinator of ChinfluenCE1 and CHOICE2 projects

China has made visible inroads into offer multilateral working capabilities with the region of Central and Eastern Europe open trade mechanisms and established (CEE) over the past several years, based on logistics platforms. From CEE countries’ both bilateral arrangements and multilateral perspective, China is regarded as a source frameworks (e.g. 16+1)1. It is a newcomer of alternative investment that can help to the region, which is already occupied by diversify their economic and trade policies. a dense network of institutional The ‘China card’ can also be perceived as a frameworks. For Beijing, the region is potential ‘bargaining chip’ within the attractive due to its strategic position close European Union (as is the case shown in to major Western European markets and a Hungary, led by Viktor Orbán) or a valuable relatively high-skilled yet reasonably priced counterweight to Russian influence (as labor force. At the same time, CEE countries argued in Poland).

1 ChinfluenCE is an international project mapping China’s influence in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) through media content analyses and complex analyses of key agenda setters, revealing e.g. links between Czech political and economic elites and pro-China lobby. ChinfluenCE research results were presented at the , mentioned at U.S. Congress, in US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2018 Annual Report, Reporters without Border’s report and widely quoted by European, Australian and American press. For more information see www.chinfluence.eu 2 China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) platform aims to form a consortium for monitoring and evaluating the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The goal of CHOICE is to critically assess and analytically dissect 16+1, Belt and Road and other China-led initiatives and by drafting a joint strategy which could be used by 16 CEE countries it strives to offset the asymmetry in their relations with China. For more information see www.chinaobservers.eu 1 The 16+1 format is an initiative led by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, education, and culture. The format is often criticized as serving China’s interests and dividing the EU.

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China’s activities in the region of China has also attempted to shape Central and Eastern Europe combine the coverage of itself through direct economic investment with increased purchases of media companies, such as diplomatic activity and media presence. As Empresa Media, who owns a TV station and the case of the Czech Republic a number of weeklies in the Czech Republic. demonstrates, China’s influence so far has The latter trend has proved worrying, as been limited, and traditional media (print, ChinfluenCE research clearly shows that TV, and radio) have proved surprisingly even a co-ownership of a media outlet by a resilient against efforts at introducing Chinese company effectively eliminates all openly pro-China policies, especially if this negative coverage of the country. Not only entailed compromising of liberal democratic the tone of the reporting shifted towards values. Since China started as a complete being exclusively positive on China, also the newcomer to the region, the limited success topics, which the media with Chinese of its strategy is understandable. However, (co)owners have pushed for (e.g. Belt and Beijing increasingly utilizes the Russian Road initiative promotion), differed long-term experience and established links significantly from what other both private to the groups of sympathizers in the region, and public Czech media reported on. which represent a much more effective Based on the Russian model, China toolbox of influencing tactics. If China could go much further in cultivating learns not just from its own mistakes but contacts to favorable politicians of all borrows heavily from Russia’s ‘handbook’, ideological stripes. While eccentrics like the the risk of its rising influence in (not only) Czech Republic’s president Zeman have Central and Eastern Europe significantly done its interests more harm than good, increases. carefully selected political figures could China has already been able to establish influence the situation much more tight ties to politicians in the region, effectively from behind the scenes. Last but including presidents (Miloš Zeman of the not least, China has so far lagged behind Czech Republic took a Chinese national as Russia in effective use of social media and his personal advisor on China affairs and dedicated ‘alternative news’ (i.e. defended Huawei on a number of instances, disinformation) servers, but Russian downplaying the warnings of the Czech experience obviously shows a way ahead. National Authority on Cyber and Hence, the focus should be on political and Information Security); Prime Ministers economic elites of Central and Eastern (Viktor Orbán of Hungary promoted Huawei European countries as well as traditional and together with Greece watered EU joint and ‘alternative’ media in the region. On the position criticizing China’s human rights Chinese side, primary point of interest abuses); and former politicians (such as ex- would be its diplomatic missions in the Ministers of Defense or Foreign Affairs, the respective countries, companies with clear former EU commissioner, etc.). These links to Chinese state (especially its political elites are either both pro-China and intelligence services) as well as instruments pro-Russia oriented (Zeman, Orbán), or of inter-party dialogue with counterparts directly on a payroll (the case of above from the region. mentioned former politicians who have been working for the Chinese CEFC/CITIC It has been a long believed ‘common companies). knowledge’ that the Russian and Chinese

