Marines from Company G and Company E, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, being interviewed pier side following rescue operation of merchant vessel SS Mayaguez, May 20, 1975 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library)
The Mayaguez Incident A Model Case Study for PME
By Gregory D. Miller
any Americans are familiar into the curriculum. Despite existing highlights the value of a thorough histori- with the basic facts of the scholarship on the Mayaguez, it is not cal education, as well as the danger of too M Cuban Missile Crisis, a case a particularly well-known case among much distance between the strategic and that is canon in many military institu- decisionmakers, and less so among the operational levels. Despite the President’s tions and civilian programs that teach public. Even at the war college level, ability to micromanage at the tactical level, history, political science, or decision- too many students are unaware of the the lack of understanding between the making. This article contends that 1975 event, much less the details that strategic leader and operational planners the Mayaguez Incident (May 12–15, make it such a valuable case study. almost resulted in a more significant crisis. 1975) is an even more useful case, This does not suggest eliminating the This article is organized according and all levels of professional military Missile Crisis study, but the challenges to the three core courses in the Joint education (PME) should incorporate it and lessons of the Mayaguez Incident Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) should be just as familiar to senior curriculum, though this information military and civilian decisionmakers. is applicable to all military institutions. This article highlights the criti- The main sections below examine the Dr. Gregory D. Miller is an Associate Professor of Leadership Studies at the Air Command and cal elements of the case, intended as relevance of the case for the study of his- Staff College. an instructor’s supplemental guide. It tory, strategy, and operational planning.
36 JPME Today / The Mayaguez Incident and PME JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 The article concludes with some final that they would endanger the crew, still War. And the poor use of historical anal- thoughts about the case, intended as believed to be on the island. Of the 11 ogy by President Ford’s advisors makes it questions for seminar discussion and for helicopters in the first wave, only 4 were particularly valuable for students. future research. available to bring in the second wave The Historical Context: Cold War due to both mechanical issues and taking vs. Local Conflict. It is important to Background enemy fire. When the second wave did understand the strategic environment Some consider the Mayaguez to be arrive, it delivered fewer than half the surrounding any historical study. This the last battle of the Vietnam War, and Marines as originally planned. historical context puts the case in perspec- those who died during the operation Less than 20 minutes after the tive and is helpful for understanding the are part of the Vietnam War Memo- first wave of Marines landed, the mindset of the decisionmakers, particu- rial in Washington, DC.1 The final Cambodians released the crewmem- larly President Ford and the NSC. U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam on bers, none of whom was on Koh Tang. Gerald Ford had been President for April 29–30, 1975—just 2 weeks prior The USS Holt arrived and found the only 8 months since Richard Nixon’s to the Mayaguez Incident—certainly Mayaguez empty, and it began towing August 1974 resignation, and the coun- influenced how the National Command the ship away from Koh Tang. Because try was still reeling from Watergate and Authority perceived both the crisis and of the rescue of the ship and crew, the Vietnam War. Ford had yet to be the need to respond quickly and with President Ford canceled the third wave tested on foreign policy, and he wanted force. Because there are already several of Marines and tasked the remaining to show himself to be capable of making detailed accounts of the crisis, this helicopters with extracting more than difficult decisions. He retained many of section provides a brief overview of the 200 Marines from the island, although Nixon’s advisors, most notably Henry main events and decisions.2 this took more than 5 hours. In the con- Kissinger serving as both Secretary of On May 12, 1975 (at roughly fusion of the extraction, three Marines State and National Security Advisor,3 and 0318 EST), the SS Mayaguez, a U.S. were left behind and are presumed to Secretary of Defense Arthur Schlesinger. container ship, was seized off the coast have been captured and executed. Ford also faced a minor crisis of le- of Cambodia. U.S. officials believed The operation ended with the crew gitimacy. He was not Nixon’s first Vice initially that Khmer Rouge forces were and ship rescued, but with 41 U.S. President, but took over when Spiro moving the ship and the 40-person crew Servicemembers dead and three helicop- Agnew resigned over tax evasion. Thus, to Kompong Son, a port on mainland ters destroyed. Upon completion of the Ford was the first unelected President of Cambodia. Later, during the rescue op- operation, the Ford administration saw the United States. eration, U.S. officials believed both were a temporary increase in public opinion Regionally, on April 17, 1975, on Koh Tang, an island 32 miles off the and an enhanced U.S. reputation with Cambodia fell to the Communist Khmer coast of Cambodia. its allies. Despite being a political and Rouge. Two weeks later, Saigon fell to President Gerald Ford learned of strategic win, the operation was rife with the North Vietnamese, and