Campaigning The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

Featured Essays

Surrounded by Operational Assessments Doctrine…and Losing and the Commander’s Decision Cycle Project the False and Protect the Real Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown

“That All May Labor As One”

Spring 2015 Campaigning Spring 2015 https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

Commandant RADM John W. Smith, Jr

Dean, Joint Forces Staff College Dr. Patricia B. Strait

Joint Advanced Warfighting Joint and Combined Warfighting School School Dr. Robert Antis CAPT John Maxwell

Joint Continuing and Distance Joint Command, Control and Education School Information Operations School COL Dale D. Fair COL Michael Miller

Editor Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

Editorial Board: Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel Dr. Frederick R. Kienle Assistant Professor Stephen W. Dennis

Cover image: The Joint Service Color Guard advances the colors during the retirement ceremony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. Shelton, at Fort Myer, Va., on Oct. 2, 2001. DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel. (Released). Campaigning Spring 2015 i Guest Editor’s Corner:

Hello and welcome to the Spring 2015 version of Campaigning. I’m confident you’ll find this edition interesting as it takes on several issues highly pertinent to today’s joint warfighters.

Reflecting the composition of the staff at the Combatant Commands, the vast majority of joint professionals in our student body at the Joint Forces Staff College are the O-4s and O-5s responsible for translating strategic guidance to tactical actions. The messy and difficult task of functioning at the operational level of war takes a great deal of expertise, which emphasizes the importance of joint education specific to this mission.

To understand the value of education at the operational level of war, we must appreciate that service members on our combatant command, component, and service staffs start their military careers at the tactical level. They are evaluated and promoted to senior leadership positions mostly due to their accomplishments at the tactical level. When they are placed in billets at the operational level, they often have to learn how to translate policy and strategy into tactical actions through on-the-job training. Once promoted to Flag or General Officer, these joint leaders no longer work as tacticians - they become strategists and policy experts so they can best advise senior military and civilian leaders.

Many of our greatest military leaders were experts at the operational level of war. In World War II, the strategy of “Germany First” and “Unconditional Surrender” gave operational level commanders the necessary national-level intent to develop activities to accomplish those broad objectives. Led by their commanders, who were heavily involved in the strategy discussions, operational staffs accomplished the required work that put the Allies’ training, supply, and logistics machines into action. Operation DESERT STORM was successful because General Schwarzkopf and his staff translated President George H. Bush’s statement, “This will not stand” into a well-planned, well-sustained, and well-equipped force able to swiftly defeat the Iraqi military and return sovereignty to the nation of Kuwait.

In contrast, not fully appreciating the role and complexity of operational level efforts adversely affected Phases IV and V during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Properly translating policy and strategy to unit actions became all the more difficult for our combatant command planners when the Iraqi military was disbanded and Baathists were removed from government positions. Had strategy and policy decisions been influenced more by operational activities, a different outcome may have been possible.

Skill at the operational level of war relies on joint professionals that can understand the lessons of history, can systematically break down complex issues, and can make informed projections of broadly-defined future events. It takes a team of joint professionals, collaborating with a shared understanding of the environment (adversary, friendly and neutral) and a shared understanding of higher guidance, to accomplish these tasks effectively. Only then can that team - and the Joint Force Commander - articulate the right problem to be solved and then come to a reasoned approach to solving it.

Campaigning Spring 2015 ii The challenges we face across the military are far too complex for rote actions that are not informed by history, current events, and future predictions. Excellent policy, coherent strategies, and effective strategic communications are vital to successfully meeting our national objectives. Naturally, we spend time and effort educating our future senior military leaders because of the importance we place on the strategic level of war. It is also just as crucial to have logical and rational approaches that align the actions of tactical-level operators with national policy and strategy. Critical and creative thinkers are responsible for providing these approaches and plans; let’s make sure they are properly educated to take on this task.

Enjoy this version of Campaigning - and let us know what you think.

Very respectfully,

John Maxwell Captain, U.S. Navy Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Joint Force Staff College

Campaigning Spring 2015 iii In this issue of Campaigning:

Features

Surrounded by Doctrine…and Losing………………………………….. 1 Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis, JCWS Faculty

Project the False and Protect the Real…………………………………. 17 CDR Michael Posey, JC2IOS Faculty

Operational Assessments and the Commander’s Decision Cycle…….. 22 Mr Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, and Lt Col Richard Collins, JCWS

Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown…………………………. 30 COL Jerry Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, and LTC Gregory Trahan, JCWS

Commentary

Weaponizing Social Media: What We Can Learn from Our Adversaries………………………………………………………………. 43 CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and MAJ Kevin Thaxton, JCWS

Decision-Making Models and the SS Mayaguez Crisis ……………….. 55 LTC Thomas Feltey, JAWS

Biofuels and the Defense Department: A Push Toward a Greener, More Secure Force …………………………………………… 62 LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and Maj Mark Enriques, JCWS

The Conventional Force and Irregular Warfare: How the Conventional Force Can Relieve Mission Pressure on Special Operations Forces ………………………………………………………. 71 LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas, JCWS

Putin’s Peninsula? How United States and NATO Policy Paved the Way to Crimea………………………………………………. 80 CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Bincarousky, and Lt Col Todd Hoover, JCWS

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Campaigning Spring 2015 iv Surrounded by Design…and Losing among all US forces to free JFCs and their staffs to focus efforts on solving the (Or the Tao of the Alternative 6 View) complex problems confronting them.” The doctrine expresses an aspiration - it “should By Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis foster creativity” - but is that aspiration achievable? What drags doctrine down to Who believes that doctrine is your friend? the “unimaginative” realm? That doctrine is liberating…that doctrine will set you free…that doctrine will cast a The language we use, the questions we ask, light unto your path? That you have to know reveal the paradigm in which we work. In it to violate it? Or do you agree with Gen “The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for James N. Mattis, USMC that “doctrine is the Design,” Klaus Krippendorf states: last refuge of the unimaginative?” “Channeling” your “inner Mattis” will lead “Language is a cultural artifact that enables you to Oscar Wilde and Ralph Waldo humans to coordinate their conceptions, Emerson, where, ultimately, “To be great is engage in joint action, and construct and to be misunderstood.”1 Mattis’ zinger is reconstruct the realities they see. In the use related to Wilde’s “consistency is the last of language, languaging, acting, and refuge of the unimaginative”2 as well as perceiving are inseparably tied to a Emerson’s “a foolish consistency is the constructive understanding. It is a truism hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little that one cannot know what exists without conceptualizing it as such. Language is the statesmen and philosophers and divines. 7 With consistency a great soul has simply primary source of conceptions.” nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.”3 How Joint doctrine provides a language of can we determine the appropriate balance of operational art that has its historical, doctrinal “best practices” and creativity, of paradigmatic roots in the Great Captains of “method” and “no method”? military strategy. Yet if “…the very premise of doctrine, which is to draw a common Current joint doctrine attempts to walk the picture through the use of a common tightrope between creativity and the language, is the limiting factor in being able to develop new concepts, to build new “consistency” mentioned above. “Joint 8 doctrine is not dogmatic – the focus is on frames, to confront new challenges” then how to think about operations, not what to how can joint doctrine foster the creativity think about operations. It is definitive required to solve complex problems without enough to guide operations while versatile also imposing semantic limitations that hobble the creative effort? And if “joint enough to accommodate a wide variety of 9 situations. Joint doctrine should foster education is based on joint doctrine,” and initiative, creativity, and conditions that doctrine stifles creativity, then how can joint allow commanders the freedom to adapt to doctrine mediate between a legacy varying circumstances.”4 Joint doctrine prescriptive institutional mindset and the states that it is not policy, but authoritative education required to address current and guidance.5 In addition to providing future complex challenges? guidance for joint operation planning and execution, it also “standardizes terminology, Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation relationships, responsibilities, and processes Planning,” provides an expanded description

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and explanation of operational design, but War, or the Third? What is the relevance of paradigms that inform joint doctrine the Second Seminole War to the wars we are development create anomalies within the in now, or the ones we need to be prepared doctrine, especially in terms of doctrinal to fight (or avoid) in the future? In the case language. “…doctrine attempts to fix of Native Americans, a national policy of language with specific meanings. Fixing Indian removal predated President Andrew language, viewing the world through our Jackson’s by some three decades. The doctrinal lens, actually works to fix our policy was as hotly debated then as it would ability to conceptualize, and this fixation, or be now. Our goal is to understand how stagnation, keeps us from being able to see commanders of the time attempted to as far as we could.”10 Joint doctrine is implement the policy through military developed through consensus from the action. What was their understanding of services and combatant commands, among what was going on? How did things work, others, and this consensus struggles to why were things happening the way they synthesize a new pragmatic doctrinal were? Why did they get the guidance that paradigm that retains the best of traditional they got? Why did they think the way they principles and incorporates current best did? practices from the field.11 “New paradigms offer new ways to think about the world – The Second Seminole War, specifically the new questions to ask and new ways to period from December 1835 to December pursue them.”12 These tensions are 1836, is one of the Joint and Combined institutionalized in joint doctrine, and this is Warfighting School (JCWS) Satellite carried into joint education and ultimately Program’s historical vehicles to illustrate the into operational decision-making. Arguably, aspects of joint doctrine’s “design” this has always been the case. methodology, with specific attention to the elements of operational design. In earlier Second Seminole War versions of joint doctrine, the design methodology looked strikingly similar to the Now, imagine receiving a mission, with process for conducting a strategic estimate, compelling moral and ethical implications, and the elements of operational design were against a motivated, adaptive, called “facets of operational art.” The unconventional foe, in the toughest terrain number and names of the elements have imaginable, under horrible weather varied slightly over time and circumstance, conditions, with a joint force ill-trained, but they still capture enduring aspects of educated or even desiring to fight this kind operational planning, much like the of war, hindered by limited sustainment and principles of war and joint operations. They strained force structure, on an uncertain also reflect the language, logic and time-table driven by Presidential policies, paradigms of generations of military with fractured Congressional and American operational artists. The commanders in the public support. Is this Vietnam? Second Seminole War estimated the Afghanistan? Iraq? Syria? Iran? No. It is situation by trying to understand the Florida during the Second Seminole War strategic direction and the operational from 1835-1842. environment and define the problems as they saw them. If joint doctrine from 2006 was Why study the Second Seminole War? Who still in force this sentence would read: can distinguish it from the First Seminole “CCDRs develop strategic estimates after

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reviewing the operational environment, joint warfighting principles and concepts to nature of anticipated operations, and joint operations.14 national and multinational strategic direction.”13 What is not apparent is the Our ability to understand what they faced is theory and logic behind design as a complicated by numerous limitations, deliberately (or necessarily) structured way including our use of contemporary doctrinal of learning, and the insidious institutional terms to frame our understanding of their paradigm that drives operational artists and understanding. Nevertheless, to understand planners to formulaic solutions, i.e., the Second Seminole War, it is necessary to template-based “products.” be familiar with what preceded it, and this retrospective will challenge our The Second Seminole War also provides “institutional” paradigm of the Seminole opportunities to study leadership at various wars. levels, from tactical to operational and strategic. In discussions about decision Indian Removal making and paradigms, Dr. Vardell Nesmith was apt to say during scores of staff rides to It is not surprising that the Seminoles would Gettysburg, “men do what they do for what resist removal to “Indian Country.” What is to them are good reasons at the time.” In surprising is how long it took for the United October 2013 the U.S. Army Combat States to accomplish that goal. President Studies Institute published a study of Thomas Jefferson provided an early leadership using Dade’s Battle in December perspective of the national policy when he 1835, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, “Should any tribe be foolhardy enough of Staff’s desired leader attributes are woven to take up the hatchet at any time, the into this segment of the JCWS curriculum. seizing the whole country of that tribe, and The commanders led operations that driving them across the Mississippi, as the reflected the logic of their operational only condition of peace, would be an approaches using a paradigm heavily example to others, and a furtherance of our influenced by the Napoleonic wars, and final consolidation.” 15 Indian removal exposed flaws in their concepts of became a matter of law with the Indian operations, integration of joint functions and Removal Act of 1830. The Second application of elements of operational Seminole War was “responsibly ended” in design. Additionally, their actions August 1842 and a third war was fought illustrated their critical abilities or inabilities from 1855-1858. No peace treaty was ever to: signed and thus the Seminoles remain “unconquered.” understand the security environment and the effect of all instruments of national power, National strategic goals evolved over time. to anticipate and adapt to surprise and Starting in the 1790s, the fledgling United uncertainty, to recognize change and lead States negotiated with the Native Americans transitions, to operate on intent through over the myriad relationships between the trust, empowerment and understanding, to two bodies, including the issue of slavery. make ethical decisions based on the shared As white settlers pushed south and west, values of the profession of arms, and to Spanish Florida became a destination for think critically and strategically in applying runaway slaves. Americans were beginning to feel the pull of “Manifest Destiny” and

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there were numerous clashes over cattle and considered the most militant. With their slaves between settlers along the Florida migration and growing sense of separateness border and Indians living in the Spanish from the Creek Confederation, the territory.16 In the late 1820s, the Adams Seminoles asserted their autonomy in administration decided upon full Indian Florida. The Creek Confederation (so called removal as they were leaving office. In his by whites because the Indians lived near first annual message to Congress, President creeks) was a loose association of “Upper” Jackson “recommended that land west of the Creeks located in the valleys of the Mississippi be set apart, and that the Indians Tallapoosa, Coosa, and Alabama Rivers, and in the East be encouraged, but not forced, to “Lower” Creeks from the lower trade eastern for western land. If they failed Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers.18 to do so, they would be obliged to come under the harsh jurisdiction of the states.”17 “Red Stick” War during the War of 1812

After the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, President Jefferson led efforts to increase overland access to New Orleans. Opening this line of communication resulted in more frequent settler and Indian interactions. The migrations of various Creek groups and interaction with Spanish and American culture contributed to a social fracture within the Creek culture: Upper Creeks who had less interaction with whites adhered more closely to tribal traditions than did the Lower Creeks, who had more interaction with the white culture and thus were more accommodating to it.19 The butchering of two white families near Nashville, TN, Routes of Southern U.S. Indian Removal Operations escalated into the “Red Stick” war that http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas Jefferson and Indian removal engulfed the entire Creek Confederation and included raids against Spanish and United The Seminoles States settlements, such as the massacre at Fort Mims in Alabama.20 The U.S. response The indigenous Indians of Florida were was a three-pronged invasion into Upper decimated due to war and disease during the Creek territory, and on 27 March 1814, period of Spanish colonial rule, and their Andrew Jackson destroyed the combat depopulated lands were later reoccupied by power of the Red Sticks at the Battle of various tribes that migrated into Florida due Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River. to European colonial wars and Indian Jackson imposed a severe treaty on the expansion. Various migrating bands, such Creeks at Fort Jackson; the vanquished Red as Tamathli, Chiahas, Oconee, Yamassee, Stick Upper Creeks (and also some allied Talassee, Yuchi, Apalachicola, Lower Creek Creeks) ceded 23 million acres in Alabama and Upper Creek were the constituent and Georgia. Jackson followed this victory elements of the Alachua and Mikasuki bands with one over the British at New Orleans in of the Seminole tribe. The Alachuas were January 1815. the principle band, and the Mikasuki were

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command in person and bring the Seminoles under control.”22 Jackson was directed not Army Reorganization and the First to take possession of any Spanish towns or Seminole War forts so as not to jeopardize negotiations then being conducted between the U.S. and With the victory over the British, Congress Spain.23 immediately downsized and reorganized the Army, and MG Jackson was given Jackson’s Campaign against the command of the “Division of the South.” Seminoles and Spanish Florida Attempting to protect settlers in the ceded area, Jackson directed BG Edmund Gaines Jackson’s campaign was delayed getting to build a fort near the confluence of the started from Fort Gadsden (erected at the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, just north site of the Negro Fort) for two months due of the Florida border. Resupply of Fort to an inefficient supply system (mainly a Scott required naval vessels to navigate the failure of operational contract support), lack Apalachicola River through Spanish Florida. of adequate geographic knowledge of the In July 1816, when these vessels were fired area and few guides. Once started, Jackson upon, as expected, by a formerly British fort destroyed Mikasuki towns and broke the now controlled by runaway slaves and called strength of Seminole resistance while “Negro Fort,” LTC Duncan Clinch simultaneously scouring the countryside for destroyed the fort with a barrage of cannon supplies. He reported that the Spanish were fire from his gunboats, including “hot shot” supporting the Indians and he forced the that hit a powder magazine. In 1817, border surrender of St. Marks in April 1818. incidents continued with Spain powerless to Jackson’s letter to the Spanish commander restrain the Seminoles and Seminole tribes there stated, “To chastise a savage foe, who, refusing to abide by the terms of the Fort combined with a lawless band of Negro Jackson treaty. In November 1817, when brigands, have for some time past been Maj David Twiggs attempted to bring in carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war Mikasuki chief Neamathla, the ensuing fight against the citizens of the United States, has initiated the beginning of what became the compelled the President to direct me to First Seminole War. march my army into Florida.”24

The Seminoles struck back after the attack Jackson continued his movements to and burning of Neamathla’s Fowltown by contact, attacking and burning towns and ambushing and massacring a resupply party seizing crops and cattle. At “Bowleg’s on the Apalachicola River that included Town” on the Suwannee River, Jackson soldiers’ wives. The War Department’s captured and subsequently hung two initial response on 2 December 1817 was “British adventurers from the Bahamas” that that “it was not politic to enter Spanish had been instigating the Indians against the territory to chastise the Seminoles.”21 When Americans.25 With these victories, Jackson John C. Calhoun became the Secretary of returned to Fort Gadsden. The next month War a week later, he gave BG Gaines Jackson captured Pensacola with the permission to cross into Spanish territory following justification: “The immutable and “carry retribution to the savages” as laws of self-defense, therefore, compelled long as they did not take refuge in a Spanish the American government to take possession fortress, and directed MG Jackson to “take of such parts of the Floridas in which

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Spanish authority could not be maintained. Duval requested that the War Department Pensacola was found in this situation, and increase their allowance for food, but his will be held until Spain can furnish military longer-term solution was to send the strength sufficient to enforce existing Seminoles west of the Mississippi. After treaties.”26 As part of the terms of Florida was organized as a territory, land capitulation, Jackson offered full military speculation became rampant and white honors, transport to Cuba, property rights, settlers moved in, bringing with them religious toleration and free trade. Jackson’s African slaves and a hunger for Indian maneuvers provided the Madison land.28 “Slave catchers and strife followed, administration diplomatic cover and the and by 1823 the Seminoles were eager to leverage it needed to force a treaty with sign a treaty guaranteeing them a refuge in Spain, the Adams-Onis treaty of 1919, central Florida.”29 President Monroe said which acquired Florida and defined the the Seminoles must either be moved out of southern border of the United States all the Florida or moved to a smaller area. If the way to the Pacific Ocean. Seminoles were moved out of Florida it would reduce the tendency for slaves to seek Seminole Containment and Slavery sanctuary in Seminole areas. But the government had yet to identify lands west of After the treaty with Spain, Congress the Mississippi River for that purpose. immediately downsized and reorganized the Army and MG Jackson was “RIF’d” Treaty of Moultrie Creek and (reduction in force) out of the service. “Old Establishment of the Reservation Hickory” had upset too many in the Madison administration and Congress with In September 1822, the Seminole bands his brand of foreign policy; as a sop, he was selected Neamathla to represent them in named the first Governor of the Territory of negotiations at Moultrie Creek (a few miles Florida. The treaty took two years to be south of St. Augustine) for a reservation ratified, and the transfer of land from Spain within Florida. In the Moultrie Creek to the U.S. created many land title issues. Treaty, the Seminoles surrendered all claim The Seminoles occupied the land that was to land in Florida except for the reservation transferred but did not participate in the which comprised about four million acres negotiations. Jackson recommended that the between the latitude of Tampa Bay and the Seminoles be concentrated along the Caloosahatchee River further south. The Apalachicola River near the borders of reservation would be no closer than 20 miles Alabama and Georgia, and sealed off from to the coast, and the Seminoles would try to trade with Cuba. His goal was containment prevent concentrations of runaway slaves of the Seminoles away from white from forming in their area. In return, the settlements and away from the line of U.S. would protect law-abiding Indians, communication between Pensacola and St. keep unauthorized white men off of the Augustine.27 reservation, and provide subsidies for livestock, equipment and an annuity for 20 Jackson resigned in October 1821 and years, among other incentives. When the William P. Duval was commissioned to be Senate ratified the treaty in December of Territorial Governor. The Seminoles were 1823, the Indians that moved became the hesitant to plant crops because they feared responsibility of Governor Duval, and he the white men would take their lands, and now had to feed daily over 1500 Seminoles.

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The War Department sent LTC George 1827 to stop the atrocities against white Brooke to establish a military post on the settlements and prohibit whites from flank of the reservation in the vicinity of trespassing on the reservation or trading Tampa Bay. with the Seminoles. In January 1827, the federal government centralized military The Seminoles argued that the reservation control by making COL Clinch the would not sustain them, and it was enlarged commander of regular military forces in in 1824, but this did not reduce the settler Florida. In 1828 Brevet MG Winfield Scott and Indian interactions. Duval could not attempted to close Cantonment King, but stop the Indians from spending their annuity Floridians protested and Scott’s order was on alcohol or enforce the law to keep overruled until a new General of the Army, shopkeepers from selling it to them. As the MG Alexander Macomb, agreed with him 1 October 1824 deadline passed for all and closed it in 1829. Brevet BG Clinch Indians west of the Suwannee to be on the protested, but Macomb said, “I cannot see reservation, more Seminoles were off the that any danger can be apprehended from reservation than on it. On 27 January 1825, the miserable Indians who inhabit the President Monroe sent a message to the peninsula of Florida.”32 Fort King would be Senate saying that an area west of Arkansas resurrected in 1832. should be made into Indian Territory, and Indians would receive these lands in Jackson’ Election and Slavery Issues exchange for lands they would lose in the east. Another temporary expansion of the With Jackson’s election in November 1828, Seminole reservation was approved in Indian removal continued to gain December 1825; each expansion generated momentum. From Jackson’s perspective of lawsuits due to Spanish land titles that had the problem, the only way to save the transferred with the Adams-Onis Treaty. Indians from annihilation within the states was to remove them from those states and Management of the Reservation put them outside of state jurisdiction. After the Indian Removal Act was signed in May Drought and other food supply problems 1830, Congress appropriated $500,000 to do caused the Seminoles to leave the whatever was required to move the Indians. reservation in search of food. The As 1831 proceeded, starving Indian bands government-issued rations were expensive preyed upon white herds and supplies. and state-issued currency was depreciated There were also numerous fugitive slave by Federal banks. The government rations settlements among the Seminoles. White were insufficient to live on and Seminoles settlers were to be given opportunities to were starving to death. It was easier to raid identify their runaway slaves and pay the existing farms and cattle than to plant food territorial government for repatriation. The and raise their own.30 By late 1826, there problem was that both sides, Seminole and had been so many requests to place soldiers white, held slaves belonging to the other.33 closer to the reservation that the War Office The Seminoles continued to deliver decided to open a second post, “Cantonment runaways to their former owners, but King,” and Duval placed it in the vicinity of Floridians still felt they were holding back. the Indian Agency near Silver Springs (just The Seminoles grew to believe that the outside present day Ocala).31 The Florida whites intended to take away all of their Legislature passed several measures in early slaves.

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after the Seminoles signed the latter treaty; with Senate ratification in April 1834, the Treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort Seminoles had three years to relocate. The Gibson Seminoles argued that the Treaty of Moultrie Creek was still in effect, giving In January 1832, the War Department them at least nine more years on the land appointed James Gadsden to negotiate with and annuities. This impasse would lead the Seminoles to relocate to Indian ultimately to war. Territory. Gadsden had built Fort Gadsden during the First Seminole War and was a Road to War commissioner during the Moultrie Creek treaty negotiations. He had also conducted In August 1833, former Congressman and the survey to define the boundaries of the Major General of Georgia Militia, Wiley reservation and commented on the fugitive Thompson, was named Indian Agent. In slave settlements. Gadsden’s talking points December 1833, Thompson took charge of were that the government could not continue the Indian Agency near Fort King. He to feed the Seminoles year after year and assessed that the most influential group was that the Seminoles would prefer life west of the Indian-Negroes, who “had everything to the Mississippi compared to a harsher lose and nothing to gain by a change, and situation in Florida.34 The treaty stated that their influence over their “masters” was the Seminoles would send seven of their decisive.”37 Thompson received an chiefs to inspect the lands west of the appropriation to distribute the annuity and Mississippi, and “should they be satisfied pay claims to the Indians, mainly for stolen with the character of that country, and of the slaves. Final removal of the Indians was favorable disposition of the Creeks to projected for spring 1835. At a meeting reunite with the Seminoles as one people” with the Seminoles in October 1834, then a deal would be binding.35 Little is Thompson observed that the Seminoles did known directly of the meeting except that not waste the annuity on alcohol but bought the chiefs signed the treaty at Payne’s a larger-than-normal share of powder and Landing. Later, the chiefs would claim that ball. The Seminoles pushed back against they did not sign the treaty or that their relocating, and Osceola took center stage in marks were forged, and that a key sentence rejecting the treaties and asserting Seminole was deliberately mistranslated to ensure that claims to the land. When these reports the Seminoles would agree to go.36 reached Jackson, he directed that military forces be sent to protect the citizens and In March 1833, a treaty at Fort Gibson, enforce the treaty. BG Clinch was given Arkansas Territory was signed by the seven central command in Florida and Fort Brooke chiefs, which indicated that they were was reactivated. satisfied with the land and the Seminoles would move as soon as the government By early 1835 it was clear that the Indians could make the arrangements. A dispute did not want to move. Among the sticky arose over whether the Seminole chiefs issues was the ownership of Indian-Negroes. actually signed the treaty, or if they did sign Slave holders lobbied the President – could were they coerced. President Jackson the federal government buy the slaves? This submitted the Treaty of Payne’s Landing could solve the problem of black influence and the Treaty of Fort Gibson to the Senate over the Indians and remove the potential

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problem of the Creek Indians in the new between Fort King and Fort Brooke.42 In Indian Territory taking the Seminoles’ October, the War Department rejected BG slaves.38 Governor John Eaton, who Clinch’s request for mounted volunteer replaced Duval in April 1834, reported that militia to “prevent the continuous and “if force was used against them they would dangerous intercourse between the fight. Should the government decide on Seminole-Negroes and the slaves on the violence, he recommended a ‘strong plantations.”43 In November, Osceola imposing force,’ not volunteers.”39 BG murdered Charley Emathla, a Seminole Clinch requested more forces and the timing chief who was planning to move to the west. of Seminole removal was left up to the Other Seminoles who agreed to move west officers on the ground. “Previous plans for were camped at Fort Brooke, and the post removal had gone awry so often that the commander provided food for these 500 agent and the general were authorized to displaced persons. Communication between delay it as late as spring 1836.”40 Fort King and Fort Brooke was effectively broken, and Governor Eaton enlisted 500 In March 1835 Thompson read a letter from horsemen under MG Richard Call (western President Jackson, “the Great White Father,” Florida militia commander) and 250 under to the Seminoles telling them that they must COL John Warren of Jacksonville. move as they had promised. The Dade Massacre and beginning of the …If you listen to the voice of friendship and Second Seminole War truth, you will go quietly and voluntarily. But should you listen to the bad birds that December 1835 was a month a chaos and are always flying about you, and refuse to tragedy. On 7 December, a mounted move, I have then directed the commanding scouting party rode through a hammock and officer to remove you by force. This will be was ambushed. On 18 December, a wagon done. I pray the Great Spirit, therefore, to train was ambushed by Osceola. On 20 incline you to do what is right. December, militia scouts located the hostile Indians and dispersed them. During Your Friend Christmastime many east coast sugar A. Jackson41 plantations were wrecked, and by the end of the year the entire industry was destroyed. In April, key Seminole leaders refused to The Indians were roaming freely and whites sign a document acknowledging that the crowded into settled areas and near the forts. Treaty of Payne’s Landing was valid and MG Call reported that whites had deserted Thompson removed their names from the the area from the Suwannee River to the St. list of chiefs. In June, Thompson humiliated Johns River for 50 miles north of the Indian Osceola by throwing him in chains and boundary.44 making him certify that the treaty was binding. With the increasing violence, With the growing violence attributed to the Thompson forbade the sale of ammunition Mikasukis, BG Clinch decided to attack to the Seminoles. In July, Jackson endorsed them at the forks of the Withlacoochee a rule that prohibited unauthorized persons River, hoping “it would drive terror among from entering the reservation. In August, the timid and wavering, and perhaps Army courier PVT Kinsley Dalton was effectually silence the efforts of others in scalped and disemboweled on a mail run creating disaffection among them.”45 Clinch

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repositioned five companies from Fort King Dr. John Mahon made the following to Fort Drane (site of his plantation) and assessment of the result: ordered two companies from Fort Brooke to move to Fort King. This battle probably did more harm than good. First, it created in the army the On 23 December Brevet Major Francis Dade erroneous impression that the Indians could led the two companies from Fort Brooke be brought to the fight in large groups, more toward Fort King. Tracked by Seminoles or less white-style. Second, it gave the the entire way, on the morning of 28 savages confidence in the leadership of December, 40 miles south of Fort King, Osceola. Finally, when the column Dade’s column was caught in ambush and withdrew without trying to strike at 105 out of 108 soldiers (including eight Seminole settlements, the Indians reached officers) were killed in the day-long battle. the conclusion that they could stop any “Only when they had withdrawn did a white force.50 swarm of Negroes come to kill the wounded and loot the dead.”46 The same day, Osceola Subsequent Operations in the Florida led a war party to Fort King to riddle Wiley Theater, 1836 Thompson with bullets and take his hair. Halpatter Tustenuggee (aka war chief The Jackson administration, Congress, Alligator) said the Seminoles had worked on territorial and military leaders took various this plan for a year. The Seminoles would actions to address the problem. Secretary of resist removal by terrorizing the Florida War Lewis Cass gave BG Clinch permission countryside with raids and atrocities, to call up the state militia and arranged for assassinating the Indian Agent, and the cooperation of three Revenue Cutters “strik[ing] an effective blow at the meager from the Treasury Department.51 While not American force.”47 declaring “war,” Congress appropriated money in increasing amounts to fund the Even before the nearly simultaneous growing contingency operations, and the massacre and assassination, regular Army Adjutant General reported that the War forces under BG Clinch were committing to Department, “perhaps under the influence of take the fight to the Seminoles. On 24 the President, was determined to protect the December, Clinch’s force was joined by property of slaveholders. No terms would Call’s mounted territorial volunteers, whose be offered to the hostiles...as long as one term of service ended 1 January 1836. It is slave belonging to a white man remained certain that they did not know of Dade’s among the Seminoles.”52 The Florida fate, and it is not clear that they knew about legislature increased the size of the militia, Thompson’s;4849 regardless, on 29 instituting a draft in counties with a low December 1835, BG Clinch began his number of volunteers. In addition to movement to attack the Seminole requests for patrols by the West Indies stronghold. After putting his regular force Squadron of the Navy, on 19 January, 1LT across the Withlacoochee using a single Nathaniel Waldron, USMC, departed leaky canoe and leaving the mounted Pensacola for Fort Brooke with 57 volunteers on the other side of the river, the Marines.53 The combat zone in Florida Seminoles, led by Osceola, attacked the overlapped two areas of responsibility, and regulars and Clinch was forced to execute a SecWar Cass ordered MG Winfield Scott, hasty defense and withdrawal to Fort Drane. commander of the Eastern Department, to

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take command of the Florida Theater – his eating up Scott’s rations. Scott’s operational strategic guidance was specific: “he might idea was to envelop the Seminoles from not open negotiations with the Indians until three directions in a tightly synchronized he had first reduced them to unconditional pincers, compressing and then destroying surrender.”54 Meanwhile, MG Edmund them near the Cove of the Withlacoochee so Gaines, commander of the Western that they did not escape to the south. This Department, upon hearing of Dade’s battle effort failed for a variety of reasons, in his area of responsibility, proceeded to including Scott’s grounding in Napoleonic raise volunteers and embark on transports tactics and doctrine. Next, based on naval from New Orleans to Tampa. intelligence that the Seminoles had escaped to the south, he sent columns there to move Gaines’s Operation: February – March to contact. On 21 May, Scott was directed 1836 by SecWar Cass to pick up the offensive in Alabama against resurgent hostile Creeks. MG Gaines’s operational idea was to move After a month of discussions about who to Tampa with maximum combat power, should next command the theater, Governor retrace Dade’s march, and seek contact with Call was given command. and destroy the Seminoles. While enroute to Fort Brooke, Gaines received orders from SecWar Cass directing him to proceed to the border with Texas and take command (the Alamo battle will occur two months later), but Gaines continued on to Tampa. On 20 February, Gaines found the massacre site, and proceeded to Fort King and then Fort Drane for supplies. Gaines departed Fort Drane for Fort Brooke via BG Clinch’s battlefield and made contact with approximately 1100 Seminoles. Surrounded, MG Gaines sought assistance from BG Clinch at Fort Drane: Gaines would fix the Seminoles and Clinch would take them in the flank. MG Scott ordered Clinch not to relieve Gaines’s force; this contributed to an already-fierce rivalry between the two generals. The Seminoles had started a parley with Gaines when Clinch, acting on his own authority to relieve Gaines, surprised the Seminoles and caused them to disperse.

