Jfqjoint Force Quarterly

JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Center of Gravity

Homeland Security

Consequence Management

Command and Control

Effects-Based Operations

35Issue

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Signal Corps officers like to remind us that “although Congress can make a general, it takes communications to make him a commander.” —Omar N. Bradley

Issue 35 A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY FORCE JOINT JFQ Center of Gravity Homeland Security Consequence Management Command and Control Effects-Based Operations

JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE THIRTY-FIVE JFQ plus JFQ ashington, D.C. Published for the W National Defense University asymmetric warfare, component commands, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff psychological operations, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies and more in issue thirty-six of and more t... the future of Reserve Forces of Reserve the future JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY coming nex ■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman 42 Disengaging from by Richard B. Myers Consequence Management by Joel D. Cusker, Charles H. Hash, 8 From the Field and Fleet: Mary E. Landry, and Dallas D. Owens Letters to the Editor

JFQ 50 Charting New Seas: Navy- JFQ FORUM Coast Guard Cooperation 9 Clausewitz and War by Charles S. Hamilton II and Patrick M. Stillman 10 Center of Gravity: 58 Recommendations for Linking Conventional and Joint Doctrine Special Operations Forces by Ronald S. Mangum by Antulio J. Echevarria II 64 18 Interpreting the Legacy The Evolution of Special of Clausewitz Operations Joint Fires by Eric Braganca by Christopher Bassford

20 Center of Gravity: What MILITARY TRANSFORMATION Clausewitz Really Meant 69 Transforming Joint by Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron Warfighting Capabilities by Scott E. Jasper

28 U.S. Strategic Command— 77 Stepping Outside the Reality Meeting Global Challenges Box by James O. Ellis, Jr. by Mark R. Lewis and John C.F. Tillson

34 The DOD Role in Homeland 83 Information Operations and Security Millennium Challenge by Adrian A. Erckenbrack and by Mark W. Maiers and Aaron Scholer Timothy L. Rahn

PHOTO CREDITS 88 Ground Radar Surveillance and Targeting The cover shows marines firing 155mm howitzer, Iraqi by Price T. Bingham Freedom (U.S. Marine Corps/Andreas A. Plaza). The front inside cover features soldiers in Bradley fighting vehicle, Iraqi Freedom (982d Combat Camera/Lee Davis); USNS 95 Centralized Control/ Spica alongside USS Harry S. Truman, Enduring Freedom (Navy Visual News Service/John L. Beeman); Marine am- Decentralized Execution in phibious vehicles on Splash Beach, Okinawa (1st Marine the Era of Forward Reach Air Wing/Tony Vega); and F–16s over Mediterranean (U.S. by Mark G. Davis Air Force/Mark Bucher). The table of contents depicts accident response exercise (20th Communications Squadron/ Josef Cole). The back inside captures C–17 dispersing 100 Operational Command countermeasure flares (U.S. Air Force). The back cover highlights activities of the Reserve Forces: rehearsing crowd control (Fort McCoy/Lou Ann Mittelstaedt); re- and Control in the fueling F–15s (83d Fighter Squadron/Michael Ammons); conducting weapons Information Age training (Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Brandon A. Teeples); and flying to by Milan N. Vego live fire exercise (16th Special Operation Wing/Greg L. Davis).

2 JFQ / issue thirty-five ISSUE THIRTY-FIVE

129 Trends in Future Warfare by Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Haffa, Jr., and Robert E. Mullins

134 The Other Gulf War: British Intervention in Iraq, 1941 by Douglas Porch

OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 141 Wallace Martin Greene, Jr.

OFF THE SHELF 143 Bombing Serbia into Submission: A Review Essay by Conrad C. Crane

144 Statecraft and Maritime Power: A Book Review 108 Revisiting the Korean by Thomas G. Mahnken Tree-Trimming Incident by Richard A. Mobley 145 Chinese Naval Power: A Book Review 116 The Origins of Effects-Based by Larry M. Wortzel Operations by Phillip S. Meilinger 146 Wars and Rumors of Wars: A Book Review 123 Systems Integration and the by James Jay Carafano New American Way of War by Paul Bracken

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAF Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 148 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm ISSN 1070–0692 Published in October 2004

issue thirty-five / JFQ 3 JFQ AWord fromthe Paratroopers boarding C–130 in Iraq.

Chairman (SuzanneU.S. Air Force M. Jenkins)

ne of my three agenda items as Chair- raised the stakes. Terrorists, who want to under- man is military transformation, an im- mine the very principles on which America is perative that is obviously gaining founded, threaten our security at home and O acceptance across the defense commu- abroad. nity. It is difficult to find an argument for stand- The Armed Forces have many advantages ing still rather than developing new capabilities. over potential enemies: command and control, Yet there are many unresolved issues because logistics, precision weaponry, and professional- clarity on the future environment is lacking. ism. But terrorists pose an unconventional threat Despite such uncertainties, there are many that is highly adaptable and shrewd. For example, capabilities that must be transformed in order to while many al Qaeda leaders have been killed or get to the fight more quickly, achieve better infor- captured, their command and control network mation sharing and command and control, has adjusted. It is necessary to transform in order increase interoperability, and improve interagency to be more agile, responsive, and capable to de- coordination. And while progress on transforma- feat global terrorism. tion in the 1990s was not insignificant, 9/11 (continued on page 4)

issue thirty-five / JFQ 1 ■ Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (continued from page 1) Publisher Experimentation ADVISORY COMMITTEE Transformation has three aspects: technolog- Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF ■ National Defense University ical, intellectual, and cultural. New technology Chairman and weapons systems are important, but old problems also must be approached in new ways— BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman the intellectual piece. And the ways in which or- Maj Gen John J. Catton, Jr., USAF ■ The Joint Staff ganizations interact—components, services, agen-

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College cies, and allies—must change. That is the cultural aspect, which is probably the greatest challenge. RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN ■ Naval Postgraduate School There are real benefits in understanding re- Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF ■ Air War College sistance to change. As part of the CJCS lecture series, I recently invited Hugh O’Neill of the Uni- Col George E. Flemming, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College versity of North Carolina to address the subject of MG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army War College transformation. He has written and lectured

RADM Richard D. Jaskot, USN ■ National War College widely to business and government audiences on the dynamics that make organizations resistant to VADM Timothy J. Keating, USN ■ The Joint Staff change. The key influences that work against Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College change are size, age, and success. Although these

MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA ■ Joint Forces Staff College

RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN ■ Naval War College what defines experimentation BG Volney J. Warner, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is applying scientific method to MajGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces evaluate a concept

EDITORIAL BOARD Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense University factors strike close to home for many of us in uni- Chairman form, O’Neill identified some methods to over- Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University come them. He recommended encouraging innovation and risk-taking by breaking out smaller ■ Col John M. Calvert, USAF Joint Forces Staff College groups that can function separately from the day- Stephen D. Chiabotti ■ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies to-day tasks of the organization. These groups would go outside normal processes to come up Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University with innovative ideas. There is a growing com- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy munity hard at work doing just that. We call Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University them experimenters. Experimenting is not new, especially in ■ Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces wartime. During the Civil War, the Navy built and CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College employed USS Monitor, a ship that was really a floating set of experiments; it had ironclad armor, Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College an innovative hull design, and a moveable gun Daniel T. Kuehl ■ Information Resources Management College turret. Aviation was in its infancy in World War I

Kathleen Mahoney-Norris ■ Air Command and Staff College when the Army Air Corps experimented with observation, aerial gunnery, and bombing. In the Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation Korean War, the Army experimented with combat William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College medical care, aeromedical evacuation by helicopter, and MASH field hospitals, all of which dra- John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago matically reduced combat casualties. LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute What defines experimentation—whether it

Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF ■ Air War College takes place in isolation or as part of an exercise, wargame, or demonstration—is applying scientific COL Robert E. Smith, USA ■ U.S. Army War College method to evaluate a concept. Experiments test LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University ideas by hypothesizing, testing the hypothesis, collecting data, and analyzing results to determine ■ Col Gary West, USAF National War College their validity. By contrast, traditional exercises provide training for commanders, staffs, and units to practice existing doctrine and capabilities. A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

4 JFQ / issue thirty-five Myers Charles B. Johnson) U.S. Army ( Patrolling in Al Fallujah, Iraqi Freedom. The real key to experimentation is risk-tak- force, which became operational at Camp ing. Although the acquisition process attempts to Lejeune. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have 27 mitigate risk by a structured approach and rigor- labs in all, but until recently no one was responsi- ous accountability, experimenters accept a certain ble for coordinating them. Today the joint com- degree of risk. Outcomes are not predetermined; munity is making great strides in linking experi- failure is an option. That amounts to a cultural ments to lessons learned and required joint change for most. For example, in a recent experi- capabilities as well as coordinating experiments ment, an off-the-shelf networking program was among the services and combatant commands. used to link planners. It did not work, so U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), working with Steering the Course the Defense Information Systems Agency, went Last year, JFCOM assumed the lead role in back to the drawing board to find a better tool. military transformation. One of its functions is Even as a formal process to support transfor- issuing the joint concept development and exper- mation, experimentation has been taking place imentation campaign plan, which lays out criteria throughout the Department of Defense for some and priorities for all joint experiments. The com- time. The services have been making progress for mand coordinates experiments with all services, about a decade, and their battle labs have been combatant commands, and other Government experimenting and developing concepts for years. agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investiga- The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, estab- tion, Central Intelligence Agency, and Justice lished in 1995, has developed and fielded a range Department, as well as allied nations. of projects. For example, it designed and tested One task that JFCOM must tackle, along the chemical and biological incident response with other players, is balancing readiness against mid- and long-term transformation. Professor O’Neill suggested ways to have highly independent groups begin transformation experiments,

issue thirty-five / JFQ 5 ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

enormous simulation network. The experiments covered everything from headquarters command and control to individual weapon systems. One concept tested was standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), conceived as a means to provide the combatant commander with a core command and control team, along with collaborative networking capabilities, for joint task force headquarters. The goal is eliminating the spin-up time for ad hoc, service-centric headquarters to respond to contingencies as combined and joint headquarters. Initially, XVIII Airborne Corps had the lead for the SJFHQ experiment, but it could not participate in Millennium Challenge because it was deployed to Afghanistan; III Corps responded in just three weeks. This late change in the game plan actually proved beneficial. Despite short notice, III Corps validated the headquarters concept by becoming operational in only five days. Information sharing was another focus of Millennium Challenge. At one point, 800 people were networked in a collaborative information environment that furnished situation awareness on opposing forces, Web portal to access databases, and a collaborative tool. The prototype system that resulted is about to be fielded in Korea, the Pacific region, and various non-DOD agencies. The air component conducted several experiments within Millennium Challenge, including a program for generating air tasking orders and an improved process for time-sensitive targeting. These capabilities were employed in Iraqi Free- dom, with over 800 time-sensitive targets struck. Experiments went beyond headquarters information systems and strategic and operational processes to tactical aspects of joint warfighting. For example, the Army Stryker Brigade proved its intratheater ability to deploy, flying aboard

U.S. Navy (Todd Flint)U.S. Navy (Todd C–130s to the National Training Center. The USS Theodore brigade is now serving in Iraq. In another exam- Roosevelt, Enduring ple, the Marine Corps experimented with Dragon Freedom. Eye—a five-pound, $70,000 UAV designed to pro- increase efforts within existing organizations fo- vide surveillance and reconnaissance out to six cusing on mid-term modernization, and encour- miles. This vehicle was also employed during age critical thinking to come up with innovative Iraqi Freedom. solutions for the long term. The JFCOM vision of experimentation is strikingly similar, encouraging Enhanced Jointness efforts along two separate paths. The first is The experimentation community is func- aimed at the near term—fielding prototypes tioning in high gear. The JFCOM charter ensures quickly to solve existing problems. The second is that it will not lose sight of its primary objective: aimed at developing innovative concepts and ca- enhanced joint warfighting. As Chairman, I have pabilities for the future. Both are critical. In fight- stressed the need to look beyond the Armed ing the global war on terrorism we must trans- Forces in planning and executing operations to form in midstride, balancing short-term needs bring every instrument of national power to bear with longer-range vision to ensure that we are as in a coherent way. Experimentation is fertile prepared as possible to meet future threats. ground for exercising interagency processes. The Olympic event of experimentation to date was Millennium Challenge in summer 2002, which involved more than 13,500 people and an

6 JFQ / issue thirty-five Myers

global positioning to all weapons delivered by Navy, Marine, and Air Force platforms. In Iraqi Freedom, nearly every air-to-ground fighter and bomber employed JDAM or other precision munitions day or night in any weather. Second, experimenters must share information and stay connected to lessons learned from ongoing operations. Together with the Marine Corps, JFCOM recently hosted Emerald Express. Returning warfighters from five services and several coalition nations met with concept develop- ers to discuss lessons from Iraqi Freedom and generate ideas for future experiments. This is exactly the right approach. Third, experimentation must balance costs and risks against potential benefits. Millennium Challenge cost on the order of $250 million, but it was a needed, innovative set of experiments. Smaller events, whether conducted independently or as part of larger exercises, also play a major role and may provide substantial benefits. U.S. Marine Corps (Kevin R. Reed) Many past experiments were born of neces- Marines crossing river sity. When Americans are engaged in combat, in Iraq. their willingness to take risks at home increases. Millennium Challenge investigated a concept But in times of peace, innovation tends to follow known as the joint interagency coordination a more cautious path. Should a pause occur in the group that provides civilian perspectives and con- global war on terrorism—which may take some tacts to joint task forces. It is being expanded time—experimentation can play an important from an initial focus on counterterrorism to the role in transformation by providing an environ- range of military operations. The day may not be ment for continued risk-taking. too far off when we will include the private sector Innovation is measured by its impact on the in the integration process. environment. In other words, we are looking for Multinational cooperation is important in good ideas with practical applications to solve fighting the global war on terrorism, and JFCOM real-world problems or create new capabilities. experimentation is breaking new ground by test- Above all, experimentation is a means to an end: ing allied participation in collaborative networks. improved joint warfighting. In the last event, the Armed Military transformation has come a long Forces linked with four national way, but the Armed Forces are still organized for experiments are vital in militaries and performed a com- the 20th century. Though it is necessary to be pre- creating momentum and bined operational net assess- pared to defeat conventional threats, terrorism is cutting across barriers ment. This comprehensive different and requires being ready for the un- analysis of enemy capabilities known. Change implies taking risks to provide evaluated not only instruments every possible advantage when going into harm’s of power such as military forces, but networks way. Warfare will always be part art and part sci- and alliances, intellectual and financial resources, ence. Experimentation is one project in which and other national assets. The next multinational scientific methods and creative ideas combine to experiment will involve six nations and focus on generate dramatic results for joint warfighters. combined effects-based planning. Experiments are vital in creating momentum RICHARD B. MYERS and cutting across barriers. However, they are not Chairman the answer to every transformation challenge. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff First, like all new processes and systems, it is necessary to think jointly from the outset. The joint direct attack munition (JDAM) is a success in part because it was born joint. In Desert Storm, less than 10 percent of air-to-ground bombs were laser guided and only 5 percent of air-to-ground fighters could even guide them. After the Persian Gulf War, JDAM kits were developed to provide

issue thirty-five / JFQ 7 ■ You’ re Not from Around Here, Are You? By IKE SKELTON and JIM COOPER commentary

now thy enemy. That adage has been with the two-fingered peace sign, a gesture com- repeated since armies first clashed on monly used by their Croat enemies. And the cir- the field of battle. Understanding cled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to So- K enemy intentions, tactics, and vulner- malis. The military has enough to worry about abilities is an essential part of warfare. But it is without alienating the local population. also necessary to know your friends. Making enemies is easy, but it is harder to make friends. The Afghanistan and Iraq wrong approach to allied or occupied countries Though it may be premature to draw defini- can quickly create enemies. tive lessons from Afghanistan or Iraq, it is clear The United States has not been an occupying that the Armed Forces lack sophisticated knowl- power since immediately after World War II. In edge of foreign countries. That does not dishonor Korea and Vietnam, their performance; cultural awareness is not a rebuilding Iraq may hinge on where the goal was fight- mission-essential task—but it should be. ing and leaving, sensitiv- Winning a conflict means more than subdu- drawing appropriate inferences ity to local culture was ing an enemy. While the U.S. military ran into from ethnic and religious important, although it trouble in the past, it was not because it lacked aspects of its culture was not a long-term con- combat skills, personal courage, or the necessary cern. In Iraq, however, a resources. As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq cultural divide brought have demonstrated, the process of restructuring to the fore issues that three generations of sol- the political order, economy, and social well- diers have considered only peripherally. being of an entire country is as critical as defeat- Operating in a foreign land can be a mine- ing organized resistance. But it is cultural aware- field. Few members of the Armed Forces will be ness that helps determine whether a host familiar with cultural traditions of the countries population supports long-term American military in which they operate. Yet violation of local presence—and may determine the outcome of norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming popula- the mission. tion into a hostile mob. It is uncertain whether the majority of the Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their Iraqi people will support the multinational ef- heads forced to the ground, a position forbidden forts, which many see as responsible for the un- by Islam except during prayers. This action of- rest. Rebuilding Iraq may hinge on drawing ap- fends detainees as well as bystanders. In Bosnia, propriate inferences from ethnic and religious American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them aspects of its culture—including tribal dynamics—and then properly responding to them. Commanders in Iraq have stressed the importance of being aware of these elements of the se- The Honorable Ike Skelton and the Honorable Jim Cooper are members curity landscape. of the House Armed Services Committee.

12 JFQ / issue thirty-six Skelton and Cooper

Flight deck fire training aboard USS John C. Stennis. commentary U.S. Navy (Mark J. Rebilas)

The House Armed Services Committee held a with local civilians who, once insulted or mis- hearing in late 2003 to examine the lessons of treated, either supported active resistance fighters Iraqi Freedom at which Major General Robert or joined them. Moreover, Russian leaders real- Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), highlighted the requirement ized that they had underestimated the influence for cultural awareness among both civilian and of religion in the region. military personnel. His testimony emphasized that had American planners better understood Cultural Awareness Iraqi culture, efforts to win the peace would have Understanding the culture and social factors been more sound. Senior officials and command- peculiar to the countries in which Americans are ers might have reached a different conclusion on most likely to be deployed will make the environ- the willingness of Iraqis to welcome the U.S. mili- ment work to U.S. advantage. On the lowest tary for an extended period of reconstruction. level, awareness means knowing enough about Events during Uphold Democracy further local culture to permit military personnel to oper- emphasized cultural differences: ate effectively. Along with linguistic capability, The Army in general had little appreciation of cultural awareness can highlight political, social, Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew any- and other characteristics of the operational area. thing about Haiti other than its basic geography. In a It can explain why local people may see things combat operation, where overwhelming firepower differently from Americans. It can enable troops achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local popula- on the ground to understand how their attitudes tion’s culture and traditions clearly is not a top prior- and actions directly influence mission outcome. ity. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy, The Armed Forces often operate as part of however, knowledge of how a people think and act, coalitions and alliances. Nations cannot work to- and how they might react to military intervention, ar- gether without recognizing their cultural differ- guably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture ences—where the other guy is coming from. That in general focuses on training warriors to use fire and awareness becomes even more important over maneuver and tends to resist the notion of culture time. It is not a touchy-feely or nice-to-have so- awareness.1 cial grace; it is basic intelligence on attitudes and potential actions of host nations and coalition The need for cultural awareness is not partners. Only such insights can enable the mili- unique to the American military. Russian soldiers tary to understand other cultures. in Chechnya made cultural blunders in dealing

issue thirty-six / JFQ 13 ■ YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE

A combat brigade would not be deployed into hostile territory without maps. The beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The unit should have those coordinates as well. Defining the Need Predeployment preparations must include cultural awareness training. Just as personnel are trained in specific tactics, they should be provided an understanding of the environment where they will operate. The ability of deployed personnel to draw inferences from experience or study could contribute decisively to the national strategy. General Scales describes the operational en-

commentary vironment and importance of cultural awareness: The image of sergeants and captains acting alone in the Afghanistan wilderness and the sands of Iraq, innovating on the fly with instruments of strate-