the United the situation at his morning briefing. At flaws, and this contrast is one reason it States fully withdrew from Vietnam as noon, roughly 9 hours after seizure of is such a valuable case study for future part of Operation Frequent Wind. The the ship, he convened the first of four decisionmakers. United States still generally viewed all National Security Council (NSC) meet- communists as part of a unified bloc, ings before he approved the military Theory and History but what the NSC did not know at the plan. Military operations began at 1700 There is often a tension within PME time of the Mayaguez Incident was that EST on May 14 and involved the USS over what to teach, and many see history Cambodia ramped up its defense of Koh Holt securing the ship and Marines land- as easily replaced with topics that are Tang after the fall of Saigon out of fear ing on Koh Tang to occupy the island more valuable, or more “timely,” such as of growing Vietnamese power. While the and rescue the crew. Because there were counterinsurgency after 2004, or great Khmer Rouge shared a communist ideol- not enough helicopters to deliver all power competition after 2018. What the ogy with the North Vietnamese, both the Marines at one time, the operation Mayaguez case does, even more than the groups were nationalistic and in competi- required three waves of helicopters from Cuban Missile Crisis, is illustrate why an tion with one another over a variety of Thailand. However, it was a 4-hour accurate use of history is so important issues, including the islands near where round trip, meaning the first one-third for senior leaders. the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez. of the planned force would be on its own Lack of awareness over the Mayaguez Globally, the Cold War was still in a until the next wave arrived 4 hours later. Incident is particularly troubling consid- period of relative détente, especially after Immediately upon landing on Koh ering the poor use of history by strategic the opening of U.S. relations with China Tang, the Marines encountered heavy re- decisionmakers during the crisis. The case in February 1972 and the signing of the sistance, as much as five times larger than itself is a valuable lesson in history, com- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agree- anticipated. The expected pre-landing ing as it does on the heels of the Vietnam ment and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty strikes did not occur out of concern War and in a transition point of the Cold with the Soviets in May 1972. But there
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miller 37 Section of negative contact sheet for White House Photography Office roll A452 includes President Gerald Ford, Chief of Staff Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, and Vice President William Rockefeller, on day 3 of Mayaguez discussions, May 1975 (David Kennerly/Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library) was still Cold War competition. The and how to apply these historical analo- what was technically still a state of war Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was gies effectively.6 between the United States and North falling apart after France’s June 1974 The most pressing analogy that the Korea. In contrast, the Mayaguez was withdrawal,4 and communists took over NSC used during the discussions is the a commercial ship, and it is still unclear in Ethiopia in September 1974. The USS Pueblo case 7 years prior, in which where it was seized and whether it was Ford administration was also concerned North Korea seized a U.S. intelligence even flying an American flag at the time by reports that North Korea sought sup- vessel and held the crew for 11 months. of its seizure,8 meaning the Cambodians port from China and the Soviet Union Ford’s advisors brought up the 1968 might not have realized they were seizing for some type of military action against incident on multiple occasions. Vice an American ship. South Korea.5 This weighed heavily on President Nelson Rockefeller was the first The use of the Pueblo analogy is U.S. decisionmakers during the crisis. to use the analogy, simply offering, “I re- understandable if Ford’s advisors were The Use of Analogy: Bad History member the PUEBLO case.” Schlesinger concerned about North Korean activities. Leads to Bad Decisions. Historians are later said, “It is like the PUEBLO. Once But frequently drawing that comparison fond of saying that history does not re- it got to Wonson [a port city in North without addressing the key differences peat itself, but it often rhymes. This is an Korea] it was hard to bring it back.”7 negatively influenced the decision. Using important sentiment because it suggests Both cases involved the seizure of a the Pueblo analogy placed an unwarranted that while no two cases are identical, we U.S. ship and its crew, but that is where time constraint on Ford. Rather than can apply lessons from history to modern the similarities end. The Pueblo was a work to resolve the situation and get the events. The challenge is to know when military ship, engaged in intelligence crew and ship back, the President felt he gathering in North Korean waters during needed to act before the crew reached the
