Number 11, Fall 2006

21st Century Allies… Efraim Inbar on Israel Olivier Guitta on Europe Peter Brookes on Japan Joshua Eisenman on Australia Anupam Srivastava on India Rob Huebert on Canada Svante Cornell on Eurasia Chuck Downs on South Korea …and Adversaries R. James Woolsey et al. on Iran Robert Rabil on Syria Alexandr Nemets on the Sino-Russian alliance Luis Fleischman on Venezuela Walid Phares on future terrorism Response Nikolas Gvosdev on Russia policy Dispatches More of the same in Mexico? A strategy for avian influenza Preserving Georgia’s political direction

Book Reviews Joshua London’s Victory in Tripoli ◊ The Other War by $7.95 US $12.50 CAN 6 3 Stephanie Gutmann ◊ John Yoo’s The Powers of War and Peace ◊ Hamas by Matthew Levitt

0 7 4 4 7 0 5 7 8 8 2 6 www.securityaffairs.org Ilan Berman Editor

Tom Neumann Publisher Jim Colbert Associate Editor/Managing Editor Karla Jones Circulation Manager Jennifer Keech Graphic Designer James P. Cetrone Web Development

Editorial Board Dr. Stephen Bryen, Armeane Choksi, Adm. Leon “Bud” Edney USN (ret.), Hon. Jack Kemp, Dr. Joshua Muravchik, Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow USA (ret.)

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Inc., is an independent, non- profit, non-partisan, non-sectarian educational organization established in 1976 to fulfill a two-fold mandate: To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America’s security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of liberty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

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Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in The Journal of International Security Affairs (ISSN 1532-4060) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JINSA. Number 11, Fall 2006

From the Publisher Tom Neumann 3

Editor’s Corner Ilan Berman 5

21st Century Allies…

Israel: An Enduring Union Efraim Inbar 7 Why Israel remains a vital American ally

Japan: Coming of Age Peter Brookes 15 The benefits of Tokyo’s changing threat perceptions

India: Toward True Partnership Anupam Srivastava 21 The logic behind Indo-American rapprochement

Eurasia: Crisis and Opportunity Svante E. Cornell 29 American strategy adrift in the “Post-Soviet Space”

Europe: Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide Olivier Guitta 39 Don’t believe the hype. Cooperation with Europe is alive and well.

Australia: An Ally Down Under Joshua Eisenman 45 Canberra’s strategic calculus, and Washington’s place in it

Canada: Partnership in Flux Rob Huebert 53 New realities confront the North American defense alliance

South Korea: Slouching Toward Submission Chuck Downs 61 Seoul searches for an accommodation with Pyongyang, at Washington’s expense … and Adversaries

Iran: Confronting the Threat R. James Woolsey et al. 69 Results of a JINSA Roundtable

Syria: Buying Time Robert G. Rabil 75 Bashar al-Assad plays the waiting game

Russia/China: Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance Alexandr Nemets 83 Moscow and Beijing’s partnership has a concrete purpose

Venezuela: Anatomy of a Dictator Luis Fleischman 89 The next threat for Latin America

Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads Walid Phares 97 Where, and how, the next battles in the War on Terror will be fought Response

A Dose of Realism on Russia Nikolas K. Gvosdev 103 When it comes to Russia, idealism is no substitute for real engagement Dispatches

MEXICO: Calderón’s Challenge Fredo Arias-King 109

SLOVENIA: Tackling the Next Pandemic I. Podbregar & T. Ivanusa 111

GEORGIA: Back on its Feet Irakli Mchedlishvili 113 Book Reviews

Past as Prologue Aaron Mannes 115 Joshua London explores the first American Middle East crisis

The Palestinians’ Best Battalion Eric Rozenman 119 Stephanie Gutmann probes the media front in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Striking a Balance Thomas Karako 123 John Yoo’s ambitious vision of a new constitutional order

Debunking the Hamas Myth Glen Feder 126 Matthew Levitt calls a spade a spade From the Publisher

As of this writing, the UN Security Council has passed a resolution calling for a “cessation of hostilities” in the war between Hezbollah and Israel. It is an extremely one-sided resolution that addresses the terrorist and the victim as morally equivalent.

By the time this issue of The Journal reaches your hands, the world will have turned twelve times over. It changes by the minute. Yet if we were to acknowl- edge the truth about our enemy, things might seem pretty constant.

Analysts pathetically verbalize answers and insights that are simultaneously complex and shallow. There is less to analyze if you face up to the fact that the enemy is pure evil and is driven by evil.

The Iranians like to call us the “Big Satan,” and Israel the “Little Satan.”

In his Paradise Lost, John Milton, the Puritan poet, quotes Satan as saying, “Better to reign in hell, than serve in Heaven.” That is the way Iran views this conflict. After centuries of lagging behind the West, a sense of inferiority and anger has set in. They remember when they were the center of cultural gravity.

Iran’s leaders resent not the dominance of America and the West, but its suc- cess. Our success is their definition of American evil. The G-d of Milton was not evil. It was Satan who was evil. Satan did not like the order of things; he wanted to be in charge. That was his failing. And so it is with al-Qaeda and Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Simply put, as with Satan, if you can’t improve upon it, destroy it. This is the crux of the conflict.

We can look for complicated explanations, but there is no need. We are engaged in what biblically or mythologically has been called the struggle between light and darkness.

Tom Neumann Publisher

The Journal of International Security Affairs  The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Translating Ideas into Policy

Mission

To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America’s security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of lib- erty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

Founded 1976

1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW • Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: (202) 667-3900 • www.jinsa.org • F: (202) 667-0601 Editor’s Corner

The War on Terror, it seems, will be with us for quite some time. The latest indication came shortly before this issue went to press, when British authorities foiled an ambitious terrorist plot to blow up as many as 10 airliners in mid-air. Had it been successfully carried out, that plan would have killed hundreds and caused damage on an unimaginable scale. Credit for thwarting the attacks rests primarily with British authorities, but a number of foreign nations—including the United States and Pakistan—provided valuable assistance in uncovering the plot, and exposing its inner workings.

August’s abortive terror attacks underscore an unmistakable fact. Given the diffuse nature of today’s terrorist threat, the United States simply cannot “go it alone”—if it ever could. In today’s world, Washington needs reliable allies capable of complementing and augmenting its efforts on everything from coun- terterrorism to counterproliferation. It is therefore more than a little fitting that this issue of The Journal focuses on identifying exactly who America’s main international partners—and its chief adversaries—will be in the years ahead.

Our first section deals with allies. Efraim Inbar, director of Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Stategic Studies, outlines the strategic bonds, old and new, underpinning the Middle East’s most durable alliance: the partnership between the United States and Israel. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Founda- tion takes a probing look at Japan’s evolving threat perceptions—and how they are bringing Tokyo closer to Washington. The University of Georgia’s Anupam Srivastava offers an incisive analysis of the principles underpinning the emerg- ing partnership between India and the United States. Svante Cornell of Johns Hopkins University’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, meanwhile, provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and opportunities confronting the U.S. in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For his part, counterterrorism expert Olivier Guitta explores the quiet cooperation that is taking place, away from all the public discord, between Washington and European capitals. From there, we move to Australia, as the American Foreign Policy Council’s Joshua Eisen- man reviews the state of America’s strategic alliance “down under.” Closer to home, Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary sketches the contours of America’s future defense relationship with Canada. Finally, Chuck Downs, a former Pentagon policy planner, gives us a worrying glimpse into the growing rift between the United States and South Korea, as Seoul continues its drift into Pyongyang’s orbit.

The second deals with adversaries. For a cutting edge treatment of Iran, we turn to the synopsis of a recent policy roundtable convened by the Jewish Insti- tute for National Security Affairs. Then, Robert Rabil of Florida Atlantic Uni- versity reviews the survival strategy of Iran’s major regional partner: Syria. Sino-Russian expert Alexandr Nemets, meanwhile, gives a sobering review of the burgeoning strategic ties between Moscow and Beijing—and their likely consequences for the United States. For his part, Latin American expert Luis

The Journal of International Security Affairs  Fleischman identifies the next great threat emanating from the Western Hemi- sphere: the radical, anti-American regime of Hugo Chávez in Caracas. Last, but most certainly not least, Walid Phares of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies examines the changing nature of terrorist threats to the United States and its allies, and the likely battlefields where the War on Terror will be joined in the years ahead.

Here at The Journal, our objective is to foster new and creative thinking about U.S. foreign policy, so it is our distinct pleasure to inaugurate a periodic new feature which allows experts to debate the ideas published in these pages. The first such “Response” comes from Nikolas Gvosdev ofThe National Interest, who takes issue with Stephen Blank’s policy prescriptions on Russia from our Spring 2006 edition.

We also have dispatches on a variety of foreign policy topics from Mexico, Slo- venia and Georgia. Rounding out the issue are reviews of four important books: Joshua London’s Victory in Tripoli, The Other War by Stephanie Gutmann, John Yoo’s The Powers of War and Peace, and Hamas by Matthew Levitt.

All in all, we think that you will agree that there is plenty of food for thought in these pages.

Ilan Berman Editor

 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel An Enduring Union

Efraim Inbar

he strategic partnership between the U.S. and Israel has been the object of substantial criticism over the years, and again of late. Opponents have blamed the strong ties between the U.S. and T 1 Israel for resentment of America in the Arab and Muslim worlds. But the proposition that the U.S. would be better off not lending its support to Israel betrays ignorance of what the Middle East really is, and of the real causes of anti-Americanism both there and elsewhere.2 In fact, negative attitudes toward the United States and the West are deeply rooted in Arab and Muslim culture, and have little to do with American aid to Israel.

Indeed, the case for supporting Israel—built around Israel’s strategic location in the region, its political stability, and its technological and military assets—is almost self-evident. Nevertheless, even self-evident truths some- times need enunciation.

The ties that bind Since the mid-1960s, Israel has adopted an American orientation in its foreign policy. One of the chief proponents of such a policy direction was Yitzhak Rabin, then chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. For the follow- ing three decades, Rabin remained a major force in Israeli foreign policy—as prime minister (1974-77), defense minister (1984-90), and again as prime minister (1992-95)—and so did his views about the prudence of partnership

Efraim Inbar is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv, Israel, and Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Efraim Inbar

with the United States.3 For Rabin, lent course of action that they have as well as for all of his successors, unambiguously adopted.) strategic coordination with Washing- Indeed, Israel reluctantly accepts ton was of paramount importance. its unequal status in its bilateral rela- Prime Ministers Benjamin Netan- tions with the U.S., and is invariably yahu (1996-99) and Ehud Barak sensitive to American preferences. (1999-2001) intensively engaged Perhaps the best known example the Clinton administration in trying of this acquiescence was Israel’s to promote peace-making in the restraint in response to unprovoked region. Even Prime Minister Ariel missile strikes from Iraq during Sharon (2001-2006), long a skeptic of Operation Desert Storm in 1991—a the merits of alliance with the U.S., decision which served to undermine quickly learned the need for strate- Israel’s deterrence.4 Similarly, at gic coordination with Washington. America’s request, Israel halted dip- He and his successor, Ehud Olmert, lomatic overtures to North Korea in made sure that their planned unilat- 1994, and canceled a planned $1 bil- eral withdrawals were presented to lion sale of Phalcon airborne early Washington even before obtaining warning systems to China in 2000. the approval of their own cabinets. The contours of the Gaza withdrawal in 2005 were likewise defined in the Israel is one of the few countries framework of Israel’s initial dialogue in the world that does not see U.S. with Washington.5 Bilateral relations between primacy in international affairs as a the two countries are occasionally troubling phenomenon. If anything, marred by passing tensions stem- Israelis fear that the U.S. may ming from differing perspectives on succumb to isolationist impulses developments in the Middle East— and from a mismatch between Isra- and as a result give up its activist el’s regional agenda and America’s posture in the Middle East and global strategic calculus. Neverthe- other parts of the world. less, with the advent of the 21st cen- tury, Israel is one of the few countries Similarly, the gradual increase in the world that does not see U.S. in Israel’s use of force, primarily primacy in international affairs as a against the Palestinians since Sep- troubling phenomenon. Moreover, tember 2000, has been continuously in contrast to much of the rest of the calibrated to a level that the U.S. world, Israel is not preoccupied with has been ready to tolerate, despite how to tame American power. To the the fact that more muscular Israeli contrary, Jerusalem counts on the responses to Palestinian terrorism U.S. to fend off unbalanced Euro- would have probably been more pean policies towards the so-called effective and less costly to all sides Middle East peace process, and in the long run. (It can be argued looks to Washington for support (and that a more forceful response also compensation) for the risks it takes would have better served American in attempting to make peace with its interests in the long run, signal- neighbors. If anything, Israelis fear ing minimum tolerance of terrorist that the U.S. may succumb to isola- activities and demonstrating to the tionist impulses and as a result give Palestinians the futility of the vio- up its activist posture in the Middle

 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union

East and other parts of the world. The A preference for unipolarity difficulties that the U.S. has faced in The unipolar nature of the con- Iraq have reinforced such apprehen- temporary international system sions. Simply put, the relationship where the U.S. holds a dominant with Washington has been and will position will probably end some day, continue to be a central pillar of Isra- when a powerful-enough competitor el’s national security orientation. arises. Several major powers, includ- Israel’s pro-American foreign ing Russia, France, China and even policy orientation is also buttressed India, eagerly await such a moment, by cultural trends. Few societies in preferring a multi-polar world where the world tend to consume Ameri- American influence is diminished can products of all kinds—from TV and curtailed. Not so Israel. While programs and films to cars and cui- it does not carry enough weight to sine—so avidly. American sports make much of a difference in this cal- are watched regularly in Israel. culus, Israel is highly unlikely to aid American English has penetrated in the evolution of an anti-American Hebrew discourse, with little oppo- alliance, either now or in the future. sition. American politics are fol- Jerusalem clearly prefers the current lowed intensely with great interest distribution of power in the interna- and admiration, and American uni- tional system, intuitively realizing versities are preferred by Israelis that a competitor to American inter- seeking to attain higher degrees. ests in the Middle East will in all In 2006, the United States was the likelihood seek to court the enemies top destination for Israeli tourists, of Israel. Israel also backs the Ameri- while America became the larg- can policy of limiting foreign power est market for Israeli exports a full involvement in the Middle East, and decade ago. All of the above make rejects demands from European and democratic Israel the most stable other countries for a more active and reliable ally in the region for the role in the peace process. In other United States. words, Pax Americana, not only in the Middle East but also on the Korean An overlapping peninsula and in Central Asia, seems strategic agenda to suit Israeli interests. The alliance between Israel and the U.S. is not based on a defense Common threats treaty. Israel, in particular, has been Today, the major challenges to reluctant to enter into a formal alli- U.S. security—among them threats ance, instead preferring to preserve to the free flow of oil, the proliferation its freedom of international action. of weapons of mass destruction, and Islamic terrorism—all originate in Israeli leaders have emphasized that 6 no American soldiers are needed the Middle East. Deepening Ameri- to defend Israel, echoing Winston can involvement in the region has Churchill’s refrain: “Give us the tools reflected this fact. The U.S. invaded and we will finish the job.” Rather, the Afghanistan in 2001 in order to root current burgeoning strategic relation- out al-Qaeda, and overthrew the ship is based on a common strategic regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq agenda that has survived and tran- two years later in order to put an end scended the end of the Cold War. to its quest for WMD and support for anti-American forces in the region.

The Journal of International Security Affairs  Efraim Inbar

Similarly, although actual American after the death of current President policy remains in flux, Washington’s Hosni Mubarak. Both also hope that antagonism toward Iran reflects the Egypt will play a positive, moderat- understanding that Iran’s deep sup- ing role with the Palestinians, par- port for Islamic terrorism, its pursuit ticularly in Gaza. Another regional of WMD, and its growing regional power whose foreign policy has elic- ambitions have put it on a collision ited some alarm in Washington and course with the U.S. Jerusalem is Turkey, which under Israel clearly shares both Ameri- the proto-Islamist Justice and Devel- can goals and American perceptions opment Party (AKP) has begun to on these issues. Thus, although drift away from cooperation with Jerusalem had considerably less both countries. enthusiasm than the U.S. about the Syria has become a similar prospects for democracy in Iraq, point of convergence. The United Israeli officials strongly supported States, deeply enmeshed in Iraq, has the war against Saddam Hussein on struggled with Syrian support for the the grounds that it removed a major insurgency there, as well as with the strategic threat to Israel and the Assad regime’s stubborn grip on Leb- West. Israel also shares the Ameri- anon, which endures (albeit in altered can objective of resurrecting a uni- form) in spite of the 2005 “Cedar Rev- tary Iraqi state that can serve as a olution.” Israel, for its part, wishes balancing force against Iran in the to minimize the difficulties that the Gulf region. For, while Iran consti- United States is experiencing in Iraq, tutes a major international challenge and remains concerned about Syrian for the U.S., it represents an existen- sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas and tial threat for Israel.7 And although the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Israel is pleased with the belated two countries also obviously compare international realization that Iran’s notes on the Syrian regime and its ayatollahs are after a bomb, it is alliance with Iran. And while so far skeptical that diplomacy or economic Washington has displayed caution pressure can contain or end Tehran’s about exerting pressure on Damas- nuclear dreams. Instead, Jerusalem, cus, if and when the U.S. government like most other capitals in the Middle chooses to do so, Israel could prove to East, ultimately looks to American be a useful tool. determination to prevent the strate- Consensus also exists regard- gic nightmare of a nuclear Iran. Con- ing Hashemite Jordan, which is seen versely, if Israel should find the need by both Washington and Jerusalem to undertake unilateral measures as a reliable ally in fighting radical against this threat, officials in Jeru- Islam and Palestinian extremism. salem know that they can probably In 2003, King Abdullah displayed count on American indulgence and self-confidence and political adroit- at least tacit support. ness in supporting the American invasion of Iraq (in contrast with his Shared concerns father’s performance under similar Other areas of strategic com- circumstances in 1991). For its part, monality are also visible. Both Israel has traditionally played an countries are concerned about the important role in providing an insur- stability of the Egyptian regime and ance policy to the pro-Western regime hope for a smooth transition of power in Amman.

10 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union

Even the Palestinian issue elicits U.S. adopted military preemption much mutual understanding nowa- as part of its official menu of policy days. Washington is inching toward options.9 Such action has been an Israel’s minimal territorial demands integral part of Israeli strategic think- by accepting the incorporation of ing and policy since the 1950s. In the “settlement blocs” in the final, yet wake of 9/11, Israel’s preemptive pos- to be determined, borders of Israel. ture, once a source of tension in the The need for a security zone along bilateral relationship, is now met with the Jordan River to defend Israel (and better understanding in Washing- Jordan) is also accepted by American ton. Indeed, the dilemmas involved policymakers. Moreover, despite spo- in combating terrorists, particularly radic lip service to the “roadmap” and in urban settings with large civilian the “two-state” paradigm by some in populations, are no longer academic Washington, the current Administra- questions for the U.S. tion has made clear that its backing for any compromise is conditional America’s increasingly upon the emergence of a Palestinian proactive strategic posture leadership willing to live in peace with Israel and establish effective control is very much in tune over its territory by dismantling the with Israel’s own defense myriad militias that operate there doctrine, which stresses today. But since there is little chance of Palestinian society producing such self reliance and which is a responsible leadership in the near skeptical of the effectiveness future, the U.S. has thrown its weight of multilateral action. behind Israel’s adoption of a conflict management strategy.8 The gap between Washington and Jerusalem has even narrowed on National security doctrine a traditional area of disagreement: In the post-Cold War era, there nuclear posture. While the U.S. was is also greater compatibility between and remains committed to the 1968 the U.S. and Israel in terms of national Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty security doctrine. As a superpower, (NPT), Israel has consistently opposed the U.S. has always had great free- joining this international regime. To a dom of action, but this latitude has great extent, Israel’s nuclear ambigu- been magnified by the unipolar state ity has helped to minimize tensions of the international system. America’s surrounding this issue. Nevertheless, perceived unilateralism has garnered the 1995 NPT Review Conference criticism from many corners, but could have exacerbated relations by Israel has not been averse to this pre- providing an opportunity for Egypt dilection. Indeed, America’s increas- and its allies in the Third World to ingly proactive strategic posture is pressure the U.S. to force Israel into very much in tune with Israel’s own adherence by threatening not to sup- defense doctrine, which stresses self- port the Treaty’s extension. Yet, the reliance and which is skeptical of the U.S. did not apply pressure on Israel to effectiveness of multilateral action. change its position, and by eventually The U.S. also has grown closer securing the extension of the NPT, to Israel in terms of its approach to it actually lent legitimacy to Israel’s the use of military force. In 2002, the exceptionalism on the nuclear issue.10

The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 Efraim Inbar

Strategic cooperation companies in order to penetrate the Security cooperation between American weapon market. But these Israel and the U.S. goes back a long partnerships have proven beneficial— way, and much of it takes place away and profitable—over the long run. from the public eye. One such area is Among other positive aspects, such the exchange of intelligence; while business alliances have enabled Israel American data collection capabilities to purchase arms based on Israeli tech- are staggering, Israel itself excels nology from the U.S. using U.S. mili- in several areas, including eaves- tary aid funds. And American-Israeli dropping and human intelligence industrial partnerships can sell weap- (humint). It is a testament to Israel’s ons to third parties, expanding export security contributions to the bilat- opportunities for both countries. eral relationship that strategic ties Yet this collaboration is not between the two countries have never without its creative tensions. In been stronger. the shrinking post-Cold War arms On the military front, the U.S. market, Israeli and American firms armed forces have intensified joint often compete fiercely—a fact that training with Israeli air, sea and land has, on occasion, injected tensions units, and avail themselves of contin- into the larger relationship between uous access to Israeli military experi- Washington and Jerusalem. The U.S. ence and doctrine. In particular, since opposes unrestricted Israeli arms the start of the War on Terror, Israel’s sales to a number of countries for expertise in Low Intensity Conflict political-strategic reasons. For exam- (LIC) operations has been a boon to ple, in the past it has vetoed Israeli the U.S. military. So has Israel’s vast arms sales to China and Venezuela. combat experience and an array of Neither does Washington hesitate to weaponry specifically tailored for the use its international leverage to pro- situations confronting the U.S. today. mote its own military industries at Similarly, a greater American focus the expense of those of other coun- on homeland security has naturally tries (including Israel), though not intensified cooperation with Israel, always successfully. a country that has coped with such threats for decades. In turn, Israeli A partnership preserved agencies, experts, and manufactur- Over the years, the strategic ers of equipment for counter-terror ties between Washington and Jeru- purposes have been happy to aid salem have survived changing inter- American efforts to improve home- national circumstances and many land defense. bilateral tensions. Throughout, the Another area of synergy is visible U.S., unquestionably the senior part- in the defense-industrial arena. While ner, repeatedly has had the option of the U.S. dominates the global arms ending or scaling down the relation- market in the post-Cold War era,11 ship. But Washington has generally Israel enjoys a relative technological understood the advantages of having advantage in several niches—a superi- close ties with Jerusalem. Perhaps ority which American firms have capi- Dov Zakheim, a former senior Pen- talized upon. Moreover, most of Israel’s tagon official who has been deeply home-made weapon systems are battle involved in the bilateral relationship, proven. Initially, Israeli firms entered put it best in a recent interview: “On into partnerships with American balance, if the relationship was not

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union in U.S. interests, it would have been Review 4, no. 1 (1996), 17-29. diluted years ago.”12 11. Stephanie G. Neuman, “Defense Industries and Global Dependency,” Orbis 50, no. 3 Yet today, the alliance remains as (2006), 429-451. vibrant as ever. The reason is clear; 12. As cited in Barbara Opall-Rome, “U.S.-Israel the Middle East is still a troubled Alliance Proves Demanding, Yet Durable,” neighborhood—one that will con- Defense News, May 22, 2006, 15. tinue to generate sources of global instability into the foreseeable future. In confronting these challenges, the strategic bonds that bind the United States and Israel together have proven to be both useful and durable.

1. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s controversial paper on The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, which is available online at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/ wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011. 2. See Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (London: Penguin Books, 2004); Barry Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002), 73-85. 3. Efraim Inbar, Yitzhak Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Washington: Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 34-57. 4. Efraim Inbar, “Israel and the Gulf War,” in Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, eds., The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 67-89. 5. Author’s private communication with senior Israeli official, June 21, 2006. 6. See Steven David, “American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A Neces- sary Change,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Isra- el’s National Security in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006, forthcoming). 7. See Efraim Inbar, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of Interna- tional Affairs 10, no. 1 (2006), http://meria. idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7. html. 8. For the elements of such a strategy, see Efraim Inbar, “The Palestinian Challenge,” Israel Affairs 12, no. 4 (2006, forthcoming). 9. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 6. 10. Gerald M. Steinberg, “The 1995 NPT Exten- sion and Review Conference and the Arab- Israeli Peace Process,” Non-Proliferation

The Journal of International Security Affairs 13

Japan Coming of Age

Peter Brookes

rguably, the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been better. Building on efforts begun in the latter years of the Clinton administration—and Aaccelerated on President George W. Bush’s watch by a combination of unforeseen events and determined efforts on both sides of the Pacific— bilateral security ties between Tokyo and Washington have expanded beyond all expectations. As both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush look back over the last five years, they can take satisfaction in knowing that they have taken bold steps toward developing the U.S.-Japan alliance into a truly global partnership, capable of addressing more international security challenges than ever before.

Of course, there are still challenges to be met, and areas in which the bilat- eral security relationship has room to grow. But the progress of the last few years will provide a solid foundation upon which to confront the inevitable troubles, political or otherwise, that rock any relationship. Moreover, it sets the stage for a future solidification of the strategic partnership, should both countries decide that it is in their best interest to do so.

The alliance since 9/11 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a seismic event in Tokyo-Washington ties. In the days after 9/11, Japan took the unprecedented step of offering to deploy a flotilla of Japanese Mari-

Peter Brookes is a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., and the author of Devil’s Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2001 to 2002. Peter Brookes time Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) There has also been significant support ships to the northern Arabian progress between Washington and Sea to provide fuel oil to U.S. Navy Tokyo on another area of critical ships involved in military operations in importance: missile defense. Since Afghanistan against the Taliban and al- North Korea’s unexpected launch of a Qaeda—Japan’s first out of area, non- Taepo-Dong intercontinental ballistic peacekeeping operation in post-World missile over Japan in 1998, the Japa- War II history. The initial six-month nese government has been engaged operation approved by the Japanese in missile defense cooperation with Diet under a special anti-terrorism the United States. But, when Presi- law was passed in record time, and dent Bush took office, that program included an additional appropriation was in serious trouble. The Japanese of $100 million for fuel oil. The special Defense Agency had become increas- legislation was subsequently renewed ingly skeptical of Washington’s long- several times for additional six-month term commitment to missile defense. periods, and eventually included the The Pentagon’s Missile Defense deployment of an Aegis-equipped Agency was equally frustrated with Kongo-class destroyer as well. This Japanese foot-dragging on commit- show of political will in support of ments beyond simply joint research. Washington gave teeth to Tokyo’s The joint research program was famous “checkbook diplomacy,” over- almost defunded by the Pentagon coming the historic criticism of Japan in 2001. Fortunately, strong politi- for its lack of concrete involvement in cal leadership on missile defense by the 1991 Gulf War. President Bush, as well as robust mili- In the years since, Japan has tary diplomacy on the part of the Pen- made other contributions to the War tagon, rescued the joint effort from on Terror. Following the conclusion the dustbin of history. of major combat operations in Iraq, Missile defense cooperation, Tokyo contributed $5 billion to the spurred by China’s unprecedented reconstruction effort, and led an inde- military build-up and North Korea’s pendent effort to pressure Persian expanding nuclear and ballistic Gulf states to match its donation. In missile capabilities, has intensified 2003, Tokyo also dispatched Japanese dramatically in recent years. Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) has agreed to move from develop- to Samawah in southern Iraq for ment to deployment of anti-missile reconstruction duties. In all, some capabilities, agreeing to outfit its 5,500 Japanese soldiers in 600-man Aegis-equipped destroyers with SM- detachments participated in the two- 3 interceptors, placing an X-band and-a-half-year deployment, making missile defense radar array in Japan, it the largest overseas deployment of and upgrading its theater missile the JGSDF in its history. Fortunately defense units to the next generation for sensitive Japanese public opinion, of the U.S. Patriot system. In another the unit saw no military action in first, in June 2006, a Japanese Aegis- Iraq. And today, even as the JGSDF equipped destroyer participated in draws down its contingent, the Japa- a successful joint missile defense nese Air Self-Defense Force’s C-130 exercise off Hawaii, providing accu- aircraft based in Kuwait will increase rate surveillance and tracking for the its operational tempo in support of American Aegis-equipped “shooter.” multinational forces in Iraq.

16 The Journal of International Security Affairs Japan: Coming of Age

Shared threats gence, however. The rise of China is These monumental advances, also creating a new focus in Wash- moreover, are likely to be only the ington and Tokyo. While neither beginning. There can be no doubt country is looking to make China its that a strong desire exists on the part next enemy, both understand that the of both the Bush and Koizumi govern- ascendance of a new power can be a ments not only to preserve the gains disruptive occurrence. While Chi- made thus far, but to improve upon nese strategic intentions, by some them. The June 2006 Bush-Koizumi estimates, are ambiguous, the sig- summit held in the United States nificance of Beijing’s growing mili- yielded a joint declaration identify- tary capabilities is not. China now ing common interests and objectives has the world’s third largest defense for the partnership—and laying an budget, and while figures are inexact ambitious theoretical basis for the due to a lack of transparency in the alliance’s future. Chinese military budget, the Pen- These days, perhaps nothing is tagon estimates Beijing’s defense driving Tokyo and Washington into spending to be in the $70-90 billion each other’s arms more forcefully per year range, according to its 2005 than North Korea’s rogue behav- Annual Report to Congress on the Mili- ior, most recently manifested by the tary Power of the People’s Republic of DPRK’s July 4th launch of seven China. Perhaps even more troubling ballistic missiles of various ranges is the rate at which Chinese defense into the Sea of Japan (some of which spending is growing—10 percent or reportedly landed within Japan’s more a year for over a decade. Wash- 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone). ington and Tokyo must be asking In fact, North Korea has been the themselves what Beijing plans to do principal motivation for a reinvigo- with the fruits of the world’s fastest rated security relationship between growing peacetime defense budget. Japan and the United States for over The issue of Taiwan has also come a decade. Over the years, events like into focus on the Japanese security the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis horizon. While Tokyo has long opted and North Korea’s 1998 Taepo-Dong to remain low-key on the Taiwan issue launch have helped politicos and for- for fear of upsetting Beijing, Japan eign policy elites in both capitals to has taken a public interest in stability rediscover the enduring importance across the Taiwan Strait. The dete- of the post-Cold War American-Japa- rioration in Sino-Japanese relations in nese alliance. Tokyo has come to fun- recent years, coupled with the rise of damentally understand that Japan is Chinese political, economic and mili- as much in the cross-hairs of North tary power, has led to deep concerns Korea’s nuclear and missile programs in Japan about Chinese intentions. as are the United States and South Korea. In truth, considering Pyong- The challenges ahead yang’s current inability to strike the But deepening the Washington- United States and its probable reluc- Tokyo relationship won’t necessarily tance to attack its brethren in South be easy. There are plenty of obstacles Korea, Japan may be the nation that is that both sides, but especially Tokyo, today most threatened. will need to navigate. At the top of the North Korea is not the only list is the upcoming change in leader- reason for U.S.-Japanese conver- ship slated to take place in both coun-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 17 Peter Brookes tries. Japan’s current Prime Minister, ment of 8,000 Marines and 9,000 Junichiro Koizumi, will step down dependents from Okinawa to Guam), in September, and candidates are problems remain. In some cases, it is already lining up for the 2008 presi- the local Japanese who are the prob- dential race. These political changes lem. In others, it is U.S. congressional could substantially alter the Japa- objections over financial “burden- nese-American alliance. While Bush sharing” and host nation support. and Koizumi “clicked” from the very And sometimes, it is Japanese domes- beginning, as evidenced by frequent tic politics or tight purse strings in meetings, playing catch at Camp Tokyo that get in the way. Whatever David, and Koizumi’s now-famous the reasons, finding the right fit for a trip to Elvis Presley’s home at Grace- continued U.S. military presence in land, there is no guarantee that future Japan will be a thorny subject for the Japanese and American leaders will foreseeable future. have this sort of close personal—and A deepening of ties also is poten- working—relationship. tially hampered by Japan’s pacifist There could also be a shift in constitution. Drafted in the aftermath policy emphasis. Five years on, it is of World War II by American occupi- easy to forget how the Clinton admin- ers, Article 9 of the Japanese constitu- istration viewed Japan during its tion forbids Japan from using military tenure. While some, particularly in force as an instrument of foreign policy the Pentagon, saw Japan as critical to to settle disputes, but allows the coun- regional security, the Clinton White try to defend itself. By long-standing House opted to put China squarely at interpretation, Article 9 also prevents the center of its Asia policy. Naturally, Japan from involving itself in collec- relations with Japan soured. While tive self-defense. According to cur- the Bush administration’s Asia policy rent views, Japanese forces may only has been firmly focused on Japan be used in the defense of Japan, hence from day one, a change in the White their non-threatening name. There is House in 2009 could easily bring with no Japanese army, navy or air force it a similar shift in focus. per se, but rather contingents of Self- The basing of some 50,000 U.S. Defense Forces. Currently, Japanese forces in Japan, especially on Oki- forces do not even have the constitu- nawa, also continues to be a potential tional authority to defend U.S. forces, flashpoint. While Tokyo and Wash- unless doing so was seen as contrib- ington have tried to be responsive to uting to the defense of Japan. The Japanese locals over the years about U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is the noise generated by aircraft and not, in fact, a “mutual” defense pact, helicopters and the occasional crimes like NATO’s formative document, committed by American service mem- the North Atlantic Treaty, where an bers, the domestic outcry continues. armed attack on one is interpreted Both the U.S. and Japan fundamen- as an armed attack on all. Should tally understand the importance of the United States come under attack, the presence of American forces in Japan is under no obligation to come to Japan to the defense of Japan, a North America’s defense. It might do so, but Korean contingency and as a hedge under current circumstances the Jap- against China’s military build-up. But anese parliament, or Diet, would have despite creative solutions proposed to pass legislation to allow Japanese by both sides (such as the redeploy- forces to exceed their current con-

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs Japan: Coming of Age stitutional mandate. And in the past, siles, to its military arsenal. In Febru- with the possible exception of special ary 2003, Defense Minister Shigeru anti-terrorist legislation passed in the Ishiba warned that Japan would attack aftermath of 9/11, this legislative pro- North Korea if it had evidence Pyong- cess has been highly politicized and yang was preparing to launch ballis- painfully slow. tic missiles, going so far as to indicate Nevertheless, change may be that Japan could regard the process of on the horizon. While Japan largely fueling a missile as the start of mili- considers itself a pacifist nation, the tary attack, according to an interview summer 2006 North Korean mis- with Reuters. Ishiba’s statement, at sile launches may have precipitated that time absent a provocation simi- a significant shift in Japanese secu- lar to the July 2006 missile tests, may rity thinking. In the days after North have sent tremors throughout East Korea launched its missiles into the Asia, but, equally importantly, it was Sea of Japan, several senior Japanese a telling indicator of Japan’s growing officials, including the government’s frustration with—and worry over— leading spokesman, Chief Cabinet Pyongyang’s behavior. Secretary Shinzo Abe, announced that Japan should look at its constitu- In the driver’s seat tion to see whether it would allow for Clearly, Japan is rethinking its developing the military capabilities to security. Not everyone in the region launch a pre-emptive attack against will view Japan’s efforts in the same North Korean missile facilities as way. While the U.S. may see Japan’s an act of self-defense. Abe, the front- desire to expand its contributions to runner to replace Koizumi as premier, international security in the context of has been a leading voice in Japanese the bilateral alliance as a net benefit, conservative political circles to revise other Asian neighbors may view it as the constitution to allow Japan to build provocative, especially considering armed forces commensurate with Japan’s militarism during the 20th cen- Japan’s political and economic role in tury. Despite the relatively small size of the world. And Abe is not alone; the Japan’s armed forces (which number head of the Japanese Defense Agency, some 240,000) compared with other Fukushiro Nukaga, has also publicly regional militaries, outcry from China supported such a re-conception of the as well as South Korea could poten- use of force “if an enemy country defi- tially slow Japan’s efforts to become nitely has a way of attacking Japan a more “normal” nation. While Bei- and has its finger on the trigger.”1 jing and Seoul cannot directly affect Some analysts believe that con- the pace of change in Japan’s security servative politicians like Abe may be policy, a desire to avoid public contro- seizing on the North Korean missile versy over its past history may play a tests in hopes that public anger will role in slowing the pace of change in increase support for revising the con- Tokyo’s security thinking. stitution. But while these comments And there is no doubt that there are striking, they are not entirely will be a significant debate within unexpected. In recent years, Japa- Japan about hitching itself more nese government officials have begun fully to America’s wagon. U.S. for- openly discussing whether Japan eign policy in Japan is not without should add offensive weapons, such controversy. While the invasion of as air- and sea-launched cruise mis- Afghanistan after 9/11 was popular

The Journal of International Security Affairs 19 Peter Brookes and deemed to be fully justified, the It makes sense that two of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 world’s most powerful democracies, received only mixed support. And which share common interests and the fact that the Iraq war has dragged values such as economic and politi- on for over three years now has con- cal freedom, should work together vinced the average Japanese that the to advance stability, security and United States is not omniscient—or prosperity in Asia—and beyond. omnipotent. While the United States This won’t necessarily be easy, but it and Japan share many similar values, should certainly be endeavored. because of the ongoing challenges in The U.S.-Japan alliance, while Iraq there is a healthy dose of skep- not perfect, is much more ready to ticism among the Japanese public face 21st century threats than it was about being swept up in American just five years ago. There is still room “adventurism” overseas that may for improvement in terms of bilateral not directly benefit perceived Japa- coordination, planning and interop- nese interests. For instance, some erability. Political constraints are Japanese scholars, while generally also present; absent a crisis such as concerned about the rise of China, another North Korean provocation, have no interest in getting involved it is unlikely that there will be much in a Sino-American donnybrook over more progress in the bilateral security Taiwan’s future, especially if Taipei relationship while Japan transitions to mismanages cross-Strait relations. new leadership. But the political tran- Of course, other Japanese security sition to the post-Koizumi era won’t specialists realize that the disposition last forever, and Japan will need to of Taiwan’s future could have a seri- make some difficult decisions in the ous effect on Japan too, noting that years ahead if it wants the bilateral the island nation is a strategic piece security relationship to grow beyond of real estate connecting Northeast the Bush-Koizumi legacy. For right Asian and Southeast Asian sea lanes, now, Washington is a willing part- on which Japan is heavily dependent, ner in this endeavor, and holds high especially for its energy needs. hopes for further progress. But there are a number of inter- As such, the future of the bilat- national security threats upon which eral security relationship by and the United States and Japan can cer- large rests in Japan’s hands. With tainly agree. Islamic terrorism, sea appropriate attention, proper tend- piracy and the proliferation of weap- ing and enlightened leadership, the ons of mass destruction are critical alliance has the potential to become issues for both countries, and there the bedrock of peace and stability in has been notable progress in some of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as a these areas, including Tokyo’s acces- powerful force for dealing with both sion to the Bush administration’s regional and global challenges. It is premier counterproliferation part- up to officials in Tokyo to make this nership, the Proliferation Security vision a reality. Initiative (PSI). Yet, so far, these advances have been ad hoc in nature. In the future, both sides need to seek 1. Martin Fackler, “Tokyo Talks of Military ways to build upon them by forging Strike on North Korea,” International Herald a durable, global partnership capable Tribune, July 10, 2006, http://www.iht.com/ of advancing mutual interests. articles/2006/07/10/news/japan.php.