70 influences operate differently. While the Chinese influence has been if not welcome Russian approach has predominantly by Russia then at least tacitly tolerated. focused on influencing the narratives and If successful, China could effectively policies from bottom to top, influencing the ‘buy out’ significant portions of economic public first and then waiting for politicians and political elites in the region and purge to pick up the issue to appease the the media coverage of itself of any critical electorate, the Chinese approach originally views. Such a result would undermine the worked from top to bottom, focusing on countries’ commitment to liberal democratic political and economic elites who would values, could change their economic and then ‘take care’ of the population. But given political orientation, and simultaneously the Chinese interest in Russia’s influencing make them more vulnerable to manipulation ‘handbook’, operation of the same anti-West by other hostile powers, such as Russia The groups of elites and its growing interest in rising influence of China in Central and direct purchases of media, China in fact Eastern Europe due to the cultivation of may be seen as moving towards adopting friendly elites, suppression of critical voices both approaches. If China learns how to in traditional media and spread of effectively use both, it will significantly disinformation through ‘alternative’ news increase its capabilities to influence different servers threatens to undermine the forms of decision making at the local strategic unity of the European Union and (regional), state, or institutional level to NATO. The EU is arguably more important favor and/or gain China’s strategic goals in this regard at the moment, due to its while undermining the target—EU and collective economic clout and positions NATO member state(s). The Czech concerning specific issues such as the arms Republic, where both Russian and Chinese embargo, South China Sea dispute or the influence coexist and have been growing, status of Taiwan. However, NATO would be represents a litmus test for the Central and affected as well: With a host of pro-Chinese Eastern European countries’ abilities to members or, worse, a consolidated bloc of detect and counter the threat. such like-minded states, it would cease to The question of course arises of how function as a strategic forum for seeking much Russia is aware of the growing consensus on key security challenges, to Chinese influence in Central and Eastern which China as a rising power with global European countries. On one hand, the goals ambitions belongs. of the Russian Federation (to push countries Counter reaction of the countries in out of the EU and NATO formats) are Central and Eastern Europe, EU and NATO different than the goals of the People’s should aim at supporting the resilience Republic of China (to ensure the countries against pro-China assertiveness advocated stay within the formats which will enable by various political and economic elites with China to influence the organizations from ties to the Chinese state entities. More inside). On the other hand, the ultimate effort should be directed towards Russian goal is to create chaos and China’s uncovering and publicizing the mechanisms involvement contributes to achieving this used by China in influencing the local public goal. Moreover, in the Czech Republic no and politicians and towards experience significant clash of interests between Russia sharing between those who study Chinese and China has been so far detected, leading and Russian influence. Both EU and NATO to a hypothesis that the late coming

71 should be alerted at the growing threats global ambitions of China and the increasing posed by foreign actors to the member capacities and capabilities of the would-be states. While Russia has been prioritized by hegemon, Trans-Atlantic information NATO for some time now, China and its sharing and counter-measures coordination activities have not received a significant seem crucial. attention by the member states. Given the

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HOW AMERICA INVENTED CYBERWAR1