38 JPME Today / The Mayaguez Incident and PME JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 mainland (without knowing where the Powers Act and the concept of reputa- Cambodians have already seized three crewmembers were or whether they were tion. The first section below begins ships: A Panamanian, a Philippine and being moved to the mainland). This self- with one of the key starting points for now an American. They did release the imposed time constraint then increased any strategic choice: understanding the first two ships.”14 Yet the NSC ignored the likelihood of groupthink. In fact, it problem. these facts in favor of finding some action is not clear that this situation needed to Understanding the Problem: Asking that would signal U.S. toughness, based rise to the level of a crisis, but the NSC the “Why” Question. The first flaw of on the assumption that the Cambodians approach from the beginning created a decisionmaking in the NSC was the must have targeted the United States. sense of urgency. failure to understand why they were in a Without properly addressing the Another flawed analogy used in the crisis to begin with. NSC minutes reveal source of the problem, all moves by the NSC meetings was the Cuban Missile occasional questions about why the NSC were subject to flawed assumptions Crisis. Ford’s Counselor to the President, Khmer Rouge might have taken the ship, and poor judgment. These issues were Robert Hartmann, referenced Cuba but Ford’s advisors never addressed that worsened by the nature of the decision- during the third NSC meeting of the issue adequately. The few instances when making process in the NSC. crisis (the second meeting on day 2), not the question was asked were quickly Groupthink and Strategic Risk. because of parallels between the cases overcome by calls to mine harbors, take Groupthink can manifest in a number themselves, but to highlight the need to reciprocal action against Cambodian of ways and may result in a variety of resolve the incident successfully, to give ships, or bomb Cambodia using B-52s. outcomes, none of which are condu- Ford a foreign policy win. Hartmann At the beginning of the first NSC meet- cive to effective decisionmaking. In stated, “This crisis, like the Cuban missile ing, as Director of Central Intelligence the Mayaguez case, there is significant crisis, is the first real test of your leader- William Colby briefed the situation, he evidence of groupthink, including the ship. What you decide is not as important stated, “We have no hard information on presence of time constraints (though self- as what the public perceives.”9 Comparing why the Khmer Communists seized the imposed), and the group’s unwillingness the seizure of a ship in Cambodia to the ship.”10 to consider alternative solutions (or to re- removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba Later in that first meeting, Deputy visit alternate courses of action). Further created additional pressure on Ford to Secretary of Defense William Clements evidence includes the lack of outside resolve the issue in a way that created a reminded the NSC that “we should not perspectives (despite legal requirements significant political win. forget that there is a real chance that this to consult with Congress) and the belief While history can be a persuasive tool, is an in-house spat.”11 Yet by that point, that whatever solution the group arrived its incorrect use is dangerous because most of the group had already moved on at would be the correct one. flawed analogies based on a poor under- to discussing possible military options. As discussed above, analogies to the standing of the current context can lead Immediately after Clements’s comment, Pueblo incident created a crisis-like at- to poor decisionmaking. Given that many President Ford stated, “This is interesting, mosphere because of the perceived need of Ford’s advisors were around during but it does not solve our problem. . . . We to rescue the crewmembers before they the Pueblo incident, the use of the anal- should also issue orders to get the carrier reached mainland Cambodia. Drawing ogy is both understandable, and perhaps turned around.”12 The fact that nobody parallels to the Pueblo incident, despite less forgivable, since they should have could answer the “why” question is a the important differences between the been aware of the differences. problem but is not completely surprising two events, put additional time pres- in the preliminary phases of an incident. sures on the decisionmakers. Also, the Strategy More troubling is how little time the perceived importance of acting tough to JAWS uses the Mayaguez case at the NSC spent even asking why, and how strengthen U.S. reputation enhanced the beginning of the block of strategy quickly the President moved to military crisis mentality. As a result, the NSC’s lessons focused on the diplomatic, options without understanding the rea- assessment of the greatest risk to its stra- informational, military, economic, son for the crisis. tegic goals was for the crisis to become financial, intelligence, and law enforce- There are even points where a prolonged hostage situation, as in the ment instruments of national power to members of the NSC claimed that the Pueblo case. The NSC was willing to highlight how quickly the NSC jumped Cambodians had done this before and accept some risk to personnel (both the to the military solution without seri- released the crew and ship shortly after crew and the military forces), as well as ously considering other options. This seizure. In the same initial brief, Colby some domestic political risk, to reduce case incorporates so many elements of a stated, “A Panamanian charter vessel was the likelihood of a hostage crisis. An typical strategy curriculum that it might seized by the Khmer Communists last understanding of strategic priorities is be used in conjunction with lessons on week in roughly the same area, but was important for planners because it helps decisionmaking and groupthink, analysis subsequently released.”13 Secretary of them identify where to accept higher lev- of strategic risk, or the political dimen- Defense James Schlesinger followed up els of risk and where they must mitigate sions of strategy, to include the War later in that same meeting, stating, “The or transfer risk.