Scott’s Operation: March – April 1836

MG Scott viewed Gaines’s uncoordinated offensive as disruptive to his elaborate campaign plan, especially Gaines’s force

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Call’s Operations: September – varying degrees, the current CJCS’s desired November 1836 leader attributes. Their understanding of strategic direction guided their actions even On 16 March 1836, Richard K. Call was as the operational environment changed confirmed by the Senate to be the Territorial through the year of 1836. Their operational Governor of Florida. He had served as a approaches reflected different conceptions regular army officer for eight years before of the problem they faced. But it was MG becoming a lawyer and general of Florida Jesup who saw the war in a fundamentally militia in 1823. A friend and former different light: “this…is a negro, not an roommate of Jackson’s, Call sold Jackson Indian war.”56 The tide of war seemed to on a concept to defeat the Seminoles in a change for the better when MG Jesup began summer campaign. On 21 June, Call was operations in late December 1836. given operational command: “Rarely before Unfortunately, after MG Jesup, the war had a civil governor been given command of would continue under the commands of BG a field army made up, not only of his own Zachary Taylor, BG Walker Armistead and militia, but of militia from other states and COL William Worth, until changes in units of the regular army.”55 Call’s political leadership and policy, legislation operational idea involved operating from and public support, and Seminole attrition four logistics hubs close to the Seminole enabled COL Worth to declare the war at an stronghold to seek decisive battle and quick end on 14 August 1842. The problems of victory. Due to delays in receiving Indian removal did not go away in 1842, sufficient troops and sustainment, his initial however…in 1855 a Third Seminole War effort to bring the Seminoles to battle failed. was fought, concluding in 1858 on the eve After reconstituting his force, his second of the American Civil War. operation also culminated in failure despite heavy contact with the Seminoles. The doctrine of the time may have adversely Jackson’s stinging criticism of Call created affected the creativity required to address an estrangement between them, and Call the complex problem represented by relinquished command to MG Thomas Jesup Seminole removal. The general officers in on 9 December 1836. the Florida Theater had not attended the U.S. Military Academy, although most of Second Seminole War – The End of the the junior officers had. Many of the general Beginning officers had been in fights with the Indians before, while most of the junior officers and The Second Seminole War historical case enlisted men had not been trained in Indian presents opportunities to practice joint fighting, which was one of Jackson’s doctrine’s design methodology and glean criticisms of the professional standing army. examples of elements of operational design. Major Leigh Read of the Florida militia From BG Clinch’s initial attack into the publicly criticized MG Scott, who had been Cove of the Withlacoochee River to MG studying Napoleonic doctrine and producing Gaines’s marching to the sound of the guns, army manuals since 1815, for applying “the and MG Scott’s textbook doctrinal approach shreds and patches of the obsolete system of to Governor Call’s repeated efforts for quick European tactics where they could not decisive victory, the leaders attempted to possibly work.”57 If the leaders in 1836 had implement national policy through military been familiar with current joint doctrine, action. The commanders demonstrated, to

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would they have used it? Would it have students do not know the joint doctrine and mattered? are not wedded to it, the joint doctrine actually challenges their institutional The Tao of the Alternative View service-centric tactical-level paradigms. Joint doctrine (and by extension, joint A goal of joint professional military education) provides an alternative frame of education phase II is for joint field grade and reference to challenge what they have senior officers to think critically and learned at the tactical level. Students are not creatively, analytically and synthetically, at constrained by the language of doctrine the operational level of war and higher. A because they do not know the doctrine. A concern is that students are mired in a few more generalizations: where Army and service-centric, tactical-level mindset, and Marine officers may know service doctrine, for some students, breaking out of that to the extent that joint doctrine differs from paradigm is difficult business. Another service doctrine, joint doctrine provides an concern is that leaders who will operate at alternative viewpoint. The Army and Air the operational level may not be creative Force officers experience this when trying to enough to “embrace ambiguity” because understand the role of “conditions” or their thinking is constrained by adherence to “effects” as elements of operational design. joint doctrine. Is it true that the language of Joint doctrine developers attempt a synthesis doctrine prevents development of extra- of service doctrines through the consensus doctrinal conceptualizations and frames? development of joint doctrine; however, Do we develop these concepts outside of there are internal logical inconsistencies in doctrine, or in spite of doctrine? If the doctrine which carry over into performance on JPME II pre-course operational decision-making. assessments is a valid indicator, this concern is unwarranted. Student thinking is not Joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publications constrained by joint doctrine because they 3-0 and 5-0, struggle to synthesize current do not know the joint doctrine. Students do best practices and legacy (“institutional”) have a tactical bias, based on their time-tested principles such as the integration experiences; this is the paradigm that JPME of joint functions, elements of operational II seeks to break using historical cases such design, and principles of joint operations. as the Second Seminole War. Officers have One source of friction is the juxtaposition of not had the time or inclination to read and the paradigm of “ends, ways and means” reflect on joint doctrine (“it’s only a lot of with the abductive reasoning that is required reading if you do it”). In their joint in a complex world. Doctrine is goal- assignments, they have not had to find the oriented and depends heavily on the best practices unless an emergent situation relationship of action to result, cause and calls for it or they will be teaching it to effect. Current joint doctrine provides a others. Officers are seldom able to complete glimpse into this challenge when it states: the doctrinal and other reading assignments, “The proximate cause of effects in complex and reflect on them, in the manner intended situations can be difficult to predict. Even by the JPME II institutions; this is borne out direct effects in these situations can be more by years of post-course student surveys. difficult to create, predict, and measure, particularly when they relate to moral and An interesting result of this shallow cognitive issues (such as religion and the treatment of doctrine is that because the “mind of the adversary,” respectively).

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Indirect effects in these situations often are discretely. The real issue is that legacy difficult to foresee.”58 At the philosophical terms like the elements of operational design level, this relates to issues of teleology, reflect an older logic that no longer fits ontology and epistemology. The logic that contemporary conditions. Concepts like manifests itself in joint doctrine describes a conflict termination are arguably more tension between an Aristotelian perspective important than ever, yet seem to have of cause and effect and a Heraclitian dissipated in the current doctrine. The perspective of constant flow and change. continuing cottage industry of debate about Joint doctrine may be leaning more toward “center of gravity” in deliberate planning for Heraclitus as it emphasizes “red teaming”59 contingencies and theater campaign and says things like: planning reflects a discontinuity that begs for appropriate synthesis. “Lines of …the commander must empower operation” are giving way to “lines of organizational learning and develop effort” that reflect a transition from an older methods to determine if modifying the logic geared toward linearity to a newer operational approach is necessary during logic that acknowledges non-linearity. The the course of an operation. This requires Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, continuous assessment and reflection that developed to complement Joint Publication challenge understanding of the existing 5-0’s efforts, highlights the paradigmatic problem and the relevance of actions conflict with its attempt to write “effects” addressing that problem.60 out of the vernacular and blurs the distinction between conditions, objectives Is joint doctrine the right venue, or Joint and end states.62 Historical cases such as Publication 5-0 the best place, for the Second Seminole War are developed to explicating the philosophy and theory teach the elements of operational design; to behind operational design? If so, is the the extent that effort is successful, description of operational design sufficient? paradoxically, the risk of constrained creativity may be increased. …you showed students a guitar, showed them a few cords, let them strum a few What should cause more concern is where minutes and now they are going to walk out the institutional paradigm of doctrine is the door thinking they are musicians. Those really in force: within the cadre of JPME II of us who depend on OD [operational instructors. JPME II instructors seldom design] for planning on a daily basis will have actually used joint doctrine, except now have to deal with the monsters you have when they teach it. The group that may be created for the rest of our careers. And since most constrained by doctrine is the civilian they passed a test...there will be no way to educators, those who retired from active convince them.61 duty military jobs teaching joint doctrine and now teach it as civilians. They may The problem is not necessarily the well- have the most difficult time breaking out of intentioned attempt to infuse Joint the paradigm. One challenge is the Publication 5-0 with more design-oriented requirement to produce a JPME II- aspects. This has been a trend since 2006, certificated officer on an assembly-line when mission analysis included some design model that tends toward a vocational elements, to 2011, when these elements and emphasis vice an educational emphasis and mission analysis were broken out more yields “products.” All is not lost on the

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front line of instructors, however; these look, deliberately, at situations differently in instructors, through years of experience order to increase that understanding, to the teaching new students, have generally point of uncovering problems with the become masters of their craft. This mastery structure of thinking about situations at a enables them to step outside of the joint theoretical level, it is these instructors who doctrinal paradigm and look at situations will lead the way to determine the from different perspectives. If the purpose appropriate relationship between doctrine of operational design is to create better and design, consistency and creativity. understanding, and the Tao of design is to

1 ("Self-Reliance" 1847) 28 ("A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure: The 2 (“The Relation of Dress to Art" 1885) Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War" 2011, 3 ("Self-Reliance" 1847) 66) 4 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) 29 ("A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure: The 5 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War" 2011, 6 (JP 1 2011, IV-3) 66) 7 (The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for Design 30 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 2006, 20) 1842 1967, 61) 8 (Prolegomena: The Structure of Operational 31 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- Revolution 2009, 111) 1842 1967, 63-64) 9 (JP 1 2011, IV-5) 32 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 10 (Prolegomena: The Structure of Operational 1842 1967, 67) Revolution 2009, 107) 33 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 11 (Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained 2007, 1842 1967, 61) 67) 34 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 12 (Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained 2007, 1842 1967, 75) 73) 35 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 13 (JP 3-0 2006, chg1 2008, III-3 to III-4) 1842 1967, 76) 14 (Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020 36 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 2013) 1842 1967, 76) 15 ("President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison: 37 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- February 27, 1803" 2000) 1842 1967, 87-88) 16 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 38 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 19) 1842 1967, 93-94) 17 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 39 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 72) 1842 1967, 94) 18 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 9-11) 40 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 19 (Osceola and the Great Seminole War 2012, 17) 1842 1967, 94) 20 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 16) 41 (Jackson, "Message to the Seminoles" 1836) 21 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 42 (Staff Ride Handbook for Dade's Battle, Florida, 28 1842 1967, 25) December 1835 2013, 31) 22 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 43 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 25) 1842 1967, 99) 23 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 27) 44 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 24 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 102) 1842 1967, 26) 45 (The War in Florida: Being an Exposition of It's 25 (CMH Pub 30-21 2009, 152) causes, and an Accurate History of the Campaigns of 26 (Florida's Seminole Wars 1817-1858 2003, 40) Generals Clinch, Gaines and Scott 1836, 99) 27 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 46 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 31-32) 1842 1967, 106)

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56 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 47 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 196) 1842 1967, 103) 57 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 48 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 161) 1842 1967, 108) 58 (JP 5-0 2011, III-21) 49 (The Seminole Wars: America's Longest Indian 59 (JP 5-0 2011, III-4, III-5) Conflict 2004, 97) 60 (JP 5-0 2011, III-3) 50 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 61 (Student 2014) 1842 1967, 112) 62 (Joint Staff 2011) 51 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- 1842 1967, 138) 52 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- Author Biography 1842 1967, 138) 53 (Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare in the Stephen Dennis is an Assistant Professor in Everglades 1835-1842 1975, 19) the Joint and Combined Warfighting School 54 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- (JCWS) of the Joint Forces Staff College 1842 1967, 139) 55 (The History of the Second Seminole War 1835- (JFSC), and a retired U.S. Naval officer. 1842 1967, 168)

Campaigning Spring 2015 16 Project the False and Protect the increasingly certain, decisive, and grossly Real: Deceiving Hitler in incorrect about the friendly course of action. FORTITUDE SOUTH However, it is also a textbook example of how planners can combine the disciplines of

MILDEC and OPSEC by emphasizing and By CDR Michael M. Posey protecting key indicators. Control of

indicators, bits

of information Operations Security (OPSEC) is often that can be relegated to an afterthought. Do not leave pieced together your security badge on outside the building. to create Do not throw personally identifiable evidence of information in the trash. Do not discuss friendly actions, deployment information at the bus stop. proved Through ubiquitous training, have we lost instrumental in our understanding of the tenets of OPSEC? selling the Have we taken a discipline designed to blind deception story and deafen our adversary and turned it into to Hitler and his standard operating procedure (SOP) while German high ignoring its value at the operational level? command, the When paired with deception, the value of Oberkommando Symbol of the fictitious 1st United OPSEC as a complementary discipline der Wehrmacht States Army Group (FUSAG). becomes evident. Through the most complex (OKW). Actual and successful case study of deception, Allied disposition of forces and intentions FORTITUDE SOUTH,1 we can see the how were proactively guarded. OPSEC played a the Allies applied proactive OPSEC as vital role in ensuring that only the desired, countermeasures to operational misleading indicators, like the existence of vulnerabilities. the fabricated one-million soldier-strong 1st

U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) were presented FORTITUDE SOUTH, the WWII operation to Hitler, while actual invasion preparations designed to convince Hitler that an Allied remained hidden. 4 By carefully projecting invasion of Europe would land at Pas de certain indicators using various MILDEC Calais instead of Normandy, was one of the means, and protecting others with carefully most successful military deceptions controlled OPSEC measures, the Allies were (MILDEC) in history.2 However, it could able to shape Hitler’s perception of the not have occurred without the essential operational environment, causing him to secrecy afforded through strict OPSEC. misallocate resources, notably keeping the FORTITUDE SOUTH not only set Fifteenth Army fixed at Pas de Calais. favorable conditions for the initial “D-Day” Hoodwinking Hitler required the Allies to landing on June 6, 1944, but the operation correctly portray false indicators while convinced the Germans that the Normandy protecting key truthful indicators. invasion was just a feint while the main

attack would occur several weeks later at An indicator is information that is Pas de Calais.3 MILDEC planners often characteristic of an activity.5 Adversaries study FORTITUDE SOUTH as a classic piece indicators together like puzzle pieces example of an ambiguity-decreasing military to create evidence of friendly activities, deception, which caused the adversary to be

Campaigning Spring 2015 17 intentions, or capabilities. Vulnerabilities information by observing friendly activities, exist when adversary decision makers gain and disrupting the adversary’s decision- the initiative based on the indicators they making process.11 OPSEC protects certain can piece together, process, analyze, and indicators “to create an information subsequently act upon in a timely manner. vacuum” that can be filled with deception. However, by sowing the seeds of deception, Examining FORTITUDE SOUTH, one can indicators can become a friendly advantage. see how the Allies misled the adversarial How? Uncertainty pervades all military military decision maker, Hitler, to believe operations because it is impossible to gather the deception story. enough information in time to create certainty.6 Human beings, being unable to FORTITUDE SOUTH’s deception story understand the entire complex, real suggested that Allied forces would invade environment, must create situational Pas de Calais in July. The Allies created the awareness, or representative pictures in our imaginary FUSAG, led by the minds by “selecting, rearranging, tracing swashbuckling, well-respected Patton, patterns upon and stylizing” key bits of through a variety of MILDEC means. These information, e.g. indicators.7 As such, transmission means included double agents, friendly decision makers must vigilantly part of the Twenty Committee (or Double ensure the right intelligence exists to build a Cross, XX Committee) whose agents fed the picture of the adversary so that friendly Germans misinformation. One XX member, forces can plan and conduct operations.8 For Von Loop, informed the Germans of the example, without ULTRA, the Top Secret influx of U.S. soldiers, all phantom, into decryption tool that allowed the Allies to Dover.12 Another double agent, Popov, gave decipher the German’s technical German intelligence the FUSAG’s order of communications, Allied forces would have battle.13 The most famous of all the double been unable to assess FORTITUDE agents, Garcia, known by his codename SOUTH’s effectiveness as they executed the GARBO, fed the Abwehr the actual date and deception. Likewise, by controlling time of OVERLORD’s amphibious assault, indicators, friendly forces can exploit an yet did so too late for the Germans to act adversary’s imperfect picture of the upon it. With his credibility established, operational environment. This proves GARBO’s future messages misled the OKW especially useful when friendly forces know to believe that the Normandy invasion was an adversary decision maker’s pre-existing merely an Allied feint.14 Additionally, biases well enough to ensure he sees what he pictures of British officials visiting the area is predisposed to already believe. along with letters about women in Southern England corrupted by foreign troops were In this case, Hitler was predisposed to “leaked” to local British newspapers that believe the Allies would attack at the Pas de eventually made their way to the German Calais.9 He believed its beaches to be ideal high command through neutral ports like for an amphibious assault, being closest to Lisbon.15 the British shore. Additionally, Hitler knew success at Calais would allow the Allies to The Allies furthered the masquerade by quickly advance to Berlin via Paris, a visualizing every way the FUSAG could be mirror-image of how Hitler advanced observed by German intelligence and west.10 OPSEC and MILDEC both seek to providing visual and auditory indicators of limit the adversary’s ability to derive useful its existence. They filled the electromagnetic

Campaigning Spring 2015 18 spectrum with simulated radio traffic.16 Nazi forces, specifically the Panzer tank They created tent cities, used smoke divisions, he was the deception target for machines to simulate cooking, and FORTITUDE SOUTH. Although many of constructed a staggering number of false these deception means would be uncovered tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft— by today’s technology, like space-based creating the most costly, in economic terms, intelligence assets, the Allies considered the MILDEC in history.17 They crafted sound capabilities of German reconnaissance and tracks played through loudspeakers that applied OPSEC measures accordingly. filled the air with a cacophony of action.18 During the night, the Allies used deceptive OPSEC supported the deception story by lighting to further their ruse.19 Additionally, ensuring that unclassified information, in the the Allies employed a version of “detainee form of indicators, remained protected from seeding” to the ailing, unwitting Nazi “Hitler’s eyes,” German intelligence. One General Cramer, who was being released OPSEC measure was air defense. Fighters from Britain to Germany. General Cramer allowed German reconnaissance missions to toured southwestern England, the actual fly over the FUSAG at high altitudes to see Allied staging area, while his “talkative and the elaborate visual display (not at low friendly” British escorts “carelessly” told altitudes where details could be seen) while him they were driving past Dover and seeing Allied fighter aircraft vigorously intercepted the FUSAG.20 The ruse continued, even any German aircraft flying over the actual during D-Day. As the assault ships bound staging grounds and ports in southwest for Normandy set sail, a large-scale England.25 To protect the invasion location, diversion headed for Pas de Calais used the Allies conducted twice as many bombing overhead chaff, false radio transmissions, and reconnaissance missions over Pas de and enough dummy ships to concoct two Calais as they did over Normandy.26 Neither “ghost armadas” as the MILDEC means to the pilots flying these missions nor the overwhelm and confuse German radar soldiers who would storm the French operators.21 To confuse the Germans further, beaches were told where the actual invasion the size of the false FUSAG was equal in would occur. The soldiers were issued size to the actual invasion force.22 ambiguous maps and confined to their sausages (staging areas) before the invasion. Leveraging these MILDEC means, the The Allied soldiers’ French “invasion deception goal of FORTITUDE SOUTH money,” which could have let the German’s was to mask the real invasion of Normandy know of an impending invasion, was not on D-Day, increasing OPERATION given out until just a few days prior. By not OVERLORD’s probability of success. disclosing invasion specifics to the troops, Success of the invasion on Fortress Europe the Allies mitigated the risk of accidental hinged on the deception objective: the disclosure. For the same reason, while German Fifteenth Army remaining fixed at simulated radio communications blared in Pas de Calais for several days to allow the the vicinity of the FUSAG, the actual Allied invasion force to land amphibiously sausages for the invasion were on radio and be resupplied. 23 FORTITUDE SOUTH silence. The Allies even tailed Eisenhower’s efforts continued for over a week, until alleged “fling,” Ms. Kay Summersby, as Hitler realized the ruse and moved the part of the effort to ensure no one disclosed Fifteenth Army south from Pas de Calais.24 the deception plans.27 Finally, the Allies As Hitler dictated complete command of all needed to keep quiet about the intentions of

Campaigning Spring 2015 19 man-made harbors that would resupply the ensuring that only the desired, misleading invasion force until a major port could be indicators, were presented to German taken. By not adding any tell-tale resupply intelligence, while actual preparation for the paraphernalia to the makeshift Mulberry invasion remained hidden. Meanwhile, a harbors, the Germans interpreted the giant carefully crafted deception story was concrete blocks at sea to be anti-aircraft conveyed to the German high command by staging areas.28 cleverly projecting certain indicators using various MILDEC means. By manipulating If the Germans knew the true purpose of and protecting key indicators, the Allies these structures, it would be an indicator of shaped Hitler’s perception of the operational the Allies’ actual invasion plans. Other environment. Ultimately, incorrect security protocols were enforced alongside situational awareness caused the German OPSEC to achieve essential secrecy. For military leader to misallocate his resources. instance, physical security placed the entire General Bradley, in an after-action report to FUSAG staging area off limits to all General Eisenhower, noted the civilians. Further, information security overwhelming success of FORTITUDE demanded the highly vetted, centralized SOUTH in fixing at least 20 German group of MILDEC planners employ divisions in the vicinity of Pas de Calais,31 electronic “scramblers” on any telephonic enabling the Allies to establish a beachhead communication.29 So secret were the in Normandy. By controlling the indicators identities of MILDEC planners, they in FORTITUDE SOUTH, the Allies misled referred to themselves as “Bigots” to Hitler until it was too late to act, creating an confuse any Allies without a need to know operational advantage enabling the about the deception, as well as any potential successful Allied invasion of Europe. German spies.30 While physical and information security aided in protecting the plan, carefully construed OPSEC measures controlled key indicators that would have revealed the Allies’ intentions for FORTITUDE SOUTH to Hitler.

The proactive, operational tasks devised by the Allies during FORTITUDE SOUTH went far beyond the basic OPSEC programmatic-level. Instead, these measures focused on blinding the adversary sensors, controlling adversary conduits, and weaving falsehood into the OKW’s operational picture. In other words, the Allied planners built OPSEC into the operational plan to ensure that Hitler was misdirected during the largest amphibious invasion in history.

FORTITUDE SOUTH hoodwinked Hitler, enabling the successful Allied invasion of Normandy. OPSEC played a vital role in

Campaigning Spring 2015 20

1 Jon Latimer, Deception in War, (New York: Overlook Press, 29 Ibid, 138 2001), 205 30 Bigots received their curious name by reversing a stamp of “To 2 Fowler and Nesbit, Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare Gib” that was used on orders for officers headed to Gibraltar to (Journal of Electronic Defense, June 1995), 2 support operations in North Africa in 1942. The title existed to 3 William Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception support essential secrecy. Breur, 149 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 219 31 Brown, Anthony Cave, Bodyguard of Lies (Toronto: Harper and 4 Ibid, 111 Row, 1975), 900 5 Joint Publication 3-13.3, Operations Security, Jan 12, I-1 6 Naval Command and Control Doctrine, 12 7 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion,(Greenbook Publications, LLC 2010) 4 8 Joint Doctrine, 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, I-3 Author Biography 9 Robert Greene, 33 Strategies of War (London: Profile Books, 2006), 304 10 Barbier, Mary, D-day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the CDR Posey is an active duty E-2C Naval Normandy Invasion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 170 Flight Officer with Naval Subspecialty in 11 Joint Doctrine 3-13.4, Military Deception, Jan 12, II-4 12 Breuer, 112 Information Systems and Operations. He 13 Ibid, 118 currently serves as an instructor at the Joint 14 Stephen Talty, Agent Garbo: The Brilliant Secret Agent who tricked Hitler and Saved D-Day (Boston: HMH Books, 2012), 167 Command, Control and Information 15 Breuer, 116 Operations School, teaching joint, 16 Ibid, 177 17 Barton Whaley, “The 1% Solution: Costs and Benefits of interagency, and multi-national information Military Deception,” Information Strategy and Warfare (New operations planning to mid-grade officers York: Routledge, 2007), 131 18 Ibid, 114 and civilian equivalents. He holds the 19 Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the academic titles of Assistant Professor and Second World War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 536 20 Breuer, 160 Master Faculty and is the course director for 21 Ibid, 201 the Defense Military Deception Training 22 Latimer, xx 23 Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign Course at JFSC. He can be reached at (New York: Overlook, 2000), 118 [email protected] 24 Breuer, 236 25 Ibid, 185 26 Holt, 551 27 Breuer ,140 28 Ibid, 149

Campaigning Spring 2015 21 Operational Assessment and the Commanders can view these assessments Commander’s Decision Cycle against their operational vision and intent to adjust operations to meet their objectives and By Mr. Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, end state. and Lt Col Richard Collins Current joint doctrine discusses assessments In the 2000 National Football League Draft, but provides no defined process or tool for Tom Brady was the 199th pick overall. He the conduct of these assessments nor does it was the 7th quarterback picked that year. discuss the requirement to devote resources None of the quarterbacks picked before him to the conduct of the assessment. This have demonstrated the leadership and statement has been reinforced in recent joint capabilities he has through his career; in fact, publications and articles: only two of those six are still in the league today and those as back-ups. Why did Tom “Planning processes supporting design do Brady go so low in the draft yet his not resolve problems identified within today’s subsequent performance clearly demonstrated assessment practices …”i and “…the current that he was the best quarterback available? operational assessment process in joint The pre-draft report stated he had a poor doctrine is inadequate for the joint force build and was very skinny. Even after commander to conduct adequate gaining 16 pounds since the end of his senior assessment.…”ii season at Michigan, the report said he looked frail and lacked physical stature and strength. Therefore, the current commander’s decision It further stated that he could get pushed cycle and the operational assessment process down easily, lacked the mobility and ability must be reassessed to ensure consistent, to avoid the rush, lacked a strong arm and a repeatable assessments. tight spiral, and couldn’t drive the ball down Background the field. Essentially the teams evaluating Tom Brady looked hard at the statistics, what The word “assessment” means many we refer to as the Measures of Performance different things to different people, in operational assessment. However, these dependent upon the context. For the purpose teams didn’t look at how well he played and of this discussion, we will use the definitions how he continually led his team to comeback from Joint Publication 3-0 (Operations): victories. They failed to base their assessment on the Measures of Effectiveness, another “1. A continuous process that measures the key component in operational assessment. overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Operational Assessment is a key input and Determination of the progress toward component of the Joint Force Commander’s accomplishing a task, creating a condition, Decision Cycle. The operational assessment or achieving an objective.”iii process helps commanders see a direct linkage between the missions they assign to The operational assessment can help the subordinate commands and the effects and commander know the answers to four critical objectives laid out in the plan. The process questions: 1) “Are we meeting our helps commanders to determine not just if objectives?” 2) “Do we need to change what they are doing things right but, more we are doing tactically to achieve our effects importantly, if they are doing the right things. and objectives?” 3) “Do we need to change

Campaigning Spring 2015 22 what we are measuring & observing to see if and the people and their economic livelihood our actions are correct?” 4) “Are we nearing unthreatened. the culmination point that allows the Joint Force to disengage, and/or to re-focus our efforts towards different objectives or missions?”