20 The Journal of International Security Affairs India Toward True Partnership

Anupam Srivastava

he horrific events of 9/11 re-ignited a long-running debate in the United States. Should America “retreat” behind its oceanic bound- Taries, or adopt a more muscular foreign policy to proactively shape outcomes to suit its interests? The Bush administration unwaveringly chose the latter. Its response to the attacks of September 11th marked the end of the “post-Cold War era”—a nebulous decade that had defied easy characterization. U.S. retaliatory strikes against Afghanistan in November 2001 signaled the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The theater subsequently was expanded by American preemptive strikes against Iraq in March 2003. Unmistakably, a new era was in the making.

Three issues will be critical to the United States maintaining this momen- tum in the years ahead. The first is to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and to create new “coali- tions of the willing” to do so. A second priority is to combat state and non-state sponsors of terrorism. The third objective is to promote democracy in gover- nance—both to ameliorate the marginalization that gives rise to terrorism and to improve the accountability of state actors. To implement these objectives, the Bush administration has emphasized creating cooperative frameworks for regional security. This has entailed constructing strong, if bounded, partner- ships with “pivotal states” in key regions of the world.1

Dr. Anupam Srivastava is the Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Trade & Security, University of Georgia. Anupam Srivastava

It is no wonder, therefore, that Proliferation Washington has gravitated toward The United States today faces greater cooperation with New the challenge of retooling multilateral Delhi. India’s size and location—a institutions to better address the pro- sub-continent-sized country with liferation of WMD and their means of long maritime borders, situated delivery. Of the treaty-based institu- strategically between the Persian tions, the Chemical Weapons Conven- Gulf and the Strait of Malacca— tion (CWC) is the only one that seeks make it an indispensable ally for the to eliminate an entire class of WMD. United States in South Asia. And, Its disarmament focus resonates with while a host of reasons made them India, and although the country sur- “estranged democracies”2 during prised many by declaring that it had the Cold War, the revised priorities developed a small CW arsenal, India now animating U.S. policy discourse and the United States are the only two resonate strongly with India’s new countries that have met their sched- pragmatism and aspiration. uled CW destruction targets so far. On the nuclear front, the 1968 A reorientation Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in New Delhi (NPT) remains the cornerstone of One of the biggest dividends global non-proliferation efforts. But, of the economic reforms begun in unlike the CWC’s mandate of compre- New Delhi in 1991 was the gradual hensive disarmament, the NPT is sad- emergence of a new, less ideological dled with the division of countries into and more pragmatic international “haves” (the P-5) and “have-nots,” with posture. By the mid-1990s, this prag- the former adopting a lackadaisical matism had begun to animate India’s approach toward arms reduction. The security discourse. At the same time, effectiveness—and the legitimacy—of the paradigm shift generated by the the NPT is further called into question end of the Cold War underscored by three states that have never joined the importance of re-engaging the (India, Pakistan and Israel) and three United States. that are members in poor standing or Conceptually, India’s post- who have withdrawn from the treaty Cold War strategic frontiers can be (Iraq, Iran and North Korea). divided into three concentric circles. Regarding the latter category, The innermost ring represents South India contended that Saddam Hus Asia (including Pakistan and Central sein’s regime had not sufficiently Asia), the middle ring is Asia (includ- reconstituted its WMD program to ing relations with Russia, China, and warrant preemptive military strikes, Southeast Asia), and the outermost or that such a course of action would circle is international (including be prudent from the standpoint of other actors and factors).3 While it Iraq’s long-term stability. India’s evolved independent of Washington, attitudes were informed by the exis- New Delhi’s strategic perceptions tence of a large Indian expatriate were similar to those of the United population in the Middle East, and States—a congruence that has facili- by the worry that involvement in the tated the deepening of bilateral ties conflict risked radicalizing its large on a number of fronts. Muslim population at home. These issues were vigorously debated, and India ultimately decided not to send

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs India: Toward True Partnership troops to Iraq, although it has other- the funneling of uranium enrichment wise participated in post-war recon- technology to North Korea in return struction efforts. for material assistance to bolster its India’s relations with Iran have missile capabilities.5 This nuclear- recently been portrayed as the “litmus missile “swap” made eminent sense test” of its sincerity to partner with for both countries, providing Pyong- the United States. Indeed, India long yang with a convenient route for fis- has had close economic, social and sile material production and allowing cultural ties with Iran, given their Islamabad to benefit from North proximity and civilizational bonds. But Korean upgrades to its Chinese- during the Cold War, New Delhi was origin medium-range missiles. repeatedly disappointed by the lack of In addition to sharing concerns support from Tehran when Islamabad over these regional security chal- tabled resolutions condemning the lenges, New Delhi has demonstrated Indian “occupation of Kashmir” at vari- growing affinity for Washington’s ous meetings of the OIC (Organization new initiatives to interdict prolifera- of the Islamic Conference). Bilateral tion: the Proliferation Security Initia- ties were strained further with the rise tive (PSI) and the Container Security of radical Islam in Iran following the Initiative (CSI). The first is a coalition Islamic Revolution of 1979, and when of over 65 countries that cooperate in India subsequently learned of a secret real time to board ships in docks and understanding that Iran would assist territorial waters or on the high seas Pakistan in a future war with India.4 to interdict prohibited WMD-relevant Nevertheless, today, India’s growing cargo and personnel. India, like sev- energy requirements have persuaded eral other countries, is debating New Delhi to negotiate the construc- whether interdiction on the high seas tion of a pipeline to transport Iranian constitutes an infringement of inter- oil via Pakistan into India. national law. The second is an effort But cooperation is not collusion. to upgrade technical, procedural and New Delhi has made clear that it would personnel safeguards to improve not be in its interests if Iran were to security and verification of interna- develop or acquire a nuclear weapons tional-bound cargo loaded onto ships capability. That is the reason why, and aircraft. And, while still the sub- in line with U.S. expectations, India ject of considerable domestic debate, has voted twice at the International India has begun to respond positively Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to on both fronts. refer Iran to the United Nations Secu- rity Council. And while India might Missile defense and have preferred to abstain, India’s nuclear energy national interest ultimately coincides An important indicator that New with U.S. desires to prevent Iran from Delhi will support Washington’s making further progress toward an attempts to restructure international atomic bomb. security came in 2004. India was When it comes to North Korea, among the earliest supporters of the by contrast, there is no ambiguity in U.S. move away from the ABM Treaty India’s opposition to the DPRK’s dan- and toward the deployment of a mis- gerous quest for a nuclear capability. sile defense system. India’s support India had long articulated its con- was logical; it had itself been working cerns over Pakistan’s involvement in for years to develop such a capabil-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 Anupam Srivastava ity, albeit on a much smaller scale. gram—barely 2.8 percent of its total India’s open-architecture, multi-lay- energy requirements. If this deal ered system seeks to integrate Rus- comes to fruition, New Delhi has set sian platforms (the S-300 PMU-1 for the target of generating more than its army and S-300-V for its air force) ten times that amount via nuclear and AWACS systems (using Antonov energy by 2025. Even if this target is or Ilyushin aircraft) with the indig- only partially reached, the deal will enously-made “Rajendra” radar and reduce the upward pressure on global short-range missiles. oil prices because India is the 6th America, in turn, has begun largest consumer of oil and the 10th to engage India on this issue. U.S. largest economy in the world, and approval has paved the way for its economy is expected to continue the integration of Israeli technol- growing at about 7-8 percent annually ogy—namely the Green Pine radar for the foreseeable future. and Arrow interceptors—into Indian The second benefit is in the non- capabilities. Washington has also proliferation arena. Under this agree- offered India a customized version of ment, reaffirmed in March 2006 the Patriot Advanced Capability the- during President Bush’s visit to New ater missile defense system (PAC-2 or Delhi, the Indian government provided PAC-3), and allowed Indian scientists a blueprint to separate 65 percent of and military officers to witness live its nuclear complex—including power missile defense tests on U.S. soil on reactors, research facilities, and des- at least three occasions since 2003. ignated fuel fabrication and mining But perhaps the single most sig- facilities—and place it under IAEA nificant indicator of Washington’s safeguards by the year 2014. In addi- attempts to engage New Delhi is the tion, this deal will bring a vast majority proposed civil nuclear cooperation of India’s currently unprotected fissile agreement between the two coun- material, which accounts for over 50 tries. This deal, struck in July 2005, percent of the world’s total, under in essence requires India to separate IAEA safeguards. At a time when an all of its civilian nuclear facilities from international consensus to negotiate a its weapons complex and place the fissile material cut-off treaty remains former under the safeguards of the elusive, this represents a significant IAEA. In return, the United States interim development. has pledged to amend its domestic This “paradigm-shifting” deal laws and international provisions has sparked an intense domestic in order to permit participation in debate in both countries, and else- India’s civilian nuclear complex. The where. Discussing the relative merits core rationale is to create a prag- of those arguments is beyond the matic mechanism to end decades of scope of this article,6 but it is safe to embargoes against India, a non-NPT say that this agreement represents a member that first tested a nuclear crucial success for the Bush adminis- device in 1974, and help it meet its tration, which recognized the need to growing energy needs. move beyond America’s historic pre- Two significant wider benefits dominantly sanctions-based dialogue are associated with this so-called with India. To be sure, India’s strong “nuclear deal.” First, India currently export controls and its commitment produces 3,300mW of electricity not to proliferate beyond its borders through its indigenous nuclear pro- might have continued, but until now

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs India: Toward True Partnership the international community had calism in Bangladesh by improving little direct leverage to ensure Indian economic conditions and facilitating compliance. The Bush administra- its integration into the South Asian tion’s incentives-based approach Association for Regional Cooperation matches rewards with correspond- (SAARC). At the same time, India in ingly greater Indian obligations. The 2005 ensured that the United States results have been unmistakable: India was granted “observer status” within has already harmonized its nuclear SAARC, facilitating U.S. trade, invest- and missile control lists with those of ment and broader economic coop- the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the eration with the region. Indo-U.S. Missile Technology Control Regime, technical cooperation, meanwhile, is and is improving its export control focused on assisting Dhaka to disrupt regulations.7 India is also working to the financial and logistical networks harmonize its dual-use control lists in of terrorism in Bangladesh and their the chemical, biological and advanced connections abroad. conventional weapons spheres with Similarly, in Nepal, the fester- those of the Australia Group and the ing Maoist rebellion has fused with Wassenaar Arrangement. broader dissatisfaction against the Taken together, these multi- monarchy for its increasingly auto- lateral export control regimes are cratic rule. The United States and critical to the success of global non- India have conditioned further proliferation. And the nuclear deal arms supplies to the regime of King forged between Washington and Gyanendra on the provision of greater New Delhi has generated more coop- powers to the parliament, and linked eration from India vis-à-vis these closer economic cooperation to Nepal regimes than two decades of inflex- complying with its obligations under ible dialogue had accomplished. SAARC. Greater Indo-U.S. coordina- tion is also visible in their efforts to Counterterrorism and address the festering Tamil-Sinhala democracy promotion struggle in Sri Lanka. Washington The United States, as the world’s and New Delhi have expanded eco- most powerful democracy, and India, nomic cooperation with Colombo as the largest one, share the view that but reduced their direct presence, terrorism has to be fought simultane- instead encouraging the negotiated ously on two fronts: by fostering trans- settlement mediated by Norway. At parent, accountable institutions and the same time, U.S. and Indian naval destroying terror networks. Indo-U.S. and intelligence teams have cooper- cooperation, therefore, is most visible ated to intercept arms shipments to in their leadership of the Conference the Tamil separatists, while main- on Democracy at the United Nations, taining pressure on the government in which both sides have pledged sub- in Colombo to enter into a durable stantial amounts toward the creation power-sharing agreement with the of a Democracy Fund.8 rebels and to strengthen democratic At the same time, Washington institutions in the provinces of the and New Delhi have intensified coor- war-torn country. dination and are pursuing a subtle The United States and India are “carrot and stick” approach to pro- also deepening their interaction on mote democracy in South Asia. They the maritime security front. Under a are cooperating to curb Islamic radi- February 2001 agreement, the Indian

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Anupam Srivastava navy has escorted high-value U.S. for the U.S. are also clear; India com- commercial ships through the Indian pares favorably in recent Pentagon Ocean up to the Strait of Malacca, assessments with other American and permits American ships to refuel allies in East Asia regarding the utility at southern Indian ports, saving and cost of joint armaments produc- them a 1,700-kilometer detour to tion. From Washington’s standpoint, Diego Garcia. The 2002 signing of therefore, enhanced cooperation the Generalized Security of Military will secure a larger share of India’s Information Agreement (GSOMIA) defense procurement and facilitate has facilitated real time cooperation greater military interoperability on a against piracy and drug interdic- range of shared missions in Asia. tion, as well as in search-and-rescue Bilateral defense ties between and joint patrol operations. The U.S. Washington and New Delhi received a Pacific Command has conducted big boost in June 2005, when Defense a series of increasingly significant Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian naval exercises with India involving Defense Minister Pranab Mukher- aircraft carriers, frigates and guided jee signed a landmark 10-year agree- missile destroyers, and plans to deploy ment expanding defense cooperation.9 technical assets on Indian ships for The bilateral Defense Policy Group improved coordination and execution (DPG) remains the chief policy body of joint tasks. Securing the sea lanes overseeing defense ties, and under between the Persian Gulf and South- its aegis bilateral military contacts east Asia is a critical objective of have expanded rapidly. The Indian Indo-U.S. cooperation, because over and U.S. armies, air forces and navies 45 percent of international maritime have conducted over 20 increasingly commerce transits through these complex exercises since 2002,10 while dangerous waters, which are prone to collaboration in defense R&D, net- drug and small arms trafficking and work-centric warfare, and technology WMD-sensitive proliferation. The co-production have all increased.11 swift coordination of Indian, U.S. and These initiatives—and the lift- Japanese naval assets within hours of ing of U.S. sanctions—have enabled the tsunami catastrophe in December some major sales of U.S. technol- 2004, including the de-mining of the ogy to India. During 2004-05, India Sri Lankan ports to expedite rescue purchased counterterrorism equip- efforts, was a concrete example of ment worth $29 million for its special this growing effectiveness. forces, $105 million-worth of elec- tronic ground sensors to contain mili- Transforming security tant infiltration in Kashmir, and spent cooperation $40 million of self-protection systems Although for different reasons, for aircraft that carry the Indian politi- New Delhi and Washington increas- cal leadership.12 Current U.S. defense ingly agree on the value of diversify- offers to India total well over $1 bil- ing India’s military arsenal from its lion, and include maritime patrol and predominantly Russian-based plat- reconnaissance aircraft, multi-role forms toward Western systems. To combat aircraft (F-16s and F/A-18s), India, in the midst of modernizing the anti-missile systems (PAC-2 or PAC- world’s fourth largest military, such a 3), and the offer to transfer the USS step provides better terms-of-trade Trenton amphibious transport ship to in defense cooperation. The benefits India in early 2007.13

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs India: Toward True Partnership

Through the this troika has calibrated the use of looking glass radical Islamic groups to pursue its Today, the burgeoning ties aggressive goals regarding Kash- between the U.S. and India are both mir, at low cost to itself. As such, bolstered and reinforced by comple- Kashmir is a violent manifestation mentary strategic outlooks. India is of a larger anti-India agenda—one a “net revisionist” state that desires that will impede bilateral relations international recognition for its grow- between the two countries even if ing capabilities and track record of a negotiated settlement of Kashmir 15 responsible governance. The United can be achieved. The July 2006 States, for its part, wants to reorder Mumbai blasts have reinforced these 16 world politics so that it can respond views in many Indian minds. While more effectively to new challenges Washington has belatedly begun to confronting the global community. share a diluted version of this assess- But is an alliance between the ment, it has repeatedly subordinated two feasible in the near term? The its demands for Pakistani democracy answer is no, for four key reasons. and an end to the insurgency against First, the absolute “power gap” India in favor of more pressing U.S. between the two countries is so great goals (such as counterterrorism that India currently lacks the requi- cooperation in Afghanistan and Cen- site military resources and domes- tral Asia). As such, American poli- tic political consensus to become a cies toward Pakistan will continue to U.S. partner in missions other than cast a long—and negative—shadow humanitarian and preventive diplo- on U.S.-India ties. macy efforts. Second, while both Finally, while the senior leader- countries share concerns about the ship in Washington and New Delhi is future behavior of China, Washing- committed to transforming bilateral ton and New Delhi alike have opted ties, the legislatures and wider expert to expand economic and diplomatic communities in both countries still ties with the PRC. If Beijing’s behav- retain a measure of Cold War era mis- ior becomes coercive or confronta- trust. While this has begun to change, tional, India would be loath to enter it will still take time for the new para- into a U.S.-led coalition unless its digm of U.S.-India cooperation to be interests were directly threatened. accepted and embraced. Third, New Delhi and Washing- All of this begs the question: is ton sharply disagree on the means an alliance feasible, or even desirable, to be adopted to achieve their shared in the medium to longer term? The goals regarding Pakistan—assist- answer is that at least three factors ing it to become a moderate Islamic will fundamentally reshape bilateral state with greater democracy, at calculations so that the partnership peace with itself and its neighbors. will progressively yield benefits com- India contends that Pakistan’s armed parable to those of an alliance. First, forces, in cooperation with the landed the two economies are becoming aristocracy and civilian bureau- rapidly integrated in a range of civil- cracy, have consistently undermined ian and military sectors. Second, the democracy by dominating the coun- two-million-strong Indian-American try’s economic, political and secu- community will not only remain a rity arena.14 Since the early 1990s, powerful “human bridge” between the two countries, but become an increas-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 27 Anupam Srivastava ingly persuasive “policy bridge” as accounts of non-proliferation related criti- well, arguing in favor of Indian free- cisms of the deal, see material available at www.ArmsControlToday.org. For a compre- dom of action abroad. Third, the old hensive technical account of the benefits of Communist adage reminds us that the nuclear deal, see Ashley J. Tellis, “Atoms “one’s class perception is a function of for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Coop- one’s class position.” As India moves eration and India’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Car- negie Endowment for International Peace to a higher position in the hierarchy Report, June 2006, http://www.carnegieen- of nations, its interests and behavior dowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf. might converge more fully with those 7. For a comprehensive detailed account of of the United States, and will serve to Indian export controls and related details, see Seema Gahlaut and Anupam Srivastava, transform it into a valuable, if spirited, Nonproliferation Export Controls in India: American ally. Update 2005 (Athens: Center for Interna- tional Trade and Security, 2005). 8. “Transforming India-US Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership,” Address by Indian Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran at Car- negie Endowment for International Peace, 1. India is regarded as one such pivotal state. Washington, D.C., December 21, 2005. See Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, 9. For the full text of the agreement, see Aspects “India,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and of India’s Economy no. 41, December 2005, Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A http://www.rupe-india.org/41/app5.html. New Framework for US Policy in the Devel- 10. Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global oping World (New York, London: W. W. Power: An Action Agenda for the United Norton & Company, 1999); see also Michael States (Washington: Carnegie Endowment D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting for International Peace, 2005), http://www. China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_ Future (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000). India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf. 2. Dennis Kux, India and the United States: 11. David McCormick, Under Secretary of Com- Estranged Democracies 1941 – 1991 (Wash- merce for Industry and Security, Remarks ington: National Defense University Press, at the High Technology Cooperation Group 1992). Public-Private Forum, New Delhi, Novem- 3. For a detailed assessment using the con- ber 30, 2005, http://newdelhi.usembassy. centric circle schematic, see Anupam Sriv- gov/pr113005.html. astava, “The Strategic Context of Evolving 12. Alan Kronstadt, “India-US Relations,” CRS Indo-US Ties,” in Satish Kumar, ed., India’s Issue Brief, August 1, 2005, http://www.fas. National Security: Annual Review 2002 org/sgp/crs/row/IB93097.pdf. (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), 13. Fact sheet, “U.S. – India Defense Relation- 88-114. A brief reference to this schematic ship,” U.S. Department of Defense, March also appears in C. Raja Mohan, “India and 2, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ the Balance of Power,” in Foreign Affairs, Mar2006/d20060302us-indiadefenserela- Special Section, “The Rise of India,” July/ tionship.pdf. August 2006. 14. Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, “A 4. Author’s off-the-record conversation with a New Policy for Pakistan,” in Kanti Bajpai, senior member of the Indian security estab- Afsir Karim, and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., lishment, April 13, 2006. For a recent report Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy on this subject, see Willard Payne, “Cross- (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. fire War - Iran - Pakistan Increase Military Ltd., 2000), 164-190. Cooperation - Target India,” newsblaze.com, 15. Tavleen Singh, “Attack on the Idea of India,” July 19, 2006, http://newsblaze.com/story/ Indian Express, August 6, 2006, http://indi- 20060719090849payn.nb/topstory.html. anexpress.com/story/10018.html. 5. David Sanger and William Broad, “Pakistan 16. For an analysis that juxtaposes U.S. state- May Have Aided North Korea A-Test,” New ments after the Mumbai blasts with state- York Times, February 28, 2004 ments from the U.S. State Department’s 6. For a detailed assessment of the nuclear annual report on terrorism, see Ajai Sahni, deal, see Anupam Srivastava and Seema “Terrorists and Their Fellow Travelers,” Gahlaut, “The New Energy in US-India South Asia Intelligence Review 5, no. 2 (2006), Relations,” Defense and Security Analyses, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index. December 2006, forthcoming. For specific htm.

28 The Journal of International Security Affairs Eurasia Crisis and Opportunity

Svante E. Cornell

n the wake of September 11th, America identified important inter- ests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the short term, the focus Iwas on planning and sustaining military operations in Afghanistan. With strategic access crucial to the prosecution of the war, the repub- lics of Central Asia took center stage in the most important conflict to confront the United States in decades. Although less prominently cov- ered in the media, the states of the South Caucasus were equally vital; situated between Iran and Russia, they were the only practical cor- ridor connecting NATO territory with Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The resulting diplomatic and political effort was remarkable. Within weeks, Washington had not only secured transit, refueling and landing rights in most countries in the region, but had established a major military presence on the ground as well (in southern Uzbekistan and northern Kyrgyzstan, respec- tively). This achievement is not to be underestimated. The great powers of the region, mainly Russia and China, were adamantly opposed to an American mil- itary presence in what they viewed as their geopolitical backyard. Local states, meanwhile, were worried about the long-term consequences of allying with the U.S. The American withdrawal from the Afghan conflict in 1989 and its implications for Pakistan were still fresh in regional memory, while the results of the current conflict were by no means evident. Indeed, concerns regard-

Dr. Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, a joint research and policy center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University, Sweden. He is Editor of the Joint Center’s biweekly publication, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org). Svante E. Cornell ing America’s staying power were tarian rule, the latter often deeply already potent factors at this stage, corrupt. Aware of the U.S. and Euro- leading Uzbekistan to seek to put its pean emphasis on democracy promo- relationship with Washington in writ- tion, the corrupt forces are typically ing in the form of a formal document opponents of westward orientation on strategic partnership. and of Euro-Atlantic integration. But if America’s short-term goals They instead favor a closer relation- in the campaign against the Taliban ship with Russia, which pays little and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were or no attention to the domestic char- effectively achieved, the same cannot acteristics of government. On the be said for its long-term interests. other hand, advocates of reform are These can be roughly separated into typically pro-western, seeing in west- three categories. ern institutions the tools, assistance, The first relates to “hard” secu- and guidance for meaningful reform. rity matters. Given the realization that In this situation, ignoring or shun- America was engaged in a “long war,” ning state institutions undermines preserving strategic access to Cen- the very progressive forces that are tral Asia and the Caucasus became an the best hope for gradual political important strategic priority. Second, and economic reform, and strength- the United States has long worked ens the hand of the autocratic forces for the westward export of the Cas- that western policies are designed pian region’s energy resources, and to counter. Isolation, exclusion and this gradually became an even more finger-pointing, which some in the important issue as energy markets west advocate as the preferred policy tightened and oil prices soared. Third, toward countries perceived to not the U.S. sought internal reform in the comply fully with international stan- mainly authoritarian countries of Cen- dards, are the safest ways to ensure tral Eurasia. This objective was both a the victory of authoritarian-minded principled and a pragmatic one. Sup- forces there. Instead, engagement porting democratization and human and the development of broad rela- rights had become a moral element tions in multiple fields provide the of Western foreign policy, shared by best course of action for the long- both the U.S. and the European Union. term strengthening of sovereignty, Moreover, democracy was increas- governance, and democracy. ingly understood as a way of tackling Clearly, interests in security or the perceived root causes of terrorism, energy should not be allowed to stifle namely socio-economic backwardness democratic and institutional reform and political repression. in the region. But neither should In the years after 9/11, U.S. poli- excessive demands for these coun- cymakers have come under fire, both tries to achieve overnight a level of at home and abroad, for these priori- democracy comparable to leading ties. Security concerns, critics say, western states be allowed to sup- have led Washington to once again press legitimate security and energy ally with dictators, thereby ignoring interests—or, for that matter, the human rights and democracy. But development of trade relations. It is in the governments of the Caucasus America’s interest to advance these and Central Asia are not monolithic. three sets of issues simultaneously, In all of them, forces favoring reform not allowing one to take precedence coexist with those favoring authori- over the other.

30 The Journal of International Security Affairs Eurasia: Crisis and Opportunity

Seeing Eurasia straight attention after 9/11 due its proxim- Western governments and inter- ity to Afghanistan. Indeed, access to national institutions alike have long Central Asia will remain an important seen the Caucasus and Central Asia objective for the United States, given as one and the same, failing to take the reality of a long-term engagement into account the fundamental differ- in the War on Terror’s first front. ences, both political and strategic, that exist between the two regions. Western governments and Simply put, the Caucasus is both international institutions alike mentally and geographically closer have long seen the Caucasus to the European orbit than is Central Asia. However brief, all three coun- and Central Asia as one and tries in the South Caucasus—Arme- the same, failing to take into nia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—have account the fundamental prior histories of statehood. By con- trast, the five states of Central Asia differences, both political and (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki- strategic, that exist between stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) the two regions. emerged as sovereign nations for the first time in 1991. Prior to their cre- Moreover, the ability to project power ation as Soviet republics in the 1920s, into the heart of Asia, a region sur- no entities had ever existed with bor- rounded by Russia, China, Iran and ders or names that approximated the Indian subcontinent, is crucial these five entities. for the global role of the U.S. But the Since independence, Central Caucasus plays a more complex— Asia and the Caucasus have devel- and arguably more important—stra- oped in diverging directions. In tegic role. To begin with, the region Central Asia, political pluralism and is the corridor through which the civil society have progressed slowly, West can access Central Asia. This finding roots only in the nomadic was most obviously shown after 9/11, societies of Kyrgyzstan (and to some as virtually all Coalition flights des- degree Kazakhstan), and prospects tined for Afghanistan transited the for democracy are limited. In the Caucasus, given the unavailability of South Caucasus, by contrast, a true Iranian and Russian airspace. Sec- tug of war between equally strong ondly, as the eastern shore of the forces favoring authoritarianism and Black Sea, the Caucasus is part of democracy has developed. This is an emerging Black Sea region that most obvious in Georgia, where the will form the southeastern corner of “Rose Revolution” of 2003 brought Europe—making the EU an increas- to power a new generation of politi- ingly involved actor there. Third, the cal leaders committed to meaning- Caucasus borders the Middle East, ful reforms. But also in Armenia and and its border with Iran is particu- Azerbaijan, young, western-oriented larly important to American inter- forces exist alongside the older, ests. Fourth, the completion in 2006 Soviet nomenklatura in government, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) gradually replacing it in a measured pipeline and the accompanying South and excruciating process. Caucasus natural gas Pipeline (SCP) The regions also diverge in stra- makes the Caucasus an integrated tegic terms. Central Asia got most part of European energy architec-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 31 Svante E. Cornell ture, a role that is only likely to grow The foundation of U.S. interests in the future, providing Central Asian in the region is the pro-western policy producers an independent export pursued by Azerbaijan and Georgia. route to the West. Finally, the three These two states have been among states of the Caucasus are growing the most unequivocally independent into increasingly solid components of and pro-American countries of the European security through their bur- former Soviet Union and the wider geoning relationships with NATO. Middle East. These differences mean that Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” was Washington has different prospects the spark that triggered the Ukrai- in the two regions. In Central Asia, nian “Orange Revolution” and the especially after the 2005 collapse of Kyrgyz upheaval dubbed as a “Tulip its relationship with Uzbekistan, the Revolution.” And whereas Kyrgyz- U.S. will be forced to work to pre- stan has backtracked and Ukraine serve its presence and regain lost has stagnated since their respective ground. This will require engage- revolutions, Georgia has continued to ment, primarily with Kazakhstan pursue a course of determined trans- and the smaller countries of the formation. Reforms of the police force, region, pending political change in public administration, justice system, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In and other sectors have brought mean- the Caucasus, on the other hand, ingful, if at times difficult, change to American policymakers have far the country. In this sense, Georgia greater ability to work with friendly deserves—and depends upon—the powers and leaders in order to secure very clear support that President Bush the region, help resolve its conflicts, has given it, expressed most recently speed up and support reforms, and during Georgian President Mikheil strengthen integration with Euro- Saakashvili’s visit to Washington in Atlantic institutions. July 2006. Georgia remains one of the few success stories of the Bush The South Caucasus: administration’s Greater Middle East quarreling allies project, and the U.S. government— The South Caucasus poses a par- no matter which administration is ticular challenge for the United States. in power—has invested substantial All states in the region have a stated energy, money and prestige in Geor- Euro-Atlantic orientation and attach gia’s success. great importance to relations with Georgia will remain a key coun- Washington. Yet the conflict between try for the United States in the wider Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Eurasian region for several reasons. internal conflicts in Georgia—which First, its location on the Black Sea have pitted the central government and on the Caucasian corridor to against Russian-supported seces- the Caspian Sea makes it a crucial sionist minorities—are a greater player in energy security, as well as security threat with each year that in access to Central Asia. Second, goes by without a resolution. Frozen it is a country whose leadership, as along cease-fire lines since the early well as the overwhelming major- 1990s, these conflicts have ham- ity of the population, is strongly pered the development of prosperity pro-American and likely to remain and democracy. so. Indeed, there are few countries in Europe and Eurasia where Presi-