U.S. Army (Gul A. Alisan) gic killing power, reaffirms the truth that today’s lead- Soldiers departing for ers must acquire the skills and wisdom to lead indi- Afghanistan. rectly at a much lower level. Today‘s tactical leaders The 1940 Marine Corps manual on insur- must be able to act alone in ambiguous and uncertain gency noted that: circumstances, lead soldiers they cannot touch, think so as to anticipate the enemy’s actions—they must be The motive in small wars is not material de- tactically proactive rather than reactive.3 struction. It is usually a project dealing with social, economic, and political development of the people. It The need for cultural awareness extends be- is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be de- yond the foxhole. Senior officers must create an rived from the psychological aspects of the situation. appropriate command climate. Civilian officials That implies a serious study of the people, their need to be culturally aware in developing policy racial, political, religious, and mental development. and strategy. They must know that imposing By analysis and study the reasons for the existing American values on unwilling people in a foreign emergency may be deduced; the most practical country may have undesired strategic and opera- method of solving the problem is to understand the tional consequences. Deployed personnel must possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be have sufficient awareness in theaters where am- expected from any actions which may be contem- biguous and contradictory situations are the plated. By this study and ability to apply correct psy- norm. And because of the reliance on the Reserve chological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and components, they must have similar training. the success of the undertaking assured.2 At a minimum, training on cultural awareness should occur on two levels. The first would Stability operations and postconflict recon- be focused on planners. As an interim measure, struction are among the major challenges facing programs for flag and field grade officers would the military in the post-Cold War world. This was be appropriate, along with greater emphasis on clear even before cultural awareness in curricula at both the staff personnel must have awareness Afghanistan and Iraq— and war college levels. As soon as practical, that two battlefronts in the in theaters where ambiguous training should be extended to all officers. global war on terrorism. One report on the experiences of general of- and contradictory situations are The Army and Ma- ficers who served in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti the norm rine Corps have a his- noted the need for additional training. tory of conducting such operations under the Greater emphasis must be placed on geopolitical rubric of low intensity conflict and military opera- and cultural training for the Army‘s officer corps. tions other than war. Operations in the Philippines Such training must begin at the officer basic course from 1899 to 1903 and in Haiti from 1994 to and continue at all levels of professional military edu- 1995 also offer examples of partial success in such cation. Officers at all grades will benefit from such efforts. Other than foreign area officers, defense training because of the likelihood that they will be in- attachés, and Special Forces, there is insufficient volved in peace operations on multiple occasions 4 cultural awareness and linguistic skill among throughout their careers. commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

14 JFQ / issue thirty-six Skelton and Cooper

Marines landing in amphibious exercise. commentary U.S. Navy (Terry M. Matlock)U.S. Navy (Terry

Training should be comprehensive and of- no real conduit down to company and platoon levels, fered to both the active and Reserve components. and perhaps most important, to the individual soldier. The ideal program would reward continued learn- In most organizations of the conventional infantry ing and require that officers get an early start on force, there is no foreign area officer or civil affairs of- becoming indirect leaders. Unit leaders would ficer who specializes in these matters to fill the gap. mentor their performance while undergoing in- Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well instruction. Both the classroom and distance learn- formed in these facets of operations, it is often the ing would stretch across career assignments. The company commander, platoon leader, or squad leader curriculum would be historically based and thor- who finds himself...dealing with the civilian popu- oughly joint. lace day by day.5 The second tier involves language and area studies. Commissioned and noncommissioned A Matter of Timing leaders must possess some language skills and un- Cultural awareness must be taught on the derstanding of nations to which they are de- primary level. And knowing your enemy should ployed. This sort of training results in street be accompanied by knowing your friends. More- sense—knowing how to gather intelligence from over, educational and training programs should local people. That can only happen with cultural focus on those regions likely to pose threats to awareness. It is the level on which simple linguis- national security and cultures vital to long-term tic skills are essential: Halt, lay down your weapon. strategic relationships. But it is better to warn of the likely consequences Mandating cultural awareness training is eas- of such interactions with locals. ier than implementing it. First, identifying which Compared to education, training involves cultures to study and what level of proficiency to imparting specific skills. It can be prepackaged attain is demanding. There is no one-size-fits-all and offered throughout a career. It is part of the answer to cultural awareness. Nonspecific theories daily military routine. As one officer described his on cultural contexts can be detrimental, and gen- experience in Bosnia: eralizing cultural characteristics can be deceptive. Specialists are assigned to ensure the command- Americans are often direct in their conversations, ers are politically astute, historically aware, and cul- expecting the truth with no hint of deception. At the turally sensitized. Unfortunately, this information has

issue thirty-six / JFQ 15 ■ YOU’RE NOT FROM AROUND HERE

Crew chiefs performing final checks on F–15. commentary U.S. Air Force (Verlin Levi Collins)U.S. Air Force

same time, Americans also tend to be uncomfortable teaches that cultural awareness is a force multi- with silent moments. People in some other countries, plier. It is the time to be serious about enhancing though, may prefer not to be direct and may shift our knowledge of today’s world. The Armed their eyes away from the American...a person who is Forces are busier than ever before, but they are reluctant to maintain eye contact is called shifty-eyed not too busy to be culturally aware. JFQ and arouses suspicion. But in some countries an attempt to maintain eye contact may be perceived as a NOTES sign of aggression. Accordingly, in Japan, South 1 Walter B. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T. Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian countries, maintain- Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise ing eye contact is not an acceptable behavior. On the History of the U.S. Army Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort other hand, in Saudi Arabia, eye contact and gestures Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General of openness are important and could facilitate com- Staff College, 1998), p. 188. munications.6 2 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washing- ton: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 18. Predeployment training focuses on the cur- 3 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), rent military situation for all the obvious reasons. letter to the Honorable Ike Skelton, June 12, 2003. But cultural awareness training must be accom- 4 U.S. Institute for Peace, Alternative National Military plished on a regular basis and well in advance. Strategies for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Thus that knowledge must already be in place be- Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, fore it is time to go. 2000), p. 6. 5 Joel B. Krauss, “Cultural Awareness in Stability and The national security strategy envisions a Support Operations,” Infantry, vol. 89, no. 1 (January/ more assertively expeditionary military. Over the April 1999), p. 15. 6 Gary Bonvillian and William A. Nowlin, “Cultural last two decades, extended coalition operations Awareness: An Essential Element of Doing Business have become the norm. This requires operational Abroad,” Business Horizons, vol. 37, no. 6 (November/ planning that recognizes the importance of cul- December 1994), p. 45. tural awareness. If implemented, integrated training to develop such awareness will have lasting, This article is also published as chapter 12 in Ike Skelton, positive effects for plans, actionable intelligence, Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era and the credibility of U.S. objectives. Experience (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), pp. 131–37.

16 JFQ / issue thirty-six

9 Center of Gravity Lock) (JeremyCombat Camera Squadron T. st 1 Recommendations for Joint Doctrine By ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

dvanced by Carl von Yet after more than two decades of Clausewitz, the concept of controversy, the meaning of center of center of gravity is a pop- gravity remains unsettled. Fortunately, A ular strategic theory. Mili- some of the confusion can be elimi- tary transformation assigns a dominated by returning to its original nant role in doctrine to this concept sense. Both the concept and its ana- despite its roots in the industrial age. logue in the mechanical sciences have common properties: neither is a source of strength, but rather a point at which physical and psychological Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is director of national security forces meet. As a result, doctrine affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College and the should be revised—in particular, Joint author of After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War. Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,

10 JFQ / issue thirty-five Echevarria and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Stryker brigade at Campaign Planning, to establish a clear National Training understanding of the meaning of cen- Center. ter of gravity. Joint Doctrine Each service has applied the concept of center of gravity differently. The Army and Navy typically thought in terms of a single center of gravity, which resided at the core of landpower or seapower and provided the source of physical and psychological capacity to fight. The Air Force, on the other hand, envisioned multiple centers, each targeted from the air to paralyze an enemy. The Marine Corps, which con- Public Affairs Detachment (RhondaPublic Affairs M. Lawson)

ducts forcible entry operations, has th long regarded center of gravity as a crit- 28 ical vulnerability. Thus the concept has assumed many guises over the years. In the mid-1990s the military at- tactical centers facilitates tactical ob- or national strategy. On the opera- tempted to consolidate individual serv- jectives that contribute to the defeat of tional and tactical levels, they would ice perspectives into a single definition operational centers and assist in generally consist of principal sources that asserts that the essence of the op- of combat power erational art resides in massing effects Joint Pub 5-00.1 stresses the importance such as modern, mo- against enemy sources of power—cen- bile, or armored ters of gravity—to gain a decisive ad- of linking centers to critical vulnerabilities forces that can assure vantage. Joint Pub 3-0 defined centers or prevent mission as “characteristics, capabilities, or loca- achieving operational objectives and accomplishment. In other words, Joint tions from which a military force de- so on until national security objectives Pub 3-0 strove for consensus by draw- rives its freedom of action, physical are reached. On the strategic level, cen- ing together service predilections. In strength, or will to fight.” It also im- ters might include military forces, al- doing so, however, it defined centers plied that centers exist for every level lies, national will, critical capabilities, broadly and offered no method for de- and type of war. Presumably, defeating termining them. Joint Pub 5-00.1, which appeared in January 2002, builds on Joint Pub 3-0 and provides a general method for Washington at determining centers of gravity. It de- Princeton. fines the concept like Joint Pub 3-0, except that locations is replaced by sources of strength. In addition, it states that centers consist of “those aspects of the adversary’s overall capability that, theo- retically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will lead either to the adversary’s inevitable defeat or force opponents to abandon aims or change behavior.” Thus it is a capabilities-based definition that is derived from the sum of enemy capabilities despite terms such as characteristics and sources of power. Moreover, Joint Pub 5-00.1 stresses the importance of linking centers to critical vulnerabilities, enabling an attack through weak points in the overall system. Similar to the approach adopted by the Marine Corps, centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities Painted by D. McLellan (DVIC/NARA)

issue thirty-five / JFQ 11 ■ JFQ FORUM

Recommendations for Joint Doctrine

■ To align the definition of center of gravity with the Clausewitzian concept and bring it back under control, doctrine in general and Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.1 in particular should redefine it as focal point—the element with centripetal force to hold everything together and provide raw power, purpose, and direction. ■ Planners should refrain from applying the concept to every kind of war or operation to reduce competition with political-military objectives. We must ask whether the total military collapse of an enemy is commensurate with our political objectives and endstate. ■ If total collapse is desired, planners should identify the connections and gaps in an entire enemy structure or system before deciding whether a center of gravity exists. The concept does not apply where the enemy is not connected enough to act with unity. Also, given the anticipated proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons, there could be times when it is dangerous to assume that individual enemy segments can be defeated by a single knockout blow. If several al Qaeda cells were armed with such weapons, for instance, striking one could trigger massive retaliation. Continued proliferation and information technologies could make the concept of center of gravity academic in the future. ■ Employing the concept means learning to think more about the desired effects and less about capabilities to be destroyed, all without denigrating the importance of those capabilities. ■ Centers of gravity can change during a conflict if, for example, allies enter or leave the fight, or other changes occur within the combatants’ power structures. We must therefore reassess any previous determination of a center. We should reevaluate whether we need to attack centers that are so transitory they can quickly be replaced. Perhaps we have only found a center of critical capability. ■ Resist dissecting an enemy into tactical, operational, and strategic centers of gravity. Efforts and intermediate objectives should largely be focused on destroying the center. Creating subunits is artificial unless an enemy is too dispersed or decentralized to have a dominant center of gravity. Then it may be possible to trace individual centers to a central one. JFQ

are regarded as different but comple- centers of gravity in relationship to ca- centers for Strange are important be- mentary ideas. Identifying the latter pabilities, requirements, and vulnera- cause of their critical capabilities. Al- will focus efforts on something that bilities. Key combat forces, for exam- though this approach can link critical can achieve decisive results. Critical ple, may be centers if they possess strengths or capabilities to critical vul- vulnerabilities will provide knowledge critical capabilities. Those capabili- nerabilities, it will bring planners to on attacking centers of gravity, but as ties—to shoot, move, and communi- an actual enemy center of gravity as one military analyst explained, using cate—have critical requirements such opposed to a center of critical capabil- this concept in planning “leads you to as open lines of communication that ity only by coincidence. see very quickly that some vulnerabili- enable them to continue operating. A The definition in Joint Pub 5-00.1 ties are interesting but a waste of re- requirement that is inadequately pro- and its approach to determining cen- sources because they do not lead any- tected—such as enemy lines of com- ters of gravity thus begs the question: where useful in the end.”1 munication near Inchon during the Why not just call centers of critical ca- The process described in Joint Pub Korean War—constitutes a critical vul- pabilities what they are?—critical cen- 5-00.1 does not lead to center of grav- nerability. Neutralizing critical vulner- ters or critical points. Although identi- ity, but rather to a set of critical capa- abilities would contribute to defeating fying enemy centers of critical bilities. It seems to rely on an ap- the enemy center of gravity. capabilities can be useful, as will be proach developed by Joseph Strange, Strange links centers of gravity to seen in the definition by Clausewitz, who concluded that service definitions critical vulnerabilities in a way that an enemy might not have a center—at lacked precision and tended to equate war planners can put into practice. least not one that can be attacked. In centers of gravity with physical vulner- However, since any number of “dy- those cases one should focus on de- abilities or strengths without enough namic agents of action or influence” stroying critical capabilities. It stands attention to psychological centers of can exist in a given battlespace, his ap- to reason that neutralizing them will power.2 To redress that notion, Strange proach does not focus resources on el- eventually lead to accomplishing ob- redefined centers as “dynamic agents ements that will prove decisive. His jectives. of action or influence,” as specific methodology lacks criteria for deter- “moral, political, and physical entities mining what makes one dynamic The Clausewitzian Concept that possess certain characteristics and agent more important than another. The Prussian philosopher of war capabilities, or benefit from a given lo- Moreover, since he does not build on apparently derived his concept of cen- cation/terrain.” Moreover, he defined the Clausewitzian definition, in which ter of gravity in part from Paul Erman, center of gravity serves as a focal point, his interpretation is capabilities-based and tautological. In fact,

12 JFQ / issue thirty-five Echevarria

latter. Directing a blow with enough Guided missile cruisers. force against the center of gravity of an infantryman could lay him low regardless of his strengths and weaknesses because this center is connected to his physical characteristics. Most definitions of the concept of center of gravity are based on the

center of gravity connects various strengths of the soldier without being a strength itself

translation of On War by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, especially book six (Defense) and book eight (War Plans). It is “always found where the mass is concentrated most densely,” serves as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends,” and emerges from the “dominant characteristics of both belligerents.”3 Unfortunately, this version creates a false impression that centers of gravity are akin to sources of strength: The first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone. The attack on these sources must be compressed into the fewest possible actions—again, ideally, into one....The task of reducing the sources of enemy strength to a single center of gravity will depend on: 1) the distribution of the enemy’s political power . . . 2) the situation in the theater of war where the various armies are operating.4 A closer look at the German origi-

U.S. Navy (Daniel J. McLain) nal reveals that Clausewitz never used source (Quelle). Instead he advised tracing the full weight (Gewicht) of an enemy force (Macht) to as few centers a physicist who taught at the Univer- fall. Center of gravity is therefore not a of gravity as possible. Like the example sity of Berlin and Allgemeine Kriegs- source of strength but a factor of bal- of physics, center of gravity connects schule (war college). Clausewitz was di- ance. The strength of an infantryman, various strengths of the soldier with- rector of the latter institution from for example, can be attributed to his out being a strength itself. A more lit- 1818 to 1830 and exchanged ideas on muscles, brains, or weapons in any eral translation is: the mechanical sciences with Erman. combination, but it relates to center of For Clausewitz and his contempo- gravity only so far as he needs to be ...to trace the full weight [Gewicht] of raries, center of gravity represented the balanced to use them. Conversely, a the enemy’s force [Macht] to as few cen- point where the forces of gravity con- soldier might be physically frail, intel- ters of gravity as possible, when feasible, verge within an object in the context lectually challenged, or lack for to one; and, at the same time, to reduce of modern elementary physics. Striking weaponry, but these conditions have the blow against these centers of gravity to an object with enough force will usu- little effect on his equilibrium. Strictly as few major actions as possible, when ally cause it to lose its equilibrium and speaking, a center is neither a strength feasible, to one.... nor a weakness, though striking it can compromise the former or exploit the

issue thirty-five / JFQ 13 ■ JFQ FORUM

Amphibious assault vehicles.

Battle of New Orleans. Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Brien Aho)

Reducing the enemy’s force to one as a single entity. If center of gravity depends, first, upon the so, we should look [enemy’s] political connectivity [or unity] for connections itself . . . and, second, upon the situation among its parts to in the theater of war itself, and which of discover what holds the various enemy armies appear there.5 them together. In 1809, for example,

Enemy Cohesion Lithograph by Kurz and Allison (DVIC/NARA) Napoleon had to References to center of gravity in fight on two fronts: the text indicate that the concept re- against Anglo-Span- mains valid only when an enemy has can apply the concept. Accordingly, there ish forces in Spain and the Austrians in sufficient unity or interdependence exist within these forces certain centers of Central Europe. Although they had a (Zusammenhang) to act as a single body. gravity which, by their movement and di- common enemy, the Anglo-Spanish Just as the center of gravity is always rection, exert a decisive influence over all and Austrians did little to coordinate found where the mass is most concen- other points; and they exist where the their efforts. Hence it would have been trated, and just as every blow directed forces are most concentrated. However, correct for Napoleon to look for two against the body’s center of gravity yields just as in the world of inanimate bodies centers of gravity, one on each front. the greatest effect, and—more to the where the effect on a center of gravity has As Clausewitz stated, the degree of point—the strongest blow is the one deliv- its proportions and limits determined by unity formed by forces and the geo- ered by the center of gravity, the same is the interdependence of the parts, the same graphical spaces in which they have to 6 true in war. The armed forces of every is true in war. fight can create more than one center. combatant, whether an individual state or In other words, before applying He advocated tracing multiple centers an alliance of states, have a certain unity the concept to war planning, one must of gravity back to a single one. Yet he and thus a certain interdependence [or determine whether an enemy will act allowed that a lone center of gravity connectivity—Zusammenhang]; and might not exist. The key question, where such interdependence exists, one

14 JFQ / issue thirty-five Echevarria then, is whether enemy forces are con- Schwarzenberg [100,000 versus not strictly a source of power. Rather, it nected sufficiently so actions against 140,000], was nonetheless the more is a focal point for drawing power from them in one area will have a decisive important adversary due to his enter- various sources: population (recruits), effect in other areas. prising spirit; hence, the center of industry (weapons and matériel), and Second, center of gravity refers to gravity lay more with him and it agriculture (food). The same holds true an element that holds enemy forces to- pulled the others in his direction.”8 In for the personalities of leaders, capital, gether or, in other words, serves as a the actual campaign, Napoleon (with or alliance networks, which draw raw focal point. Indeed, this becomes clear 75,000 men) defeated the Prussians, power and then refine and redirect it. in a popular passage from book eight then turned on the Austrians and which actually described center of drove them back. Nonetheless, Blücher Cause and Effect gravity as it applies to war plans: and Schwarzenberg recovered and Center of gravity focuses on What theory can admit to thus far is the bested Bonaparte a month later. achieving a specific effect: collapse of following: Everything depends upon keep- Clausewitz argued that Napoleon an enemy. Hence it is an effects-based ing the dominant characteristics of both should have pursued and crushed rather than capabilities-based ap- states in mind. From these emerge a cer- Blücher—the allied center. Such a vic- proach. These approaches are linked. tain center of gravity, a focal point [Zen- tory would have induced the Austrians Attacking specific capabilities produces trum] of force and movement, upon to withdraw. Like mechanical sciences, certain effects. Achieving them often which the larger whole depends; and, it military centers have a centripetal requires attacking specific capabilities. is against the enemy’s center of gravity quality; they represent a focal point Indeed, one could say that these ap- that the collective blow of all power must where forces come together. proaches represent two sides of the be directed.7 Clausewitz provided several exam- same coin. In the capabilities-based ap- ples of focal points. The centers of proach, the first step is identifying key To find a center in any particular gravity of Alexander the Great, Gus- enemy strength that could prevent one situation, one must look for whatever tavus Adolphus, Charles XII of Swe- from achieving his objective. In the ef- provides an enemy with a certain cen- den, and Frederick the Great rested fects-based approach, the first step is tripetal (center-seeking) force as op- with their armies. Under different cir- identifying the desired effect and deter- posed to centrifugal force, which is cumstances, the personalities of lead- mining what actions are needed. Fre- outward-seeking. Clausewitz pointed ers, capital, or network of allies and quently such actions might go beyond out that in the campaign against their community of interests might fill neutralizing or destroying specific capa- France in 1814, the allied center of that function. What these elements bilities. The capabilities-based approach gravity lay more with the Prussians share in common is not that they are seeks a negative aim, destroying a capa- under Field Marshal Blücher than the sources of power; rather they perform a bility. The effects-based approach pur- Austrians under Prince Schwarzenberg. centripetal function that holds systems sues a positive aim, creating a certain Blücher, “although weaker than of power together and in some cases effect. The Armed Forces have gotten provides direction. But military force is into the habit of narrowly focusing on the former but could benefit from the broader approach of the latter. In one sense, the Clausewitzian effects-based center of gravity resembles an emerging concept known as effects-based operations more than the current capabilities-based notion, with the exception that only one particular effect is sought—total collapse of an enemy. For Clausewitz, the effect and the objective—total collapse—were always the same. Effects-based operations have the benefit of forcing political and military leaders to focus on the specific effects they want military and nonmilitary action to achieve. Like effects-based operations, center of gravity requires the ability to reasonably predict how to achieve at least first- and second-order effects and possibly more. Yet the Prussian considered the calculation of a center of gravity a Marching into Mexico City. matter of “strategic judgment” on the Painting by Tom Lovell (DVIC/NARA) Painting by Tom

issue thirty-five / JFQ 15 ■ JFQ FORUM highest levels. Given his distaste for of gravity should have a unifying effect translating strategic objectives—the ex- prescriptive formulae, it is doubtful he on tactical, operational, and strategic pulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and reduc- would have approved of current efforts efforts. Dividing centers of gravity into tion of enemy offensive capabilities— to make such calculations by means of tactical, operational, and strategic ele- into operational and tactical objectives information technology and software. ments only leads to centers of critical should have given Coalition forces all On the other hand, he would certainly capability. the necessary operational guidance. have supported educating leaders to Clausewitz emphasized that cen- This is not to say that the concept only develop their strategic judgment in ters of gravity should only be sought applies in wars of annihilation; but it order to make such determinations. in wars designed to defeat an enemy is neither appropriate nor necessary in That theme runs throughout On War. completely. Only vast energy and re- all cases. Moreover, Clausewitz did not dis- sources aimed at decisive victory cause tinguish between tactical, operational, such centers and their areas of influ- Determining Centers or strategic centers of gravity. Center is ence to emerge. In such wars, military Defining center of gravity is only and political objectives—the total half of the battle. Planners must find a center is defined in terms of the political and military defeat of an practical way to determine the center entire system or structure of enemy—essentially complement for specific enemies. The method each other. To achieve the total should be simple, in keeping with the an enemy, not by a level of war collapse of an enemy, one should Clausewitzian dictum that in war even strike at its center. In limited wars, the simplest thing is difficult; yet it defined in terms of the entire system on the other hand, centers compete should use the best intelligence avail- or structure of an enemy, not by a level with the typically more restricted po- able and accommodate revision as the of war. A soldier can have only one at a litical objectives. For example, the result of rigorous analysis. time. Accordingly, a local commander ground component planning staff of Determine whether identifying and might determine a center for enemy U.S. Central Command spent more ef- attacking a center of gravity is appropriate forces directly opposing him, provid- fort in trying to identify the Iraqi cen- for the war being waged. The campaign ing that the forces are sufficiently re- ter of gravity during the Persian Gulf against al Qaeda, though part of the moved from their comrades. However, War than planning its defeat. Ironi- larger global war on terrorism, is essen- this separate center would only be cally, under the Clausewitz concept, tially a conflict that cannot end with- local rather than either tactical or op- that determination would have been out neutralizing or destroying that erational. To isolate such a center, lev- unnecessary since Desert Storm was group; hence the identification and els of war would have to exist inde- not a war of annihilation. Simply pursuit of center of gravity serves a pendently. Using the concept of center constructive purpose. Determine whether the enemy structure or system is sufficiently connected to be treated as a single body. Al Qaeda has Rough Riders on numerous cells globally, and most do San Juan Hill. not know the others exist. Some of these cells or individuals within them appear to have been linked to group leadership by networked electronic communications. Messages and commands were thus passed via the Inter- net, cellular phones, and other electronic devices. It is also possible that some cells have orders and will attempt to execute them at a certain time and place if they receive no guidance to the contrary. Thus the physical links are intermittent at best. Success- ful operations against cells in Europe will not likely cause those in Singapore to collapse. The group’s psychological links appear strong. If cells are not well linked physically, they have strong ideological ties. Perhaps we should seek an ideological center of gravity. Determine what element has centripetal force to hold the system together. U.S. Army (William Dinwiddie)