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miller 39 we can strike, but we should certainly consider this. If they get any hostages, this can go on forever.”18 In the first NSC meeting, the President made the decision to act mili- tarily, and after that, the NSC focused on the details of the operation, rarely revisiting nonmilitary options. Direct diplomacy was difficult because of the lack of communication with the new Khmer Rouge government, and the NSC dismissed economic measures and multilateral diplomacy because of the perceived need to resolve the crisis before the Cambodians took the crew to the mainland (again, based on the flawed Pueblo analogy).19 Many also believed other states would view nonmilitary courses of action as weak. As a result, the Department of Defense put a joint operation into motion consisting of Marines, volunteers from an Air Force security squadron, Air Force helicopters out of Thailand, and Naval vessels in the region, namely the frigate USS Holt and the destroyer USS Wilson. The Navy also diverted the USS Coral Sea carrier group to the South China Sea. More Naval and Marine assets were avail- able 24 hours later, but the NSC accepted a higher level of risk to the mission and to personnel in exchange for reducing the risk that the crew would become hostages on the mainland. The War Powers Act: Testing the Imperial President. The War Powers Act is an important element of this case, Marines with M-60 machine guns on deck of merchant ship SS Mayaguez after boarding it and finding it empty (U.S. Marine Corps) although it is too involved to address sufficiently here. This was the first real The speed with which President Ford The first problem is how to get the test of the act, which largely failed be- moved to a military solution without seri- ship back. The second problem is how cause nobody seemed to know what the ously considering alternate instruments the United States appears at this time. requirements were,20 because Congress of national power illustrates groupthink, Actions that we would take to deal never challenged the Presidential author- but it also demonstrates the NSC’s view with one of these problems may not ity to act, and because there were no of risk. Minutes into the first NSC meet- help to deal with the other.”16 Kissinger real costs imposed on the President for ing, James Schlesinger already offered the continued, “What we need for the next ignoring Congress. President military options, saying, “We 48 hours is a strong statement, a strong Since the operation was over can have a passive stance or we can be note and a show of force.”17 quickly, the use of military forces against active. We can do such things as seizing The Vice President echoed Cambodia never triggered section 5 of Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. Kissinger’s view, stating, “I think a the War Powers Act. But the Ford ad- We could seize a small island as a hostage. violent response is in order. The world ministration’s decision to mostly ignore We might also consider a blockade.”15 should know that we will act and that sections 3 and 4, the consultation and Shortly after that, Kissinger laid out we will act quickly. We should have an reporting requirements, either out of ig- the challenges for the team: “As I see it, immediate response in terms of action. I norance or out of disdain, set a precedent Mr. President, we have two problems. do not know if we have any targets that for future Presidents when introducing
40 JPME Today / The Mayaguez Incident and PME JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 military forces into hostilities. It also worse by the confused command and adequately addressed a number of criti- signaled the NSC’s willingness to accept control structure.28 Regardless of where cal questions, including why the Khmer some political risk with Congress to score to lay the blame, accurate intelligence Rouge seized the ship, what some of the a win with the American public and, was not available to the planners or to the nonmilitary options were, and what the more important, to enhance U.S. reputa- forces during the operation. potential risks of military action were. tion overseas. Other discussions of joint functions According to Joint Publication 3-0, might include decisions to go forward Joint Operations, commander’s intent Operational Planning with the operation despite the lack of “provides focus to the staff and helps sub- Most officers have some familiarity with assets to both insert the Marines and to ordinate and supporting commanders act the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and quickly extract them should things go to achieve the commander’s objectives the cases that contributed to passage of wrong (movement and maneuver), the without further orders once the opera- that legislation. Operation Eagle Claw’s decision to withhold pre-invasion bomb- tion begins, even when the operation (1980) failure and the successful but ings out of concern that the crew was on does not unfold as planned.”30 Had the flawed invasion of Grenada (1983) led Koh Tang (fires), and the lack of coordi- NSC communicated national prestige as Congress to reform how the Depart- nated air and sea support for the Marines the top priority, military plans might have ment of Defense plans