32 The Journal of International Security Affairs Eurasia: Crisis and Opportunity dent Bush has been greeted not with power a leader from a younger gener- anti-American demonstrations but ation. But unlike Georgia, that leader with chants of support by thousands was the son of the ailing incumbent of locals, as happened in May 2005. President, Heydar Aliyev, and his Third, Georgia’s reform process is election to power was disputed by an symbolically important; it was the angry opposition that denounced it first democratic breakthrough in as “dynastic succession.” Ilham Ali- a CIS country, and the survival of yev’s election to the presidency was Georgian democracy is crucial to indeed controversial, yet during the America’s wider regional objectives. election, it was clear that he was by Azerbaijan is, if possible, stra- no means unpopular—and equally tegically even more important than clear that the bickering, unreformed Georgia, though somewhat more opposition did not possess the popu- controversial. The oil-rich country lar support that Saakashvili did in will pump a million barrels of crude Georgia. Although Aliyev’s election a day to western markets by the end was marred by recorded irregulari- of the decade.1 Given the state of ties, there is little doubt that he actu- global oil markets, the timing of the ally won that election and would have arrival of Azerbaijani oil to world done so without the interference of markets could not be better. Its oil, his satraps. And since coming to supplemented by natural gas deliver- power, Ilham Aliyev has proven his ies, will provide an important chunk credentials as a reformer. His coming of the projected increase of Euro- to power coincided with the market- pean energy consumption in the next ing of Azerbaijan’s oil wealth and the decade. But Azerbaijan’s importance world’s highest GDP growth figures, is not limited to its energy resources. with 26 percent recorded in both 2005 As the only country to border both and 2006.2 But he has also followed a Russia and Iran, it is the virtual key consistent (though cautious) policy of to western access to the Caspian Sea incremental reform, most notably in and Central Asia. Indeed, given cur- the economy, bringing to positions rent political realities, Azerbaijan is of influence a new guard of younger, the only truly irreplaceable country often western-educated professionals. in the East-West corridor linking The reasons for Azerbaijan’s tentative- Europe and Turkey to Central Asia. ness are clear: Aliyev has to deal with Moreover, being a moderate, secular deeply entrenched, regionally based Muslim country, with a potential to power groups established during the strengthen democratic institutions, Soviet period and his father’s tenure, Azerbaijan has an added symbolic groups deeply suspicious of reform value to the West—particularly at a and which can only be marginalized time of great flux in America’s rela- gradually and incrementally. tionship with Turkey. That is not to say that all is well But Washington has been much in Azerbaijan. Political reform is still slower to embrace Azerbaijan. The proceeding more slowly than eco- reason has everything to do with the nomic reform; the judiciary remains slower speed of democratic develop- a sector where wholesale change is ment in Baku. Concurrent with Geor- needed; corruption is widespread gia’s “Rose Revolution,” a similar among the bureaucracy and key min- transfer of power took place in Azer- istries, not least among important baijan. As in Georgia, it brought to institutions such as the interior minis-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 33 Svante E. Cornell

try, defense ministry and the customs years struggled to ensure that it is service; and the country’s record not left standing on the platform as in elections as well as human rights the Euro-Atlantic train boarded by protections remain questionable. Yet its two neighbors races off. It has movement toward reform is palpable upgraded its relationship with NATO in Azerbaijan, all the more so given and been even more careful to tend President Aliyev’s clear ambition to to its relationship with the European bring his country greater respect- Union. It is thus important to keep ability in the community of nations. working for Armenia’s integration Indeed, Azerbaijan has consistently into Euro-Atlantic institutions and shown itself to be a country ready to simultaneously seek to resolve the listen and adapt to western advice. All conflict between Armenia and Azer- this makes Azerbaijan an obvious ally baijan, something the U.S. admittedly of the United States—a country that has invested substantial energies in, can serve an important purpose and but so far to no avail. which America can support and influ- Finally, as long as the Nagorno- ence on its path of reform. Karabakh conflict remains unre- solved, the U.S. will face a divided A tour d’horizon of Central Caucasus, a situation which serves the purposes of its Russian and Ira- Asia in 2006 provides the U.S. nian rivals. Only if that conflict finds with no easy solutions. a solution will Armenia fully be able to realize its potential as a part of The foreign policies of Azerbaijan the Euro-Atlantic community and and Georgia are not only complemen- become a full member of the coopera- tary, they are mutually reinforcing. tive ventures developing in the South As analyst Vladimir Socor has noted, Caucasus. The opportunity cost of the two “stand or fall together.”3 This failing to resolve the conflict is high, is most obvious in energy security, given the potential gains of a solution where the BTC pipeline connects the and, not least, the horrible price the fates of the two countries—Azerbai- entire region will pay in the event of a jan providing Georgia much-needed renewed war. energy and transit income, and Geor- gia providing Azerbaijan with an Central Asia: partners, export route, and with the pipeline anywhere? providing both with strategic value If the central problem in the in the eyes of the West. It is there- Caucasus is the troubles among fore crucial for the U.S. to work to America’s partners, the main impedi- strengthen the positive interaction ment for Washington in Central Asia between Azerbaijan and Georgia, not stems from regional perceptions of least by facilitating their integration the United States. A tour d’horizon of into NATO. Central Asia in 2006 provides the U.S. Yet America must also continue with no easy solutions. Until recently, to cultivate its relationship with Washington enjoyed a privileged Armenia. Dependent on Russia to a relationship with the region’s strate- great degree because of its conflict gic pivot, Uzbekistan. But as a result with Azerbaijan and its unsettled of numerous factors—the Uzbek relationship with Turkey, Armenia government’s continued reluctance has nevertheless in the past several

34 The Journal of International Security Affairs Eurasia: Crisis and Opportunity to reform and the violent repression tionship with Russia. Indeed, 40 per- of an uprising in the eastern town of cent of the Kazakh nation was killed Andijan, America’s distraction in Iraq during Stalin-imposed collectiviza- and its consequent failure to fulfill tion in the 1920s, and the remainder the provisions of the strategic part- was subjected to strong “russifica- nership treaty inked with Tashkent, tion” and the in-migration of Slavs, and Washington’s neglect of all issues making Kazakhs a 30 percent minor- other than human rights in Uzbeki- ity on their own land several decades stan—the relationship went sour later. By the time of their country’s in 2005.4 The consequences have independence in 1991, Kazakhs had been nothing short of catastrophic; recuperated somewhat, and out- after a decade of seeking to escape migration of Russians ever since has Russia’s embrace, Uzbekistan has led the Kazakhs to now form close to rejoined the Russian fold, practically two-thirds of the population, spurring cutting ties to the United States and a revival of national pride and of the expelling the U.S. military from the Kazakh language. Kharshi-Khanabad base near the All this has enabled Kazakhstan Afghan border. The prospects for a to gradually stake out an increasingly rapprochement between Washington independent foreign policy. Under and Tashkent are remote, and what- the decade-long guidance of foreign ever trust existed in the constantly minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev, troubled relationship has evaporated. Kazakhstan has embraced a bal- In the short term, the U.S-Uzbekistan anced relationship to all three major relationship is unlikely to be repaired, powers in Eurasia—Russia, China but this should not prevent the United and the United States. At present, it is States from seeking to rebuild it, the only state in the region to overtly either with the Karimov regime, if chart such a policy, leaving room for possible, or with a future government long-term cooperation with the U.S. that may have less baggage than the Thus, by default and also because current one. of its economic and political devel- With Uzbekistan lost for the opment, an important pillar of any time being, Kazakhstan has emerged American role in Central Asia will as America’s best friend in Central have to be a deepening relationship Asia. Since 2000, it has become the with Kazakhstan. region’s economic powerhouse. If Kyrgyzstan is by necessity the Uzbekistan provides the majority of next country on the list of U.S. pri- Central Asia’s population, Kazakh- orities, primarily because it hosts stan single-handedly provides the America’s only remaining military majority of its economic output. This base in Central Asia. Yet bilateral is mainly related to the oil industry, relations between Washington and scheduled to produce three mil- Bishkek have seen better days. The lion barrels a day by 2010,5 but also so-called “Tulip Revolution” of March to others that exploit Kazakhstan’s 2005 brought to power a weak oligar- rich natural resources. With impres- chy of deposed officials that quickly sive growth rates for a decade now, sought Russian support for their posi- Kazakhstan has sped ahead of the tion, aware they could be unseated rest of the region, and with it has as easily as they had attained power. come a feeling of independence, The new government, under strong despite a troubled history and rela- Russian and Chinese pressure,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 35 Svante E. Cornell

threatened to expel the U.S. military the most reclusive and isolated coun- in Spring 2006, settling nevertheless tries on earth. As long as Niyazov to keep it in July, but extracting an is in power, the U.S. will have little exorbitant price (a yearly fee of some opportunity for greater engagement. $150 million). More worrisome still is Yet this is no reason for America not the fact that the sole justification for to plan on engaging Turkmenistan the facility is the conflict in Afghani- in the future, should the opportu- stan. Once Afghanistan is pacified, nity arise. Tajikistan, for its part, is a the U.S. will lose its self-proclaimed more promising candidate. Recover- reason to retain a presence in Central ing from a debilitating civil war, it is Asia—implying that these two impor- gradually rebuilding and has begun tant objectives are fundamentally at to seek a place in the region. While odds.6 This leaves America vulner- still under strong Russian influence, able to renewed pressure from Russia Tajikistan has shown a willingness to and China. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s engage western powers. It is desper- polity has weakened considerably, ately poor, possesses few resources amid increasing influence from orga- aside from abundant water that could nized criminal groupings and grow- be converted into hydropower, and ing political instability. So far, the U.S. deeply affected by the drug trade has done very little to help Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan. It is therefore stabilize. And, given the remaining no candidate for a direct role as an tension in relations, it is unlikely to be American ally in the region, but is able to do much in the near future. For nevertheless a country that could in the time being, America needs Kyr- time develop into a more indepen- gyzstan, but the latter risks becoming dent actor—a process that Washing- a scene of almost permanent politi- ton should support. cal instability, ensuring that the U.S. presence there will be controversial The problem with Russia and problematic. (and China) No analysis of America’s rela- It has become exceedingly clear tionship with the countries of Cen- that in virtually all of its dealings tral Asia and the Caucasus would with the Central Eurasian states, be complete without addressing the U.S. will face the problem the role of Russia and, increasingly, that of China. For a decade, the U.S. of a Russia emboldened by high has sought to build relations with oil prices and determined to Moscow, seeking honestly to portray minimize American influence in its role in Central Eurasia as benign and not directed at Russian inter- the region. ests. Indeed, American diplomats have advanced a vision of a win-win This leaves Tajikistan and Turk- situation, whereby U.S. actions in fact menistan. The latter is strategically benefit Russia. Stabilizing the South important, bordering Iran and the Caucasus, seeking to resolve its con- Caspian Sea and possessing some flicts, and removing the Taliban from of the world’s largest natural gas power in Afghanistan are only some reserves. Yet it is run by the eccen- of Washington’s efforts that might tric Saparmurad Niyazov, who be seen as useful in Moscow. Yet in turned this tribal land into one of

36 The Journal of International Security Affairs Eurasia: Crisis and Opportunity reality, Russian leaders, particularly Moscow and Beijing view one another since Vladimir Putin’s ascension to with suspicion. In the long run, Russia power, have viewed U.S. actions in is a retreating power, with little to offer Central Asia and the Caucasus almost the region in economic terms and a exclusively from a zero-sum perspec- deeply troubling demographic devel- tive: as American encroachment on a opment. China, on the other hand, is a Russian sphere of influence. rising power, an economic powerhouse In response, Moscow has put bent on establishing influence over pressure on Georgia for its NATO Central Asia.7 The resulting unease aspirations and pro-American poli- in Russian-Chinese relations is best cies, severely undermining that observed in the energy field: China country’s stability. It has continued to has spent substantial efforts to seek to drag its heels on efforts to resolve the avoid dependence on Russian energy, conflict between Armenia and Azer- instead seeking to develop direct con- baijan. It has worked hard to lock up nections to Central Asian states. Central Asia’s oil and gas resources, This state of affairs provides the which it buys on the cheap thanks United States with an opportunity. to its de facto monopoly on regional While it has sought to engage Russia energy. Finally, Moscow worked suc- on Central Asian affairs, it has yet cessfully to wrest Uzbekistan from its to make use of its broad economic relationship with Washington, exert- and political dialogue with China ing major pressure to evict U.S. forces as regards Central Asia. There is, from the Kharshi-Khanabad airbase. indeed, room for an attempt by Wash- It has become exceedingly clear ington to engage Beijing on Central that in virtually all of its dealings Asian issues and forge both mutual with the Central Eurasian states, the understanding and a level of confi- U.S. will face the problem of a Russia dence about American intentions in emboldened by high oil prices and the region. Such an initiative may be determined to minimize American difficult to accomplish, but that will influence in the region. A decade of not be known unless it is attempted. seeking to engage Russia has not Should the U.S. achieve even a modi- changed this reality, and Washington cum of success in such an endeavor, it remains at a loss as to how to coun- would go a long way toward increasing ter this problem. In all likelihood, the its prospects of achieving a durable U.S. will be forced to adopt a tougher, strategic presence in Central Asia. clearer position regarding what its core interests are, and communicate Toward real regional these to Moscow while simultane- engagement ously leaving the door open for a con- As the past five years have shown, structive Russian role in the region the underlying problem in America’s and capitalizing on common interests relationship with Central Asia and if and when they arise. the Caucasus has been the lack of a As for China, Beijing has for the clear policy toward both regions. And past several years appeared to forge a in the absence of a coherent strategy, common front with Moscow on issues inertia and tensions have permeated pertaining to Central Asia. Their joint U.S. policy toward Central Eurasia, efforts in the Shanghai Cooperation with predictable results. Organization are the most important Moving forward, it is clear that example of this. Yet it is also clear that the United States must refocus on

The Journal of International Security Affairs 37 Svante E. Cornell building partnerships with the key states of the region. In the Caucasus, 1. For more on the economics of Azerbaijani it must pay equal attention to Azerbai- oil, see Jonathan Elkind, “Economic Implica- tions of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” jan and Georgia, while not neglecting in S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, to enlist Armenia in regional plan- eds., The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil ning. Bringing about equitable solu- Window to the West (Washington & Uppsala: tions to the conflicts of the region Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2005), 39-60. likewise will remain a key task. 2. 2006 estimates from the Economist Intelli- In Central Asia, meanwhile, the gence Unit. U.S. faces a different and more com- 3. Vladimir Socor, “A Tale of Two Post-Post- plicated set of challenges. Unques- Soviet Countries,” Wall Street Journal Europe, December 19, 2003. tionably, America’s position in the 4. See John Daly et al., “Anatomy of a Crisis: region has deteriorated significantly U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2000-2005,” Silk in recent years. The bright spot Road Paper, February 2006, http://www.silk- in this otherwise murky picture is roadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/ 0602Uzbek.pdf. Washington’s growing relationship 5. Official statistics from the Ministry of with an increasingly independent and Energy and Natural Resources of the Repub- wealthy Kazakhstan—an emerging lic of Kazakhstan, http://www.minenergo. bond that must be cultivated. Addi- kz/. 6. See Stephen Blank, “Beyond Afghanistan: tionally, nurturing ties with Kyrgyz- The Future of American Bases in Central stan will remain a major American Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 8, no. priority. But none of these things will 15 (2006), 3-5. be as decisive as the fate of Uzbeki- 7. See Niklas L.P. Swanström, “China and Cen- tral Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional stan. A stable, cooperative and pros- Vassal Relations,” Journal of Contemporary perous Uzbekistan will mean a lot to China 14, no. 45 (2005), 569-584. Central Asia’s other states, while an unstable and impoverished regime in Tashkent could seriously threaten the progress being made in Kazakh- stan or elsewhere. America cannot afford to remain without influence in shaping Uzbekistan’s future, and must work to regain a measure of the influence it once possessed. Today, a lack of strategic clarity has muddled America’s message to the region, confusing local leaders as well as policy planners back home. Yet U.S. interests in governance, energy and security need not be con- tradictory, and can be made mutually reinforcing. A policy that is clearly based on this understanding would provide Washington with new oppor- tunities to develop its interests in this complex yet increasingly crucial area of the world.

38 The Journal of International Security Affairs Europe Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide

Olivier Guitta

rench President Jacques Chirac has put it quite bluntly: “I have one principle regarding foreign policy. I look at what the Americans are Fdoing and I do the opposite. Then I am sure to be right.”1 On the other hand, Edouard Balladur, a close ally of Chirac and former French Prime Minister, sees things very differently: “Europe has no advantages in system- atically opposing the U.S. Our fundamental interests are closely linked.”2

These two perspectives—one antagonistic and one Atlanticist—encapsu- late the tug-of-war now underway in Europe over cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, for now, Chirac appears to be the rule and Balladur the exception. But the reality is a good deal more complex. While publicly, anti- Americanism may be not only fashionable but politically advantageous, when it comes to quiet cooperation (on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and other issues), Europeans dance to a different tune.

Behind the scenes Germany is a case in point. Back in 2002, the administration of Gerhard Schröder was reelected on a vehemently anti-American and anti-war platform. But new revelations suggest that in reality, Berlin was not nearly as removed from the U.S.-led war effort against Iraq as Schröder liked to claim. “Despite the troubles in the relationship between Berlin and Washington, the political deci- sion was made to continue the close relationship of the intelligence services,”

Olivier Guitta is a foreign affairs and counterterrorism consultant in Wash- ington, D.C. Olivier Guitta an unidentified source from the BND ligence services to collaborate with told the public German television their opposite numbers in the United station ARD.3 This collaboration, States “as if they were your own ser- moreover, was approved at the high- vice.”7 But the most significant exam- est levels, with Frank-Walter Stein- ple of Franco-American cooperation meier (Schröder’s then chief of staff was revealed by the Washington Post and current Foreign Minister) and in July 2005. Three years earlier, a top Joschka Fischer, then foreign minis- secret center called Alliance Base had ter, signing off on continued intelli- been established in Paris by the CIA gence contacts.4 and French intelligence services. Its That close relationship appar- purpose was to analyze the transna- ently involved the stationing of two tional movement of terrorist suspects, German intelligence agents in Bagh- and to develop operations to catch or dad throughout the course of the spy on them. As such, it was a unique entire Iraq war, even while Schröder operation—one geared toward not and his coalition cabinet were offi- simply sharing information, but actu- cially maintaining strong opposi- ally planning operations.8 tion to Washington’s actions. The It should be quite telling indeed German operatives allegedly helped that two of the most visible and vocal American forces by identifying “non- opponents of American foreign policy targets” such buildings as embassies, are in fact extraordinary partners of schools and hospitals that should the United States on counterterror- not be bombed. But they also went ism issues. further, delivering assistance in the identification of high-value targets— Two steps forward, including the April 2003 bombing one step back in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansur dis- Germany and France are not trict aimed at Saddam Hussein and alone. Before September 11th, intel- several top members of his regime. ligence services throughout Europe An additional German agent report- would complain about their lack of edly was stationed in Qatar in the interaction with the United States. office of General Tommy Franks, the But no longer. Europeans now U.S. commander of Operation Iraqi acknowledge that cooperation is Freedom. And all three received the much improved, with information Meritorious Service medals from the 5 flowing freely in both directions. United States for their assistance. This interaction, moreover, is facili- Another unlikely ally has been tated by the fact that European and France. One might even go as far as American cooperation is complemen- to say that, for all its public vitriol, tary in nature. The forte of European the French government ranks as services—and especially those of Washington’s top counterterrorism France—is human intelligence and partner. Former acting CIA Director knowledge of Islamist terrorism, John McLaughlin has described the while America’s strength lies in elec- relationship between the CIA and its tronic intelligence gathering. The French counterparts as “one of the resulting synergy is beneficial for best in the world” and termed French both sides of the Atlantic. contributions as “extraordinarily valu- 6 According to former CIA official able.” Indeed, in the days after 9/11, Stanley Sloan, “U.S.-European coop- President Chirac advised his intel-

40 The Journal of International Security Affairs Europe: Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide eration has been one of the more suc- Another aspect of the European cessful aspects of post-September 11 approach is the priority given to efforts against international terror- human rights. Rhetorically, human ism.”9 Sloan’s comments ring true. rights have become the leitmotif for a Given that most of the planning for whole generation of Eurocrats, even the September 11th attacks occurred though most European anti-terror in Hamburg, and that Europe has laws restrict civil liberties to a much become a base for Islamist cells, greater extent than those passed by America’s national security is irre- the United States. One such example vocably linked to the Old Continent. is France, where authorities have the And Europe needs America too; its right to detain suspected individu- defense capabilities (and budgets) als for six days without access to a fall well below those of the United lawyer, and where suspects can be States, and there is little probability held for up to three-and-a-half years that this will change. As such, neither in pretrial detention while the inves- side can afford political divisions to tigation against them continues. impede partnership. But while cooperation has greatly Sticking points improved, it has not been without In light of the European philoso- bumps in the road. The first deals phy on the current conflict, Washing- with designation. In December 2001, ton is perhaps right to be suspicious the European Union (EU) formulated about the extent to which the EU, as an official list of terrorist organiza- a whole, actually has the stomach for tions, but forgot to include al-Qaeda. a prolonged fight against terror—or Instead, twelve groups, including more importantly, a real understand- the ETA, the Real IRA, and North- ing of the magnitude of the problem. ern Ireland’s obscure Orange Volun- In response to a written question- teers, were designated. And little has naire prepared by the European Par- changed; the EU’s most recent list, liament in 2005, Commissioner for issued in November 2005, includes 47 External Relations Benita Ferrero- groups, but still no al-Qaeda.10 This Waldner spoke of development work, glaring omission has been the prod- poverty reduction, and education uct of a heated semantic debate in as the essential tools to fight terror- Europe about whether al-Qaeda’s dif- ism. But, while combating the root fuse, atomized nature allowed it to be causes of terrorism is an important depicted as a unitary entity. European long-term objective, the current con- officials have claimed that since they flict requires immediate and concrete are using the UN list designating al- policy tools—effective counterterror- Qaeda as a terrorist entity, there is no ism, intelligence sharing, extradition need to include it in their own list. treaties, and cooperation on the basis Likewise, perceptions about the of mutual trust and if necessary, force. scope of the current conflict differ And here, the EU has been unable to greatly. Europeans categorically focus on a suitable role for itself to refuse to view the struggle against play in the War of Terror. terrorism as a war. To them, a legal On occasion, Washington has approach to combating terrorism given voice to its frustrations on this is still preferred. In short, Europe subject. As the U.S. State Depart- wants to fight the war with arrest ment’s 2005 Country Reports on Ter- warrants, and never ever use force. rorism report notes:

The Journal of International Security Affairs 41 Olivier Guitta

Efforts to combat the threat in ever, did step up to the plate. It is worth Europe were sometimes ham- noting that 12 EU member states were pered by legal protections that part of the initial “coalition of the will- made it difficult to take firm judi- 13 cial action against suspected ter- ing” in Iraq. And eight European rorists, asylum laws that afforded prime ministers—from Spain, Portu- loopholes, inadequate legisla- gal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland, tion, or standards of evidence Denmark and the Czech Republic, that limited the use of classified expressed their solidarity with the information in holding terrorist Bush administration on the pages of suspects. The new EU arrest war- the Wall Street Journal Europe, out- rant encountered legal difficul- lining their commitment to “unity ties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens. and cohesion: in the face of terrorism 14 Germany found it difficult to con- and proliferation.” This did not go vict members of the Hamburg over especially well with Chirac, who cell of suspected terrorists alleg- blasted the East European countries edly linked to the September 11 that had sided with Washington and attacks. Some European states ordered them to “shut up.” have at times not been able to This incident in itself represents prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists a ray of hope. Indeed, the former mem- brought before their courts.11 bers of the Soviet bloc have emerged as staunch and faithful allies of Wash- Transatlantic cooperation has ington. So have Denmark, Holland, also stumbled over the issue of Iraq. Britain and now Germany under More than any other event in recent Chancellor Angela Merkel. They, history, the American decision to go together with a new generation of to war against the regime of Saddam pro-Atlanticist European politicians, Hussein has badly damaged relations are making a forceful case for a much across the Atlantic, especially with closer transatlantic alliance. France and Germany. This friction Still, the U.S. has lost at least two was unexpected; until January 2003, faithful allies in recent years. In 2004, the government of Jacques Chirac in it was Spanish Prime Minister Jose France had sided with the U.S., even Maria Aznar who was overthrown by going so far as to order the French socialist challenger Jose Luis Rodri- army to begin preparations for war and guez Zapatero. More recently, Italy’s expand coordination with U.S. forces. conservative prime minister, Silvio But things turned sour in February Berlusconi, lost to his center-left oppo- 2003, after then-Foreign Minister nent, Romano Prodi, in the country’s Dominique de Villepin’s now-famous May 2006 elections. In both cases, speech at the UN raised the specter the change of government brought of a French veto to planned military to power forces far less amenable to intervention. Villepin went even fur- cooperation with the United States ther, embarking upon a lobbying tour than their predecessors. to convince all the other members The specter of anti-Americanism of the UN Security Council to vote likewise looms large in transatlantic against the U.S. Even Interior Minis- ties. In poll after poll, Europeans term ter (and presidential hopeful) Nicolas the U.S. the biggest threat to world Sarkozy had qualms about France’s peace, ahead of Iran, Syria and North zealous attitude.12 Korea. Indeed, in some countries, it Some European countries, how- has become a national sport to blame

42 The Journal of International Security Affairs Europe: Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide

America first—nowhere more so than openly supporting Hezbollah in its in France. Such perceptions have only war against Israel—have taken place been reinforced in recent years by in the center of London. the emergence of Arab satellite chan- Authorities in London are nels, which influence large segments aware—and worried—about this of Europe’s Muslim population. threat. A 2004 British government Which raises the issue of the report leaked in July 2005, after Continent’s large—and growing— the London attacks, acknowledged Muslim population. With around 20 that about 16,000 British Muslims million Muslims living in Europe, are engaged in terror activities.19 It and with a failure of regional govern- is unfortunately not by chance that ment to integrate them, Europe is recent cases of homegrown terror- facing a profound crisis of identity. ism, among them the 7/7 attacks And against the backdrop of conflicts and the recent foiled multiple air- in the Middle East and the Israeli- liner plot, have occurred in Britain. Arab conflict, European politicians And this problem is poised to get need to think about their constitu- worse; pressure on British officials ents. For countries that were already is mounting from the Muslim com- traditionally favorably biased towards munity to rescind the country’s his- Arab regimes, this domestic dimen- toric close links with America, with sion only serves to reinforce their tangible results. Politicians from the ingrained positions. Labour party are already pushing A Finnish diplomat summed Prime Minister Tony Blair away from it up simply not too long ago: “In Washington. This domestic pres- Europe political parties worry about sure, moreover, coincides with a very the Muslim vote.”15 And the most long pro-Arab tradition in the Brit- worrisome country for the future of ish Foreign office, which has of late transatlantic ties is none other than advocated closer links to Islamists our current greatest ally: the United and a departure from the Atlanti- Kingdom. British Muslims are the cist tradition. This is not surprising, most integrated in Europe because since the man in charge of Islamic of England’s history of multicultural- affairs within the Foreign Office is ism, which has made them the envy an Islamist himself. In fact, Mockbul of their French and German counter- Ali has successfully lobbied to bring parts. Nonetheless, British Muslims the notorious Muslim Brother Sheikh are by far the most radicalized and Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who is still banned anti-Western of the European Muslim in the U.S., to Britain. Unfortunately, communities. This has been borne if these efforts are successful, it may out by recent polls, which have found mean losing America’s best political that 24 percent of Muslims in Eng- ally in Europe. land supported the motives behind Indeed, the Muslim issue is the July 7th London terror attacks,16 already influencing foreign policy, in 40 percent are for the installation of Britain and elsewhere. A case in point: sharia (Islamic law) in Britain,17 and in 2003, just before the outbreak of 68 percent have a negative view of the Iraq war, France’s rough equiva- Jews.18 Not surprisingly, the largest lent of the FBI, the Renseignements and most violent European demon- Généraux, warned Prime Minister strations during the Danish “cartoon Chirac that were France to join the controversy”—and, more recently, Coalition, it would have to face exten-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 43 Olivier Guitta sive rioting and unrest in the largely 2006. Muslim-populated suburbs—creating 5. Ibid. 6. Dana Priest, “Help From France Key in major domestic pressure for Chirac, Covert Operations,” Washington Post, July 3, already indisposed toward coopera- 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- tion, to keep his distance from U.S. dyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361. efforts. And this trend is only likely to html. 7. Ibid. intensify in the future, as expanding 8. Ibid. Muslim populations among the coun- 9. Louis R. Golino, “Europeans Move Against tries of Europe generate increasingly Terrorists,” Washington Times, December pro-Arab policies. 18, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes. com/world/20051218-011205-5956r.htm. 10. “Council Common Position 2005/847/ Taking stock CFSP of 29 November 2005,” Official Jour- All in all, transatlantic ties have nal of the European Union 314, November 30, 2005, 41, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ seen better days, but they are still lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/ vibrant. The “behind the scenes” l_31420051130en00410045.pdf. collaboration between Washington 11. “Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and and European capitals is proceeding Eurasia Overview,” in Office of the Coordi- nator for Counterterrorism, United States as robustly as ever. But on issues of Department of State, Country Reports on defense and foreign policy, public dis- Terrorism, April 29, 2006, http://www.state. sensions are still numerous. gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm. This does not need to be the case, 12. Giesbert, La Tragédie du Président, 333. 13. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, however. Europe does not have to Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Neth- choose between the EU and the U.S.; erlands, Poland, Spain and the United King- it can have the best of both. Officials dom. in Europe should be working to make 14. Jose Maria Aznar et al., “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal Europe, January 30, 2003, their partnership with the U.S., in the http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/ words of Balladur, “an indestructible ?id=110002994. alliance.”20 The first step in this direc- 15. Cited in Mark Perry and Alistair Crooke, tion would be for Europe to realize “The Loser in Lebanon: The Atlantic Alli- ance,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), August that it is at war—but not with Amer- 7, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ ica. Rather, European capitals, like Middle_East/HH08Ak01.html. Washington, are at war with radical 16. Anthony King, “One in Four Muslims Islam. Until they recognize this fact, Sympathizes With Motives of Terrorists,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 23, 2005, Islamist terrorists will have the abil- http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main. ity to drive a wedge between Western jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/23/npoll23. democracies. xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/23/ixnews- top.html. 17. ICM, “Muslims Poll,” February 2006, http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/ reviews/2006/Sunday%20Telegraph%20- 1. Franz-Olivier Giesbert, La Tragédie du Pré- %20Mulims%20Feb/Sunday%20Telegraph% sident (Paris: Flammarion Paris, 2006), 329. 20Muslims%20feb06.asp. 2. Edouard Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jaco- 18. “The Great Divide: How Westerners and bine (Paris: Fayard 2005), 101. Muslims View Each Other,” Pew Global Atti- 3. Charles Hawley, “Berlin’s Spies Reportedly tudes Project, June 2006, http://pewglobal. Helped US,” Spiegel Online (Hamburg), org/reports/display.php?PageID=831. January 12, 2006, http://service.spiegel. 19. Robert Winnett and David Leppard, “Leaked de/cache/international/0,1518,394874,00. No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British html. Recruits,” Sunday Times (London), July 10, 4. Richard Bernstein and Michael R. Gordon, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/arti- “Berlin File Says Germany’s Spies Aided cle/0,,2087-1688261,00.html. U.S. in Iraq,” New York Times, March 2, 20. Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jacobine, 97.

44 The Journal of International Security Affairs Australia An Ally Down Under

Joshua Eisenman

he U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the cornerstones of American regional security strategy in East Asia. Years of work by succes- Tsive administrations in Washington and Canberra have forged both trust and synergy in the two nations’ strategic objectives. Of course, no two countries share identical interests. But perhaps more then any other bilateral relationship in East Asia, America’s partnership with Aus- tralia is rooted in common values and a common vision for the region.

The ties between Washington and Canberra run deep. The two countries boast decades of cooperation in both the commercial and security spheres. The U.S. is Australia’s single largest investor, while Australia is America’s eighth larg- est, and both see eye-to-eye on nearly all security-related topics. Through coop- eration, interpersonal ties, and military interoperability, each has allowed the other to develop a stronger diplomatic position, project influence in East Asia, and respond quickly to challenges, whether natural, such as the 2005 tsunami disaster, or man-made, like the growth of militant Islam. In the process, the part- nership between the two countries has become more than the sum of its parts.