An assessment mechanism built on a defined and repeatable methodology with a mix of observable qualitative and quantitative indicators adds credibility to the process and the product. Both Commander Robert Michael, in his paper: “Effective Operational Assessment: A Return to the Basics”iv and Army Field Manual 5-0 recommend that an effective assessment combines, “…quantitative and qualitative indicators … using informal assessment methods with Figure 1: Assessment and the Commander's formal methods.”v Decision Cycle

The Assessment Process The commander’s decision cycle has four Operational assessment is not a new concept; distinct steps: Plan, Direct, Monitor, and commanders have always sought to Assess (Figure 1).vi Operational assessment understand how well they were progressing is a commander-centric process designed to towards mission accomplishment so they support the commander’s decision cycle. The could either reinforce success or refocus process entails three distinct tasks: efforts to gain the initiative. As the continuous monitoring of the situation and operational environment has become more the progress of operations; evaluating the complex and the need for integrated military operation against measures of effectiveness operations has become more prevalent, the and measures of performance to determine assessment process has also become more progress relative to the mission, objectives, complex. Normally, the tactical commander and end states; and developing can assess operations based upon almost recommendation/guidance for improvement. instantaneous feedback from tactical actions, e.g., “did the bomb hit the target?” or “did the force seize the defined objective?” Planning for the Assessment However, commanders at the operational and strategic levels must look beyond “doing Operational assessment is a continuous things right” to help determine if their process and requires continual review of the operations are successful. Not only did the assessment plan—to include validation of the bomb hit the target, but by hitting the target measures and indicators—to provide timely the electrical grid was shut down preventing and appropriate feedback to the commander an enemy armored force from moving on and the planning staff (Figure 2). For the railcars to attack a key city. Thus, the city assessment process to support the safe from attack, the government protected, commander, the assessment must be planned

Campaigning Spring 2015 23 for as part of the overall planning process. be measured, not everything that can be Assessment planning is normally conducted measured. As a general rule of thumb staffs during the Joint Operation Planning Process should develop 3-5 MOE per effect. (JOPP) by the Joint Planning Group/Operational Planning Team (JPG/OPT). As the JPG/OPT develops the approved objectives and effects for the joint force they will begin to examine how the operation should be assessed. The planning effort lead may direct the formation of Effects Development and Assessment Cells during the planning process. The Effects Development Cell will consider the objectives and develop effects which will help to achieve them; they will also examine and define the undesired effects which may be created in the operation.vii

During the planning process the Assessment Figure 2: Assessment Plan Steps Cell will develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for each of the identified effects (desired and undesired) to determine if For each MOE, a set of indicators (MOE- actions taken are having an impact (effect) on Indicators or MOEI) are developed by the the system intended. In short, they help Assessment Cell. These indicators are the determine if the command is “doing the right “metric” used for a specific activity. The thing.” Measures of Performance (MOP) are assessment may use a mix of qualitative used to determine if tactical actions taken are (opinion based) and quantitative (observation taken properly. They are a measure of the based) indicators. These indicators help to success of a particular action—i.e., “doing determine if the MOE trend supports things right.” Typically MOPs are used by achieving the desired effect. The assessment the current operations staff (J33) to track team may also need to find country specific successful completion of missions while the or focus area expertise when selecting MOEs are used by the Assessment Cell to indicators to makes sure they are appropriate. help track progress towards achieving an assigned effect and objective. Indicators help identify assessment-based collection requirements and need to be OEs measure or identify the trends and integrated into the collection plan. Forces should be expressed in terms of increase or deployed in the operational environment can decrease. Using this format eliminates the help the assessment process by gathering common error of confusing an MOE- information in their normal observations that Indicator for an MOE at this level. help to answer specific indicators. Examples: Additionally, MOEs do not measure “Blue” “# of hospital beds in use at local medical or Coalition actions; they are focused on the facilities,” “# of hospital beds available for system behavior, state or capabilities. When use at local medical facilities,” or “# of local building an assessment, it is important to business operating.” remember to measure the things that need to

Campaigning Spring 2015 24 These inputs, when compiled with other accomplishment and the achievement of the observations for the same indicator (or coupled desired effect. Since there is not a direct with other indicators), help to develop a picture correlation between performance on tactical of the environment that serves to show a trend. tasks and mission accomplishment, the That trend may support an objective Effect— assessment process must look at all aspects of “Medical facility capabilities are able to performance to develop an overarching view provide essential services without US military for the commander. assistance” or a subjective Effect— “Local government improves the security environment For the assessment process to support the allowing restoration of daily life.” See Figure 3 Commander’s Decision Cycle, resources must for the relationship between indicators, MOEs, be dedicated to development of the assessment effects, and objectives.viii framework and to the conduct of the assessment. These resources come from across the staff for the development of the framework and for the tracking of inputs from the indictors and trends for each of the MOE. In addition to staff elements involved in the assessment, other elements within the command will be involved in the process through the indicators.

Figure 3: Measurement of Effectiveness Example

After building the assessment, it is important to

periodically revalidate the MOE and MOEI to balance the changing measures with the Figure 4 - Interpretation of generalized requirement to establish a consistent measure operational-assessment resultsix that follow-on analysis can be based upon. Figure 4 provides a graphic view of how high performance on tactical tasks may not lead to Organizing for Assessments achievement of operational effects and objectives. Conversely, low performance on There are a number of people from across the tactical tasks can still achieve excellent results command with key roles in the operational towards achievement of the effects. Using this assessment process. The most important of example, it becomes apparent where resources these, as stated previously, is the commander. are needed or being wasted on tactical tasks. In The Commander leverages staff addition, it depicts the relationship of how the recommendations and inputs as well as tactical tasks affect overall mission subordinate command assessments along with his own circulation across the operating

Campaigning Spring 2015 25 environment, discussions with the varied constant. The trend tracked by the MOE may stakeholders and his own experience and show continual progress in a positive instincts to formulate his personal assessment direction then stall or even temporarily of the situation. reverse. This does not mean that the joint force is not doing the right thing; it may The Chief of Staff guides the staff work in indicate temporary changes in the the assessment effort to help the commander environment have stalled progress and the with his decision making process. Although positive trend may begin again. the quantitative expertise of an operational research officer is critical to the assessment When the trend analysis indicates the desired team, a team chief with recent operational effects are being achieved, the commander experience and a broad operational may direct that actions or tasks continue as perspective is necessary to align and guide planned. When the trend analysis indicates the assessment activities to support the that there is insufficient progress towards commander. achieving desired effects (or that friendly actions are resulting in undesired effects), the Many commands have recognized the assessors may initiate a deficiency analysis importance of broadening stakeholder inputs with the planners, analysts and relevant into the assessment process. Commands have subject matter experts that will result in included members of the interagency recommendations to the planners and community, coalition partners, non- ultimately the commander. The plan may governmental organization members, and then be adjusted following the local representatives to enrich the inputs and recommendations derived from the quality of the assessment. During the assessment processes. execution phase of operations a cross- Assessment Capabilities in the Joint Force functional team from across the staff may need to be brought together to collect the Beginning in 2007, United States Joint assessment inputs from the assigned Forces Command fielded the Global indicators, track the trends for the MOEs and Synchronization Tool (GST) for use by the formulate the staffs assessment inputs. This combatant commands as an assessment tool.x team may have to brief the commander on The first operational use of the GST was in the recommended assessment inputs and the spring of 2008 for the conduct of the participate in the deficiency analysis to Integrated Assessment of Supporting Plans support the “what’s next” discussion with the (IASP) conducted by SOCOM to support the planning staff. Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Campaign Assessment (GCA). Each Decision Cycle Review Geographic Combatant Command used GST to facilitate input of its data and rationale in Presented with the results of the assessment, conduct of GWOT in its region. Global the Commander provides guidance to the analysis of this information led to planners to determine the future course of the recommended changes in GWOT planning operation. It is imperative operational and and operations. The GST continued to evolve strategic level staffs and commanders to meet the growing need for a robust, global, recognize when they develop the assessment web-based planning and assessment framework that progress towards achieving capability. It soon became the primary the effect may be neither instantaneous nor assessment tool for Joint Task Force and

Campaigning Spring 2015 26 Theater Campaign Planning for United States capabilities of the individual staff officer, not European Command, Pacific Command, and a repeatable process and format. Africa Command. Recommendations for Future Assessment Efforts The GST was originally designed as a suite of tools to assist planners in developing a The Department of Defense should develop a systems perspective of the operational defined and easily understood assessment environment. The tools would assist the process that is repeatable across commands, commander in examining likely adversary geographic areas and the range of military objectives and to promote consideration of operations. This process should address both Diplomatic, Informational, Military and the individual elements of the assessment Economic actions against key relationships, framework and the requirements for strengths, and vulnerabilities of the assignment of appropriate resources to build adversarial systems. Since that early this framework in conjunction with the development, the tools were later expanded operational planning process. The personnel to include the steps of the Joint Operations assigned to assessment efforts must Planning Process and an operational understand the process, the operational assessment capability to provide the approach, and the specifics of the plan. commander input from multiple sources in Assessors need access to the planning team to formulating his assessment. best understand how the operation is envisioned, and to the commander to relate The GST was a web-based set of tools, their findings and recommendations. owned by the US Government and hosted on SIPRNET servers at US Joint Forces To support this process, the Department Command and accessible by all joint should field a tool to support the assessment commands. Extensive field testing and process with the capability to tie together the instruction took place at each of the understanding of the operational geographic combatant commands; so much environment, the operational planning so that the commands began looking for new process, and operational assessments while ways to use GST to assess their plans. On taking inputs from across the staff and occasion, the GST was loaded onto “stand multiple organizations within the joint force. alone” laptop computers to allow use of the The Global Synchronization Tool, which is tool in a disconnected, degraded, or coalition already owned by the United States environment.xi Government and has received significant field testing, could be rapidly activated and Unfortunately, the GST program was fielded for use in the field to support this cancelled when United States Joint Forces effort. Command was disbanded. Since that time, commands are using internally built Excel Assessments are ultimately a commander’s spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides to build tool to synchronize efforts across the their assessment frameworks and track the command and ensure mission success. It inputs from the indicators to provide should include functionality for both assessment recommendations to the Joint subjective and objective measures as well as Force Commander. These common tools may the ability to display results via graphical or provide a view for the commander but the as a table. This tool must have the ability to development of the product is tied to the conduct operational assessments and merge

Campaigning Spring 2015 27 them with higher HQ campaign plan Conclusion assessments. Plan and assessment integration provides combatant commanders and Assessment is essential to the successful subordinate commanders a shared and more execution of planning since the environment complete view of their AOR and their in which the plan was developed is constantly operations. changing. Every operational commander, regardless of level, wants and needs to know In addition, Robert Michael’s how the command is doing in terms of recommendation in “Effective Operational mission accomplishment. The staff should Assessment,”xii highlights key develop a method for collecting information recommendations. Using various historical required to provide the commander an examples, Michael stresses the following: assessment recommendation for the operation. The operational assessment is the - Avoid measuring activities and collecting commander’s view of how the mission is metrics just because it can be collected; progressing; the commander must make the they must be applicable to the operational decision to either continue the operation objectives and desired effects according to the current plan or to alter the - Combine quantitative and qualitative effort in some manner—be that in the tools indicators and organizations used to accomplish tasks in - Use informal assessment methods with support of the mission or if the mission must formal assessment methods be altered. - Avoid excessive and overly detailed collection of metrics By building effects and MOEs for each objective, commanders can see a direct The main premise of the paper is well linkage to the tasks they assign to subordinate captured in the last sentence of this paper: commands. It helps them to determine not “…the Joint Staff must institutionalize these just if they are doing things right but, more basic principles in a well-defined process importantly, if they are doing the right things. through joint doctrine.…”xiii Building an assessment on a defined and repeatable method adds credibility to the process and the product. It also gives the Commander confidence in the recommendations received from the staff before making operational decisions.

i Douglas J. MacIntyre, "Operational Assessment," Execution (Suffolk, VA: Department of Defense, Marine Corps Gazette, (2011), 17-22. 2011). vii ii Robert J. Michael, Robert J. II, "Effective Ibid. viii Operational Assessment: A Return to the Basics." Ibid. ix (Naval War College, 2010), 29. Clinton R. Clark and Timothy J. Cook, "A Practical iii Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations Approach to Effects-Based Operational Assessment," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011). Air & Space Power Journal (2008), 82-99. x iv Michael, 29. United States Joint Forces Command, Design in v Ibid. Military Operations: A Primer for Joint Warfighters, vi Joint Staff, J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting. (Suffolk, VA: Department of Defense, 2010). xi Commanders Handbook for Assessment Planning and Ibid. xii Michael, 29. xiii Ibid.

Campaigning Spring 2015 28 commissioned through ROTC at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Team Biographies: (VPI&SU) in 1993 with a BS in Civil Engineering; he later returned to VPI&SU to Mr. Michael McGonagle, DAF Civilian. earn a MS in Civil Engineering (2002) and a Mr. McGonagle is currently serving as Ph.D. in Industrial and Systems Engineering Technical Director, Joint Planning Support (2011). Prior to his current assignment, LTC Element, Joint Enabling Capabilities Chamberlayne was the District Commander Command, in US Transportation Command. of the Charleston District, US Army Corps of He is a graduate of the US Army Officer Engineers. Candidate School and retired from active service in 2000. Mr. McGonagle earned a Lt Col Rich Collins, USAF. Lt Col Collins BS in Criminal Justice from the American is currently serving as Commander 682 Air Technological University in 1986 and an MS Support Operations Squadron, Ft Bragg NC. in Strategic and National Security Studies He was commissioned through United States from the Naval War College in 2010. Prior Air Force ROTC in 1994. Lt Col Collins to his current assignment, Mr. McGonagle earned a BS in Aviation Management from served as Program Manager for the Global Southern Illinois University in 1994, and an Synchronization Tool at US Joint Forces MA in Military Science and Management Command. from Trident University in 2007. Prior to his current assignment, Lt Col Collins served as Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. the Deputy Corps ALO, 18th Air Support Chamberlayne, Ph.D., P.E., USA. LTC Operations Group, Ft Bragg NC. Chamberlayne is currently serving as the Program Integration Branch Chief of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, HQ Department of the Army. He was

Campaigning Spring 2015 29 Mission Command at the Battle of empowers individuals to exercise judgment Yorktown in how they carry out their assigned tasks and it exploits the human element in joint By COL Jerry A. Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, operations emphasizing trust, force of will, and LTC Gregory S. Trahan initiative, judgment, and creativity. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise The operational artist who best applies the disciplined initiative, acting aggressively key attributes of mission command— and independently to accomplish the understanding, intent, and trust—is more mission. Orders are focused on the purpose likely to win the day. The United States of the operation rather than the details of military is attempting to codify “mission how to perform assigned tasks. Essential to command” into joint doctrine and practice. mission command is the thorough To those outside of the military or knowledge and understanding of the uninformed by history, it may appear that commander’s intent at every level of mission command is a new concept based on command and a command climate of mutual modern technology and the complexity of trust and understanding. Under mission the current environment. This is simply a command, commanders issue mission type matter of presentism and is unjustified. The orders, use implicit communications, and truth is that those great captains, throughout delegate most decisions to subordinates history, who have practiced mission wherever possible.2 command, have largely been successful while those who have not are largely Although this is a much better description doomed to failure. An analysis of the battle than the DOD definition, the key attributes of Yorktown, and the application of mission of mission command are buried under an command by the generals on both sides of avalanche of words and ideas on command the fighting will test this hypothesis. and control, resources, and sustainment. General Martin Dempsey’s White Paper on The current definition of mission command Mission Command more effectively lays out in the Department of Defense simply does the key attributes of mission command. In a not accurately depict current thought on few pages, General Dempsey describes the mission command for the Joint Force. The future operational environment, the definition is overly simplistic: “The conduct commander’s role in mission command, the of military operations through decentralized key attributes of mission command, how to execution based upon mission-type instill mission command, and the way ahead. orders.”1This type of oversimplification Although all are equally important to does not get to the heart of mission understanding mission command, it is really command and provides little understanding. his discussion of the key attributes of In addition to the simple definition, JP 3-31 mission command that provides the heart of does further describes mission command: understanding: understanding, intent, and As joint land operations tend to become trust.3 Using these three key attributes of decentralized, mission command becomes mission command, the Battle of Yorktown is the preferred method of C2. Mission examined. command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. It

Campaigning Spring 2015 30 Mission Command Among the Allies? would ultimately align joint efforts for victory. From these deliberations, the Allied The movements and decisions of the Allies leadership gained shared context on the (American Colonial, French, and Spanish Necessity of Naval Supremacy, the forces) culminating in the strategic allied importance of Survival, Timing, and victory at Yorktown effectively illustrate the Command and Control. application of the principles of mission command. Even without a unified military Necessity of Naval Supremacy. The command structure, the ability to conduct foundations for the Allied victory at successful joint operations against the forces Yorktown in 1781 were being laid as early of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown was as 1759 when the French King, upon facilitated by the unity of effort of Franco- recommendations of his advisors, set out American forces.4 By developing a common upon a strategic investment establishing understanding and shared context of the French Naval supremacy. In March of 1759, type of engagement for victory against the the Duc de Choiseul wrote in a letter to the British forces, General Washington, and his French Ambassador to Sweden, “The true subordinate leaders, were able to develop a balance of power really resides in commerce clearly defined intent. Coupled with the and in America…” and that naval careful development of trust among these supremacy and fighting “the true war, the nations’ military leaders, a time-constrained, war upon the seas and in America…” was yet highly successful joint campaign at the only way to restore French prestige.6 His Yorktown and in the waters of the arguments led to an unprecedented Chesapeake Bay and the Virginia Capes investment in building a large, capable occurred. The success of the allies in French naval force. The return on this applying the key attributes of mission investment occurred over two decades later command allowed the decentralized when the leaders of the Allied forces execution of a joint operation, which yielded developed a strategy for victory that was a strategic victory that brought a successful completely dependent upon the interruption end to the American Revolutionary War. of Britain’s command of the sea off the coast of America. Understanding Throughout the first five years of the War, In mission command, a bottom-up and top- the American Revolutionary armies under down understanding must be obtained the command of General Washington through a co-creation of the operational executed a strategy of survival, avoiding environment. This shared context will set direct conflict that could result in the the stage for intent.5 The Allies worked complete defeat of the fledgling army. tirelessly in the lead up to Yorktown to Washington and his generals had a shared establish a solid shared understanding of understanding that they did not have the their operational environment and forces capable of meeting and defeating the operational approach to defeating the British in a decisive battle. However, while British. Critical to the development of holding these forces together through sheer understanding was a conscientious effort to will and sense of purpose, he continually meet in person, to use letters to inform each sought for the right circumstances to win other of changes in situation, to debate such a decisive battle. Observing the British strategy, and to converge on an answer that advantage of maneuver because of their

Campaigning Spring 2015 31 command of the sea, Washington developed setbacks while obtaining the occasional a contextual position that the Allied armies victory against the British. These early would not prevail until the balance of power victories ultimately provided the French and at sea could be shifted. Washington Spanish Governments reason to believe the considered naval superiority “as a Revolution could actually survive and fundamental principle, and the basis upon succeed. This belief allowed the French and which every hope of success must ultimately Spanish to risk supporting the rebel cause in depend.”7 the hopes an American victory would set the British Empire back and restore a balance of General Marquis de Lafayette echoed this power to Europe. Washington was the shared understanding in his reports to Comte supreme commander of the colonial armies, de Rochambeau, the assigned leader of a but it was extremely difficult for him to French expeditionary force of 6,000 soldiers exercise his authority over large distances being sent to America to fight under the with poor means of communication. As a direction of General Washington. Lafayette result, his generals exercised a considerable informed the Count that there would be no amount of independent authority10 based on success until and unless the Allies controlled what today is called mission command. American waters.8 In 1780 Lafayette wrote to his French ministers, “Situated and Setting the example for his generals, disposed as America now is, it is essential to Washington led multiple daring escapes that the interest as well as the honor of France established the shared “can do” mindset that our flag reign on these seas, that the among his generals. This mindset ultimately campaign be decisive, and that it begin next proved vital right up until the siege of spring…With naval superiority we can do Yorktown, when Lafayette used this mindset everything, without it we can do to avoid a major engagement with superior nothing…With a naval inferiority, it is British forces under Lord Cornwallis in impossible to make war in America.”9 The Virginia, while keeping the British allied leadership agreed that the formula for landlocked in Yorktown as he awaited the ultimate victory was a decisive battle that combined forces of Washington and entailed sufficient land forces attacking a Rochambeau. As Larrabee stated, “…as British Army blocked from escape by the long as Washington and his army were in sea due to Allied naval superiority. While the field and not dispersed or annihilated, developing a vison for a battle for New York the core of the independence movement that never took place, Washington and his lived and endured; and no amount of British generals generated a common understanding victories in detail could add up to a winning of how success was to be attained if the of the war.”11 This shared principle of circumstances presented the right survival allowed time to present the opportunity. opportunity for a decisive victory to the Allied forces. Survival. While diplomatic efforts to obtain French and Spanish support continued for Time is of the Essence. After over five years the first years of the war, General of war in which the colonial forces had Washington’s ability to convince his survived but attained no comparative generals that survival of the armies was advantage, the leaders of both the American paramount in all engagements enabled the and French forces started realizing that time Colonial Armies to survive a series of early was of the essence. In May and June of

Campaigning Spring 2015 32 1781, the Count de Rochambeau, General of Command and Control. Following the French armies in America, wrote a significant struggles with Allied command pivotal series of letters to his colleague, and control (C2) during the early years of Admiral de Grasse, operating his French the war, General Washington had squadron of warships in the Caribbean. In established a very clear and orderly C2 these letters, Rochambeau emphasized the structure by 1781. Key to this structure was importance of de Grasse’s timely arrival off the voluntary subordination of senior, more the East Coast of America and that “the state experienced French officers to the command of affairs and the very grave crisis in which of General Washington. Marquis de America, and especially the states of the Lafayette emphasized the importance of this South, finds herself at this particular time. C2 principle when requesting assistance The arrival of M. le Comte de Grasse would from the French. He asked for “a decided save this situation, all the means in our naval superiority for the next campaign” and hands are not enough without his joint pointed out the importance of Rochambeau action and the sea superiority which he is and any other French forces being under able to command…that the Americans are at Washington’s orders without any the end of their resources…I am quite accompanying secret instructions.14 persuaded that you will bring us naval Rochambeau himself made it clear that superiority….”12 Washington “may do with him what he pleased.15 In late summer, highlighting the importance of this critical window of opportunity, This clear C2 structure enabled the leaders Rochambeau again described the decisive to debate, make decisions and efficiently land battle against the British to Admiral de communicate over long distances with slow Grasse, and emphasized the British means of communication to obtain shared requirement of naval superiority for any understanding of their overall approach to chance for success. He offered the Hampton their operations. It also allowed subordinate Roads region and New York as options from officers and troops to understand clearly which de Grasse could choose to establish who the decision makers were, freeing them local maritime superiority and that the to act when operational decisions were Allied land forces would act upon this made. French and American allies achieved decision. In subsequent correspondence harmonious teamwork among their leaders between de Grasse and the Allied Generals, in large part due to the way French officers de Grasse made it clear that he could not of high rank agreed willingly to accept stay one day beyond the end of October orders from generals and admirals to whom 1781 due to his higher priority obligations in they were technically superior.16 the West Indies.13 The stage was now set for a window of opportunity from July to Intent October of 1781 for a decisive battle either in Virginia or New York. This shared Once the foundation of common understanding of the strategic posture of the understanding was established, General Allied forces facilitated a sense of urgency Washington firmly outlined the among the Allied leaders to make a decision commander’s intent for operations prior to culminating in a battle at Yorktown. and leading up to the Battle of Yorktown. The intent he articulated to his leadership was to Survive Until Circumstances

Campaigning Spring 2015 33 Provided Opportunity for a decisive battle execution. The Allied intent was to mass a and to execute a Model for Victory that was land army with siege equipment around a essentially firm at a Time and Place as British Army that was blocked from escape circumstances and opportunity allowed. This and re-supply from the sea by a superior framework of intent enabled his leaders to naval force provided by either the French or maneuver and utilize their forces both on the Spanish. This model was originally land and at sea in a decentralized manner to attempted on a smaller scale in a battle accomplish his strategic and operational where General Washington directed General objectives. Lafayette in February of 1781 to attempt to surround Benedict Arnold’s British Army in Survive Until Circumstances Provide Hampton Roads. Although this attempt Opportunity. In General Dempsey’s failed to trap Arnold’s army due to a failure discussion of mission command, he stated, of the French to take command of the sea in “Commanders will be required to Chesapeake, it proved to be a dress rehearsal understand intent to the level of effect; that for the Battle of Yorktown.19 is, strategic to tactical and across domains.”17 The Allied forces exemplified Flexible Time and Place. With a firm this understanding of intent during the years Model for Victory established by the Allied leading up to and the months directly before leadership, the next key to the ultimate the Battle of Yorktown. The Allied leaders strategic victory at Yorktown was ensuring repeatedly had to make tactical decisions to the intent maintained flexibility in the Time avoid major combat, pull out of combat and and Place of execution. The prevailing even give up potential tactical victories to thought throughout the war was that a ensure Survival to accomplish the strategic decisive battle would be fought against the goal of avoiding destruction of the Army British in New York, a British stronghold. until a decisive strategic victory could be Even up until the summer of 1781, General assured. Early in the war, shared Washington was very focused on executing understanding was attained within the Allied his Model for Victory against the British in force leadership and the intent carried out by New York. The French general, all of Washington’s generals. This intent Rochambeau, played a critical role at this was executed up to the final skirmishes juncture in the war by convincing between Lafayette and Cornwallis in Washington and the American leadership Virginia in the months leading up to the that although the Model for Victory was Battle of Yorktown. right, they should not focus on New York as the place for a decisive battle. In May of Model for Victory Firm. Mission command 1781, Rochambeau wrote the first in a series says that intent provides a “clear and concise of letters that were to change the course of expression of the purpose of the operation history. and the desired military end state.”18 After the first several years of fighting, the Allies Upon his learning that Lord Cornwallis was realized there would be no ultimate victory now in Virginia, he wrote his colleague the against the superior British forces without Count de Grasse about Washington’s plan to gaining naval superiority in at least a limited attack the British in New York once naval region. Washington and his generals decided superiority had been established by the on a Model for Victory that was firm in French. However, he also highlighted that structure but flexible in time and place of Lord Cornwallis’ Southern army was in

Campaigning Spring 2015 34 Virginia and that French naval superiority in vision. The French officers’ ability to the Chesapeake Bay area may also present understand the importance of the rebellion an option to execute their battle plan in being led by American officers was an Virginia. Ultimately, in his letter to de essential element of establishing the shared Grasse, Rochambeau gave de Grasse the understanding of a clear C2 structure for the option of where to establish naval Allied forces. superiority in lieu of directing him to New York.20 This flexibility set the stage for Superior Officer Subordination to Junior Admiral de Grasse to determine where naval Officers. Many cases existed in both the superiority was most likely attained so the American and French forces in which land forces could respond and maneuver as superior and more experienced officers necessary. Ultimately, although Washington subordinated themselves to more junior was set on a decisive battle in New York up officers to accomplish the right team until the late summer of 1781, he, too, dynamics for success. Early in the war this remained flexible to circumstances that caused significant problems for Washington presented the best opportunity for success. within the American army;22 however, His diary on 14 August states,: “Matters Washington learned from this and made having now come to a crisis-and a decisive character and trust a key component of his plan to be determined on-I was obliged, selection of officers to serve under his from the shortness of Count de Grasse’s command. This selectivity of officers promised stay on this coast-the apparent created an environment where trust could disinclination in their naval officers to force enable senior officers to subordinate the harbor of New York…to give up all idea themselves for the right reasons at the right of attacking New York” and to mass troops time. Examples of this presented in Virginia for an attack on Cornwallis.21 themselves within the French forces as well. Admiral de Barras, a senior French Officer, Trust subordinated himself to Admiral de Grasse during the operations in the Chesapeake to General Dempsey rounds out the final ensure continuity of the established C2 element of mission command with stating structure. De Barras wrote, “No one is more that trust informs execution of intent and is interested that I in the arrival of M. de the moral sinew that binds the force when Grasse in these seas. He was my junior…As couples with shared understanding and soon as I know that he is within reach of this intent. In the victory at Yorktown, trust at place, I shall set sail to serve under multiple levels proved to be that vital him….”23 element that enabled the shared understanding and intent of Washington to International Trust. During the early years be realized. of the Revolution, the French and the Spanish stayed on the sidelines waiting to French Subordination to Washington. The see what the American revolutionaries were willingness of proud and more experienced made of and all about. Slowly, through their French officers from a major European operational approach of Survival, the power to subordinate them to the command Americans gained the trust of the French of a young General from an unrecognized and the Spanish that their effort was worth country rebelling against their colonial the risk of inciting British aggression. This masters took tremendous trust and strategic trust allowed an alliance to be established