Emily Parker

Future Tense Fellow, New America Foundation

According to the Mueller Report, nuclear program. The collaboration, dubbed “The Internet Research Agency (IRA) Operation Olympic Games, targeted Iran’s carried out the earliest Russian interference Natanz reactor, which relied on remote operations identified by the investigation — computer controls. Malware designed by a social media campaign designed to American programmers took over the provoke and amplify political and social reactor’s valve pumps, allowing NSA discord in the United States.” operatives to remotely increase the flow of uranium gas into the centrifuges, which The Mueller Report and the dramatic eventually burst. By early 2010, the headlines surrounding Russia’s interference operation had destroyed almost a quarter of in the U.S. election may reinforce the Iran’s 8,700 centrifuges. perception that America is primarily a victim of cyberintrusions. But it’s not. For years, the Iranians failed to detect the intrusion and must have In fact, the U.S. government has wondered if the malfunctions were their been an aggressor for over a quarter own fault. The Iranians and the wider public century. In his book, “Dark Territory,” Fred might never have learned about the virus, Kaplan describes “counter command-control now widely known as Stuxnet, if it had not warfare”—attempts to disrupt an enemy’s accidentally spread from the computers in ability to control its forces—that goes back Natanz to machines in other parts of the to the Gulf War in 1990–91. At a time when world, where private sector security U.S. President George H. W. Bush had researchers ultimately discovered it. never used a computer, the National Security Agency (NSA) was employing a With Olympic Games, the United secret satellite to monitor the conversations States “crossed the Rubicon,” in the words of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his of the former CIA director Michael Hayden. generals, which sometimes revealed the Stuxnet was the first major piece of positions of Iraqi soldiers. malware to do more than harm other computers and actually cause physical The United States’ most ambitious destruction. The irony was rich, as Kaplan cyberattack began in 2006, when it teamed notes: “For more than a decade, dozens of up with Israel to sabotage the Iranian panels and commissions had warned that

1 This essay is an updated and modified excerpt from “Hack Job,” a 2017 article that ran in Foreign Affairs. Link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-04-17/hack-job

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America’s critical infrastructure was deploying trolls to post offensive or vulnerable to a cyber attack—and now distracting comments. Chinese Internet America was launching the first cyber attack commenters also try to muddy the waters on another nation’s critical infrastructure.” of online discussion. In his book, “The Hacked World Order,” Adam Segal claims Of course, cyberattackers have often that the Chinese government pays an targeted the United States. In 2014 alone, estimated 250,000–300,000 people to Kaplan reports, the country suffered more support the official Communist Party agenda than 80,000 cybersecurity breaches, more online. than 2,000 of which led to data losses. He also points out that until recently, U.S. Segal suggests that the United policymakers worried less about Russia than States will likely not win social media wars China, which was “engaging not just in against countries such as China or Russia. espionage and battlefield preparation, but U.S. State Department officials identify also in the theft of trade secrets, intellectual themselves on Facebook and , react property, and cash.” slowly to news, and offer factual, rule-based commentary. Unfortunately, as Segal notes, China and Russia are not the only “content that is shocking, conspiratorial, or players. Iran and North Korea have also false often crowds out the reasonable, attacked the United States. In 2014, the rational, and measured.” businessman Sheldon Adelson criticized Iran, which responded by hacking into the Social media battles also play out in servers of Adelson’s Las Vegas Sands the Middle East. In 2012, the Israel Defense Corporation, doing $40 million worth of Forces and Hamas fought a war for public damage. That same year, hackers calling opinion using Facebook, Twitter, , themselves the Guardians of Peace broke Pinterest, and Tumblr at the same time as into Sony’s network. They destroyed the two were exchanging physical fire. The thousands of computers and hundreds of Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has servers, exposed tens of thousands of Social launched digital campaigns that incorporate, Security numbers, and released in Segal’s words, “brutality and barbarism, embarrassing personal e-mails pilfered from packaged with sophisticated production the accounts of Sony executives. techniques.” U.S. government officials blamed the The United States has tried to fight North Korean government for the attack. back by sharing negative stories about ISIS Sony Pictures was about to release “The and, in 2014, even created a video, using Interview,” a silly comedy about a plot to footage released by the group, that assassinate the North Korean ruler Kim Jong featured severed heads and crucifixions. Un. As opening day neared, the hackers The video went viral, but analysts inside threatened theaters with retaliation if they and outside the U.S. government criticized it screened the movie. When Sony canceled for embracing extremist tactics similar to the release, the threats stopped. ISIS’ own. Moreover, as Segal notes, it seems to have failed to deter ISIS’ The United States and other supporters. countries use social media for political ends. Russia, as we know, tries to shape online Part of what makes the cyber era so discourse by spreading false news and challenging for governments is that conflict