16 JFQ / issue thirty-five Echevarria

Last shot fired. U.S. Army (Morris Finebuerg)

One ideological element appears to that defeat will mean employing the NOTES have sufficient centrifugal force to bind diplomatic and informational ele- al Qaeda: avowed hatred of apostasy. It ments of national power as deliber- 1 Huba Wass de Czege, “Clausewitz: His- is probably that loathing, rooted in a ately as the military one. It will also re- torical Theories Remain Sound Compass radical Islam, that serves as center of quire the support of moderate Islam. References: The Catch Is Staying on Course,” Army, vol. 38, no. 9 (September gravity rather than Osama bin Laden. 1988), p. 42. While he admittedly laid much of the The Armed Forces have reached a 2 Joe [Joseph L.] Strange, Centers of Grav- groundwork to establish al Qaeda, it critical point. On the one hand, the ity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the does not appear that his removal will concept of center of gravity could be Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All bring collapse. Most intelligence ana- replaced by center of criticality to more Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on lysts claim that even if bin Laden was accurately represent its original mean- Warfighting Series, no. 4, 2d ed. (Quantico, captured or killed, someone would re- ing. Then center of gravity can be Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1996). place him. He can only be more or less deleted from the military lexicon. On 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited effective. Thus leadership really the other hand, if the concept is re- and translated by Michael Howard and amounts to a center of critical capabil- tained to focus on an element that Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 485–86, 595–96. ity; it is an element that should be neu- compels an enemy to collapse, center 4 Clausewitz, On War, p. 617. In fairness tralized, but its absence will not end of gravity should be redefined to mean to Howard and Paret, their translation is the war in itself. focal point. By choosing the latter more interpretive than literal by their own Instead, the hatred of apostasy path, planners would be better posi- admission. They could not have foreseen draws raw power—recruits, money, tioned to incorporate ideas such as ef- the extent to which the U.S. military would and support of other states—and moti- fects-based operations. But the concept take their interpretation of center of gravity vates members to wage a particular must be applied judiciously. At a time literally. style of asymmetric warfare. Thus deci- when an enemy can operate in a de- 5 See Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, th sive defeat will require neutralizing centralized manner globally, certain 19 ed. (Regensburg, Germany: Pustet, that center. However, accomplishing situations may arise in which the idea 1991), pp. 1009–10. 6 Ibid., pp. 810–11. does not apply and pursuing it will not 7 Ibid., pp. 595–96. benefit warfighters. JFQ 8 Ibid., p. 324.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 17 Interpreting the Legacy of Clausewitz

By CHRISTOPHER BASSFORD

hen Clausewitz wrote including chance, individual and orga- his famous opus, On nizational mindsets are quickly over- War, little did he real- whelmed and events tend to escape W ize that a new industry control. Consequently, he sought to had been born. Interpreting, reinter- identify key variables and explore their preting, and artfully refining—not to complex relationships, for “in war mention plagiarizing—his ideas on war more than in any other subject...the has been a minor but profitable cot- part and the whole must always be tage industry ever since. thought of together.” It is easy as well Clausewitz knew the limits on in- as dangerous to be mesmerized by dis- tellectualizing about war; his concept crete, equivocal Clausewitzian terms, of friction applies not only to the prac- such as real war, culminating point, criti- tical conduct of war, but also to the cal analysis, or center of gravity, and lose difficulty of thinking clearly about it. track of their connectivity. Like dispu- Because war involves many variables, tations among theologians over matters of faith, some analysts become lost in theoretical hair-splitting and an at- Christopher Bassford teaches at the National War College and is the author of tempt to overdefine principles that, by Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, their very nature, are mutable and de- 1815–1945. pendent on the context.

18 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bassford

France, 1944. U.S. Army

But it is inevitable that all the terminology and technical expressions of a given [theoretical] system will lose what meaning they have, if any, once they are torn from their context and used as general axioms or nuggets of truth that are sup- posed to be more potent than a simple statement. Clausewitz was interested in fun- —Carl von Clausewitz damental truths on war. He sought to develop concepts of universal applica- bility to the past and an unpredictable future, while most analysts are concerned with the political-military is- that these elements had become fatally There is nothing wrong with such sues of the day, tending to narrow and disconnected during the Vietnam con- an intellectual evolution, for one must redefine concepts in specialized ways. flict was helpful in provoking reform always adapt to the task at hand. A classic case is the adaptation of the in the military. But the simplified Nonetheless, it is always necessary to concept of trinity by Harry Summers in model of people, army, and govern- be mindful of the context and inten- the aftermath of the Vietnam War. ment offers little guidance for action tions of a theoretician. The latest chap- Clausewitz argued that the course of in the world today. ter in the what-Clausewitz-really- war is driven by complex and inher- Similar accounts can be found of meant debate can be revealing, as ently unpredictable interactions that other isolated concepts in On War, illustrated by the two accompanying occur as conflicting human intentions, helping to explain how this Prussian articles in this issue of Joint Force Quar- driven by rational calculation (policy) military philosopher, long since dead, terly. But it can also inflict elaborate and violent, irrational emotion, hit the managed to evolve from being the unspoken assumptions and produce proverbial fan of reality. Addressing apostle of total war during the 1920s rigid tools exquisitely overadapted for the crisis in the 1970s, Summers recast to the preeminent strategist of limited a global security environment that that dynamic trinity as a fixed, trian- war by the 1970s. has vanished. JFQ gular relationship among “people, army, and government.” Recognizing

issue thirty-five / JFQ 19 Big Three at Yalta.

Center of Gravity U.S. Army What Clausewitz Really Meant By JOSEPH L. STRANGE and RICHARD IRON

he Armed Forces have come Staff Officer’s Guide, multiple centers of a long way in understand- gravity may exist on a given level of ing centers of gravity and warfare and change during a campaign, T critical vulnerabilities. The sometimes unexpectedly when an former are equated to strength; the lat- enemy shifts “the weight of its attack, ter to weakness. As stated in The Joint thus uncovering or relying on a previously unforeseen center of gravity.” Nevertheless, ambiguities abound. Joseph L. Strange is professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College That same publication contains the fol- and has taught at the Air War College; Colonel Richard Iron, British Army, heads lowing statement: “Centers of gravity the doctrine branch in the Directorate of Land Warfare at the Joint Service Com- are the characteristics, capabilities, or mand and Staff College and has commanded an armored infantry battalion. locations from which a military force

20 JFQ / issue thirty-five Strange and Iron

Beachhead on Okinawa. U.S. Coast Guard

derives its freedom of action, physical our enemy to do our will,” which en- Misunderstanding Book Eight 1 strength, or will to fight. On the strate- tails a “collision of two living forces.” In book six (Defense), Clausewitz gic level, centers of gravity might in- Much of the work is focused on war as offers a clear discussion of opposing clude a military force, an alliance, a set a clash between armed forces and the armies as centers of gravity. But in book of critical capabilities or functions, or use of physical force to “throw an op- eight (War Plans), he applies the term national strategy itself.” According to ponent” to break his will to resist. to the broader realm of national and this definition a military force cannot Chapter 27 in book six develops “the coalition (or grand) strategy, as op- be a center of gravity, yet it is cited as nature and effect of a center of grav- posed to the operational and tactical an example. It also presents a choice ity” in the context of “several theaters levels. On the strategic level, the army among characteristic, capability, or lo- of operation” in which “division of may be just one among several centers cation, when in reality all three exist si- forces then becomes inevitable....A of gravity: “In countries subject to do- multaneously in mutual dependency. A center of gravity is always found where mestic strife, the center of gravity is force operating in a given location is the mass is concentrated most densely. generally the capital. In small countries ineffective without essential character- It presents the most effective target for that rely on large ones, it is usually the istics and capabilities. Moreover, the a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow army of their protector. Among al- use of terms such as foundation of capa- is that struck by the center of gravity.” liances, it lies in the community of in- bility, hub of all power and movement, Clausewitz drove to the heart of the terest, and in popular uprisings it is the and dominant characteristics is ambigu- matter in chapter 28: “A major battle personalities of the leaders and public ous enough. And worse, they are in- in a theater of operations is a collision opinion.” Moreover, chapter 4 (“Closer variably accompanied by an expansive between two centers of gravity; the Definition of the Military Objective: list of examples that include alliances, more forces that can be concentrated The Defeat of the Enemy”) of book communities of interest, public opin- in a center of gravity, the more certain eight contains perhaps the most ion, and “national strategy itself.” and massive the effect. Consequently, quoted passage regarding centers of any partial use of force not directed to- gravity: “One must keep the dominant A Collision of Centers ward an objective that either cannot characteristics of both belligerents in To understand centers of gravity, be attained by the victory itself or that mind. Out of these characteristics a cer- one must be grounded in the original does not bring about the victory tain center of gravity develops, the hub context of On War. Book one defines should be condemned.” warfare as “an act of force to compel

issue thirty-five / JFQ 21 ■ JFQ FORUM of all power and movement, on which spite of the enormous area still unoccu- everything depends. That is the point pied. In 1805 Austerlitz was decisive. The against which all our energies should possession of Vienna and two-thirds of the be directed.” Austrian territory had not sufficed to bring The discussion of centers of grav- about a peace. On the other hand, after ity in book eight is much less precise Austerlitz the fact that Hungary was still and is the source of misunderstanding intact did nothing to prevent peace being made. The final blow required the discussion of centers of gravity was to defeat the Russian is much less precise and is the source army....Had the Russian army been with the Austrians of misunderstanding on the Danube in 1805 and shared in their defeat [refer- for two reasons. First, the Howard and ring to Ulm], it would hardly have been Paret translation of On War, the most necessary to take Vienna; peace could commonly used English edition, may have been imposed at Linz.2 have confused some aspects of the orig- Third, “the hub of all power and inal text. Moreover, some interpreta- movement” must be understood in the tions have taken the original out of broader context of the remarks found context. Notwithstanding possible misin chapter 27 of book six. The follow- Mathew Brady (DVIC/NARA) translations, Howard and Paret are usu- ing passage appears immediately after ally clear and consistent—provided the the sentence “A center of gravity is al- text is interpreted within the context of ways found where the mass is concen- be based only on cohesion, that is, in- the relevant passages elsewhere. trated most densely.” Even in Howard and Paret, book terdependence or connectivity (Zusam- 3 eight supports the notion of armies or The fighting forces of each belligerent— menhang). Consider the next to the their components functioning as phys- whether a single state or an alliance of last sentence in chapter 27: “Our posi- ical centers of gravity on the strategic states—have a certain unity and therefore tion, then, is that a theater of war, be it level. For example: “For Alexander, some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, large or small, and the forces stationed Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and the analogy of the center of gravity can be there, no matter what their size, repre- Frederick the Great, the center of grav- applied. Thus these forces will possess cer- sent the sort of unity in which a single ity was their army. If the army had tain centers of gravity, which, by their center of gravity can be identified. That been destroyed, they would all have movement and direction, govern the rest; is the place where the decision should gone down in history as failures.” and those centers of gravity will be found be reached.” Finally, it is difficult to Secondly, commonly overlooked wherever the forces are most concentrated. conceive of a mass of an armed force acting as a physical center of gravity or ignored is the very large paragraph Here the phrase “hub of all power that does not also function as a “hub of in On War that precedes the “domi- and movement” refers unequivocally all movement and power” and as a glue nant characteristics” and “the hub of to the main bodies of the opposing that holds everything together. all power and movement” passages forces. This point is supported by a pas- Fourth, even the term dominant quoted earlier. There Clausewitz ex- sage on the same page: “It is therefore a characteristics has often been applied plained the relationship between a major act of strategic judgment to dis- devoid of the context. The next sen- capital city and a defending army in tinguish these centers of gravity in the tence in the Howard and Paret version several different scenarios. enemy’s forces [that is, concentrations in reads: “Out of these [dominant] char- their total force] and to identify their If Paris had been taken in 1792 the war acteristics a certain center of gravity spheres of effectiveness [and influence]. against the Revolution would almost cer- develops, the hub of all power and One will constantly be called upon to tainly for the time being have been movement.” Note the use of the terms estimate the effect that an advance or a brought to an end....In 1814, on the out of and develops; the sentence does retreat by part of the forces on either other hand, even the capture of Paris not read “One of these characteristics side will have upon the rest.” would not have ended matters if Bona- will emerge as a center of gravity.” The phrase “where there is cohe- parte had still had a sizeable army behind Moreover, Clausewitz elaborates on sion” causes confusion. One commen- him....Again, if in 1812 Bonaparte had one such characteristic—cohesion. managed, before or after taking Moscow, tator contends that where should be to smash the Russian army . . . the fact read as if. But based on the previous There is a decided difference between the that he held the capital would probably sentence it can be inferred that Clause- cohesion of a single army, led into battle have meant that he could make peace in witz meant that although the degree of under the personal command of a single unity and cohesion is small, the con- general, and that of an allied force extend- cept still applies. Nor should concept ing over 250 or 500 miles, or even operating against different fronts. In the one, cohesion is at its strongest and unity

22 JFQ / issue thirty-five Strange and Iron

Pearl Harbor.

Inchon. U.S. Navy

They are variables that be seen in the proper light as the cen- determine which armies ter of power or mass of a force, not a or their components secondary element or characteristic function as centers. from which power emanates or Moreover, Clausewitz around which it revolves. Moreover, described these three this interpretation is reinforced by the characteristics in stark first reason for misinterpreting the terms: unity of effort is concept of center of gravity. remote because precarious and imperfect coali- Alternative Translations tion political interests The description of center of grav- cause weak or fictitious ity as “the hub of all power and move-

U.S. Marine Corps (W.W. Frank) U.S. Marine Corps (W.W. cohesion—so much so ment” has appeared several times in that, like Napoleon, this analysis. Actually, these words be- more often than not long to Howard and Paret, not Clause- [another characteristic] at its closest. In they would be weaknesses akin to the witz. He meant something rather dif- the other, unity is remote, frequently concept of critical vulnerabilities today, ferent in the phrase ein Zentrum der found only in mutual political interests not powerful centers of gravity. Kraft und Bewegung, which is translated [another characteristic], and even then Fifth, at the end of the chapter, as “a center of power and movement.” rather precarious and imperfect; cohesion Clausewitz indicates that “[book eight] The actual difference is small but sig- between the parts will usually be very will describe how this idea of a center nificant. The analogy of a center of loose, and often completely fictitious.4 of gravity in the enemy’s force oper- gravity as a hub of a wheel came from In this context, cohesion, unity, ates throughout the plan of war.” Note the translation, and the current con- and political interests are clearly not that it is not contributing to the cept has been shaped by its words. viewed as candidate centers of gravity. strength of an enemy nor associated in- While one should not adhere directly with an enemy. Even in the dogmatically to 180-year-old defini- Howard and Paret translation, the tions, the original concept of center of “hub of all power and movement” can

issue thirty-five / JFQ 23 ■ JFQ FORUM

no indication of alliance cohesion, Bombing North Vietnam. lines of communication, or seaports. According to one analyst, the original German text is more specific than Howard and Paret or Graham in “that a center of gravity is a center of strength.” The term Schwerpunkt (center of gravity) appears 51 times in support of this reading. Moreover, Macht [power] appears eight times in conjunction with Schwerpunkt. Chapter 9 of book eight in the Howard and Paret version “leaves out Macht quite a bit, and so leaves the door open for misin- terpretation.”6 The Adversarial Element According to the Howard and Paret edition, “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops.” But there is another meaning in the original text: Es kommt darauf an, die vorherrschenden Verhältnisse bei- U.S. Air Force (CecilU.S. Air Force J. Poss) der Staaten im Auge zu haben. Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt... bilden.7 Graham rendered this passage gravity was simpler than those found The concept is much simpler. as “the great point is to keep the over- today in references such as the NATO There is no doubt that Clausewitz ruling relations of both parties in view. Glossary of Terms and Definitions: meant center of gravity as the main Out of them a center of gravity . . . will “Those characteristics, capabilities, or strength of an enemy. The mechanics form itself.” localities from which a nation, an al- analogy as rendered by Howard and That translation includes an es- liance, a military force, or other group- Paret states: “A center of gravity is al- sential ingredient that is missing in ing derives its freedom of action, ways found where the mass is concen- Howard and Paret: what is important is trated most densely. It presents the adversarial nature of centers of there is no doubt that Clausewitz the most effective target for a gravity. Clausewitz described centers blow; furthermore, the heaviest meant center of gravity as the emerging from the “overruling rela- blow is struck by the center of tions (Verhältnisse) of both parties”; main strength of an enemy gravity.” According to a transla- that is, a center of gravity is relevant tion by J.J. Graham published in only in relation to an enemy. It is not physical strength or will to fight.” Stu- 1874: “As a centre of gravity is always an isolated concept. In the Civil War, dents of history may consider panzer situated where the greatest mass of the Army of Northern Virginia was a groups and the Army of Northern Vir- matter is collected, and as a shock center of gravity because of the threat ginia or Winston Churchill and Abra- against the centre of gravity of a body it posed to Washington and its ability ham Lincoln as centers. It takes con- always produces the greatest effect, to block the march of the Army of the siderable imagination to regard any of and further, as the most effective blow Potomac on the Confederate capital of those military formations or leaders as is struck with the centre of gravity of Richmond. “characteristics, capabilities, or locali- the power used, so it is also in war.”5 The Republican Guard consti- ties,” while they are undoubtedly cen- The Graham translation is more tuted a center of gravity in 1991 not ters of gravity. literal, conveying a slightly different only because it was well trained and This confusing definition is the and clearer meaning. Note that Clause- equipped, but because it was a threat root of disagreement on centers of witz was talking about the center of to VII Corps. It was again identified as gravity. It is so open to interpretation gravity having an effect on an enemy, a center in 2003 because it was vital to that analysts can view the same situa- and the blow it strikes is the most ef- the defense of Baghdad. However, tion in a variety of ways. Hours are fective—not necessarily the heaviest. wasted in fruitless argument that could But both translations leave no doubt be better spent on planning. that reference is made to something physical that can strike blows. There is