Campaigning Spring 2015 35 which was vital to the success of the Carolina for Virginia. The second event that Americans in their war for independence. contributed to the American victory was the Other examples of this trust exist which defeat of Vice Admiral Graves, the acting enabled the operational maneuvers required commander of the British Fleet by the to obtain the victory at Yorktown. One key French Admiral De Grasse. While several example was the willingness of the French chance events aligned against the British in to trust the Spanish navy to protect French the summer of 1781, both the decision of interests in the Antilles while the French Cornwallis that led him to initiate operations navy supported Allied land operations off in Virginia and the defeat of the British Fleet the coast of Virginia.24 in September 1781 were preventable. Infighting and jealousy within the British Trust in De Grasse—Key to Victory. chain of command, political gamesmanship Ultimately, the Key to Victory rested in the within the British Parliament, unquestioned trust that Rochambeau directly and assumptions about the nature of the conflict Washington indirectly placed in the Count with the colonists and poor awareness de Grasse. After providing him the intended regarding British naval capability all Model for Victory and emphasizing the need conspired against the British ability to for more troops and cash, Allied leadership exercise the elements of mission command. trusted de Grasse to make the decision that maximized the probability of establishing Understanding conditions for a successful decisive battle. The political tact and strategic vision that de The Chinese general and philosopher, Sun Grasse displayed resulted in achieving a Tzu said, “If you know your enemy and concentration superior to that of the enemy know yourself you need not fear the results at the right time and place. He wrote to of a thousand battles.” At the strategic and Washington and Rochambeau that the operational levels during the British Chesapeake was “the point which appears to expedition to subdue its rebellious colonists, me to be indicated by you…as the one from they failed to understand their enemy and to which the advantage you propose may be a lesser extent their capability. most certainly attained.”25 He fulfilled this At the strategic level, the British chain of trust by establishing naval superiority in the command, key ministers in parliament and Chesapeake by early September, setting the most notably King George III all conditions prerequisite to the Allied Model underestimated colonist resolve to resist the for Victory. British (Larrabee). The king found it inconceivable that the nascent Continental Mission Command Among the British Army and colonial militia could withstand the British Army. King George III The British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown perpetuated group think of British primacy can be attributed to several events of in any engagement with the fledgling “chance” (to borrow from Clausewitz), but colonial forces within his closest advisors. two were decisive in sealing their fate. The The king fostered the misunderstanding of first event to ensure the demise of the British colonial determination and capability by was the decision by General Cornwallis, in selecting and elevating to positions of direct contravention to the Commander-in- authority only those who agreed with the Chief of the British Army in America, king’s perception.26 The nepotistic method General Clinton, was to depart South of selecting ministers, generals, and

Campaigning Spring 2015 36 admirals favorable to the crown deprived the Colonies and then American Affairs, King George III and the British Government strategic vision for the employment of the of leaders capable of orchestrating a British Navy. Lord Germain wanted Lord complex strategy and limited dissenting Sandwich to direct the navy to contest opinion about the prosecution of the war. French naval operations before they made it to the Atlantic. Lord Sandwich believed Notable examples of where the criteria of Lord Germain’s proposed course of action agreeing with the king’s strategic direction left the British coastline vulnerable and were placed above capability were the refused to direct the British Navy to engage selection of Lord Frederick North as First the French until its ships were of no threat to Minister and Lord Sandwich as the Minister Britain.29 of the Admiralty. In the case of Lord North as First Minister, he was intrinsically unable Compounding the compilation of sycophants to compel the other ministers of the British at the strategic level to manage the conduct Government to work in any concerted way of the war with the colonies was the manner toward achieving victory in the colonies.27 in which strategy was developed. Larrabee states, “Given North’s personal Ultimately, strategic direction emanated qualities, his well-known indolence, his from King George III. Undermining the conciliatory disposition, his disinclination to development of a strategy capable of make decisions,” the result was a fatal defeating the colonists was the weekly amount of sheer inaction at a time when consultations between the king and from his action was imperative.” ministers. The consultations were routinely discussed with each minister individually Nowhere did the elevation of the “Kings instead of in a concerted manner so that all Friends” do so much damage as the ministers understood the current situation selection of Lord Sandwich as Minister of and strategic direction.30 The manner in the Admiralty. Under Lord Sandwich’s which ministers were selected and the administration the British Navy languished, method in which strategy was developed “Offices were bought, stores were stolen, provided considerable friction against shared and worst of all, ships unseaworthy and understanding at the strategic level that also inadequately equipped, were sent to fight the hindered understanding at the operational battles of their country.”28 In addition to his level. administrative mismanagement, Lord Sandwich misrepresented the readiness and Nowhere was the lack of shared capability of the British Navy to his fellow understanding of the Allied situation more ministers, allowing those responsible for evident than when juxtaposed with the directing the war to develop an overinflated British situation, specifically the chasm that sense of British naval strength. This existed between General Cornwallis, incomplete understanding of British naval commander of the British Army in the strength facilitated the formulation of a South, and General Clinton. In fact, it is the flawed strategy. This flawed strategy was very lack of operational level understanding based on the belief that the colonial ports that contributed to General Cornwallis’ could be isolated from trade with other decision to depart the Carolinas for Virginia. European powers, notably the French and In the spring of 1781, Cornwallis and his Spanish. Lord Sandwich contested Lord army were recovering from their battle at Germain’s, the British Secretary of State for Guilford Court House in Wilmington, North

Campaigning Spring 2015 37 Carolina, a victory that exacted a hefty toll Fundamentally, General Clinton disagreed on the British forces. Far from believing that that a decisive battle with the colonists could the colonists had been defeated in the South, be achieved in the Chesapeake, calling Cornwallis could not force colonial forces Virginia “the graveyard of armies” and under General Greene to a decisive battle. supposing a complete British defeat in the He believed Greene’s forces were receiving region.33 Clinton saw as the primary threat considerable support from the North, the combined forces of Washington and particularly from Virginia. Furthermore, Rochambeau in New York along with de Cornwallis believed the terrain in South Barras in Rhode Island. Clinton foresaw a Carolina favored Greene and his forces decisive battle against the allies in New whereas Virginia, with its many rivers, was York and failing that a combined land and ideal to support land operations by the sea engagement against Philadelphia.34 British Army. Additionally, Cornwallis The disjointed understanding of the believed that a victory in Virginia would operational environment added a layer of prevent General Washington from misunderstanding at the strategic level. Prior reinforcing the South. to departing Charleston and installing General Cornwallis as commander in the These factors constituted General South, General Clinton authorized Cornwallis’ understanding of the operational Cornwallis to communicate directly with picture in April 1781 and were considerably Lord Germain.35 This direct communication different from how General Clinton viewed between a subordinate commander with the situation from his headquarters in New civilian authority separate from the York.31 Cornwallis wrote in a letter to commander-in-chief contributed to a lack of General Phillips in Virginia: “If we mean an unity of command which prevented clear offensive war in America, we must abandon articulation and understanding of intent from New York and bring our whole force into the strategic down to the operational level. Virginia; we then have a stake to fight for, and a successful battle may give us Intent America.”32 If it was not written or explicitly General Clinton expected Cornwallis to communicated, it is certain that most British maintain control of South Carolina and ground and sea operational commanders specifically the Port of Charleston to isolate understood the intent to defeat the Colonial the South. General Clinton understood Army was the strategic end state that would Georgia and South Carolina had not bring the American Revolution to an end on completely been pacified by the British British terms. It is questionable whether or victory at Charleston and Virginia supported not within the British command structure of partisan operations in South Carolina. To the late 18th century whether there was an this end, General Clinton dispatched General overarching vision of how to deal a decisive Phillips and General Arnold to disrupt blow to the colonists. The British lacked an Virginia’s efforts to support South Carolina articulated clear intent from the strategic to and prevent Washington from dispatching the operational level that meant tactical Continentals from the North to degrade actions would likely never be tied to the General Cornwallis operations. strategic end state of bringing the American colonies to yield to British authority. The command arrangement from the British

Campaigning Spring 2015 38 Secretary of State to the army and navy and General Cornwallis to communicate directly poor communication between General with Lord Germain in England. Lord Cornwallis and General Clinton specifically Germain, perhaps spurred on by the belief in inhibited articulation of clear intent in the the superiority of British forces on the summer of 1781. This poor communication, battlefield, desperately desired General perhaps more than any other factor, led to Clinton to take offensive action. In the the events culminating in British defeat at spring and summer of 1781, General Clinton Yorktown. was reluctant to initiate such an operation believing that New York would be retaken For any sustained operation in the American by General Washington’s forces. In late July colonies, the British were dependent upon 1781, Lord Germain ordered General their connection back to England by sea. Clinton “that no troops were to be Naval power was a critical capability for the withdrawn from Virginia and that the main British, and it was the means by which the operation was to be an advance through that Army conducted operational maneuver, was colony.”37 It is unlikely Germain would supplied and reinforced. Most importantly, have given General Clinton those the navy had the critical responsibility of instructions had Cornwallis not been isolating the colonies from outside sources corresponding separately with him. of support. However, the command General Clinton’s direction to General arrangement employed by the British during Cornwallis lacked a clear vision of how he the prosecution of the American Revolution saw the prosecution of the war. In May did not reflect this critical link between the 1780, after the fall of Charleston and reports army and navy. The navy took its strategic of a French Fleet underway for America, direction from the Minister of the Clinton departed Charleston for New York Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, and the Army issuing Cornwallis the following order: from the Secretary of State in America, Lord “To regard the safety of Charleston and Germain. In the American theater of war, no the tranquility of South Carolina as the formal command authority existed between principal and indispensable objects of his the Army and Navy to ensure each of their attention. Only when those goals had been efforts were harmonized to achieve the reached, and in a proper season of the year, strategic end state. The commander-in-chief was His Lordship at liberty, if he judged directed the ground forces and the chief of proper, to make a solid move into North the North America naval forces directed Carolina.”38 naval operations. The two commanders only once operated in a concerted effort and that In the aftermath of the British victory at during the battle of Charleston and Guilford Court House in March 1781, “forthwith proceeded to quarrel furiously General Cornwallis had not heard from and for many months afterward.”36 Given General Clinton regarding any concerted the Army’s dependence on the Navy, what operations the army should undertake.39 was required was an operational commander General Cornwallis wrote to General with authority to direct both the ground and Clinton regarding his desire to begin a new naval forces jointly. campaign in Virginia. General Clinton’s response back to Cornwallis was deferential Despite the ground and naval forces working regarding his intent for Cornwallis’ Army to independently, General Clinton convoluted be used to pacify South Carolina. General his unity of command by authorizing Clinton’s tone and tenor of his

Campaigning Spring 2015 39 correspondence seemed to elevate General According to Germain, the intent of the Cornwallis to that of an equal rather than a letter was to prevent a German General from subordinate commander.40 The lack of clear assuming the role of commander-in-chief. intent by General Clinton left open for The fact that Germain had communicated interpretation by General Cornwallis his preference for the next commander-in- whether to proceed with a Virginia chief without consulting Clinton was an campaign. insult. The matter proved an embarrassment to Cornwallis as well. Clinton noted that In June 1781, General Clinton’s direction to after the incident Cornwallis only visited Cornwallis became even more convoluted Clinton headquarters when it was necessary. and desperate. General Clinton was made Clinton feared he would be relieved by aware of a possible combined offensive Germain for the smallest mistake and against New York by the combined became even more cautious in his actions. American and French Army supported by a Clinton was hesitant to issue decisive orders French Fleet. General Clinton sent General to Cornwallis fearing that if the matter Cornwallis four letters with conflicting turned out badly, he would have to defend orders between June 8 and June 19.41 As his actions from Germain. before, General Clinton’s direction to Cornwallis was differential regarding these Lord Germain contributed to a general lack latest orders and provided no clear intent of trust with General Clinton through his regarding the British Army in the South. constant directives for troop movements and the initiation of campaigns. As General Trust Dempsey explains, the relationship between providing direction and trusting subordinates General Dempsey states that “Building trust “will be required to clearly translate their with subordinates and partners may be the intent to their subordinates and trust them to most important action a commander will perform with responsible initiative in perform.”42 The nature of the relationships complex, fast-changing, chaotic within the British command acted as a circumstances.”44 In May 1779, frustrated countervailing force toward any positive with the constant direction from Germain, momentum achieved. Larrabee put it, “the Clinton fired off a letter stating, “For God’s principal reasons that England failed to sake, my Lord, if you wish me to do subdue her rebellious American colonists anything, leave me to myself, and let me was the internecine strife that prevailed adapt my efforts to the hourly among her principal commanders on both circumstances.”45 land and the sea.”43 The lack of trust between Germain and Nowhere did the lack of trust manifest itself Clinton and Clinton and Cornwallis most more clearly than in the relationship directly contributed to the British defeat at between Cornwallis and Clinton. The Yorktown. Those relationships were part of antipathy between the two generals began a larger system of patronage that pitted almost immediately when Cornwallis was officers against one another for favoritism installed as Clinton’s subordinate. Clinton from the British aristocracy. Officers in the found out that Cornwallis possessed a letter navy and army would rise to increasing from Lord Germain he would eventually levels of responsibility not so much for their succeed Clinton as commander-in-chief. military prowess as their connection and

Campaigning Spring 2015 40 favoritism, either by birth or marriage within the conflict with the colonies, and how to the aristocracy. Another factor contributing achieve victory. General Washington to the lack of trust within the British military established clear intent for his subordinates was that frequently a commander would be that were fairly well executed by his court-martialed for loss in a battle. If there operational and tactical commanders. were any question regarding the Washington stressed the survival of the commander’s courage, competence or Army and that the revolution would not adherence to the strict instructions for naval continue should the Army suffer a decisive combat a subordinate or superior could level defeat. Secondly, Washington developed a charges against the responsible commander. model to defeat the British that proved Both the method of promotion and potential effective at the battle of Yorktown. Intent ramifications for losing in battle created an within the British Army was challenged due underlying level of mistrust in the British to a command relationship that prevented military. naval and ground forces from working in concert, micromanagement of tactical Comparison of Allied and British Mission actions by strategic leaders, and poor Command directives from the British commander-in- chief to subordinate commanders. Finally, In comparing the Allied and British the level of French and American trust in operations through the lens of mission comparison to the British was substantial command, one cannot help but interpret that and perhaps more than any of the other the French and American forces enjoyed elements of mission command led to the significantly more shared understanding, American victory at Yorktown. clear intent and trust. The combined French and American Forces understood the necessity of naval supremacy, the survival of the American Army, the critical nature of time and the importance of a clear command relationship. The British, on the other hand, were hampered by an overestimation of the capabilities of their land and naval forces, the resolve of the colonialists, the nature of

1 Joint Publication (JP) 3-31: “Command and 10 Ibid, 89. Control for Joint Land Operations” (Washington, 11 Ibid, 89. D.C.: GPO, 2014) GL-7. 12 Ibid, 152-153. 2 JP 3-31, 3. 13 Ibid, 262. 3 Martin Dempsey, White Paper on Mission 14 Ibid, 80. Command (Washington, DC, Chairman Joint Chiefs 15 Ibid, 82. of Staff, 2012), 1-4. 16 Ibid, 249. 4 Robert W. Coakley and Stetson Conn, The War of 17 Dempsey, 5. the American Revolution (Washington, DC: Center of 18 Ibid, 5. Military History, United States Army, 1975), 79. 19 Larrabee, 130-131. 5 Dempsey, 5. 20 Ibid, 243-244. 6 Harold A. Larrabee, Decision at the Chesapeake 21 Ibid, 252. (New York: Charles N. Potter, 1964), 70. 22 George F. Scheer, Military History of the American 7 Ibid, 78-79. Revolution, “Washington and His Lieutenants: Some 8 Ibid, 78. Problems in Command,” Department of History and 9 Ibid, 80.

Campaigning Spring 2015 41 Military Studies from the Air Command and Association of Graduates, United States Air Force Staff College. His military education Academy (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1974), 139-140. includes the Armor Officer Basic and 23 Larrabee, 250. 24 Ibid, 156. Advanced Courses, Scout Platoon Leader 25 Ibid, 154. Course, and the Air Force Command and 26 Ibid, 23. General Staff College. He has had tours of 27 Ibid, 27. combat in Haiti,Kosovo, Bosnia- 28 Ibid, 38. Herzegovina, Iraq, and Afganistan. 29 Ibid, 42. 30 Ibid, 34. 31 Ibid, 114-124. Commander Seth Burton, USN. A 1994 32 Franklin Wickwire and Mary Wickwire, graduate of the University of Alabama in Cornwallis: The American Adventure (Boston: Huntsville with a degree in Chemical Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 319. Engineering, CDR Burton reported in 1996 33 Larrabee, 127 – 128. 34 Ibid, 127. for his first at-sea duty aboard USS 35 Ibid, 112. JEFFERSON CITY (SSN 759) in San 36 Ibid, 98. Diego, California. In 2005, he was assigned 37 Ibid, 138. to Freiburg, Germany to study as an 38 Ibid, 109. Olmsted Scholar in International Relations 39 Ibid, 127. 40 Ibid, 130-135. at the Albert Ludwig’s University of 41 Ibid, 137. Freiburg. Following completion of studies 42 Dempsey, 6. in Freiburg, CDR Burton reported to the 43 Larrabee, 44. USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750) as 44 Dempsey, 5. Executive Officer in 2007, and subsequently 45 Larrabee, 98. served in position of Executive Officer of the Tactical Readiness Evaluation Team at Team Biographies Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, VA. From January 2012 to Colonel Jerry Turner, USA. COL Turner August 2014, CDR Burton served as entered the Army in 1986. He has served in Commanding Officer of USS SCRANTON positions from Scout to Section Sergeant. (SSN-756). He received his commission through the Green to Gold program at the University of Lieutenant Colonel Scott Trahan, USA. Texas at El Paso in 1994. His past LTC Trahan is an Infantry officer with over assignments include Scout Platoon Leader, twenty years of service and has commanded Troop Executive Officer, Squadron at the O-5 level. He has served at multiple Maintenance Officer, Brigade S1, and Joint and operational commands conducting Company and Troop Commander. After contingency and campaign operations. attending the Command and General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Trahan is currently College he served as Division Planner, serving as an Observer / Trainer assigned to Squadron S3 and Brigade S3 prior to the Joint Staff J7, Deployable Training assuming command of the 3rd Squadron 4th Division. In his capacity as an Observer / U.S. Cavalry. COL Turner earned a Trainer, Lieutenant Colonel Trahan Bachelor of Arts degree majoring in participates and provides feedback to Political Science from the University of combatant commands on staff process Texas at El Paso and a Master of Arts in associated with Joint Operations.

Campaigning Spring 2015 42

Weaponizing Social Media: arms race and needs to master some of its What We Can Learn From Our adversary’s tactics to seize the initiative. Adversaries The United States must pursue a comprehensive social media strategy to

By CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and collect intelligence, infiltrate adversary MAJ Kevin Thaxton organizations, and communicate a strategic message.

During their spring 2014 invasion of Iraq, A thorough analysis of social media the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) warfare by ISIS and the Chinese in 2014 manipulated social media like no other reveals five core maxims for social media terrorist organization. They employed an war fighting. First, censorship rarely array of slick anti-Western videos, time- works; second, social media provides phased beheadings to instill terror, and good intelligence; third, social media will global on-line recruiting. As they become increasingly resistant to advanced on Mosul, Iraq, they saturated intrusion; fourth, social media enables the Internet with more than 40,000 tweets individuals to threaten nations; and fifth, in one day,1 drawing immediate support if done right, social media can influence from radicalized youth and condemnation target audiences. To seize the initiative, from the free world. Their command of therefore, the United States needs to social media to inflate terror and recruit incorporate these maxims into three was nothing short of superb, not to wings of social media warfare: mention that they did this while seizing intelligence collection, infiltration, and half of Iraq. strategic messaging.

ISIS’s success raises questions about ISIS Social Media Warfare America’s ability to strike back in the social media battle space. Specifically, The 2014 social media battle in Syria and how did the United States let ISIS Iraq was a seminal event in modern dominate social media? And what is the warfare. As Defense Secretary Hagel United States doing to prevent it from noted, “This is beyond anything we have 4 happening again? The answers to these seen.” For the first time in history, questions are key because the United individual ISIS fighters documented their States should expect future terrorists— exploits in unfiltered real time, providing indeed, any future adversary—to use detailed information on what was 5 social media as part of their battle plan. happening on the ground. Defense The Chinese government is years ahead Secretary Hagel was particularly on this point. With an army of low-paid impressed with ISIS’s use of social media social media manipulators2 and a world- “to increase its global profile and attract 6 class cyber and propaganda machine,3 the tens of thousands of fighters.” Chinese government waged a massive social media war against Hong Kong’s To be sure, most modern terrorist groups Umbrella Revolution, introducing a use social media to promote their aims. variety of new techniques not previously They no longer need television seen. From a U.S. perspective, there is intermediaries to broadcast their much to be learned from ISIS and information – they simply publish it Chinese social media tactics. Notably, the directly on social media within minutes. United States is losing the social media What separated ISIS from others was

Campaigning Spring 2015 43 their sophisticated information campaign enemy intrusion, they even produced a involving high-end, audio-visual training guide to help supporters maintain marketing, and their ability to manipulate operations security with instructions on social media to inflate their message. how to remove metadata from tweets and avoid photographs that would identify Prior to their advance on Iraq, ISIS their location.11 launched a media branch called Al-Hayat Media to target Western and non-Arabic With viral content and battlefield success, audiences through social media. Al-Hayat ISIS was probed by thousands of Media produced videos, speeches, and interested young radicals. On sites such images in multiple languages and placed as Ask.fm, ISIS members interacted with them on a variety of social media potential recruits to answer questions networking sites to avoid censorship. covering everything from what socks to When their Twitter accounts were shut wear in battle to what flights to take to down, they simply created new Twitter get into Syria.12 By September 2014, accounts or used other free social media these techniques yielded more than venues such as Archive.org or Justpaste.it 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 nations;13 to get their message out. 7 Notably, not all and as the United States led strikes ISIS media content was intended to shock against them, ISIS recruiters were still the West or to highlight their fighting able to enlist as many as 1,000 foreigners credentials. They also projected per month.14 Never before had social themselves as capable governors with media been used to replenish troop professional-quality videos and images of strength on the battlefield. fighters helping children, aiding the infirm, and handing out ice cream cones. 8 Chinese Social Media Warfare

During their June 2014 advance on As the United States fought ISIS, another Mosul, ISIS encouraged supporters to social media battle emerged in Hong download their Arabic-language Twitter Kong. One of the most technologically app, The Dawn of Glad Tidings. This app advanced cities in the world, Hong Kong allowed ISIS to post news content, such has a vibrant Internet culture with data as audio and video clips, on the personal cables and wireless routers that—unlike Twitter accounts of its entire subscriber those on the mainland—are typically not base. To avoid triggering Twitter spam under the direct control of the detection, content was metered out at government. On one side were members careful intervals. Eventually, the content of the Umbrella Revolution who would start to “trend,” which, as a unique harnessed smart phones to organize social media phenomenon, increases the protests and report their progress to chance that it will achieve a “viral” audiences in China and the world. On the condition and gain greater exposure. This other side was the Chinese government, technique enabled ISIS get out 40,000 whose sophisticated counter-information tweets in one day.9 ISIS also organized apparatus was controlled by a cadre of hashtag campaigns to train supporters on more than two million operators who how to make their content trend and pop regularly monitor and manipulate the up on trend-tracking websites, such as Internet in support of the Communist @ActiveHashtags, which likewise results Party.15 in even more retweets.10 To counter 2

Campaigning Spring 2015 44 Hong Kong’s Internet culture is not Chinese government infiltration was also entirely free from government control. common. In June 2014, they initiated Although China’s constitution permits “bomb-scare” tactics during a Hong Kong freedom of speech and the press, its vigil commemorating the 25th anniversary media regulations have been amended to of Tiananmen. By creating fake Twitter punish those whose news content accounts and posing as activists, Chinese endangers the country.16 China also infiltrators posted a police report requires anyone wishing to post on declaring that six terrorists had just China’s main social media networks to escaped from a prison and were heading register with real names so that users, in into Hong Kong. Meanwhile, another essence, can be tracked, fined, or arrested false activist posted that he was at the for posting unfavorable content.17 vigil and saw an individual fitting a fake suspect’s description. His post was In 2014, the Chinese government retweeted 315 times by a number of other censored networks in Hong Kong and the Twitter accounts of dubious origin—all mainland using bandwidth throttling, likely created by Chinese government keyword filtering, and website infiltrators.23 While this particular tactic blocking.18 Search words like Tiananmen, failed to stop the vigil, it is impossible to Hong Kong, or Occupy Central were know the extent of Chinese government either blocked or rerouted to sites infiltration throughout the Umbrella favorable to the Communist Party.19 And Revolution, although this example does as the protests picked up steam, the demonstrate Chinese government intent. Chinese government blocked highly popular social media sites such as Sina Cyber warfare and social media warfare Weibo, Instagram, and Flikr.20 Activists also converged in this online war. Aware fought back through the use of mobile that protesters had a tendency to messaging apps such as WeChat since download software to circumvent these apps effectively exist outside the censorship, the Chinese government Internet. Indeed, in recent years, mobile targeted several iPhone users with a virus messaging apps have evolved to include that steals text messages, photos, call group chat, video conferencing, and logs, passwords and other data. content sharing.21 The Chinese were able Masquerading as a regular software to block access to these, too, by download for mobile messaging apps, the eliminating activist user accounts, so virus was injected by an email phishing many activists simply switched to another scam. 24 Even now, countless phones are app called FireChat, a product developed likely providing data back to the Chinese by the San Francisco-based company government. Open Garden. FireChat incorporates Bluetooth technology and Apple Multi- Despite continuous censorship and deep peer Connectivity Framework, infiltration by the Chinese government, connecting phones without a cellular the Umbrella Revolution activists network or Internet connectivity.22 The mobilized, coordinated activities, and only drawback of FireChat is that it lacks gained support from people outside of encryption so it is still susceptible to China. In one notable case, the activists Chinese government monitoring. even used drones to produce videos for social media to illustrate the sheer size of their protests to a global audience.25 3

Campaigning Spring 2015 45 Altogether, this battle demonstrated a concerned about Facebook privacy number of emerging tactics—to include issues.26 There are also a number of non- covert accounts, viruses, subterfuge, and governmental organizations that build digital countermeasures—which any state apps to hoodwink repressive regimes. or non-state actor can expect to encounter The Guardian Project, for instance, is one when it goes to battle in the social media private organization that creates free domain. software for mobile devices to help individuals “communicate more freely” Five Maxims for Social Media Warfare and to protect them “from intrusion and monitoring.”27 Despite the fact that The These two social media battles reveal five Guardian Project receives unspecified core maxims that explain today’s social funding from the U.S. State media warfare paradigm (Table 1). Department,28 they are adamant about not creating back-door technology that would 1. Censorship is rarely effective allow for government intrusion. 2. Social media provides good intelligence 3. Social media will become increasingly Still, censorship—both comprehensive resistant to intrusion and limited—will, if anything, 4. Social media enables individuals to temporarily slow down social media use, threaten nations 5. Social media can influence target but such tactics guarantee an acceleration audiences of new countermeasures, or worse, inhibit good intelligence collection. Table 1. Maxims for Social Media Warfare 2. Social media provides good 1. Censorship is rarely effective. Due to intelligence. The United States, through technological advancements—often dedicated collection and analysis of social produced by American companies—it media networks, can not only track what increasingly possible to circumvent adversaries are saying on open-source tactics such as bandwidth throttling, IP social media, but may be able to predict blocking, wireless blackouts, and human behavior. According to recent firewalls. When blocked from access to news reporting, there are several nascent one social media venue, users move to efforts to exploit this concept. For another. When blocked from access to the example, in early 2012, the Federal internet, users move to wireless-enabled Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started mobile messaging. Encountering blocked development on a social media cellular networks, users move to monitoring capability—described as a Bluetooth. "geospatial alert and analysis mapping application"—to predict future events.29 Notably, the United States private sector Elements of the Department of Defense is the world’s largest producer of anti- (DoD) use “population-centric” censorship technology. For example, technology to provide “global and when Twitter and YouTube deleted the persistent indications and warnings beheading video of journalist James capability that complements and Foley, ISIS simply switched to a more enhances conventional sensors.”30 The secure social media site called Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Open Diaspora—a social media site created in Source Center even has a dedicated staff 2010 by New York University students of several hundred “Ninja Librarians” 4

Campaigning Spring 2015 46 who scour social media for intelligence.31 4. Social media enables individuals to The CIA also has been known to partner threaten nations. Not all nefarious social with marketing companies like Attensity media activity is a threat to the United to analyze the entire Twitter network and States, but some of it is. As discussed, evaluate “sentiments, hot spots, trends, social media is used by individuals and actions, intent.”32 groups as a tactical tool to organize local events, whether they are battlefield The bottom line is social media provides maneuvers or protest vigils. It is also used a wealth of information on people, as a strategic messaging platform to networks, and intent, but as demonstrated radicalize populations, fundraise, and in recent social media wars, not all of its recruit thousands of fighters. Especially content is expected to remain open source dangerous are hackers who blend cyber- indefinitely. warfare expertise with social media. In 2013, for instance, the Syrian Electronic 3. Social media will become Army sent malware in a “phishing” email increasingly resistant to intrusion. to members of the Associated Press and Advances in encryption technology for gained access to an account. On the main mobile devices, mobile messaging apps, Associated Press Twitter page they sent a and traditional social media sites will tweet to more than two million followers increasingly disrupt intelligence that said, “Breaking: Two Explosions in collection efforts. Recently, FBI Director the White House and Barack Obama is James Comey noted that his department injured.” Within three minutes, the Dow is “struggling to keep up with the lost $136 Billion, but quickly recovered changing technology and to maintain our after it was determined that the tweet was ability to actually collect the fake.36 communications we are authorized to collect."33 This trend is likely to impact The challenge for the United States is to other United States intelligence agencies balance passive intelligence collection on as well. these threats—which effectively allows adversaries to continue radicalizing, Another way to get around technology is recruiting, and coordinating activities— to compel private social media with adopting Chinese-style tactics to go corporations to disable the accounts of after threats by either shutting down offenders or to provide information on individual accounts and servers or by terrorist social media accounts.34 infiltrating social media networks with However, these efforts have largely been undercover agents.37 At present, the futile since the material that needs to be balance leans towards intelligence blocked may have already gone viral— collection. having already leapt to other social media sites—or the perpetrator may have 5. Social media can influence target switched to a new account under a audiences. Social media sites bombard different name.35 Thus, much of the users with endless news, humor, terrorist’s online information operations advertisements, and the day-to-day go unchecked; or his tactical plans end up musings of friends. To break through the locked inside an encrypted mobile device noise and influence viewers, strategic network. messengers must follow certain rules. First, they must have the ability to 5

Campaigning Spring 2015 47 connect globally. This requires a multilingual staff, the ability to produce An American-style social media fight high-quality content quickly, a strong should focus primarily on three wings of presence on a variety of social media sites social media warfare: intelligence (including thousands of “friends”), and collection, infiltration, and strategic the technical ability to make a message messaging. Success depends not only on go viral. understanding the five maxims listed above, but also on discarding techniques Second, once connected, the messengers that conflict with American values. must choose the audience they can Censorship as a fourth wing, for example, realistically expect to influence. For is out of the question. Not only is it example, ISIS did not expect the West to ineffectual (Maxim 1); it is also violates rally to its side; although, they did hope freedom of expression. to inspire Western radicals to help fight. Similarly, the United States government Intelligence Collection. The U.S. cannot expect to meaningfully change the intelligence community has made modest minds of radical ISIS sympathizers, but strides in exploiting the data resident in they might be able to have an impact on open-source social media streams, and is Middle Easterners who are increasingly even making progress on the production fed up with extremist activity.38 A of algorithms that can predict future messenger’s credibility also matters events. Indeed, the intelligence available because it increases the chance his in social media is quite good (Maxim 2). content will be viewed, and thus enables As noted in Maxim 3, however, it will the messenger to communicate ideas become increasing difficult to access non- which resonate within a target audience. internet social media forums, such as The United States, for example, is not mobile messaging apps, due to advances likely to achieve widespread success in in encryption technology and the creation changing radicalized minds because it of other non-internet-based social media lacks credibility in most Middle East and networks. These challenges are a problem North African countries.39 Local imams domestically, as noted by the FBI, and a and religious leaders, however, might be problem for the broader U.S. intelligence more effective. community.

