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The Perspective of One of the Last Eleven Marines to Leave Vietnam

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The Perspective of One of the Last Eleven Marines to Leave Vietnam Escape, Surrender, or Fight: The Perspective of One of the Last Eleven Marines to Leave Vietnam Interviewer: Jack Tsintolas Interviewee: Terry J. Bennington Instructor: Alex Haight Date: February 17, 2015 Table of Contents Interviewee Release Form……………….………………………………………...………3 Interviewer Release Form....................................................................................................4 Statement of Purpose…………………….……………………………...…………....…...5 Biography….…………………………………………………………...………………….6 The Vietnam War: Plagued with Politics from the Start…………….……………………8 Interview Transcription………………………………………………………..................23 Interview Analysis……………………………………………………………………….63 Appendix...……………………………………………………………………………….69 Works Consulted……………………………………………………………....................72 Statement of Purpose The purpose of this Oral History Project is to provide a greater understanding and a new perspective of the Fall of Saigon through an interview with Mr. Terry Bennington, a retired Marine Security Guard, who experienced the North Vietnamese takeover firsthand. As the culmination of the long Vietnam War, the Fall of Saigon is a perfect example of the United States’ role in world affairs and how politics failed the war effort. Mr. Bennington’s memories will provide a primary source as to what transpired in Vietnam during the Fall of Saigon as well as to promote further study on this momentous event in United States history. Biography of Terry J. Bennington Terry J Bennington was born on November 15th, 1952 in Bellaire, Ohio. When he was four years old, his mother committed suicide. When Bennington’s father remarried, his family moved to Bridgeport, Ohio. He went to Bridgeport High School, but ran around nearby on Wheeling Island, which is in Wheeling, West Virginia. In high school Bennington participated in his school’s wrestling team and placed second in the state in his junior year for his weight class. Bennington dropped out of high school after his junior year because it wasn’t a challenge to him. After dropping out of high school, he worked on the coal barges in the Ohio River. Initially, Bennington wasn’t interested in fighting the Vietnam War. However, a month after a Master Gunnery Sergeant challenged him that he could not become a Marine, Bennington accepted the challenge. Upon completing basic training, Bennington was selected to be a Marine Security Guard. Soaring through the ranks to Sargent, Bennington got orders to Saigon, Vietnam in the end of June 1974. As a Marine Security Guard, he participated in the Vietnam War away from the front lines. Bennington experienced the Fall of Saigon first hand, running the rooftop evacuations in the United States Embassy compound in Saigon. After evacuating thousands of Americans and Vietnamese, Bennington and 10 other Marines were accidentally left on top of the roof of the American Embassy. They were soon rescued, expecting the worse possible scenario. Before settling in Stafford, Virginia Bennington also fought in Beirut and Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield in addition to Vietnam. After spending 25 years in the Marine Corps, Bennington spent four years teaching high school until working for the Government as the Deputy Director of Training and Education Capabilities Division. Bennington got married in 1990 and has one daughter and two sons. Historical Contextualization: “The Vietnam War: Plagued with Politics from the Start” Defense Secretary under Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, once said “The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one” (Norton 844). This quote by McNamara encompasses the seemingly endless struggle the United States faced in the Vietnam War. The bloody Vietnam War took place between November 1st, 1955 and April 30th, 1975. In the course of these 20 long years, the United States strived to stop the spread Communism from Northern Vietnam to Southern Vietnam, evoking the Domino theory as their reasoning. The Domino Theory states that if one country fell to communism the rest of the countries in that area will be a part of that “domino effect”. (Summers 145) This justification in the Cold War allowed the United States to intervene countries in the name of spreading or maintaining Capitalism throughout the world. The communist forces of North Vietnam, the Viet Cong and their communist allies fought against the anti-communist forces of South Vietnam, the United States and their anti- communist allies. Even though the anti-communists had superior firepower, the Communists used guerilla warfare tactics, which were highly successful in the vast jungles of Vietnam. The eventual North Vietnamese victory was a blow to the United States because the Vietnam War is regarded as one of the only war that the United States did not win. In order to understand the Fall of Saigon and the events leading up to it from the point of view of someone who participated in the Vietnam War, it is important to first examine France’s influence