24 JFQ / issue thirty-five Strange and Iron

Paret. Instead the term dominant char- German soldier, World War II. acteristics was introduced. This is the origin of the NATO definition—a mis- translation of the original. It implies that center of gravity could exist in its own right and is a function of “nation, alliance, military force, or other grouping” taken in isolation. This assumption is obviously wrong. Nothing in war is vital except in the context of the balance between combatants. And using the English term characteristic permits inclusion of virtually anything as a center of gravity: logistics, road networks, unit cohesion, or radar systems. This confuses planners. The official definition is a long way from a strength that strikes “the most effective blow,” although many examples quoted in doctrine are precisely those Clausewitz would recognize, contrary to the formal definition. Clausewitz would recognize the evolving concept of effects-based operations. A center of gravity exists because of its effect on an enemy or situation (for instance, striking a heavy blow), not because of its inherent capabilities. A center needs certain capabilities as well as characteristics and locations to achieve the effect, but that effect is the starting Unknown (DVIC/NARA) point, not the capability. Kuwait. Moral Centers of Gravity It is possible to defeat an enemy, destroy its industry, and occupy with the gift of hindsight, the Feday- its land. But if the spirit een were briefly more worrisome be- of resistance burns in cause of their grip on cities along sup- the hearts of its people, ply lines from Kuwait. While the one cannot claim vic- Kurdish peshmerga may have relished tory. It might be possible fighting the Fedayeen, the Republican to subjugate an enemy Guard with its superior firepower, mo- in the short term, but bility, and protection were a more po- Joint Combat Camera (David McLeod) who can doubt that tent center of gravity. Thus centers of trouble will arise in the gravity are formed out of the relation- long run? It is difficult ships between two forces. Although until it ends. Physical centers function to envisage, for instance, that the Is- the Iraqi operational center of gravity as active agents that endeavor to de- raeli Defense Force can achieve lasting may have been the Republican Guard stroy enemy capabilities and the will peace in the Occupied Territories while against the Kurds, it was more likely to resist, and moral centers function as the Palestinians believe they are being the asymmetric Fedayeen forces against active agents to influence or control wronged. That is a powerful example the Coalition. physical centers. of a strong-willed people who lack Clausewitz maintained that once Nevertheless, the adversarial ele- conventional military power but are an enemy decides to engage in a con- ment in the concept of centers of grav- determined to fight indefinitely for test of physical and moral strength, ity is largely missing in Howard and their cause. centers of gravity are “active agents”

issue thirty-five / JFQ 25 ■ JFQ FORUM

gravity, the Republican Guard. But Sad- Desert Storm. dam Hussein, a strategic moral center, remained undefeated. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam was effectively neutralized early in the war, and the information operation undermined popular will (another potential strategic center) to fight on his behalf. Thus the moral centers of gravity were neutralized simultaneously with defeating operational centers of gravity, the Re- publican Guard and the Fedayeen. The Coalition achieved operational objectives, seizing Baghdad and toppling the regime. However, neutralizing a U.S. Army (Robert L. Reeve) strategic center of gravity is not the same as defeating it, which is necessary for the wider strategic objective of last- Clausewitz understood the phe- and conducting political and eco- ing peace. The evolving nature of the nomenon of popular will. According nomic activities? Moreover, the Gra- conflict in Iraq demonstrates that con- to Howard and Paret, “The moral ele- ham edition reads, “this centre gener- tinuing effort is required to win over ments are the most important in war. ally lies in the capital.” Lies in is quite the will of the Iraqi people to accept They constitute the spirit that perme- different than is the. Is it actually “the Coalition strategic postwar objectives. ates war as a whole, and at an early community of interest?” Both the Gra- How does one identify moral cen- stage they establish a close affinity ham and the Howard and Paret trans- ters of gravity? The process begins and with the will that moves and leads the lations render “lies” in the community ends with people, for only they can cre- whole mass of force....History proof interest. But who determines that ate and sustain moral resistance. People vides the strongest proof of the impor- interest over the duration of a conflict? fall into the following categories. tance of moral factors and their often On popular uprisings, the Graham Leaders have the will to develop, incredible effect.” Throughout history, translation states that center of gravity execute, and sustain a policy of opposi- many would-be conquerors have resides “in the person of the chief tion to an enemy as well as the ability failed to succeed largely because they leader, and in public opinion.” What if to exert that will through the military did not fully appreciate moral centers the public is apathetic? Is it still a cen- and people (examples include Saddam of gravity. ter of gravity? A strong-willed popula- Hussein in 1990–91, Winston Churchill In chapter 4 of book eight, tion is a source of moral strength and, in 1940–41, and Joseph Stalin in World Clausewitz cites specific moral centers: conversely, a weak-willed one is a criti- War II). “In countries subject to domestic strife, cal vulnerability. Ruling elites are closed groups in the center of gravity is generally the To reach a lasting settlement— which real power resides in their mem- capital....Among alliances, it lies in self-sustaining peace—one must under- bers, who are loosely described as king- mine enemy strategic, and espe- makers, and who direct policy and it is unlikely that defeating an cially moral, centers of gravity. wield control over the military and There must be clear linkage be- operational center of gravity will people (examples are the Soviet Polit- tween campaign objectives on buro in the 1970s and clerics in the undermine strategic moral centers the operational level and under- 1979 Iranian revolution). mining moral centers of gravity Strong-willed populations are large the community of interest, and in pop- (or resistance) on the strategic. That groups with common beliefs that ular uprisings it is the personalities of takes more than the military instru- compel them to engage in conflict (ex- the leaders and public opinion.” But ment; the total strategy should em- amples include the Palestinians and does he mean “the center of gravity is brace every instrument of national Israelis in their dispute over the generally the capital” or what is in the power—military and nonmilitary. If Occupied Territories and Americans in capital? He concludes that capturing operations stand alone, it is unlikely the wake of the Japanese attack on the capital would be “important for that defeating an operational center of Pearl Harbor). the defeat of the enemy . . . if it is not gravity will undermine strategic moral only the center of administration but centers of gravity. Two central elements common to also that of social, professional, and The outcome of the Persian Gulf these moral centers of gravity are the political activity.” Who is governing War was a resounding victory that will to fight and the ability to com- achieved the limited objective of the mand the necessary resources. Coalition, liberating Kuwait, by defeating the Iraqi operational center of

26 JFQ / issue thirty-five Strange and Iron

Iraqi Freedom. Marine Division Combat Camera (Kevin C. Quihuis, Jr.) st 1

According to Clausewitz, “The active agents (people in formations and NOTES first, the supreme, the most far-reach- groups or individuals), obvious (more ing act of judgment that the statesman for physical than moral centers, de- 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and commander have to make is to es- pending on the quality of intelligence and translated by Michael Howard and tablish...the kind of war on which gathered on an enemy), and powerful Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75, 77. they are embarking....This is the first and strike effective blows. Physical cen- 2 Ibid., p. 595. of all strategic questions and the most ters of gravity can be visualized more 3 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s comprehensive.” They must therefore easily as armies or units, those things Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfight- first appraise the moral and physical that resist an enemy. By contrast, moral ing Doctrine—Again!” (Carlisle Barracks, character of an enemy to include its centers of gravity are less obvious. Yet it Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army moral and physical centers of gravity. is essential to understand them since War College, September 2002). See espe- There is no alternative, short cut, or they are likely to be more important on cially p. 10. analytical model to make up for inac- the strategic level. 4 Howard and Paret, On War, p. 486. 5 curate assessment of the enemy when Clausewitzian centers of gravity Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans- deciding on centers of gravity. are not characteristics, capabilities, or lated by J.J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1908), volume I, book Defeating a leader differs from locations. They are dynamic and pow- six, p. 354. undermining popular will. In Afghani- erful physical and moral agents of ac- 6 Joe [Joseph L.] Strange, Centers of Grav- stan, for instance, planners could have tion or influence with certain qualities ity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the considered several moral centers of and capabilities that derive their bene- Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All gravity: Mullah Omar, the Taliban fit from a given location or terrain. Fur- Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on elite, or large segments of the Pashtun ther analysis is required to clearly de- Warfighting Series, no. 4, 2d ed. (Quantico, population. The right choice assumed fine the relationship between centers of Va.: Marine Corps University, 1996). in-depth knowledge of the Taliban gravity and critical vulnerabilities, thus 7 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, edited and the local situation, and a wrong enabling planners to better focus by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmler, one would likely have led to a misdi- sources of power on developing suc- 1980), p. 976. He uses the standard meaning of Schwerpunkt, which was center of gravity. rected campaign. cessful strategies and campaigns. This The military definition as a point of main process will indicate where characteris- effort was accepted by the Prussian army. By appealing to the original con- tics, capabilities, and locations properly Since Clausewitz appeals to both, accurate cept of centers of gravity, one can deter- belong in the overall scheme of things translations must depend on the context. mine that they are dynamic, positive, when thinking about warfighting. JFQ

issue thirty-five / JFQ 27 B–2 on ramp, Nellis Air Force Base.

U.S. Strategic Command 509th Communications Squadron (Michael R. Nixon) Meeting Global Challenges

By JAMES O. ELLIS, JR.

he Nation has faced unprecedented reflect the major challenges faced by a com- threats over its history that called for a mander in chief who worked with Congress to re- bold strategy. Consider the following organize the Armed Forces and establish new mis- T statement in the inaugural address of sions demanded by national security. Today Harry Truman: “Events have brought our Ameri- civilian leaders are again taking bold steps to in- can democracy to new influence and new respon- troduce changes in military organization because sibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion of national security imperatives. to duty, and our concept of liberty.” Those words Established in October 2002 to replace Strate- gic Air Command and U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command capitalizes on synergy gener- Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN (Ret.),s served as the first commander of ated by combining command and control of nu- U.S. Strategic Command and also was commander, U.S. Naval Forces clear forces and space-based operations. Subse- Europe and commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe. quently, it received four previously unassigned

28 JFQ / issue thirty-five Ellis

missions: global strike planning and execution; in- number of Peacekeepers in exchange for the war- tegrating information operations; integrating heads on the older Minuteman III missiles in fis- global ballistic missile defenses; and command, cal year 2006. It is also extending the life of Min- control, communications, computers, intelligence, uteman III missiles by upgrading both propulsion surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). and guidance systems while exploring future in- Each new mission is strategic in both scope tercontinental ballistic missile concepts. and effect. Full operational capability for this dynamic package will provide a unified resource for Information Operations better understanding threats as well as a means to Analysts often equate information opera- respond quickly. Legacy missions impose the rig- tions with computer networks, but that view does orous discipline of nuclear responsibilities and cre- not reflect actual missions. Commanders operate ative drive of experience in space. Effective evolu- in a multidimensional battlespace that calls for tionary strategy runs through these missions as going beyond day-to-day military requirements. the command gathers and translates real-time In this environment, information operations data to produce actionable intelligence to enable have an incredible impact through electronic decisions on a timely basis for joint warfighters. warfare, psychological operations, operations security, and military deception. U.S. Strategic Global Strike Command seeks to ensure use and trust of The first new mission requires rapidly pro- friendly information systems while denying some jecting military power against terrorists, hostile or all of that use and trust to an enemy. Under- states, or any other threat. It depends on syn- standing the vital role of information in every ergy achieved by identifying target sets and segment of society highlights the importance and managing space-based assets for weather and in- scope of this mission. telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mis- Information operations are rarely defined sion planning support, global positioning for broadly enough. They can include all instruments precision execution and timing, and compre- of national power and the interagency process. hensive communication systems under the sea, They will not be effective unless integrated across in the air, and in space. the national security community. Furthermore, To reclaim the original meaning of the term information operations are not new. Almost every strategic as more than a synonym for nuclear, the organization has its own program. The difficulty capabilities must include conventional weapons comes when commanders find themselves in the as well as kinetic and midst of crises and organize information teams the distinction between national nonkinetic alternatives from disparate sources. The command vision has that can be employed resolved this issue by providing a single inte- missile defense and theater to meet various threats grated source of assets for every commander. missile defense no longer exists in time-critical situations. The promise and Global Missile Defense challenge of global strike is producing capabilities There is a wider range of threats today than that reach across mission areas. Global strike is re- during the Cold War. The distinction between na- aligning and repositioning the military to protect tional missile defense and theater missile defense the Nation and its allies. The structure and em- no longer exists. The Missile Defense Agency is ployment of the Armed Forces are changing. specifically tasked to develop missile protection Agility is an attribute requiring smaller, more rap- for the homeland and allies. The mission of U.S. idly deployable units. U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Command is turning the focus of must be able to support them with a responsive warfighters to missile defense and also making strike capability, which can reach globally in the system operational. Initially, the command hours or even minutes. will integrate disparate missile defense systems in The command is also preserving six decades one system and link it to other offensive capabili- of nuclear weapons stewardship and its focus on ties. In addition, it must examine technological, strategic nuclear forces. The triad of bombers, bal- organizational, and operational capabilities to in- listic missile submarines, and intercontinental tegrate and develop a multilayered system to pro- ballistic missiles is key. The President is commit- tect the United States and its allies. ted to reducing operationally deployed warheads Multilayered missile defense involves more to between 1,700 and 2,200 within a decade, and than directing missile-on-missile engagements. the command is responsible for this task while The emerging defense network will integrate maintaining national security. Toward this end, it will periodically assess the strategic environment and reductions to ensure that forces are aligned for the future. The command will draw down the

issue thirty-five / JFQ 29 ■ U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

USS Lake Erie firing SM–3 missile. U.S. Navy

command and control, attack operations, intelli- missile defense system is likely to include sea- gence, interceptors, and the full spectrum of based interceptors, the airborne laser, and other sensors able to feed information on the terres- cutting-edge technology. trial and space environment to battle management centers that direct interceptors to targets. Global C4ISR But there is no system capable of stopping every The fourth mission, global command, con- threat. The solution lies in multiple layers of de- trol, communications, computers, intelligence, fense with a number of systems. The initial surveillance, and reconnaissance, is best underground-based missile defense interceptors will stood in terms of its constituent parts. Each ele- be fielded at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air ment is distinct and raises specific issues. The first Force Base. The command is also considering goal is developing a command and control struc- other systems such as Patriot and theater high ture that provides knowledge superiority, infor- altitude air defense. In the future, the global mation assurance, timely decisionmaking capabilities, and prioritized resource tasking on a global

30 JFQ / issue thirty-five Ellis

Tomahawk missile test systems. The ultimate goal will involve cultural at Point Mugu. change as the command introduces a 24/7 cross- functional information sharing system. U.S. Central Command had seven times more bandwidth available in Iraqi Freedom than Desert Storm, and four-fifths of that expansion came from commercial systems. Modern systems require increased capabilities. For example, Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles can receive commands and transmit high resolution streaming video with up to 1.2 gigabytes of bandwidth per second. By contrast, older manned U–2 aircraft need only 2 megabytes per second. War- ships that fire Tomahawk cruise missiles can also be heavy users of satellite communications, especially when relying on space-based systems to obtain targeting information. Bandwidth demands will only increase as more unmanned aerial vehicles are fielded and new weapons are deployed that can be reprogrammed in flight, such as the Tactical Tomahawk. U.S. Strategic Command is assuming some intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance duties from the Joint Staff. These capabilities are seen as a weapons system to enable operations DOD with a deterrent value of their own. As commanders rely on more sophisticated and integrated ISR support, the command must supply scale. This will allow integrating strategic, opera- unprecedented situational awareness for battle- tional, and tactical levels of command from the field dominance. President to warfighters. In addition to obvious The command is building on the legacy of technical challenges, establishing governance, U.S. Space Command. Land forces will depend on standards, and policy to ensure the transition to a the next generation of space systems with space- multilevel, secure, network-centric enterprise re- based radar, transformational communications, mains a primary objective. and space-based infrared and global positioning U.S. Strategic Command is integrating com- systems. When integrated, space forces will offer mand and control systems across mission areas decisionmakers and commanders unprecedented and engaging other organizations to identify re- situational awareness, communications, and nav- quirements for consolidated support of warfight- igation and timing. ers. One example is its collaboration with U.S. Coordinated application of these capabilities Joint Forces Command and the Office of the As- is essential to give the Armed Forces battlefield sistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and In- dominance and enable concepts such as global formation Integration to delineate the responsi- strike and missile defense. This will require a sin- bilities of warfighter command and control. In a gle source for space-based capabilities that cuts parallel effort, the command is working to con- across the military and national space boundary. solidate and centralize command and control Strategic Command is uniquely positioned to help governance, a key to attaining a truly global plan and support an effort to combine military DOD enterprise. and national security space operations in support Lessons from Enduring Freedom and Iraqi of both peacetime and wartime operations. Freedom identified requirements for commercial satellite communications, network security, and Military Culture bandwidth expansion. The command is working A global focus and unique combination of with public and private sources to improve the missions require cultural changes. To achieve the use and protection of these assets. It will remain vision of the President and the Secretary, U.S. focused, apply lessons, and address challenges Strategic Command must synchronize its assets while ensuring that it does not create stovepiped toward a single purpose. Its missions are dynamic and must evolve cohesively. Strategic thinking requires breaking down boundaries and surmount- ing ownership issues. The Nation can no longer

issue thirty-five / JFQ 31 ■ U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

USS Ohio undergoing conversion.

U.S. Navy (Wendy Hallmark)

afford bifurcated operations. Old divisions—civil- board, and other allies will join the endeavor in ian and military, joint and service—must give Omaha to work together in unprecedented ways way to a strategic, coordinated, unified approach to ensure the security of the free world. to serve everyone concerned. The command must continue to engage a fu- U.S. Strategic Command has Army and Ma- ture that not only links across military and na- rine Corps components that work closely with tional security operations but builds a truly com- their Navy and Air Force counterparts. Joint task bined system where observing, orienting, and force-global network operations and information acting are one process, not three. operations center personnel interact with part- Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom re- ners from the National Security Agency and De- vealed the potential of cutting across organiza- fense Information Systems Agency. Moreover, for- tional boundaries in space as orbiting capabilities eign colleagues are being added. Britain is on became critical warfighting components. Now the command must change the way it interacts in all mission areas to ensure that warfighters have the

32 JFQ / issue thirty-five Ellis

support to access data and conduct effective oper- U.S. Strategic Command is literally new. Its ations during any conflict. Timely and accurate missions confirm that strategic should not be information has become a decisive advantage in equated with nuclear but rather defines the range the shadowy global war on terrorism, especially of options available to protect national security. for Special Operations Forces. While these profes- Meanwhile, potential enemies will seek to exploit sionals do not ask for accolades, they demand the vulnerabilities on land, at sea, and in the air as most up-to-date information. well as in information networks and space systems. The Armed Forces are challenged to discover, The command can build on traditional observe, and target more elusive enemies in the strengths while shaping its broader and deeper 72-hour air tasking order role. To accomplish this goal, its service compo- U.S. Strategic Command will cycle and even the 45- nents must reach outside their own traditions to minute response time seen integrate tasks in new organizational constructs provide a unified resource to in Iraq. While that is a re- and draw on expertise from across the defense better understand threats markably short kill-chain community. At the same time the command re- cycle, it was ten minutes late lies on the services to provide unique perspectives and rapidly respond to them for one well-publicized and distinct contributions. This mix of tradition strike. The command is and innovation has resulted in excellent progress. uniquely positioned to help plan and support the dynamic evolution required to further compress There are unprecedented opportunities to this timeline to better hold enemies at risk. shape capabilities to meet the needs of the Na- The command will not realize its potential tion. Unfortunately they will remain nothing until processes linking it to the common pursuit more than opportunities without the courage to of national security are addressed. New organiza- seize them, which means consolidation. U.S. tions with old processes are not an answer. It is Strategic Command must integrate operational clear that chains of command must be stream- concepts as well as streamline chains of com- lined and duplication avoided. And it is not an mand, not just draft memoranda of understand- issue of ownership or self-aggrandizing authori- ing or organize senior steering groups. Bold inno- ties. Rather it is about doing what is right and vation must drive efforts to support the new best for the security needs of the Nation. missions assigned. Global threats are too radical Partnerships with civilian agencies, industry, for old ideas. The bottom line is not compli- and academe are also vital to all mission areas cated: U.S. Strategic Command must think and and to achieving the integrated teamwork essen- act in new ways. JFQ tial to success. The command is fortunate in having strong relations with these players, and as it moves forward in each new mission area it will need even stronger ties with all its partners, old and new. Tradition and Innovation As it becomes fully operational, U.S. Strategic Command will provide a unified resource to better understand threats and rapidly respond to them. However, achieving such capabilities will require charting a course over the horizon. This effort involves developing a new paradigm that is not understood at present. Consider designers of video games. It can take from 18 to 30 months to make a quality game for personal computers. Work can begin on games before the computer on which they will be played becomes available. And all that effort is for developing games. The stakes involved in developing and coordinating systems for national security are much higher and need an advanced level of fore- sight. America has reached a pivotal point in its history. The security environment is changing dramatically.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 33 Preparing for Hurricane Isabel.