The state of the affair The contemporary U.S.-Australian alliance may be strong, but until the tenure of premier John Howard, it was by no means assured that Canberra would pursue a U.S.-based approach to securing its interests in East Asia. Rather,

Joshua Eisenman is Fellow in Asia Studies at the American Foreign Policy Coun- cil in Washington, D.C., and editor of the Council’s China Reform Monitor and Asia Reform Monitor bulletins. Joshua Eisenman

until recently, Australia’s strategy Indeed, over the past several for regional engagement oscillated years, Australia has established itself between building alliances, regional as an inimitable counterterrorism ties, and multilateralism.1 partner for both the U.S. and coun- To be sure, America has long tries in its immediate neighborhood. occupied an important role in Austra- Examples of this new role abound. In lian foreign policy decision making. May, Canberra announced that over Since 1951, the two countries have the next four years it will provide been joined in a formal defense part- nearly $70 million to Southeast Asian nership via the ANZUS Treaty. Yet nations to combat terrorism. These only during the last decade—and funds will support increased informa- particularly since September 11th— tion sharing, border controls, checks has this relationship been truly on chemical, biological, and nuclear institutionalized through practical materials, and efforts to counter ter- measures, such as increased interop- rorist propaganda.2 By expanding the erability between U.S. and Australian Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) law forces, and shared objectives, rang- enforcement, forensic and technical ing from the destruction of regional training of regional forces, the pack- terrorist networks to supporting age will also supplement a variety of Japan’s emergence as a partner in the anti-terror initiatives Canberra has security sphere. put in place since 2002.3 Canberra’s efforts to combat Countering terrorism terrorism in Asia are closely tied to The Indonesia-based Jemaah Washington’s. The U.S. government, Islamiyah’s (JI) killing of dozens of through its Rewards for Justice Pro- Australians in the October 2002 Bali gram, has put up millions of dol- bombings, and the group’s subsequent lars for the capture of top JI leaders September 2004 bombing of the Aus- wanted in the Bali bombing attacks. tralian embassy in Jakarta, have left And in December 2004, a study com- a deep impression on the Australian missioned by the U.S. government psyche and underscored the need for concluded that terrorists operating a regional approach to combating ter- in the South China Sea have the rorism. These deadly acts, and Prime capability to blast a hole through the Minister Howard’s coincidental visit double hull of a liquified natural gas to Washington during the September tanker. Every year, billions of dollars 11, 2001, attacks, have solidified the in Australian exports pass through War on Terror as the United States the region’s waterways, making and Australia’s most robust bilateral this report—and a recent rise in security commitment. piracy—cause for Australian lead- ers to redouble their efforts against maritime threats.4 Over the past several years, These efforts have borne fruit, Australia has established solidifying the bilateral security rela- itself as an inimitable tionship while allowing both nations to build closer ties with individual Asian counterterrorism partner for states. This has, in turn, affirmed both the U.S. and countries in both countries’ continued influence its immediate neighborhood. and bolstered America’s stabilizing presence in the region. Looking for-

46 The Journal of International Security Affairs Australia: An Ally Down Under ward, however, the challenge for both Defense Force Joint Operations Com- Washington and Canberra will be to mand and the U.S. Pacific Command maintain this momentum and con- have included a sea, air, and land tinue working to build the capacity of mock battle, a computer-simulated regional security forces to uproot and war, paratroop and amphibious inser- counter Islamic militancy. tions, live-fire exercises, and anti-sub- marine warfare.7 Mitigating traditional In November 2005, the U.S. and security threats Australia signed a joint agreement U.S. strategy in East Asia announcing the beginning of regular emphasizes bilateral and multilateral B-1, B-52, and B-2 bomber aircraft exercises with the armed forces of training in the Northern Territory. friendly and allied nations, Austra- This agreement was executed in lia included. In addition to supplying July, when the U.S. and Australian air its own forces to these maneuvers, forces held joint bomber exercises, Canberra also provides the U.S. and codenamed “Green Lightning,” at other allies with access to facilities as the Darwin Royal Australian Air a way of ensuring preparedness and Force base. The movement of bomb- coordinated responses to regional ers into the western Pacific began crises. Such arrangements under- in 2004 and is intended to enhance score the increasing importance of the deterrence capability of the U.S. U.S.-Australia ties to regional secu- and its allies. Such drills are seen rity, as well as Canberra’s commit- as “a key component of [Australia’s] ment to a credible and potent U.S. strong defense relationship with the presence in East Asia. During Mr. United States.”8 Howard’s tenure, this commitment In addition to bilateral exercises, has been reaffirmed through a vari- the two countries have forged ahead on ety of agreements, including the another front: missile defense. Cooper- 1996 Joint Security Declaration (also ation between the Australian Defense known as the “Sydney Statement”), Science and Technology Office and which expanded combined exer- the Pentagon Missile Defense Agency cises and joint training, and through has seen substantial movement since Canberra’s 2005 decision to host July 2004, when the United States U.S. bombers. In all, there are now and Australia signed a MoU outlin- hundreds of defense-related bilateral ing future Australian participation in arrangements in place between the missile defense activities. That 25- United States and Australia.5 year agreement commits Canberra to The historical basis for this Washington’s missile defense program, partnership is sound. Australian and including cooperative development of American forces fought together in advanced radar technology capable of both World Wars, in Korea, in Viet- providing early detection of hostile bal- nam, and in the first Gulf War. Most listic missiles.9 This agreement was put recently, Australian forces have into practice this July, when the Pen- served in Operation Iraqi Freedom. tagon unveiled plans to sell about $1 U.S. and Australian forces regularly billion worth of sea-based anti-missile conduct joint military exercises, rang- systems to Australia as part of efforts ing from full-scale joint maneuvers to to further integrate Canberra.10 (Nota- unit-level operations.6 Joint training bly, however, Australia appears to have exercises sponsored by the Australian no plans to purchase the U.S. Patriot

The Journal of International Security Affairs 47 Joshua Eisenman

Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) theater response to the December 2004 tsu- missile defense system.11) nami disaster helped foster goodwill among many Indonesians. Integrating Indonesia Australia has also nudged Indo- The 1998 East Asian financial nesia toward greater partnership crisis hobbled the Indonesian econ- with the U.S. As Dennis Richardson, omy and weakened that country’s abil- Australia’s Ambassador to the U.S., ity to lead the region. In recent years, has explained, however, the world’s largest Muslim country has reemerged as a diplomatic We welcome Indonesia’s direc- force that can again shape its own des- tion in recent years, especially tiny, as well as that of its neighbors. under President Yudhoyono. We also welcome the significantly For this reason, it is critical that the increased U.S. engagement with U.S. and Australia work to bring Indo- Indonesia over the past twelve nesia into the fold and collaborate with months. We believe, for instance, Jakarta to combat threats both within it was a proper recognition of real and outside its borders. change when the United States recently restored military-to- One source of tension is Canber- 14 ra’s attempts to end fighting in East military ties with Indonesia. Timor. Despite the mission’s humani- tarian mandate, many Indonesians Australia’s attitude is under- see it as a ploy by Canberra to gain standable. Given its proximity to control of the area’s oil and natural Indonesia, and the fact that JI has gas deposits. For its part, Australia specifically targeted its citizens, Can- remains deeply concerned about the berra has a vested interest in ensuring growth of Islamist-inspired separat- that the world’s fourth most populous ism and militancy in Indonesia. The country and third largest democracy Indonesia-based—and al-Qaeda- regains its place in East Asia and proj- connected—terrorist organization ects constructive influence into the Jemaah Islamiyah has targeted region. And, Australia understands, Australians in the past, and in Sep- such a transition will be catalyzed by tember 2005 a videotape mentioned closer consultations and coordination Melbourne as a possible target. In between Indonesia and the U.S. the past, similar concerns prompted Prime Minister John Howard to Engaging Japan threaten preemptive strikes against In August, on a visit to Tokyo, terrorist organizations based in other Australian Foreign Minister Alexan- countries—a statement that was der Downer clarified Canberra’s vision vehemently rejected by the Indone- for Australia-Japan security ties: sian government.12 Such disagreements notwith- [Because] our two countries share the same values and the same standing, Australia continues to play alliance relationship with the an important role in integrating Indo- United States, in the same broadly nesia. The AFP and Indonesian police, defined region of the world, it’s for instance, are working jointly to only natural that there should disrupt JI’s terrorist activities, arrest be some association between 13 the Self-Defense Force and the suspects, and build cases. On the 15 humanitarian front, meanwhile, Australian Defense Force. the Australian government’s rapid

48 The Journal of International Security Affairs Australia: An Ally Down Under

Australia has taken a lead in forg- China. For a middle power, Canberra ing these bonds. In March, Mr. Downer enjoys disproportionately strong influ- hosted Japanese Foreign Minister Taro ence in Washington, but also believes Aso and U.S. Secretary of State Condo- “China’s growth is unambiguously leezza Rice in Sydney for the so-called good for Asia and the United States.”18 Trilateral Security Dialogue. Those For its part, in July 2006, Beijing’s talks culminated in a joint statement in state-run press called the bilateral which all three agreed to “support the relationship between the PRC and emergence and consolidation of democ- Australia “an example of peaceful, racies,” strengthen cooperation in the mutually beneficial cooperation.”19 Asia-Pacific, enhance regional security planning, and “support Japan’s bid for a Australia is also in a unique permanent seat on the Security Coun- position among America’s cil.”16 The statement was a reflection of the primary objectives of all three East Asian allies because of its nations: promoting regional peace and friendly relations with China. stability through democracy, strength- ening the American security architec- Australia and China share a ture in East Asia, and ensuring Japan’s robust trade relationship based gradual reemergence and incorpora- largely on Australia’s rich natural tion into that framework. It was also an resource wealth and China’s low- indicator of Australia’s importance to cost manufacturing. Last year alone, this emerging trilateral partnership. Australian exports to China rose 46 Today’s U.S.-Japan alliance is percent and imports rose 19 percent, simultaneously bolstered and under- with bilateral trade rising to $27.3 bil- mined by the intense mistrust and lion, a 30 percent increase over 2004 suspicion towards Japan that lin- levels.20 China, a developing country gers among the people of East Asia, with a low per-capita GDP, purchases who remember well Tokyo’s aggres- raw materials such as iron ore, ura- sion during the first half of the 20th nium, and natural gas from Australia, century. This is particularly true in a developed country with a high per- China, where anti-Japanese senti- capita GDP. ment still runs high (as evidenced This unique commercial relation- by anti-Japanese riots there just last ship allows Canberra to leverage its year). Australia’s support for Japan is political stability in its dealings with critical to Tokyo’s efforts to partici- Beijing. Simply put, while China’s pate in its own security without rais- investments in resource-rich rogue ing the suspicion of its neighbors. As nations like Iran, Sudan, and Zimba- one Australian official has explained, bwe come with political costs, inse- while some observers say that letting curity, and moral questions, its deals Japan rearm is like giving drink to with Australia do not. a recovering alcoholic, others argue One recent example of this that it is fine for Japan to drink—so leverage was Canberra’s insistence long as it does not drink alone.17 in April that Beijing provide written guarantees that future uranium pur- Coordinating on China chases would not be diverted into Australia is also in a unique posi- nuclear fuel for weapons programs. tion among America’s East Asian allies With 40 percent of the world’s known because of its friendly relations with deposits of uranium and the political

The Journal of International Security Affairs 49 Joshua Eisenman

stability to guarantee a dependable Such fears surfaced in 2004, supply, Canberra was in a position when Foreign Minister Downer to make such demands, and the Chi- made statements on a trip to China nese government acquiesced. In that seemed to indicate his govern- return, beginning in 2010 Australia ment would not automatically support will export 20,000 metric tons of ura- America in a conflict over Taiwan. nium to China per year.21 According to Downer’s interpreta- Yet although Canberra has tion, the ANZUS Treaty would be accommodated Beijing economi- invoked only if Australia or the U.S. cally—granting Market Economy were attacked and not in the case of Status and beginning negotiations “some military activity somewhere on a free trade deal—there is a pal- else in the world.” In a response that pable wariness of China’s military underscores Washington’s sensitiv- expansion among Australians that ity on this subject, the Bush admin- follow cross-Strait and Sino-Japanese istration is now known to have sent relations. The result has been a diplo- no fewer than five diplomatic cables matic effort to mitigate possible con- seeking Canberra’s immediate expla- flicts and reassure Beijing that fears nation for the comments.23 of a U.S.-Japan-South Korea-Austra- But because in the short term a lia axis are unfounded, and that it conflict over Taiwan is unlikely, both is in China’s interest to have Japan the U.S. and Australia will continue, engaged rather than isolated. as Ambassador Dennis Richardson said in June, to “want China to play As a resource rich middle by the rules.”24 This has led Canberra power boasting a close security to support the White House’s efforts to encourage China to accept policies relationship with the U.S., supportive of current international Australia today is in a historic institutions and frameworks through position to affect stability in mechanisms like former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s the Asia-Pacific region. Senior Dialogue. The rationale of this approach is that greater cooperation That said, Beijing’s claims to from China is essential to the smooth Taiwan mean that Washington may functioning of the international need to count on Australian support system. To Australia, this means in the unlikely event of a regional encouraging Beijing to move toward conflict over the island. Both Wash- greater transparency regarding the ington and Beijing know Australia’s pace and scale of its defense mod- commitment in this scenario is ernization. It also means continuing uncertain, and thus, most coveted. to work to improve Beijing’s human Yet, both also know that if the United rights practices and support rule States recoils from its commit- of law and poverty reduction initia- ments to Taiwan, its predominance tives, all of which the U.S. also backs. in East Asia and the Asian security Unfortunately, however, successes in architecture to which Canberra has these areas are notoriously difficult entrusted its nation’s defense may to measure given China’s massive be irreparably damaged—a prospect population and the Chinese Commu- that one U.S. observer writes should nist Party’s recalcitrance. “horrify” Canberra.22

50 The Journal of International Security Affairs Australia: An Ally Down Under

Looking forward expand its commitment to East Asian As a resource-rich middle power security, and Australia’s leading role boasting a close security relation- in preserving it. Today conflicts in ship with the U.S., Australia today Iraq and Afghanistan rightfully loom is in a historic position to affect sta- large at the Pentagon, but given the bility in the Asia-Pacific region. Pre- economic strength of East Asia, the serving this role in the years ahead commercial costs of militancy there will require Canberra and Washing- are far greater and require continued ton to continue to work with Tokyo, attention. It would be wrong to allow integrate Indonesia, and coordinate the war in Iraq or a resurgent Taliban regional counterterrorism initiatives in Afghanistan to overshadow the and their policies toward China. very real gains made in East Asia. Development of the Canberra- New challenges will doubtless Tokyo security relationship remains emerge on the horizon. But regard- a critical priority. Foreign Minis- less of their nature, the foundation of ter Downer’s August visit to Tokyo the U.S.-Australia relationship remains ought to be the start of a series of strong because, as one observer talks that strengthen the so-called recently noted, “We share values. “third leg” of the Trilateral Security We share ideals. We share a simple Dialogue. Although upgrading the outlook about right and wrong in this relationship to a full alliance may be world, and it brings us together.”25 premature (and could be perceived as threatening in China), efforts to integrate Japan into regional security plans should nonetheless be pursued, and explained to China as a neces- 1. David Martin Jones and Andrea Benvenuti, “Tradition, Myth and the Dilemma of Aus- sary step to prevent Japan’s isolation. tralian Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal Interoperability is a key component of of International Affairs 60, no. 1 (2006), 03- these efforts, and Canberra would be 124. well served to continue procurement 2. “Philippines, Australia Say Jemaah Islami- yah ‘Biggest’ Regional Terror Threat,” Phil- of U.S. systems and joint training with ippine Star (Manila), June 29, 2006. the U.S. military and other regional 3. These include: two regional counterterror- forces. This is critical if Australia is to ism assistance packages ($97.4 million); the retain its unique status and influence establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation ($28.1 million); in both East Asia and Washington. counterterrorism assistance programs for Continued cooperation on coun- Indonesia ($15.3 million) and the Philip- terterrorism is also important. Aus- pines ($7.6 million); enhanced Australian tralians are well aware of the dangers Federal Police regional counterterrorism cooperation capabilities ($78.0 million); of Islamic extremism in Southeast and the establishment of a regional coun- Asia. It is for this reason that the terterrorism intelligence cooperation and AFP has become a regional leader in joint training program. See http://www.for- counterterrorism training and intel- eignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/fa046_ 06.html. ligence collection. Expanding col- 4. “Australia and the Philippines Expand Coop- laboration with Washington—and eration in Sea Surveillance,” Jakarta Post, working closely with authorities in July 4, 2006. neighboring countries, particularly 5. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, remarks to the Commonwealth Club of Cali- Indonesia—will be crucial to preserv- fornia, July 21, 1997. ing Canberra’s gains in this arena. 6. Ibid. Finally, the United States must 7. “Australia and U.S. Forces Strengthening

The Journal of International Security Affairs 51 Joshua Eisenman

Regional Security,” Asia-Pacific Defense speech by Australian Defense Minister Forum, Fall/Winter 2005-2006, http:// Brendan John Nelson, the American Enter- forum.apan-info.net/06_fallwinter/austra- prise Institute, Washington, D.C., June 27 lia/1.html. 2006. 8. Shane A. Cuomo, “Exercise Green Light- ning,” Air Force Print News, July 26, 2006, http://www.pacom.mil/articles/ articles2006/060726story1.shtml. 9. News release, “United States and Austra- lia Sign Missile Defense Agreement,” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, July 7, 2004, http:// canberra.usembassy.gov/ausmin/2004/ missile-defense.html. 10. “US to Sell Australia Billion-Dollar Weapons Systems,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 15, 2006. 11. John Liang, “Defense Minister: Australia Won’t Buy PAC-3,” Inside Missile Defense 12, no. 14 (2006). 12. Federico Bordonaro, “Asia’s Dawning Mul- tipolar System Increases Australia’s Geopo- litical Importance,” Power and Interest News Report, June 14, 2006, http://www.pinr.com/ report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=509. 13. Jones and Benvenuti, “Tradition, Myth and the Dilemma of Australian Foreign Policy.” 14. Dennis Richardson, remarks at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., June 9, 2006. 15. “Downer Flags Closer Japan Military Ties,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney), August 2, 2006. 16. “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint State- ment, Australia-Japan-United States,” March 18, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/australia/joint0603-2.html. 17. Author’s interview, July 2006. 18. Dennis Richardson, remarks before the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., January 24, 2006. 19. “China-Australia Ties an Example,” People’s Daily (Beijing), July 2, 2006, http://english. people.com.cn/200607/02/eng20060702_ 279298.html. 20. Ibid.; “Australia’s Trade with China Boom- ing,” Agence France-Presse, June 25, 2006. 21. “China to Buy Australia Uranium,” BBC News (London), April 3, 2006, http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4871000. stm. 22. Dan Blumenthal, “Strengthening the U.S.- Australian Alliance,” AEI Asian Outlook, April 29, 2005. 23. Richard Baker, “US Sent ‘Please Explain’ to Downer Over China Comments,” The Age (Melbourne), May 17, 2006, http://www. theage.com.au/news/national/us-sent- please-explain-to-downer-over-china-com- ments/2006/05/16/1147545327241.html. 24. Richardson, remarks at the Nixon Center. 25. Danielle Pletka, introductory remarks at “Enhancing the U.S.-Australian Alliance,”

52 The Journal of International Security Affairs Canada Partnership in Flux

Rob Huebert

t has been said that Canada’s biggest defense problem is that it does not have one. Sharing a continent with the United States has meant Ithat any military threat to Canada is a threat to the U.S. as well. Ulti- mately, the United States guarantees Canada’s security. What further simplifies Canadian defense requirements is the fact that the two coun- tries share core values. While there are differences regarding some issues, Canada and the United States are both societies that are com- mitted to the maintenance and promotion of democratic governance, the development of free market economies, the protection and entrenchment of human rights, and share a common cultural, linguistic and historical experience. Good relations are further protected by a shared but very complex economic partnership that is primarily (but not exclusively) based on the Canadian export of natural resources (including oil and gas) to the U.S., and the Canadian import of finished products.1 The net result is that since the end of the Civil War, Canada has not needed to fear an attack from the United States, while it remains in the American interest to ensure that Canada is protected from external military threats.

Such circumstances suggest that Canadian political leaders may be inclined to simply “free-ride” on American military capabilities. In fact, however, this has not happened. It is true that there have been times when Canadian officials have

Dr. Rob Huebert is an associate professor with the department of political sci- ence at the University of Calgary, and associate director of the University’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. His main areas of research are Arctic security, maritime security and Canadian defense, foreign and security policy. Rob Huebert not given defense issues the attention needed to be undertaken away from that they deserved. But today, Cana- Canadian territory. da’s security policy is centered on a small but robust military capable of The common defense serving as a force multiplier for the of North America United States. And, because Cana- As the Soviet Union expanded dian officials have long worried that its strategic arsenal throughout the if the U.S. feels Canada is not doing 1950s and 1960s, the direct threat to enough, the U.S. will take action on Canada grew. Canadian cities were Canada’s behalf, they have learned at risk of nuclear annihilation if war to anticipate—and be sensitive to— broke out. It soon became evident American security concerns. to Canadian and American mili- tary planners alike that there was a The Cold War balance need for a common defense of North Throughout the Cold War, Cana- American airspace—both to defend dian defense policy was commit- against Soviet aerial capabilities and ted to three main elements: 1) the to deter against the missile threat national defense; 2) the common from Moscow. The result was the cre- defense of North America; and ation of NORAD, the North Ameri- 3) collective security. While the can Air Defense Command (later defense of Canada always ranked as re-named the North American Aero- the most important priority, the bulk space Defense Command), on May of Canadian spending and planning 12, 1958. Its original mission was to was ultimately dedicated to over- oversee the air defense of the North seas operations in the name of col- American continent against the pos- lective security and peacekeeping. sibility of Soviet bomber attack. But This was the result of the belief that as the Soviets developed their missile Canada was best defended by meet- capability, this role shifted to also ing military and security threats as include an early warning system for far as possible from its shores. But the maintenance of nuclear deter- this approach was also bolstered by rence. Over time, NORAD became the reality that any direct threat to the central Canada-U.S. defense Canada would invariably be met by organization, and a cornerstone of American capabilities. the strategic relationship between Washington and Ottawa. The defense of Canada The real physical threat to Cana- Collective security dian soil during this period was posed Canadian officials led the effort by the USSR and its nuclear missiles to develop the North Atlantic Treaty and bomber forces. Canadian defense Organization (NATO) in 1949. The planners quickly recognized that the reasons were practical: policymak- best defense against an attack on ers in Ottawa recognized that the Canadian soil was to deter the Sovi- growing Soviet threat was best met ets from attacking in the first place. by collective security. They also Thus, Canadian planning focused on wanted to create a forum where Can- contributing to the common defense ada’s defense relationship with the of North American air and aerospace, United States could be balanced by and to collective security in Europe. the inclusion of other states. The mil- In both instances, homeland defense itary strength of the United States

54 The Journal of International Security Affairs Canada: Partnership in Flux may have been central to defend- ment to a small but highly capable ing against the USSR, but Canadian force for primary expeditionary pur- officials also knew that a bilateral poses also carried several costs. Per- alliance would permanently relegate haps most problematic was the fact their country to the role of junior that the expeditionary nature of the partner. In pushing for the creation forces meant that, with few excep- of NATO, Canadians hoped simul- tions, the Canadian military did not taneously that the Soviets would be have a significant “footprint” in Cana- deterred from taking aggressive dian society. As a result, there was action and that Americans would little political support for—or interest not overwhelm Canada.2 In turn, the in—increased military expenditures. Canadian contribution to NATO was And, as the Cold War progressed, substantial. From the 1950s to the there was a tendency on the part of late 1980s, Canadian land and air Canadian political leaders to reduce assets were stationed in Europe and the funding provided to these forces. its naval forces were tasked almost As well, over time, the overseas focus exclusively for anti-submarine duties of Canadian defense policy led to the against the USSR. domestic misconception that the prin- Over time, a secondary prior- cipal mission of these forces was for ity—peacekeeping—also emerged. international peacekeeping, rather Today, this role has become accepted than collective security against the by most Canadians as the main reason USSR—resulting in a lack of appreci- why Canadian forces exist. The fact ation for their warfighting nature and that peacekeeping was something ongoing difficulty in acquiring new that Canada appeared to do without and necessary equipment. As a result, the assistance of the United States by the time the Cold War ended a sub- also appealed to those concerned stantial disconnect existed between about American dominance. Thus the Canadian society and its forces. mythology of Canadian peacekeep- A related problem was the reluc- ing was actively encouraged by suc- tance to acknowledge the close ties cessive Canadian governments, who between Canada and the United found it a politically saleable concept. States. Cooperation between the two These priorities had several countries in the defense of North important implications for Canada’s America and Europe occurred security relationship with United largely out of the view of the Cana- States. On the positive side, they dian public. Greater public attention led to the creation of a well-trained, was instead given to peacekeeping professional force with the ability to operations that often did not include deploy worldwide. Membership in cooperation between American and NORAD and NATO also meant that Canadian forces. The outcome was Canada was operating alongside the that the Canadian public did not fully most advanced military powers in the appreciate the closeness and com- world. Specifically, the Canadian part- plexity of what can best be termed a nership with the United States meant security partnership. that Canadian forces were required to develop the means—and the tech- Closer, yet farther apart nology—to cooperate with American The end of the Cold War created forces on a day-to-day basis. new circumstances that both con- However, the Canadian commit- founded and complicated Canadian

The Journal of International Security Affairs 55 Rob Huebert defense needs. On the one hand, the by approximately 30 percent, from collapse of the Soviet Union elimi- slightly over $15 billion (Cdn) in 1988 nated the most serious military threat to just $11 billion (Cdn) in 2001.4 It was to Canada. The danger of a nuclear not until 2005 that the country’s mili- attack by the USSR was gone, remov- tary saw its first post-Cold War budget- ing the need to station Canadian ary increase. The number of available forces in Europe and greatly reduc- forces has shrunk as well, from 90,000 ing the forces necessary for the aero- in 1990 to a low of 62,000 in 2004.5 The space defense of North America. But Canadian commitment to NATO was the expected peace dividend never likewise reduced with the closing of arrived. While Canadian leaders had Canadian bases in Germany. hoped that the end of the Cold War At the same time, however, Cana- would result in a more peaceful inter- dian forces faced an increase in the national system, outbreaks of violence number and operational tempo of in the 1990s in Yugoslavia, Africa and overseas commitments. As it became Asia soon destroyed any optimism clear that the new international envi- that there would be a peaceful and ronment was becoming more—rather just “new world order.” than less—violent, Canadian leaders The impact on the Canada-U.S. from both major parties stepped up relationship has been profound. First, the number of deployments, as well as while policymakers saw an opportu- providing these missions with increas- nity to reduce military expenditures ingly robust rules of engagement.6 and the size of Canadian forces, they The terrorist attacks of Septem- also have increased the number of ber 11, 2001, further accelerated their country’s overseas deployments. this transformation. The Canadian The nature of these deployments has government’s support of the United also changed; while still committed to States was manifested in two impor- the support of NATO and the United tant ways. First, Canada agreed to Nations, Canadian forces increasingly send forces to assist in the war in are deployed on peacemaking and Afghanistan. The naval commitment, peace enforcement missions,3 and on authorized in October 2001, was sus- missions composed of a “coalition of tained and substantial, ultimately the willing” rather than strictly those involving almost all of the Canadian sanctioned by the UN or NATO. fleet (only Canada’s maritime coastal Second, challenges and irritants have defense vessels and submarine were begun to plague Canadian-American not sent). In February 2002, Canada defense relations, even while U.S. and also announced that it had decided Canadian forces have moved to even to send ground forces. Initially this closer interoperability. deployment was based in Kabul, but in 2005 moved to the more dangerous Decreased funding, but region of Kandahar. Currently, with increased and different over 2,300 troops deployed, this oper- deployments ation has become a major Canadian Even before it was entirely clear commitment. that the USSR had ceased to exist, But even more telling is the Canadian leaders were moving to nature of this effort. Canadian land reduce both the size and expenditures forces are engaging the Taliban on provided to the forces. From 1988 to a warfighting basis, targeting the 2001, defense spending was slashed enemy and being targeted in return.

56 The Journal of International Security Affairs Canada: Partnership in Flux

This represents a paradigm shift for mand and communications and fos- Canadian warfighting—and a con- tered substantial American reliance crete demonstration of Canada’s com- on Canada. mitment to the War on Terror. During Land forces have followed suit. the Cold War, while Canadian forces While Canadian troops had previ- were targeted by the Soviet Union, ously trained with U.S. forces in no actual fighting took place, keep- Europe under the auspices of NATO, ing the conflict out of sight and out of the end of the Cold War saw a sub- mind for the Canadian public. Today, stantial decrease in such training with over 20 servicemen killed, Can- opportunities. The commitment of ada’s commitment can no longer be Canadian and American ground ignored. While these human costs troops to Afghanistan changed all have generated some domestic con- that; Canada’s initial deployment troversy, at this point there is no took place in August 2003, with its sign that the current government is troops placed under the authority of thinking about withdrawing. Rather, the International Security Assistance Ottawa has shown its determination Force (ISAF) in Kabul. In reality, to support and continue this mission, however, this meant that Canadian voting to extend it for another two troops were operating jointly with years into 2009. American forces. And, as time pro- gressed, both forces have begun con- Canadian-American ducting more numerous and complex defense relations operations together. Throughout the 1990s and into Politically, however, a number of the 2000s, Canada-U.S. relations governmental decisions have gener- faced contradictory trends caused ated tensions between Washington by the process described above. and Ottawa. The first was the war in Operationally, Canadian forces have Iraq. As the U.S. government began substantially improved their abil- to make its case for the invasion ity to cooperate with the American of Iraq, it was clear that officials in military. The U.S. and Canadian air Canada were uncomfortable consid- forces have always enjoyed close ering an invasion of that magnitude cooperation via NORAD, but Cana- without the sanction of the United da’s participation in the air offensive Nations. Canada had been a willing in Kosovo has further refined combat participant in the war to drive Iraq interoperability. Naval coordination out of Kuwait in 1991, and had fully has also increased. In 1998, Canada supported the subsequent oil and offered to deploy one of its frigates, arms embargo against the regime of the HMCS Ottawa, with an Ameri- Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it was can carrier battle group following clear that successive Canadian gov- successful combined naval opera- ernments disapproved deeply of the tions in the Persian Gulf.7 This gave Iraqi regime’s violations of human the Canadian Navy the opportunity rights. But, as the Bush administra- to train with the world’s largest and tion began to prepare for war in the most advanced navy, while provid- fall of 2002, the Chrétien government ing a supplement to U.S. capabilities. began to send mixed messages about Since then, more than five additional its commitment. When efforts to deployments have allowed Canadian obtain a UN mandate collapsed and forces to share in American com- a U.S.-led invasion became imminent,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 57 Rob Huebert

the Canadian government declined to sure to prompt the government to participate. Yet, although Canada did reject America’s invitation to join in not join in the conduct of the war, it the development of the system.8 still provided support to the Ameri- It is a decision with long-term can effort. ramifications. Faced with mount- ing threats from ballistic missiles The Canadian-American defense launched by either rogue states or ter- relationship has been tested, and rorist organizations, the United States has been left with the task of defend- has always thrived. Their common ing the entire continent if and when commitment to democratic such threats develop.9 This means governance, human rights and Canada will truly be “free-riding” on free markets means that both the United States—a situation with negative ramifications for regional countries will always share the cooperation. Partly in response to same understanding of security. Canada’s choice, the United States has separated its Space Command from Much more damaging has been NORAD, and there are fears among the divergence between Washing- some experts that the United States ton and Ottawa over missile defense. will continue to reduce the organi- Under the Bush administration, the zation’s importance because Wash- United States has begun deploy- ington no longer trusts the Canadian ment of a national system to defend commitment to continental defense.10 against the threat of ballistic missile On a more positive note, however, attack. These steps have been seen the most recent NORAD agree- by some segments of Canadian soci- ment, signed in May 2006, includes ety as destabilizing for international an expansion into issues relating to security—and as potentially ominous maritime and land forces, suggesting moves toward the militarization of that both the U.S. and Canada do see space. Some in Canada believe that its continued existence as important. if a successful anti-missile system is It is too early to tell, however, whether developed, nuclear deterrence will this represents an important new step no longer constrain conflict between or simply is a means of papering over the U.S., Russia and possibly China. the rift caused by Canada’s decision Secondly, while American efforts are on missile defense. currently focused on the deployment of ground-based systems, some fear Lasting bonds that in time anti-missile capabilities Canadian defense policy is now will be placed in space. Thirdly, there undergoing a profound transforma- were those who simply oppose the tion. The Canadian military is being system because it is being promoted used in a manner that few could have by the Bush administration. predicted when the Iron Curtain fell. The result has been an enor- Central to this transformation is the mous lost opportunity. Initially, the Canada-U.S. relationship. In some minority government of Paul Martin ways it has never been stronger. The gave indications that it would agree ability of the Canadian Forces to oper- to participate. Ultimately, however, ate with their American counterparts those opposed to participation were has never been more complete, and able to marshal enough political pres- Canada continues to be an important

58 The Journal of International Security Affairs Canada: Partnership in Flux partner of the United States in many peace. Peacemaking operations occur with- post-Cold War international interven- out the consent of the warring parties. Thus, such forces have to be well-armed and are tions. But there are also important often required to use deadly force to impose disagreements, with many Cana- a peace. dians opposed to the defense and 4. Canadian Security and Military Prepared- international policies of the Bush ness, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defense, Parliament administration. of Canada, February 2002, http://www.parl. Yet some perspective is in order. gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com- The Canadian-American defense e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05feb02-e.htm. relationship has been tested, and has 5. Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition, An Update of Security Problems in Search of always thrived. Their common com- Solutions, Standing Senate Committee on mitment to democratic governance, National Security and Defense, Parliament human rights and free markets means of Canada, November 2004, http://www. that both countries will always share parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/ com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04part2- the same understanding of security. e.htm#_Toc89252258. Differences can and do arise in how 6. “Current Operations,” Department of best to achieve it, but a military threat National Defense, Government of Canada, to the United States will be a military March 30, 2006, http://www.forces.gc.ca/ site/operations/current_ops_map_e.asp. threat to Canada, and vice versa. 7. Press release, “Canada-US Relations - Cana- As such, Canada can be expected dian Navy Teams up with US Carrier Battle to continue working closely with the Group,” Department of National Defense, United States on defense issues both Government of Canada, June 7, 2005, http:// www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/canada-us/ at home and abroad, not because it backgrounder_e.asp. has to, and not because it is forced to, 8. “Statement by the Prime Minister on a Bal- but because it remains in the Cana- listic Missile Defense System,” Privy Coun- dian national interest to do so. Exactly cil Office, Government of Canada, February 24, 2005, http://www.pco.gc.ca/default. how this will happen, however, will be asp?Language=E&Page=archivemartin&S the interesting question. ub=statementsdeclarations&Doc=statemen t_20050224_428_e.htm. 9. The recent actions of North Korea indicate that it is very much a question of “when,” and not “if.” 10. Dwight N. Mason, “A Flight from Responsi- 1. Canada is now the biggest oil exporter to the bility: Canada and Missile Defense of North U.S., surpassing Saudi Arabia in the year America,” Center for Strategic & Interna- 2000. With the development of the Alberta tional Studies working paper, February 25, oil sands, it is expected that this market dom- 2005. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ inance will continue for a long time to come. pubs/050225_mason.pdf. See “Country Analysis Brief - Canada,” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, February 2005, http:// www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/canada.html. 2. For a complete discussion of the Cana- dian role, see James Eayres, In Defense of Canada: Growing up Allied, vol 4. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980). 3. The difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking is understood in the nature of the relationship between the belligerents in a conflict and the force that is intervening. With peacekeeping operations, the interven- ing force is accepted by the combatants and requires only light arms for self-defense. They are there to maintain an established

The Journal of International Security Affairs 59 The Nonproliferation Review

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View an online sample at: www.tandf.co.uk/journals/onlinesamples.asp South Korea Slouching Toward Submission

Chuck Downs

n the summer of 2006, two American allies faced clear and present dangers from terrorist forces armed with thousands of highly lethal, Istate-of-the-art missiles. Their respective enemies denied that these democratic societies had a right to exist, and pursued a long-standing, openly announced intention to wipe them from the face of the earth. Yet the similarities between Israel and South Korea seem to stop there.

Imagine that after its two soldiers were abducted by Hezbollah, Israel had called upon its neighbors to stop criticizing the terrorist group, urged the United Nations not to take action against it, advanced rationales for why Hez- bollah might want to pursue more capable weaponry, dismissed its threatening rhetoric, and proposed to arbitrate from a position of neutrality between the United States and the terrorists. Imagine also that it criticized allies which came to its defense. It is certainly true that each foreign policy issue is sui generis—possessing its own unique characteristics based on political, economic, and cultural factors. But what we have seen in the vastly different responses of these two American allies clarifies the depths of South Korea’s crisis. In stark contrast to the way Israel has shown respect for, attention to, and dependence upon its partnership with the United States, the government of South Korea appears to be attempting to dissolve its strategic bonds with Washington. Seoul’s response during the Korean missile crisis of 2006 will go down in history as a landmark case of an ally tearing down the foundations of an alliance at the very moment it faces significant danger.

