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Twenty-five years ago this month, the Vietnam War came to an end with bewildering speed. The Fall of Saigon N April 30, 1975, North Viet- 1972 offensive against the South. The By Walter J. Boyne namese troops accepted the People’s Army of Vietnam needed surrender of Saigon and thus time to recuperate. snuffed out the Republic of OVietnam, humiliating Wash- Thieu’s Gambit ington in the process. Sai- South Vietnam’s president, Ngu- gon, within 24 hours, had become Ho yen Van Thieu, took advantage of Chi Minh City. The surrender of the Hanoi’s decision to refit and re-equip, capital and its prompt renaming—25 extending the South Vietnamese hold years ago this month—became the on territory wherever possible. The ultimate symbol of the failure of US result was that the South Vietnamese policy in Southeast Asia. army was spread out over a large For Americans, that day forever area and by late 1974 was ripe for will be remembered for the spectacle an attack. Its condition was worsened of overcrowded US helicopters flee- by the drying up of US assistance, a ing in a badly timed but well-executed drastic increase in inflation, and, as evacuation, their flight to safety con- always, flagrant corruption. trasting with the terror that gripped The January 1973 Paris peace ac- thousands of loyal South Vietnamese cords led to a near-total withdrawal left to their fates. The media presented of US forces in early 1973. In fall hundreds of wrenching scenes—tiny 1974, leaders in Hanoi had decided After more than two decades of boats overcrowded with soldiers and upon a two-year program to conquer fighting the Communists, the South family members, people trying to the South and unite the two countries Vietnamese army collapsed quickly in force their way onto the US Embassy under Communist rule. Called “Gen- early 1975, setting in motion chaotic grounds, Vietnamese babies being eral Offensive, General Uprising,” evacuations like this one from a roof- passed over barbed wire to waiting the program was designed so that a top in Saigon. hands and an unknown future. series of major military of fensives Saigon fell with bewildering speed. in 1975 would bring the South Viet- After 21 years of struggle against namese population to the point of the Communist forces, the South revolution and permit a conclusive Vietnamese army collapsed in just victory in 1976. weeks into a disorganized mass, un- North Vietnam was well aware able to slow, much less halt, forces of the disarray in American politics from the North. since President Richard M. Nixon’s In nearly 30 years of war, Hanoi had August 1974 resignation, and it de- defeated France and South Vietnam cided to test the waters. In January on the battlefield and the US at the 1975, it conquered Phuoc Long prov- negotiating table. The Communist ince on the border with Cambodia. regime was expert in manipulating North Vietnamese regular units, US opinion. For example, Hanoi had supplemented by local guerrillas, converted its debilitating defeat in routed the South Vietnamese army the 1968 Tet Offensive into a stun- in a mere three weeks. More than ning propaganda victory, one that 3,000 South Vietnamese troops were ultimately drove the United States killed or captured, and supplies worth out of the war. millions were lost to the invaders. Still, North Vietnam had suffered Although Phuoc Long was not par- about 50,000 casualties in Tet and ticularly important in either military was similarly mauled in its spring or economic terms, it was the first 68 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2000 The Fall of Saigon UPI/Corbis–Bettmann AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2000 69 Vietnamese army’s defenses. If it were lost, Communist forces could easily cut South Vietnam in half. North Vietnam disguised its real UPI/Corbis–Bettmann assault by mounting pinprick attacks in the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. Minor though they were, they triggered a panic flight of more than 50,000 refugees that would have immense effect on battles soon to come. Northern forces isolated Ban Me Thuot by cutting off or blocking the main highways to it. On March 10, 1975, three North Vietnamese army divisions, well-equipped with tanks, assaulted the city, which was defended by two reinforced regiments of the 23rd Division. Despite a barrage of 122 mm artillery fire, the South South Vietnamese President Thieu withdrew his forces from the Central Highlands Vietnamese army, commanded by after Ban Me Thuot fell March 12. The North Vietnamese then moved to take over Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, fought well. Pleiku, triggering this exodus of soldiers and civilians. However, they were worn down and, by March 12, Dung had essentially province the North Vietnamese