Campaigning The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College Featured Essays Surrounded by Operational Assessments Doctrine…and Losing and the Commander’s Decision Cycle Project the False and Protect the Real Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown “That All May Labor As One” Spring 2015 Campaigning Spring 2015 https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69 Commandant RADM John W. Smith, Jr Dean, Joint Forces Staff College Dr. Patricia B. Strait Joint Advanced Warfighting Joint and Combined Warfighting School School Dr. Robert Antis CAPT John Maxwell Joint Continuing and Distance Joint Command, Control and Education School Information Operations School COL Dale D. Fair COL Michael Miller Editor Dr. Daniel H. McCauley Editorial Board: Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel Dr. Frederick R. Kienle Assistant Professor Stephen W. Dennis Cover image: The Joint Service Color Guard advances the colors during the retirement ceremony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. Shelton, at Fort Myer, Va., on Oct. 2, 2001. DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel. (Released). Campaigning Spring 2015 i Guest Editor’s Corner: Hello and welcome to the Spring 2015 version of Campaigning. I’m confident you’ll find this edition interesting as it takes on several issues highly pertinent to today’s joint warfighters. Reflecting the composition of the staff at the Combatant Commands, the vast majority of joint professionals in our student body at the Joint Forces Staff College are the O-4s and O-5s responsible for translating strategic guidance to tactical actions. The messy and difficult task of functioning at the operational level of war takes a great deal of expertise, which emphasizes the importance of joint education specific to this mission. To understand the value of education at the operational level of war, we must appreciate that service members on our combatant command, component, and service staffs start their military careers at the tactical level. They are evaluated and promoted to senior leadership positions mostly due to their accomplishments at the tactical level. When they are placed in billets at the operational level, they often have to learn how to translate policy and strategy into tactical actions through on-the-job training. Once promoted to Flag or General Officer, these joint leaders no longer work as tacticians - they become strategists and policy experts so they can best advise senior military and civilian leaders. Many of our greatest military leaders were experts at the operational level of war. In World War II, the strategy of “Germany First” and “Unconditional Surrender” gave operational level commanders the necessary national-level intent to develop activities to accomplish those broad objectives. Led by their commanders, who were heavily involved in the strategy discussions, operational staffs accomplished the required work that put the Allies’ training, supply, and logistics machines into action. Operation DESERT STORM was successful because General Schwarzkopf and his staff translated President George H. Bush’s statement, “This will not stand” into a well-planned, well-sustained, and well-equipped force able to swiftly defeat the Iraqi military and return sovereignty to the nation of Kuwait. In contrast, not fully appreciating the role and complexity of operational level efforts adversely affected Phases IV and V during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Properly translating policy and strategy to unit actions became all the more difficult for our combatant command planners when the Iraqi military was disbanded and Baathists were removed from government positions. Had strategy and policy decisions been influenced more by operational activities, a different outcome may have been possible. Skill at the operational level of war relies on joint professionals that can understand the lessons of history, can systematically break down complex issues, and can make informed projections of broadly-defined future events. It takes a team of joint professionals, collaborating with a shared understanding of the environment (adversary, friendly and neutral) and a shared understanding of higher guidance, to accomplish these tasks effectively. Only then can that team - and the Joint Force Commander - articulate the right problem to be solved and then come to a reasoned approach to solving it. Campaigning Spring 2015 ii The challenges we face across the military are far too complex for rote actions that are not informed by history, current events, and future predictions. Excellent policy, coherent strategies, and effective strategic communications are vital to successfully meeting our national