Chuck Downs, a former Pentagon official and Congressional advisor, is the author of Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (AEI Press, 1999). Chuck Downs

Going wobbly People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Although an armistice officially as its “primary enemy.” But the elec- limits hostilities between North and tion of formerly imprisoned leftist South Korea, the Korean peninsula opposition leader Kim Dae Jung has been in a de jure state of war since to the South Korean presidency in 1950, when Kim Il Sung tried to unify 1997 ushered in a new era. In hopes the peninsula under Communist of winning over his country’s hostile control by invading the South. The northern neighbor, Kim launched United Nations came to the aid of the a conciliatory approach (known as elected government of South Korea, the “sunshine policy”) built around which was declared to be the only economic inducements and reassur- “lawfully-established government” in ing strategic overtures. This policy Korea. Three years of bloody fighting remains very much in vogue today; ended in a standoff. After the Korean Kim’s successor and ideological pro- War, the Communist government tégé, current President Roh Moo in the North was propped up by the Hyun, has expanded the “sunshine” Soviet Union until the latter’s demise policy into a “peace and prosperity in 1991, after which it suffered severe policy”—one that attempts to engage economic crisis, famine and institu- regional players in developing the tional duress, but continued to send North’s economy. submarines and commando teams This policy shift has brought to the South on sabotage missions. with it a substantial strategic reorien- South Korea’s security, on the other tation. In recent years, South Korean hand, was guaranteed by the United defense planners have grappled with States, enabling the country—in spite how best to describe the threat posed of the threat posed by Communism in by the Communist regime, against North Korea—to make spectacular which so much of South Korea’s mili- progress and become the economic tary planning and alliance relations powerhouse it is today. are based. Politically, however, the writing is on the wall. In 2001, a few In recent years, South Korean months after Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang for a well-orchestrated defense planners have grappled summit meeting, his administration with how best to describe the announced that it “was examining threat posed by the communist a plan to use a different expression regime in Pyongyang, against than ‘primary enemy’ in the official description of South Korea’s relation- which so much of South ship with North Korea.”1 The pro- Korea’s military planning and cess proved so controversial that for alliance relations are based. three years South Korea’s formative Politically, however, the writing defense policy document could not be printed, until finally the term “pri- is on the wall. mary enemy” was dropped entirely. As stunning as this avoidance of From the start of the Korean identifying North Korea as its primary War, the government of the Repub- enemy may be, it has been accompa- lic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) nied by a series of policy pronounce- understandably labeled North Korea, ments that has brought ever deeper otherwise known as the Democratic confusion and embarrassment to the

62 The Journal of International Security Affairs South Korea: Slouching Toward Submission alliance between South Korea and need for such tests—for example, the United States. Such statements for peaceful space exploration. That have included the informal remarks notion was not an original idea; it had of ruling party security advisors vis- been the official North Korean line iting Washington that North Korea’s when the DPRK shocked the world nuclear developments are a long-term in 1998 by launching a three-stage advantage for all Koreans. Following Taepo-Dong intercontinental ballistic a chorus of Congressional condem- missile over Japan into the Pacific nation, those remarks were repudi- Ocean. That demonstration proved ated, but President Roh’s oft-repeated that North Korea’s missile capa- statement that South Korea should bilities far exceeded western intel- play a fair, balancing role between the ligence estimates. It naturally also United States and North Korea con- raised concerns about North Korea’s tinues to guide South Korean policy. recklessness; the missile could have That this approach is contradictory sent debris into Japanese cities, but it is self-evident. As AEI economist was launched without even a routine Nicholas Eberstadt has pointed out, notice to mariners fishing near the Roh’s approach suggests that the gov- point of splashdown. ernment of South Korea can balance North Korea’s objectives in the the interests of “a proven ally that has missile launches of July 4, 2006,3 repeatedly defended South Korea’s were similar to those of 1998. The sovereignty and independence with Taepo-Dong II test in July, however, those of an enemy that has consis- was a technical failure, with the mis- tently called for its annihilation.”2 sile exploding less than a minute Indeed, while some changes in after launch. To some degree, how- South Korea’s approach to its alli- ever, the failure was mitigated by an ance with the U.S. have occurred impressive series of mobile launches gradually, and could be chalked up to of Scud and No-Dong missiles (some generational factors or popular mood with new characteristics). swings, South Korea’s denigration of The successful Scud and No- the U.S.-ROK alliance has reached a Dong tests could be described as dangerous level that cannot be con- posing a threat to Russia, China, and fused with political maturity. Seoul, Japan, because parts of each coun- simply put, has become North Korea’s try’s territory lay within the missiles’ most persistent apologist. range. Without a doubt, however, the greatest threat posed by these weap- Stockholm syndrome ons is to South Korea, whose entire in Seoul territory sits within range, and whose The summer 2006 Asian mis- historical enmity can be presumed sile crisis has brought this state of to matter. Back in June 2006, South affairs into sharp perspective. While Korea had joined diplomatic efforts even North Korean ally China urged to persuade North Korea not to carry Pyongyang not to proceed with what out the missile tests. But, when push American intelligence concluded came to shove, the Blue House, the were likely preparations for mis- South Korean president’s executive sile launches, South Korean Presi- mansion, was hesitant to respond dent Roh took pains to explain that to the launches. In explaining why North Korea might have a legitimate two hours had lapsed before Presi- dent Roh was even informed of the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 63 Chuck Downs

launches, Unification Minister Lee that drew rebuke from South Korea’s Jong-seok said, “Because these mis- opposition party. Instead, a state- siles were shot toward the East Sea, ment from officials at the Blue House it was not thought they posed a direct declared that the situation was “not threat to national security.”4 a national security emergency.” The In press briefings, South Korean silence might have been justified if officials also chose not to empha- it were a tactic designed to allow the size President Bush’s statement that rest of the world to voice its alarm North Korea had taken “a provoca- more effectively. But that was not tive action,” instead voicing muted the case. In a telling statement, the concern that the missile launches President’s staff explained, “There is might produce a “grave and negative a reason for the president’s silence. impact on inter-Korean ties.”5 South It would be foolish to take action that Korean officials did make a show of could throw national security into declaring that meetings previously jeopardy by raising tension levels on scheduled with North Korea might the peninsula.”6 The message was not be held and food aid to the North clear: North Korea had succeeded in would be temporarily suspended. But bullying the South Korean govern- simultaneously, they also pointed ment into silence, even though stat- out reassuringly that South Korean- ing a fear of self-defense is seldom sponsored economic activities at an effective means of guaranteeing North Korea’s Kaesong industrial one’s security. complex would be unaffected by the Sensitive to South Korea’s prox- missile tests, because they were a imity and distaste for confrontation matter for the private sector (even with the North, American officials though South Korean taxpayers pro- welcomed the leading role Japan vide the official financial guarantees was willing to play in drafting and without which these activities would sponsoring a UN resolution repri- not be undertaken). manding North Korea for the missile tests. The Japanese draft called upon While some changes in South member states not to provide materi- Korea’s approach to its alliance als to North Korea that could be used in manufacturing missiles and raised with the U.S. have occured the possibility that stronger measures gradually, and could be chalked up under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to generational factors or popular including military enforcement and mood swings, South Korea’s economic sanctions, could be autho- rized against the rogue regime. Japan denigration of the U.S.-ROK backed up this proposal by taking alliance has reached a dangerous immediate action to impose economic level that cannot be confused with sanctions prohibiting Japanese com- panies from providing funds or mili- political maturity. Seoul, simply tary equipment to North Korea. put, has become North Korea’s It might have been expected most persistent apologist. that South Korea would express quiet gratitude to Japan for carrying President Roh himself chose its water on this issue. Yet quite the to make no statement on the North opposite occurred. During the hiatus Korean action for a week, a silence in presidential statements about the

64 The Journal of International Security Affairs South Korea: Slouching Toward Submission missile crisis, President Roh’s staff stance than it had in 1998; some of took the opportunity to declare that the missiles from the July test now lit- South Korea had “no reason to make tered their Pacific fishing zone. But, a fuss about it like Japan did.”7 In fact, in the week after the missile launches, when President Roh broke his silence a Chinese effort to reason with North on the missile crisis, he did so to criti- Korea ran aground, and South Korea cize Japan, whose attitude, he said, watched as China stiffened its resolve “may lead to a critical situation in the on North Korea’s defiance of regional peace over Northeast Asia.”8 concerns. After the PRC’s Vice Pre- In South Korea’s topsy-turvy anal- mier Hui Liangyu and its top nuclear ysis, its own diplomatic efforts were negotiator, Wu Dawei, returned from focused on proceeding with North- Pyongyang without North Korean South talks that had been scheduled consent even to attend a new round of before the missile crisis. Recognizing the Six-Party Talks, the official PRC when they had a compliant hostage, statement told the story: “China is the North Korean delegation attended gravely concerned about the current these talks and pulled out all the situation and we have expressed our stops. North Korean negotiator Kwon position to the North Korean side.”9 Ho-ung exclaimed that South Korea And China did not abstain on July ought to provide assistance to North 15th, when the UN Security Council Korea in gratitude for Kim Jong-il’s unanimously approved Resolution policy of putting the military first. 1695 condemning the North Korean Kim’s notorious “military first” policy test launches and demanding “that the justifies starving North Koreans in DPRK suspend all activities related to order to develop nuclear weapons. Yet its ballistic missile program.” Kwon argued that it not only defends Washington took action to put North Korea from imperialism but back in place economic sanctions actually protects South Korea’s real against North Korea that had been interests as well. The South Korean lifted during the Clinton administra- delegate demurred, saying such pro- tion. Two days later, President Roh tection had not been requested. criticized American efforts to impose these additional financial sanctions Parting ways on North Korea, and called Japan’s Although it seemed not to notice, role in the crisis “rash and thought- South Korea’s approach was alien- less.”10 An aide called Japan “truly ating it from neighbors while also evil,” in case there was any doubt how making it vulnerable to abuse from the Roh administration felt. President its enemies. China and Russia, as Roh then explained that in dealing expected, initially opposed the Japa- with the United States, “since they nese draft and proposed something are an ally, we cannot scold them, but similar to what had been done after we have to go at it with Japan.”11 the 1998 Taepo-Dong test—a letter On July 19th, Roh summarized from the President of the Security his government’s distance from Council expressing concern over the American objectives: “The missile North Korean action. That de mini- launches were a wrong behavior and mis approach had South Korea’s tacit are feared not only to harm peace approval, but fell far short of what and stability on the Korean penin- Washington sought in New York. Even sula but also trigger a regional arms Russia had reason to take a harder race … but the moves by some forces,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 65 Chuck Downs which create unnecessary tension, widespread public outrage and calls will not be helpful either for settling for Lee’s resignation from the opposi- the problems.”12 The message was tion party, which has recently gained clear: South Korea had decided that clout in local elections. The South the UN resolution would not hamper Korean public seems to know who its sunshine policy toward North its friends are, even if its government Korea. Economic projects with the does not. The U.S. State Department regime would, it announced, continue deftly answered the minister’s com- unabated. Minister of Unification Lee ments by pointing out North Korea’s Jong-seok explained that because the policy has actually demonstrated the resolution was aimed at missiles and greatest failure. weapons of mass destruction, it does The alliance between the United not require “sanctions on general eco- States and South Korea has with- nomic exchanges.”13 stood five decades against a persis- Luckily, the government of the tent totalitarian threat. It is one of People’s Republic of China, North the closest and strongest military Korea’s erstwhile friend, saw the alliances the world has ever wit- situation more clearly. In late July, it nessed between people who speak froze North Korean bank accounts at unrelated languages. It is based on the Bank of China—a move that won an extensive architecture of mutual praise from the White House because defense activities, unique command it recognized the need to rein in structures that facilitate warfighting North Korea’s international illicit when necessary, and the deployment operations (including counterfeiting, of tens of thousands of American drug smuggling, and proliferation) troops in Korea, at a cost of about funded through external banking ten billion dollars annually. The alli- institutions.14 ance has shown tremendous resil- iency, delivering success in war and Off the reservation prosperity in peace. And there is no As a month closed, it had question that in an alliance between become clear that whatever had sovereign states there will occasion- been gained or lost by North Korea ally arise disputes and differences of and its adversaries, the relationship opinion, and those may be centered between Washington and Seoul had on key questions of how the alliance suffered severe stress. Sometimes addresses threats. In this instance, the murky, nuanced world of diplo- no one doubts that the government macy becomes painfully blunt. In of South Korea has the right not just one such moment of clarity, when to hold a different view but also to asked who he thought had pursued state it. But when a nation faces an the most unsuccessful policy during enemy that seeks its destruction, it this crisis, South Korea’s point man, is unwise for that nation to pander Unification Minister Lee, said that to the enemy and abuse its friends. Washington’s policy had failed the Part of North Korea’s objective in most. Lee’s was by no means an iso- creating crises like the missile crisis lated sentiment. When questioned by of July 2006 is to drive a wedge reporters, President Roh responded: between Seoul and Washington. For “Do you think the United States is a the moment, Seoul seems intent on country without fault?”15 These veiled helping it succeed. attacks on U.S. policy were met with

66 The Journal of International Security Affairs South Korea: Slouching Toward Submission

11. “[Exclusive] President Lobs Informal Criti- 1. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Korea,” in Richard J. cism at U.S.,” Hankyoreh Shinmun (Seoul), Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds. Strate- July 15, 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/ gic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose (Seat- english_edition/e_international/141578. tle: National Bureau of Asian Research, html. 2001), 154. See also Jonathan D. Pollack, 12. Ryu Jin, “Korea-U.S. Alliance Crack- “The Strategic Futures and Military Capa- ing,” Korea Times (Seoul), July 20, 2006, bilities of the Two Koreas,” in Ashley Tellis http://search.hankooki.com/times/ and Michael Wills, eds. Strategic Asia times_view.php?term=levey++&path=h 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era ankooki3/times/1page/nation/200607/ of Uncertainty (Seattle: National Bureau of kt2006072017215411950.htm&media=kt. Asian Research, 2005), 148. 13. “Unification Minister Calls for Strict 2. Nicholas Eberstadt, remarks at the Ameri- Implementation of UN Resolution,” can Enterprise Institute, June 5, 2003, reiter- Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), July 18, 2006. http:// ated in an email exchange and conversation English.chosun.com/w21data/html/ with the author thereafter. news/200607/200607180029.html. 3. The date in Korea was actually July 5th, but 14. “North Korea: U.S. Praises Accounts Freeze analysts are in general agreement that the by China,” Associated Press, July 27, 2006, timing was selected to occur in the after- http://select.nytimes.com/mem/tnt.html noon of America’s Independence Day, and ?emc=tnt&tntget=2006/07/27/world/asia/ perhaps intended to draw a comparison to 27briefs001.html. the American shuttle launch of the same 15. “Roh Defends Minister’s Right to Slam date. U.S.,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), July 25, 2006, 4. “Seoul’s Late Response to Missile Launch http://English.chosun.com/w21data/html/ Draws Flak,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), July 6, news/200607/200607250013.html. 2006. http://English.chosun.com/w21data/ html/news/200607/200607060024.html. 5. “Inter-Korean Ties to Suffer from Mis- sile Launch,” Korea Herald (Seoul), July 6, 2006, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/ SITE/data/html_dir/2006/07/06/200607 060034.asp: See also “Government State- ments on North Korean Missiles,” Korea Policy Review (Seoul), August 2006, http:// www.kois.go.kr/multimedia/attach/ kpr/2006080101_en.pdf. 6. Kim Ji-hyun, “Criticism Builds Over Seoul’s Handling of Missile Crisis,” Korea Herald (Seoul), July 12, 2006, http://news.nate.com/ Service/natenews/ShellView.asp?Link ID=1&ArticleID=2006071201205990188. 7. Ser Myo-ja, “‘Fussy” Japan Rejects Seoul’s Barbs,” Joong Ang Ilbo (Seoul), July 10, 2006, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200607/10 /200607102235209509900090409041.html. 8. Chun Su-jin, “On the Seventh Day, Roh Finally Speaks About Missile Crisis,” Joong Ang Ilbo (Seoul), July 13, 2006, http://joon- gangdaily.joins.com/200607/12/2006071 22217414609900090309031.html; see also “Roh Against U.S.-Japanese Sanctions on North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), July 19, 2006. http://English.chosun.com/w21data/ html/news/200607/200607190019.html. 9. “China’s President Appeals to North Korea,” Associated Press, Juy 11, 2006. 10. Ryu Jin, “Roh Critical of U.S. Financial Sanctions,” Korea Times (Seoul), July 16, 2006, http://times.hankooki.com/ 1page/200607/kt2006071616564210440. html.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 67

Iran Confronting the Threat

Results of a JINSA Roundtable

n February 6, 2006, the Jewish Institute for National Secu- rity Affairs convened a panel of leading experts to exam- Oine the emerging crisis over Iran’s nuclear program and policy options available to the United States in confronting the Islamic Republic. Below is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks.

Iranian Capabilities Ilan Berman Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council The U.S. government should brace for six concrete trends in the years ahead as a result of Iran’s progress toward a nuclear bomb. First, we will see—in fact, we are already seeing—an expansion of Iran’s regional influence. In recent years, Iran has signed bilateral agreements with a number or regional countries, among them Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These deals are an indication that the countries of the Middle East are preparing for a nuclear Iran, and that they do not expect the U.S. to stay in the region long enough to protect them. The second trend that is likely to emerge in the near future is a new arms race in the Middle East. Countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have already shown signs of seeking expanded strategic capabilities in order to counterbal- ance a potential Iranian bomb. The third trend that we can expect is greatly expanded proliferation. Iran is already a major “secondary proliferator,” and Iran’s radical new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made clear that he is willing to provide nuclear technology to any Muslim states that come seeking it. Prudence dictates that we take him at his word. Results of a JINSA Roundtable

The fourth trend is increased There is much that we now know terrorism. Iran is already the world’s about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In its leading state sponsor of terrorism, reports referring Iran to the United and if it has the nuclear muscle to Nations Security Council for action, back it up, Iran will be bound to feel the International Atomic Energy greater freedom to export its radical Agency (IAEA) highlighted that revolutionary principles. Iran had a working relationship with Fifth, we can expect an upsurge A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani in strategic blackmail emanating bomb. The Iranian regime bought from the Islamic Republic. Given its plans and equipment from Khan’s strategic location atop the Strait of network, indicating that the Iranian Hormuz, Iran has the ability to vir- regime is not simply interested in tually dictate energy terms to the nuclear power. United States and Europe. But what is not known about The sixth trend is regime longev- Iran’s nuclear capabilities is just as ity. Iran today is in ferment, with ram- troubling. IAEA inspectors have pant social discontent, unemployment indicated that Iran’s uranium (UF- and drug use. All of this, however, is 4 and UF-6) is not of good quality, likely to change if the regime acquires which makes enrichment much more the bomb. The closer the Iranian difficult. What is not known is how regime gets to a nuclear capability, much this complicates Iran’s nuclear the more its leaders will feel that they efforts, and how long it will take to can repress their domestic opposition resolve. It is also not known if Iran without serious repercussions from has used the centrifuges it received the international community. An Ira- from the Khan network to enrich nian bomb, in short, will fundamen- UF-6, imported from China. If it has, tally alter the relationship between Iran may have enough enriched ura- the regime and its population. nium for 20-25 bombs. The biggest Since the extent of the Iranian unknown, however, may be the exis- nuclear program is not known, Amer- tence of a parallel program using the ica must begin to develop a plan to same technology and being perfected deal with these six trends sooner, in sites that are buried and unknown rather than later. to IAEA inspectors. This idea is sup- ported by the fact that the Iranians Kenneth Timmerman have in their possession a technical Investigative Journalist 15-page description of how to make The threat from Iran is expand- hemispherical shapes out of enriched ing. Iran first tested its Shahab-3 uranium, a key element in construct- medium-range missile in 1998. It is ing a nuclear bomb. also believed to have tested a mis- sile with an electromagnetic pulse Western Policy Options (EMP) warhead. And Iran is known Helle Dale to have tested a short-range ballistic Deputy Director, Davis Institute for Interna- missile off a barge in the Caspian Sea, tional Studies, The Heritage Foundation indicating that it may hope to use a Public diplomacy toward Iran is low-tech delivery system in order to a difficult task. The state media is attack the United States from 60 to very tightly controlled, newspapers 100 miles offshore, where detection are arbitrarily closed, the Internet is would be difficult. filtered, and private satellite dishes

70 The Journal of International Security Affairs Iran: Confronting the Threat are banned. But the Iranian people, enhancing public diplomacy by using especially the young people, have a broadcast facilities both to beam great deal of discontent with the hard uncensored news to the Iranian hand of the ruling classes. So much people and to serve as “surrogate so that they will often defy the gov- radio,” telling people the news about ernment in order to access outside their own country that their govern- news sources. ment does not want them to hear. The U.S. can carry out better The use of humor and satire is also public outreach to Iran in several effective, as are interactive program- ways. First of all, a goal must be ming, such as call-in radio where the decided upon. Radio Farda today pro- telephone number is in an accessible vides essentially the same news that third country. Iranians can get from their state news These kinds of tactics could be agency. The content is repetitive and very effective if properly funded due contains little analysis. If our goal to the young age of Iranian society. were to simply broadcast news from There is a broad field of hearts and a slightly different angle, this would minds that could be won if we are be sufficient. But it is not. Incorporat- smart enough to tailor our public ing Western values into news analy- diplomacy to reaching them. sis could have a great impact on an Iranian public thirsty for thought-pro- James S. Robbins voking debate. Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs, Another problem is a lack of Farsi- American Foreign Policy Council speaking journalists. Radio Farda is There is a body of opinion that thus forced to choose between people nuclear weapons bring stability who simply speak the language but through deterrence. The thinking lack journalistic training or journal- goes that if Iran becomes a nuclear ists who don’t speak Farsi. They often state, somehow this would add to the do not have both, which hampers the overall stability of the region. After effectiveness of our broadcasts. all, Israel is presumed to have nuclear The Voice of America’s (VOA) weapons, and because the Cold War Farsi television is also cause for “balance of terror” worked so well, concern. VOA, often criticized as a we can replay it on a smaller scale. bloated bureaucracy, controls Radio This is an extremely danger- Farda and has recently been cut- ous idea. It has only gained traction ting back Radio Farda’s budget. This because its proponents focus on the comes at a time when more fund- high end of the conflict spectrum. ing than ever should be devoted to But, as we learned during the Cold public diplomacy in Iran. Radio Farda War, the deterrence model is based should be divorced from VOA and on many more variables than simply placed under a more flexible working the assumption that countries will environment. not employ nuclear weapons because Ultimately, vast improvements if they annihilate a country, they will must take place in our public diplo- be annihilated in return. macy toward Iran. The U.S. govern- One of the key assumptions in ment should provide support and deterrence modeling, that of having encouragement to Iranians who seek rational actors on both sides, does to move their country in a more pro- not hold up well in the case of Iran. Western direction. This includes Maybe the Iranians are rational

The Journal of International Security Affairs 71 Results of a JINSA Roundtable actors, maybe not. If they are not, or to predict. We knew exactly what if they are working under a rational their military capabilities were and framework that is based on a radi- that their leadership did not want to cally different view of reality, then all go to war. In addition, by the 1950s, bets are off. the Soviet Union was pretty much a Another assumption is that each non-ideological enemy. Iran, on the side has full information about the other hand, is unpredictable, fanati- capabilities of the other; in other cal and religiously motivated. Deter- words, transparency. Also, both sides rence worked on the Soviet Union, but must have a presumed or demonstra- it will not work against Iran. We need ble second strike capability, meaning in effect to set aside not only most but that a country can absorb the blow all of the mind-set that we had during from the other side and then respond the Cold War about how to deal with a with sufficient force to annihilate the country like the Soviet Union. aggressor. This is necessary to fore- Iran’s leadership is committed stall a first strike “bolt from the blue” to an extremely aggressive, totali- scenario. In other words, just to get to tarian worldview. Ahmadinejad has deterrence you would need an arms stated publicly that a world without race. Yet another requirement is open America and Israel is possible and communications. can be achieved. Ahmadinejad’s Furthermore, these issues are chief of strategy, Hassan Abbassi, only at the high-intensity end of the has similarly explicitly indicated his conflict spectrum. But there are other wish to destroy Anglo-Saxon civiliza- aspects to this that make deterrence tion. This is not the stodgy old Soviet even more sophisticated. The value Union we are dealing with; this is al- of nuclear weapons is to enable con- Qaeda as a state. flict at other levels of the spectrum Military options should not be by engaging the fear of escalation. used unless they are for the purpose That is the reason we had proxy wars of preventing Iran from obtaining or during the Cold War. developing a nuclear weapon. But if If Iran succeeds in acquiring military action is the only remaining nuclear weapons, therefore, the U.S. option, the Greek axiom that “if you would have to stop talking about strike at the king, you must kill him,” regime change, at least by force. Iran, must be applied. All of the elements on the other hand, would be able to of state power in Iran, including its employ a variety of force options. intelligence apparatus, must be com- The bottom line? Deterrence is pletely destroyed. working fine right now. It is working Prior to the use of military force, in Iran’s favor. They are deterring us. however, a couple of things can be attempted. The U.S. must engage R. James Woolsey in targeted sanctions against Iran’s Former Director of Central Intelligence investments and imports. Ahmadine- Is it possible to deter a nuclear- jad must be named as an accused capable Iran, as we did with the Soviet before a specially convened interna- Union during the decades of the Cold tional tribunal for his violation of the War? The simple answer is that Iran Genocide Convention (public advo- today is very different from the USSR. cacy of genocide is a violation). The The latter was rigid and bureaucratic, U.S. government should also consider which made their actions fairly easy tailoring sanctions against Iran to

72 The Journal of International Security Affairs Iran: Confronting the Threat areas with the greatest impact, includ- Iran. Also of major concern would ing an embargo on the Iranian impor- be the political implications of flying tation of refined petroleum products. over states like Jordan, Turkey and The U.S. also needs to work with Iraq. Another problem is that, unlike European allies in order to have them the Osirak reactor strikes in 1981, disengage economically from Iran. there are many targets, and some While this has not been successful in are deeply buried. One can assume, the past, the latest developments in therefore, that Israeli strikes will not Iranian behavior have increased the absolutely destroy the Iranian nuclear urgency of doing so. program. Rather, they would simply buy more time and make Iran’s abil- The Military Option ity to reacquire certain components IDF Representative much more difficult. The issue of a Name withheld for security reasons violent Iranian response also compli- Before analyzing the military cates the decision to strike. Iran will option, it is necessary to talk about likely respond against Israel with ter- timetables. Here, the United States rorist attacks, and may also choose to and Israel have some differences of involve American targets. opinion. For the U.S., the yardstick is These problems do not make the how long it will take Iran to acquire military option impossible, only risky enough fissile material for one nuclear and complicated. The military option, device. Since the official assessment therefore, should not be taken off the puts that point at five to ten years table. If Iran thinks this option has away, there is the perception that the been eliminated, it will only serve to United States still has time to deal embolden their defiance. with the problem. Israel, on the other hand, believes that once the Iranians Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, overcome the technical difficulties USMC (ret.) they are currently facing, they could Former Commander, U.S. Marine go underground, copy the enrichment Corps Forces Central Command capabilities in numerous other sites When it comes to military options and operate a fully parallel clandestine against Iran, the United States has a program that would be much harder to long list of potential actions. From uproot and destroy. Therefore, accord- smart weapons and intelligence to ing to Israel, the critical time frame to special operations forces, the U.S. has try and stop the Iranians is within the the finest fighting force in the world. coming year or so. However, there is a great deal more Does a viable military option to war than conventional forces. Iran exist? From an Israeli point of view, the is quite different from Iraq, both in only viable military option would be a terms of its size and in its terrain. Its one-time surgical air strike against population is four times that of Iraq. Iranian nuclear sites. Israel has both There are also accessibility prob- the air capabilities and the munitions lems; it may be politically difficult to to carry out this kind of operation. It access Iran from one of the bordering would not be without considerations countries. Also, the coastline is very and complications, however. Mid-air shallow, and it would be difficult to refueling would be necessary for all bring forces ashore. Overall, reach- of the planes involved due to the geo- ing Tehran would be much more chal- graphic distance between Israel and lenging than reaching Baghdad.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 73 Results of a JINSA Roundtable

There is also the question of defining the military’s exact mission. In what state do we want to leave their nuclear program? Can we find everything that must be targeted? Many of the nuclear sites in Iran are deeply buried, and we will not destroy or incapacitate all of them with preci- sion strikes. Are we looking to change the regime? And if so, what are some of the unintended consequences that may present themselves? You are not going to do it without boots on the ground. Yet with boots come the related, unintended consequences of an occupation force. We also have other global commitments to think about. The U.S. cannot abandon its missions in other countries and fronts. Another unknown is the commitment of our allies in this potential war. Are we going into this alone or with sup- port from other countries? Concerns about U.S. national will and funding for this mission also arise. If we hope to succeed militarily, these are all questions that must be answered well before we take action.

74 The Journal of International Security Affairs Syria Buying Time

Robert Rabil

or the United States, Syria has long represented something of a conundrum. Historically, Washington has preferred to main- Ftain diplomatic relations with Damascus, in spite of Syria’s prominent role as a repeat offender on the State Department’s “ter- rorism list.” But with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ensuing insur- gency there, Syria has taken on a new and ominous role as an enabler of anti-Coalition insurgents and a source of regional instability.

So far, however, Washington has failed to formulate a coherent strategy toward Damascus. Central to this shortcoming is a lack of understanding about Syria’s socio-political dynamics—and the nature of regional politics themselves. Yet such an analysis is crucial, because in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Free- dom, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has undergone a profound foreign policy transformation. Internally, the regime has accelerated the process of “Assadization,” sup- pressing dissent and shifting even greater power to the country’s Alawite minor- ity. It also has deepened its cooperation with Iran in an effort to solidify its most important strategic alliance. Most of all, however, Damascus is attempting to reassert its regional significance, especially in Lebanon, and in the process pre- vent the United States from forging a new, democratic regional order.

Dr. Robert G. Rabil is assistant professor and director of graduate studies in the political science department at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) and Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East (Praeger, 2006). Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the FAU Division of Research, to which the author extends his deep gratitude. Robert Rabil

Tension and State Department’s 1994, 1995, 1996, ambivalence and 1997 annual reports on terrorism, Throughout most of their modern for example, found Syria innocent of history, Washington and Damascus the charge of terrorism, but neverthe- 1 have had an uneasy relationship— less an accomplice to it. one that, though marked by tension The advent of the War on Terror and apprehension, has rarely been fundamentally altered the dynam- confrontational. From 1946 to 1979, ics of the U.S.-Syrian relationship. ties between the two countries were Although initially ambivalent, Wash- dictated by the geopolitics of the ington could no longer condone Syrian Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold support for—or harboring of—terror- War. And, although Syria moved ist organizations. Syria’s initial assis- headlong into the Soviet camp, the tance in the fight against al-Qaeda, United States, believing in Syria’s which helped to foil terrorist attacks ability to influence events beyond its on U.S. targets in Ottawa and Bah- borders, maintained diplomatic rela- rain, was outweighed by its persistent tions with Damascus that were based role as a terrorist enabler. Despite sev- above all on realpolitik. Washington, eral requests, including one delivered for example, mediated a disengage- in person by then-Secretary of State ment agreement between Israel and Colin Powell in May 2003, Syrian Syria in the wake of the 1973 Yom president Bashar al-Assad continued Kippur War, and subsequently sup- to allow a bevy of terrorist organiza- ported the entry of Syrian troops into tions, among them the Popular Front Lebanon in 1976. for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestin- The advent of the War on ian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas, to operate in Damascus. Terror fundamentally altered Against this backdrop, the U.S.- the dynamics of the U.S.- led invasion of Iraq sent shockwaves Syrian relationship. through Syria. It shattered the regional status quo around which the Syrian But Syria’s complicity in terror- regime had built its reputation as the ism, which landed the country on vanguard of Arab nationalism, and the U.S. State Department’s terrorist upended the security regime under- list beginning in 1979, emerged as pinning the authoritarian rule of the a source of friction with the United Ba’ath governments in the Gulf and States between 1979 and 2000. Even Levant. Perhaps even more threaten- at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian ing was the Bush administration’s con- peace process (1991-2000), which current initiative to spread democracy helped thaw U.S.-Syrian relations, in the greater Middle East, which pre- Washington’s attitude toward Damas- sented a threat to the very nature of cus remained unclear. Syria’s par- the regime in Damascus. The results ticipation in the U.S.-led anti-Iraq were dramatic; quite suddenly, the coalition during the first Gulf War regional order onto which Syria his- was certainly appreciated, but not torically had projected its power—and enough to exclude Damascus from from which it drew its legitimacy as a Washington’s official blacklist of nationalist state—had collapsed. As countries supporting terrorism. The seen from Damascus, nothing less than regime survival was at stake.

