The Fall of Sai Gon 30 April 1975
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
WALL NOTE TWO: THE FALL OF SAI GON 30 APRIL 1975 DANIEL R. ARANT [email protected] DATE OF INFORMATION: 06 MAY 2008 "We must ensure that any major foreign policy commitment has the full support and understanding of the American people....." GEORGE H. W. BUSH, 41st President of the United States. "The American soldiers who fought in the war did so out of a sense of duty to their country, but their country betrayed them by sending them to an unconscionable war." PHILIP CAPUTO, U.S. Marine infantry platoon leader in Viet Nam and author of A Rumor of War. "... the leaders who planned and executed the war did not understand what they were getting into. The values and ideals we stood for were correct, but it was the wrong war in the wrong place - a place we did not know." RICHARD HOLBROOKE, Foreign Service diplomat in Viet Nam. "Those Americans who went to Vietnam fought for freedom, a truly noble cause. This battle was lost not by those brave Americans and South Vietnamese troops who were waging it but by political misjudgments and strategic failure at the highest levels of government." RONALD REAGAN, 40th President of the United States. "The Vietnam War was a political war that imposed restraints on the military that prevented use of power that we had readily available. ... it was very difficult to tell friend from foe, hence the Calley affair." ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970-1974). "It was a disastrous, insane, imperial invasion of a weirdo Third World country." TIMOTHY LEARY. Producer of Psychedelic Celebrations. "It was an Indochina war, as seen from Hanoi, if not from Washington. United States forces were not allowed to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia. As long as the trail was open, the war could not be won, and peace could not come to the South." PETER BRAESTRUP, newsman in Vietnam. Author of The Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. "... powerful nations may stumble, though their intentions are good, that tragedy and failure are often the lot of man, even of the citizens of a great and favored nation such as ours." HARRY C. McPHERSON, Jr., Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson. "We lost the Vietnam War. We could have won it. We could have won it easily if from the start we had fought the real enemy, North Vietnam. ..... The reason our government chose to settle for halfhearted, self-defeating moves in Vietnam was its lack of trust in the American people's judgment." VICE ADM. JAMES B. STOCKDALE, USN. POW. Recipient of the Medal of Honor. Page 1 of 23 "... the United States lost. ...of all the tactical mistakes we made, perhaps the most serious was to take on the fighting of the North Vietnamese main force units, leaving the South Vietnamese to defend the villages. I am sure the results will help ensure that we pick our fights more carefully in the future." JOHN NEGROPONTE, U.S. diplomat in Viet Nam, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, former Director of National Intelligence, currently Deputy Secretary of State. "The military did not lose a battle of consequence and did not lose the war. The war was lost by congressional actions withdrawing support to the South Vietnamese government despite commitments by President Nixon." GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, MACV commander, 1964-1968. "The most important thing for today's students to understand about the Vietnam War is that while their country entered the war for moral reasons, it also got out for moral reasons." GARY TRUDEAU, creator of Doonesbury. 01. PURPOSE. A. The above quotes are abstracted from an article titled "What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?" in the May/June 1988 edition of American Heritage. Fifty-two of the respondents are quoted in the article. The editor of the article states: "Taken together, the answers form a powerful and moving record of the national conscience." B. 30 April 2008 was the 33rd anniversary of the fall of Sai Gon and concomitantly, the disappearance of the country of South Viet Nam on 30 April 1975. I have noted that during anniversary dates, Wall visitors ask questions concerning the specific event. This Wall Note may help Park Rangers and volunteers to answer some of the questions regarding the subject. The aim is to present facts and not interpretations, although admittedly, I have discretion of what facts to present. I hope I have been objective. Some of the detailed information may not be relevant to all rangers and volunteers, but I think the information regarding some of the names on the Wall (the five U.S. servicemen who died/went missing on 27 January 1973, the eleven U. S. Air Force personnel killed on the 04 April 1975 C-5A Babylift crash, and the four Marines who died on 29 April 1975, for example), may be useful. I like to converse with Wall visitors who had an association with specific events; I can learn from them. Or, I may be able to educate a visitor about the association of a name with a specific event. C. Thousands of books and articles have been written about the Southeast Asian conflict. Many attempt to answer (01) "who lost the war" (the media, the antiwar movement, the Congress, the President, the military commanders, our South Vietnamese allies, to name a few), or (02) did the U.S. really lose the war, or (03) did we just pack up and go home. It is interesting to me to read how many political and military leaders in their writings blame one another for the result in Viet Nam. But in the end I am reminded of the oft-quoted 25 April 1975 exchange in Ha Noi between then Lt. Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr. (1932-1999), U.S. Army and North Vietnamese Army Colonel Tu. Lt. Col. Summers was the Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) and Col. Tu, Chief, North Vietnamese (Democratic Republic of Viet Nam) Delegation. (See Wall Note Number One regarding the FPJMT.) (01) "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant." (Summers, Jr., Harry G. Colonel of Infantry, U.S Army. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. California: Presidio, 1982.) Page 2 of 23 02. DISCLAIMER. This Wall Note in not an official publication of the U.S. National Park Service or the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund. Some issues are too complex to put into a sentence or two. For in- depth details, refer to paragraph 87, Selected References. Any errors are mine. Corrections are appreciated. 03. NOTE. A. If you desire to find locations of cities/districts/provinces mentioned in this Wall Note, use a contemporary map of the period discussed. Many administrative boundaries were redrawn after 1975. I reflect these changes in the discussion. 04. 14 April 1971. The last operational U.S. Marine Corps combat organization, the 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade (3rd MAB), is activated. 3rd MAB is composed of: (01) 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, (02) elements of the 11th Marine Regiment (artillery) of the 1st Marine Division, (03) representative fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft of the 1st Marine Air Wing, and (04) supporting units. 3rd MAB personnel are 14,681 Marines and 835 Sailors. 05. 06 May 1971. All U.S. Marine Corps combat operations in Viet Nam cease. The U.S. Army 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) assumes ground operations in the former Marine tactical area of interest (TAOI). Some USMC helicopters continue noncombat flights. 06. 28 June 1971. 542 Marines remain in Viet Nam. They are assigned to the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), the Marine Advisory Unit, the U.S. Embassy Security Guard Detachment, and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) staff. A. On 29 June 1972, during the North Vietnamese Nguyen Hue/"Eastertide" Offensive, USMC Capt. Michael B. Brown, 1st ANGLICO, was flying with USAF pilot Capt. Steven L. Bennett of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (20th TASS) in a OV-10A Bronco supporting a naval gunfire mission by a Navy cruiser and destroyer, an air control mission by Navy attack aircraft, and an own aircraft strafing mission all in support of South Vietnamese infantry units. The Bronco was hit by a SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missile (SAM) and Capt. Brown's parachute was rendered unusable. Capt. Bennett elected to ditch his aircraft in the sea knowing that because of the aircraft's configuration, his chances for survival were minimal. Capt. Brown survived; Capt. Bennett was killed. Capt. Steven Logan Bennett, USAF received a posthumous Medal of Honor and a U.S. Navy prepositioned merchant ship was named in his honor. (01) Capt. Steven L. Bennett, USAF. 01W 051. 07. 22 August 1972. The U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) departs Viet Nam. 1/7 operated as Task Force Gary Owen in July and August 1972. A. 1/7 participated in the Battle of LZ X-Ray (14-16 November 1965) during the Ia Drang Campaign (23 October-26 November 1965). The Ia Drang Campaign, LZ X-Ray, and LZ Albany are discussed in the book We Were Soldiers Once ...And Young by Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore, U.S. Army (Ret.) and Joseph L.