objectives. Naturally, we spend time and effort educating our future senior military leaders because of the importance we place on the strategic level of war. It is also just as crucial to have logical and rational approaches that align the actions of tactical-level operators with national policy and strategy. Critical and creative thinkers are responsible for providing these approaches and plans; let’s make sure they are properly educated to take on this task. Enjoy this version of Campaigning - and let us know what you think. Very respectfully, John Maxwell Captain, U.S. Navy Director, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Joint Force Staff College Campaigning Spring 2015 iii In this issue of Campaigning: Features Surrounded by Doctrine…and Losing………………………………….. 1 Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis, JCWS Faculty Project the False and Protect the Real…………………………………. 17 CDR Michael Posey, JC2IOS Faculty Operational Assessments and the Commander’s Decision Cycle…….. 22 Mr Michael McGonagle, LTC Ed Chamberlayne, and Lt Col Richard Collins, JCWS Mission Command at the Battle of Yorktown…………………………. 30 COL Jerry Turner, CDR Matthew S. Burton, and LTC Gregory Trahan, JCWS Commentary Weaponizing Social Media: What We Can Learn from Our Adversaries………………………………………………………………. 43 CDR Christopher Hill, Lt Col Ryan White, and MAJ Kevin Thaxton, JCWS Decision-Making Models and the SS Mayaguez Crisis ……………….. 55 LTC Thomas Feltey, JAWS Biofuels and the Defense Department: A Push Toward a Greener, More Secure Force …………………………………………… 62 LTC David Carey, LCDR James Hoey, and Maj Mark Enriques, JCWS The Conventional Force and Irregular Warfare: How the Conventional Force Can Relieve Mission Pressure on Special Operations Forces ………………………………………………………. 71 LCDR John Dolby, MAJ Zachary Kerns, and Maj Chad Gugas, JCWS Putin’s Peninsula? How United States and NATO Policy Paved the Way to Crimea………………………………………………. 80 CDR Cielo Almanza, Maj Bincarousky, and Lt Col Todd Hoover, JCWS Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. Campaigning Spring 2015 iv Surrounded by Design…and Losing among all US forces to free JFCs and their staffs to focus efforts on solving the (Or the Tao of the Alternative 6 View) complex problems confronting them.” The doctrine expresses an aspiration - it “should By Assistant Professor Stephen Dennis foster creativity” - but is that aspiration achievable? What drags doctrine down to Who believes that doctrine is your friend? the “unimaginative” realm? That doctrine is liberating…that doctrine will set you free…that doctrine will cast a The language we use, the questions we ask, light unto your path? That you have to know reveal the paradigm in which we work. In it to violate it? Or do you agree with Gen “The Semantic Turn: a New Foundation for James N. Mattis, USMC that “doctrine is the Design,” Klaus Krippendorf states: last refuge of the unimaginative?” “Channeling” your “inner Mattis” will lead “Language is a cultural artifact that enables you to Oscar Wilde and Ralph Waldo humans to coordinate their conceptions, Emerson, where, ultimately, “To be great is engage in joint action, and construct and to be misunderstood.”1 Mattis’ zinger is reconstruct the realities they see. In the use related to Wilde’s “consistency is the last of language, languaging, acting, and refuge of the unimaginative”2 as well as perceiving are inseparably tied to a Emerson’s “a foolish consistency is the constructive understanding. It is a truism hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little that one cannot know what exists without conceptualizing it as such. Language is the statesmen and philosophers and divines. 7 With consistency a great soul has simply primary source of conceptions.” nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.”3 How Joint doctrine provides a language of can we determine the appropriate balance of operational art that has its historical, doctrinal “best practices” and creativity, of paradigmatic roots in the Great Captains of “method” and “no method”? military strategy. Yet if “…the very premise of doctrine, which is to draw a common Current joint doctrine attempts to walk the picture through the use of a common tightrope between creativity and the language, is the limiting factor in being able to develop new concepts, to build new “consistency” mentioned above. “Joint 8 doctrine is not dogmatic – the focus is on frames, to confront new challenges” then how to think about operations, not what to how can joint doctrine foster the creativity think about operations. It is definitive required to solve complex problems without enough to guide operations while versatile also imposing semantic limitations that hobble the creative effort? And if “joint enough