76 The Journal of International Security Affairs Syria: Buying Time

Assad’s survival strategy ously, the membership of the Ba’ath The resulting approach adopted Party’s Regional Command Coun- by the Assad regime has been essen- cil, which wields significant power, tially two-pronged. The first compo- was reduced from 21 to 14.4 These nent involves turning a blind eye to steps were followed just weeks later jihadi infiltration into Iraq as a way by important changes to the leader- of undermining U.S. efforts there. ship structure of the Syrian security In the process, Syrian authorities forces.5 Significantly, almost all of have indirectly transformed what these changes localized power to Ala- was once a disordered infiltration wites close to the President, thereby into an organized operation. Growing narrowing the regime’s base of politi- conservatism in Syria, coupled with cal support. lax governmental rules (such as no The Congress served another entry visa requirements for Arabs), crucial function as well: to reaf- has created a political climate that firm the dominant role of the Ba’ath is conducive to insurgent activities. party in Syrian politics. In his speech This trend, moreover, has been per- before the Congress, Assad asserted petuated by Syria’s minority Alawite that the “role of the Ba’ath will remain regime, which, in order to atone for essential.”6 Reformers were deeply its brutal suppression of the Muslim disappointed by the outcome; they Brotherhood in 1982, has embraced had believed that the regime, sub- moderate Islam.2 jected to mounting international pres- The second is a deepening state sure, would introduce some reform to of domestic repression in response bring about national unity. But the to re-energized civil calls for politi- Ba’ath Congress was a show of soli- cal and economic reform. Before darity directed at the opposition, and and upon his assumption of power in the West. Its underlying message, in 2000, President Assad had pledged the words of one Syrian analyst, was to introduce change into Syria’s scle- that the Ba’ath was here to stay.7 rotic political system. But as the so- called “Damascus Spring” began to Opening a new front spread, the regime backtracked on When the United States launched those promises. Under the pretext of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March the Arab-Israeli conflict and “national 2003, the Syrian regime did more security,” the regime has continued than simply denounce the U.S.-led to harass, detain and allegedly liqui- invasion and occupation of Iraq. Fear- date reformers and/or dissidents. ful of the impact of an American pres- At the same time, the Syrian ence next door on its own internal regime has set about accelerating stability, and wary of the possibility the consolidation of its rule. Since of military action migrating across his assumption of power, President the Iraqi-Syrian border, the Assad Assad has been trying to replace regime launched a concerted—and members of the old regime and offi- ongoing—effort to first support cials whose loyalty is uncertain. This Iraq’s army and subsequently fuel trend reached a crescendo during the the insurgency that has emerged in Ba’ath Party’s Tenth Regional Con- the former Ba’athist state. As Syrian gress in June 2005, when nearly the Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara entire “old guard” of the regime was told the Syrian parliament on March forced into retirement.3 Simultane- 30, 2003, “Syria has a national inter-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 77 Robert Rabil est in the expulsion of the invaders infiltration resulted in clashes with from Iraq.”8 Syrian forces. Under intense pres- This strategy took on a number sure from the U.S., the Syrian regime of forms. The Syrian regime mobi- did take certain measures, such as lized Muslim public opinion in an increasing the number of troops in effort to encourage jihadi infiltra- border towns, to monitor and prevent tion into Iraq. It did so by creating the ongoing infiltration. But reports religious sanction for instability in of training camps and Syrian intelli- Iraq, with Syria’s senior cleric, Grand gence officials aiding insurgents cast Mufti Ahmad Kaftaro, issuing a fatwa doubt upon Syria’s true intentions.12 (religious edict) calling on Muslims Syria’s unhelpful role has also “to use whatever means possible to ratcheted up tensions between defeat the [U.S.] aggression includ- Damascus and Baghdad. In mid-2005, ing suicide bombings against the Iraq’s defense minister, Saadoun al- Zionist Americans and British invad- Dulaimi, criticized Damascus for ers.”9 Indeed, the Syrian regime made ignoring Iraqi demands “to stop the good on its policy by providing the infiltration of terrorists” and warned Iraqi regime with military equipment that “when the lava of the exploding including night-vision goggles and volcano of Iraq overflows, it will first allowing jihadis to cross the border hit Damascus.”13 Al-Dulaimi’s criti- into Iraq to kill Americans. cisms were well-placed; Syria’s sup- Testifying before the Subcom- port of the insurgency, both direct mittee on the Middle East and Cen- and indirect, has greatly undermined tral Asia of the House International the security environment in Iraq. Relations Committee, John Bolton, At the same time, the Syrian then the Under Secretary of State for regime—once a staunch opponent of Arms Control and International Secu- religious radicalism—has embraced rity, stated: an array of regional Islamists. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas We have seen Syria take a series operate freely in Damascus, inflam- of hostile actions toward Coali- ing Palestinian public opinion against tion forces in Iraq. Syria allowed the U.S. and Israel and allegedly military equipment to flow into masterminding suicide bombings in Iraq on the eve of and during the 14 war. Syria permitted volunteers Israel. The Syrian regime has also to pass into Iraq to attack and expanded its support for Hezbollah kill our service members during in Lebanon; in addition to supplying the war, and is still doing so.10 the Shi’ite militia with arms, Syria has served as a key conduit for trans- This dual policy—mobilizing ferring missiles from Iran to the Muslim public opinion while turning Islamist party. a blind eye to jihadi infiltration—was speedily capitalized upon by extrem- The turn to Tehran ists throughout the Muslim world. Deprived of its strategic depth in A broad network of Sunni mosques Iraq and its historic and geo-strategic emerged as the hub for organiz- backyard in Lebanon, Syria has also ing this infiltration, encompassing moved headlong into the Iranian “almost every village and town from camp. In February 2004, the two 11 Damascus to Baghdad.” Efforts by countries signed a key “memoran- American troops to stop cross-border dum of understanding” outlining an

78 The Journal of International Security Affairs Syria: Buying Time expansion of bilateral defense coop- Ahmadinejad against Israel and for eration—and codifying an Iranian Palestinians, especially Hamas. commitment to protect Syria in case Damascus is the lynchpin in of attack by either Israel or the United these plans. Because of its strate- States.15 This partnership was further gic location, Syria has the ability to bolstered by the visit of Iranian Presi- extend Iran’s reach into the Levant, dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Syria as well as to serve as a foil to advance in January 2005. The summit served Iranian regional ambitions under the to coordinate Syrian and Iranian pretext of Arab nationalist causes. But policy and consolidate their alliance; Syria is also unquestionably the junior Damascus backed Iran in its confron- partner in this alliance. As Syrian tation with the West over its nuclear troops left Lebanon, Damascus lost program and both countries sup- important leverage vis-à-vis Hezbol- ported Hezbollah and Hamas in their lah and Palestinian groups there. As resistance to Israeli occupation.16 a result, Syria can no longer dictate This alliance culminated in a defense its policies to these groups without treaty signed between the two coun- making considerable concessions. tries in June 2006. Commenting on In the words of former Syrian Vice- the treaty, Syrian Defense Minister President (and current vocal regime Hasan Turkmani explained that “we opponent) Abdel Halim Khaddam: [Syria and Iran] form a mutual front “Bashar Assad is not a strategic ally against Israeli threats.” He asserted of Iran, but only a strategic tool.”19 that “Iran considers Syria’s secu- rity as Iran’s security.”17 Since then, Damascus is the lynchpin in cooperation between Damascus and Tehran’s plans. Because of its Tehran has increased, with both countries stressing the need for a strategic location, Syria has joint approach to the American and the ability to extend Iran’s Israeli threat.18 reach into the Levant, as well The reasons for Syria’s inter- as to serve as a foil to advance est in this alliance are clear. Both countries share concern over being Iranian regional ambitions targeted by the United States as under the pretext of Arab part of the War on Terror, as well as nationalist causes. a common belief that they must pre- vent the U.S. from creating a new, Syria versus the democratic regional order. In addi- “Cedar Revolution” tion, Damascus sees partnership Lebanon has long occupied a with Tehran as a necessary deter- central role in Syria’s strategic calcu- rent against the U.S. and Israel. lus, serving as a patronage system for But whereas the Syrian regime Syria’s Alawite security chiefs and a is fighting for its survival, Iran is proxy front against Israel. Over time, angling for regional hegemony. Cog- however, this situation became pre- nizant of the current disarray in carious as many Lebanese, encour- pan-Arab politics, Iran has begun aged by the collapse of the regional to champion Arab causes, thereby order, began efforts to reclaim their forcing Arabs to toe its political line. country from Syrian occupation. No Arab leader has spoken as force- This represented a serious threat to fully as Iranian President Mahmoud

The Journal of International Security Affairs 79 Robert Rabil

Syria. Since their entry into Leba- ers charged, Syrian troops were no non in 1976, the Syrians, pursuing a longer needed to defend Beirut against divide-and-conquer strategy among Israeli aggression—something Syrian the country’s diverse Christian and authorities had continuously trum- Muslim denominations, had been peted to legitimize their occupation. able to impose their hegemony over Syria, in response, tried to fur- most of Lebanon. The country was ther entrench itself in Lebanon. Its brought under complete Syrian con- tool of choice? A pro-Syrian govern- trol when Syria joined the U.S.-led ment that would be committed to anti-Iraq coalition in 1990-1991 and stemming the rising tide of anti- Washington returned the favor by Syrian political activities. Damascus giving Damascus the green light directed its loyalists in Lebanon’s to attack the last bastion of Chris- parliament to extend for three years tian resistance to Syrian hegemony. the term of its ally, President Emile Throughout the 1990s, as the peace Lahoud. But Syria’s blatant med- process became the cornerstone of dling in Lebanese affairs caused a U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, backlash, with former Prime Min- Damascus increased its support of the ister Rafik Hariri and Druze leader Islamist party, Hezbollah, enabling it Walid Jumblaat realigning their loy- to become an effective instrument alties in the direction of anti-Syrian to pressure Israel while at the same forces, thereby potentially threaten- time relegating the Lebanese authori- ing the very nature of the country’s ties to a supporting role. Hezbollah, fragile Syrian-imposed order. Exter- in turn, capitalized on these develop- nal pressure was mounting as well, ments, legitimizing itself as both a with the United States and France political party and a resistance move- co-sponsoring UN Security Council ment in the eyes of many Lebanese. Resolution 1559 in September 2004 calling for Syria’s withdrawal from The departure of Syrian Lebanon and the disarmament of forces from Lebanon has Hezbollah. beeen succeeded by a cycle of In an attempt to nip this grow- ing anti-Syrian campaign in the bud, violence, now over a year old, the Syrian regime—in tandem with aimed at anti-Syrian politicians its underlings in Lebanon’s secu- and journalists and showcasing rity apparatus—is believed to have orchestrated the assassination of a clear message: only Syria Hariri in February 2005. But this act can prevent Lebanon from backfired spectacularly, triggering a descending into chaos. mass uprising intent on reclaiming an independent democratic Lebanon. The dynamics of the Israeli- On March 14, 2005, approximately Lebanese-Syrian relationship changed 1.5 million Lebanese (over a third of dramatically with Israel’s unilateral the country’s entire population), took withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. to the streets to demonstrate for Syr- Israel’s redeployment, which was ia’s withdrawal.20 carried out without first concluding Buffeted by international pres- a peace treaty with Syria, prompted sure and stunned by this sudden immediate Lebanese calls for a similar “Cedar Revolution,” Syrian troops Syrian withdrawal. After all, observ- humiliatingly evacuated Lebanon the

80 The Journal of International Security Affairs Syria: Buying Time following month. But their departure Tanwiriyah… Suria al-‘Ulmaniyah Tazdad has been succeeded by a cycle of vio- Islamiyah” [Damascus Reports on Infidel (unbelief) Cells and Calls for Awareness lence, now over a year old, aimed at Efforts… Secular Syria Grows Islamic], anti-Syrian politicians and journal- Al-Hayat (London), June 18, 2005. See also ists and showcasing a clear message: Al-Hayat (London), March 30 and May 3, only Syria can prevent Lebanon from 2006. 3. Among those retired as part of the reshuffle descending into chaos. were Vice-Presidents Abdel Halim Khaddam and Muhammad Zuheir Mashariqa, former Hunkering down Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa Miro, former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, and Syria, in short, is acting from a former Speaker of Parliament Abd al-Qader sense of siege. The scope and breadth Qaddura. of domestic repression—coupled 4. Ziad Haydar, “Mu’tamar al-Ba’ath: Tawsiat with the regime’s subversive activi- Islahiyah Lam Takruq Saqf al-Tawaqu’at” [Ba’ath Summit: Recommendations of ties in Lebanon, Iraq and even Jordan, Reform That Did Not Pierce the Ceiling of only serve to highlight the fact that Expectations], As-Safir (Beirut), June 10, Damascus remains governed by a 2005. criminal mind-set and ruled by the 5. For example, Bashar’s brother-in-law, 21 Brigadier General Asef Shawkat, heads language of force. And, although the regime’s Military Intelligence, while it is emerging as a weak link in the his brother, Maher, is the commander of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, Syria has the Republican Guards. As well, Brigadier the ability to play an essential role in General Fouad Nassif, a close family friend, directs internal security in the Syrian Gen- it—extending this dangerous part- eral Intelligence Directorate. For more nership to Palestinian radicals and details, see Robert G. Rabil, Syria, the United other extremist forces in the region. States, and the War on Terror in the Middle For the United States, these East (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 192-193. 6. “President Bashar al-Assad’s Speech to the internal perceptions of weakness are Tenth Regional Congress of the Ba’ath Arab likely to have concrete consequences. Socialist Party,” SANA (Damascus), June 6, Humiliated in Lebanon and belea- 2005. guered by both internal and external 7. Sami Moubayed, “Bashar Assad Ensured the Baath Was Here to Stay,” Daily Star threats, the Syrian regime is likely (Beirut), July 18, 2005. to find sanctuary in a continuation of 8. Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and its role as regional spoiler. Time and Bilateral Issues (Washington: Library of again, Syria has embraced terror- Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2003), 6. ism as a strategic tool to counteract 9. “Hal Qararat Suria an Tu’aser ‘ala al-Ahdath perceptions of its regional insignifi- fi al-Iraq?” [Has Syria Decided to Influence cance, and the conditions are ripe for Events in Iraq?], Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), it to do so again. March 29/30, 2003. 10. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Septem- ber 16, 2003, http://www.state.gov/t/us/ rm/24135.htm. 1. See the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns 11. John Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,” New of Global Terrorism for 1994 through 1997, York Times, June 5, 2005. available online at http://www.state.gov. 12. Tom Masland, “Syria: Jihad without Bor- 2. The regime has supported the building ders,” Newsweek International, November 8, of some 80,000 mosques, over 22 higher- 2005. education institutions for teaching Islam, 13. As cited in “Attack on Iraqi Workers Kills and many Shari’a (Islamic Law) schools. 12,” cnn.com, July 26, 2005, http://www. See Ibrahim Hamidi, “Dimashq Ta’lun ‘an cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/26/ Khalaya Takfiriyah wa Da’awat ela Juhud

The Journal of International Security Affairs 81 Robert Rabil

iraq.main/. 14. For example, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Syria was reportedly behind a suicide attack in Haifa in 2003. See J. W. Anderson, “Israeli Airstrike Hits Site in Syria,” Wash- ington Post, October 6, 2003. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal has been vocal in support- ing the party’s armed resistance against Israel. See “Mashaal Yad’ou ela Da’m Hamas bil-Silah wal-Rijal” [Mashaal Calls for Sup- porting Hamas in Arms and Men], As-Safir (Beirut), April 11, 2006. 15. “Defence Minister Says Syria a Part of Iran’s Security,” IRNA (Tehran), February 26, 2004. 16. “Syria and Iran Back Each Other Against All Comers,” Daily Star (Beirut), January 20, 2006. 17. “Tehran wa Dimashq Tuwaqi’an Itifaqan Askarian” [Tehran and Syria Sign a Defense Treaty], As-Safir (Beirut), June 16, 2006. 18. Ibid. 19. Abdel Halim Khaddam, interview with United Press International (Arabic), as transcribed by Al-Mustqbal (Beirut), June 5, 2006. 20. The March 14th demonstration was also in part a response to an earlier, pro-Syrian march organized by Hezbollah. Approxi- mately half a million people participated in that rally. 21. In addition to supporting and upgrading its relationship with Hamas against the wishes of the international community, Damascus has been accused of training and arming Hamas members. Jordanian authorities arrested twenty Hamas members in May 2006, who, according to Jordanian authori- ties, were planning to carry out terror attacks in the Hashemite Kingdom. Under inter- rogation, they revealed that they had been trained and armed in Syria. See Muham- mad al-Da’meh, “Al-Mushtabah Fihum Biqadiat ‘Hamas’ fi al-Urdun Ya’tarifun Bitalqihum Tadribat fi Suria” [Those Sus- pects in the ‘Hamas’ Case in Jordan Confess That They Received Training in Syria], As- Sharq al-Awsat (London), May 12, 2006; and “Al-Urdun Ya’rud I’tirafat Nashiti Hamas” [Jordan Displays the Confessions of Hamas Activists], As-Safir (Beirut), May 12, 2006.

82 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia and China The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance

Alexandr Nemets

onventional wisdom has it that China’s expanding military capabili- ties, and Beijing’s growing regional ambitions, will one day soon Cpose a challenge to the United States in Asia. Likewise, Russia under Vladimir Putin has shed any ambiguity about its post-Cold War direction, become increasingly assertive, powerful and anti-American.

Yet perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. interests and objectives in the years ahead will not come from Beijing or Moscow alone, but from the ominous alli- ance that is emerging between the two. It is a partnership that holds the power to reconfigure the balance of power in Europe, Asia and beyond—much to the detriment of the United States and American interests in those regions.

Genesis Contemporary Sino-Russian relations can be traced back to September 1984, when the Soviet Union’s newly-appointed deputy premier, Ivan Arkhipov, visited Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng. Though no agreements were reached at the time, both leaders committed unequivocally to a major upgrade of the bilateral relationship, thereby kicking off a multi-year revival of the thriv- ing partnership that had existed between the two countries before 1960. Additional overtures soon followed. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and the improvement of relations with China

Dr. Alexandr Nemets is an independent Minnesota-based foreign policy and defense consultant. He has worked for the University of Minnesota, the Sci- ence Applications International Corporation, Newsmax.com, and other private and governmental organizations. He received his Ph.D. from the Russian Acad- emy of Sciences, where he worked as a researcher between February 1986 and October 1993. Alexandr Nemets became one of his top foreign policy Russia and China, the same period priorities. The results were dramatic; saw a rapid growth in strategic coop- just three months later, in June 1985, eration. Most notably, the Moscow during a visit by Li Peng to Moscow, visit of Jiang Zemin, General Sec- the USSR and China signed a major retary of the Chinese Communist pact on economic-technological coop- Party, in May 1991 yielded a new eration—the first such agreement in a border agreement that transferred quarter-century. That deal paved the to China hundreds of small islands in way for Soviet assistance in the mod- the Amur, Argun, and Ussuri rivers, ernization of China’s aging industrial and granting Chinese ships greater sector, as well as a rapid expansion of docking privileges at Russian ports.2 Sino-Russian trade and extensive aca- demic exchanges that led to a boom in A shifting balance science and technology collaboration. Jiang’s visit showcased an Subsequently, in late May 1989, important development. The bal- Gorbachev, as General Secretary of ance of power between the USSR the Communist Party of the Soviet and China—previously squarely in Union (and the newly elected presi- Moscow’s favor—had begun to shift dent of the USSR), visited China and significantly toward the latter. The met Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Soviet Union and China were now other Chinese leaders. The visit was equal partners in their strategic hailed worldwide as the final nor- relationship. Moreover, China was malization of Chinese-Soviet ties actually becoming stronger in some after three decades of hostility. In (primarily economic) areas, though it practical terms, this visit created still lagged behind the USSR in mili- an environment for even greater tary technology. cooperation. This expansion was not By the end of 1991, the Soviet marred in the least by China’s brutal Union had ceased to exist and Russia suppression of student protests in became an independent country. Tiananmen just weeks later. To the The fledgling Russian government contrary, Soviet leaders recognized initiated radical economic reform, the new opportunities emerging which resulted in great economic and from the resulting constriction of political chaos and hyperinflation. Chinese ties with the West. By contrast, in January 1992, China’s By the time the Soviet Union “paramount leader,” Deng Xiaoping, began to crumble in 1991, contacts proclaimed a “new stage of economic between Moscow and Beijing had reform,” which brought with it an become steady and robust, encom- annual rise of fourteen percent in passing vibrant science and tech- China’s GDP. nology collaboration, ballooning Yet, although the trends in the bilateral trade and a thriving trade two countries were diametrically in high-tech Soviet arms (as Soviet opposite, this state of affairs actually defense firms, facing imminent pros- facilitated further cooperation. The pects of cutbacks in military orders new Russian leadership was desper- inside Russia, began to look to a new ately looking for economic partners prospective customer: the PRC).1 to replace broken ties with Eastern The first half of 1991 saw grow- Europe and the former Soviet repub- ing chaos among the Soviet repub- lics, while China had become inter- lics, and in Russia itself. But between ested as never before in Russian raw

84 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance materials and Russian markets for This warmth facilitated a major “thrifty” Chinese consumer goods. change in military posture on the The mutual interests of the Russian part of both countries. Based on defense industry and the PLA and accords signed with Beijing in April Chinese defense industry were also 1996, Moscow launched a major troop on the rise.3 redeployment, moving forces away At the end of 1992, following from the 2,500-mile border shared a visit by new Russian president with China to the Moscow and Lenin- Boris Yeltsin to China, Sino-Rus- grad military regions, close to NATO sian relations reached a qualita- borders. China, for its part, shifted tively new level with the signing of its best troops—at least 200,000 sol- twenty important framework agree- diers and a substantial amount of ments—more than half dealing with heavy weaponry—from the Russian cooperation between the People’s and Kazakh borders (the Shenyang, Liberation Army and the Russian Beijing and Lanzhou major military armed forces, Chinese-Russian mili- regions) to the Taiwan Strait and the tary-technological cooperation and South China Sea coast. related spheres. The deals paved the way for a subsequent, multi-bil- The writing was on the wall; lion-dollar, five-year agreement on Russia’s top leaders had chosen military exchanges and defense tech- a geopolitical partner, and nology cooperation, one which would provide a major boost to China’s despite Moscow’s overtures military modernization during the toward Washington and mid-1990s. The writing was on the European capitals, their choice wall; Russia’s top leaders had chosen a geopolitical partner, and despite was clearly Beijing. Moscow’s overtures toward Wash- ington and European capitals, their A new “Great Leap Forward” in choice was clearly Beijing.4 Chinese-Russian ties was at hand, driven largely by Russian fears of Expansion and Western encroachment. The geopo- solidification litical agenda of Alexei Arbatov, the The ascendance of Yevgeny Pri- influential chairman of the Russian makov to the post of Foreign Minister Duma’s Military Commission, was in 1996 provided new momentum to published by the Russian press at the the unfolding Sino-Russian strategic very beginning of 1997. In it, Arbatov partnership. That year, overt Russian made clear that, if NATO continued its eastward expansion, Russia would weapons and arms technology deliv- 5 eries surpassed $1 billion. And arms have to do the same. In short, Russia trade was not the only sign of prog- would form an alliance with China, ress; in the wake of a November 1996 as well as with Iran and India. This visit by Primakov to Beijing, Russia was, in effect, an ultimatum from and the PRC also enhanced their Russia’s political elite to America and political coordination on a number of the West. fronts—most notably, opposition to Arbatov’s manifesto was echoed American plans for the deployment of in Beijing. At their April 1997 ballistic missile defenses. summit, presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin issued a joint statement

The Journal of International Security Affairs 85 Alexandr Nemets on “Multi-polarization of the World polar world, with the diminished and Establishment of a New Interna- influence of the U.S.”6 tional Order,” a document articulat- Economic realities were also ing the opposition of both countries working in the alliance’s favor. In to a world dominated by the United August 1998, the Russian govern- States and its allies. At the same ment officially announced that it time, Jiang was making new inroads was bankrupt. This economic fail- in Central Asia. Over the span of ure undermined Russian belief in several months in 1997, the Chinese a market economy, and the last president met with the presidents of friendly ties to the West unraveled. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz- Yeltsin began expanding the politi- stan. These meetings resulted in a cal power wielded by Primakov, a dramatic reduction of Chinese, Rus- tried-and-true friend of China, and sian and Kazakh troops based near the latter wasted no time in looking the former Chinese-Soviet border. east for assistance. In late August of Moscow and Beijing also drew that year, China broke the de facto closer on regional security matters. “financial blockade” of Russia that By mid-1997, China and Russia, along had emerged, providing Moscow with several of the former Soviet with $540 million in financial aid. republics, had formed something The move was greatly appreciated in akin to a unified “defense perim- the Kremlin. eter”—one encompassing Russia, International events, meanwhile, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz- seemed to confirm the prudence of stan and Tajikistan—and had begun partnership. In December 1998, the redeploying troops along that new United States and England launched border. As a result of the arrange- Operation Desert Fox in Iraq—a ment, Russia received additional mili- move that generated angry protests tary forces with which to oppose the from both Moscow and Beijing, and U.S. and Europe, while China solidi- provided new impetus to Chinese fied its military potential for a pos- and Russian discussions about the sible conflict over Taiwan. establishment of a joint air-defense Progress was palpable on network. During the same period, another front as well. A Chinese- Primakov also proposed the idea of a Russian summit in Beijing in Novem- Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic tri- ber of 1997 by and large resolved a angle aimed against the West.7 The long-standing border dispute over subsequent outbreak of hostilities in three large islands in the Amur and Kosovo in May 1999 only served to Argun rivers. Even more impor- accelerate these trends. tantly, Jiang and Yeltsin signed the In the midst of this burgeon- Sino-Russian Border Demarcation ing partnership, a new era dawned Treaty, which affirmed the border in Moscow with the elevation of pact signed by Jiang and Gorbachev Vladimir Putin to the post of Prime in May 1991. The Chinese and Rus- Minister in August 1999. But the cor- sian media stressed after the summit responding transfer of power from that the two nations henceforth had Yeltsin’s corrupt “family” to the Putin “no unresolved problems, no differ- regime—based primarily on FSB/ ences in foreign policy goals.” Russia KGB structures—did nothing to and China were “pursuing the same dampen the intensity of Sino-Russian ultimate goal: the creation of a multi- cooperation. Indeed, between August

86 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance

1999 and July 2001, strategic coop- are also deeply interested in greater eration between Moscow and Beijing access to the hydrocarbon resources ballooned, as exemplified by a new of Central Asia and the Middle East. accord on weapons and technology transfer worth at least $2 billion, Moscow and Beijing have and by the initiation of joint military maneuvers between the Russian harnessed the Shanghai armed forces and the People’s Libera- Cooperation Organization as tion Army. During their first meeting a geopolitical instrument to in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on July 5-6, restrain Western penetration 2000, Putin promised Jiang Zemin that in the case of a conflict over into the Caspian region and Taiwan, “the Russian Pacific Fleet all of Central Asia. will block the path of U.S. naval ves- sels heading to Taiwan.”8 Russia, meanwhile, is intent on Increasingly, Moscow and Bei- expanding influence in the “post- jing were also making regional plans. Soviet space,” as well as complicating The summer of 2001 saw the formal Washington’s freedom of movement expansion of the “Shanghai Five” in its Near Abroad and in the Middle with the addition of Uzbekistan. The East. Officials in Moscow also fear resulting grouping—encompassing that, unless confronted, America’s China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz- regional presence in the “post-Soviet stan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan— space” could lead to a final disintegra- has emerged as Eurasia’s premier tion of the Commonwealth of Indepen- post-Soviet security bloc, with both dent States (CIS) and the “peaceful defensive and far-reaching offensive transformation” of Russia through capabilities. Officially, the major “democratic reconstructions” and function of the Shanghai Cooperation “color revolutions.”10 These efforts Organization (SCO) was the struggle have met with considerable success, against “the ‘three forces’ of separat- with Moscow contributing to Wash- ism, terrorism and extremism.”9 In ington’s forced strategic retreat from reality, however, Moscow and Beijing Uzbekistan (and quite possibly Kyr- have harnessed the SCO as a geo- gyzstan in the near future). On the political instrument to restrain the surface, American-Russian relations Western penetration into the Caspian may still be quiet, but a fierce strug- region and all of Central Asia. gle is taking place underneath. These objectives are comple- New horizons mentary, and synergistic. It is there- Today, the Sino-Russian relation- fore not surprising that bilateral ties ship continues to be animated by a between Moscow and Beijing are on number of factors. For China, these the upswing. China and Russia are include maximizing influence over sparing no efforts to build a “multi- Taiwan and neutralizing U.S. influ- polar world” in which the power of the ence there, as well as rolling back United States is diminished. America’s presence on the Korean In the future, these efforts are peninsula, in the South China Sea, likely to take several concrete forms. and throughout Southeast Asia. Poli- For China, the first priority will be cymakers in Beijing, cognizant of to ensure an electoral victory for their country’s growing energy needs, the opposition Kuomintang party in

The Journal of International Security Affairs 87 Alexandr Nemets

Taiwan in March 2008, a move that Presidents Hu Jintao and Vladimir Chinese policymakers believe—with Putin endorsed a new long-term some justification—will pave the way action plan for strategic cooperation for a formal agreement between Bei- between their two countries. This jing and Taipei on Taiwan’s eventual program—which envisions new levels reunification with Mainland China. of economic, scientific, cultural and The end goal is the ambitious concept political cooperation between Moscow of a “Greater China” encompassing and Beijing in the years ahead—sets the Mainland, a politically and eco- the stage for a further evolution of the nomically integrated Taiwan, and Sino-Russian alliance. It is a partner- Hong Kong. A secondary goal is the ship with which the United States will withdrawal of American troops from be grappling for a long time to come. South Korea and the unification of the peninsula under a defacto Beijing pro- tectorate. PRC policymakers are also keen to establish direct control over most of the South China Sea, thereby 1. For more on Sino-Russian military trade, cementing China’s dominion in the see Alexandr V. Nemets and John Torda, The Chinese-Russian Alliance (independently region, as well as exerting greater published, 2002), 2-6. pressure on regional rival Japan. 2. Alexandr V. Nemets, The Growth of China Russia, meanwhile, is intent upon and Prospects for the Eastern Regions of the establishing an “independent” (read Former USSR (The Edwin Mellen Press, NY, 1996), 59-62. anti-American) foreign policy in the 3. Nemets and Torda, The Chinese-Russian Alli- greater Middle East—an objective ance, 9-11; see also Nemets, The Growth of that includes, in no small measure, China and Prospects for the Eastern Regions the provision of assistance to the Ira- of the Former USSR, 62-66. 4. Ibid., 12-18. nian regime in its efforts at military 5. Alexei Arbatov, “If the West Continues the modernization, as well as tacit support Expansion, Moscow Will Drive East,” Neza- for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The visimaya Gazeta (Moscow), January 3, 1997, latter makes good strategic sense for 3. 6. Nemets and Torda, The Chinese-Russian Moscow; since the Islamic Republic Alliance, 28-29; see also Renmin Ribao (Bei- is a major nuclear client, Iran’s nucle- jing), November 9-11, 1997; Xinhua (Bei- arization would be a boon to Russia’s jing), November 9-11, 1997; Nezavisimaya nuclear industry, providing a show- Gazeta (Moscow), November 10-12, 1997. 7. “Russia’s Primakov Urges ‘Strategic Tri- case for Russian nuclear expertise to angle’ With China, India,” Agence France- other aspiring atomic states. Russia Presse, December 21, 1998. will also remain intent on reasserting 8. Ibid., 51-52. hegemony in the “post-Soviet space,” 9. “SCO Defense Ministers Discuss Regional Security Issues in Beijing,” Xinhua (Bei- and is likely to increase its efforts jing), April 26, 2006. to influence—and destabilize—the 10. “The Prospects of International Relations,” fragile political systems of Ukraine, Liaowang (Beijing), January 2, 2006, 52-54. Georgia, and the Central Asian states. All of this sits well with China, which is interested in restoring Moscow’s dominion over the entire “post-Soviet space” and, consequently, nullifying American influence there. And Moscow and Beijing are making progress. In March 2006,

88 The Journal of International Security Affairs Venezuela Anatomy of a Dictator

Luis Fleischman

profound transformation is under way in Venezuela. Since taking power in 1998, strongman Hugo Chávez has imposed stricter con- A trols on economic activity, reduced opposition political parties to near-insignificance, launched a series of legal attempts to limit the media, and rolled back individual liberties—all in the name of “social justice.” As a result, Venezuela today is drifting towards a regime that is authoritar- ian in form and anti-capitalist, socialist and anti-American in substance.

These changes are not purely domestic. Claiming that his government rep- resents a continuation of the work of those who helped liberate Latin America from Spanish domination, most notably Simón Bolívar, Chávez increasingly has come to view himself as a regional leader—and occasionally, as a global player as well. In the process, Venezuela has become a strategic threat to the United States. From the provision of safe haven to radical Islamic groups to increased support for—and cooperation with—rogue states such as Iran, Caracas has emerged as a hub for anti-American activity in the Western Hemisphere—one that increas- ingly poses a challenge to the interests of the United States in its own backyard. It is a threat that Washington has so far not confronted resolutely.

Dr. Luis Fleischman is an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. He is also an adjunct pro- fessor of Political Science and Sociology at Wilkes Honors College at Florida Atlantic University. Luis Fleischman

A constitutional coup death of political parties and insti- The anti-democratic drift tutional representative democracy. taking place in Caracas is both Chávez had managed to launch a sudden and alarming. After all, revolutionary process that reduced Venezuela is one of the few Latin the power of parliamentary politics American countries that did in favor of grassroots populism.1 not suffer under dictatorship in Long-winded public speeches and recent decades. Instead, for most television programs lionizing the of the second half of the 20th cen- new leader replaced parliamentary tury, Venezuela was governed by debate, and the national executive two parties, Democratic Action slowly but surely began to eclipse (Acción Democratica) and the the legislature and judiciary. Christian Democrats (COPEI), Additional steps soon followed. which monopolized political power Under pressure from supporters and regularly took turns in the of the new populist president, the presidential palace. Venezuelan Supreme Court autho- Over time, however, this rized the country’s Constitutional status quo became unsustainable. Assembly to declare a “judicial Economic and political malaise emergency” and evaluate all exist- resulted in plummeting popularity ing judges. Chávez leveraged this for parties, generating disaffection opening into a lasting “state of and paving the way for the rise of emergency,” and began the pro- a new political leadership, with cess of uprooting the country’s Hugo Chávez Frias at its head. old political institutions. By early Back in 1992, Chávez, a 2000, a new constitution had been former paratrooper and army approved by general referendum. lieutenant colonel, had staged an It extended the presidential term abortive coup against the govern- from five to six years, and allowed ment of then-president Carlos the president to stand for re- Andres Perez. He was jailed for election once. It also eliminated his efforts. But just six years later, the country’s historic bi-cameral Chávez would be elected president parliamentary system in favor of a as head of a new political bloc, the one-chamber National Assembly. Patriotic Pole, by the largest major- Most significant, however, was ity in four decades. Chávez’ wildly- the new constitution’s provision of successful campaign—built on an near-absolute power to the execu- anti-corruption and anti-poverty tive branch. In the name of “social platform—was a direct repudia- justice,” it imposed restrictions on tion of the political order that had the activities of private institutions dominated Venezuelan politics and diminished the power of cor- since 1958. porations while increasing govern- Once in office, Chávez did ment regulation and federal control not waste any time consolidating of the economy. The constitution power. Between April and July also provided new limits on the role 1999, via referendum, he success- of the traditionally-independent fully orchestrated the drafting of military. The results were unmis- a new national constitution, usher- takable; under Chávez’ watchful ing in a new political era in Vene- eye, Venezuela’s constitution had zuela—one marked by the virtual become a political project aimed

90 The Journal of International Security Affairs Venezuela: Anatomy of a Dictator at expanding the power of the state, enabled Venezuela to experience diminishing the power of civil society, some degree of economic growth and and subordinating the military to the provide for jobs with public expendi- political will of the executive. tures. Over time, however, the private sector is likely to disappear from the Social engineering economic future of the country.5 What drives Chávez’ efforts to In keeping with his view of the expand control over the Venezuelan armed forces as the backbone of social state? The answer can be found in and political revolution, Chávez has the principles of the president’s own also moved to monopolize and politi- peculiar social movement, called Boli- cize the country’s military. About 100 varianism. Named for the 19th cen- military officers were purged for trea- tury Venezuelan-born independence son while key posts were given to offi- hero Simón Bolívar, it aims to destroy cers loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution. the old oligarchy and achieve full In the wake of an abortive coup d’état in equality between classes and races. April 2002, Chávez has also overseen Even though Bolívar was a product the creation of elite parallel paramili- of the Enlightenment and philosophi- tary forces, called Bolivarian Circles cally supported republicanism, when (Circulos Bolivarianos), overwhelm- it came to Latin America, Bolívar ingly loyal to the presidency. These backed a form of government in militias are also involved in expropria- which legislative powers were relin- tions of private property and other quished to the executive as a way of social projects promoted by Chávez.6 making society more governable and Chávez has likewise turned on orderly.2 Chávez has embraced this the national media, accusing it of part of Bolívar’s complex thought engaging in anti-regime propaganda wholeheartedly. “Previous rulers have and attempting to foment a politi- sold the nation to foreign interests,” cal coup. The results have been dra- Chávez has announced. “There is no matic; according to Human Rights solution to the poverty and misery of Watch, today “journalists face physi- Latin America within the capitalistic cal violence and threats often by fer- system. To put an end to capitalism vent civilian supporters of President will take years, perhaps decades. The Chávez.”7 The recently approved “Law only way to finish off capitalism is to for Social Responsibility in Radio and replace it with socialism.”3 TV” empowers the government to He has wasted no time putting control programs broadcast between this principle into practice. Since 5:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m.8 By the same January 2003, in a policy clearly token, a recent overhaul of the coun- aimed at destroying the country’s try’s criminal code has criminalized private sector, the government has opinions “that affect public officials or halted foreign exchange sales and that bring turmoil to the collective.”9 imposed import controls. Businesses The end result of these (and have become forced to buy American other) efforts on the part of Venezu- dollars on the black market or close ela’s strongman has been the rise of down entirely.4 Assaults on private a “dual state,” in which the rule of law property have created a hostile envi- and legal institutions have gradually ronment for private economic activi- given way to unfettered power in the ties that severely affect the work hands of an increasingly unaccount- force. Only abundant oil dollars have able leader.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 91 Luis Fleischman