The DOD Role in (WilliamU.S. Air Force M. Plate, Jr.) Homeland Security By ADRIAN A. ERCKENBRACK and AARON SCHOLER

any experts warned prior to Sep- One year after 9/11, the commission tember 11, 2001, that the prolifera- cochairs, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, cau- tion of weapons of mass destruc- tioned: “America remains dangerously unpre- M tion (WMD) would exploit pared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic weaknesses in the defense of America. A report by terrorist attack on U.S. soil.” And, as the Nation the Commission on National Security/21st Cen- prepares for such attacks, so will terrorists. tury sounded one such alarm: “The United States Though America maintains a superiority in will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile at- weaponry, personnel, and other resources, terror- tack on the American homeland....military su- ist groups can convert their disadvantage in num- periority will not entirely protect us.” The subse- bers into an advantage. Networked terrorists can quent terrorist attacks validated the commission coordinate strategy and plans, execute schemes report and the need to reexamine protecting the quickly, and outpace the cumbersome U.S. deci- homeland. Moreover, they resulted in a reap- sionmaking cycle. praisal of the role of the Department of Defense in support of civil authorities. Among Federal The DOD Role agencies, it has the most experience in combat- The establishment of U.S. Northern Com- ting terrorism. mand (NORTHCOM) strengthened the capabilities of the Nation to respond to terrorism. The Lieutenant Colonel Adrian A. Erckenbrack, USA, is special assistant command solidifies the DOD role in homeland for legislative affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense and provides information to Federal, Aaron Scholer is deputy military legislative assistant for Senator state, and local authorities. And it could do more Joseph Lieberman. by leveraging WMD expertise through planning,

34 JFQ / issue thirty-five Erckenbrack and Scholer

training, exercises, and consequence manage- Existing procedures must be enhanced and ment to support the homeland defense mission. other mechanisms developed to coordinate DOD This is a break with the traditional practice by involvement with first responders. These steps the defense community of getting involved in may include: domestic consequence management only after ■ making homeland security the primary mission events overcome the capacity of civil authorities of part of the National Guard to respond. ■ developing a NORTHCOM civil support struc- The defense establishment should not be ture to parallel the Federal Emergency Management the first responder or lead agency in preventing Agency (FEMA) regions and National Guard state area or detecting terrorism but should assist organiza- commands (STARCs) tions tasked to respond. It alone has the capacity ■ broadening current policy in DOD Instruction to both improve homeland security on the Fed- 2000.12 and DOD Directive 2000.16 to require military installations and defense agencies to incorporate first eral, state, and local response and consequence management organizations existing procedures must be levels and respond to in terrorism planning, exercise, and evaluation activities chemical, biological, enhanced to coordinate DOD ■ working with the Department of Homeland Se- radiological, nuclear, curity to develop a telecommunications infrastructure involvement with first responders or large explosive to connect selected homeland security agencies events. For the Na- ■ expanding defense participation on both the tion to become more Federal and state levels, developing more comprehen- secure as a result of NORTHCOM activities, the sive interagency curricula at professional military edu- conventional homeland defense paradigm of re- cation institutions, fielding regional chemical biological sponse must give way to a new model that in- incident response teams (CBIRTs), and organizing consequence management centers of excellence. cludes both prevention and preparedness. To date the Secretary of Defense has specifi- The result must be improved prevention, cally referred to DOD involvement as homeland preparedness, and consequence management on defense rather than homeland security—signifying the state and local levels, enhanced interoper- more than a semantic difference. Defense implies ability among agencies, common communica- deterrence and/or response whereas security is tion and equipment standards among all agen- more comprehensive; defense is part of security cies, and coordinated and synchronous response but not the only part. This distinction avoids mechanisms. Such actions do not suggest that having the Pentagon become embroiled in an ill- the Department of Defense should assume those defined mission as capstone agency for Federal, responsibilities alone or be the lead Federal state, and local police and first response agencies. agency but that it should coordinate with the The Department of Defense is not prepared, will- Department of Homeland Security and supporting, or in some cases constitutionally permitted ing organizations. to play that role. Yet because agencies that must respond to the consequences of an attack using Strategic Planning weapons of mass destruction need resources now It is essential to develop a plan to defend instead of after another terrorist attack, the DOD and secure the homeland. By definition it should mission must be expanded from just defending include the objectives of the Secretary of Defense the homeland to supporting homeland security, for operations needed to meet the requirements especially since a future attack could inflict more of homeland defense and security. Such a plan casualties than were suffered on 9/11. would guide development of supporting operational and tactical planning and facilitate coordi- Support Planning nation of strategic priorities and resource alloca- A strategic support plan should be developed tion on the national level. It must seek to link to meet the challenges of homeland defense and homeland defense and security goals to NORTH- security. While emphasizing defense, it should COM and DHS planning. Absent an overarching also be focused on security objectives to support plan, the unified commands and services should state and local authorities, in some cases with ex- rely on policies, regulations, and other issuances tant defense organizations, resources, and poli- from organizations with disparate responsibilities cies. The plan should provide a strategic vision and perspectives to safeguard their personnel and and endstate, be coordinated with both Mexico facilities as well as assist the civil authorities. and Canada, focus NORTHCOM activities by pro- To address the threat of domestic and viding clear goals, be linked to the Department of transnational terrorism, this plan must be na- Homeland Security (DHS), and work in partner- tional and international in scope. It should inte- ship with other Federal and state agencies. grate homeland defense and security planning with state and local authorities at home as well as

issue thirty-five / JFQ 35 ■ HOMELAND SECURITY

include appropriate organizational structures and added resources. In addition, it must plan, train, and conduct exercises with agencies that respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or large explosive events. NORTHCOM, working with state adjutants general, should develop a plan to address concept development and valida- tion of homeland defense roles and missions. The plan must also move assets from geographic support to assist in homeland defense and security. While reorienting a portion of the National Guard is a departure from current thinking and operations, it reflects the changing national security environment. The Quadrennial Defense Review issued in 2001 concluded that defending America was the primary DOD mission and that policy would Communications Squadron (JosefCommunications Squadron Cole)

th evolve accordingly. NORTHCOM was designated 20 to provide unity of command for this mission, Antiterrorist exercise. but there are significant problems because capabilities intended to defend the homeland and in Mexico and Canada. This approach will ad- support civil authorities were developed for fight- dress existing shortcomings and provide compre- ing overseas. Thus the command must first be hensive responses to threats such as smallpox, configured to better leverage existing organiza- which can spread rapidly beyond boundaries. tional structures. The plan must be accompanied by a concept development and experimentation process that Command Restructuring will allocate forces and resources and develop Central to the success of U.S. Northern Com- both joint and service mission essential task lists. mand in providing timely, appropriate support to This process will be valuable for the Army and Air civil authorities is the development of a com- National Guard, which are expected to assume re- mand and control structure that reaches down to sponsibilities for homeland defense and support- state level while reaching out to other Federal ing security. agencies. The purpose of this structure is not to exercise command and control as lead agency but Reserve Components to facilitate coordination. NORTHCOM can lever- With the decline of the homeland protection age several organizations. One is the Federal role in the last century, the military became in- Emergency Management Agency, which deals creasingly expeditionary, applying its power with consequence management through ten re- abroad to deter foreign threats to national inter- gional offices covering most of the NORTHCOM ests. Turning back to homeland defense, it is criti- area of responsibility. Within those regions, cal for the Armed Forces to maintain their expedi- STARCs can be tasked and organized to help over- tionary character. But securing the Nation is a see training regimes and standardize require- fundamental mission that the Reserve compo- ments, develop common terminology, and syn- nents must be reorganized, trained, and equipped chronize the efforts of state and local first to accomplish. responders—a million firefighters, half a million The Army and Air National Guard are best local police, and 150,000 emergency medical suited for a homeland defense and security role. workers. In addition, there are numerous active These two Reserve components have deep roots in duty service installations in each of these FEMA their local communities. Furthermore, because regions and STARCs that currently conduct anti- most state adjutants general also serve as both terrorism planning, training, exercises, and evalu- emergency manager and homeland security direc- ations. It is imperative that the National Guard tor, they are engaged in intragovernmental issues and first responders take part in all critical plan- as well as Federal and interagency matters. Operat- ning, training, and evaluation in their locales. ing outside existing arrangements or establishing This would often incur no extra funding, but it new organizations that replicate those efforts would require thinking differently. By looking be- would add bureaucracy, increase turf battles, and yond the perimeter of the installation and the decrease efficiency on the state level. Homeland defense is not a new mission for the National Guard, but it must be expanded to

36 JFQ / issue thirty-five Erckenbrack and Scholer

USCGC Bainbridge in New York harbor. U.S. Coast Guard (Tom Sperduto) (Tom U.S. Coast Guard

military as a whole and by incorporating the ef- immediate emergency response authority to save forts and resources of many agencies into plans, lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate prop- exercises, and evaluations, the Department of De- erty damage under imminently serious condi- fense can significantly improve first responder cations. Commanders who receive verbal requests pabilities. This will decrease the likelihood that from civil authorities during an exigent emer- the department will have to provide first response gency may initiate informal planning and imme- to a local incident. diately respond under the directive. This information should be incorporated in professional Policy and Directives military education, starting with courses for jun- DOD Directive 2000.12 establishes responsi- ior officers, and also disseminated to civil author- bilities for antiterrorism/force protection while ities on all levels. DOD Instruction 2000.16 sets antiterrorism stan- Once NORTHCOM has broadened its antiter- dards. Both issuances apply to physical security rorism policy to include functional prevention for activities overseas and at home, but their scope and preparedness activities that are paired with an must be expanded to include Federal, state, and organizational structure designed to best support local agencies in antiterrorism planning, training, civil authorities, it must communicate its changed and exercises. Extending these authorities across regulations and standing directives to all Federal, the Department of Defense will be a major step in state, and local homeland security agencies. improving interoperability and capabilities. Moreover, many commanders are unaware Connecting the Dots of their responsibilities to respond to civilian re- While first responders must be integral to quests for emergency assistance based on DOD network-centric warfare, the current state of play Directive 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil suggests that is not the case. One way to rectify Authorities.” The Secretary of Defense retains ap- this situation is the better use of the defense mes- proval authority for support to civil authorities sage system, a telecommunications capability involving the use of commander-assigned forces, based on off-the-shelf commercial products. which would include any personnel or assets that The system can provide secure, accountable, might be used in a chemical, biological, radiologi- reliable writer-to-reader electronic messaging for cal, nuclear, or large explosive event in the United States. This issuance gives commanders

issue thirty-five / JFQ 37 ■ HOMELAND SECURITY

both institutional and individual users. It re- Another way to foster interagency coordina- placed AUTODIN as well as other disparate e-mail tion involves providing the same type of DOD li- systems within the Department of Defense. The aison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, user-friendly X.400-based messaging system, which is responsible for antiterrorist crisis man- which resembles a common e-mail application, agement. Finally, liaison officers could be as- handles classified information with high-assur- signed to state emergency operations centers. ance message security and delivery capability. The Terrorists are most likely to target infrastructure defense message system also provides global to overwhelm preemption and consequence X.500 directory services and supports transmis- management capacities. Such an attack may be sion of digital files containing graphics, photo designed to provoke Federal, state, and local re- imagery, and video. The system has been de- sponses simultaneously. The Department of De- signed to use interoperable commercial hardware fense must be prepared on every level (its first re- and software. sponders will be on the installation level) to Another option is supporting the effort by participate in a joint interagency task force made the National Guard Bureau to optimize GuardNet up of multiple Federal, state, and local agencies. for homeland defense and security. Although not Training for such events can occur in both mili- as capable as the defense tary schools and installations across the country NORTHCOM must also help open message system, it was or at National Guard training centers—existing useful for limited long- assets that can be economically expanded to sup- interagency communication distance communica- port realistic interagency planning, training, and pipelines and develop manning tions on 9/11 when exercising with first responders, law enforcement for liaison elements phone lines became un- agencies, active duty personnel, and all levels of available. Regardless of government. Optimally, the Department of De- which system is selected, fense must develop this capability until it be- it must enable numerous Federal, state, and local comes second nature to both the installation agencies to exchange information, and it must force protection officer and the joint staff officer serve as an alternate secure means of communica- in any organization. A special focus of any ex- tion during a crisis. NORTHCOM must also help pansion of the defense role in the interagency open interagency communication pipelines and process must be the knowledge of actions to be develop manning for liaison elements within se- taken in a chemical or biological environment. lected Federal and state agencies. A natural adjunct to DOD efforts would be a training academy under the Department of Expanding the Mission Homeland Security for first responders and con- The Department of Defense lacks domestic tinuing education of officials in appropriate agen- WMD prevention or consequence management cies and organizations. interoperability to deal with a real asymmetric threat. Accordingly, it must expand its intera- A Chemical/Biological Initiative gency role through education, exercises, and One key assumption about a catastrophic ter- training. To foster interoperability, cooperation, rorist attack is that defense and response begin on and jointness, the defense presence in the intera- the local level and that sufficient Federal and state gency process could be increased by assigning assistance will not arrive for hours or days. Given more personnel to liaison offices in FEMA re- current assets, state and local law enforcement, gions. Emergency preparedness liaison offices as- emergency response, and medical services may sist in planning and coordination with state au- collapse quickly. The Department of Defense can thorities, local jurisdictions, and integrated decrease the time required to identify, react, and training and exercises. Coordination should not contain a chemical or biological attack, provide a be limited to consequence management but multilayed national crisis response capability, and should include prevention and preparedness ac- decrease the scope and length of any commit- tivities with Federal, state, and local agencies. ment. Any such initiative must: Members of both the active and Reserve compo- ■ develop and integrate disease diagnosis and re- nents should staff these liaison elements. To ex- porting with the Centers for Disease Control and Pre- pand the number and type of National Guard vention (CDC) personnel in full-time positions may require a ■ create CBIRTs to improve the national chemical change in the authority for Federally financed, and biological response capability and create conse- state-controlled National Guard activities. quence management centers of excellence ■ broaden participation of Federal, state, and local prevention, preparedness, and consequence management under the revised emergency management standard of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations

38 JFQ / issue thirty-five Erckenbrack and Scholer

F–16 patrolling American skies, Noble Eagle. Combat Camera Squadron (AaronCombat Camera Squadron D. Allmon II) st 1

■ help implement a laboratory response network variety of syndromic surveillance activities and for bioterrorism facilitate more accurate and timely reporting of ■ review and recommend changes to Federal, disease information to the Centers for Disease state, and local contingency plans to integrate installa- Control. It will include data standards, an Inter- tions, facilities, and personnel in the movement, secu- net-based communications infrastructure built on rity, and distribution of national pharmaceutical stock- industry standards, and agreements on data ac- pile packages. cess and sharing, burden reduction, and confi- Detection and Warning dentiality. This type of system would provide in- For the Department of Defense to help civil formation crucial to monitoring the health of authorities identify and contain the spread of any DOD personnel, identify their health problems contagion, it must improve its disease surveil- and priorities, help the department take actions lance detection systems and the way it communi- to prevent further illness, assist in evaluating the cates indication and warning of pending attack, actions, and serve as a collaborative means of confirmation of an attack in progress, and details monitoring syndromic trends in other parts of of a past attack to partners. Currently, sources of the country. data for both defense and public health surveil- Consequence Management lance are as varied as the diseases and conditions themselves. Because there are multiple data The concept for chemical biological incident sources, information requirements, distinct users, response teams grew out of the chemical biologi- and private and governmental partners with cal incident response force (CBIRF), formed in whom the Department of Defense may collabo- 1996 in response to Presidential Decision Direc- rate in obtaining data for specific program areas, tive 39. The Marine Corps organized this self-con- there is no single syndromic surveillance system tained unit of 375 marines and sailors that can that captures information required to monitor counter chemical/biological terrorist threats. the health of DOD personnel and share it with When directed, this force can rapidly re- the Centers for Disease Control. spond to chemical or biological threats. Once de- To meet this need, the defense community ployed, it coordinates initial relief efforts, secu- must be integrated into the national electronic rity, detection, identification, expert medical disease surveillance system or something like the health alert network or a parallel system. When completed, the system will electronically link a

issue thirty-five / JFQ 39 ■ HOMELAND SECURITY

USNS Comfort in New York harbor, September 18, 2001. U.S. Navy (Aaron Peterson) U.S. Navy (Aaron

advice, and limited decontamination of person- local agencies with first response missions and re- nel and equipment. Although this unit can per- quirements. In effect, although no single organi- form its primary missions, the scale of a potential zation would be responsible for responding to an biological terrorist attack has expanded the scope event on the scale of Dark Winter, contributing of the required response. such expertise will improve the capability to pre- The level of response being considered must vent an incident from reaching a supercritical be able to deal with a threat similar in size and magnitude, while decreasing the probability that scope to that portrayed in the biological terrorism the Department of Defense will be required to re- exercise, Dark Winter. In that scenario, the effects spond in the first instance. of a terrorist attack using smallpox encompassed To achieve this objective, the best option a multistate region and would be embedding a more capable prevention, the best option would be rapidly overwhelmed the detection, and consequence management capac- Federal, state, and local ity in the National Guard. It must develop chemi- embedding a more capable consequence management cal biological incident response teams, determine consequence management response. Under this sce- their appropriate size and equipment, and pro- nario, CBIRF would re- vide transport for five or six strategically located capacity in the National Guard spond with critical re- regional teams, each within four hours flying sources as needed, but its time of any point in its area of responsibility. capabilities in security, detection, identification, That would enhance the capability to respond to expert medical advice, and limited decontamina- bioterrorism incidents that overwhelm first re- tion would be quickly overwhelmed. Indeed, sponders. Moreover, developing and pre-position- even multiple units would be insufficient to man- ing teams in selected locales would offer a layered age a terrorist attack like the one in the exercise. response (no mid-sized WMD consequence man- Part of the solution is lending DOD expertise agement assets exist between state and local to planning, training, exercises, detection, and HAZMAT units and strategic CBIRF assets). This medical operations in a contaminated environ- would also reduce the distance over which re- ment and providing WMD response and manage- sponse forces must travel in an emergency. ment capabilities alongside Federal, state, and

40 JFQ / issue thirty-five Erckenbrack and Scholer

The response force would provide regional the CDC national strategic stockpile ensures the consequence management centers of excellence. availability of vital pharmaceuticals, antidotes, On a day-to-day basis teams would form centers and other medical supplies and equipment. The to provide consequence management planning, program can rapidly deploy resources to any do- training, evaluation, and exercises. They would mestic location in the event of an attack involving also serve as catalysts by developing standards for biological or chemical agents. As part of its re- equipment, communications, and doctrine sponse, the Centers for Disease Control would among first responders. This phenomenon is oc- transfer stockpile resources to state or local au- curring already, albeit on a lower level and thorities who, in turn, would repackage medicines smaller scale, wherever WMD civil support teams and other commodities. This stockpile program are present. While not originally envisioned as a was exercised in response to 9/11 when officials in DOD mission, a collateral benefit of civil support New York requested large amounts of medical ma- has been offering a credible and neutral catalyst terial and logistic support. With the support of in an environment that is often turf oriented. On state and local public health and emergency re- a larger scale, while CBIRTs have not previously sponse agencies, the operation was performed suc- existed, there is precedent for providing such as- cessfully according to contingency plans. sistance to Federal, state, and local agencies. The deployment of the stockpile package in The National Defense Authorization Act of response to 9/11 occurred in a relatively benign 1997 required the development of a program to environment that facilitated its rapid and effi- test and improve responses to emergencies in- cient transfer to the New York metropolitan area. volving biological and chemical weapons. To en- Had the attack been coordinated with the release able this program, Federal funding must support of chemical or biological agents—which can National Guard CBIRTs, including planning, spread rapidly and contaminate or infect large training, evaluation, and exercise oversight to numbers of people—and had terrorists interdicted state and local organizations. or destroyed the package to increase mortality, the outcome might have been different. Medical Support With the arrival of a stockpile package, few To respond to the threat of bioterrorism, law enforcement agencies would be capable of plans should be developed to increase the capac- maintaining public order long enough to distrib- ity of the Laboratory Response Network. The De- ute vaccines under chaotic conditions. Ultimately, partment of Defense could contribute by enlarg- the Departments of Defense and Homeland Secu- ing the number of level-four labs and connecting rity must jointly recommend appropriate changes them with Federal information systems to im- in contingency planning to integrate military as- prove rapid diagnostics and report attacks. Such sets into the distribution of stockpile packages. capabilities are located at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease at Fort The Department of Defense is not yet pre- Dietrich, Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, pared to address the consequences of events that Southwest Foundation in San Antonio, and Na- employ weapons of mass destruction or asymmet- tional Institutes of Health in Bethesda. To de- ric attacks with conventional means. Detection crease the time required for a sample from a sus- and containment capabilities are limited in this pected terrorist attack to be positively identified, area. Integrated planning, training, exercises, and the Department of Defense and Centers for Dis- evaluation have been discussed but not fully im- ease Control must improve existing facilities on plemented. Most importantly, there is no com- the west coast such as the Madigan Army Medical mon understanding of the relationship among Facility at Fort Lewis and in the midwest or de- prevention, preparation, and response. To over- velop new capabilities. If population density is a come the ambiguities in its mission, the defense factor, then the demographics of California, community must be able to immediately respond Texas, and Oregon demand that level-four labora- in support of Federal, state, and local authorities. tories be located in these regions as well. It should expand its policy on antiterrorism by By locating more facilities in key areas, the leveraging expertise in WMD to prevent any fu- Departments of Defense and Health and Human ture act of terrorism. By so doing, it can protect Services will bolster the number of qualified epi- the Nation and manage the consequences of an demiological experts, reduce the lag time between asymmetric terrorist attack. JFQ discovering and identifying an agent, enhance communicating diagnostic information, and improve the probability of containing a biological attack before it becomes pandemic. To ameliorate the consequences of nerve agents, biological pathogens, or chemical agents,

issue thirty-five / JFQ 41 Disengaging from

Marines fighting fires in Salmon, Idaho.