The third way to influence the targeted Infiltration. One way to get around audience is to ensure that the message encryption (Maxim 3) is to infiltrate elicits an emotional reaction. High- social media with undercover on-line quality videos and images that either personas and to make “friends” with shock or inspire are, according to studies, adversaries (Maxim 4). Agencies such as more likely to be shared and gain viral the FBI, CIA, and DoD require this traction,40 and therefore more likely to capability, not only for passive incite action. ISIS was exceptional in this intelligence collection and early warning regard. (Maxim 2), but to potentially influence human behavior (Maxim 5) – that is, if they can establish a large enough presence and friend base. There have An American Style of Social Media been a number of attempts to do this, but Warfare the overall scope and lessons learned are 6

Campaigning Spring 2015 48 not yet known. The FBI retains a number activities. The legality of fake social of online undercover employees, for media accounts has also come into example, who evidently befriend and nab question. If deemed “covert,” such potential terrorists in the United States.41 accounts require direct presidential authorization and must include The Agency for International Congressional oversight.44 In the Cuba Development (USAID) even developed a case, President Obama has insisted that “Cuban Twitter” on mobile messaging USAID’s Cuban Twitter is not a covert apps—distributed through non-U.S. front operation and that it has actually helped companies—which Cubans can use to information flow freely to Cubans.45 Still, share news and avoid government the risk for the U.S. government, as it is censorship. In this effort, USAID with any intelligence program, is established an undercover subscriber base balancing individual liberty—especially to help move news content through the when a U.S. citizen is involved—with the network, and when the time was right, to real threat of terrorist use of social media introduce political content to inspire to radicalize, recruit, and organize Cubans to organize a “Cuban Spring.”42 (Maxim 4). Oversight and transparency The viability of this plan remains to be are essential, and abuses of intelligence seen. There are also reports that the DoD gathering must be addressed. As created software that enables operators to Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg create multiple online personalities—or noted, "The U.S. government should be “sock puppets” —to counter the extremist the champion for the internet, not a threat. narrative on social media and be the "first They need to be much more transparent with the truth."43 Again, the success of about what they're doing, or otherwise this effort and many others are not people will believe the worst.”46 Due to known. Outside of physically going the real national security threats presented undercover and joining the adversary, by groups such as ISIS, however, the however, these efforts are still the best intelligence community must establish a way to understand one’s enemy and much more robust undercover presence in influence real threats one-on-one. social media. Embedded social media infiltrators may even be able to discourage an enemy Strategic Messaging. The most course of action, or as the FBI transparent arm of an American-style demonstrated, encourage them to take a social media war is its strategic course of action that facilitates capture. messaging wing—that is, its public social media campaign to engage key audiences Such infiltration projects, however, are while promoting the benefits of American expected to come under tough public values and countering the enemy’s scrutiny. Free speech, particularly the message. In this wing, the State right of social media users to be free from Department has the lead. The Department government intrusion, is sacrosanct in the of State’s Center for Strategic United States. In the social media world, Counterterrorism Communication, for large networks inevitably contain U.S. example, has the task of developing citizens, on whom the intelligence “highly focused social media campaigns” community is prohibited from collecting, to target violent extremism and terrorist unless federal authorities can demonstrate organizations.47 As part of this effort, that the subject is involved in terrorist they established a social media presence 7

Campaigning Spring 2015 49 called “Think Again Turn Away,” which Joseph Lieberman. Based on the engages directly with terrorists and their assumption that “we’ve been kind of supporters in multiple languages. absent” in the social media sphere,50 the Although the concept is a step in the right group intends to “expose the architecture direction—at least as far as establishing of support for extremist groups and their an active presence and attempting to ideology and combat their spread by counter terrorist propaganda—the Center pressuring their financial support for Strategic Counterterrorism networks, countering the narrative of Communication has been plagued by a extremists and their online recruitment, lack of support and messaging blunders. and advocating for strong laws, policies While intended to be the linchpin of a and regulations.” 51 Another idea is to whole-of-government social media mentor Muslim scholars on establishing a approach, it has suffered from low large social media presence in order to funding (approximately $5 million counter terrorist ideology, while enabling annually), a lack of interest from the them to build trust with vulnerable National Security Council, and turf populations. There are risks indeed with concerns from the National helping private efforts engage in social Counterterrorism Center. 48 Additionally, media warfare—much the same as critics argue that its guerrilla campaign is arming radical insurgent groups to a “gaffe machine” that “provides jihadists overthrow governments—but this might with a stage to voice their arguments— be the only way to significantly expand regularly engaging in petty disputes” with America’s army of digital diplomats and terrorist supporters “and arguing over social media influencers. who has killed more people while exchanging sarcastic quips.”49 Some experts suggest that America’s Altogether, the campaign does not fully online strategic messaging should not meet the standards of Maxim 5—that is to refrain from using propaganda and say, the overall intent is on track, but the deception.52 As discussed in Maxim 5, target audience and tactics need work. however, credibility is a key component For example, menacing videos of dead in influencing target audiences. The State ISIS soldiers—intended by “Think Again Department in particular can increase its Turn Away” to frighten young, credibility by concentrating its social radicalized individuals from joining media message on promoting truth and ISIS—are more likely have the opposite countering untruth—similar to Voice of effect on this type of audience, America radio programs across the encouraging them instead to join the ISIS world.53 In this sense, America should not campaign. Indeed, to some, martyrdom or be like the Chinese government. the opportunity of martyrdom can be motivational. Who Must Lead Social Media Warfare? (Figure 1) Moreover, the State Department should not be the only strategic messenger. An The Director of National Intelligence alternative is to encourage private efforts (DNI), whose stated mission is to “lead to engage in online strategic messaging. intelligence integration” and to “forge an One such effort is the Counter Extremism Intelligence Community that delivers the Project, which includes a number of most insightful intelligence possible,”54 former U.S. officials including Senator must be responsible for intelligence 8

Campaigning Spring 2015 50 collection and infiltration. This ensures Geographic Combatant Commanders. unity of effort across domestic Indeed, intelligence collection, intelligence agencies (including the FBI) infiltration, and strategic messaging can and overseas entities, such as the Defense supplement information operations and Intelligence Agency (DIA), all Service provide predictive analysis relevant to the intelligence organizations, CIA, the Drug physical battlefield. Enforcement Agency, the State Department, and the National Security The biggest problem, however, is that Agency. In accordance with traditional there is no formal organization that can missions and under the direction of the unite the efforts of the State Department DNI, the CIA and FBI should have the and the Office of the Director of National lead in implementing a government-wide Intelligence in social media warfare. army of undercover social media Intelligence collection, infiltration, and warriors. strategic messaging cannot operate in individual vacuums, nor should they focus on countering only terrorist threats. Indeed, social media warfare has application across the spectrum of threats—conventional, criminal, terrorist, etc. Thus, on direction from the President of the United States, the National Security Council must prioritize the development of an interagency coordination task force to, first, produce a relevant social media strategy, and second, to synthesize efforts across all three wings of social media warfare. Figure 1. Social Media Warfare Coordination Conclusion

As stated, the strategic messaging wing The United States admits it has fallen must fall under the State Department, behind in the information war against with the additional responsibility to train groups like ISIS.55 Intelligence collection and promote the efforts of other and infiltration efforts are in their infancy governmental and civilian entities to and appear stove-piped across agencies. engage global audiences, while Strategic messaging is underfunded and leveraging lessons learned from its own clumsy at best. Worst of all, the entire social media campaign. Training should effort lacks leadership and a coordinating not be limited to U.S. organizations and infrastructure to synthesize activities. various citizen groups. Allies can also play a significant role in social media In this new fight, however, the United strategic messaging. States can still learn from its adversaries and regain the initiative in social media. In all three wings, the Defense Success begins with applying the five Department and DIA will play an active maxims learned from ISIS and Hong supporting role to ensure that relevant Kong. Success continues with beefing up data makes it to the appropriate intelligence collection, infiltration, and 9

Campaigning Spring 2015 51 strategic messaging efforts, and wherever one-way news provider are missing the applicable, incorporating techniques point. Those who use it as an interactive already used by adversaries. forum and embrace its “social” characteristics are much more likely to Social media is a fascinating new influence target audiences and succeed in phenomenon. While it exists partly inside their information goals, whatever they cyberspace and partly outside it, it is an may be. Finally, the term “weaponize” outlet for all kinds of information, and for was chosen not to sensationalize, but to the first time, a means by which any emphasize the dominate role the United information provider—individual, non- States must play in this new battle space state, or state actor—can interact in order to achieve global social media personally on a global scale. superiority. Organizations that see social media as a

1 J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The On Twitter And Facebook: 'Internet, Restaurants, Atlantic, June 16, 2014. Cars, iPhones... Allah Has Made... Jihad In Sham 2 Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere and Jonathan [Syria] So Easy',” The Middle East Media Ansfield, “China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. the Internet,” The New York Times, April 7, 2010. 5586, January 3, 2014. 3 Tim Phillips, “Chinese Spin Doctors Urged to 13 “CIA Says IS Numbers Underestimated,” Spread 'Positive Energy' Online,” The Telegraph, Aljazeera.com, September 12, 2014. January 18, 2013. 14 Greg Miller, “Airstrikes Against Islamic State 4 Chelsea J. Carter and Azadeh Ansari, “Pentagon Do Not Seem to Have Affected Flow of Fighters Chief: ISIS ‘Beyond Anything We Have Seen,’” to Syria,” Washington Post, October 28, 2014. CNN, August 22, 2014. 15 Tim Phillips, “Chinese Spin Doctors Urged to 5 Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Spread 'Positive Energy' Online.” Neumann, “#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance 16 Beina Xu, “Media Censorship in China,” and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders, Networks,” The International Centre for the Study September 25, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014, of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship- accessed November 7, 2014, http://icsr.info/wp- china/p11515. content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report- 17 Malcolm Moore, “China Moves to Control Sina Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce- Weibo Social Network with Real Names,” The in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf Telegraph, March 16, 2012. 6 Jim Garamone, “Hagel Says ISIL Threats Real, 18 Beina Xu, “Media Censorship in China Must Be Dealt With,” DoD News, Defense Media 19 Malcolm Moore, “China Moves to Control Sina Activity, September 18, 2014. Weibo Social Network with Real Names.”; also 7 “New ISIS Media Company Addresses English, Patrick Frater, “China Extends Media Blocking as German and French-Speaking Westerners,” Hong Kong Protests Swell,” Variety, October 2, MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 2014. June 23, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014 20 Patrick Frater, “China Extends Media Blocking http://www.memrijttm.org/new-isis-media- as Hong Kong Protests Swell.” company-targets-english-german-and-french- 21 “Messaging Apps: The New Face of Social speaking-westerners.html Media and What It Means for Brands,” IPG 8 Lorraine Ali, “ISIS’s Soft Weapon of Choice: Media Lab, 2014, accessed November 7, 2014, Social Media,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, http://ipglab.com/wp- 2014. content/uploads/2014/04/MessagingApps_Whitep 9 Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter.” aper_Final.pdf. 10 Ibid. 22 Robert Mann, “Young Protesters in Hong Kong 11 Johnlee Varghese, “ISIS Releases Training Have Found an Ingenious Way Around Cyber Guide on ‘How to Tweet Safely, Without Giving Censors,” AdWeek, October 2, 2014. Out Your Location to NSA’,” International 23 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China’s Social Business Times, October 19, 2014. Media Underground,” Foreign Policy, September 12 “American ISIS Member From Chicago Active 16, 2014. 10

Campaigning Spring 2015 52 39 Julie Ray, “Opinion Briefing: U.S. Image in 24 Paul Mozur, “Protestors in Hong Kong Are Middle East / North Africa,” Gallup.com, January Targets of Scrutiny Through Their Phones,” The 27, 2009. 40 New York Times, October 1, 2014. Maria Konnikova, “The Six Things That Make 25 Mary-Ann Russon, “Flying Drones Capture Stories Go Viral Will Amaze, And Maybe Dramatic Scale of Hong Kong ‘Occupy Central’ Infuriate, You,” The New Yorker, January 21, Protests on Video,” International Business Times, 2014. 41 September 29, 2014. Robert Windrem and Mike Brunker, “No LOL 26 Jeff Stone, “Blocked On Twitter And YouTube, Matter: FBI Trolls Social Media for Would-be ISIS Turns To Diaspora And VKontakte To Jihadis,” NBCNews.com, October 20, 2014. 42 Disseminate Message,” International Business Desmond Butler, “US Secretly Created ‘Cuban Times, August 22, 2014. Twitter’ to Stir Unrest,” Associated Press, The 27 See The Guardian Project website at Big Story, April 4, 2014. 43 https://guardianproject.info, accessed November Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US 7, 2014. Spy Operation That Manipulates Social Media,” 28 Email interview with Mr. Nathan Freitas, The Guardian, March 17, 2011. 44 Guardian Project Lead, October 10, 2014, See Central Intelligence Agency website at available to authors. cia.gov 45 29 “What The FBI Wants In A Social Media Desmond Butler, “US Secretly Created ‘Cuban Monitoring App,” NPR.org, January 30, 2012. Twitter’ to Stir Unrest,” 46 30 Aram Roston, “Unwitting Sensors: How DoD is “Wikipedia, Facebook Slam US Government Exploiting Social Media,” Defense News, 13 Spying,” CNBC.com, March 14, 2014. 47 November 2012. “Executive Order 13584 -- Developing an 31 “How Does The CIA Use Social Media?” Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism NPR.org, November 7, 2011. Communications Initiative,” available at 32 Aram Roston, “Unwitting Sensors: How DoD is whitehouse.gov. 48 Exploiting Social Media.” Ali Weinberg, “Obama’s Social Media Srategy 33 Fred Dews, “WATCH: FBI Director James Against ISIS Falling Short, Experts Say,” Comey on Technology, Law Enforcement, and ABCnews.com, 1 October 2014. 49 ‘Going Dark,’” Brookings, October 16, 2014, Rita Katz, “The State Department’s Twitter accessed November 7, 2014, War With ISIS Is Embarrassing,” Time.com, 16 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings- September 2014. 50 now/posts/2014/10/fbi-director-james-comey- Alex Altman, “Government Veterans to Take technology-law-enforcement-going-dark Fight to Extremists on Online Battleground,” 34 Caleb Garling, “Twitter C.E.O. Dick Costolo on Time.com, 22 September 2014. 51 Receiving Death Threats from ISIS,” Vanity Fair, See the Counter Extremism Project website at October 9, 2014; also Daniel Byman and Jeremy http://www.counterextremism.com/projects/count Shapiro, “We Shouldn’t Stop Terrorists from er-narrative- program#sthash.4qu73uD0.dpuf 52 Tweeting,” The Washington Post, October 9, Philip Ewing, “U.S. Struggles in the ISIL 2014. Propaganda War,” Politico.com, October 30, 35 Jillian C. York, “The Internet is Not the 2014. 53 Enemy,” Foreign Policy, October 23, 2014. Voice of America’s (VOA) Charter states that it 36 Max Fisher, “Syrian hackers claim AP hack that “will serve as a consistently reliable and tipped stock market by $136 billion. Is it authoritative source of news. VOA news will be terrorism?” Washington Post Blog, April 23, accurate, objective, and comprehensive.” See the 2013. VOA website at 37 Jeff Bardin, “Why America Is Losing the http://www.insidevoa.com/info/voa- Online War with ISIS,” Yahoo Business Insider, charter/2322.html. 54 October 6, 2014. See Director of National Intelligence website at 38 “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission. 55 in Middle East,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Philip Ewing, “U.S. Struggles in the ISIL Project, July 1, 2014, accessed November 7, Propaganda War.” 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns- about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle- east/ 11

Campaigning Spring 2015 53 1997, a Masters in Aeronautical Science Team Biographies from Embry-Riddle in 2007, and a Masters in Military Operational Arts and Commander Christopher F. Hill, USN. Science from Air University in 2011. CDR Hill is currently assigned to the Prior to his current assignment, Lt Col Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, White served as Commander, 437 Air Warfare Branch. He was Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Joint commissioned through ROTC in 1996. Base Charleston, SC. CDR Hill earned a BA in Political Science from Tufts University and an Major Kevin L. Thaxton, USA. MAJ MA in Security Studies from Georgetown Thaxton is currently serving as Deliberate University’s School of Foreign Service. Planner at the Joint Forces Component Prior to his current assignment, CDR Hill Command for Space. He was served as Commanding Officer of Carrier commissioned through ROTC in 2001. Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE MAJ Thaxton earned a BS in Computer TWO FOUR. Science from Fisk University in 2001. Prior to his current assignment, MAJ Lieutenant Colonel Ryan White, Thaxton served as Space Operations USAF. Lt Col White is currently serving Officer and Deputy Chief Space Support as Military Advisor, Element of the XVIII Airborne Corps. OUSD(AT&L)/A/Treaty Compliance for Open Skies at the Pentagon. He was commissioned through the ROTC in 1997. Lt Col White earned a BS in History from Troy State University in

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Campaigning Spring 2015 54 accurate representation of both American Decision-Making Models and the and Soviet decision-making. As result of the SS Mayaguez Crisis prescribed brevity and limited information regarding Cambodian decision-making, this By LTC Thomas M. Feltey essay focuses solely on the American reaction—or more precisely the question; On May 12, 1975, the SS Mayaguez, a how did the United States arrive at the United States flagged merchant container decision to launch a rescue operation after ship, was fired upon then subsequently Cambodian forces seized the SS Mayaguez? boarded and seized by Cambodian gunboats near the island of Poulo Wai in the Gulf of To begin this analysis, it is first useful to Thailand approximately 60 miles off shore appreciate the incident from the perspective from Cambodia. This event set in motion an of the Cambodians since their decision- intense iteration of American decision- making is not assessed with Allison’s making led by the most senior leaders in the models. Although detailed data regarding United States Government. The SS Cambodia’s decision-making is not Mayaguez incident provides the policy currently available, there is enough maker and military planner an excellent information to construct a plausible opportunity to analyze and understand the explanation to Cambodian actions. Less than dynamic nature of executive governmental a month prior to the seizure of the SS decision-making. Ultimately, the United Mayaguez, the United States-backed States arrived at a rational decision to rescue government of Cambodia fell to the the SS Mayaguez as a result of choosing an Communist Khmer Rouge. Within that option that best achieved the goals and confusion, it is likely traditional and objectives of the United States Government. functional governmental apparatus were not However, some evidence also reveals fully operational. Nonetheless, Khmer governmental politics influenced the United Rouge gunboats began seizing and releasing States’ decision. a number of various foreign flagged ships in the vicinity of the Gulf of Thailand in an 2 To analyze and assess the United States’ effort to assert territorial control. decision-making during the SS Mayaguez Circumstantial evidence suggests the incident, Graham Allison’s rational actor Cambodian gunboats were not directly and governmental politics models are used. targeting the American SS Mayaguez, but In concluding his book, Essence of once central authorities learned Americans Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile were captured, they, in fact, took control of 3 Crisis, Allison offers the decision-making the incident via radio from Phnom Penh. analyst a series of “cookbook questions” to Cambodian forces initially sought to bring assist in unpacking or searching for the the American crew to the Cambodian underlying determinants for his three mainland. It cannot be certain what ends the models.1 Allison expertly analyzes and Khmer Rouge were pursuing by moving the conclusively details the decision making SS Mayaguez crew to the mainland; during the Cuban Missile Crisis by however, some potential gain through examining a Soviet action, followed by an negotiation was certainly a possibility. American reaction, and further by Soviet counteraction. He uses this method through As the situation rapidly unfolded, the all three models to arrive at the most Cambodians definitely grew concerned over

Campaigning Spring 2015 55 the presence of United States airplanes and validity of the domino theory.6 Moreover, were even more distraught over the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “made it destruction of a number of their gunboats.4 clear he believed the Southeast Asian One could assume that the Cambodians debacle would inevitably lead other nations weighed the consequences of a conflict with to test the will of the United States.”7 America versus some potential negotiated Kissinger and many in Congress thought prisoner settlement and decided to release North Korea would be the most likely the crew. This release of the SS Mayaguez candidate to test American resolve.8 In crew by Cambodian central authorities in essence, this ostensibly small incident of Phnom Penh in response to building state sanctioned piracy now threatened to American military pressure is indicative of shift the balance of power from the United “hypothetical Rational Actor perspective.”5 States to one or more Communist countries.9 In addition, the United States’ diplomatic Rational Actor Model efforts to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Middle East were rejected by To understand how the United States arrived Israel—another sign of weakened American at its decision to launch a rescue operation in leadership since Nixon’s resignation only response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS nine months earlier.10 Mayaguez crew it is necessary to answer five core questions: In many ways, threats to American interests 1. What are the objective circumstances that present opportunities, and this is exactly the United States conceived as threats and how American leaders viewed the opportunities? Mayaguez incident. After the rapid- 2. What are the United States’ goals? succession of setbacks and threats to 3. What are the objective options for American credibility, President Ford saw addressing the seizure of the ship and crew? this incident as an opportunity for the United 4. What are the objective strategic costs and States to demonstrate its “power and resolve benefits of each option? in the face of challenge.”11 This desire to 5. What is the United States’ best choice demonstrate to the world that American given these conditions? power still mattered underpinned the development of American goals. The goals Fortunately, there is ample evidence to for American action were simple and support this analysis. straightforward: “to recover the ship and its crew; and to do so in such a way to Threats and Opportunities demonstrate firmly to the international community that the United States could and The SS Mayaguez incident occurred at a would act with firmness to protect its particularly sensitive time for the United interests.”12 States’ international and domestic image and reputation. The Khmer Rouge completed its Options takeover of Cambodia on April, 17 1975, and soon afterwards, on April 30, 1975, the The National Security Council produced North Vietnamese captured Saigon, South various options and proposals during a series Vietnam. These two incidents were clearly of lively crisis action planning sessions that threats to worldwide freedom and ranged along the diplomatic to military democracy, and were indicative of the

Campaigning Spring 2015 56 spectrum. These proposals included the mature nor practiced. While diplomacy is following: always prudent and beneficial, the feasibility of this option was questionable. President - “Use diplomacy with the People’s Ford equated the diplomacy only option to Republic of China, the Cambodian doing nothing and viewed the consequences government, and the United Nations in an of not reclaiming the ship and crew, and attempt to have the ship and crew further damage to international reputation as returned. “very, very bad.”15 The seizure of the USS Pueblo by North Korean in 1968 and the - Conduct a military show of force. ensuing long-term hostage situation provided clear historical context for the - Seize a Cambodian island in retaliation. United States’ aversion to pursing a Authorize a helicopter landing on the diplomatic solution only. The cost of not Mayaguez. acting to secure the ship and crew was high.

- Order a landing on the USS Holt, with a The next option available to the United subsequent seaborne approach to the States was diplomacy first then decisive Mayaguez. military action. The benefits of this option included an attempt to resolve the incident - Assault Koh Tang with marines. diplomatically before resorting to military action; justification to use military force - Attack the port of Kompong Som with because diplomacy failed; a strong United navy tactical aircraft. States strategic message of “power and prestige” to its friends and enemies; and the - Authorize B-52 bombing of Kompong rapid rescue of both the ship and the crew Som.”13 before they could be moved to mainland Cambodia.16 The greatest downside of this The National Security Council debated the option was the potential failure of the efficiency of each of these distinct actions, military action to secure the crew and ship. but it was President Ford who grouped these Such a failure would manifest itself with a potential actions into three distinct options: strategic message opposite of what the U.S. (1) diplomatic only; (2) diplomacy first, desired: lack of power and prestige. then, if necessary, strong, decisive military action; and (3) diplomacy first, then Finally, the last option for consideration by incrementally imposed military action.14 the United States was diplomacy first then incremental use of force. The benefits of this Costs and Benefits option included initiating prudent diplomatic means to avert military action; a gradual Each option the United States explored escalation of military force as a signal of the possessed its own unique costs and benefits. United States’ strong commitment; and an With the diplomacy only option, the United off ramp for Cambodia to de-escalate the States immediately recognized the crisis. The downsides of this option included difficulties associated with it. The Khmer the perception of a weak response by the Rouge represented a fledging government United States, and the potential of a long- still trying to gain complete control of its term Pueblo-like hostage crisis due to slow country, and its administration was neither ineffective military action.