A Latin American guerillas linked to drug trafficking in Nasser Colombia, and allegedly has cooper- But Chávez’ ambitions do not end ated with the country’s leftist rebels to at the border. Like his inspiration, stymie that policy. Press reports sug- the explorer Simón Bolívar, Venezu- gest that the National Armed Forces ela’s president desires a unified Latin of Venezuela have entered Colombian America under a single government. territory in the past, allegedly in order Toward that end, Chávez is actively to support the Revolutionary Armed working to cobble together a new Forces of Colombia (FARC), a left- Latin American body politic—one wing guerilla group supported by the 12 modeled in his own image and with country’s drug cartels. There have Venezuela at its center. also been allegations that Chávez is Not surprisingly, Chávez has logistically and militarily supporting aligned himself with Cuba’s aging dic- the FARC with weapons purchased 13 tator, Fidel Castro. Early in his tenure, from Russia. Chávez visited Havana on a bridge- Likewise, Chávez’ ideological building mission between Caracas influence—and quite possibly his and Latin America’s last truly socialist practical assistance—has been felt state. Since returning home, in a ges- in Bolivia, where two army officials ture of goodwill, Chávez has thrown attempted to mobilize the country’s open his country’s doors to Cuban military to carry out a coup d’état doctors, teachers and other experts against the constitutional govern- in a bid to improve Venezuelan health ment of Carlos Mesa in June 2005. and education. In return, Venezuela Following the same pattern, Chávez has become a sorely-needed economic has expressed solidarity and support lifeline for Havana, much the way the for indigenous and rebellious move- Soviet Union was until the 1990s.10 ments in Peru and Ecuador. Most importantly, Chávez receives As this support for left-wing from Cuba strategic advice on how to movements suggests, Chávez is cut consolidate his power, which, accord- from the same cloth as other revolu- ing to observers, “would not be what it tionary and transnational tyrants of is without the assistance of the Cuban the 20th century. Perhaps the strong- intelligence apparatus.”11 man that Chávez most closely per- sonifies, however, is Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Like Nasser in his Chávez’ ambitions do not end at day, Chávez seeks to foment a radi- the border. Like his inspiration, cal, anti-imperialist revolution—and the explorer Simón Bolívar, to assume a position of both regional Venezuela’s president desires a and global leadership. Chávez has worked toward this unified Latin America under a goal in a number of ways. The “Bolivar- single government. ian Circles” have established chapters in many countries in Latin America Cuba is hardly the Chavista state’s and beyond in order to help spread the only regional ally. Chávez has regis- Bolivarian message. Chávez has also tered his opposition to “Plan Colom- launched a new television network, bia,” the American plan aimed at dubbed “Telesur,” modeled after al- dismantling the activities of left-wing Jazeera and intended to promote his- torical personalities such as Bolívar,

92 The Journal of International Security Affairs Venezuela: Anatomy of a Dictator

Artigas, San Martin, Che Guevara, chez, better known as “Carlos the Sandino and other role models in Latin Jackal,” calling him a “distinguished America to replace Superman, Spider- compatriot.”17 Chávez has also lauded man and other Hollywood-type char- Libya’s dictator, Muammar Qadhafi, acters.14 In other words, “TeleSur” is as a “hero” and declared that Libya likely to become an instrument of anti- (which until recently was consid- American propaganda. ered a terrorist-sponsoring state) Chávez’s internationalism has and Venezuela share the same mis- a clear economic dimension as well. sion and goals. Similar praises have Venezuela’s president has gener- been lavished upon the now-defunct ated an economic vision for Latin government of Saddam Hussein in America—one in which continen- Iraq, which Chávez characterized as tal economies would make up for a “model” for Venezuela.18 their deficiencies by complementing More recently, Chávez visited each other in a sort of “most favored Iran in July 2006 to demonstrate his nation” exchange system that avoids support for the Islamic Republic’s “monetarism” and the need for credit opposition to the West—and to agi- from international financial bodies.15 tate for confrontation with the United Moreover, Chávez talks about the States. “Let’s save the human race, creation of a Latin American Central let’s finish off the U.S. empire,” Bank or Federal Reserve (to be called Chávez is reported as having told Ira- “BancoSur”) to develop indepen- nian leaders.19 Under the veil of tech- dence from the International Mon- nological cooperation with Tehran, etary Fund. Another project, dubbed Chávez may even be seeking nuclear “PetroAmerica,“ seeks to integrate weapons. As part of a deal signed state-owned oil companies in Latin between Venezuela and Iran in March America and the Caribbean so that 2006, the two countries established a they can jointly invest in exploration, $200 million development fund and use and trade of oil and natural gas. signed bilateral deals to build homes The basic premise is that all of them and exploit petroleum. The Venezu- together form a powerful unified bloc elan opposition raised the possibility capable of dealing with the develop- that the deal could involve the trans- ment of energy production.16 fer to Iran of Venezuelan uranium.20 And in a confirmation of the solidarity The enemy of my enemy between Tehran and Caracas, Chávez These policies have made Chávez has threatened to respond to interna- a natural adversary of the United tional sanctions against the Islamic States. His anti-American rhetoric is Republic over its nuclear program by hate-filled, loud and often delirious. providing Iran with embargoed petro- The reasons may be ideologi- leum products, and perhaps even by cal, but they are also practical. Anti- choking off gasoline exports to the Americanism generates solidarity United States. with other regions of the world that Which brings us to energy. As share the same antipathy. part of Venezuela’s plan to reduce This particular obsession has led American power, the Chávez govern- Chávez to make some strange bedfel- ment has signed agreements with lows. Early in his presidency, Chávez China and India, and has been dra- reportedly wrote a personal letter to matically increasing the oil supplies master terrorist Illich Ramirez San- to these countries at the expense of

The Journal of International Security Affairs 93 Luis Fleischman

U.S. customers.21 According to oil Marcos Ferreira, a former director analyst Roger Tissot, Venezuela wants of the Venezuelan National Guard’s to reduce dependence on the U.S. in border control, the Chávez govern- order to position itself in the world’s ment has issued false identities and fastest growing markets.22 But this Venezuelan passports to a large is not merely an economic decision. number of terrorist operatives.25 And Rather, it is driven by a clear politi- news investigations have found that cal objective: to increase Venezuela’s Middle Eastern terrorist groups— international influence at the expense among them Hamas, Hezbollah, and of the United States. Gama’a Islamiyya—“are operating Chávez, moreover, is positioned support cells in Venezuela and other to accomplish just that. According locations in the Andean region.”26 to a recent study by the U.S. Govern- Moreover, constitutional changes ment Accountability Office (GAO), made on Chávez’ watch have actually a 6-month disruption of crude from encouraged such complicity. Under Venezuela “would result in a signifi- the country’s 1999 constitution, a cant increase in crude oil prices and Venezuelan citizen can now simul- lead to a reduction of up to $23 billion taneously hold two passports—a in U.S. gross domestic product.” The loophole that observers say Middle report also states that, while a short- Easterners with ties to terrorism have term reduction would be manageable begun to exploit.27 Indeed, investiga- for the U.S. economy, long-term curbs tions by U.S. News & World Report on Venezuelan oil production and and the Miami Herald have found exports should be “a concern for U.S. that the Chávez regime has provided security, especially in light of current nationality documents to foreigners tight supply and demand conditions from countries such as Syria, Paki- in the world market.”23 stan, Egypt and Lebanon, as well as to supporters from Saddam Hussein’s Terror central ousted regime in Iraq.28 Back in 2003, General James The goals of these activities? A Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern show of solidarity with third-world Command, highlighted that a number radicals, as well as the formation of of Islamic terrorist groups were active a sort of “foreign legion” that could in the area of Isla Margarita (Mar- protect the Chavista state against for- garita Island), a tourist destination eign threats, and potentially internal and mountainous tropical Caribbean dissent as well. Island located off the north shore of Venezuela. Hill stated then that Worse to come Islamic terrorist cells extended from Under Hugo Chávez, Venezuela Trinidad and Tobago (a country with a has become more than just a repres- high Muslim population) to Margarita sive regime. Caracas today is a revo- Island and that they represent a stra- lutionary state, with enemies both tegic danger to the United States.24 foreign and domestic. And its ability Hill’s warning highlights a trou- to harm the country that it sees as its bling fact: Venezuela under Chávez chief adversary—the United States— has become a safe haven and launch- is on the rise. ing pad for radical Islamist activities On the energy front, Chávez is in the Western Hemisphere. Accord- pursuing politically-motivated poli- ing to none other than General cies that favor foreign nations such

94 The Journal of International Security Affairs Venezuela: Anatomy of a Dictator as China and India at the expense 29, 2005. of the U.S., and doing so despite the 11. Marifelli Perez-Stable, deputy director of the Interamerican Dialogue, as cited in Chirino, fact that they are not economically “Venezuela y Cuba Como Referencia.” prudent. Meanwhile, his grandiose 12. “Confirman que Guardia Venezolan Incur- plans for regional unity—to say noth- siono en Territorio Colombiano,” El Univer- ing of his attempts to influence the sal (Caracas), October 25, 2000; “Gobierno Nacional Niega Incursiones a Territorio domestic politics of his neighbors— Colombiano,” El Universal (Caracas), Janu- speak to a serious quest for regional ary 4, 2004. power. Chávez has also emerged as 13. “FARC Solicitaron a Chávez Suministro de a staunch ally of America’s greatest Armas en 2000,” El Universal (Caracas), January 20, 2004; “Analistas Temen Que Middle Eastern adversary, Iran, and Chávez De Municiones a FARC,” El Univer- as a supporter of terrorists seeking sal (Caracas), February 16, 2005. to harm regional stability and the 14. “La TV en ‘Estado’ Febril,” La Nacion United States. (Buenos Aires), July 24, 2005. 15. See, for example, Ali Rodriguez, PetroAmer- As these moves indicate, Venezu- ica vs. ALCA (Buenos Aires: Capital Intel- ela today is fast emerging as the most lectual S.A., 2004). dangerous player in the Western 16. PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez, as cited Hemisphere. If it is successful in its in Samuel Blixen, Chávez: 48 Horas en la Vida de Hugo Chávez (Montevideo: Edicio- efforts, the regime in Caracas could nes Trilce, 2005), 88. become one of the greatest strategic 17. Jorge Rueda, “Chávez: Carlos the Jackal a challenges facing the United States Good Friend,” Associated Press, June 2, in the years ahead. 2006. 18. “Chávez: A New Danger to America,” News- Max, September 21, 2001. 19. Nasser Karimi, “Hugo Chávez Receives Iran’s Highest Honor,” Associated Press, 1. Andres Benavente Urbina and Julio Alberto July 30, 2006. Cirino, La Democracia Defraudada (Buenos 20. Kelly Hearn, “Iranian Pact with Venezuela Aires: Grito Sagrado, 2005), 115-140. Stokes Fears of Uranium Sales,” Washington 2. Simón Bolívar, “An American’s Convic- Times, March 13, 2006. tions,” in John Lynch, ed., Latin American 21. “Venezuela Oil Sales to U.S Drop as Chávez Revolutions, 1808-1826: Old and New World Sends More to Asia,” Bloomberg, July 12, Origins (Norman: University of Oklahoma 2006. Press, 1994), 375-276. 22. Ibid. 3. Hugo Chávez, speech at Palacio Municipal, 23. United States Government Accountability Montevideo, Uruguay, March 2, 2005. Office, Energy Security: Issues Related to 4. Lowel Fleischer, “Political Troubles Plague Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Pro- Venezuela,” americandiplomacy.org, April duction (GAO-06-668), Report for the Chair- 18, 2003. man, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 5. Pedro. A. Palma, “Venezuela’s Economy: Senate, June 2006, 2. Problems Ahead,” Latin Business Chronicle, 24. General James Hill, as cited in El Nacional June 12, 2006. (Caracas), June 4, 2003. 6. Wladen Bello, “Militares Radicales en Ven- 25. As cited in Martin Arostegui, “Venezu- ezuela: Cual es su Relevancia para el Resto ela, Tierra Fertil para el Terrorismo,” Vida de los Paises en Desarrollo,” Focus on the Latina, November 2003. Global South (Bangkok), March, 15, 2006. 26. Linda Robinson, “Terror Close to Home,” 7. Daily International News Review, May 22, U.S. News & World Report, October 6, 2003. 2003. 27. Ibid.; see also “Chávez Protege a Terroristas 8. Asdrubal Aguiar, “La Revolucion Bolivari- Arabes y Narcoguerrilleros Colombianos,” ana al Descubierto,” Working Paper, April militaresdemocraticos.com, December 28, 2005 (in author’s possession). 2002, http://www.militaresdemocraticos. 9. Ibid., 6. com/denuncias/sp/20021228-17.html. 10. See Juan Forero, “Cuba Perks Up as Venezu- 28. Robinson, “Terror Close to Home”; Phil ela Foils Embargo,” New York Times, August Gunson, “Two Radicals to Head Passport 4, 2006; see also Carlos Chirino, “Venezuela Agency,” Miami Herald, November 28, y Cuba Como Referencia,” BBC Mundo, June 2003.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 95

Future Terrorism Mutant Jihads

Walid Phares

he strategic decision to carry out 9/11 was made in the early 1990s, almost ten years before the barbaric attacks on New York and Wash- Tington took place. The decade-long preparations—and the testing of America’s defenses and political tolerance to terrorism that took place before September 11th—were a stage in the much longer modern history of the jihadist movement that produced al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers. Decades from now, historians will discover that the United States, the West and the international community were being targeted by a global ideologi- cal movement which emerged in the 1920s, survived World War II and the Cold War, and carefully chose the timing of its onslaught against democracy.

Undoubtedly, the issue that policy planners and government leaders need to address with greatest urgency, and which the American public is most con- cerned about, is the future shape of the terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies. Yet developments since 2001, both at home and overseas, have shown that terror threats in general—and the jihadi menace in particular— remain at the same time resilient and poorly understood.

Defining the war The jihadi war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War—and the struggle against the United States and some of its allies thereafter—are all part of a single continuum. Over time, jihadi Salafists and Khomeinist radicals alike

Dr. Walid Phares is Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democ- racies, and author of Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America (Pal- grave/St. Martin, 2005). He is also a Professor of Middle East Studies at Florida Atlantic University. Walid Phares

have become proficient in selecting than radical Islamist dogma. All their objectives and infiltrating tar- non-Islamist governments must be gets. Indeed, an analysis of the secu- brought down, and pure, pious ones rity failures that made 9/11 possible erected in their stead. Global jihad- clearly demonstrates that the hijack- ism, in its Salafi-Wahhabi form, is ers exploited systemic malfunctions ideologically at war with the rest of at the national security level. the world. The conflict is universal Learning these lessons is essen- in nature. It encompasses the entire tial for better counterterrorism plan- West, not just the United States and ning in the future. But the jihadists Europe. Russia, India, and at some are also learning, and the advantage point even China, in addition to mod- will go to the side which can adapt erate Muslim governments, must be most quickly. If the jihadists learn brought down. Like no other docu- to understand and anticipate their ment to date, Bin Laden’s speech opponents, their tactics and strate- outlines the final fantasy of the jihadi gies will mutate. mind: world domination. The second branch of jihadism The jihadists are also learning, is smaller, and concentrated in the and the advantage will go hands of a single regime: the Islamic to the side which can adapt Republic of Iran. Since its inception, Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution has most quickly. seen itself as universal in nature. And today, flush with oil dividends, The first strain of mutating it is rapidly expanding its influence Islamist ideology is that of al-Qaeda in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and its affiliates. In his now-historic and Afghanistan. Similar to its Salafi April 2006 speech, Osama Bin Laden counterpart, the Khomeinist world- confirmed his commitment to global, view seeks to erect Islamist regimes, total and uncompromising jihad. “It is launch radical organizations and a duty for the Umma with all its cat- expand its ideology. But unlike in egories, men, women and youths, to Wahhabism, the chain of command give away themselves, their money, is narrow and tightly controlled; experiences and all types of material Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah support, enough [to establish jihad Ali Khamenei, is the unquestioned in the fields of jihad] particularly in ideological head, while Iran’s radical Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan, president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Kashmir and Chechnya,” Bin Laden decides the time, place and scope of has maintained. “Jihad today is an the battles. imperative for every Muslim. The Umma will commit sin if it did not Future battlefields provide adequate material support By understanding the objec- for jihad.”1 tives of these forces, it is possible to Bin Laden’s latest risala (mes- extrapolate some theaters of likely sage) is as important as his initial confrontation in the years ahead. declarations of war and of mobiliza- tion, laying out his most compre- Iraq hensive vision so far. As this “world Today, U.S.-led forces in Iraq declaration” makes clear, the global are battling al-Qaeda and other Salafi agenda accepts no truth other Salafi forces in the so-called “Sunni

98 The Journal of International Security Affairs Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads

Triangle.” In the south, meanwhile, centrated in Pakistan. So far, Paki- Coalition forces have engaged Ira- stan’s radical Islamists have been able nian-supported militias, such as to block their government from taking Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army. U.S. back control of the country’s western and Iraqi forces will continue to battle tribal areas and uprooting the funda- on both of these fronts, in Iraq’s center mentalist organizations in its east. and south. The Salafi strategy will But potentially even more dangerous center on classical terrorist attacks, is the possibility that jihadists could while Iranian-supported forces are take control of Pakistan’s nuclear likely to attempt to infiltrate and arsenal. In this context, the most seri- take control of Iraqi forces. U.S.-Iraqi ous threat to the United States would counterterrorism cooperation will be the collapse of the Musharraf gov- continue to expand, but a decisive vic- ernment and the Pakistani military at tory for Baghdad cannot take place the hands of radical Islamists. Should before Iranian and Syrian interfer- this happen, the U.S. would be under ence has receded—and that will not direct nuclear threat from a nuclear- happen until both of those regimes armed al-Qaeda regime—one that are weakened from the inside. Hence, would have tremendous control over American support for democratic and many other Muslim countries. opposition forces in Syria (and by extension Lebanon) and Iran is the Asia surest way to ensure success in Iraq. A major shift in south Asia will not only impact Afghanistan and Pak- Afghanistan istan, but is likely to spill over into The consolidation of the Karzai Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, government in Kabul is essential to and the southern Philippines, with American strategy, both as a bridge ripple effects on U.S. allies Australia, to a younger generation of Afghans Thailand, and India. The U.S. will be and as a counterweight to the appeal deeply and adversely affected by the of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is committed expansion of jihadism in Asia. to preventing such a development. It has a vested interest in causing the country’s post-Taliban government to The most serious threat to fail, and in preventing a new genera- the United States would be tion of citizens from being exposed the collapse of the Musharraf to non-Salafi teachings. U.S. and NATO forces therefore face a long- government and the Pakistani term struggle against jihadists in that military at the hands of radical country, both on the military and Islamists. Should this happen, the socio-cultural level. Sustaining the U.S. would be under direct engagement there will depend on two factors: American public support, and nuclear threat from a nuclear- the outcome of the struggle between armed al-Qaeda regime—one fundamentalists and the government that would have tremendous currently taking place in Pakistan. control over many other Pakistan Muslim countries. Many of the components of the worldwide war with jihadism are con-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 99 Walid Phares

Iran Lebanon While the Salafi threat is likely to Since the 1970s, Lebanon has extend east into Asia, Khomeinism is been a key battlefield between the likely to expand westward, from Iran forces of terror and the West. The to southern Lebanon via Iraq’s Shi’ite country houses a dense conglomera- areas and Syria’s Alawite-dominated tion of anti-democratic forces, rang- regime. Since its inception, the radi- ing from Hezbollah to pro-Syrian cal regime in Tehran has had a vision groups to extreme Salafists. Since of itself as a great power, and conse- the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine quently perceives itself to be on a col- barracks, the United States has lision course with the “Great Satan”: altered its strategy toward Lebanon the United States. The imperial vision several times, but today, Washington of a Shi’a Crescent from Afghanistan finds itself forced to contain a rising to the Mediterranean held by Iran’s Hezbollah and support a struggling leaders mirrors the Sunni Caliphate “Cedar Revolution.” envisioned by al-Qaeda and its fol- lowers—albeit one with a modern Sudan and the Horn of Africa twist: nuclear weapons. Bolstered All the indications suggest that by its partnership with Syria and the al-Qaeda is planning to open a new strength of its proxy force in Leba- battlefield in Africa. In the speeches non, Tehran today envisions a global of Bin Laden and other Islamist lead- confrontation with the United States. ers, Sudan represents a central arena As such, the Iranian regime repre- of confrontation with the infidels, sents a cardinal threat to democra- and a major launching pad for world cies in the region and, by extension, jihad. The jihadists aim to thwart the to the United States. international community in Darfur and reignite a holy war in southern Syria Sudan. In addition, fundamental- Ever since Hafez al-Assad chose ists are expanding their influence to permit Iran to expand its influence in Somalia, and conspiring against in Lebanon, a Syrian-Iranian axis U.S. ally Ethiopia. Here again, the has existed in the region.2 During U.S. and other democracies find the Cold War, Damascus was able to themselves on a collision course with outmaneuver the U.S. on a number radical Islamists, even though inter- of fronts, chief among them Leba- national engagement in Africa today non. By 1990, the latter had been is essentially limited to humanitarian abandoned by Washington to Syria. assistance. The Ba’athist domination of Leba- non, in turn, led to the ascendance Europe of Hezbollah. But America’s post- With the Madrid and London 9/11 volte-face brought the dangers attacks, the many plots foiled in Great of Syrian-occupied Lebanon into Britain, France, Germany and Italy, sharp focus. By 2005, Syria had been the violence in the Netherlands and forced out of Lebanon, but Bashar al- Scandinavia, the French “intifada” Assad remains defiant. Today, in the and the “Cartoon Jihad,” Europe has aftermath of Hezbollah’s war with well and truly become the next battle- Israel, Syria, like Iran, finds itself field. Transatlantic cooperation could hurtling toward confrontation with give way to tensions between America the United States. and its European partners, as Euro-

100 The Journal of International Security Affairs Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads pean jihadis become a danger to the meanwhile, both al-Qaeda and Hez- United States. Indeed, jihadi penetra- bollah have successfully put down tion of Europe, particularly Western roots in the Andes and the Tri-Border Europe, is expected to facilitate the Region between Brazil, Paraguay and infiltration of North America. Argentina. With the long and porous Mexican-American border a major Russia vulnerability, another future threat to Since the 2002 Moscow theater the U.S. is brewing to its south. hostage-taking and the subsequent Beslan school massacre, jihadism While Moscow has confronted has engulfed Russia. Wahhabism fundamentalists at home head-on, has already taken hold in Russia’s southern provinces, and jihadists are it nonetheless pursues a policy of thinking beyond Chechnya, toward support for Iran and Syria—and, the dismemberment of the Russian by extension, Hezbollah. In doing Federation. Russian strategy, for its part, has been peculiar; while so, Russia’s foreign policy has Moscow has confronted fundamen- become antithetical to its own talists at home head-on, it nonethe- national security. less pursues a policy of support for Iran and Syria—and, by extension, Canada Hezbollah. In doing so, Russia’s for- Finally, American security is eign policy has become antithetical also at risk from the north. Not only to its own national security. The U.S. is Canada considered a passageway and Russia have a solid basis for col- by which international terrorists can laboration against international ter- enter the United States, it has also rorism, but unless Moscow abandons become a site for the proliferation of its tolerance of Tehran’s radicalism, jihadi groups. The arrests made in the two countries will miss a strate- Toronto in the summer of 2006, and gic opportunity to defeat world terror the coordination between U.S.-born in this decade. radicals and their Canadian “broth- ers,” are signs of a new era—one in Latin America which Islamists view the United States While the Soviet legacy has and Canada as one strategic arena for mostly dissipated in Latin America, operations. Washington therefore with Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba will increasingly need to coordinate the last ailing vestige of the Cold its counterterrorism strategies with War, it has taken just one decade for its northern neighbor, despite the dif- new threats to emerge. The populist ferences in political culture, institu- regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela tions and attitudes. not only poses a challenge to liberal democracies in the region, it also serves as a conduit for foreign jihadi The home front threats. With an alliance with Iran in For the United States, winning the making and with an al-Qaeda and the War on Terror depends on two bat- Hezbollah presence in the country, tlefields. The first is overseas, where Venezuela is facilitating the activities Washington must confront jihadi of a network of forces inimical to U.S. forces and help allies to win their interests. Deeper in the continent, own struggles with terrorism. This

The Journal of International Security Affairs 101 Walid Phares will require the United States to sup- port democratic change abroad, both 1. “Transcript: Bin Laden Accuses West,” Al- Jazeera (Doha), April 24, 2006, http://english. as a counterweight to jihadist lobbies aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F9694745-060C- and as a means of assisting Arab and 419C-8523-2E093B7B807D.htm. Muslim democrats to win the conflict 2. For a comprehensive analysis of this alli- within their own societies. ance, see Walid Phares, “The Syrian-Iran Axis,” Global Affairs VII, no. 3 (1992), 83- The second, however, is closer 86. to home. Homeland security plan- ners must be thinking seriously about a duo of unsettling questions. First, are jihadists already in posses- sion of unconventional weapons on American soil, and how can the U.S. government deter them? This crucial issue tops all other challenges, for a terrorist nuclear strike on the U.S. has the potential to transform inter- national relations as we know them. Second, how deeply have jihadist elements infiltrated the U.S. govern- ment and federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Secu- rity, the Department of Defense, and various military commands, either through sympathizers or via actual operatives? As the recent scandal over the National Security Agency’s domes- tic surveillance program has shown, the answers are fraught with compli- cations. Five years into the War on Terror, the U.S. has not fully made the transition from the pre-9/11 legal counterterrorism framework to one based on intelligence, prevention and robust police action. And, without a national consensus about the serious- ness of the jihadi threat, America will lose its own war of ideas. The future enemies of the United States will be a mutation of current and past terrorist foes. In confronting these forces, knowledge of their ide- ologies, objectives and determination will make all the difference.

102 The Journal of International Security Affairs Response

A Dose of Realism on Russia Nikolas K. Gvosdev

would like to thank Professor Blank for his thoughtful com- ments and reasoned propositions (“The Great Russia Debate,” I Spring 2006). All too often, the “Russia debate” is characterized by personal attacks and ad hominem arguments. However, not sur- prisingly, I do disagree with a number of points raised in his essay.

First, let me object to the characterization of the “realist approach” as “one of expediency.” Expediency is a loaded term, implying a lack of principles or consistency in one’s approach to policy. Expediency as a guiding principle in foreign affairs fails Hans Morgenthau’s own test that “a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.” It is in that spirit of morality and practicality that contemporary American realists assess policy towards Russia. One failing in the U.S. debate over “what to do about” Russia is to confuse realistic assessments with desired preferences. Stephen Blank and others have a long list of very legitimate grievances about the way in which Russia is gov- erned and how it conducts its foreign policy. Most American realists likewise have profound disagreements with many actions taken by Putin. But structur- ing the Russia debate around a clash between “Putin apologists” and his critics is counterproductive. My 2004 National Interest article, “The Sources of Russian Conduct,” did not argue that developments in Russia were our ideal preferences, but rather posed the question: “Yet even with all these disappointments, is this a

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is Editor of The National Interest. Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Russia with which we can live?” enjoy these liberties. Yes, there are One component of a rational, no guarantees, but the East Asian realist foreign policy is being able experience indicates that managed to draw a distinction between one’s pluralist systems have better odds preferences and one’s priorities. This at transitioning to long-term, stable is why, in answering the question I democracy than the repetitive cycle posed, I noted, “If Eurasia were the of democratic revolutions, coups and only item on the agenda, things might dictatorships that have characterized be different. But it isn’t. 9/11 made democratization attempts in Latin sure of that.” America and Africa. And despite Western support, lib- Russia needs time, continued eral democratic forces have steadily economic growth and further lost ground in Russia since the 1993 Duma elections. The 2005 Moscow development of its civil society city elections should have been a before it can sustain developed wake-up call. The liberals tried to democracy. Under those make this ballot a “referendum” on conditions, managed pluralism democracy, yet, in the richest, freest, most liberal, best-educated city in seems preferable to an the country, under conditions far less outright dictatorship of either onerous than those in 1990, when the red or the brown variety. the demokraty were swept into power, these forces received just one-fifth Let’s take the discussion about of the vote. It was not a particularly the Putin regime. Throughout this ringing endorsement of the notion essay, Blank seems to work from that liberals are waiting in the wings, the assumption that we have a viable lacking only sufficient encourage- choice between Putin’s managed plu- ment from Washington. ralism/soft authoritarianism and full- We must also avoid falling into fledged, developed liberal democracy. the trap that being in political oppo- I disagree. My so-called “ringing sition to Putin makes one a liberal endorsement” for managed pluralism democrat. At the “Drugaya Ros- is based on my assessment—shared siya” (Alternative Russia) confer- by noted Russian scholars and politi- ence held prior to the G-8 summit cal liberals like Dimitri Trenin and in St. Petersburg, plenty of criti- Mark Urnov—that Russia needs cism of the Kremlin was heard from time, continued economic growth anti-democratic and anti-American and further development of its civil political movements, such as Viktor society before it can sustain devel- Anpilov’s revolutionary communists oped democracy. Under those con- and Eduard Limonov’s neo-fascist ditions, managed pluralism seems National Bolsheviks. preferable to an outright dictatorship Similarly, we should not confuse of either the red or the brown vari- apples and oranges. From the U.S., ety. It is also, in my opinion, better British or German perspective, the than the chaotic and unsuitable Putin government is indeed “dys- pseudo-democracies of the Yeltsin functional” and unable to address for type which in abstract terms might the longterm the “most urgent chal- be freer but leave the bulk of the pop- lenges to Russian society.” But com- ulation with no ability to exercise or pared to Yeltsin’s pseudo-democracy

104 The Journal of International Security Affairs A Dose of Realism on Russia of the 1990s or Gorbachev’s failed prepared to undertake the massive perestroika of the 1980s, the Putin effort to displace Russia as Eurasia’s regime has been quite successful at economic and political center of slowing, halting and even reversing gravity.” This, however, is the very some of the most damaging trends. crux of the debate. Yet he provides Most Russians today have no diffi- no answer at all. culty in answering the question, “Are If he disagrees with my assess- you better off today than you were ment, there are two possible eight years ago?” with a resounding responses. The first is that it won’t affirmative. This, in turn, helps to take a massive effort at all, only a explain the continued support Putin relatively minor one on our part. But enjoys—including, significantly, a I think that the Kremlin called our high approval rating among the 18- bluff—in a very ham-handed, clumsy to 24-year-old demographic, Russia’s way—when it terminated a preferen- first post-Soviet generation. tial price for Ukrainian consumption Blank also glosses over the of its natural gas and demanded an very real challenge of how to move immediate shift to the world market a society from embracing authoritar- price. Against U.S. aid of $174 million ian solutions that provide short-term to Ukraine in 2005 stood a Russian stability and a modicum of prosper- natural gas subsidy of $3 billion— ity to a more open, pluralistic and slack the West was unprepared to law-governed country that guaran- take up. tees much greater amounts of peace and prosperity for the longterm (a Realists don’t assume that subject extensively examined by the forces of history will Ian Bremmer, president of the Eur- asia Group, in his forthcoming work automatically produce a better The J Curve: A New Way to Under- alternative, if only we encourage stand Why Nations Rise and Fall, and the Putin regime to go. Those whose prescriptions for Russia are strikingly different than those put who do are under an obligation forward by Blank). to present real evidence Blank dismisses Anatol Lieven’s supporting this contention. admonition, “If Putin weren’t there we’d soon miss him,” but never Fine, then, the second response answers Lieven’s challenge: “Putin is that the West is now, or soon will may be an uncomfortable partner, be, prepared to undertake this effort. but the West is unlikely to get a better There is no evidence of this so far. Let’s one.” Realists don’t assume that the again take the case of Ukraine. I wrote forces of history will automatically in the November 26, 2004, issue of the produce a better alternative, if only International Herald Tribune that if the we encourage the Putin regime to go. Orange Revolution were to succeed, a Those who do are under an obligation Yushchenko government “would have to present real evidence supporting to demonstrate that [its] westward-ori- this contention. ented policies would generate results. What about the Russian role in And here the United States and the the Eurasian space? Blank cites with European Union would have to lay disapproval my comment that “nei- down clear benchmarks for facilitat- ther the United States nor Europe is ing Ukraine’s closer integration with

The Journal of International Security Affairs 105 Nikolas K. Gvosdev

the Euro-Atlantic world—and be pre- recognition of the reality of Russia’s pared to commit real resources. Even political and economic dominance in if European leaders hold out the pros- the region—is “music to more than a pect of EU membership decades in the few Russian ears.” Actually, it is not. future, there is no reason that tangible American realists call for continued benefits cannot be offered now—such U.S. engagement in the Eurasian as a free-trade agreement, or a guest space, not total and complete with- worker regime that allows Ukrainians drawal altogether, which is the real to live and work legally in Europe or in Russian preference. I argued in 2004 the United States.” None of this hap- that “the United States can under- pened. And even talk about eventu- take a targeted, limited and success- ally offering Ukraine a Membership ful intervention into the Eurasian Action Plan for NATO is no substitute space and obtain Russian acquies- for concrete aid. Why are we sur- cence.” This is a far cry from engag- prised, therefore, at the outcomes of ing in wholesale transformation of the 2006 Ukrainian elections? the region, and there should be no illusions about what we can achieve. Given our commitments Given our commitments elsewhere, our goal ought to be to strengthen the elsewhere, the goal of the states of the periphery to give them a United States ought to be greater degree of independence and to strengthen the states of leverage vis-à-vis Russia, rather than the periphery to give them a to hold out quite unrealistic expec- tations that the West is prepared to greater degree of independence break them out of the Russian sphere and leverage vis-a-vis Russia, of influence altogether—or support rather than to hold out quite them against Moscow in violent con- flicts where the U.S. has little or noth- unrealistic expectations that ing at stake. the West is prepared to break Let me now turn to the case for them out of the Russian sphere (Russian) democracy. A consistent altogether—or support them point that is raised is that “how Russia governs itself decisively shapes its against Moscow in violent foreign policy,” and that a long list conflicts where the U.S. has of less than desirable policy choices little or northing at stake. made by the Russian government is directly connected to Putin’s soft If fundamentally changing the authoritarianism—the implication geopolitical and geo-economic ori- being that a more democratic Rus- entations of the states surround- sian government would make funda- ing Russia is a task that the West is mentally different choices. unable and unwilling to undertake— I see no evidence for this con- and Blank and others offer nothing clusion. As I wrote in the Los Angeles to challenge this assessment—then Times this past May, “It is difficult to why are realists taken to task for their conceive of any Putin foreign policy stance that the job of government is decision of the last several years to shape policy to what is achievable? that would have been reversed by Blank argues that the Ameri- a more democratically accountable can realist position—starting from a Russian government”—a statement