74 isn’t limited to states. Many actors, including firms are part of an effort to modernize the individuals and small groups, can carry out country and build comprehensive power, no attacks. In 2011, for example, the hacker matter whether they are private or state collective Anonymous took down Sony’s owned. Stealing for their benefit is for the PlayStation Network, costing the company benefit of the nation.” $171 million in repairs. Individuals can also The intense secrecy surrounding disrupt traditional diplomacy, as when cyberwarfare makes deciding what kinds of WikiLeaks released thousands of State hacking are acceptable and what behavior Department cables in 2010, revealing U.S. crosses the line even harder. The Snowden diplomats’ candid and sometimes revelations may have alerted Americans to embarrassing assessments of their foreign the extent of U.S. government surveillance, counterparts. but the public still remains largely in the Americans tend to see themselves as dark about digital conflict. Yet Americans a target of Chinese hackers—and indeed have a lot at stake. The United States may they are. The problem is that China also be the world’s strongest cyberpower, but it sees itself as a victim and the United States is also the most vulnerable. Segal writes: as hypocritical. In June 2013, U.S. President “The United States is . . . more Barack Obama warned Chinese President Xi exposed than any other country. Smart Jinping that Chinese hacking could damage cities, the Internet of Things, and self- the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Later that driving cars may open up vast new month, journalists published documents economic opportunities as well as new provided by Edward Snowden, an NSA targets for destructive attacks. Cyberattacks contractor, showing that the NSA had could disrupt and degrade the American hacked Chinese universities and way of war, heavily dependent as it is on telecommunications companies. It didn’t sensors, computers, command and control, take long for Chinese state media to brand and information dominance.” the United States as “the real hacking empire.” ***** The U.S.-Chinese relationship also There are no easy solutions to these suffers from a more fundamental challenges. The cyber era is much murkier disagreement. U.S. policymakers seem to than the era of the Cold War. Officials find it believe that it’s acceptable to spy for difficult to trace attackers quickly and political and military purposes but that reliably, increasing the chances that the China’s theft of intellectual property crosses targeted country will make an error. The a line. The United States might spy on U.S. government and U.S. firms face companies and trade negotiators all over cyberattacks every day, and there is no the world, but it does so to protect its clear line between those that are merely a national interests, not to benefit specific nuisance and those that pose a serious U.S. companies. The Chinese don’t see this threat. In his book “The Perfect Weapon,” distinction. As Segal explains: David Sanger notes, “After a decade of hearings in Congress, there is still little “Many states, especially those like agreement on whether and when China that have developed a form of state cyberstrikes constitute an act of war, an act capitalism at home, do not see a difference between public and private actors. Chinese

75 of terrorism, mere espionage, or cyber- cyberattacks in 2016 did not do enough to enabled vandalism.” deter future attackers. But if Obama underreacted, the United States may now The public also understands face the opposite problem. Trump has cyberthreats far less well than it does the proved willing to make bold, sometimes threat of nuclear weapons. Much of the unsubstantiated accusations. This behavior information is classified, inhibiting public is dangerous in any conflict, but in the fog discussion. of cyberwar, it could spell catastrophe. Segal recommends that the United Is there anything the American States replace its federal research plan with public can do to prevent this? Policy about a public-private partnership to bring in cyberspace generally doesn’t draw the same academic and commercial expertise. level of public engagement, in part due to a Government and private companies need to lack of knowledge. Cyberbattles can seem share more information, and companies confusing, technical, and shrouded in need to talk more openly with one another secrecy, perhaps better left to the experts. about digital threats. But cybersecurity is everyone’s problem The United States should also now. The American public should inform “develop a code of conduct that draws a itself, and these two books are a good place clear line between its friends and allies and to start. If Washington inadvertently led the its potential adversaries.” This would United States into a major cyberwar, include limiting cyberattacks to military Americans would have the most to lose. actions and narrowly targeted covert operations, following international law, rarely spying on friends, and working to strengthen international norms against economic espionage. If the United States is attacked, it should not necessarily launch a counterattack, Segal argues; rather, it should explore using sanctions or other tools. This was apparently the path that Obama took after the attack on the Democratic National Committee (DNC), when the United States punished Moscow by imposing fresh sanctions and expelling 35 suspected Russian spies. ****** It’s likely only a matter of time before the Trump administration faces a major cyberattack. When that happens, the government will need to react calmly, without jumping to conclusions. Failure to do so could have dire consequences. Some experts have argued that Obama’s response to the Russian