Campaigning Spring 2015 57 5. What is the action channel that is the Choice established process for aggregating competing perceptions, preferences, and As a result of the threats, opportunities, stands of players in making decisions and options, and cost/benefit of each of these taking action? options relative to its desired goal, the United States rationally chose the diplomacy Players first then decisive military action option. This option best accomplished the goal of Unlike many other Governmental Politics securing the ship and crew while sending a models in which key players are numerous robust strategic message to the world that and span the spectrum of government policy the United States would not tolerate this making, the key players for the Mayaguez type of behavior. The associated decisive incident decision-making are limited to the military actions were selected from a menu principles of the National Security Council. of military actions discussed in earlier NSC The key players were as follows: President meetings. Once this option was selected, the Gerald Ford; Henry Kissinger, Assistant for United States National Security Council National Security Affairs and Secretary of further developed the course of action by State; Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant for sequencing these proposals in time, space, National Security Affairs; and James and force prior to handing over the detailed Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. Other planning and execution to the Department of important players include William Colby, Defense. While the rational actor model Director of Central Intelligence; and General seems to answer the questions, there are David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs indicators to suggest governmental politics of Staff. may have influenced the decision. Unsurprisingly, President Ford along with Governmental Politics Model his views and values played a prevailing role in decision-making. As the leader of the To understand if governmental politics United States, his views were unique and influenced how the United States arrived at reflected the office of President, and that of its decision to launch a rescue operation in a career politician. President Ford was response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS inaugurated only nine months earlier as a Mayaguez crew, it is obligatory to result of President Nixon’s humiliating investigate five questions. The answers to resignation. President Ford certainly felt the these questions strive to limit facts only office of the presidency’s reputation was pertinent to this particular model of damaged and that confidence must be Governmental Politics. Allison poses the restored.17 President Ford also realized he following questions: was not elected by the people and therefore Who plays? possessed no clear mandate. President Ford Whose views and values count in shaping personally took charge of leading the efforts the choice and action? to resolve the crisis. Arguably this was an 3. What factors shape each player’s opportunity to restore confidence in the perceptions, preferred course of action, and presidency that had been severely shaken thus the players’ stand on the issue? with Nixon’s resignation. In addition, 4. What factors account for each player’s President Ford was confronted with the War impact on the choice and action? Powers Act that legislatively restricted his

Campaigning Spring 2015 58 authority as commander-in-chief and Finally, the last key player within Ford’s directed consultation with Congress. National Security Council was Lieutenant President Ford and Secretary Kissinger General Brent Scowcroft. General viewed the War Powers Act as an obstacle Scowcroft served as the Deputy Assistant to to acting decisively to rescue the crew, and the President for National Security Affairs necessitated quick action while informing and as a valued and trusted agent of Congress along the way.18 President Ford. Scowcroft’s most essential contributions to the NSC were his intellect, Henry Kissinger was the next key player temperance, and prudence.24 Fundamentally, associated with the Mayaguez decision- Scowcroft agreed with Kissinger’s making process. His views and values geopolitical framework. However, in dominated the other players in the National addition, Scowcroft focused in on core Security Council. Kissinger was a brilliant American interests like a laser and would historian, strategist, and an experienced counter Kissinger’s aggressive presentations statesman. He was supremely self-confident of opinion with insightful counter points. and possessed an exhaustive knowledge of Moreover, it was General Scowcroft’s view defense capabilities, and crisis and historical comparison of the Pueblo management.19 Most significant to his incident that greatly influenced the NSC influence on the Mayaguez decision-making decision to act strongly to avert another was “his grand strategic framework of damaging hostage situation for the United “geopolitics”.”20 Kissinger approached this States. crisis within the following framework: opportunity, executive management, Perceptions, preferred actions and stands symbolic effect, firmness, deterrent effect, use of sufficient force, force as an As illustrated, each of the key players’ views instrument of diplomacy, the American role and values offered distinctive contributions in the world, and domestic consensus.21 to the Mayaguez decision-making process. Kissinger’s framework captured his deep However, as the Governmental Politics views and values, and irrefutably model suggests, a certain group process exemplified the decisions made during the emerged that appreciably effected decision crisis. making. Ultimately it was the group’s overall perceptions, preferred course of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was actions, and stand on the crisis that drove the in position for approximately two years as diplomacy first—strong military action the Mayaguez crisis unfolded.22 Schlesinger option. Fundamental was the perception that was a proven academic of international United States’ power and prestige was affairs and a military expert. His values and damaged. The resignation of President views also suggest prudence, restraint, and Nixon, the fall of Saigon, and the failed proportionality as indicated through his American diplomatic efforts to barter an dissenting debates with Kissinger regarding agreement between Israel and Egypt in the the use of B-52s on the Cambodian Sinai were all indicators that America’s mainland.23 His recommendations were strength and influence were on the decline. reflective of his views regarding domestic and international opinion. There was also a prevailing perception that the North Koreans would soon test the United States and that America would lack

Campaigning Spring 2015 59 the will to respond.25 The perception that the time line than that supported by Schlesinger Mayaguez incident was an opportunity to and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through regain some domestic and international skillful bargaining and a monopoly on the credibility was on the forefront of every key details of military action and preparation player’s mind involved in the decision. Re- timelines, Schlesinger was successful in establishing credibility became the NSC’s delaying the rescue operations by twenty- central goal. Since gaining power and four hours and in using surgical military prestige was framed as the main strategic strikes on the Cambodian mainland instead outcome of the Mayaguez crisis, swift and of Kissinger’s preferred B-52 firepower decisive military action was essentially the demonstration. Another potentially default decision of the group. As Graham significant factor affecting choice and action Allison describes in his discussion of the was the President’s decisions relative to the Governmental Politics Model, use of War Powers Act. The President deliberately military force increases as the number of excluded Congress from the decision- decision makers have an initial personal making process to preserve his freedom of preference for military force.26 This action as the Commander-in-Chief. Despite approach was especially true in the legislation, the President only informed Mayaguez incident. In fact, none of key Congress of his actions after decisions were decision makers truly considered a already made and, in some cases, military diplomacy only option. The face of the issue action was complete. This is another clear was always presented from a position that signal of Governmental Politics at play. necessitated military action—to stop another Pueblo incident. Additionally, the threat of Action channels the Mayaguez crew, as hostages, moving to the Cambodian mainland raised the stakes This model concludes with exploring the and created an artificial deadline to act fast. question of action channels as a means of All these factors are indicative of the aggregating competing positions. Normally, Governmental Politics Model. it is through the bureaucratic action channels that seemingly irrational decisions are Factors and impact on choice and action explained; however, the Mayaguez incident presents the analyst with an action channel Since the NSC was a small decision-making purposely designed to limit government group within the framework of the bureaucracy. President Ford demonstrated Governmental Politics Model, the factors his keen understanding of bureaucratic impacting each player were minor. Power government by deliberately containing the and influence over decision is the pivotal debate and decision-making to the National factor impacting choice and action. Security Council, despite the availability of President Ford, at the helm of the NSC, held other standard decision-making all the power. Other key players were organizations. This early action by the relegated to influencing the decision by President exemplified a mastery of bargaining the degree and timings of governmental politics. Leading the NSC military action. For example, Henry himself, the President ensured only the most Kissinger supported the President’s desire trusted of likeminded advisors were part of for strong and quick military action; the process and guaranteed a favorable however, his desired course of action was decision. This technique also ensured the much harsher and occurred along a faster President himself could take much of the

Campaigning Spring 2015 60 credit as a way to restore confidence in the Allison’s view that to really understand the leadership of the United States. myriad aspects of decisions, multiple decision-making models must be used to The United States arrived at a rational gain a more complete understanding. As Dr. decision to rescue the SS Mayaguez as a Greg Miller discussed during a Joint Forces result of choosing an option that best Staff College lecture, the decision-making achieved the goals and objectives of the models are like search engines. They help United States Government. However, the the analyst identify the significant causal influence of governmental politics played a factors and the resultant is a strengthening of major role in the United States’ decision to the explanations and understanding of the launch a rescue operation in response to the issue. Cambodian seizure. Furthermore, the preceding analysis reinforces Graham

1. Graham T. Allison and Phillip D. Zelikow, 23. Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile the Mayaguez Crisis, 689. Crisis (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational 24. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 78. Publishers Inc, 1999), 389. 25. Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in 2. The Mayaguez Incident, Case Study C14-82-443, the Mayaguez Crisis, 692. Kennedy School of Government (1983), 2. 26. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. 311- 3. U.S. Congress, Seizure of the Mayaguez, pt 2, 312. 208,194. 4. Ibid. 192. 5. Chris Lamb, “Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 99 (Winter 1985): 697. Author Biography 6. Ibid. 683. 7. Ibid. 684. LTC Thomas M. Feltey, U.S. Army, is 8. Ibid. 9. Robert J. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident: currently a student in the Joint Advanced Testing America's Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era Warfighter School, Joint Forces Staff (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2011), College in Norfolk, Virginia. He most 217. recently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 23rd 10. Robert C. Head, Richard G. Short, and Frisco W. Infantry Regiment, 4-2 Stryker Brigade McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations Combat Team, in Afghanistan and Joint (A Westview Special Study) (New York: Westview Base Lewis-McChord. He holds a B.S. from Press, 1978), 102. Rutgers University, a M.A. from the Naval 11. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, 218. War College and is a graduate of the 12. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 110. Maritime Advanced Warfighting School. 13. Ibid. 114-115 14. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 117-118. His assignments include tours with Armored 15. Ibid. Cavalry formations at Fort Hood and 16. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, 218. Germany, and with the NATO Allied Rapid 17. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 71. Reaction Corps in the United Kingdom. He 18. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 141-142 has four deployments in support of OIF and 19. Ibid. 74. 20. Ibid. OEF. 21. See Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 75-76, for a detailed description of Kissinger’s framework. 22. Head et al., Crisis Resolution, 76.

Campaigning Spring 2015 61 Biofuels and the Defense Department: A Push Toward a The Problem Greener, More Secure Force The Department of Defense is the largest

By LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and single consumer of petroleum products in Maj Mark Enriques the world, although it only accounts for about one percent of the energy Americans use. In 2010, the DoD consumed more than Imagine a future conflict in which a five billion gallons of fuel in military deployed Marine purchases fuel for the operations at a cost of $13.2 billion, a 255 1 unit’s light armored vehicles (LAVs) and percent increase over 1997 costs. These power generators from a nearby village high energy costs siphon resources away farm. Procuring local fuel strengthens from training and equipping the Armed counter-insurgency efforts by bringing Forces. As the demand for energy grows, the prosperity to the village and reducing the reliability of global energy supplies is number of fuel convoys and associated IED- increasingly at risk. Transit and oil- casualties. Several months later, the Marine producing nations, including those hostile to will return home on military and contract the interests of the United States and its aircraft, all-consuming half the JP-8 Allies, can drive market and political traditionally burned and with reduced CO2 volatility. emissions. In another region, a formation of F/A-18s will return to its Carrier Strike Likewise, the increase in demand for fuel Group, whose non-nuclear ships and increased vulnerabilities for logistics helicopters will also consume half the personnel. Potential disruption of fuel traditional fuel amounts. The formation’s transport and supplies threaten battle space fuel burns so efficiently, the jets will take freedom of maneuver. Over 3,000 Army off with enough ordnance to negate a second personnel and contractors were wounded or formation, saving fuel and flight hours while killed during attacks on fuel and water reducing risk. resupply convoys in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, ground 2 These scenarios are possible through convoys were attacked 1,100 times. Future continued military investment in sustainable adversaries, including those armed with biofuels. Biofuels provide the Department precision weapons, may be even more 3 of Defense (DoD) an opportunity to reduce capable of targeting military supplies. demand and improve the efficiency of operational energy in order to enhance The DoD Strategy combat effectiveness, and reduce risks and costs across the range of military operations. Energy availability costs and security are at Therefore, the DoD must seek the the forefront of the challenges faced by the comparative advantages afforded by biofuels United States and the DoD. Prior to 2011, and lead public and private sector efforts for the DoD tended to treat energy as a the nation. To overcome the fiscal and commodity that would always be readily political pressures preventing these realities, available, overlooking strategic, operational, the DoD must expand current initiatives, tactical, and opportunity costs. In 2011, the garner Congressional support, and enable DoD released an Energy Strategy outlining private sector and international investment. three principles to enable a stronger and

Campaigning Spring 2015 62 independent energy force: reduce the stability of U.S. interests and those of its demand for energy in military operations; Allies. Efficient tactical power management expand and secure the supply of energy for will also be critical to accommodate next- military operations; and build energy generation weapons systems with increased security into the future force.4 These goals power requirements. seek to improve military combat capability and increase energy security by addressing a Navy significant military vulnerability: dependence on foreign oil.5 The Navy successfully showcased its alternative fuels program during the Rim of Energy security is the assured access to the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise reliable supplies of energy and the ability to demonstration in 2012. This “Great Green protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet Fleet” operated with no degradation of warfighting and installation needs. performance or mission using a “drop-in” Strategically, the goal is to reduce reliance biofuels blend. The two-day demonstration on fossil fuels. Tactically, the goal is to use premiered the first biofuel-powered carrier energy sources available on location and landing and first biofuel refueling of an improve energy efficiency. Both goals underway destroyer.7 The fuel was a 50/50 increase military capability per energy input mixture of biofuels (derived from cooking and improve military range and endurance, oil and algae) blended with traditional fossil which will lead to increased force protection fuels. As drop-in alternatives become more and savings. readily available, the Navy will make them a regular part of its bulk fuel procurement.8 Flexibility and sustainability link directly to energy access. Heavy fuel dependency is a The RIMPAC exercise was the initial concern for every warfighter whose tactics stepping-stone to a future Great Green Fleet, in the battle space are limited by the range which will continue using alternative energy and endurance of ships, aircraft, or tactical sources, including biofuel blends and vehicles. As previously stated, the need to nuclear power. Significant energy provide fuel to tactical forces requires a conservation measures will be a part of long, and often vulnerable, logistics tail. regularly scheduled deployments throughout This support requirement draws forces from 2016. The exercise also demonstrated other combat operations and potentially exposes energy-saving initiatives , such as the use of them to hostile action. These additional solid state lighting, changes to engineering requirements for securing and transporting maintenance procedures to increase fuel fuel to tactical forces effectively increase the efficiencies, a shipboard energy dashboard, cost of fuel to what is called the “fully- smart voyage planning decision aids, and burdened cost of fuel.”6 Although fuel structural changes to ships to reduce drag constraints may not be eliminated entirely, and hull resistance.9 Although biofuels did targeted investments in energy efficiency not drive these efficiencies, their lengthen the “fuel tether,” enhancing combat advancements represent investments into capability, and providing more options to future operational energy savings. Joint Force Commanders. In a networked alternative fuels chain, significant potential Building upon the success of the RIMPAC exists to improve partner nation capabilities, exercise, the Departments of the Navy, reduce the risk to forces, and improve the Energy, and Agriculture, as directed by a

Campaigning Spring 2015 63 2011 Presidential Directive, awarded three and power generators.15 In 2010, the Naval contracts to construct and commission bio- Surface Warfare Center began measuring refineries capable of producing drop-in LAV performance using biofuels. At nearly biofuels to meet the transportation needs of 500 vehicles, LAV fleet represents a the military and private sector. In total, the significant part of the Marine Corps motor projects will produce more than 100 million pool.16 The year-long test proved the 20/80 gallons of military grade fuel beginning in biofuel and diesel or jet fuel blends did not 2016 and 2017 at a price competitive with cause long-term damage, even after sitting their petroleum counterparts.10 The 2020 for extended periods time.17 goal is to use alternative sources for half of all energy consumption afloat, which will During the same period, the Expeditionary require nearly 300 million gallons of Energy Office successfully tested power biofuels.11 generators using cottonseed oil blended with JP-8 at Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan.18 The Department of the Navy, Energy, and While using the least amount of fuel of the Agriculture subsequently entered into a 20- services, Marines used 200,000 gallons per to 30-year public-private initiative that day [2011] in Afghanistan. Procuring fuel builds upon the synergy of developing a from local sources to power their vehicles competitive, advanced biofuels industry and generators could significantly reduce compatible with the military infrastructure. resources, both lives and dollars, required to Each agency plans to provide $170 million, transport, store, and protect fuel. for a total of $510 million to support this initiative.12 It is predicted the shift to Air Force synthetic fuels will result in the most significant step in jump-starting the Within the DoD, the Air Force consumes 48 manufacture and use of synthetic fuels percent of the petroleum procured. Of that, within the broader U.S. economy and 81 percent goes to aviation. Acknowledging partner nations. how the volume of consumed fuel impacts operations, the Air Force set a goal in 2006 Marine Corps to reduce aviation fuel usage by 10 percent by 2015. Efforts to promote awareness, Although the Marine Corps defers to the innovation, and adopt commercial airline Navy as the lead for the DoD’s Operational efficiencies were extremely effective as they Energy Strategy target to promote the reached that goal in early 2013, saving $1.5 development of alternative fuels,13 they are billion in 2012.19 Future efforts and pressing forward with Secretary Mabus’ associated savings require more emphasis on vision. The Marine Corps Expeditionary the Air Force’s strategic approach to assure Energy Office examines alternative fuels supply through the increased use of and ways to reduce operational energy alternative aviation fuels.20 requirements, critical to expeditionary operations from combat to humanitarian The Air Force has completed certification assistance. that all of its aircraft can operate on a 50/50 biofuel blend. The Thunderbirds While the MV-22 has flight-tested biofuels demonstration team performed a full show successfully,14 Marine biofuel testing has in May, 2011 using a biofuel blend, focused on light armored vehicles (LAVs) showcasing the ability to fly on biofuels

Campaigning Spring 2015 64 without a loss of performance.21 Air Force additional Sidewinders, five Mavericks, or investment has advanced biofuels two stand-off land attack missiles development with several other milestones: (SLAMs).27 the first supersonic flight, first transcontinental flight, and first air-refueling Army using biofuels blends.22 Like the Marine Corps, the Army is not as The next step could be encouraging partner platform-centered as the Navy and Air nations to certify their aircraft to use biofuel Force, and thus presently focuses its green blends, particularly those who fly American- initiatives toward installations. This focus on built aircraft, air-refuel with U.S. tankers, or installations makes sense as the Army is the heavily rely on U.S. fuel during largest facility energy consumer in the expeditionary operations. This certification Federal government, spending $1.25 billion would be in line with objectives to ensure in FY2012.28 In February, the Army “began interoperability with international partners,23 its long-awaited process for signing up to $7 and would enhance future planning for air- billion in renewable energy contracts over refueling and basing. Some foreign the next 10 years.”29 With these contracts, militaries, such as the Royal Netherlands Air the Army Energy Initiatives Task Force Force, have already certified biofuel aircraft, (AEITF) aims to derive at least 25 percent of and a technical review may be the only the electricity consumed by renewable requirement for interoperability approval.24 energy by 2025. The AEITF focuses on five categories of renewable energies: solar- A potential future military advantage biofuel photovoltaic, wind, geothermal, biomass could provide aviation is in the area of (that makes biofuel), and other alternative “super-fuels” such as JP-10. JP-10 is 11 energy technologies. percent more efficient than JP-8, but it’s hard to produce, which increases costs. As a Through a promising public-private result, JP-10 is currently restricted to air-to- initiative, the Army has agreed to long-term air and air-to-surface missiles only. Last land lease to the Hawaiian Electric year, however, Naval Air Warfare Center Company (HECO) to build, operate, and researchers reported synthesizing “a fuel maintain a 50 MW biofuel-capable power that had JP-10esque [thermal munit] generation plant. The plant could begin properties from a blend of biobased operations in 2017 using blends of liquid terpenes” (hydrocarbons found in biofuels and natural gas, reducing aromatherapy plants).25 Increasing the dependence on oil and coal-based production and lowering the price of JP-10 electricity.30 The plant would give is not viable in the near-term. However, if Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Airfield, terpenes can be engineered to improve the and Field Station Kunia, whose combined storage of and release of fuel, and load averages 22.4 MW, priority in the event proponents estimate a potential to produce of a grid outage. Additionally, its “fast back- 500 gallons of JP-10 per acre,26 the military up” capacity will allow for quick start-up advantage for aviation would be and shut-down, improving integration with considerable. For example, an 11 percent intermittent solar and wind facilities around increase in efficiency would provide a fully- the island. The plant will also have a “black fueled F/A-18 an extra 3,200 pounds of start” capability, meaning it does not rely on carrying capacity, the equivalent of 16 the external power grid during a blackout.

Campaigning Spring 2015 65 This feature is especially important in Chemical said it would tap a strain of supporting the Federal Emergency Solazyme algae oil for use in electrical Management Agency (FEMA) and transformer insulating fluids. In addition, a municipalities during natural disasters.31 “spin-off” of Solazyme’s biofuel research led to the discovery of additional strains of Finally, while not focused on developing algae that provide food sources that could aviation biofuels, the Army is posturing to replace eggs and butter in a variety of use them. Earlier this year, the Army foods.34 Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center completed flight Opposition tests of a UH-60A Black Hawk using a 50/50 alcohol-to-jet biofuel and JP-8 blend. Despite the substantial investment the DoD In September, the CH-47 Chinook has made into biofuels, the recent progress completed its first successful flight.32 These in the industry, and potential military flights, like the other Services’, showed benefits, opponents wish to curb further neither loss of performance nor ill-effects to military investment. Critics repeatedly cite a engines. 2011 RAND monograph, sponsored by the Defense Logistics Agency, stressing that Startups biofuels “offer no particular military benefit over their petroleum-derived counterparts.” One of the many beneficiaries of the DoD’s The monograph argues that current fuel biofuel initiatives is the continued growth of supplies will not expire in the foreseeable biofuel technology startup companies. future, and during a crisis, price increases History reveals that military necessity has would cause consumers to use less, and often been the driver of innovation in supplies would remain available. The technology: from the beginning of mass RAND argument centers on three reasons: production and metallurgy through the cost, supply, and politics. nuclear age and into the Internet age. There are several startups in the biofuel field that Currently, cost is the most significant are using military necessity to drive further hindrance to biofuels. Although the RAND research. Funded with $85 million from Bill monograph concludes with the curious Gates and other investors, plus $104 million remark that, “As long as the military is in Government cash and loan guarantees, willing to pay higher prices, it is unlikely to Sapphire Energy is the world’s only have a problem getting the fuel it commercial outdoor algae biorefinery.33 requires,”35 the U.S. military is neither Sapphire’s initial goal is to extract 1.5 willing nor able to absorb higher prices million gallons of crude oil from algae and without strategic or operational risk. With to be price competitive by 2018. that in mind, however, present fiscal constraints mean that for each dollar spent Another startup is Solayzme, which helped on emerging biofuel technology or research produce some of the 450,000 gallons of is a dollar that cannot be spent on training, biofuel used during RIMPAC 2012. readiness, and other acquisitions. Notably, Growing algae in bioreactors with sugar and the RIMPAC exercise consumed one million excrete crude oil, the biofuel produced by gallons of the 50/50 blend, at a cost of $13 Solazyme produced aviation quality drop-in million, nearly four times the cost of fuel already in use. In May [2012], Dow petroleum.36 Air Force tests used biofuels

Campaigning Spring 2015 66 costing up to $150 per gallon.37 While these determining cost and environmental initial biofuels costs are staggering, such impacts.39 “fuels premiums” are also affected by the volatility of petroleum. For example, from Production quantity is an important FY04 to FY05, Navy expenditures for fuel consideration and will likely prove increased by 55 percent while consumption prohibitive for some types of biofuels. only increased by one percent over the same However, limited production potential of period. That $912 million single-year biofuels should not deter the DoD from increase in Navy fuels expenditures could exploiting a possible opportunity. The DoD cover the funds for 7,000 personnel or three must commit to large investments in littoral combat ships.38 technology R&D, especially for technology beyond the next decade. If the United States The cost of the drop-in biofuel is can develop algae-derived biofuel, there will considerably higher than its petroleum literally be oceans of sustainable fuel for counterpart, for now. Securing a fuel source military and commercial consumption. at a consistent price and in high supply will provide strategic and tactical advantages, The last argument by opponents is politics. such as reduce foreign oil dependency, In a somewhat strange twist, the military’s decrease supply line vulnerability, and push for greener and less dependent energy increase operational capabilities. Regardless sources has put them at odds with some of of the cause of high prices, it is clear that the their staunchest allies in Congress. DoD would benefit from price stable Republicans on the Senate Armed Services domestically produced biofuels for today Committee assess the directive to the Navy, and in the future. Energy and Agriculture Departments as undermining Defense priorities, and trying Limited supply and production of biofuels is to “use our military as a piggy bank to fund another argument against further military the President’s domestic energy agenda.”40 investment. The 2011 RAND monograph As evidence, they point to bankrupt solar- states, “Because of limited production panel maker Solyndra.41 Still, “more than 70 potential, fuels derived from animal fats, percent of insiders say the DoD’s move to waste oils, and seed oils will never have a use more biofuels will survive congressional significant role in the larger domestic, opposition, arguing lawmakers will have commercial marketplace. Algae-derived trouble saying no to the Pentagon.”42 Draft fuels might, but technology development Defense spending bills in each of the past challenges suggest that algae-derived fuels two years have included language cutting will not constitute an important fraction of biofuel expenditures and research though the commercial fuel market until well that language has been removed each time beyond the next decade.” Specifically, during final negotiations and voting. The animal fats and waste oil feedstocks are DoD military and civilian leaders will likely likely limited to 30,000 barrels per day. continue pushing Congress for continued Vegetable oil feedstocks would be limited to research and expenditures into biofuels for 200,000 barrels per day and require an area the foreseeable future. equal to 10 percent of croplands currently cultivated in the U.S. Algae feedstock would require “large investments in R&D” before

Campaigning Spring 2015 67 Final Thoughts navies as “inevitable,” Navy Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering expressed Perhaps the greatest impediment to biofuel “fear of a failure of the supply,” the acceptance is the skepticism often associated uncertainty of which “might develop into with emerging technologies. The Navy’s condition menacing the mobility of the shift from coal to oil over 100 years ago is whole fleet and safety of the nation.”44 an example of dangerous skepticism of History and the world’s current dependence emerging technology with respect to cost, on oil prove how wrong these leaders were supply, and politics. In 1897, the Navy and should guard present leaders’ reliance began testing marine engines using oil fuel on potential estimates of cost and supply. but was very slow to adopt them for remarkably similar arguments presented Private sector investment is another against biofuels. In his 1902 annual report, indication that biofuel development is not a Engineer in Chief of the Navy stated the DoD folly. In 2008, Virgin Atlantic flew the following: first commercial aircraft using a 20/80 It may be regarded as a certainty that, except biofuel/kerosene mixture in one of four wherein unusual conditions prevail, the cost engines. In 2009, Continental Airlines of oil for marine purposes will generally be demonstrated the first U.S. biofuels flight greater than that of coal [….] As regards to using a 50/50 blend of algae-derived biofuel. the question of supply, it may be more 2011 saw United complete the first expensive if not difficult to transport and to commercial revenue flight on biofuel.45 As store oil than coal [….] The mining and well as uncertainty about future fuel costs, railroad companies have invested so heavily expected carbon-emission caps drive in the coal industry and the transportation commercial airline actions. As such, the facilities have been so perfected that it is “industry as a whole has set for itself two now possible to quickly deliver a cargo of goals to address emissions and fuel use: coal at any point in the world [….] Since it Achieve carbon-neutral growth beginning in will require progressive development to 2020 and reduce carbon dioxide emissions perfect the transportation and the storage of 50 percent by 2050 compared with 2005 oil, and as the world’s supply is still an levels.”46 unknown quantity, it will leave some time before there may be a reserve supply of oil Energy is essential for developing and at the principle seaports [….] The military employing U.S. combat capability in support aspect of the establishment of fuel stations of national security interests. Energy may prove to be a serious problem, since it security provides the Joint Force with the may not only necessitate heavy ability to assure access to reliable supplies expenditures, but may involve the greater of energy, and the ability to protect and political question as to the wisdom of deliver sufficient energy to meet operational maintaining a complete chain of fuel stations needs.47 Volatile oil markets and shrinking between country and colony.43 U.S. Defense budgets call for a balancing of missions and resources. Biofuels present a In addition to the increased infrastructure path to reliable, cost-effective, and and decreased cost, oil could be stored sustainable alternatives to stabilize fuel costs throughout the ship and eliminated stokers and provide military operational advantages. and half the required engine tenders. Yet While biofuel technology has a way to go even after accepting the use of oil by all before cost and supply are equivalent to

Campaigning Spring 2015 68 fossil fuels, it is clear the DoD can, and must, continue to research and develop innovative ways to fuel the force. Domestically-grown or locally-sourced sustainable fuels creates a stabilizing effect for the DoD in a dynamic, fiscally-austere environment.

1 Department of Defense. Operational Energy 19 Insinna, Valerie, and Yasmin Tadjdeh. "Air Force Strategy: Implementation Plan. Plan, Department of Making Headway on Fuel Efficiency Goals." Defense, 2012. National Defense, June 2013. 2 Ibid. 20 U.S. Air Force. "U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic 3 Ibid. Plan," 2013. 4 Ibid. 21 Cook, Catherine. "Energy Security and Alternative 5Office of the Secretary of the Navy. U.S. Navy, Energy Sources." Inside Charleston, October 1, 2014. Energy, Environment and Climate Change. 2014. 22 Cook, "Energy Security and Alternative Energy http://greenfleet.the DoDlive.mil/energy/great-green- Sources." fleet/ (accessed October 2014). 23 U.S. Air Force. "U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic 6 Ibid. Plan." 7 Matthews, William. "Price Points: Weighing Cost 24 Klopper, Hal. "First Biofuel-Powered Military of Biofuel Production Against Other Navy Priorities Helicopter Takes Flight." Boeing. September 1, 2010. At Heart of Debate." Seapower, November 2012: 34- http://www.boeing.com/Features/2010/09/bds_feat_r 36. nlaf_09_07_10.html (accessed November 7, 2014). 8 Office of the Chief of Information. Departments of 25 Lane, Jim. "Making Superfuels Affordable, Via the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture Invest in Biofuels: the JP-10 Story." Biofuels Digest, February Construction of Three Biorefineries to Produce 5, 2013. Drop-In Biofuel for Military. Article, Office of the 26 Ibid. Chief of Information, U.S. Navy, 2014. 27 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 28 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy 10 Office of the Chief of Information. Departments of and Sustainability. Army Energy and Sustainability the Navy, Energy, and Agriculture Invest in Program. U.S. Army, 2014. Construction of Three Biorefineries to Produce 29 Amy S. Koch, Lorraine Mullings Campos. "U.S. Drop-In Biofuel for Military. Army looking for $7 Billion in renewable energy 11 Department of Defense, Operational Energy over the next ten years." Reed Smith mobile site, Strategy: Implementation Plan. 2014: 1-4. http://m.reedsmith.com/us-army-looking- 12 Department of Defense, Operational Energy for-7-billion-in-renewable-energy-over-the-next-10- Strategy: Implementation Plan. years-03-12-2012/ 13 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational 30 Clover, Ian. "Fast-Reacting 50 MW Power Plant Energy. Energy Investment for Military Operations: Planned for Hawaii's Solar Revolution." PV For Fiscal Year 2003. Washington D.C.: Department Magazine, October 27, 2014. of Defense, 2012. 31 Energy Initiatives Task Force. Schofield Barracks, 14 U.S. Navy. "Department of the Navy Goes Green Hawaii 50 MW Biofuel-Capable Power Generation with Osprey." Biodiesel Magazine, August 23, 2011. Plant. Fact Sheet, U.S. Army, 2014. 15 Lombardo, Tony. "Corps Tests Biofuels in 32 Keith, Ryan. "Engineers Test Bio-Fuel in Vehicles, Generators." Marine Corps Times, June 14, Helicopters." Army.mil. October 16, 2014. 2011. http://www.army.mil/article/136334/Engineers_test_ 16 Lawlor, Maryann. "Marines Go Green." Signal bio_fuel_in_helicopters/?from=RSS (accessed Magazine, July 2010. November 8, 2014). 17 Lombardo, "Corps Tests Biofuels in Vehicles, 33 Woody, Todd. "Military Dividend." Forbes, Generators." 9/24/2012: 44-48. 18 Lawlor, "Marines Go Green." 34 Ibid.