had was modeled on the US Army. It had captured the city. taken since 1972—and it was only about 750,000 troops, of which only It was at Ban Me Thuot that there 80 miles from Saigon. about 150,000 were combat troops. first occurred a phenomenon that This absolutely crucial event was They were well-equipped but poorly would increasingly undermine the scarcely noted in the American news supported, despite the Army’s huge South’s morale. Many of its army media. Washington had pledged to “re- logistics tail. officers used helicopters to pick up spond with decisive military force” to Giap in 1973 had become ill with their families and flee to the south any North Vietnamese violation of the Hodgkin’s disease, and power passed with them. Phu himself fled when 1973 accords. In the end, however, the to his protégé, Van Tien Dung, North the time came. US did nothing at all. Hanoi doubtless Vietnam’s only other four-star gen- South Vietnamese hordes then be- was encouraged to continue. eral. Dung, a short, square-faced gan to flee the countryside, crowding Oddly enough, Thieu was not dis- peasant who had worked his way up the main roads and the pathways in a couraged. That is because he contin- through the ranks, carefully infil- mass exodus for the coast, where they ued to believe in Nixon’s promises, trated his forces so that he was able ultimately jammed seaports seeking even after Nixon had been forced to to set up his headquarters at Loc transport to the south. The refugees resign, and he would continue to be- Ninh, only 75 miles north of Saigon. included not only those civilians lieve in those promises almost to the The elaborate preparations included who had helped the South’s army end, frequently musing about “when construction of an oil pipeline and or the Americans, but also a great the B-52s would return.” telephone grid that was impervious mass who had no reason to expect March 1975 saw Hanoi make its to electronic countermeasures. bad treatment from North Vietnam’s next seriously aggressive move. In Dung dictated tactics designed army. They were simply fleeing in the preceding two years, North Viet- to minimize casualties from the the general panic. nam’s army patiently moved into massed firepower upon which South The refugee crowd had another the South enormous quantities of Viet nam’s army had been trained to characteristic, one that would prove Soviet artillery, surface-to-air mis- rely. Unfortunately for the South to have a disastrous effect upon siles, and armored vehicles, along Vietnamese, their supplies of am- South Vietnamese resistance. South with 100,000 fresh troops. The Paris munition were badly depleted by Vietnamese soldiers were leaving the accords allowed more than 80,000 rampant inflation and severe reduc- line of battle to find their families North Vietnamese regular troops to tions in American aid. and escort them to safety. It was a remain in the South, and their num- natural response to the war, but it bers had already increased to more Final Battle Begins accelerated the dissolution of the than 200,000. Dung arrived at Loc Ninh via the South’s capability to resist. North Vietnamese regular and Ho Chi Minh Trail, now expanded guer rilla forces now numbered some from foot paths to include paved, two- Fatal Error 1 million, despite the heavy losses of lane highways with extensions that Thieu had believed the target of the previous decade. North Viet nam’s reached within 30 miles of Sai gon. Dung’s attack would be Pleiku. He army units, created by Gen. Vo Nguy- His first target was Ban Me Thuot, panicked on learning of the fall of en Giap, were weapons-intensive, a city in the Central Highlands and Ban Me Thuot and on March 14 with few logistics or support person- the capital of Darlac province. It was secretly ordered the withdrawal of nel. In contrast, South Vietnam’s army the absolutely vital link in the South the South’s forces from the Central 70 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2000 Highlands. It was a monumental er- Unlike Kosovo where long-standing Thieu, a tough politician, had an ror, for no plans for the withdrawal ethnic hatred led to the killing of a almost childlike belief that holding had been drawn up, and the orders to few thousands, the slaughter here was these areas would give the United leave simply plunged the remaining between people of the same blood. As States time to exert its military troops into a mass of refugees whose many as 40,000 died on the road. The power and once again force the agonizing journey came to be called situation worsened when renegade North Vietnamese to negotiate. “the convoy of tears.” South Vietnamese army troops also North Vietnamese forces unleashed This flight of refugees was unlike began firing on the refugee columns.

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