Consequence J. Mielke)Marine Division Combat Camera (Tyler d 2 Management

By JOEL D. CUSKER, CHARLES H. HASH, MARY E. LANDRY, and

DALLAS D. OWENS

lmost twenty years ago, Caspar Wein- objectives, a continuing reassessment of the rela- berger defined the uses of military tionship between force structure and objectives, a power in remarks made before a reasonable assurance of popular support, and the A luncheon meeting at the National appeal to the use of force only as a last resort. Press Club. The Secretary of Defense outlined six One does not have to be a fan of the so-called conditions to be met before committing troops Weinberger doctrine to appreciate the benefit of overseas. They required that any decision that ending military operations in a timely and deci- put the Armed Forces in harm’s way must be sive manner. Leaders value planning that enables based on vital national interests, a clear determi- disengaging from one operation and deploying to nation to win, well-defined political and military another. And the same capability is valued in domestic assistance. Indeed, it is notable that the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Colonel Joel D. Cusker, ARNG, is a recipient of the U.S. Army MacArthur has registered his reluctance to commit military Leadership Award; Colonel Charles H. Hash, USA, is a strategic planner assets to aid civilian authorities without a clear in the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; Captain Mary E. Landry, exit strategy. Although planning is a scarce com- USCGR, is commanding officer, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office; modity during the early stages of such operations, and Colonel Dallas D. Owens, USAR, is an analyst with the Strategic part of the process should be dedicated to exit Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. planning as well as engagement planning.

42 JFQ / issue thirty-five Cusker et al.

First responders at McGuire Air Force Base. Communications Squadron (ScottCommunications Squadron H. Spitzer) th 305

Like disengaging from overseas commitments, and move on. Accordingly, operations are well exiting domestic missions is not exclusively a mili- served by plans that enable quick partial or total tary decision. But while the Armed Forces are sup- disengagement for redeployment. porting partners, they need not be passive. Active Next, the goal of Federal agencies in the re- interagency partnerships are essential in creating sponse plan is assisting overwhelmed state and an effective disengagement strategy. local governments. Ideally, military support ends as a community returns to normal, perhaps with Exit Strategies state help, and is able to perform emergency serv- In a high-end assistance requirement such as ices needed to save lives, protect property, and consequence management involving weapons of transition to recovery operations. If the military mass destruction, responding is the first priority. stays longer than required it violates the spirit of However, exit strategies the Federal response plan, the letter of agreement if the military stays longer than are also essential in three among participating agencies, and assumptions required it violates the spirit of ways: ensuring that mili- that justify assistance to state and local govern- tary support is available ments. It can also hamper the return to normalcy, the Federal response plan for other domestic or thereby doing a disservice to the people targeted foreign emergencies, en- for assistance. hancing return to normalcy in the disaster area, Finally, effective civil-military efforts de- and maintaining civil-military relations. pend on forthright relationships among civilian First, active or Reserve assets responding to and military agencies. State and local authorities events involving weapons of mass destruction must understand what the U.S. Government can will likely come from a variety of units, some do, including the limits on military assistance. dedicated to consequence management, some Exit planning can deflect false expectations with expertise in responding to weapons of mass among state and local officials and the general destruction as a primary mission, and many with population on the quality, magnitude, and dura- dual or no explicit missions in this area. If units tion of assistance. No one, especially citizens in involved in such a mission are required else- supported areas, should be surprised when the where, it will take time to disengage, reconstitute, military decreases and then ends support. A timely exit avoids competition between business and government agencies. In addition, particularly for the military, staying too long can risk

issue thirty-five / JFQ 43 ■ CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

works and engineering (function 3) and as support agency for other functions. The plan addresses only those disengaging Federal agencies responsible for managing assistance to state and local agencies. Disengagement naturally focuses on completing emergency support requirements and releasing agencies with primary responsibility for coordination of that function. The plan designates a lead organization, normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and a Federal coordinating officer, the senior official in charge of support. This officer, normally selected from a pool of designated, trained, and experienced officials, has responsibility for disengaging the Federal agencies called on to support an event. Now part of the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA is likely to remain responsible for providing Federal coordinating officers to execute consequence management. The life cycle of a consequence management event is largely responsible for the dual role of the Department of Defense. Early in an incident, a fast and massive response is necessary across several emergency support functions. Primary agencies may exhaust their organic assets or more likely cannot mobilize or contract for resources to respond quickly and thus will call on the military to meet some or all of the requirements. Concur- rently, the military must provide its own support. Communications Squadron (ScottCommunications Squadron H. Spitzer) th Logically, a disengagement strategy should return 305 responsibility for emergency support functions to Disaster control group, the primary Federal agency or complete the re- September 2001. quirement, whichever occurs first. This transition resentment, constitutional issues, and violations becomes complex when eleven functions are sup- of civil liberties. ported, each at different stages of completion or Contributions and ownership must be transition to a primary agency. shared by all parties for an exit plan to be effec- Determining the status of a function requires tive. In consequence management, the military coordination among at least three parties: the Fed- plan must be integral to the overall Federal en- eral coordinating officer, primary agency, and de- gagement and disengagement strategy, which in fense coordinating officer. Large operations may turn is linked to the request for assistance by state require establishing a joint task force, but the de- and local governments. The engagement strategy fense coordinator would remain the point of con- is embodied in the Federal response plan. The De- tact for the Federal coordinating officer. It is rea- partment of Defense has clearly defined responsi- sonable to expect, depending on the magnitude of bilities. In large and complex operations, its role the event and local capabilities, that this initial is more critical as a supporter of other agencies. supporting effort for the eleven emergency sup- The primary and support responsibilities dictate port functions will be a sizable requirement that dual exit strategies, each with peculiar inter- the Department of Defense is anxious to end. Yet agency relationships. it is during this phase that the military contribution is unique, because no other agency can mobi- Federal Response lize the requisite assets as quickly or efficiently. The process and structure for delivering assis- The follow-on disengagement is obviously tance to address major disasters are contained in secondary to providing immediate emergency the Federal response plan, which designates pri- services. Assistance for public works and engineer- mary and support responsibilities of emergency ing (function 3) comes from the Army Corps of agencies and functions. The Department of De- Engineers as lead agency. In support of other func- fense serves as the primary agency for public tions, the Department of Defense relies on units with specialized or general support equipment.

44 JFQ / issue thirty-five Cusker et al.

Observation base, Afghanistan. Signal Company (Milton H. Robinson) th 55

Sometimes unskilled personnel are needed, but at for Federal assistance, the plans do not directly af- other occasions a few technicians are adequate. In fect disengagement; rather requests become part all cases, the defense coordinator remains the sin- of the initial input to the Federal disengagement gle DOD point of contact and requests appropriate plan. Authorities give input to the Federal coordi- military personnel and equipment. nating officer in many forms, including amended In recent years the disaster life cycle has be- requests. All input is an important source of in- come fairly predictable for types and magnitudes formation for disengagement criteria and plans. of events. According to an experienced coordinating officer, and confirmed by recent consequence Current Strategies management efforts, the The Federal response plan is not intended to the Federal response plan is emergency response stage provide details of disengagement for agencies and with heaviest defense components of the U.S. Government. Because the not intended to provide details commitments should last Department of Defense is one of several support of disengagement for agencies no more than 90 days. agencies, its disengagement is only partially self- of the U.S. Government Disasters could be greater determined and depends largely on state and in magnitude and less local requests and taskings by the lead agency, predictable than events in under the direction of the Federal coordinator, di- the past. But after three months other Federal rectly or through another agency. It has devel- agencies generally have time to organize, contract, oped a number of documents that provide guid- and begin recovery rather than simply managing ance for affecting how that support should be consequences. Defense contributions in recovery provided and ended. operations are few and are rejected as a conse- At the highest levels, there is concern over quence management mission. Function 3 activi- disengagement because it is situation-dependent. ties are likely to last longer, but their level is gen- The Pentagon does not publish a plan for disen- erally low and routine for the Corps of Engineers. gaging from the consequence management of State and local agencies may have plans, or events involving weapons of mass destruction, at least expectations, on how and when Federal but related issues are addressed in DOD Directive agencies disengage. But after submitting requests 3025.1, which provides the response structure, agency relationships, transition strategies, and leadership responsibilities. This directive clarifies

issue thirty-five / JFQ 45 ■ CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Battling blaze, Barksdale Air Force Base. U.S. Air Force (RobertU.S. Air Force Hortsman)

disengagement planning and gives the Federal co- changes have outpaced the publication cycle. The ordinator overall responsibility for operational most recent draft contains a single paragraph on phases, including disengagement. Similarly, the termination under planning considerations and Office of the Secretary of Defense or its executive notes that “termination of military support...is agent—with the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern Com- a sensitive phase that requires detailed planning” mand, and Directorate of Military Support on the and that the agreed endstate defines when forces Army Staff (a function that is being transferred to will be disengaged. The endstate is unlikely to be the Joint Staff)—will appoint a defense coordina- determined until the danger recedes and critical tor as part of the requirement for defense assis- services are restored. It will be evident when local tance. Under the Federal coordinator, this officer authorities are able to assume responsibility for will orchestrate disengagement based on original the operation and, together with FEMA, consider and amended requests for assistance. the incident under control. This publication con- If the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS) tends that disengagement criteria have an objec- has command responsibility, the defense coordina- tive (capabilities) basis while recognizing the tor may be under its operational control, but this value of political consensus (subjective) basis. still implements disengagement. Recent initiatives, The implementation plan reiterates that suc- such as the appointment of the Assistant Secretary cessful disengagement and the transition to civil of Defense for Homeland Defense and establish- authority are key to the JTF–CS mission and re- ment of U.S. Northern Command, may lead to a quires detailed planning and execution. It also dramatic reorganization, though one theme seems states that the task force will not remain to con- immune from change: the Federal coordinator duct recovery operations, defined as long-term must continue to be provided with a single DOD cleanup and relief efforts that are the responsibil- point of contact. It does not matter to which ity of local and state authorities. The plan also rec- agency the coordinating officer belongs as long as ognizes the importance of identifying the endstate he represents the Pentagon with one voice. criteria for disengagement. The endstate should be Joint Publication 3-07.7, Doctrine for Civil based on agreements between the lead agency and Support, has been a work in progress for several combatant command before assigning forces. All years, but the recent structural and conceptual parties must agree that local authorities can assume operational responsibility before Joint Task Force-Consequence Management will redeploy.

46 JFQ / issue thirty-five Cusker et al.

Aeromedical evacuation, Hurricane Lili. Communications Squadron (Laura Smith) Communications Squadron d 2

The first JTF commander stated that disen- may be “expressed in terms of percentage of pre- gagement is important but likely to be difficult. disaster capability by specific function; for exam- He also outlined a disengagement policy: begin ple, 70 percent of electrical power restored.” The developing a strategy as soon as the joint task standard should represent the threshold by which force gets a tasking for civil support. In general, the community agrees to have services restored to the criteria will call for creating a stabilized envi- an acceptable level that can be sustained without ronment—moving from crisis to routine re- Federal assistance. sponses to requests for assistance. This process involves determining that civilian agencies can Response Context perform their functions. More specific criteria The Federal coordinating officer ultimately will be established to fit the event. He noted that makes decisions on disengagement. The issue is “We will look to FEMA to be our advocate for dis- ensuring that he has the understanding, motiva- engagement.”1 tion, and means to plan the effort. Understand- The Domestic Operational Law Handbook of- ing has been discussed, and FEMA has the mis- fers pragmatic rather than legal advice.2 Like sion to meet this requirement. Motivation prior other sources, it recommends establishing end- to the event is found in the Federal response states to mark the completion of disaster assis- plan, which serves as the mission statement for tance missions and understand community ob- coordinating officers, the urgency of being pre- jectives. Elaborating on endstates the handbook pared to perform on short notice, and the respon- indicates that they must be attainable, developed sibility derived from being the steward of scarce from the national to the lowest level, and offer a lifesaving emergency response assets. After the road map to follow. Perhaps as important, it event, it is found in the specific requests for assis- states that “the affected population must know tance, the mandate to return the communities to when military operations will cease and local sup- normalcy, and the need to manage the demands port organizations are to continue the mission.” from local and state agencies and services pro- The handbook also recommends that termi- vided by a mix of public and private agencies. nation standards quickly be set that are objective, measurable, and understood by all players. They

issue thirty-five / JFQ 47 ■ CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

The means for planning exist in the numerous But planning for only the worst case may over- teams, groups, and officials that assist the coordi- look an opportunity to disengage quickly, at least nating officer. partially. Handoff also enables other agencies to ■ The catastrophic disaster response group is com- fulfill their responsibilities and supports the in- posed of representatives from all Federal agencies and tent of the Federal response plan. operates on the national level to provide guidance and Both Federal and defense coordinating offi- policy direction on response coordination and opera- cers are essential in maximizing disengagement tional issues arising from Federal coordinating officer strategies. If they recognize the duality of defense and emergency support functions response activities. It consequence management missions, they can is normally located at FEMA headquarters. plan to disengage by handoff or functional com- ■ The disaster field office is the primary venue in pletion. That recognition will make handoff more affected states for coordinating response and for coor- likely by highlighting the responsibilities of other dinating officers to collocate, along with Federal agency regional representatives and state and local liai- agencies and supporting a characterization of the son officers. DOD role as a notional ready reserve but not as ■ The emergency response team is the principal the force provider of first resort.3 interagency group supporting the Federal coordinating Coordinators are more likely to recognize the officer in the overall operation, located at the disaster dual DOD mission when it is emphasized in doc- field office. trinal and training publications. The key docu- ■ The Federal coordinating officer information ments need to be revised to increase emphasis on and planning section collects, processes, analyzes, and disengagement and expand strategies to include disseminates information to support planning and de- disengagement by handoff. cisionmaking on both the field and headquarters lev- Revising documents is only the first step; els. It has a large section from the emergency response team and a smaller one from the emergency support training is equally important. But formal training team at the FEMA emergency information and coordi- for defense coordinating officers consists of a nation center. two-week overview supplemented by the continental army where they command the training All four assets are vital for Federal coordina- support brigade. Exercises reinforce training. Both tion, with information and planning being the types of disengagement strategy should ideally be logical lead agent for the exit strategy. This sec- part of this process. They provide the opportunity tion is located on the national and local levels for interagency players to understand the com- and has contact with interagency representatives, plexity of negotiating disengagement. including the local defense coordinating officer. Most importantly, FEMA, with support from They also have access to other agencies and its parent organization, the state and local responders leaders understand the Department of Homeland Security, should define and sources of information importance of disengagement disengagement criteria under the response plan. about recovery needs and Provisions should be made to ensure that the lead and developing a strategy activities, are collocated in agency establishes a disengagement planning cell the operations section of with governmental and nongovernmental agen- the Federal coordinating office, and normally are cies that have stakes in consequence manage- in continual contact with the defense operations ment. Without the emphasis of the lead Federal section. The information and planning section agency and coordinating officer, subordinate needs training to maximize its value for disen- agencies can do little for a successful transition. gagement planning. Planning cell guidance should establish measura- Effective Strategy ble standards for disengagement, monitor and measure progress toward meeting the standards, Generally leaders understand the impor- adjust standards based on changes to requests for tance of disengagement and developing a strat- assistance, and inform all parties of the standards egy. Doctrinal documents on each level note the and timetable for decreasing and ending support. significance and sensitivity of disengagement. The Department of Defense should follow the Doctrine treats it on the functional level, as if lead of the response plan by ensuring that it can the department was the lead in performing emer- fully support the disengagement cell. Joint Task gency support functions rather than providing Force-Consequence Management should take the support. That approach neglects the duality of doctrinal lead by expanding its implementation responsibility and results in disengagement crite- plan and ensuring that the final Joint Pub ria focused on only fulfilling functions; it over- 3-07.7 has an expanded disengagement strategy. sees disengagement by handing off to other agencies. Fulfilling these functions is a worst case approach and has merit if functions are performed before lead agencies prepare to handoff.

48 JFQ / issue thirty-five Cusker et al. DOD (R.D. Ward) Ground Zero.

The establishment of the Department of of Federal agencies. Exercising disengagement ful- Homeland Security provides an additional forum fills consequence management and demonstrates for policy level interaction among Federal agen- that a community can both respond to a disaster cies and other parties. The Department of De- and then return to functioning normally. JFQ fense has representation on all levels of homeland security committee work. It is imperative This article is based on a paper written by the authors that this new structure address policy issues but while attending the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. recognize that current relationships for executing consequence management are working well, espe- NOTES cially between Federal and defense coordinators. Care should be taken to strengthen this corner- 1 Interview with Brigadier General Bruce Lawlor, Feb- stone of effective interagency cooperation. ruary 8, 2000, Washington. 2 Peter Menk and Marsha Mills, Domestic Operations Law Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: Center for Law and It is important to exercise disengagement. Military Operations, U.S. Army Office of the Judge Ad- Without practice, state and local leaders are not vocate General, 1999). likely to trust the process or be prepared to sup- 3 Bradley Graham and Bill Miller, “Pentagon Debates port disengagement planning. And without trust Homeland Defense Roles,” The Washington Post (Febru- in the process, they are less apt to establish disen- ary 11, 2002), p. 6. gagement criteria or reach consensus on sched- ules. If local leaders are confident that the public and private sectors can resume support functions, they will be more inclined to accept the departure

issue thirty-five / JFQ 49 Charting New Seas Northrop Grumman Northrop Navy-Coast Guard Cooperation

By CHARLES S. HAMILTON II and PATRICK M. STILLMAN

he Navy and Coast Guard have a tradi- Thomas Collins, have updated this policy to syn- tion of collaboration that goes back chronize multimission platforms, infrastructure, more than two centuries to their ori- and personnel to gain the highest level of naval T gins as sea services. Faced with an un- and maritime capability. precedented threat after 9/11, they have made The Coast Guard postponed decommission- major strides in force recapitalization and trans- ing 13 coastal patrol ships and offered them with formation. This relationship was forged in the crews for homeland security missions in ports, National Fleet Policy Statement in 1998. The Chief harbors, and coastal areas. The two services also of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, and met to align homeland security, defense roles, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral and other responsibilities. This collaboration has improved global intelligence by the establish- Rear Admiral Charles S. Hamilton II, USN, serves as deputy program ment of an all-force maritime tracking operation. executive officer for ships and formerly commanded USS O’Brien; For example, working with the Coast Guard, the Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, USCG, is program executive officer of Navy is developing a global intelligence picture to the integrated deepwater system acquisition and formerly commanded track ship movements at sea, which Clark be- the barque Eagle. lieves shows profound results.