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS The Aspen Institute Congressional Program May 27 – June 2, 2019 Prague, Czech Republic

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Rep. Jim Banks Rep. Doug Lamborn and Amanda Banks and Jeanie Lamborn

Rep. Don Beyer Rep. Billy Long and Megan Beyer Rep. David McKinley Senator Tom Carper and Mary McKinley and Martha Carper Rep. Mark Meadows Rep. Diana DeGette and Debbie Meadows and Francesca Lipinsky DeGette Rep. David Price Rep. Ted Deutch and Lisa Price and Jill Deutch Rep. Tom Rice Rep. Jeff Fortenberry and Wrenzie Rice and Celeste Fortenberry Rep. John Sarbanes Rep. John Garamendi and Dina Sarbanes and Patti Garamendi Rep. Scott Tipton Rep. Andy Harris and Jean Tipton and Daniel Harris

Rep. Vicky Hartzler and Lowell Hartzler

SCHOLARS

Stacy Closson Adjunct Professional Lecturer, School of International Service, American University Robert Daly Director, The Kissinger Institute, The Wilson Center

Evan Feigenbaum Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia Thomas Graham Managing Director, Kissinger Associates Nikolas Gvosdev Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, Newport Ivan Hodáč President and Founder, Aspen Institute Central Europe Ivana Karásková PhD candidate, Charles University, founder, Chinfluence, Prague Philippe Le Corre Senior Fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government, Harvard Kennedy School Emily Parker Future Tense Fellow, New America Foundation Matt Rojansky Director, The Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center Jiří Schneider Executive Director, Aspen Institute Central Europe Dmitri Trenin Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow Igor Zevelev Professor, George Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany

EVENING SPEAKER

Jan Hamáček Deputy Prime Minister, Former Speaker, Chamber of Deputies, The Czech Parliament, Prague

FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVES

Deana Arsenian Carnegie Corporation of New York Sean Raymond The Democracy Fund

ASPEN INSTITUTE CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM

Dan Glickman Executive Director and Rhoda Glickman Lauren Kennedy Manager of Congressional Engagement Bill Nell Deputy Director Carrie Rowell Conference Director

U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS The Aspen Institute Congressional Program May 27 – June 2, 2019 Prague, Czech Republic

CONFERENCE AGENDA

MONDAY, MAY 27

American participants depart the U.S.

TUESDAY, MAY 28 All participants arrive in Prague

Working Dinner U.S. POLICY TOWARD EURASIA: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE Eastern Europe is the focal point on the dividing line between Eurasia and the western alliance. The former Speaker of the Czech Parliament will provide his perspective of the policy issues between the U.S. and Eurasia. Discussion will focus on the opportunities, challenges and potential solutions regarding U.S. relations with Eurasia. Seating is arranged to expose participants to a diverse range of views and provide opportunity for a meaningful exchange of ideas. Scholars and lawmakers are rotated daily.

Jan Hamáček, Deputy Prime Minister, Former Speaker, Chamber of Deputies, The Czech Parliament, Prague

WEDNESDAY, MAY 29

INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Dan Glickman, Executive Director, Aspen Institute Congressional Program Roundtable Discussion EURASIAN GEOPOLITICS AND GREAT POWER DYNAMICS: WHY IT MATTERS Eurasia covers one third of the ’s surface and is home to over five billion people—it is what British geographer Halford Mackinder once called "the world island." The bulk of this landmass is controlled by China and Russia, with whom the U.S. has been in competition and confrontation across different arenas and at different scales over the past decade. The two are both major powers and near peer competitors to the United States, and are increasingly aligned in their foreign, security and even development policies and programs, potentially to the detriment of key U.S. interests. The annual threat assessment by the U.S. intelligence

communities warns that China and Russia are more aligned now since the mid-1950s and that they are devoting resources into a “race for technological and military superiority.” • How significant and how durable is this alignment? • Has Washington paid it adequate attention? What U.S. interests are at stake in the region? • What is the state of the U.S.-led international order with respect to Eurasia? • Do Moscow and Beijing evince a genuinely shared vision, or is their alignment principally about countering U.S. influence? • How have U.S. allies and partners across Eurasia responded? • What have been the key pillars of U.S. strategy toward the region over the recent past?