and conducts after landing on Koh Tang (fires). been different in a number of ways. For joint operations. Mayaguez started the This was not just a problem of unde- one thing, assault forces believed the first United States down that path even veloped doctrine. Planners, admittedly wave on Koh Tang would occur after pre- earlier.21 The multi-Service nature of under time pressures, failed to adequately assault attacks on the island’s defenses. the operation was born of necessity plan for the most basic elements of an op- Planners made the late decision to avoid rather than a desire to be joint, and the eration. Several choices at the operational pre-assault fires to avoid endangering problems with the operation show how and tactical levels nearly resulted in failure, the Mayaguez crew believed to be on the poorly the Services worked together not because of incorrect decisions, but be- island. Had the message been clearer that after Vietnam. That is not to diminish cause they did not take into account the this was about resolve and not the crew, the heroism of those who participated strategic priorities of the mission. then those fires would have occurred, the in the operation, but to highlight how Commander’s Intent. It is apparent occupation of the island would have met far the Defense Department has come from the NSC minutes that President less resistance, and at least that part of the since 1975. Ford and Henry Kissinger were concerned operation would have held less risk. Two key elements of the case related foremost with resolving the crisis in a way Other operational decisions that to operational planning curricula are joint that enhanced the President’s and the might have been different with an un- functions and commander’s intent.22 Nation’s reputation. The rescue of the ship derstanding of NSC priorities include Planners did not talk about either of these and crew were of secondary importance to the order for pilots to shoot at boats in 1975, and this is why the Mayaguez the need to respond decisively and to re- potentially taking the crew to the main- Incident is such a useful case for discuss- solve the crisis quickly and effectively. The land. In addition, waiting another 24–48 ing current joint doctrine. crewmembers were means to an end. hours for more Naval and Marine as- Joint Functions. A discussion of joint Gerald Ford was still a new President sets to arrive in the region would have functions in the Mayaguez operation and not yet tested in foreign policy, so provided more support capabilities and would be an article of its own.23 I men- he personally felt the need to gain a more ground forces. Yet the NSC made tion only some key aspects here. One of foreign policy win to secure his status those decisions to reduce the risk of the the biggest problems with the operation and improve his popularity at home.29 crew getting to the mainland, not out of had to do with the complex command Kissinger’s concern for reputation was concern for the crew’s lives, but fear of a and control structure, which was slightly more about the credibility of the coun- drawn-out hostage crisis. different for each Service and violated try, having recently withdrawn from concepts of unity of command.24 The Vietnam, and as part of the larger Cold Conclusion Marine Corps, in particular, was critical War competition. Kissinger believed This article highlights several elements of the ad hoc nature of the operation and that if the United States did not stand of the Mayaguez Incident to facilitate the dominance of U.S. Air Force plan- up to Cambodia, it would further harm its use as an instructional case study. ners.25 Planning cells were also physically the country’s credibility, weaken rela- Its value is to give military officers and separated from one another, complicating tions with U.S. allies in the region and civilian decisionmakers a better apprecia- communication and coordination.26 elsewhere, and possibly embolden North tion for the uses of history, strategy, and Plenty of analysts widely criticized the Korea and the Soviet Union. operational planning. The NSC was so intelligence community.27 The bulk of The problem is that while the NSC fixated on the global Cold War that it scholarship suggests that the problem was did list its priorities, nobody relayed ignored the local factors that contributed less with the gathering or analysis of intel- these priorities to the planners and local to the incident and ignored questions ligence than with its dissemination, made commanders. Moreover, the NSC never about why the Khmer Rouge seized the