50 JFQ / issue thirty-five Hamilton and Stillman

Beyond operational cooperation, both serv- Iraqi Freedom. Both manifested improvements in ices are seeking greater overall collaboration in joint warfighting doctrine, including large-scale the future. They signed a memorandum of under- special operations, tactical agility, and interser- standing in 2002 and established a working group vice cooperation; more accurate, lethal, and to identify common elements in developing the abundant all-weather precision-guided munitions national security cutter, offshore patrol cutter, to enable effects-based targeting; and the devel- and other platforms for the integrated deepwater opment of a netted force with the C4ISR systems system (IDS) and the littoral combat ship (LCS). to enable responsive decisionmaking and effec- The Navy contribution to this effort is envi- tive force employment. Transformational devel- sioned as a small, fast, agile, and networked war- opments generate a significant force multiplier ship optimized for a variety of littoral missions. It for naval and other forces even when legacy plat- is key to next-generation surface combatants that forms are employed—compounding fighting include the multimission destroyer and guided- power, flexibility, and speed of response in the missile cruiser. The focused-mission littoral com- battlespace. The Chairman maintains that this bat ship will use a reconfigurable platform or sea trend is redefining the American way of war—a frame to deploy modules and warfighting capabil- shift from the strategy of annihilation that ities to meet littoral operational requirements. guided operations during the Civil War and The 20-year deepwater program is a $17 bil- World War II to a new model described as “wag- lion (in FY98 dollars) integrated effort by the ing precise and focused war.” Coast Guard to upgrade surface and air assets Coalition forces in Iraq demonstrated their while developing more capable platforms, includ- flexibility by adapting a war plan quickly when ing improved systems for confronted with rapidly changing circumstances. the Navy and Coast Guard have command, control, com- This flexibility characterized nearly every aspect munications, computers, of operations—from the insertion of Special Op- no alternative but to transform intelligence, surveillance, erations Forces inside Iraq to the seaborne de- in a way that ensures and reconnaissance ployment and support of ground forces, use of (C4ISR) and advanced lo- large numbers of precision-guided munitions and operational excellence gistic capabilities. When long-range cruise missiles delivered by aircraft fully implemented, the and launched from surface ships and submarines, total integrated deepwater system will consist of and deployment of soldiers and marines fighting three classes of cutters and associated small boats, dangerous three-block wars during a 350-mile upgraded fixed-wing aircraft, new and upgraded dash from the Kuwaiti coast to Baghdad. Fortu- helicopters, and cutter- and land-based un- nately, network-centric C4ISR systems linked manned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Coalition forces and provided land, sea, and air Separate but related ship acquisitions are commanders with the situational awareness to charting new seas to recapitalize maritime forces move quickly inside the decision loop of isolated and transform their operational capabilities in re- and fragmented Iraqi commanders, making it im- sponse to 21st century requirements. The defense possible for them to keep up with the tempo. acquisition process is also being transformed. The Coast Guard participated in the opera- This cooperative venture is critical to realizing a tion, deploying two high-endurance cutters, eight totally interoperable fleet. patrol boats, a buoy tender, four port-security units, strike-team personnel, and two mainte- The New Way of War nance support units to the Arabian Gulf and Military transformation is proceeding apace. Mediterranean. The presence of white, black, and The Navy and Coast Guard—indeed all the serv- gray hulls is another reminder of joint warfare ices—have no alternative but to transform as they today. Speaking to the Navy League, Clark praised recapitalize by adopting bold new concepts and the Coast Guard for its role in global port security accelerating the rate of affordable change in a since 9/11. way that ensures continued high levels of opera- Military contingencies over the past decade tional excellence. One definition of transforma- have demonstrated that the littorals—especially tion holds that it is the productive integration of in the Mediterranean, northern Arabian Sea, and technological change. The Chairman argues that western Pacific—loom large in the convergence of transformation involves more than technology; it national economic and security interests. The is a process and mindset entailing intellectual, likelihood of regional conflict, heightened sensi- cultural, and technological dimensions. tivity over sovereign rights of other nations, and In endeavoring to transform the maritime transnational threats to security suggest that sea- forces, it is useful to consider recent operations. basing capabilities will become increasingly vital. The steady transformation since the Persian Gulf War was apparent during Enduring Freedom and

issue thirty-five / JFQ 51 ■ CHARTING NEW SEAS

■ reevaluating warfighting attributes based on their ability to access and contribute to larger information networks, shared situational awareness, and speed of command ■ networking, including partnerships ■ deterring forward—developing high rates of change that an enemy cannot outpace and that require forces oriented around speed of deployment, organization, employment, and sustainment. “The entry fee for a deter-forward force,” as Cebrowski wrote, “is a network-centric structure, organizations, and understanding of the theory of war for the information age.” As Iraqi Freedom was demonstrating combat advantages of the Armed Forces to the world, the Secretary of Defense issued Transformational Plan-

U.S. Coast Guard (ZachU.S. Coast Guard Zubricki) ning Guidance. In offering a clear vision, he noted USCGC James Renkin that the military must “think differently and de- patrolling Baltimore velop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can Harbor. This outlook underscores the importance of adapt quickly to new challenges and to unex- transforming naval forces to ensure continued pected circumstances....We must promote an and uninterrupted access to the littorals. A na- entrepreneurial approach . . . one that encourages tional fleet with new cutters, littoral combat ships, people to be proactive, not reactive, and antici- and other deepwater assets designed for seamless pates threats before they emerge.” interoperability will be a force multiplier across a The littoral combat ship and deepwater sys- range of missions, including force protection, tem-of-systems force structure will provide the ca- power projection, and maritime intercept. Littoral pabilities to ensure that the national fleet is a combat ships are relevant to future Navy require- deter-forward force. Each program is advancing in ments while the Coast Guard seeks to leverage a way that conforms with defense policy and them as part of deepwater recapitalization. planning guidance for transformation. The objectives of the transformational The Transformation Imperative roadmap underpin Navy-Coast Guard collabora- According to the director of the Office of tion to achieve fully interoperable, compatible, Force Transformation, Vice Admiral Arthur and complementary forces that share the respon- Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), the United States must sibility to meet national maritime security and not only sustain the current pace of transforma- defense needs in a highly cost-effective way. tion to retain its advantage in future combat operations, but also outpace current and potential A Common Effort enemies: “We must recognize power is moving to According to the President, transformation a system level while violence migrates downward will yield a force “defined less by size and more to the level of individuals.” He has emphasized by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to de- the steps which the Armed Forces must take as: ploy and sustain, [and also] one that relies more ■ creating the future by coevolving technology, heavily on stealth, precision weaponry, and infor- organizations, and processes mation technologies.” This process is viewed in

Transformation Planning Guidance

■ Transforming how we fight—developing joint warfighting concepts that include the full range of supporting military capability areas ■ Transforming how we do business—planning and business practices such as adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, future-oriented capabilities-based resource-allocation planning process, accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development, output-based management, and a reformed analytic support agenda ■ Transforming how we work with others—integrating military power with other instruments of national power; working with other departments to share information on transformation programs to help guarantee compatibility and encourage other agencies to follow suit as appropriate—including arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming U.S. capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities. JFQ [The full text of this planning guidance is found at http://www.oft.osd.mil/.]

52 JFQ / issue thirty-five Hamilton and Stillman

The Coast Guard contribution to the national fleet includes its statutory authorities (including law enforcement), multimission cutters, boats, aircraft, and C4ISR systems designed for the full range of Coast Guard missions. In general, LCS design will be optimized to assure access and the ability to exploit littoral waters as maneuver space for naval, joint, and combined expeditionary forces. Each ship will also be configured to focus on countering one of three proliferating, asymmetric threats—mines, diesel submarines, and small, fast surface craft—and will be capable of performing other assignments such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), homeland defense, special operations, or logistic support. The primary mission capabilities will be addressed with a mix of manned and unmanned Littoral combat ship. systems (vehicles or sensors) deployed on, above, or under the sea. The littoral combat ship will be unlike previous surface combatants; it will be General Dynamics small, displacing 1,000–4,000 tons; fast, with speeds up to 50 knots; and optimized for shallow water with a maximum draft of 20 feet. the transformational planning guidance as shap- Spiral development and evolutionary up- ing “the changing nature of military competition grades will be achieved by exchanging modular and cooperation through new combinations of mission payloads or packages that are plugged concepts, capabilities, peo- into an open-systems architecture designed for the littoral combat ship will ple, and organizations...to accessibility and interoperability with other ship sustain our strategic posi- and system components. Readily transportable be small, fast, and optimized tion.” This planning guid- packages will provide sensors and combat systems for shallow water with a ance offers a concise ap- in each littoral combat ship based on a desig- proach for transforming by nated mission as determined by the assigned maximum draft of 20 feet identifying critical elements, naval or joint force commander. assigning roles and responsi- Modular, open architecture is a sea change in bilities, describing new organizational structures, designing surface combatants, operationally em- and depicting desired outcomes. This effort in- ployed, and technologically upgraded. Platforms cludes three areas that are directly correlated with will act as seaframes (the naval equivalent of air- Navy and Coast Guard recapitalization programs. frames) to deliver specific payloads and tailored The national fleet policy provides specific capabilities for users. Mission packages will be de- goals for linking the integrated deepwater system vised independently of the seaframe and accom- to the littoral combat ship program. Implementa- panied by operations and maintenance personnel tion of this guidance will transform collaboration trained to accomplish the assigned warfighting between the two services by stipulating: mission task and ensure continued performance ■ commitment to shared purpose and common of mission modules. effort focused on tailored operational integration of The reconfigurable LCS design will allow service multimission platforms, infrastructure, and per- modules to be removed and replaced without sonnel putting ships into dry dock, cutting holes, modi- ■ full cooperation and integration of nonredun- fying codes, or running cables and piping dant and complementary capabilities to ensure the through the hull and superstructure. Each mis- highest level of maritime readiness for the Nation sion payload will be engineered for incremental ■ processes to synchronize research and develop- upgrades of pre-installed systems and complete ment, planning, fiscal accountability, procurement, doctrine, training, and execution of operations for the change-out in theater. This modular mission ap- national fleet proach to sea combat capability also mitigates ■ ensuring ships, boats, aircraft, and command risk in adapting to emerging technologies by pro- and control ashore nodes of the national fleet will be viding a path for future technology insertion. De- interoperable to provide force depth for peacetime mis- veloped, tested, and evaluated in a process sepa- sions, homeland security, crisis response, and wartime rate and distinct from the actual LCS hull, the tasks.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 53 ■ CHARTING NEW SEAS

with crew rotations in theater. These ships will possess the speed and endurance to transit and operate with either carrier strike or expeditionary strike groups. For sustained operations, they will have both conventional underway and vertical replenishment capability and exploit automated and modular technologies for all at-sea and in- port material handling. The fully netted disposition of multimission ships is important in the operational construct for littoral combat ships. Additional combat support may be required from platforms with different modular mission packages, ground or sea- based tactical air, or multimission cruisers or destroyers in adjacent waters. Operating independently in LCS squadrons or with other platforms will extend capabilities to counter chal- lenging anti-access littoral threats while enabling U.S. Coast Guard (Tom Sperduto) (Tom U.S. Coast Guard larger naval, joint, or coalition task forces to fight Coast Guard port and win across the full range of conflict scenarios. security boat, Iraq. availability and affordability of the ship will not System of Systems be determined by the success or failure of a single For the Coast Guard, the integrated deepwa- developmental item or capability. ter system will lead to important changes in oper- To enhance survivability and operational ational capabilities and the acquisition process. agility, littoral combat ships will incorporate low- The award of the contract to Integrated Coast observable technologies and use evasive speed to Guard Systems (ICGS) in June 2002, a joint ven- maneuver quickly in and exploit littoral areas of ture between Northrop Grumman and Lockheed interest without being detected. By leveraging ad- Martin, marked a major milestone. vances from the next-generation multimission Unlike similar programs of the past, deepwa- destroyer program, the ships will be designed ter represents a system-of-systems approach to with integral acoustic quieting, noise monitoring, recapitalization by the Coast Guard that breaks and controlled magnetic, anti-mine signatures. new ground by implementing a performance- based acquisition model of extraordinary scope Operational Flexibility and complexity. ICGS serves as a full-industry Another transformational aspect of the lit- partner for the service. In the years ahead, legacy toral combat ship is its operational flexibility helicopters, aircraft, and patrol craft will be up- when a new mission capability is required in the- graded as more capable deepwater cutters, air- ater. Conceptually, a new modular mission pack- craft, and UAVs are introduced. age and its personnel detachment could be air- As the lead agency for maritime homeland lifted, transported, or prepositioned for delivery security, the Coast Guard plays a critical role in to a deployed ship and exchanged for old person- providing a layered defense to project U.S. bor- nel and equipment within days. ders out to sea from ports, waterways, and coastal With the capabilities of unmanned vehicles areas. Improving operational capabilities for this to both provide real-time intelligence and deliver security mission is an important element of Coast ordnance on target, littoral combat ships will have Guard strategy, and the deepwater program flight decks and support facilities for both these stands at center stage. vehicles and helicopters. Off-board vehicles will The program will provide operational capa- contribute to network-centric and combat support bilities, capacity, platforms, and systems that can operations, including rapid launch and recovery prevent attacks. Emerging requirements, especially of small boats or special operations craft. Like the those associated with maritime homeland secu- host ships, manned and unmanned vehicles alike rity, are being evaluated for inclusion in the pro- will feature integral modular-mission capabilities gram. In addition, its more capable platforms will through interchangeable vehicle payloads. also benefit traditional Coast Guard missions, in- Littoral combat ships will be manned with cluding maritime safety, protection of natural re- most personnel assigned to module detachments sources, maritime mobility, and national defense. and crew size determined by the modular mission. The optimal manning concept will permit ships to remain on station for extended periods

54 JFQ / issue thirty-five Hamilton and Stillman

Eagle Eye unmanned aerial vehicle. Bell Helicopter/ Textron

An interoperable deepwater C4ISR system The emphasis is placed on the industrial sec- will be a critical enabler for the Coast Guard in tor to assess the deepwater system and integrate developing maritime domain awareness—com- planning for asset comparability and interoper- prehensive information, intelligence, and knowl- ability while providing operational effectiveness edge of relevant entities in the maritime domain and affordability. Cost is regarded as an independ- that can affect the security, economy, and envi- ent variable in the acquisition program, which is ronment of the Nation. This awareness will con- essential for the Coast Guard to remain within the tribute to improved risk management, more pro- planned annual expenditure of $500 million (in ductive use of operational assets, and a common FY98 dollars) over the life of the program. operational picture. More capable platforms and ICGS partners in industry were provided the C4ISR will expand surveillance and detection ef- performance specifications needed to achieve sys- forts with assets that could also assist other agen- tem-wide capabilities. This allows industry to both cies as new joint competencies are forged. leverage state-of-the-market technology and bring The integrated logistics system will form a innovation and industrial capacity to bear most solid basis for transformation, driving platform effectively. Commercial items will be basic build- design that will result in higher operational readi- ing blocks for deepwater assets and components. ness, improved safety, and lower operating costs. The performance measurement plan, devel- This process demands an acquisition strategy of oped with Integrated Coast Guard Systems, will comparable vision and innovation. The deepwater measure and track performance against the basic mission calls for interoperable platforms and sup- requirement to maximize operational effective- porting systems to meet performance-based re- ness while minimizing total ownership costs. A quirements by maximizing operational effective- comprehensive mitigation strategy is in place to ness while minimizing total ownership costs. Its address risks associated with the program’s cost, needs statement outlines a systems solution to re- schedule, and performance. capitalization: “The goal of this effort is not to re- Enduring partnerships and joint competen- place ships, aircraft, and sensors with more ships, cies are another important factor in structuring aircraft, and sensors, but to provide the Coast the deepwater program. This interaction is under- Guard with the functional capabilities required to scored on all levels—from integrated product achieve mission success safely.” teams to relations between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security as well as other players, including allies and friends around the

issue thirty-five / JFQ 55 ■ CHARTING NEW SEAS

A similar vision guides the development of the deepwater plans to upgrade and modernize surface and air platforms and support the C4ISR system for the multiple Coast Guard missions. The latter will be a critical enabler for attaining maritime domain awareness—an essential ingredient of maritime homeland security. The deepwater C4ISR system will convey data among integrated deepwater system assets and other Federal, state, and local agencies. Just as FORCEnet will transform Navy operational capabilities by enabling decisionmaking and massed warfighting effects, deepwater transformation will result in platforms serving as nodes for shared information with command centers ashore, a potent force multiplier that will contribute directly to maritime domain awareness and a common operational picture. This network-centric vision translates into a

U.S. Navy consideration of working together to conduct Signing updated homeland security and defense missions. Terrorist National Fleet Policy threats make the coastal region of the maritime Statement. domain a geographic zone of immense impor- world. The Navy-Coast Guard partnership associ- tance. The transition from a homeland security ated with the transformational development and incident to a homeland defense emergency in lit- acquisition of the selected deepwater assets and toral waters could take place in minutes, not the littoral combat ship will be a work in progress hours. That said, all responsible Federal agencies for many years. and military services must possess seamless inter- Transformation Intersections operability and connectivity. Our services are on the road toward this end. As the Navy transforms forces, technologies, The agreement the Navy and Coast Guard and operating concepts within the framework of signed in 2002 established a working group to Sea Power 21, the Coast Guard integrated deepwa- specify common technologies, systems, and ter system recapitalization strategy offers a num- processes critical to the design and development ber of transformation of the deepwater national security cutter, offshore intersections where the the partnership associated with patrol cutter, and patrol boats as well as the lit- operational require- toral combat ship. This group holds regular ex- deepwater assets and the ments of each service changes on multiple levels to ensure that the overlap. littoral combat ship will be a services derive mutual benefits through a cooper- With regard to the ative technical approach. work in progress for many years national fleet, the foun- The characteristics of the littoral combat dation of Sea Power 21 ship could lead to a capable deepwater offshore rests with the network-centric capability that patrol cutter—a hull with double the speed now FORCEnet and systems such as cooperative en- contemplated. Adding 25 Coast Guard bottoms gagement capability offer commanders—an evo- based on this design would complement Navy lutionary but dramatic transition to a force that shipbuilding. LCS modular mission packages, on can share digital tactical information and sensor deepwater hulls as dictated by operational re- data seamlessly among ground, surface, sub- quirements, would amplify the national fleet merged, air, and space platforms that are broadly multiplier effect. Logistic commonality would dispersed across an operational theater. allow both services to leverage maintenance and FORCEnet, an operational construct and ar- support programs to achieve mutual efficiencies. chitectural framework for naval warfare, will inte- One possible outcome is that littoral combat grate sensors, weapons, networks, and platforms ships could become white-hulled with a Coast to give commanders more accurate battlespace Guard stripe; another is that they could be awareness and information dominance. It will painted gray with platforms configured for spe- provide the means and context for projecting a cialized systems and modular force packages. real-time, common operational picture to all battle force assets aimed at achieving advantages in tactical engagement speed, accuracy, and range.

56 JFQ / issue thirty-five Hamilton and Stillman

USCGC Midgett alongside USS Constellation U.S. Coast Guard (Alice Sennott) U.S. Coast Guard

Moreover, allies could define their own require- and identifying targets of interest, enabling im- ments, thus making littoral combat ships interna- portant contributions to maritime domain aware- tional assets. This synergy would support na- ness. This air asset could be deployed aboard lit- tional fleet policy with common technologies, toral combat ships or other vessels. systems, and processes for a network-centric, interoperable force. In the evolution of naval forces, there has Interservice cooperation in replacing obso- rarely been an opportunity to design future fleets. lete medium- and high-endurance cutters could Acquisition strategies usually consist of progres- be extended to future mission systems. In Febru- sive system upgrades and class-by-class platform ary 2003, Bell Helicopter was awarded a contract recapitalization. This approach has changed in re- to begin concept and preliminary design on the cent years with the chance to transform in ways vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial ve- that were difficult to envision a generation ago. hicle. Eagle Eye will be deployed on board new Advances in materials, technologies, and systems deepwater offshore patrol and national security offer unparalleled openings to infuse innovative cutters as well as Famous class medium-endurance capabilities in networked and distributed forces. legacy cutters. Their projected completion in The Navy and Coast Guard are committed not 2006 will coincide with delivery of the first na- only to a partnership in creating a national fleet, tional security cutter. Up to four vehicles can be but in reforming the acquisition process. JFQ deployed on each cutter, or two may deploy jointly when a helicopter is embarked. Eagle Eye will be able to accept modular mission payloads. With a planned endurance of 6.2 hours and dash airspeed of 220 knots, it will improve detection, surveillance, and monitoring capacity across the fleet. Extending shipboard capabilities will enhance the process of classifying

issue thirty-five / JFQ 57 Linking Conventional

Special Forces and Special in Baghdad. Operations Forces U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock)

By RONALD S. MANGUM

he Armed Forces have consistently based on national source real-time intelligence, demonstrated their skill in conducting are the wave of the future. joint operations. However, their capa- The interface between special operations and T bility exists almost exclusively on the conventional forces on the division and corps operational level. To cope with nonstate enemies level is a critical seam in joint doctrine. Likewise, in the global war on terrorism, jointness must ex- the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community tend down to the tactical level. Small and agile must examine its doctrinal interface at the seam joint units, self-sustaining or with reachback lo- between joint and combined operations. Exam- gistics, executing missions independently but ples from the Korean peninsula are useful because joint and combined forces operate there every Brigadier General Ronald S. Mangum, USAR, is commander of Special day in a standing theater of war. But the same Operations Command Korea and formerly served as commander, concepts are relevant for future conflicts in which 1st Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support).