Thomas Graham, Managing Director, Kissinger Associates Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia Matthew Rojansky, Director, The Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center Working Lunch Discussion continues between members of Congress and scholars on the challenges for U.S. policy regarding Eurasia. Individual Discussions Members of Congress and scholars meet individually to discuss U.S. foreign policy. Scholars available to meet individually with members of Congress for in-depth discussion of ideas raised in the morning and luncheon sessions include Thomas Graham, Evan Feigenbaum, and Matthew Rojansky. Working Dinner Scholars and members of Congress will explore topics covered in the conference. Seating is arranged to expose participants to a diverse range of views and provide opportunity for a meaningful exchange of ideas. Scholars and lawmakers are rotated daily. Discussion will focus on the key policy issues at stake in U.S.-relations with Eurasia and their importance.

THURSDAY, MAY 30 Roundtable Discussion CHINA’S INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF ITS BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE The U.S. administration has accused China of expanding its economy, global political influence and military power at the expense of the U.S. and its allies. Under the mantle of its ambitious "Belt and Road Initiative," China has spent massively on building long-distance railway networks, communications, and energy infrastructure links connecting it to Eurasia, some of which have potential military applications. Freight rail service between China’s east coast and European markets can now compete with shipping through the Straits of Malacca and the , while the opening of a Northern Sea route via the melting waterways of the puts Russia-China maritime cooperation in the spotlight. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited many European capitals this Spring and secured a BRI agreement with Italy. • How does Beijing see its position within Eurasia?

• Does Beijing harbor territorial ambitions, especially in Central Asia or Russia’s Far East, parts of which were controlled by China in the past? • Do China’s internal challenges with its restive Muslim populations limit its ability to project power and influence into Central and South Asia or the ? • How does China use the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to advance its influence with developing countries in the Eurasian region?

Philippe Le Corre, Senior Fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government, Harvard Kennedy School Robert Daly, Director, The Kissinger Institute, The Wilson Center

Roundtable Discussion RUSSIA’S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN THE REGION The freezing out of Russia from Western-led global markets and diplomatic formats following its invasion of Ukraine has pushed Moscow to regard China more as a potential partner in its efforts not only to defend against U.S. pressure, but to develop its own economy and ensure domestic political stability and security. Russia remains the dominant security actor in Eurasia, supplying its former Soviet clients, China and other regional states with advanced military hardware, and leading major military exercises in all domains, recently with Chinese participation. Meanwhile cleavages within and between Europe and the United States have tested the traditional bonds of transatlantic solidarity. • What does Moscow’s assertion of its own “pivot to Asia” and a distinctive “Eurasian identity” actually mean? • Do Russians think of Eurasia as something foreign, a “near abroad,” or a “sphere of privileged influence?” • How will the Kremlin respond to continuing political, economic and demographic change along its borders, especially in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, a region bordering Russia, China and Afghanistan? • What is the significance of Russian-led international groups like the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? • How does U.S. policy regarding China take into account China’s growing interests in Eurasia?

Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow

Working Lunch Discussion continues between members of Congress and scholars on the challenges for U.S. policy regarding Eurasia. Individual Discussions Members of Congress and scholars meet individually to discuss U.S. foreign policy. Scholars available to meet individually with members of Congress for in-depth discussion of ideas raised in the morning and luncheon sessions include Philippe Le Corre, Robert Daly, and Dmitri Trenin.

Working Dinner Seating is arranged to expose participants to a diverse range of views and provide opportunity for a meaningful exchange of ideas. Scholars and lawmakers are rotated daily. Scholars will discuss with members of Congress their perspective on China’s and Russia’s interests in the context of U.S. relations with Eurasia.