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miller 41 as Kissinger predicted during the NSC meetings.32 But the Thai government was upset over the domestic political tension caused by U.S. troops being deployed from Thai territory, not that the United States was an unreliable ally or lacked the resolve to defend its interests. Other allies (Japan, Australia, and South Korea in par- ticular) positively viewed U.S. willingness to protect its interests in the region, even after withdrawing from Vietnam. Japanese officials, for instance, called the U.S. mili- tary action “justified.”33 Other questions, more at the opera- tional level, relate to whether planners or commanders would have done any- thing differently had they understood the strategic priority of preserving U.S. reputation, rather than assuming that the rescue of the crew and ship were the priorities. Some examples are offered in the text above, but one exercise is to have a class develop two sets of plans for a Mayaguez scenario—one in which rescue CH-53 “Jolly Green” helicopter on Cambodia mainland during rescue operation (Jim Davis/Gerald R. of the crew is articulated as the priority, Ford Presidential Library) and one where it is made known to the boat. Members of the NSC drew poor for the American people is only one small planners that looking tough is the main historical parallels, enhancing the sense part of what drove Ford. concern. Comparing the finished prod- of urgency, and an emphasis on looking Ford and his advisors clearly viewed ucts would illustrate some critical lessons tough contributed to these problems reputation as a critical driver for their about the importance of understanding and to the sense of groupthink. Finally, decisions, but to what extent did U.S. the objectives of a plan. the NSC’s failure to communicate where actions alter the perception of other states Finally, classes could discuss civil- it was willing to accept risk, based on its toward the United States as either an military relations and the meaning of best prioritization of goals, contributed to ally or an adversary? We cannot know if military advice. There are examples in this flawed planning assumptions. U.S. actions deterred North Korea or the case of military advisors minimizing or Despite the effect these strategic Soviet Union. Nor can we know what overlooking risk. There are also examples mistakes had on the operation, the lens would have happened if the United States of insubordination, which may have saved of modern operational planning provides had not acted quickly. Did U.S. allies feel the lives of the crew, precisely because valuable lessons for planners and strate- that the United States was more reliable officers did what they thought was right gists. There are a number of topics only as an ally? Did the Nation benefit in its al- rather than what best fit the President’s briefly discussed above that deserve a liance relationships because of its actions? strategic priorities.34 more detailed discussion, but for which There is little evidence on either The above discussion highlights some there is not room here. It is useful, side.31 While U.S. actions probably did of the operational challenges, created or though, to list some of these as a tool for not impress the Soviets, failure to act worsened by a poor use of history, a lack generating discussion questions and/or might have lowered Soviet perceptions of awareness of the strategic situation facilitating additional research. of U.S. strength, at least in the region. beyond the Cold War, an inability to There is still debate about the relative Likewise, we cannot know if U.S. actions recognize groupthink within the NSC, success or failure of the operation. From a deterred future North Korean activities; and a failure to communicate the strategic strategic point of view, the crew and ship the best we can say is nothing happened priorities. It is ironic that most of the were rescued, and Ford received a signifi- despite U.S. concerns before the incident failures occurred at the strategic level, yet cant boost in popularity. As a result, the that an attack was likely. the outcome gave the President a political Ford administration achieved its political Most U.S. allies in the region victory. In the end, while the Mayaguez objectives. One important set of ques- appeared to view the military action favor- operation was flawed on many levels, the tions relates to the value of reputation. ably. Thailand was upset over the use of its case is an incredibly valuable teaching tool Showing competency in foreign affairs territory for staging military operations, for any part of a PME curriculum. JFQ
42 JPME Today / The Mayaguez Incident and PME JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 10 “NSC Meeting, 5/12/1975,” 2. 23 Joint functions include command Notes 11 Ibid., 6. and control, information, intelligence, fires, 12 Ibid. movement and maneuver, protection, and 1 Ric Hunter, “The Last Battle of Viet- 13 Ibid., 3. sustainment. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint nam,” Flight Journal 5, no. 2 (April 2000), 14 Ibid., 4. Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 43–46; and Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: 15 Ibid., 3–4. January 7, 2017, Incorporating Change 1, The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Viet- 16 Ibid., 4–5. Some suggest Kissinger’s October 22, 2018), chap. 3. nam War (New York: Plume, 2002). omission of the crew’s return is telling of his 24 Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, 85–88, 2 Christopher Lamb, Belief Systems and De- priorities. A report shortly after the crisis even 225–228; and Urey Patrick, The Mayaguez cision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis (Gaines- suggests Kissinger made a statement in the first Operation (Washington, DC: Center for Naval ville: University of Florida Press, 1989); John NSC meeting that the lives of the crew “must Analyses–Marine Corps Operational Analysis Guilmartin, A Very Short War: The Mayaguez unfortunately be a secondary consideration.” Group, April 1977), 17–18. and the Battle of Koh Tang (College Station: See Peter Goldman, “Ford’s Rescue Opera- 25 Glenn Starnes, “The Mayaguez Incident: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); Robert tion,” Newsweek, May 26, 1975, 16. Kissinger A Failure in Operational Leadership,” Naval Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident: Testing denied making that statement, and no such War College paper, June 16, 1995. America’s Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era comment appears in the minutes of that first 26 Lucien Vandenbroucke, Perilous Opera- (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2011); meeting. Regardless of what Kissinger said or tions: Special Operations as an Instrument of and James Wise and Scott Baron, The 14-Hour whether he prioritized rescue of the crew, it is Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University War: Valor on Koh Tang and the Recapture of apparent in reading the NSC minutes that look- Press, 1993), 98. the SS Mayaguez (Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti- ing tough was his priority and the ship (and 27 Poor estimates of enemy defenses on tute Press, 2011). crew) were both secondary. Koh Tang, as well as the location of the crew, 3 Kissinger initially served as Nixon’s 17 “NSC Meeting, 5/12/1975,” 5. contributed to lower chances of success. Wil- National Security Advisor, but he took on both 18 Ibid., 8. liam Head, “Mayaguez: The Final Tragedy of roles from September 1973 until November 19 State Department records show attempts the U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War,” 1975 and then finished out the Ford adminis- by the U.S. Embassy in China to get a message Journal of Third World Studies 29, no. 1 tration as the Secretary of State. to the Cambodians, seemingly ignored by both (Spring 2012), 57–80; Mahoney, The Mayaguez 4 “France to Stop Paying Dues to SEATO the Chinese government and the Cambodian Incident, 245–257; and Patrick, The Mayaguez in June, 1974,” New York Times, June 10, embassy. “Telegram from the Liaison Office Operation, 102. 1973, 6. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- in China to the Department of State: Message 28 Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, tion disbanded in 1977. on Cambodian Seizure of U.S. Ship, Beijing, 252–255; and Vandenbroucke, Perilous Opera- 5 Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Sees Foray May 13, 1975 (0454Z),” Gerald R. Ford tions, 99. for Ship as Signal to Communists,” New York Presidential Library, National Security Advisor, 29 Mahoney suggests this contributed to Times, May 16, 1975, 14; and Yafeng Xia and NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Ford using the crisis for political gain. Ma- Zhihua Shen, “China’s Last Ally: Beijing’s Pol- 1973–1976, Box 29, Department of State, honey, The Mayaguez Incident, 217, 259. Lamb icy toward North Korea during the U.S.-China Telegrams and Cables (1). Similarly, attempts disagrees that domestic politics played a signifi- Rapprochement, 1970–1975,” Diplomatic His- to go through the United Nations (UN) were cant part in Ford’s decisionmaking, suggesting tory 38 (November 2014), 1083–1113. largely ineffective. Lamb blames Kissinger it was entirely about showing U.S. toughness. 6 Richard Neustadt and Ernest May devote for the delay in getting the UN involved. See Lamb, “The Mayaguez Crisis: Correcting 30 half a chapter to the Mayaguez case, though Christopher Lamb, “The Mayaguez Crisis: Years of Scholarship,” 66–67. much of the information relies on Ford’s auto- Correcting 30 Years of Scholarship,” Political 30 JP 3-0, II-7. biographical account since the National Security Science Quarterly 133, no. 1 (2018), 35–76. 31 Mahoney spends two pages talking about Council (NSC) minutes were still classified. 20 President Ford even asked his NSC the response of the Thai government, but Yuen Foong Khong only briefly mentionsMay - team, “What does the law say?” Philip Buchen, there is little else in the Mayaguez scholarship aguez in the introductory chapter, but his book White House Counsel, replied, “The law says about the tangible effects of U.S. actions on its is useful for understanding the broader value of to consult before the introduction of forces reputation. Mahoney, The Mayaguez Incident, historical analogy. Richard Neustadt and Ernest and then to consult regularly. There is also 191–192. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for a requirement for a report 48 hours after an 32 Kissinger offered, “We cannot do it [take Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, action. We have to get that report in tonight.” military action] from Thailand. . . . I do not 1986), 58–66; and Yuen Foong Khong, Analo- See “NSC Meeting, 5/14/1975,” National believe we can run military operations from gies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, Security Adviser’s NSC Meeting File, Box there.” See “NSC Minutes, 5/12/1975,” 9. and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: 1, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 23, Telegrams from the U.S. Embassy in Thailand Princeton University Press, 1992), 5. available at
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