Campaigning Spring 2015 69 Team Biographies 35 Bartis, James T, and Lawrence Van Bibber. Alternative Fuels for Military Applications. RAND Lieutenant Colonel David Carey, USA. Corporation, 2011. 36 Woody, "Military Dividend," 44-48. LTC Carey is currently in route to the 37 Government Accountability Office. "Alternative Defense Intelligence Agency. He was Jet Fuels." Report to Congressional Requestors, commissioned through ROTC at Texas 2014. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663027.pdf A&M University in 1994, where he earned a 38 Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. BS in Industrial Distribution Engineering. Naval Synthetic Fuels Program. Report, Chief of Naval Operations, 2007. He earned a MS in Strategic Intelligence 39 Bartis and Van Bibber, Alternative Fuels for from the National Intelligence University in Military Applications. 2008. Prior to his current assignment, LTC 40 Goldstein, Edward. "Military Alternative Fuels Carey served as the Senior THE DOD Research: The Navy’s Great Green Fleet, and Intelligence Liaison to the Center for Opposition from Congress." Defense Media Network. September 6, 2013. Strategic Counterterrorism Communication http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/militar at the State Department. y-alternative-fuels-research-the-navys-great-green- fleet/ (accessed November 8, 2014). Lieutenant Commander James H. Hoey, 41 Alexander, David. "U.S. Air Force tests biofuel at USN. LCDR Hoey is currently serving as a $59 per gallon." Reuters. July 15, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/15/us-usa- Staff Officer, in the USAFRICOM J9 military-biofuels-idUSBRE86E01N20120715 Outreach Directorate. He was commissioned (accessed November 8, 2014). through the United States Naval Academy in 42 Belogolova, Olga. "Insiders: GOP Won't Stop 2001 where he earned a BS in Economics. Pentagon's Green-Energy Push." National Journal LCDR Hoey earned a MA in National Daily AM, 7/26/2012: 3. 43 Edwards, John R. Report of the U.S. Naval "Liquid Security Affairs, East Asia from the Naval Fuel" Board of Tests Conducted on the Hohenstein Postgraduate School in 2007. Prior to his Water Tube Boiler: Showing the relative evaporative current assignment, LCDR Hoey served as efficiencies of coal and liquid fuel under forced and the Combat Systems Officer in USS natural draft conditions as determined by an DEWEY (DDG 105). extended series of tests. Government Print Office, 1904. 44 Maurer, John H. "Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Major Mark Enriques, USAF. Maj Enriques Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898-1925." is currently serving as Theater Security Naval War College Review, November-December Cooperation Officer, in USNORTHCOM 1981: 60-77. J35 Future Operations Directorate. He was 45 Peterka, Amanda. "Biofuels: Clean, Green Options Lacking as Airlines Seek Alternatives to Petroleum." commissioned through the United States Air Greenwire, January 14, 2013. Force Academy in 2003 where he earned BS 46 Ibid. in Computer Engineering. He earned an 47 Department of Defense. Operational Energy MBA from Touro University International Strategy: Implementation Plan. in 2009. Prior to his current assignment, Maj Enriques served as Executive Officer to the Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force.

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The Conventional Force and conduct and the roles conventional Irregular Warfare: How the forces will assume. Conventional Force Can Relieve The Environment Mission Pressure on Special Operations Forces Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. military exorcised the lessons of IW as By LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary fast as possible in an effort to refocus on Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas force-on-force warfare.2 The exception to this effort was within the SOF community, which retained its IW focus The American military has a habit of as part of its broader mission set. For the forgetting the lessons it learns in next 30 years or so, irregular warfare, or irregular warfare (IW). The wars in Iraq more specifically counterinsurgency and Afghanistan have forced the United warfare, was viewed as a niche States to learn, or in many cases relearn, capability at best by the Services. how to wage IW. The Department of Defense (DoD), in envisioning a post- During the first decade of the 21st Afghanistan military, must inculcate the Century, the United States found itself lessons learned from 14 years of fighting attempting to fight counterinsurgencies IW. As the primary IW force provider, in Iraq and Afghanistan using Special Operations Forces (SOF) will conventional warfare methods. The lack struggle to source all of the requirements of IW doctrine and training in the U.S. as operations shift from large-scale conventional force’s mission set resulted counter-insurgency operations (COIN), in the creation of ad hoc elements unable such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, to to address the challenges resident in smaller intra-state IW conflicts. To meet nations mired in insurgencies. These ad the future demands of IW and COIN, the hoc elements, such as the Military DoD must use conventional forces to Transition Teams (MTTs) and Multi- reduce the burden on SOF personnel. National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I), were expected to In the decades between the Vietnam War accomplish the enormous task of and the removal of the Taliban in creating and training foreign security Afghanistan (OEF) in 2001, IW was a forces without the requisite training or niche mission set for SOF. Today, IW is expertise.3 a commonplace task for conventional as well as SOF forces because of the The DoD’s failure to institutionalize importance of COIN operations in previous IW lessons learned came with a Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the high cost of blood and national treasure. Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around This same approach, relying on the the world. With IW becoming an creation of ad hoc IW response increasingly important mission, mechanisms in times of crisis, is not an conventional forces must maintain their option for future U.S. security capability to support future IW operations. Acknowledging this fact, the 1 operations. A greater conventional 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review force role in IW necessitates the clear (QDR) states, “Although our forces will delineation of the roles the SOF will

Campaigning Spring 2015 71 no longer be sized to conduct large- requires the same level of training and scale, prolonged stability operations, we expertise. Therefore, it follows that if will preserve the expertise gained during operational requirements will increase the past ten years of counterinsurgency and SOF personnel levels will remain and stability operations in Iraq and the same, conventional forces will be Afghanistan.”4 The DoD must ascertain required to cover this shortfall. how the U.S. military will organize following its drawdown in Afghanistan In a resource-constrained environment, to ensure IW capabilities remain and both SOF and conventional forces gain continue to develop. from this symbiotic relationship. If conventional forces demonstrate a Fourteen years of war and the capability to meet increased IW concomitant military spending, along demands, this relieves SOF from the with a sluggish economy, have depleted worst aspects of its high operations and Government coffers, leaving the DoD to personnel tempo. In addition, this face significant budgetary constraints. In increased conventional force capability turn, these budgetary constraints are provides the DoD with an incentive to forcing policymakers to determine how retain conventional force levels capable and when the U.S. will employ its forces of executing both missions. Naturally, in the future.5 This fiscal reality has the conventional force must remain already resulted in a reduction in U.S. available in sufficient quantity when a military forces as a cost-saving measure. conventional conflict becomes Unfortunately, United States Special necessary. A properly constructed Operations Command (USSOCOM) advisory corps could quickly transition predicts the requirements and demand to the structure of a conventional force. for SOF will grow following the completion of the Afghanistan mission. Roles Already undermanned, USSOCOM further describes the negative impact of A review of the relevant doctrine reveals frequent deployments on SOF personnel that, while acknowledging some part for to maintain their skill set.6 conventional forces in IW, there is a dearth of guidance on what specific roles This nexus of increased requirements SOF and the conventional force will and decreasing budgets sets up a supply assume. This specification is important and demand cycle that is likely to remain since SOF and conventional forces could unbalanced if the DoD does not pursue find themselves building similar capacity an alternative solution to the status quo. while other capabilities go unsourced. In If, as USSOCOM predicts, the demand his 2008 Command and General Staff for SOF increases, who fills the College thesis, Major Joseph Escandon shortfall? If budgetary constraints addressed the issue of IW roles. restrict or preclude the growth of SOF, Escandon observed that a process will SOF continue to provide the existed within the Office of the Secretary responsive force the nation has grown to of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff expect? Although the third SOF truth (JS) to identify those missions in Iraq states, “SOF cannot be mass produced,”7 and Afghanistan that SOF would not all traditional SOF mission sets conduct while the remaining missions

Campaigning Spring 2015 72 would fall to the conventional forces to equipment and training often conducted conduct. Escandon described the in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive process as reactive and dependent upon a environments and characterized by one “formula” based on criteria and guidance or more of the following: time sensitive, provided by the Secretary of Defense.8 clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, Although this process solved the requiring regional expertise, and/or a immediate problems in Iraq and high degree of risk.”9 This definition Afghanistan, it is not likely to translate describes “special” criteria that fall into into the context of future conflicts. three broad categories: operations However, the DoD could create a new requiring specific equipment; operations formula to assign roles during future requiring specialized skills or training; conflicts, this approach would facilitate and operations involving risk. Risk can the continuance of the current reactive be further refined into two parts: process rather than transitioning to a political risk and risk to forces proactive one. A proactive process conducting the operation. These prepares conventional forces for IW categories highlight the traditional SOF before a crisis rather than simply missions of unconventional warfare backfilling the missions SOF is unable to (risk), training foreign nation SOF fill. A clear delineation of roles for SOF personnel (specialized training and, in and conventional forces in doctrine will most cases, specialized equipment), and provide conventional force leaders the counterterrorism. ability to identify training requirements and understand what roles their force In conflicts characterized by will undertake. This approach changes conventional actions, SOF augments and the way in which SOF and conventional complements the missions of forces interact, improving the synergy conventional forces. In an IW between the forces, increasing environment, the SOF and the capabilities, and enhancing trust. conventional force need to flip the Another benefit of this approach is that supported and supporting relationship of economy of force. If conventional around in which SOF conducts IW forces are prepared for IW actions with conventional force environments, less SOF may be augmentation. The fifth SOF Truth required, which frees those forces up for captures this idea that, “most special other requirements or training operations require non-SOF opportunities. assistance.”10 This SOF Truth reminds us that SOF actions create the greatest To determine how conventional forces effects when complemented by can best complement SOF IW capabilities provided by others such as capabilities, it is first necessary to conventional forces, host nation forces, understand SOF operations and or other U.S. government institutions. missions. In short, what makes Special Operations “special”? The Joint definition of Special Operations states, “Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques,

Campaigning Spring 2015 73 Applications for Conventional Forces integration of which solution number in IW two is noteworthy for this discussion. “Establish habitual training and mission How would the practical application of relationships: maintain events that will conventional forces in an IW role allow SOF–[CF] to train together, function? Historical aviation foreign expand those events beyond pre- internal defense (FID) presents an deployment training and develop [CF] interesting case study for analysis. Top with a regional focus and a habitual U.S. Air Force leaders recognized the relationship with corresponding theater need for continuing aviation FID special operations commands.”13 The focused on IW capabilities. The former second report is the Quadrennial Secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. Defense Review (QDR) IW Execution Donley, and the former Air Force Chief Roadmap that states the priority is to of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, “transform the way DOD manages its stated, “…the Air Force must balance military and civilian personnel to meet the requirements levied upon airpower in IW operational requirements.”14 The IW with the concurrent need to maintain roadmap elaborates further that general- decisive advantage in conventional purpose forces must “rebalance warfare.”11 Immediately upon capabilities and capacity to acknowledging the need for IW conduct…long duration airpower, the first tension is uncovered counterinsurgency and counterterrorism at the Service Component level. It is a operations; train, equip, and advise large balancing game; something must give numbers of foreign security forces; and within the Air Force conventional foster the development of civil society warfare model to meet IW requirements. and effective governance in ungoverned An additional question arises at the and under-governed areas.”15 Service level. Is this IW force a standing force or should the Service develop the Shortfalls capability as needed for contingencies? To find the answer, three areas are Three categories of struggles reveal assessed: requirements; historical themselves when examining U.S. precedent; and the shortfalls between conventional forces: capability, those requirements and current force ambiguity, and relevancy. Regarding the structure. struggle with capability, the 2010 QDR identified some consistent capability Requirements shortfalls for training partner aviation forces. As a solution, DoD intended to There are two reports providing broad double its current capacity by 2012.16 requirements for conventional force The struggle with the ambiguity of the participation in IW roles. The first report IW environment and the conventional is from the Joint Staff–J7 Joint and force mindset revealed itself through the Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Unified Quest 2007 & 2008 concept Section titled Decade of War: Enduring exercises.17 The teams noted, “…the Lessons From The Past Decade Of challenges of building IW campaigns Operations.12 This key report identifies demonstrated the discomfort and several solutions to enhance CF and SOF confusion of [conventional force]

Campaigning Spring 2015 74 players when forced to wrestle with the its way further down the Service’s chain ambiguity inherent in IW.”18 The teams of command. The Air Force must found that while many of the IW tasks develop leaders who have a clear they perform are essentially the same, understanding of irregular airpower the conditions under which they perform application. That leadership is critical to them are different.19 closing the gap between desire and capability.23 The Service needs Finally, and possibly most significant, is permanent solutions to meet the the struggle with relevancy. By demands of general-purpose forces employing conventional forces to meet waging IW.24 An irregular warfare IW training requirements, either for a capable force can be developed particular skill set or only during a relatively inexpensively from the particular phase, the advantage of existing combat structure within the developed relationships and cultural Service. A standing IW force, equipped awareness so significant to SOF success with an inventory of inexpensive in the IW environment is lost. For aircraft, common to the regions SOF are example, for ARSOF to conduct its employed in and designed to meet a missions, its units receive extensive variety of IW requirements, should be foreign language training, are regionally manned by personnel that have proper oriented, are attuned to cultural customs, IW education and language training.25 values and traditions, and are sensitive to The training provided to foreign nations the political implications and national should “also emphasize irregular interests that their decisions and actions concepts and training…based on the affect.20 These attributes, amplified by needs of partner nations.”26 Furthermore, persistent engagement with foreign “conventional and IW training, to forces, allow a more interactive include cultural awareness training, must relationship to form, enhancing the be taught side–by–side at all levels of training of foreign forces and promoting professional development.”27 a greater unity of effort within government at all levels.21 These three Identification, Recruitment, Training struggles of capability, ambiguity, and and Retention relevancy present a significant challenge in the transformation of applying Establishing an enduring conventional conventional forces to IW missions and force capability to conduct irregular require paradigm shifts in structure, warfare as directed in the 2014 QDR training, and employment. will require institutional mechanisms to identify, recruit, train and retain Solutions conventional advisors.28 Conventional forces provide great value in the The military as a whole must irregular warfare realm and can relieve acknowledge that the IW and the SOF of some of the burden for a capacity-building mission are enduring growing mission set. It appears clear that missions.22 For the Air Force, Secretary the Services, the Army in particular, will of the Air Force Donley and Air Force face personnel reductions in the coming Chief of Staff Schwartz acknowledged years. Maintaining a credible IW this, but this understanding must work capability lends additional relevance to

Campaigning Spring 2015 75 conventional forces in a time of fiscal coast guardsman who would be good austerity. advisors. Such criteria might be similar but not identical to those used to select Selecting the right personnel to conduct SOF. The standards cannot be as the IW mission from within the pool of stringent and might include experience conventional forces has historically been in training roles, empathy, problem- a challenge.29 It is neither desirable nor solving ability, and adaptability. Much realistic to create a SOF-like level of IW of the literature on IW indicates that proficiency within the conventional foreign language proficiency is critical force. It takes a great deal of time and to success in the IW mission.32 expense to create a SOF operator and Unfortunately, as often as not, the making the conventional force more advisor is not even working with a “SOF-like” would inevitably make SOF foreign military that speaks the language less “Special.” Those in the conventional in which the SOF operator has trained. force who are good fits for the SOF Therefore, while foreign language community end up there frequently and proficiency is certainly desirable, it is diluting the role of SOF would simply not a realistic objective for conventional make the community less effective. forces personnel prior to specific However, there are certain training. The Services, however, should characteristics that make some personnel identify those individuals who have a more suitable for the IW mission than moderate aptitude for learning new others. As Robert Ramsey points out in a languages and, more importantly, a paper for the Combat Studies Institute willingness to learn. The willingness of Press, “Careful selection and screening the Services to send high performing of advisory personnel is required. Not individuals with the motivation to everybody can or should do advisory perform the IW mission is critical to the duty.”30 success of the IW mission. Too often, as pointed out by Andrew Krepinevich Conventional forces performing IW during his 2007 testimony before missions are typically performing Congress on the future role of ground advisory roles that require different skill forces, the “soldiers sent by the Army to sets and temperament from those of the serve as advisors are the men it can most combat soldier. An effective advisor easily afford to do without.”33 should be culturally aware, comfortable operating within the local population or Recruitment and retention within the indigenous security forces, exhibit conventional force must be linked firepower restraint, and possess an closely to the IW mission. There is a ability to train others.31 IW requires a well-documented gap concerning level of adaptability neither commonly incentives within the traditional practiced nor valued in the combat arms- conventional force to recruit and retain focused conventional forces. the most qualified advisors. The perception within the Services, and the Recognizing the importance of advising Army in particular, is that promotion it is critical that the Services develop boards tend to favor those soldiers who criteria by which they can identify those serve in conventional U.S. units over sailors, soldiers, airmen, Marines, and those performing advisory roles with

Campaigning Spring 2015 76 foreign units.34 If the conventional force Recruiting and retaining the right people is to sustain a credible and effective IW is still not going to create the desired capability, the Service must change its effect absent an effective training cultural ethos to value IW capabilities as mechanism to ensure that conventional much as conventional warfighting IW advisors are capable and capabilities. To facilitate promotion and professional.36 There are two key aspects retention, John Nagl of the Center for a to developing this mechanism for New American Security has argued for acculturation. First, the training creating a separate advisory corps within curriculum must address the key skills the conventional force that has required by a conventional advisor: designated career enhancing key cultural awareness, language ability, developmental positions.35 firepower restraint, advisory skills, knowledge of how to interact with civic While the concept of an advisory corps leaders, and small-unit force protection is likely both personnel and cost capabilities.37 The second is having the prohibitive, what if the advisor corps right trainers. No doubt, there are was created from within existing Service experienced trainers within the organizations? Advisors could come conventional force; however, the from a BCT, a Navy helicopter primary expertise for the IW mission squadron, or an Air Force security forces resides within SOF. DoD should create a squadron, for example. This approach joint SOF-conventional force IW certainly poses challenges to unit training capability that leverages the leadership, particularly in the BCT expertise of both SOF and the where the unit might lose a sizeable conventional force, and it appears there portion of its officer and NCO corps, may be movement in this direction. In a thus degrading the unit’s ability to September 11, 2014 speech General deploy in the combat mission. There are Joseph Votel, Commander USSOCOM, several solutions to this problem. First, discussed the need to improve SOF- DoD could create teams from within the conventional interoperability and cited pool of advisors within different units, the National Training Center at Fort decreasing the impact on each unit. Irwin, where most COIN training occurs, Second, DoD could simply assume the as an example of improvements.38 risk that units providing officers and NCOs to serve in advisory roles could be Conclusion at lower level of readiness. If, as many predict, IW becomes an increasingly In the end, it all comes back to the fifth important mission set over the next SOF Truth, “most special operations decade, it might be worth assuming the require non-SOF assistance.”39 The IW risk in order to build a cadre of advisors mission will remain an important one in who are motivated to join and remain shaping the security environment across available for the IW mission. While the the globe, and will require the combined promotion and evaluation systems differ efforts of SOF and conventional forces. from Service to Service, the Services Although, the conventional force has a could provide direction or policy that history of conducting IW, it remains a would reward performance in IW mission set specific to SOF expertise. As missions. the DoD looks to relieve the IW burden

Campaigning Spring 2015 77 on SOF, it should look to the advisors. This approach will not be conventional force to supplement SOF without some risk and cultural resistance capability for missions that do not within DoD, but it is an effort worth involve unconventional warfare, training undertaking to ensure that SOF of foreign SOF, or counterterrorism. The capability and capacity can meet the Services can meet this demand by future demands of the global security identifying specific areas in which they environment. can contribute such as aviation FID or SFA. Once the Defense Department has identified relevant mission sets, the Services, working with USSOCOM, should develop policies and programs to identify, recruit, train and retain IW

1 US Army, Stability, FM 3-07, (Washington, 10 United States Special Operations Command, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-27. U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 2 Joseph E. Escandon, MAJ, “The Future of 2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, SFA”, (MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56. 11 Kansas 2008), 53. George H. Hock Jr., "Closing the Irregular 3 “Military Transition Teams mission,” Accessed Warfare Air Capability Gap." Air & Space October 23, 2014, Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010). http://www.army.mil/article/25521/Fort_Riley_tr Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost ains_last_transition_team_before_mission_move (accessed September 28, 2014), 5. 12 s_to_Fort_Polk/ and “Multi-national Security Russell J. Ames, “Interdependence Between Transition Forces Iraq mission,” Accessed Army Conventional Forces and Special October 23, 2014, Operations Forces: Changing Institutional http://www.understandingwar.org/publications/c Mental Models.” SAMS Monograph (July 2012- ommentaries/status-mnstc-effort-train-and- May 2013), 30. 13 advise-iraqi-security-forces. Ibid. 14 4 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD Kenneth C. Coons Jr. and Glenn M. Harned. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014). "Irregular Warfare is Warfare." JFQ: Joint Force 5 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD Quarterly no. 52 (2009 1st Quarter 2009). Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 29. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost 6 “Q&A with Admiral William H. McRaven”, (accessed September 28, 2014), 2. 15 Special Warfare Magazine, APR-JUN 2012 Ibid., 3. 16 issue, Ibid. 17 http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW25 Coons and Harned, 4. 18 02/SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRaven.html. Ibid., 5 19 7 United States Special Operations Command, Ibid, 6. 20 U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book O’Brien, 3. 21 2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, Ibid. 22 FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56. Hock Jr., 5. 23 8Joseph E. Escandon, MAJ, “The Future of Ibid., 6. 24 SFA”, (MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, Coons and Harned, 7. 25 Kansas 2008), 51. Hock Jr., 2. 26 9 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Ibid., 5. 27 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Austin, 1. 28 November 2010. In contrast the Joint Definition Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, (US DOD for Conventional Forces is, 1. Those forces Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), vii. 29 capable of conducting operations using Joseph E. Escandon MAJ, “The Future Of nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than Security Force Assistance: Is The Modular designated special operations forces. Brigade Combat Team The Right Organization?”

Campaigning Spring 2015 78 in the United States Special Operations (MA diss., US Army Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Command Policy Directorate. He is a 2008), 58. Naval Aviator who was commissioned 30 Robert D. Ramsey III, “Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18: Advising through the Naval Academy in 1999. Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, LCDR Dolby earned a BS in Political Vietnam, and El Salvador,” Combat Studies Science from the Naval Academy in Institute Press (2006), 114. 1999, a MBA from Naval Postgraduate 31 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Future of US School in 2007 and a MA in National Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements,” (testimony presented to US House of Security and Strategic Studies from the Representatives, Washington, DC, April 17, Naval War College in 2010. Prior to his 2007), 13. current assignment, LCDR Dolby served 32 Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces, as the Operations Officer at Helicopter Combat Studies Institute Press (2006), 114. Strike Maritime Squadron 75 in San 33 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” 10. Diego, California. 34 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Send in the Advisers,” New York Times, July 11, 2006, Major Zachary Kerns, USA. MAJ accessed October 20, 2014, Kerns is currently a Ground Planner in http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/11/opinion/11 the Future Operations Directorate at krepinevich.html. 35 John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation; Special Operations Command Central. It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps,” He is a US Army Special Forces Officer Center for a New American Security, The Future with operational experience in Europe, of the US Military Series (2007): 7, accessed Africa and the Middle East. MAJ Kerns October 26, 2014, earned a BS in Construction Engineering http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publication s/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf. at Missouri Western University in 1998 36 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” and a MA in Interagency studies at the 12. University of Kansas in 2010. 37 Krepinevich, “Future of US Ground Forces,” 13. 38 Matthew Cox, “Special Operations Chief Wants More Training with Conventional Units,” Major Chad Gugas, USAF. Maj Gugas Military.com News, September 11, 2014, is currently serving as Assistant accessed October 22, 2014, Secretary Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, http://www.military.com/daily- MacDill AFB, FL. He commissioned news/2014/09/11/special-operations-chief-wants- through ROTC at the University of more-training-with-conventional.html. 39 United States Special Operations Command, North Texas where he earned a BAS in U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book Criminal Justice in 2001 and later earned 2014, USSOCOM Public Affairs Office (Tampa, his MA in Religious Studies from FL: USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2014), 56. Southern Evangelical Seminary in 2012. Maj Gugas served in multiple operational and training command Team Biographies assignments culminating as KC-135R Evaluator Pilot, 97th Operations Group, Lieutenant Commander John Dolby, Altus AFB, OK. USN. LCDR Dolby is currently serving as the Basing and Posture Branch Chief,

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Putin's Peninsula? Vladimir Putin How United States and NATO Policy Paved the Way to Crimea Dr. Jerrold Post, Former Director of the CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality

By CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Joseph Bincarousky Sr., and Political Behavior described profiling and Lt Col Todd Hoover as, “perhaps most important in cases where you have a leader who dominates the society, who can act virtually without It is incumbent on the military professional constraint.”2 In the case of Putin, he sits atop to constantly assess the strategic a self-created pyramid (or vertical)3 of environment to inform national strategy, authoritarian control, and is surrounded by policy, and planning. In the words of Sun an inner circle of sycophants “who want to Tzu, “Victorious warriors win first and then give him only good news.”4 Furthermore, go to war, while defeated warriors go to war Putin is the “most experienced leader of a first and then seek to win.”1 Without a major world power.”5 One consequence of comprehensive, recurring assessment of the this experience, as offered by Mr. Dimitri environment, the military professional Simes, president of the Center for National cannot effectively fulfill his or her duties. Interest, is that Putin’s experience in With this in mind, military professionals in international affairs coupled with his the United States and Europe are asking, domestic control makes it so “there are few “What’s going on in Ukraine, and what’s to whom he will turn for advice.”6 next?” Understanding his current positon within Russia and the world, however, does not tell Though the United States and Russia are not the whole story. Therefore a closer analysis at war, readers are reminded that conflict of this intriguing and infuriating world exists well before violence begins, driving leader is required. the military professional to continuously understand and assess the peacetime conflict So, who is Mr. Putin? When Trudy Rubin environment in hopes of preventing and of the Philadelphia Inquirer asked a group of avoiding violent action or war. Following “prominent Russian politicians and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in businessmen,” he did not receive an answer; 1991, the United States and NATO became instead, he received a long pause.7 That is key players in Ukraine’s development as perhaps a fitting response, considering Putin well as its current unfortunate situation. In has been referred to as “the man without a understanding and assessing the current face,”8 or the “man from nowhere.”9 The situation in Ukraine, the real or imagined best person to ask might be Putin himself: role NATO and the United States factor into In fact, I have had a very simple life. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision Everything is an open book. I finished making. When attempting to make sense of school and went to university. I graduated the Russia/Ukraine conflict and to frame the from university and went to the KGB. I situation, the issue must be viewed from the finished the KGB and went back to perspectives of four major players: Putin, university. After university, I went to work the United States, NATO, and Ukraine. for Sobchak. From Sobchak, to Moscow and to the General Department. Then to the Presidential Administration. From there, to the FSB. Then I was appointed Prime

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Minister. Now I’m Acting President. That’s power,and to see the Rus Empire regain its it!10 former glory. Putin is sharply focused on the “full restoration of Russian influence in the If only it were that simple! In their book, post-Soviet space and recognition by the Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Fiona West that this is indeed Russia’s rightful Hill and Clifford Gaddy analyzed Putin from ‘sphere of privileged interests.’”15 Perhaps not only his multiple PR stunts, but also most interesting post-Crimea is that Putin from the remarkable strength he displayed in may no longer be able to distinguish fact his first two terms as Russia’s president.11 from fiction. Andrew Kuchins, director of They concluded that Putin is the the Russia and Eurasia program at the amalgamation of six individual identities: Center for Strategic & International Studies, the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, puts it quite well: “the frightening thing is the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the that he appears to believe his own Case Officer.12 While none of these propaganda and lies.”16 identities dominates Putin’s persona, they provide an extremely useful lens to To understand Putin, one must also address understand his interactions with the Russian his views of the West, particularly the people, his near-abroad, and his major United States and NATO. Putin, when competitors/adversaries, both internal and Acting President of Russia over 13 years external. ago, summed these views up succinctly, “we cannot forget that NATO and Europe are not The remarkable and seemingly overlooked one and the same thing. And I’ve already factor about Putin is addressed in his Statist said that Russia is a country of European identity; he is a Russian at heart—not a culture—not NATO culture.”17 Soviet! He does not yearn for the good, old Furthermore, Putin opines, “The founding days of the Soviet Union. While he did state, fathers of NATO fear that their organization “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a would change drastically [were Russia to major geopolitical disaster of the century,”13 join NATO]. From our perspective, it would in his 2005 annual address to the Federal change for the better, and from theirs, Assembly of the Russian Federation, his possibly for the worse.”18 It is possible he remarks had nothing to do with the impact harbors lingering animosity toward NATO on the Soviet Union and everything to do from the Cold War; or, maybe NATO just is with the impact on Russia and Russians. In not being led the way he thinks it should. other words, the bad thing about the collapse of the Soviet Union was the pain it caused Beyond his opinions of and feelings toward Mother Russia and her children. NATO, lies his relationship with the United States, the “one single power.”19 He sees the With that in mind, Putin sees himself as the United States as economically and morally best option for Russia’s future: “his weak.20 He sees a pattern of hypocrisy as he historical mission has been to assert himself considers U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, as the country's singular, irreplaceable Libya, and Syria as well as alleged U.S. leader and to reclaim Russia's globe- behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Georgia bestriding status.”14 Whether he is in it for and Ukraine.21 Moreover, Putin believes personal gain or ego could be logically NATO and U.S. actions in Kosovo and deduced, it would not eliminate his fervent Yugoslavia were illegal.22 In other words, he desire to see Russia reemerge as a global does not believe the United States is in any