over Vietnam and the process of American intervention in Vietnam under the various Presidents of the United States during the time period of the war Throughout the 1800s many European countries desired to imperialize and establish colonial empires throughout Asia. Great Britain established multiple colonial empires throughout southern Asia while the Dutch also established a colonial empire in Indonesia. The French did not want to be outdone by their European neighbors, so they sought out to build and cultivate their own colonial empire on the Southeast Asian peninsula, where present-day Vietnam resides (Summers 16). This conquest began in September of 1857 when the French captured the coastal city of Da Nang. Later in June of 1862 the French continued to push through the Southern Asian peninsula, making the Vietnamese court surrender the captured area to France and gave them control of the territory, known later in 1867 as Cochin China. The establishment of French protectorates and formation of the Indochinese Union in 1887 marked the end of Vietnamese independence. As the Vietnamese desired change from their Western invaders, many Vietnamese, most notably Ho Chi Minh turned to the Russian Communist Revolution of 1917 as a model for change (Summers 19). World War II became a turning point in French intervention. France fell to the Germans in June of 1940, which allowed the Japanese to have control of the French Indochina conquest area. In August of 1940, the French Vichy government gave privileges to the Japanese under the condition that they recognize France dominance of Indochina, and Japanese troops subsequently integrated themselves in Indochina. In September of 1940 the Japanese nearly had full military control over Indochina by stationing themselves on the northern side of the Red River. Later, in July of 1941 a “common defense of French Indochina” was established (Summers 19). However, Indochina grew weary of the French and Japanese controlling their homeland. Resistance movements sprung up all throughout Vietnam against the French and Japanese. The Japanese government grew afraid of the Vietnamese resistance as the Office of Strategic Services reached out to Ho Chi Minh, a communist revolutionary, for support. The government later decided to grant independence to the Vietnamese on March 9, 1945. While, Emperor Bao Dai attempted to create a new government to replace the French administration in Hue. Also, The Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh created the Committee for the Liberation of the Vietnamese People in Hanoi. Bao Dai later relinquished his power and handed it over to Ho Chi Minh, who led the August Revolution that culminated with the proclamation of the independence of Vietnam on September 2nd. This declaration of independence allowed for the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under a hidden communist government (Summers 20). After the end of World War II, the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 allowed British troops to enter Vietnam. As the British troops entered Saigon on September 12, 1945, the British decided to allow French troops to enter as well. The Vietnamese were infuriated with the British and attempted to resist, but ultimately failed. The newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Vietnam had been taken over by the end of November. In February of 1946, a Franco-Chinese agreement was created allowing France to return to Indochina. Later, another agreement was made to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a “free state”. French hostilities such as a shooting in Haiphong in November 1946 caused problems throughout Vietnam. Because French demands were so undesirable; Ho Chi Minh and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam decided to go to war instead (Summers 20-22). With the Cold War taking place around the world, the First Indochina War began on December 19th, 1946 with the first Viet Minh attack on the French. After the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese became the first country to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the government of Vietnam in January of 1950. Soon after in July of 1950, the Chinese began to supply the Vietnamese with arms to fight against the French. Later in February of 1950, Great Britain and the United States announced their recognition of the State of Vietnam, led by Bao Dai as the official government of Vietnam. Soon after the United States began aiding Bao Dai through the French. A stalemate occurred in 1952, when the American stopped the communist forces from advancing. Talks of peace started to ensue throughout Vietnam between the communist and anti-communist forces (Summers 22-23). In February of 1954, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to meet to discuss a peace treaty. Shortly after the commencement of the Geneva conference on April 26th, 1954, a Franco-Vietnamese declaration was made on April 28th stating that Vietnam is a completely independent state. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu on May 7th became a turning point in the Indochina war due to the conclusive French defeat by Viet Minh forces.
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