FRIDAY, MAY 31

Roundtable Discussion U.S. STRATEGY, ALLIES, AND RESOURCES IN EURASIA The Administration and Congress have responded to Russia’s regional and global challenges with strong sanctions, expulsions of Russian diplomats, a bulked-up NATO forward presence and military assistance to Ukraine. Despite ostensibly positive personal relations between Presidents Trump and Xi, the U.S. has also taken on China with renewed vigor, imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese imports and threatening further retaliatory action for Chinese pressure on U.S. companies, theft of intellectual property, or aggression in the South China Sea. The U.S. has increased military spending, jettisoned the Iran nuclear deal and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, and also launched ambitious denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. Eurasia is also a focal point of competition between China and the U.S. over which Superpower will be the dominant supplier of the new 5G digital technology, which presents a new realm of high-tech security concerns. • To what degree has the U.S. actually “pivoted” toward Asia in the past decade? • What have been and what should be Washington’s principal policy goals toward the region as a whole? • How should the U.S. balance its broader regional goals with its interests regarding individual regional states? • What instruments have proven most effective in advancing U.S. interests, and how available are they today? • How has U.S. policy been understood by allies and partners in the region? • Are Beijing or Moscow effectively able to drive wedges between the U.S. and its regional allies?

Stacy Closson, Adjunct Professional Lecturer, School of International Service, American University Nikolas Gvosdev, Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College Working Lunch Discussion continues between members of Congress and scholars on the challenges for U.S. policy regarding Eurasia. Individual Discussions Members of Congress and scholars meet individually to discuss U.S. foreign policy. Scholars available to meet individually with members of Congress for in-depth discussion of ideas raised in the morning and luncheon sessions include Stacy Closson and Nikolas Gvosdev.

Working Dinner Scholars and members of Congress will explore topics covered in the conference. Seating is arranged to expose participants to a diverse range of views and provide opportunity for a meaningful exchange of ideas. Scholars and lawmakers are rotated daily. Scholars will discuss with members of Congress their perspective on the evolving threats from new technologies such as cyber, social media and information operations and their policy implications.

Saturday, June 1 Roundtable Discussion NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EVOLVING THREATS: CYBER, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS The potential alignment between Chinese and Russian interests has security as well as economic implications for the U.S. beyond Eurasia, including the security of U.S. interests in cyberspace, domestic political processes, and the U.S. homeland itself. U.S. officials have confirmed that Russia and China are both major sponsors of cyber attacks, internet-based influence and radicalization campaigns, including election meddling, and the increasing use of artificial intelligence as a military tool against U.S. targets. As the Director of National Intelligence has said, “the warning lights are blinking red” about what is coming next--more interference, attacks, and near miss incidents, any of which could lead to dramatic escalation. • How does each of the major Eurasian powers consider information and technology tools as part of its national security strategy? • What lessons from addressing past threats and challenges can apply to these new threat vectors? • How does the rapid improvement of artificial intelligence capabilities affect these challenges? • How do difficulties with attribution affect the availability of deterrence as a response to Russian or Chinese cyber and information threats? • Is there a risk of escalation from cyber to conventional or even nuclear conflict? • Do the U.S. and its near peer rivals have common interests, for example, in countering online radicalization? • Are common approaches feasible, such as a convention on limiting the means or methods of cyber conflict?

Ivana Karásková, Research Fellow, Association for International Affairs; Founder, Chinfluence, Prague Emily Parker, Future Tense Fellow, New America Foundation

Policy Reflections (MEMBERS ONLY) Members of Congress will reflect on the previous discussions and offer their ideas for policy implications.

Working Lunch Discussion continues between members of Congress and scholars on the challenges for U.S. policy regarding Eurasia. Individual Discussions Members of Congress and scholars meet individually to discuss U.S. foreign policy. Scholars available to meet individually with members of Congress for in-depth discussion of ideas raised in the morning and luncheon sessions include Ivana Karásková and Emily Parker. Working Dinner Scholars and members of Congress will explore topics covered in the conference. Seating is arranged to expose participants to a diverse range of views and provide opportunity for a meaningful exchange of ideas. Scholars and lawmakers are rotated daily. Scholars and members of Congress will reflect on the discussions and analysis of the past four days to reach conclusions for the most appropriate policies for U.S. relations with Eurasia.

SUNDAY, JUNE 2 Participants depart Prague; arrive in the USA

Resource Scholars: Jiří Schneider, Executive Director, Aspen Institute Central Europe, Prague Igor Zevelev, Professor of National Security Studies, George Marshall Center, Garmisch