106 The Journal of International Security Affairs A Dose of Realism on Russia based on careful assessment of I subscribe to the old Russian opinion polls and what Russians say proverb that “if you chase after two and write about foreign policy. Note different rabbits at the same time, here a deliberate choice of words: you’ll catch neither.” This is why I democratically accountable Russian do not have much faith in proposals government. It is very easy to find that argue that the United States can in Russia politicians and movements somehow actively engage in opposi- that use the label “democratic,” and tion to the Putin regime while at the who espouse domestic and foreign same time securing Russian coop- policy prescriptions that would eration on matters of vital impor- meet with our enthusiastic approval. tance to Washington. At some point, But this does not mean that they a decision has to be made—to over- could win elections or govern with look the blemishes in favor of coop- a mandate from the people. How do eration, or to conclude that the costs we get around data that suggests of engagement outweigh what might that 60 percent of Russians see the be obtained. United States as having a negative In the case of Pakistan, for influence in the world and more example, we are prepared to live with than half believe that the U.S. is Pervez Musharraf’s version of “man- unfriendly to Russia? aged pluralism,” not only because of Surely events in the Middle East the benefits the U.S. receives (espe- and Latin America have disabused cially in the War on Terror) but also us of the notion that free and fair because we understand that what elections automatically produce pro- might replace this unelected general American governments! Democracy would be far worse, not only for U.S. is not the antidote to an anti-American interests but also for the promotion of and anti-Western policy orientation our values. Does this stance irritate in Russia (or anywhere else); I still Pakistani democrats and their U.S. believe Thucydides was right when supporters? Most certainly. Yet I have he argued that “identity of interests is no doubt that this course of action is the surest of bonds whether between both prudent and moral. states or individuals.” Blank says simply, “[S]ound But what about values? Ameri- leadership can and should endeavor can realists have never argued that to overcome and reconcile those questions about democratic gover- tensions.” My apologies, but that is nance cannot be raised; no one I am a wholly insufficient response. This aware of has advocated what Blank provides no operational guidance terms a “policy of silence.” What we whatsoever. It is just like General have consistently maintained, how- Wesley Clark’s stump speech in the ever, is that democracy promotion run-up to the 2004 presidential pri- cannot be placed at the center of the maries where he would claim that U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Bush if he were president, he would have administration has opened itself up to captured Osama bin Laden by now— charges of hypocrisy, but not because empty words! of what the realists have advocated. Is the Bush/Cheney tack of Vice President Dick Cheney’s con- this past year an example of this trasting Vilnius and Astana speeches “sound leadership?” I attended the this spring were more than sufficient G-8 summit in St. Petersburg as an in that department. observer. I saw nothing that indi-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 107 Nikolas K. Gvosdev cated any sort of “reconciliation” resources and capacities in uphold- between these tensions in a way that ing our existing global responsibili- concretely advanced both U.S. inter- ties? Sure, a more democratic and ests and U.S. values. Instead, this friendly Russia would be wonderful. so-called “selective cooperation” But a more confrontational approach approach has alienated and even irri- with Russia can only be justified if this tated the Putin government without clearly serves the vital interests—not doing much to strengthen the cause the hopes and dreams—of the United of liberal democracy in Russia. It has States. undermined efforts to enlist more Let the debate continue. active Russian support for U.S. objec- tives vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea. The United States is neither safer nor are its values on surer footing because of this muddled policy. Those who argue that we do not have to choose between our values or interests (or at least to assign priorities)—and who suggest that increased pressure on Russia both promotes our values and enhances our security—have to present compel- ling evidence that this strategy has a reasonable chance of success (or that the consequences will be minimal). Realists, of course, are being pillo- ried because they point out a number of inconvenient truths—the “democ- racy paradox” of Putin’s authoritar- ian measures enjoying broad-based public support in Russia, making the likelihood of a neat and simple “color revolution” highly unlikely; that, in the absence of the United States and the European Union extending substantial amounts of aid, Russia remains the dominant power in the region, and; that forgoing Russian assistance in dealing with a number of intractable global issues raises the costs of action higher than the Ameri- can public is willing to pay. So why such a negative response to the realist call for a businesslike relationship with Russia that pursues cooperation wherever possible and tries to manage and minimize poten- tial conflicts? Aren’t enough strains being placed both on American

108 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Calderón’s Challenge Fredo Arias-King

MEXICO CITY—Recently, former Irish prime minister John Bruton came to Mexico to speak of his country’s rags-to-riches story. In between the lines of his stories about tax, trade, lean government, and education policies lay a subtler message: countries that want to make the leap out of the third world must stop playing the victim. Regrettably, Mexico still seems a way away from heeding Bruton’s message, and may continue playing its favorite pastime. The recent re-election of the Right-Liberal National Action Party (PAN) to the presidency, however, gives hope of at least partially breaking the country’s long history of inept leadership. With nations as with individuals, incessantly alleging past abuse (real or imagined) is a way of provoking real victimization. In Mexico’s case, this sense of victimization results in defensive nationalism, which means resource protec- tionism, corporatism and cronyism, resulting in what Sovietologists call “state capture” (oligarchs neutralizing legislators, judges, media and regulators with their cash). The results are poverty and bad governance, as well as a continua- tion of Mexico’s notorious culture of dishonesty. The elites then blame Washing- ton, even as they reap the benefits. Vicente Fox was supposed to change all that after his surprise victory in 2000. But he essentially became part of the old system. Instead of breaking monopolies, challenging the growing spread of illiberalism in the Western Hemisphere or reducing bureaucracy, Fox found it more expedient to make the centerpiece of his presidency the demand (not request) that Washington legalize millions of present and future migrants, with the implicit undertone

Fredo Arias-King is a businessman and founding editor of the Washington- based Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. He served as an advisor to the Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón presidential campaigns. Dispatches that Mexico is entitled to such concessions from its abusive northern neigh- bor. While appointing former communist agitators to the foreign ministry and loyalists of nefarious former president Luis Echeverría to head the domestic security agencies, Fox openly wondered why the country had not changed for the better, instead pinning all his hopes on a deal with Washington that did not materialize. The new president-elect, Felipe Calderón, has the option of either con- tinuing with Fox’s ambivalence or of acting more in accordance with what the backbone of his party, Mexico’s entrepreneurial and middle classes, expects. Although he’s largely an enigma (it’s his first elected office), the latter scenario is perhaps the more likely—if Calderón manages to escape some Mexican cul- tural pathologies that sabotage even sincere efforts at reform. His first order of business, if he is up to the challenge, will be to encour- age the breakup of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In the short run, such a move will give Calderón’s PAN a majority in both houses of Con- gress, and facilitate the passage of some key reforms currently languishing there. But most importantly, the elimination of the PRI will establish a two- party system and force the country’s remaining political force, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), to move to the center, perhaps even becoming a liberal party. The second task facing Calderón is energy reform. Mexico could probably double its oil output and halve gasoline prices if it loosened state controls on oil, permitting private investment there as well as in energy production (only North Korea shares this prohibition). To break the stalled debate, instead of the taboo “privatization,” Calderón could speak of genuine “nationalization”—such as pro- viding half the shares of the national oil monopoly to the Mexican citizenry, with them eventually ending up in the stock market and in the hands of new (non-government) management. A third task—and one which the new president-elect openly advocates—is replacing the entire entangled and disastrous tax system with a flat tax. Such a move has done wonders for its pioneer, Estonia, under the dynamic prime min- ister Mart Laar, as well as for a slew of countries that followed (Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, etc.). Today, the high price of oil, lower debt payments and the upswing in the American economy likely mean that Mexico is on the verge of another cycle of high economic growth, after essentially zero real growth during Fox’s six years. But this is not necessarily good news. Mexico’s elites do not reform unless they absolutely have to—usually after a crisis, either economic or political. And Mexico is unlikely to face either in the coming years. All this may reduce the government’s sense of urgency to pass needed reforms, as well as prompting millions of unemployed to look northward. Though another Bruton—or another Laar—is probably too much to expect, Calderón could provide that combination of good intentions, good management and legitimacy that Mexico has rarely, if ever, seen before. Just as easily, how- ever, Mexico’s new president could turn out to be another Vicente Fox, and his term another cycle of self-victimization.

110 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Tackling the Next Pandemic Iztok Podbregar and Teodora Ivanusa

LJUBLJANA—By now, the threat of avian influenza, also known as bird flu, has receded from the headlines. But the danger posed by the disease remains very real. There still is no definitive vaccine or remedy, and experts agree that if a human-to-human transmission occurs, millions of people will die and the global economy could dip into recession. The first problem facing the international community is scientific. Bird flu is a deadly disease caused by the influenza type A virus. But, because all influ- enza viruses have the ability to change, scientists are concerned that the disease could one day mutate into a strain that could both infect humans and spread easily between people. Such antigenic shifts have happened several times over the past century: specifically, in 1918, 1957, 1968 and 1977. And, because these viruses do not commonly infect humans, there is little or no immune protection against them in the human population. Moreover, figuring out the exact muta- tion of the next avian influenza strain is bound to be difficult, and the associated degree of uncertainty makes pharmaceutical companies reluctant to produce mass stocks of drugs in advance of the flu season. The second stems from the human factor. Limiting the spread of bird flu requires controlling vaccine production, distribution and access, as well as pric- ing. It also means improving control over open corridors related to civilian air travel, and stepped-up protection of industry sectors, namely poultry, against deliberate attacks. In order to do so, we first need to identify high-risk avian influenza zones— or at least rank regions according to their risk of exposure. Second, airport surveillance should be increased in regions where the type A virus is most widespread. Closer analysis of past patterns of infection is also necessary; the first wave of the virus was recorded in Southeast Asia, infecting first poultry and later moving sporadically through the human population; the second was recorded in China. Finally by October 2005, avian influenza had reached Cen- tral Europe, with cases reported in Romania and Croatia. Additional security upgrades are thus urgently needed in airports across Southeast Asia. Medical records showing that the traveler is not infected with the flu should be required before a visa is issued to individuals living in countries where the risk of avian influenza is the highest. Because interrupting air travel indefinitely is impos- sible, the solution will have to be in better management of security along air channels and airports. Bird flu has also shed light on a very different danger—that of economic ter- rorism and organized crime. Even if we manage to escape a human pandemic in 2006/2007, the lack of coordination in response to this global threat should be reason for serious concern. For, without good government planning and proper

General Iztok Podbregar is Director of the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency and the national coordinator for the fight against terrorism. Teodora Ivanusa is assistant professor in the Veterinary Faculty at the University of Ljubljana.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 111 Dispatches oversight, pandemic diseases like the bird flu could become a boon for terrorists and organized crime syndicates alike. In fact, the upsurge in organized crime experienced by Southeast Europe this year was directly attributable in large part to the region’s failure to formu- late a coordinated policy for Tamiflu. With many seeing the drug as a remedy, demand increased exponentially as soon as the avian influenza scare engulfed Europe. But the availability of the drug, and its price, remained unregulated on the pan-European level. And with high demand, low and uncontrolled supply, the opportunity to make an extra buck by smuggling the drug across borders was soon seized upon by trans-Balkan criminal networks. The results were pre- dictable; available on the Belgrade market for 45 Euro apiece, the drug came to be sold in Italy and other EU markets for over 100 Euro per unit. Bird flu has also turned out to be a boon to the counterfeiting business. With demand for Tamiflu outpacing production, counterfeits—called “Tamiflu candies”—have flooded regional markets. This is more than just a criminal nui- sance; it is also a serious impediment to governmental response. As countries begin to formulate defenses against the bird flu, they will be forced to grapple with counterfeit “medicine” sold at cut-rate prices and, worse still, with a false sense of security among those who have already purchased what they believe to be the cure. In order to weed out organized crime from this field, governments must make three changes to their approach. The first involves public outreach; people need to be better acquainted with the Tamiflu drug, particularly with the fact that it may not be a one-stop cure. Better understanding of this reality could help stabilize market demand. Second, there is a need to better regulate the drug’s availability and pricing. As long as the alert for avian influenza remains high, governments should coordinate to keep the price of Tamiflu and other remedial drugs more or less the same. By eliminating price differences between national markets of close proximity, it is possible to decrease the incentives for criminal groups to trade Tamiflu on the black market. Finally, Tamiflu should be made more readily available. As long as demand is sky-high, more of the drug should be produced and brought to market at a controlled price in order to eliminate the attractiveness of counterfeiting. This may also be the right time to consider making a generic version of Tamiflu—a move that would simultaneously knock down the price of the drug and make it widely available, particularly in regions classified as high risk. Not least, there is a need to better guard against terrorists using the type A virus against commercial targets. Because avian influenza is typically found in birds, commercial poultry is particularly vulnerable. And if avian influenza is spread across livestock, sales will almost certainly drop. Poultry consump- tion across Europe has dropped drastically in recent months, with the sales of chicken at times dropping by more than 70 percent. This is just a foretaste of what is to come if this makeshift bio-weapon is exploited by terrorists. Such steps are crucial. Even if science fails, there is a reasonable chance that we can control the spread of avian influenza if there is a strategy in place that allows us increased surveillance over civilian air travel, livestock trade, and gives us the means to better protect key economic sectors from terrorist attacks. The only certainty is that there are no certainties, and time is running out.

112 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Back on its Feet Irakli Mchedlishvili

TBILISI—For the Republic of Georgia, a new era is dawning. Some three years after the “Rose Revolution,” Tbilisi is on the verge of real independence from Russia—and true integration with the West. But whether these trends con- tinue largely depends on what transpires in the restive regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Not long after the disintegration of the USSR and Georgia’s formal declara- tion of independence in April 1991, the country became embroiled in military conflicts with Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces. Yet, even though both regions were supported by Russia, these clashes were seen internationally as ethnic conflicts—a perception that served to diminish Western concern for Georgia’s plight and deepen Tbilisi’s isolation. Without international backing, it did not take long for the fledgling Georgian armed forces (at that point more akin to paramilitary units than a trained military) to collapse. The results were devastating. The nascent Georgian government lost con- trol of both conflict zones, and hundreds of thousands suffered. In Abkhazia alone, approximately 300,000 Georgians loyal to the central government were banished, and ten thousand were killed outright. Just as significantly, Georgia was no longer able to resist Russian political pressure, and acquiesced to mem- bership in the Russia-supported Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), at the time seen as the framework for a reconstituted Russian empire to replace the USSR. In turn, Russian military forces were deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia under CIS mandate, ostensibly as peacekeepers. The deployment—cou- pled with the ongoing presence of Russian military bases in Georgia (whose withdrawal became linked to a settlement of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts)—provided an unmistakable impression: Georgia had lost indepen- dence to Moscow once more. In the years that followed, the ramifications of Georgia’s geopolitical quan- dary became apparent. Some observers argued that Russia would play a con- structive role in their country, since it had legitimate interests in making sure that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia stimulated movement toward indepen- dence in its own North Caucasus republics. Others, however, believed Georgia had nothing in common with Russia, and perceived themselves (like Russia’s Caucasus republics) to be suffering under aggression from Moscow. The past decade has only served to validate the latter view. Georgian refu- gees remain displaced from their lands, and any attempts to remind the Russian government of its “peacekeeping” obligations results in new pressure. In 1998, for example, the Georgian government refused for a time to extend the man- date for Russia’s peacekeeping contingent—only to witness the expulsion of the remaining pro-Georgian population of Abkhazia. By and by, it has also become evident that, separated from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have drifted

Irakli Mchedlishvili is chairman of the Tbilisi-based Center for Peace and International Relations Studies, a think tank focusing on defense and security issues.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 113 Dispatches into Moscow’s geopolitical orbit—a reorientation that has included support for Russia’s war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, the past decade also saw a number of positive developments. Ten relatively peaceful years have enabled Georgia to strengthen its links with the West. Tbilisi has gained a better understanding of Western-style governance. The United States and Europe, meanwhile, have deepened their interest in the energy resources of the Caspian, and projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline have given Georgia and the South Caucasus a measure of energy inde- pendence. Georgia’s cooperation with the West has also deepened on another front. Through its participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, Geor- gia has begun a gradual transformation of its armed forces. Border security has improved as well, thanks to the U.S.-funded Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) started in 2002. Tbilisi is even on track for NATO integration pursuant to its 2004 Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the Atlantic Alliance. This transformation has profoundly changed the country’s approaches to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. From an initial reliance on Russia, Georgian offi- cials have become convinced that settlement of both situations is only possible through cooperation with the West. As a result, Tbilisi has hardened its attitudes toward Moscow, and has begun pressing for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia pursuant to the 1999 OSCE Istanbul declaration, with some success. Under the latest agreement drawn up with Moscow, Russian military forces are slated to leave Georgia completely in 2008. The next to go will be Rus- sian peacekeepers; pursuant to the latest decision of the Georgian parliament, Russian peacekeeping forces will be replaced with international peacekeeping troops in the near future. The stakes are high. If realized, these steps could mean the end of the Rus- sian era in the South Caucasus. The only thing capable of stopping this process is a new outbreak of violence in Georgia’s regions, which will provide the pretext for Russia to retain its military and peacekeeping forces in the country. Tbilisi and its Western partners, therefore, should carefully monitor this process, lest Moscow and Kremlin-supported forces find a reason to maintain their foothold.

114 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Past as Prologue Aaron Mannes

Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli: In Victory in Tripoli, Joshua How America’s War with the Barbary London tells the story of the first Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and American Middle East crisis. For cen- Shaped a Nation (Hoboken, NJ: J. W. turies, pirates based in the North Afri- Wiley and Sons, 2005), 276pp., $24.95. can states had been extorting money from European governments. Shortly after America’s independence, these Faced with a choice of appeasing hos- bandits set their sights on the United tage-taking Middle Eastern despots States as well. The resulting hostage or overturning the international order, crises and plunder finally became the United States hems and haws as so severe that the United States its prestige wanes—until finally, an was compelled to construct a navy outraged American public demands (indeed, the Barbary crisis effec- action. The European powers watch tively forced the debate towards those carefully, and maneuver to gain their who felt the new nation should have own advantage. After marginal pin- a strong navy) and launch it against prick strikes, American forces mount the Pasha of Tripoli. But the ensuing a major campaign, receive rapid capit- naval blockades and limited forays ulation, and predictably fail to press were mere pinpricks, and although their advantage. the United States enjoyed some tac- The year was 1804. tical successes, the Pasha became

Aaron Mannes is a terrorism researcher at the University of Maryland’s Information and Network Dynamics Lab, and the author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield— JINSA Press, 2004). Book Reviews even more convinced that the United between today’s troubles with the States lacked resolve. Middle East and the war with the Enter William Eaton, Revolution- Barbary pirates are unmistakable: ary War hero and former U.S. Coun- disputes between the diplomats and sel to Tunis. Eaton proposed that the the military, a perfidious role by the United States support Ahmed Qara- European powers (Britain encour- manli, the Pasha’s deposed brother, aged Barbary piracy against the in re-taking the throne. In late 1804, Americans because it kept the United Eaton traveled to Egypt, recruited States out of the valuable Mediter- Qaramanli and raised a small force, ranean trade routes), and a divisive including a single squad of eight U.S. domestic debate over the U.S. role Marines, some mercenaries, and a in the world. As such, the underlying local band of followers. He quick- lesson contained in Victory in Tripoli is marched his tiny army across the crystal clear: Middle Eastern despots desert and stormed Derna, the east- change their behavior when faced ernmost outpost of the Pasha of Trip- with overwhelming force. Precision oli’s realm, in the spring of 1805. The strikes, soft power, smart sanctions, expedition is commemorated in the and carrot and stick approaches are famous refrain in the Marine Corps not sufficient. hymn: “… to the shores of Tripoli.” But London’s book is not a policy The Pasha, after failing to retake monograph; it is a work of history. Its the city, became nervous and entered great strength is in illuminating our serious peace talks with the United present predicament by showing us States, eventually coming to terms of the past. London’s descriptions of the sorts with Washington. The United tendentious and erratic negotiation States, in turn, abandoned Derna, tactics used by the Barbary chief- spiriting out its own personnel and tains, and of the ubiquitous decay the pretender Qaramanli (who died and weakness characterizing North impoverished and exiled). African societies, could have been Victory in Tripoli is a page-turner ripped from today’s newspapers. In that moves deftly between Washing- a chilling harbinger of today’s mega- ton machinations and naval maneu- terror, London shows us how the Bar- vers in the Mediterranean. London bary pirates were forthright in citing lets this terrific story tell itself, writ- the Koran to justify their plundering ing in a lean, effective style. A bit of ways as a form of jihad. This piracy explanation about diplomatic protocol was not merely a vocation; it was a at the turn of the 19th century, some religious duty. decent maps, and perhaps a bit of To be sure, there are important background on naval warfare in the differences between the crisis of age of wooden ships (for those of us today and the war against the Bar- who don’t know a schooner from a bary pirates. The pirates were more sloop) all would have been useful— akin to contemporary international but these are merely quibbles. organized crime networks than to the Most writers would have been mass-murdering terrorists of today’s tempted to play up the parallels with Middle East. And the United States of today’s events. London, however, for 200 years ago did not have the confi- the most part has wisely resisted this dence of its own democracy to dream impulse, restricting himself to some of changing the Middle East. None- wry descriptions. But the similarities theless, the perennial issue remains

116 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews the same. Two centuries ago, as a dip- lomat in Tunis, Eaton wrote:

… there is [no] … friendship with these states, without paving the way with gold or cannon balls; and the proper question is, which method is preferable.

As we again face this criti- cal choice, a look back at the first American crisis in the Middle East has become increasingly valuable. London has done a great service in telling this tale, and telling it well.

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The Journal of International Security Affairs 117

Book Reviews

The Palestinians’ Best Battalion Eric Rozenman

Stephanie Gutmann, The Other War: 2000−2005 Palestinian terror war Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle against Israel known as the “al Aqsa for Media Supremacy (San Francisco: intifada”? Gutmann quotes then Jeru- Encounter Books, 2005), 271 pp., $25.95. salem Post editor-in-chief Bret Ste- phens: “The norm tends to be one of strict factual accuracy and rou- The Palestinian Arabs—poor, dis- tine contextual dishonesty.” And she possessed, yet bravely struggling provides plenty of examples of such to regain their rights. The Israe- media malpractice, both glaring and lis—rich, occupiers, and thanks to subtle. American aid, able to suppress the One is the infamous Mohammad Palestinians. Stephanie Gutmann’s al-Dura story: the deliberate killing, The Other War provides a timely, after 45 minutes of shooting, of a 12- informative and entertaining review year-old Palestinian Arab boy and the of how much of the foreign press wounding of his father, ostensibly by corps reporting from Israel repeat- Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. The edly presents variations on the above taped image became a world-wide themes, broadcasting and publish- anti-Israel icon. It worked its way into ing a two-dimensional morality play a speech by Osama bin Laden and in which key attributes and actions reappeared as implied justification of the lead characters—who’s really in the videotaped beheading in Paki- intransigent, who wants to be accom- stan of Wall Street Journal reporter modating, who’s the aggressor, who Daniel Pearl. Yet as Gutmann notes, the defender—are switched. this image-seen-round-the-world was A former reporter for the Los shot by only one of the many news Angeles Times and New York Post cameramen on the scene that day, a and freelancer for numerous other Palestinian stringer for France TV 2. publications, ranging from The New Bureau chief Charles Enderlin, who York Times to Playboy, Guttman is was not present, nevertheless added no stranger to controversy. Her year a dramatic voice-over. TV 2 made 2000 book, The Kinder, Gentler Mili- the tape available to others and “a tary, took on the corrosive culture of number of reporters told the story in political correctness that she charged vivid terms as if they had been there has progressively eroded the effec- themselves.” “Mainstream” Palestin- tiveness of the U.S. military. The Other ian spokesman obligingly accused War should prove provocative, too. Israel of “premeditated murder.” Just what was the problem with The often media-clumsy Israe- reporting in the early years of the lis initially allowed that they might

Eric Rozenman is Washington director of CAMERA, the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, and contributes an occasional column on news media coverage of the Middle East to AMIT magazine. Any opinions expressed above are solely those of the author.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 119 Book Reviews accidentally have shot the boy and 2002, Israel launched “Operation his father in a crossfire with Arab Defensive Shield,” reasserting con- gunmen. But a belated Israeli re- trol over West Bank Arab population enactment and a number of journal- centers. These included Jenin and its istic investigations cast doubt on the adjacent refugee camp. In nine days al-Dura “story.” They suggest that, if of house-to-house fighting, 56 Pales- a child was shot at all at the Netzrim tinians, nearly all of them gunmen, crossing that day, he was hit by Pales- and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed. tinian fire, and perhaps not acciden- Several blocks of the camp—really a tally. But here the major media did permanent, if poor, neighborhood— not follow. Their original “story” fit were largely destroyed. preconceptions of victimized Pales- But early press accounts, includ- tinians, victimizing Israelis. ing those in The New York Times, The Ramallah lynching is Washington Post, France’s influential another case in point. Thirteen days Le Nouvel Observateur and on CNN, after the al-Dura incident, on Octo- relayed Palestinian claims of a mas- ber 12, 2000, two Israeli reservists, sacre of hundreds, if not thousands, in uniform but in a civilian car, appar- of non-combatants, and of hurried ently made a wrong turn and ended secret burials by the Israelis. Four up in Ramallah in the midst of a months later, after even the United funeral procession for another “beau- Nations reported no evidence of a tiful little boy martyr.” Palestinian massacre, chagrined foreign cor- Authority police detained the men. respondents were forced to admit A mob followed, beat the Israelis to their mistake. death, mutilated their bodies, and Yet so long as the news media tossed one out a second story window view the larger Arab-Islamic conflict for further mutilation. Hours later, with Israel through the narrow, dis- Israeli helicopters fired on the police torting filter of “weak but righteous station and other PA facilities. Yet Palestinians, strong and law-break- news reporters like ABC TV’s Gillian ing Israelis,” such mistakes will be Findlay “glossed over the precipitat- made, and made frequently. They ing event (the lynching) to focus on will be made because, as Gutmann the retaliation,” and did not inform touches on, open societies like Israel viewers that the Israeli Air Force can’t hide their flaws, but societies tried to target empty buildings. Over- like that of the PA—simultaneously all, Guttman writes, the lynching ruled by intimidation and awash in “was only subsumed into a new media incitement—don’t tolerate similar take on the second intifada emphasiz- exposure. They will also be made ing ‘the cycle of violence’—a phrase because of the often corrupting suggesting, as David Gelernter put use by foreign media of Palestinian it, ‘that Israelis and Palestinians kill “fixers”—translators, cameramen, each other as part of some sort of tire- stringers, drivers, and expedit- some Punch and Judy show.’” ers—who often function overtly or Then there was the Jenin “mas- covertly as “minders” in the manner sacre.” By now, that episode is well- of old Soviet KGB media “escorts.” known; after a series of suicide And they will be made because bombings and other terrorist attacks Israel, rather than insisting on some murdered more than 110 people and sort of “pool” arrangement, tolerates a wounded hundreds of others in March foreign media infestation of hundreds

120 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews of regularly assigned correspondents, with hundreds more “parachuting” in for crises. Rather than providing a worthwhile diversity of hard news, the journalistic pack all too often files superficial, derivative, anti-Israeli, and ideologically blinkered reports. It also dismisses or avoids stories such as the PA’s widespread corrup- tion under Arafat or the anti-Western (and anti-Israeli) nature of Islamic terror groups like Hamas. Gutmann ends on a hopeful note, concluding that the Israeli govern- ment’s fragmented, competing media shops have been getting their act together, and that alternative news sources, such as Internet weblogs— not to mention outside news media monitors—will help keep the press more honest. Meanwhile, as the decline in print circulation and broad- cast audiences accelerates, and the last Gutenberg generation of news readers slowly yields to the first post- literary cohort of wireless, Podcasted information consumers, The Other War may prove to be both “old media” autopsy and “new media” marker.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 121

Book Reviews

Striking a Balance Thomas Karako

John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: move the nation to a state of “total The Constitution and Foreign Affairs war” because it is expensive to do After 9/11 (Chicago: University of so, and would sooner or later require Chicago Press, 2005), 378 pp. $29.00. supplemental funding. But Yoo’s understanding is vulnerable to the practical objection that, with large The title of John Yoo’s masterful new standing forces, the commander-in- book is perhaps too modest. The chief could embroil the nation in total Powers of War and Peace: The Consti- war well before supplementary appro- tution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 priations become necessary. deals with much more than simply The second half of the volume, war and peace. It tackles a wide field dealing with foreign relations powers of foreign relations law and, particu- other than those of war and peace, larly, “how the Constitution will adapt is less sensational but of equal sig- to the globalization of political, eco- nificance. Because of his reputation nomic, and security affairs.” for advocating broad executive war A professor of law at the Univer- powers, one might expect Yoo to sity of California, Berkeley, Yoo is best do the same with regard to treaties known, even notorious, for the subset and international agreements. But of foreign relations law dealing with although Yoo ably defends the exec- war powers, on which he, while serv- utive’s constitutional power to inter- ing in the Justice Department, wrote pret, make, and terminate treaties a famous memo defending broad at will, he also advocates unusually executive war-making power. robust Congressional powers in the It is not surprising, then, that the execution of treaties. Many review- first half of The Powers of War and ers exaggerate Yoo’s celebration of Peace focuses on the proper distribu- executive power as bordering on tion of war powers. Yoo sets forth an monarchism, and so tend to miss that exceptionally bold understanding: his sine qua non of legitimacy is in presidents have the prerogative to ini- fact “popular sovereignty,” meaning tiate any hostilities, and to continue the popular will reflected as closely them until they run out of money. as possible. Yoo rejects the tired canard that the The centerpiece of his approach is ceiling of presidential authority is an emphatic rejection of the presump- his ability to “repel sudden attacks” tion that treaties are “self-executing,” unless actual invasion is “imminent.” which means simply that a treaty may Instead, he argues that the most war- be enforced by the president once a like president would be unable to supermajority of the Senate has con-

Thomas Karako is Director of Programs at the Claremont Institute, and a Ph.D. candidate at Claremont Graduate University.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 123 Book Reviews sented and it has been ratified. Yoo gospel. He calls the interpretations locates the case for self-execution in of Jay and Hamilton “haughty” and the arguments of Alexander Ham- “extreme,” and less “evolved” theo- ilton and John Jay, but rejects them. ries of republicanism. Instead, Yoo argues for a presumption But his more “evolved” stance of “non-self-execution,” meaning that also seems more simplistic. Hamilton the president may not enforce trea- and Jay saw ratified treaties as having ties without additional implementing the “force of law,” but Yoo explains legislation passed by a majority vote this away by saying that because trea- in both houses of Congress, either by ties are not passed by both houses, statute or “congressional-executive they are not law—and so are in fact agreement.” purely executive. He shoehorns inter- To analyze “self-execution,” Yoo national agreements into two tidy begins with the Jay Treaty debate of boxes, the purely “executive” and the 1796, which centered on whether the purely “legislative”—squeezing out House of Representatives, charged what Hamilton in Federalist No. 69 with passing laws for the treaty’s called a “distinct department,” and domestic application, had the right what John Locke termed the “federa- to reconsider it “on its merits.” James tive” power. Madison famously defended the Yoo’s attachment to popular sov- House’s right to do so: “[T]his House, ereignty is problematic. But the inter- in its Legislative capacity, must exer- national environment today makes his cise its reason; it must deliberate; for position against self-execution, if not deliberation is implied in legislation.” compelling, then at least salutary. As The issue was not whether delibera- the degree of foreign involvement in tion was good, but rather who should the United States has increased since deliberate about treaties. Hamilton’s World War II, so too have interna- position that the Constitution made tional agreements. What once would treaty law part of the law of the land have been considered extraordinary was supported, Yoo says, by John international connections have, with Jay’s argument in Federalist No. 64: globalization, now become common- “All constitutional acts of power, place. The use of international agree- whether in the executive or the judi- ments to circumvent the ordinary cial departments, have as much legal lawmaking process threatens to sup- validity and obligation as if they pro- plant the deliberation so vital to good ceeded from the legislature.” George government. Washington agreed, and refused to This makes some sense. But, send Jay’s negotiating instructions to to be clear, it also implies that the the House. Framers’ Constitution as interpreted One would expect Yoo to side by Jay, Hamilton, and Washington is with Hamilton and Jay (and Wash- inadequate to meet the requirements ington) since, when discussing of the twenty-first century. Yoo’s war powers, he rejects as totally elevation of popular sovereignty also “unconvincing” Madison’s reason- contrasts with The Federalist’s theme ing in the 1793 debate with Hamil- that representatives must “refine and ton about Washington’s authority to enlarge the public views,” and that the issue the Neutrality Proclamation. departures from direct democracy Yet Yoo insists that Madison’s argu- are necessary for good government. ments about treaty power be taken as John Dewey once famously remarked

124 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews that the remedy for the ills of democ- racy is more democracy; John Yoo prescribes more democracy for the ills of “global governance.” The Powers of War and Peace is nothing less than an effort to protect American self-government against increasing entanglement in the inter- national system, certainly no small task. In the end, Yoo’s remedy may be problematic. But his reasons for seek- ing one should be apparent to all.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 125 Book Reviews

Debunking the Hamas Myth Glen Feder

Mathew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity in reality intricately interrelated. He and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (Yale provides numerous examples of how University Press, 2006), 324 pp., $26.00. charity committees, mosques, stu- dent unions, sports clubs and summer camps raise funds which eventually As Mathew Levitt was completing go toward terrorist operations, and what he calls the “first open sourced indoctrinate and recruit many of the book” on Hamas, the radical Islamist operatives themselves. Indeed, Levitt group won a surprising victory in the documents that senior Hamas lead- Palestinian Authority’s January 2006 ers—including the late Sheikh Ahmed elections. In the aftermath, a debate Yassin, Abdel Aziz Al Rantissi, Mousa quickly emerged among U.S. and EU Abu Marzook, Khaled Mishal, and policymakers about whether to con- Jamal Tawil—have all simultaneously tinue funding the Palestinian Author- played roles in the group’s military ity, now that a designated terrorist and political wings. organization was running the show. The key to undermining Hamas, As such, the publication of Levitt argues, is by understanding the Levitt’s book, Hamas: Politics, Char- secret of its success. Once a fringe ity and Terrorism in the Service of group of Islamist radicals in a rela- Jihad, could not have been more tively secular society, Hamas gained timely. Through personal interviews, prominence—and popularity—by recently declassified documents, and providing much-needed social ser- court papers, Levitt debunks once vices, from hospitals and clinics to and for all the myth that Hamas is schools and mosques. Replicating the composed of separate social, political structure of its mother organization, and military branches. the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has Hamas, Levitt writes, has been set up a social welfare and adminis- able to maintain a “veil of legiti- trative branch (dawa) which has won macy” by providing essential social the respect of many Palestinians by services to the Palestinian people, outpacing the corrupt and inefficient which Hamas apologists argue are services previously provided by the separate from its terrorism opera- secular Palestinian Authority govern- tions. By doing so, Hamas has been ment. Each year, state sponsors (such able to maintain its reputation, at as Syria and Iran), charity fronts in the least in some corners, as a legitimate U.S., Middle East and Europe, and var- alternative for the Palestinian people. ious money laundering schemes raise But Levitt drills into the reader that tens of millions of dollars to support Hamas’ three “separate” branches are this sophisticated social influence net-

Glen Feder is a Senior Research Analyst at the Investigative Project on Terrorism, and a doctoral candidate at Boston College and L’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, France.

126 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews work. Much of this fundraising, more- reform throughout his book, but his over, has been made possible because actual policy initiatives are largely Western policymakers remain under concerned with stemming Hamas’ the illusion that the funds go solely financial growth, rather than curbing towards providing social services to its radical worldview. ordinary Palestinians. Nevertheless, Levitt has pro- Thus, while military action vided a major service. A debate over against active Hamas cells may be how to undermine a terrorist organi- necessary, and could prevent future zation cannot even begin if one buys terrorist attacks, the permanent way into the idea of separate social and to weaken Hamas is by displacing its political wings. Hamas definitively social roots. Levitt offers a glimpse dispels this myth. More important into how to do so. The first step, he still, Levitt has shown us that the gen- says, is to freeze or otherwise put eral idea of such a construct did not out of business those front organiza- originate within Hamas itself. Rather, tions which support Hamas’ social it was inherited from the group’s pre- network. Once that lifeline is cut, the decessor and inspiration: the Muslim U.S., EU and Gulf states must step Brotherhood. Only by seeing pre- into the void and create a coordinated cisely how the Muslim Brotherhood international aid effort to offer those and its more radical offshoots prey services once provided by Hamas. upon Western democracies through The logic is clear; if the international their mastery of the art of rhetoric community can provide transparent and propaganda can we begin to truly social services that are of better qual- understand them—and to confront ity and more affordable than those of them. Levitt’s work brings us a bit Hamas, it could create a rift between closer to that goal. the group’s moderates and radicals, since the former support it largely for its social services. And that, Levitt argues, will eventually lead to the organization’s demise. Yet these policy prescriptions come up short in several respects. Levitt himself admits that a renewed international aid effort is largely predicated upon cooperation with “a new moderate Palestinian govern- ment.” Today, however, the Palestin- ian Authority is rapidly heading in the opposite direction. Furthermore, while an alternative to Hamas’ social network would certainly degrade the group’s power, state sponsors such as Syria and Iran are likely to remain loyal to their terrorist proxy. Finally, money may be important for preserv- ing Hamas’ popularity, but ideology plays a role as well. Levitt makes occasional calls for educational

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