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position to criticize any of his actions. changes to travel regulations,” the world Furthermore, as the United States and the saw the fall of the Berlin Wall and the West have humiliated Russia,23 it is his job thawing of the Cold War.31 to protect Russia “from its geopolitical rivals—above all, the United States and the While the West was celebrating German European Union.”24 Putin “sees himself as a reunification and the end of the Cold War, giant among weaklings,”25 and the United the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact States and NATO have not done much to struggled with one question: what next? For convince him otherwise except bombard some, the answer seemed easy: join NATO. him with phone calls and levy soft economic For others, the struggle for national identity sanctions. as a result of newfound independence was significantly more difficult. To further NATO compound the issue, when negotiating the reunification of Germany, the West initially While no formal declaration of an enemy or assured the Soviet Union that NATO would adversary is written into the Washington not expand, “We are aware that NATO Treaty of 1949,26 it is not difficult to membership for a unified Germany raises determine who NATO’s de facto enemy complicated questions. For us, however, one was, “When we pay our taxes, when we thing is certain: NATO will not expand to undergo our military training, when we the east.”32 There are multiple reports from make the sacrifices which we are making to the Russian side of the negotiation remain free, let us place the blame where it corroborating the German records, as well as belongs, on the men in the Kremlin.”27 statements from then-U.S. Ambassador to When the Soviet Union applied for Moscow indicating the Kremlin was given a admittance, the response from Lord Ismay, “clear commitment.”33 Furthermore, the last the first Secretary General of NATO, says it leader of the Soviet Union and winner of the all, “the Soviet request to join NATO is like 1990 Nobel Peace Prize, Mikhail an unrepentant burglar requesting to join the Gorbachev, asserts the United States police force.”28 Lastly, in a lecture covering promised “NATO wouldn’t move beyond what NATO is and how it works, Lord the boundaries of Germany…but now half Ismay offered his thoughts on the origin of of central and eastern Europe are NATO when he stated that the Soviets “got members….It shows they cannot be under their control one by one, the countries trusted.”34 Gorbachev goes on to say “we of Eastern Europe….It became obvious that squandered” the 10 years after the Cold unless something was done to restore the War,35 referring to world leaders having not balance of military and economic power, developed a new stability. He also claims there was no reason why the States of the missile defense systems planned for Western Europe should not also be gobbled Poland and the Czech Republic were, in the up.”29 It is clear from the NATO record and words of the Telegraph reporters, “an the Alliance’s experience with the Soviet aggressive act against Russia.”36 Lastly, Union after World War II that NATO’s de Gorbachev points out that NATO’s promise facto enemy was a ground truth of the of eventual membership to Georgia and alliance.30 Then, somewhat abruptly and Ukraine has been interpreted as “an attempt perhaps accidentally in November 1989, to extend America’s…influence into when “an East German Politburo member Russia’s backyard.”37 Such membership bungled the announcement of…limited would be seen as a “direct threat,” and the

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Russian War in Georgia in 2008 was a George Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, means to prevent it.38 had their nuances, the adversary was clearly defined and a unity of effort existed across NATO expansion into Ukraine is an the diplomatic, military, and economic ominous suggestion, especially if one agrees instruments of power. Since the dissolution that Russia cannot be an empire without of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of Ukraine,39 as Putin reasons.40 Ukraine is the a clearly defined U.S. adversary allowed historical center of the Slavic peoples, and political, diplomatic, military, and economic Kyiv “was the center of the first eastern agendas to begin competing for influence on Slavic state, Kyivan Rus,”41 circa 862 AD.42 Russian policy. The common hoped-for Much of modern Ukraine is widely accepted theme is one in which the United States and as the territory of the earliest known nation Russia work together. This approach was of the Rus, from whom ethnic Russians and recently evidenced in Secretary of State Ukrainians have likely descended.43 There John Kerry’s comments that Russia is a state has been a close relationship between “with whom we do not seek conflict, with Ukraine and Russia since the dissolution of whom we would much rather be working the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact the together to deal with the problems of the Russian empire of the 1700s absorbed most world.”48 Unfortunately, competing political Ukrainian ethnographic territory. With the and international agendas and the remnants exception of a brief period of independence of Cold War mistrust exacerbate an existing from 1917 to 1920, Ukraine was schism that creates friction as opposed to reconquered and forced to endure Soviet compatible interests. rule until independence came upon them once again in 1991.44 Based on both ancient Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there and current history, Putin seems interested have been three political administrations in in bringing into a “civilizational union” the the United States. Russia, for all intents and Eastern Slavs Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine purposes, has only seen one formidable comprise, warranting his “protection” administration. It was during the Clinton against Russia’s strategic geopolitical administration of the 1990s that Russian rivals.45 The NATO promise of membership President Boris Yeltsin faded, and the may have perpetuated a no-expansion handpicked upstart Putin began to rise by Russian myth,46 but it also fostered a very 2000. Since then, the only change in real geopolitical calculus of the Russian leadership was blatantly superficial, when leader. Putin switched places with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. This change of United States scenery only lasted until 2012, when the Medvedev-Putin “castling move” returned U.S policy toward the Soviet Union during Putin to the presidency.49 Given the natural the Cold War could be seen as a simpler variability of three different U.S. problem set than current policy toward post- administrations and the general continuity of Cold War Russia. U.S. strategies for the the Russian leadership perspective, it is easy Cold War centered on strong militaries and a to see how lack of continuity on one side determination to win, as made clear by the could cause paths to diverge over two oft-cited Reagan quotation, “Here’s my decades.50 strategy on the Cold War: we win; they lose.”47 While Cold War strategists, such as

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During the Clinton administration there was optimism for partnership. Angela Stent In the early 2000s, two newly elected describes it well, “a selective partnership, leaders, Putin and George W. Bush, where cooperation and competition attempted to reestablish relations. This coexisted.”51 The selective piece of this endeavor would prove difficult for a number partnership began to reveal itself toward the of reasons, including the resulting Russian end of Clinton’s first term, in a presidential resentment of actions by which they felt speech in October 1996 on the subject of the marginalized. At its onset, the U.S.-Russia NATO enlargement timetable. In this policy had the appearance of the Clinton-era speech, the President stated, “That's why the selective partnership. While a foreign policy United States has taken the lead in a three advisor to presidential candidate Bush in part [sic] effort to build a new NATO for a 2000, Condoleezza Rice noted “the United new era. First, by adapting NATO with new States needs to recognize that Russia is a capabilities for new missions. Second, by great power, and that we will always have opening its doors to Europe's emerging interests that conflict as well as coincide.”54 democracies. Third, by building a strong and The tragedy of 11 September 2001 provided cooperative relationship between NATO and a resurgence of relations. President Putin Russia.”52 Clinton follows later with “I was the first to call President Bush with know that some in Russia still look at condolences. Thereafter, about a year of NATO through a Cold War prism and, generally positive relations followed, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it including the Crawford Summit where the in a negative light. But I ask them to look Bush administration emphasized the again. We are building a new NATO, just as importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship we support the Russian people in building a by inviting Putin to President Bush’s new Russia.”53 personal home.

Adding to these challenges of the Clinton By 2003, a multi-polar world emerged partly era were international events such as the as a result of U.S. operation in Iraq, and the escalated Kosovo crisis in late 1998 to 1999. United States began to face diplomatic The heavily U.S.-influenced NATO challenges from allies and Russia. From intervention, juxtaposed against Poland, Putin’s perspective, Western influence Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining continued to move toward Russian borders, NATO, gave a strong appearance of as seven more countries joined NATO in Western influence advancing toward Russia, March 2004, including the three Baltic or in the least, the perception that Russia’s States. Further exacerbating tensions, Bush considerations in global affairs were of no announced the Freedom Agenda in January consequence. To the casual U.S. foreign- 2005, specifically supporting the so-called policy observer, this coincidence may have color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia as all seemed positive, but for the fledgling efforts in democratization.55 In 2006, U.S- Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, it Russia relations continued to deteriorate as was reminiscent of the fall of the Soviet economic tensions rose between Ukraine Union’s great-power position in Eastern and Russia, and as the United States Europe, as he had witnessed it from his time negotiated developing missile defense in in East Germany. Despite all efforts, the Poland and Czech Republic. In response to U.S.-Russia relationship deteriorated at the Vice President Dick Cheney’s controversial end of Clinton’s second term. speech in Vilnius, Lithuania, a war of words

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erupted and reached a crescendo when Putin Ukraine gave his confrontational speech attacking U.S. foreign policy at the 43rd Munich According to a prominent historian, “the key Security Conference, March 2007.56 The to the future of the whole of Eastern Munich speech clearly marked a change in Europe” teeters on the fulcrum of Ukraine’s the dynamics of the selective partnership handling of Russia.61 This is especially that had previously existed. This rhetoric evident when one considers the demography continued when Putin attended the NATO of Ukraine and the implications for the Conference at Bucharest in April 2008, country’s politics. Ukrainian demography advocating against membership action plans portrays a country divided without a sense for Ukraine and Georgia. Having lost his of national identity. Demographic splits composure, Putin reportedly told Bush that exist largely along “ethnic, linguistic, Ukraine was not even a “real state.”57 The religious, and regional” lines.62 Ethnically, relationship between the United States and there is a preponderance of Ukrainians Russia continued to spiral downward in late although there is a large Russian population, 2008 with the Russo-Georgian War over most of whom were born in Ukraine. Some South Ossetia, the U.S.-Poland agreement to of the ethnic Ukrainians are quite deploy missile defense interceptors in nationalist, as are some of the Ukrainian Central Europe, and the Russian response Russians many of whom believe “we announcing a plan to install Iskander haven’t moved, the borders have.”63 These missiles in Kaliningrad. polar opposites within Ukraine are reflected in the recent political approaches of the In March 2009, newly inaugurated President party in power: 1) those ethnic Ukrainians Barack Obama attempted a ‘reset’ of the who desire a nation independent of Russia deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations. Though (formerly the Soviet Union); 2) those ethnic Putin’s perspective was that a reset was Russians who live in and identify with unnecessary and contrived by Washington, Ukraine, but see it as being inseparable from speculation is that Obama succeeded in Russia; and 3) others who convey a mix of improving “the atmospherics and the the influences. These divisions are further substance of the relationship,”58 especially supported by linguistic preferences.64 as it came on the heels of U.S.-Russian Inhabitants of Western Ukraine tend to geopolitical confrontation the year prior. prefer the Ukrainian language and identify Recent events of the past year, however, has with the Ukrainian ethnicity. Eastern seen Putin “purge” the remaining remnants Ukraine is home to most ethnic Russians of the selective partnership. He has and Russophones and prefer the Russian essentially embarked on a course for language. Furthermore, most cities, in international multipolarity.59 As one analyst contrast to rural areas, prefer the Russian puts it, “there can be no reset of the reset,” language.65 and it is incumbent upon the United States to “carefully consider how to respond” to Historically, the geography of Ukraine has Putin’s challenge to the existing played a divisive role. Over the centuries, international order.60 Understanding various parts of Ukraine were subjected to Ukraine’s position in that order vis-à-vis different manifestations of dynasty and Russia is an integral part to any coherent empire, which resulted in a dissociative response. nation.66 This dissociation harkens to Robert Cooper’s assertion that “you can’t build a

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state without a nation.”67 Nevertheless, as Recommendations Andrew Wilson has so succinctly opined, “an unexpected nation is still a nation,” The impact U.S. and NATO actions and despite the historical diversity within it.68 decisions since the end of the Cold War Therefore, even though independence was have had on Putin’s perceptions of the thrust upon the Ukrainian people 23 years global world order and his foreign-policy ago, the current conflict has been the calculus cannot be overstated. That the catalyst for many to reconcile the notion of intent of those actions and decisions might national identity.69 not have been to humiliate or marginalize Russia is less important than Putin’s To drive home the point, consider that “only perceptions. Ignoring how that perceived half the country had risen up” during the impact has played into the current events in 2004 Orange Revolution.70 That revolution Ukraine will likely only bring about further was a manifestation of the public’s “unforeseen” geopolitical tragedies similar dissatisfaction with overt fraud during the to the annexation of Crimea, the current presidential elections that benefitted pro- separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych. the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Though the courts overturned the fraudulent results, the populace soon grew weary of an The West may not agree with Putin’s Orange government that could not deliver.71 rationale or his decision making, but he Yanukovych—the beneficiary of the 2004 enjoys broad popular support and will fraud—was thus legitimately elected in remain the Russian leader for the 2010. Given the clear historical divisions foreseeable future. That popular support amongst the Ukrainian people and the stems from the fact that Putin is a savvy difficulty their politicians naturally face in domestic politician. A good portion of his trying to balance domestic concerns, NATO foreign policy is actually directed toward his and the U.S would have benefitted from a domestic audience.73 Putin understands the cautious and thoughtful analysis of how to history of his people and the priority of his encourage Ukraine’s Western aspirations populace: stability.74 Strength of the without disrupting its Eastern economy, strength of Russia’s geopolitical counterweight. The leaders of both Ukraine position vis-à-vis other powers, and strength and Russia understood that “without of leadership are three manifestations of his Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire,” but savvy that have lent themselves well toward with Ukraine controlled, “Russia domestic stability in Russia, in turn pushing automatically becomes an empire.”72 As Putin’s domestic popularity to the highest Ukraine continues what has become an even point in his long leadership tenure.75 direr struggle of national survival, the United States and NATO should inform a A sound policy toward Russia should long-term strategic approach toward Ukraine consider not only how the United States and and Russia with an appreciation of the NATO are perceived, but also how Putin is historical and cultural dynamics that define using those perceptions to solidify his their dependent relationship. monopoly on domestic power. Indeed, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, cites domestic politics as the reason for Putin’s resurgence, couched in anti- Western sentiment to bolster popular

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support. As McFaul concludes, “the Putin spins such things for domestic challenge for the West is how to deal with consumption, NATO can control its own such behavior forcefully enough to block it, efforts to consider Russia’s position in but prudently enough to keep matters from global affairs and to find points of escalating dramatically.”76 cooperation. NATO members should strongly consider altering Putin’s narrative There are a number of things the United by taking demonstrative steps back from the States and NATO can do to answer such a foolhardy declaration that Georgia and challenge. The first step might be to Ukraine “will become members of develop an actual policy and strategy, NATO.”77 Since that declaration in 2008, openly communicate it, and keep it flexible Georgia and Ukraine have both suffered enough to adapt it to changing realities on militant Russian incursion, both have the ground. Despite contemporary Russian territorial integrity issues, and Ukraine is no myths, there really has not been a coherent closer to garnering popular support for such policy toward Russia since it emerged from membership. Future membership for Soviet yoke, as multiple administrations and Georgia and Ukraine should be predicated other priorities have come and gone. upon the same criteria that every other Deciding long-term goals with respect to European aspirant has had to meet; any Russia would form a foundation on which to premature promise of entry into the alliance act, whether in pursuit of partnership, only serves to feed Putin’s anti-Western counterbalance, or some combination public relations machine. thereof. Such a foundation would also work toward closing the perception of a say-do NATO would do well to consider closing gap in the U.S.-Russia relationship and the membership “open door” altogether. would be a departure from the short-term David Yost, in his most recent transactions that have characterized the comprehensive examination of the alliance, relationship over the last decade. A keen has made clear that the “risk understanding of Putin’s mindset and of…overextension has become obvious.”78 motives must precede any such goal But, not only has NATO’s mission formation, lest the resulting policy be just transformation from collective defense another reset. created risk, so too has its absorption of new members. New allies have not necessarily Any attempt to draw Putin back from translated into increased revenue to support violence will not be easy. Unfortunately, the the growing alliance. Moreover, the environment has already been shaped and intergovernmental organization necessarily conflict has begun, and it is unlikely that any requires compromise of national interests to meaningful U.S.-Russia relationship will “reach a workable consensus” in furtherance result until there has been a similarly of collective goals,79 however loosely meaningful transition of Russian leadership. defined. More members mean more But, there are things that can be done compromises. It would seem the larger simultaneously with long-term goal NATO gets, the more unwieldy it could formation that can at least move the possibly become. It might be worth relationship in the right direction. NATO exploring whether compromising with should endeavor to bring Russia back to the Russia could benefit the security of alliance table and reinvigorate the NATO-Russia members as much as compromising with Council. Though NATO cannot control how new members might. Yost even concludes

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that cooperation with Russia is an essential current issues in Ukraine; getting back to element “to the future relevance of the fundamental analysis of the problem to Alliance.”80 inform strategic policy and planning might just pave the right way forward. The United States should find points of mutual interest and actually cooperate with Conclusion Russia toward those ends. No key actor in the current European situation wants to see A lack of appreciation for Putin’s mindset in an escalation of conflict, especially between U.S. foreign policy has contributed to the major powers; the United States might need current Ukraine crisis. In addition to to compromise short-term interests for long- historical examples cited by Patrushev, one term goals, or vice versa. The key will be to can see how Putin was “doubly extract something from Putin in such an emboldened” by how poorly the United exchange. Putin’s perspective has been that States handled the Syria problem: “first, the United States is weak and can capitulate because the West looked weak, and second, rather inexpensively (Syria is a good because Russia had got away with massive example). If the United States were to stop arms shipments, many through the the economic sanctions on Russia, for Ukrainian port of Odesa. So why not use the example, the cost to Putin must be clearly same tactics against Ukraine itself?”82 defined and well thought out. As Wilson has surmised, the last decade or Nevertheless, both the United States and so can be summarized by saying “the NATO will need to consider Putin’s Russians went ape.”83 Notwithstanding the domestic calculus when dealing with Russia. chaos Putin has brought to bear, this It is unlikely that Putin will accede to any discourse should be considered an compromises that will diminish his hold on understanding of Putin’s strategic domestic power. He will need to be able to perspective vis-à-vis NATO and the United spin any agreements or cooperation in such States, an understanding that seems to have a way so as to not lose face with his been lacking from U.S. policy constituents. That is ultimately Putin’s considerations. Putin’s perspective is one in problem, but the U.S. strategist must keep it which the United States has consistently in mind, and perhaps even try to exploit it. sought to marginalize Russia in the The West has historically leveraged such international order since the end of the Cold leaders, despite their lack of democratic War. Instead of defending themselves and ideals, when priorities dictated. Global their actions against Russia’s “humiliation stability and prosperity currently so dictate, myth,”84 the United States and NATO might and the United States and NATO should be better served to incorporate that myth move on from the uninformed Russia policy into its strategic planning. of the past in order to properly understand how to manage Putin going forward. Sun Tzu discussed the importance of knowing one’s enemy and knowing oneself.81 The United States and NATO’s lack of understanding of both Putin and the effects of their own policies contributed to the

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1 Philip Martin McCaulay, Sun Tzu’s the Art of War 19 Ibid. (Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu.com, 2009), 26. 20 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 9. 2 Jerrold Post, as quoted in Benedict Carey, “Teasing 21 Ibid. Out Policy Insight from a Character Profile,” The 22 Putin et al., First Person, 177-178. New York Times, March 28, 2011, 23 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 8; Andrew Wilson, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/science/29psyc Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West (New h.html. Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014), Kindle 3 Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: version, §Unfinished Europe. Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C.: 24 Dmitri Trenin, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the Brookings Institution, 2013), ix. Couch,” 4. 4 Thomas de Waal, as quoted in Susan B. Glasser, 25 Andrew Weiss, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the “Putin on the Couch,” Politico Magazine, March 13, Couch,” 7. 2014, 26 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/put Organization (hereafter, NATO), April 4, 1949, in-on-the-couch-104647.html, 4. Of note, several http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171 references in this paper are from this Glasser article, 20.htm. in which she compiles 22 contributions from 27 Lord Hastings Ismay, “Press Statement,” NATO, “America’s most experienced Putin watchers.” October 18, 1952, Informed also by Hill and Gaddy’s Mr. Putin: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_17313.ht Operative in the Kremlin, the authors understand m. there is no single, neat, and tidy bin for Putin. He 28 Lord Hastings Ismay, “Russian Admission to must be analyzed and understood from a multitude of NATO” (transcript), NATO, angles in order to determine the best courses of action http://www.nato.int/history/doc/ for U.S. and NATO policy and strategy. 5-Soviet-Union-s-request-to- 5 Dimitri Simes, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the join%20NATO/Transcript%20of%20Lord%20Ismay' Couch,” 3. s%20Memo.pdf. 6 Ibid. 29 Lord Hastings Ismay, “NATO What It Is and How 7 Vladimir Putin, with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya It Works,” November 5, 1954, NATO, Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_17417.ht Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s m. President, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: 30 It is also clear from the U.S. Senate record, as PublicAffairs, 2000), vii. recounted in David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act 8 Masha Gessen, The Man Without a Face: The (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: Press, 2014), 4. Riverhead Books, 2012), cover. 31 Mary Elise Sarotte, “A Broken Promise? What the 9 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 2. West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion,” 10 Putin et al., First Person, xv. Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014), Military & 11 Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 9. Government Collection, EBSCOhost, accessed 12 Ibid. November 10, 2014. 13 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal 32 Uwe Klußmann, Matthias Schepp, and Klaus Assembly of the Russian Federation” (transcript), Wiegrefe, “NATO's Eastward Expansion: Did the President of Russia, April 25, 2005, West Break Its Promise to Moscow?” Spiegel Online http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/20 International, 26 November 2009, 31_type70029type82912_87086.shtml. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s- 14 David Remnick, “Patriot Games: Vladimir Putin eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise- Lives His Olympic Dream,” New Yorker, March 3, to-moscow-a-663315-2.html; Sarotte, “A Broken 2014, Promise?” http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/03/pat 33 Ibid.; Insights by the former ambassador into the riot-games-2. current situation can be found at Jack F. Matlock Jr., 15 Angela Stent, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on the “Who Is the Bully? The U.S. Has Treated Russia Couch,” 3. Like a Loser Since the End of the Cold War,” The 16 Andrew Kuchins, as quoted in Glasser, “Putin on Washington Post, March 14, 2014, the Couch,” 5. http://wapo.st/1qDM0Jy. 17 Putin et al., First Person, 178. 34 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Adrian Blomfield 18 Ibid. and Mike Smith, “Gorbachev: US Could Start New

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ignorance of what discussions with Russia took place Cold War,” The Telegraph, May 6, 2008, under the previous White House regarding NATO http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/r expansion. See Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?” ussia/1933223/ §Bribing the Soviets Out. Gorbachev-US-could-start-new-Cold-War.html. 51 Stent, Limits, 13. 35 Ibid. 52 William J. Clinton, “Transcript of the Remarks by 36 Blomfield and Smith, “Gorbachev.” President W. J. Clinton to People of Detroit,” 37 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Blomfiled and October 22, 1996, NATO, Smith, “Gorbachev”; For NATO’s eventual http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm. membership to Georgia and Ukraine, see “Bucharest 53 Clinton, “Transcript.” Summit Declaration,” NATO, April 3, 2008, ¶23, 54 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_84 Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000): §Russian 43.htm: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Weakness, Military & Government Collection, Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. EBSCOhost, accessed November 10, 2014. We agreed today that these countries will become 55 Stent, Limits; The White House, “Freedom members of NATO.” Agenda,” National Archives and Records 38 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is Administration, accessed November 10, 2014, the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that http://georgewbush- Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda. §The Western Affront, ProQuest Research Library, 56 Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following accessed November 2, 2014; Dmitri Trenin, Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security “Russia’s Spheres of Interests, not Influence,” The Policy,” transcript, February 10, 2007, President of Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 14, Russia, accessed November 10, 2014, doi:10.1080/01636600903231089; Glasser, “Putin on http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/ the Couch,” 6. speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type 39 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 6; Zbigniew 82917type84779_118123.shtml. Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign 57 Richard Lourie, “Those Ukrainian, Iranian NATO Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 80, Blues,” The Moscow Times, April 14, 2008, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045920. http://www. 40 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 6. themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/those- 41 “Ukraine: Security Assistance,” U.S. Department ukrainian-iranian-nato-blues/361932.html. of State, 20 October 2008, http://go.usa.gov/U6sY. 58 Stent, Limits, 212. 42 “Rurik Dynasty,” Britannica Academic Edition, 59 Nikolas Gvosdev, “Putin’s Great Gamble,” The http://www.britannica.com. National Interest, October 28, 2014, 43 “Russia,” Britannica Academic Edition, http://nationalinterest. http://www.britannica.com; Andrew Wilson, The org/feature/putins-great-gamble-11552. Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2nd ed. (New 60 Ibid. Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002). 61 Wilson, Ukrainians, xiii. 44 “Ukraine: Security Assistance.” 62 Ibid, 207. 45 Glasser, “Putin on the Couch,” 4. 63 Ibid, 217. 46 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Introduction; Sarotte, “A 64 Ibid, 207-33. There are those who prefer to speak Broken Promise?” Ukrainian (Ukrainophones), those who prefer to 47 James C. Humes, The Wit & Wisdom of Ronald speak Russian (Russophones), and those who have no Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, preference. Though the numbers of Ukrainophones 2007), 11. and Russophones are roughly equal, there is a 48 “US Urges Russia to Work Jointly to Solve Global minority of ethnic Ukrainians who prefer to speak Problems – Kerry”, TASS Russian News Agency, Ukrainian. October 22, 2014, http://en.itar- 65 Ibid. tass.com/world/755825. 66 Ibid., 161, 101-51, 263-64. Simply looking at 49 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.- some of the maps Wilson has reproduced conveys Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century this idea; cf. table of maps on page ix. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 67 Robert Cooper, “Picking Up the Pieces,” Financial 2014), eBook Collection, EBSCOhost, accessed Times, October 25, 2008, http://www.ft.com. November 3, 2014, §The End of the Tandem: Putin 68 Wilson, Ukrainians, xi. Returns to the Kremlin. 69 Neil MacFarquhar, “Conflict Uncovers a Ukrainian 50 Along these lines, Sarotte offers the change of Identity Crisis over Deep Russian Roots,” The New administration as a reason for Clinton staffer

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Team Biographies York Times, October 18, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1CCeW7W. Commander Cielo Almanza, USN. CDR 70 Dominique Arel, “Ukraine since the War in Georgia,” Survival 50, no. 6 (2008): 15. Almanza currently serves as the Deputy J4, 71 Taras Kuzio, “Will 2012 Bring Popular Revolt to Special Operations Command Pacific, Ukraine?” Eurasian Daily Monitor 9, no. 9 (2012), Honolulu, Hawaii. Commissioned through http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm. OCS in 1998, CDR Almanza earned a BS in 72 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Biology from Seattle University in 1996, Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 80, http://www.jstor. and an MS in Operations Research from the org/stable/20045920 (emphasis added). Naval Postgraduate School in 2009. Prior to 73 Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s his current assignment, CDR Almanza Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace,’” served as a Logistics Planner for International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1168-1169, COMPACFLT. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00762.x; Matlock, “Who is the Bully?” 74 Richard Sakwa, “Putin’s Leadership: Character and Major Joseph Bincarousky Sr., USAF. Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 6 Maj Bincarousky currently serves as the (2008): 879-897, doi:10.1080/09668130802161132; Deputy Chief, Office of Military Grigory Ambrozheichik, “Cultural Profile of Russian Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Astana, Leadership,” International Journal of Leadership Studies 6, no. 3 (2011): 310-336, Kazakhstan. He is a certified Regional http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/ Affairs Strategist, specializing in Russia and publications/ijls/new/vol6iss3/1_Ambro_pp310- Eurasia. Commissioned through ROTC in 336.pdf; Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 211. 2003, Maj Bincarousky earned a BA in 75 Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Russian Approval of Criminal Justice from Temple University in Putin Soars to Highest Levels in Years,” Gallup, July 18, 2014, 2003 and an MA in Security Studies from http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian- the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012. approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx. Prior to his current assignment, Maj 76 Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John Bincarousky served as the Chief, Force Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started the Protection Branch, USAF Special Ukraine Crisis?” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): §Putin’s Loss, ProQuest Research Library, accessed Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida. November 11, 2014. 77 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” ¶23. Lieutenant Colonel Todd Hoover, USAF. 78 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 376. Lt Col Hoover currently serves as the 79 Ibid., 377. Deputy Chief, Deterrence and Functional 80 Ibid. 81 McCaulay, Sun Tzu’s the Art of War, 37. Plans Division, United States Strategic 82 Ibid. Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He was 83 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Introduction. commissioned through the United States Air 84 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, §Unfinished Europe. Force Academy in 1994 with a BS in Basic Sciences and was awarded an MS in Space Operations from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 2004. Prior to his current assignment, Lt Col Hoover served as the Commander, ADF-E Space Operations Squadron, Ft Belvoir, Virginia.

Campaigning Spring 2015 91 Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, and senior fellows to provide the broader joint professional military education community insights into the application of joint warfighting principles through critical analysis and strategic thinking on current and future operations at the operational level of war.

Prospective Campaigning authors are asked to note the following submission guidelines:

• As a general rule, manuscripts of articles should be between 1500 to 3500 words in length, including endnotes.

• All manuscripts will be unclassified.

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• Manuscripts should conform to Turabian academic style with endnotes rather than footnotes. Endnotes should be embedded and not attached. Separate bibliographies are undesired. All bibliographic material is to be contained in the end notes.

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• All manuscripts selected for publication in Campaigning must go through a security and policy review process. JFSC will provide the necessary coordination with the NDU Northern Campus for Pentagon Security and Policy review.

• In general, the mentoring of manuscripts will not be done—authors are responsible for the quality of the content, adherence to academic standards, and adherence to the format requirements listed above. The Editor reserves the right to make minor editorial suggestions for style, grammar and length, but will not make editorial changes which affect the integrity of the argument or discussion without reference to the author.

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Campaigning Spring 2015 92 JFSC Vision

The flagship institution for educating national security professionals involved in planning and execution of joint operations.

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Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.

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