58 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mangum

special operations and conventional forces will command and control structure.” In the joint work together. warfighting environment, however, it can operate with allied corps or division headquarters and be Doctrinal Synchronization composed of both U.S. and allied forces. Current Special Operations Forces typically function doctrine recognizes that augmentation may be on the operational and strategic levels but in real- needed, but it does not flesh out such augmenta- ity are tactical assets with a strategic impact. As tion well, nor are there routine opportunities to such they interface with conventional forces on train as a joint and combined force operating in a several levels. A joint special operations compo- joint and combined environment. nent command (JFSOCC) is a headquarters that For example, each field army in Korea is aug- provides liaison with other components. It has mented by a special operations command and planners, operators, and intelligence personnel at control element organized around a Special multiple points within a theater. Coordination Forces operational detachment in its headquar- and synchronization between special operations ters. The reality is that each field army is on the and conventional forces is key, not only to multi- coast, so ROK and U.S. Army Special Forces and ply the effects of friendly engagement but to pre- Navy SEALs, as well as Air Force aircrews and spe- vent fratricide among friendly units. Both tasks cial tactical squadron personnel, can be expected are more difficult in combined warfare. to operate in the area in front of the field army. One doctrinal connection in the area of re- Currently a special operations command and sponsibility of a corps or control element is composed exclusively of Army division on the opera- personnel and has little visibility outside its own SOCCE is staffed to control all tional and tactical levels area of responsibility. In Korea, Special Opera- Special Operations Forces in the is the special operations tions Command Korea combines with ROK Spe- command and control cial Warfare Command to form the combined un- field army area of responsibility element (SOCCE). As an conventional warfare task force during wartime. Army element, Special A special operations command and control Forces have traditionally been concerned only element may be augmented by Korean personnel with other Army SOF units. In joint and com- to provide language capability because the task bined warfare, however, it must coordinate all force has a combined forward operating base with SOF–Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied forces oper- the field army headquarters, which has a Korean ating within the area of responsibility of its sup- element that commands operational detachments ported unit. within the area of responsibility. Duplicating con- Within a corps or division area, Special Oper- trol mechanisms does not provide redundancy ations Forces come under SOF command and con- because the command and control element and trol, although in some situations they may be operating base do not coordinate their efforts. placed under the operational control of supported Thus only Army personnel synchronize the ef- commanders. Field Manual 3-05.2 stipulates that fects of Army-only teams (sometimes with Korean while Special Operations Forces are not usually in- forces) within the area of responsibility of the tegrated into conventional forces, it is necessary field army. Not only is the expertise of SOCCE for the “simultaneous or sequenced execution of personnel limited to Army functions, but the separate actions in time and space to achieve a communications package that accompanies this synergistic effect.” A special operations command element is set up to meet only the needs of the and control element is the doctrinal synchroniza- Army mission. Doctrine, training, and equipping tion organization with operational or tactical con- need to emphasize the joint special operations trol of Special Operations Forces in the area of re- part of the SOCCE title, so the element is staffed sponsibility of supported units and is also and trained to control all Special Operations equipped to provide communications with either Forces in the field army area of responsibility. JFSOCC or Special Forces group headquarters. In addition to staffing and equipping a com- Special operations command and control ele- mand and control element to accomplish the full ments are formed around an existing table of or- range of SOF control, a fully manned element ganization and equipment, such as a Special must train routinely as a unit to perform its mis- Forces company headquarters. In some situations sion. A one-time deployment to Korea for an ex- they may be organized around battalion head- ercise, anticipating that an element will garner quarters. The element arrives at the supported the requisite knowledge, is unrealistic. And to ex- headquarters with personnel and equipment for a pect it to grasp the complexities of the Korean minimum of 30 days. Traditionally this mission theater of operations during wartime courts disas- provides connectivity only with Special Forces in ter. The joint mission essential task list for each their role as “the primary and often the only di- Special Forces operational headquarters needs to rect link from the conventional forces to the SOF

issue thirty-five / JFQ 59 ■ SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Special operations boats, Iraqi Freedom. U.S. Navy (Arlo Abrahamson)

contain specific tasks for operating as a joint and artillery. Without closely monitoring the fire command and control element in a coalition en- support coordination line as it moves forward, vironment, and these headquarters need the op- fratricide is likely. The element needs access to portunity to train in that environment. the tactical operations center of the supported Although a special operations command and unit as well as real-time vision of the common control element may be rotated to the National operating picture. While there is no established Training Center, it is not situated at corps head- answer to locating an element, it may be advis- quarters, which has units in the training box, able to place it with the supported unit center. since the corps is a player control element in the This provides access to a supported unit com- control center. And collocating a command and mand structure. Separation from the special oper- control element turns it into a white cell element, ations coordination detachment, which is a staff making it part of the exercise control center and element at corps level or other supported unit, privy to all aspects of the exercise, both friendly may be advisable. The detachment performs staff and enemy, which eliminates any gain from par- functions, not command and control, and collo- ticipating as a player unit. This is a typical exer- cation will confuse roles and may deflect critical cise problem when the main units are conven- command issues. Moreover, the element must tional brigades or divisions. For an element to provide intelligence up and down the chain. Op- participate in its full mission profile, the exercise erational detachments in front of the corps or must have player units from the tactical to strate- army have eyes-on-target and can provide rele- gic level—for example, from battalion to theater vant intelligence to supported units. On the other army. Since that is costly, the SOF portion of the hand, a special operations command and control exercise often gets short shrift. element must ensure that intelligence reaches the detachments to assure their survival and mission The Task at Hand success. Intelligence may simply be intelligence, Perhaps the most critical task for a command but critical intelligence requirements are different and control element in synchronizing special op- at various locations on the battlefield. erations and conventional forces is preventing What conventional force commanders must fratricide among SOF units from close air support understand to fight a counterfire battle is not the same as what operational detachment commanders need to know to survive in the deep battle area. A special operations command and control

60 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mangum

element must be able to access not only conven- Requirements tional force intelligence, but also JFSOCC intelli- In a coalition environment, a special opera- gence products to ensure that feeds to deployed tions command and control element needs rou- Special Operations Forces are relevant. Naval Spe- tine joint augmentation. Foremost is a package cial Warfare Command maintains a mission sup- that can establish secure communication with port center in San Diego to provide real-time in- the theater special operations command, allied telligence to SEAL teams worldwide. The center forces, and theater command system, including does not eliminate the need for teams to get in- connectivity for the SEAL mission support center telligence feeds from the theater joint intelligence and other intelligence feeds, either directly or center through JFSOCC, but it is another source through JFSOCC. Communications with theater of specific intelligence. Command and control el- includes the ability to obtain the common rele- ements, however, must be able to access every vant operating picture. In Korea this means con- source that provides intelligence to its compo- nectivity to the Global Command and Control nents to ensure that both levels have the same System-Korea. picture of the battlefield. Thus these elements, or A special operations command and control at least JFSOCC, must be connected to national, element must have qualified linguists in a coali- theater, and center intelligence feeds. tion environment. Interpretation must not be left A special operations command and control simply to contract or military personnel who are element must also provide guidance to deployed native speakers. Not every bilingual person can forces as the situation changes. It must transmit think in two languages. In addition, knowledge fragmentary orders to de- of military terminology in both languages is criti- in a coalition environment, tachments to re-mission or cal. Doctrine may be difficult to translate without modify missions. As con- a special operations command detailed explanation. ventional forces approach Elements that will be expected to operate as and control element needs SOF team locations, the el- special operations command and control re- ement must plan to imple- routine joint augmentation sources in wartime need a habitual training and ment the linkup. This is working relationship. Expecting an element to de- perhaps the most danger- ploy to a theater as complicated as Korea and ous phase of the SOF mission as well as the phase function effectively on arrival is unrealistic. Korea that receives the least training and rehearsal. operates under three major command structures— When the deployed forces include elements of the combined ROK/U.S. Forces Command, United Special Forces units as well as SEALs, implement- Nations Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. Even ing the linkup is delicate and critical. Hence the after fifty years the two militaries are continually need for routine joint and combined augmenta- refining these multiple command and control tion and training. structures. Where will ammunition, intelligence, Finally, according to Field Manual 3-05.2, and air support come from? Such questions while a special operations command and control should not wait until combat is under way. Conse- element is not responsible for planning or execut- quently, besides defining a basic joint SOCCE ing civil affairs (CA) or psychological operations structure, we must assure that the structure rou- (PSYOP) activities except as incidental to its mis- tinely operates in its host nation environment. sion, both are performed by Special Operations Even if only some members have had that oppor- Forces and may be integral to the mission. Often tunity, there may be enough situational awareness overlooked as a force multiplier, PSYOP proved and personal relationships with the host military valuable in Desert Storm by encouraging Iraqi sol- to overcome cultural differences. diers to surrender and in Afghanistan by gaining the support of the civilian population. As soon as Personnel a semipermissive environment is established, CA To conduct joint and combined warfare, a units can assist in restoring governmental control special operations command and control ele- by helping rebuild infrastructure. Deployed Spe- ment must be configured for success. Personnel cial Forces teams are usually the first units in hos- will be chosen based on the mission and circum- tile areas and, if augmented by CA or PSYOP per- stances but would include—and each operational sonnel, can assess the needs for civil affairs detachment should train with—certain common support and determine the impact of psychologi- elements. Augmentation by Army and Air Force cal operations on enemy forces as well as civilian SOF aviation facilitates coordinated infiltration, populations. Consequently, augmenting an ele- exfiltration, and resupply missions by fixed and ment with CA and PSYOP personnel assists in ef- rotary wing air assets, with the joint special oper- fectively using a range of SOF capabilities. ations liaison element collocated with the air component command. If a command and control element has SEALs operating within its area

issue thirty-five / JFQ 61 ■ SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

MH–53 over firing range.

16th Special Operations Wing (Greg L. Davis)

of responsibility, it should have SEAL augmenta- Moreover, a command and control element tion as connectivity with the naval special war- is not doctrinally responsible for either planning fare command mission support center and the or conducting CA or PSYOP activities. That ex- naval special operations liaison element collo- pertise will be required as the battle unfolds, and cated with the naval component command the activities must be planned in advance. After headquarters. This latter element would be part the victory over the Taliban, coalition forces of a communications package for secure commu- looked to civil affairs units to provide humanitar- nications with higher and lower headquarters as ian relief before winter and rebuild the infrastruc- well as with theater and allied headquarters. ture before the population soured on the national Within a coalition, a special operations com- government and created conditions for a Taliban mand and control element should be augmented resurgence. When the U.S. military succeeds in with appropriate counterpart organizations from crushing enemy forces, PSYOP and CA assets are allied militaries as well as host nations. This will needed to consolidate the victory and avoid slip- require interpreters from every contributing na- ping back into hostile conditions. tion. In order to pass intelligence to allied forces, the element must have a trained foreign disclo- The Way Ahead sure officer. Allies cannot access critical intelli- Current doctrine must be reviewed in light gence without this augmentation. of the demand for special operations command and control elements in a joint and combined environment. Tasks must be developed and missions anticipated so forces are prepared to assume

62 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mangum

joint planning challenges first hand. The Joint Special Operations University should develop a program of instruction and exercise on joint manning. Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center rotations should include a joint special operations command and control element, but the exercise must be scripted to portray group interaction on the division, corps, and theater levels. Simulation exercises are a cost-effective way of training headquarters and staffs without the expense of deploying troops to the field, but they do not portray Special Operations Forces well. They concentrate on the main battle area, which is usually focused in time and terrain. Because Special Operations Forces normally operate deep in the battlespace, it becomes difficult to model the large terrain areas necessary to accommodate special operations and conventional forces in the same exercise. Without combining these two warfighting elements, however, realistic training for special operations command and control elements is lost. Consequently, the best full mission profile training is probably in conjunction with major joint exercises such as Ulchi Focus Lens. Yet because Korean units are practicing defending their territory while Special Operations Forces train to deploy in enemy territory, there is an arti- ficiality that must be bridged by careful scripting.

Getting the interface right between special operations and conventional forces on the tactical level is critical to the conduct of joint and combined warfare. Although Special Operations Forces are working jointly on the operational and strategic levels, they must be able to extend jointness to the tactical level by effectively staffing and training special operations command and control elements. JFQ Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (KatrinaFleet Combat Camera Group, Beeler) Conducting search and rescue. this responsibility. Beyond simply identifying the mission and tasks in doctrinal publications, forces must train to appropriate mission standards to accomplish their assignments. This consideration, along with habitual training relationships, is important to the transition to warfare in areas in which Special Operations Forces deploy. One way to increase the abilities of a special operations command and control element is including basics such as the Special Forces qualifica- tion course exercise to enable students to learn

issue thirty-five / JFQ 63 ■

The Evolution of Special Operations Joint Fires 1st Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron Allmon) By ERIC BRAGANCA

familiar complaint about Special Op- Freedom. The use of joint fires and air coordina- erations Forces (SOF) is that they are tion elements assured these successes and should not integrated with conventional provide a model for the future. A forces. Moreover, they are suspected Prior to Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, of regarding themselves as strategic assets. How- Special Operations Forces understood the need to ever, SOF leaders recognize that they support integrate joint fires. Doctrine indicates that SOF other forces—land, sea, air, and space—just as headquarters should include joint fires expertise those forces support special operations and one in mission planning and execution. But even another. This reality has led to the improvement after 9/11, those headquarters were reluctant to of special operations joint fires in Iraq, which is seek the support of outside joint fires in order to largely based on experiences in Afghanistan. keep operations small and light, and they did not Special Operations Forces made great fully understand what was missing. Initially, they progress in integrating joint fires by borrowing resisted this assistance on the tactical and opera- ideas from three distinct battlespaces during Iraqi tional levels, deploying teams without either terminal attack controllers or qualified operational planners and executers on their staffs. Major Eric Braganca, USAF, is an MH–53 pilot who is currently assigned However, based on a battlefield assessment, as a trainer for joint fires and personnel security with Special Special Operations Forces realized their errors and Operations Command at U.S. Joint Forces Command.

64 JFQ / issue thirty-five Braganca

an extensive approach to linking organic fires (artillery, missiles, and helicopters) with Air Force close air support and interdiction using tactical air control parties attached to units down to battalion level. The Marine Corps has a similar arrangement connecting its air and ground fires. The Navy links strike aviation and missiles with the other services. Each path goes through a joint air operations center to ensure that campaigns are synchronized. Special Operations Forces only are connected to each other, reinforcing a perception that they are fighting their own war. Between 1998 and 2001, this started to change. Prior to the war in Afghanistan, some headquarters realized the shortfall in operational fires Patrolling in west expertise through joint exercises and began to ad- Baghdad. dress it. However, the effort proved insufficient. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock) (JeremyU.S. Air Force T. and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, was being revised as the conflict in Afghanistan began and included details on the took corrective action. With the air component, fire support element, including coordinating they organized a small but effective team to inte- boundaries, representing special operations to grate operations. This cooperation became the agencies such as the joint targeting and coordina- model for Iraqi Freedom. But that operation was tion board, and preventing fratricide. This vol- much more complicated because SOF assets oper- ume also recommended a fire support annex to ated in three environments, each with unique in- the task force operation order and standard oper- tegration issues. These varied supported and sup- ating procedures. However, none of these were in porting relationships required unique solutions to place when operations began in Afghanistan, joint integration, and each serves as a model for thus lessons were learned through experience. future joint fires integration. Task Force Dagger, the initial joint special The next challenge is institutionalizing suc- operations task force for Afghanistan, was built cess. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were around a Special Forces group headquarters and fought with the same land, sea, air, and special faced problems using joint fires on the tactical operations components. While other theaters and operational levels. Teams deployed without have witnessed this success, they require details terminal attack controllers—Air Force troops on SOF advances to adapt their lessons for the trained and were certified to control close air sup- future. Special Operations Forces also play an im- port. Unsuccessful close air support in the first portant role in the global war on terrorism that few days of combat indicated the need for expert- transcends conventional boundaries and that ise, which led the task force commander to de- will require increased personnel, some of whom ploy trained ground controllers. They had an im- should reinforce joint fires. One aspect of this ca- mediate positive effect on the campaign. pability is the link between special operations Within days the Special Forces team had and conventional forces. U.S. Special Operations qualified terminal attack controllers. This posed Command (SOCOM) and the Air Force should problems when air-savvy ground controllers sent institutionalize the relationships among their air support requests to the task force. No one in subordinate commands to better respond to the the headquarters could handle integration—in- next crisis. corporating joint fires in campaign planning, col- lating or submitting subordinate fires requests, Planning and Coordinating and deconflicting operations. Though there was a For years joint doctrine did not list the duties special operations liaison element at air compo- or responsibilities for the fire support element of a nent level, the task force almost exclusively relied joint special operations task force (JSOTF). Special on liaison for deconfliction and integration. This Operations Forces eventually integrated joint fires resulted in limited success but was not the com- in the theater air-ground system through Joint plete answer because the liaison cell was located Publication 3-09, Joint Fire Support. The Army has with the air component in Saudi Arabia, leaving the task force with no resident expertise to incorporate fires in the campaign.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 65 ■ SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT FIRES

SOCCENT), which developed its own joint fires element. While these organizations worked together closely, they had separate identities because the joint air component element was directed exclusively on air operations as the joint fires element focused on lethal and non-lethal effects. In the west, where Special Operations Forces supported the air component in the counter-SCUD mission, joint air component and fires elements were fused into a homogeneous body. This worked because operations in the west focused on one mission and there was no need to distinguish between them. In the south, it used a different structure to integrate with the land component. Integration in the land battle presented unique challenges. First, the two units subordinate to Third Army were organized differently for fires.

Space Communications Squadron (RichardSpace Communications Squadron Freeland) st

th 1 Marine Expeditionary Force and V Corps had 30 distinct processes for deep operations where Spe- B–52 refueling, Iraqi cial Operations Forces would be supporting them. Freedom. Rather than a one-size-fits-all solution, SOCCENT Fortunately, the air component commander and its subordinate commands organized a flexi- deployed a small element of the same type used ble system of command and control as well as liai- to support conventional Army maneuver. Like son elements to ensure SOF capabilities supported controllers on the battlefield, this dramatic ini- both Third Army and its subordinate commands. tiative enhanced coordination and integration SOCCENT and Third Army exchanged liai- with the air component. Teams on the ground son officers, ensuring conduits for information. experienced this im- By mutual agreement, SOF elements were sent to the joint air component element provement when close V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. air support became provided the ability to plan and These special operations command and control readily available. This elements (SOCCEs) took tactical control of teams coordinate joint air fires Air Force element, operating with ground forces to ensure that SOF known as the joint air operations were fully integrated. The element at component element, provided what Special Op- V Corps also recognized the need for presence at erations Forces lacked—the ability to plan and subordinate divisions to keep commanders, who coordinate joint air fires. were directly supported, informed by deploying liaison elements. This integration was effective as Iraqi Freedom SOF assets supported Third Army in front of and As operations continued in Afghanistan, U.S. behind a nonlinear operation. With this scheme, Central Command focused on planning for Iraq. Special Operations Forces reconnoitered lines of Its land, air, and special operations components— communication in advance of 3d Infantry Divi- Third Army, Ninth Air Force, and Special Opera- sion en route to Baghdad and supported 1st Ma- tions Command Central (SOCCENT)—created a rine Expeditionary Force with AC–130 gunships joint fires architecture. SOF units fought in the in rear areas, eliminating the fedayeen fighters, north, west, and south. They stopped the enemy Special Operations Forces solved integration in the north, which had fortified the unofficial challenges through innovation. The methods di- boundary with the Kurds, from reinforcing Bagh- verged but were tailor-made for battlespaces with dad. To the west they assisted the air component disparate missions. Though for many Iraq was a to prevent the launch of SCUDs and other theater unified effort, it was not for SOF units. They ballistic missiles. And they supported the land nominated over 5,200 targets while fighting on component in the south to take Baghdad and three fronts. They captured the northern oil eliminate elite forces such as the Republican fields, which contain one-third of Iraqi reserves, Guard. Because these three fronts required unique helped prevent theater ballistic missile launches, approaches to joint fires integration, Third Army, and took the southern oil distribution point in Ninth Air Force, and SOCCENT developed tai- preparation for conventional forces. Such success lored packages for each one. was largely the result of agile thinking by archi- In the north, where the SOF commander was tects of joint fires from Third Army, Ninth Air supported, the air component deployed a joint air Force, and SOCCENT. component element to JSOTF (subordinate to

66 JFQ / issue thirty-five Braganca U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock) T. (Jeremy U.S. Air Force Combat controller, Afghanistan. The Future as those deployed in Iraq with up to 21 personnel SOCCENT learned painful but beneficial les- in one command. With expertise in four areas sons in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge is in- (Army fire support, Navy and Air Force close air stitutionalizing them. By improving joint fires ex- support/interdiction, and Marine Corps artillery), pertise in SOF headquarters, formalizing the link each SOF command could develop standard oper- with the Air Force, and updating doctrine, those ating procedures, incorporate joint fires into de- lessons will endure. They should be folded into liberate operational and concept plans, and in- training so that successive clude these concepts in routine exercises. no theater special operations generations of warriors un- SOCOM is preparing to absorb a large num- derstand joint fires. ber of new positions to fight the global war on commands have standing No theater special oper- terrorism. Moving some assets to theater special joint fires elements to better ations commands have operations commands as joint fires elements will achieve both tasks since improved joint fires inte- prepare them standing joint fires elements to better prepare them to gration will significantly help combat terrorism. make this leap in ability. And the Marine Corps is working with SOCOM to Theater headquarters are small and lightly staffed integrate some of its forces, which provides an with little fires expertise. Moreover, that is true of opportunity to lend their joint fires expertise to the SOF headquarters that formed many of the re- SOF headquarters. With a three-legged joint fires cent JSOTFs. By organizing standing special oper- effort, Special Operations Forces can ensure the ations joint fires elements in each theater, there long-term survival of the process which brought will be resident expertise during deliberate plan- success in Iraq without the lengthy learning ning as well as exercise development. This asset process which preceded it. will ensure that each theater special operations The other half of this success story was the command establishes and maintains links to sis- Air Force tactical air control party—particularly ter components and rehearses processes during joint air component elements. For years, Special operational battlestaff and field training exercises. Standing joint fires elements need not be as large

issue thirty-five / JFQ 67 ■ SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT FIRES

Loading 155mm howitzer. U.S. Marine Corps (Matthew J. Decker)

Operations Forces have been augmented by Air their own war, they were fully integrated with Force enlisted terminal attack controllers, includ- other forces as both supported and supporting as- ing some who have been permanently attached as sets during the campaign. A major part of this Special Forces trainers. But direct support relation- success was joint fires, which began before the ship by these elements to JSOTF headquarters was Afghanistan conflict and culminated in Iraq. new. SOCOM and the Air Force should formalize SOCCENT learned valuable lessons in this arrangement for tactical and operational Afghanistan and, through a collaborative effort training purposes as well as contingencies. Link- with other components, established a network of ing specific headquarters with tactical air control, joint fires, air coordination, and command and perhaps geographically, would create a standing control elements on multiple levels. Special Oper- relationship with common tactics, techniques, ations Forces applied different joint fires solutions and procedures before contingencies erupt. With- on three fronts in Iraq, tailored to specific circum- out a formal agreement, recent successes will fade stances. They were supported in the north with and need to be revived with the same risks experi- joint fires linked to air component elements em- enced by U.S. Central Command. ploying traditional Army side-by-side integration. Lessons learned must also be incorporated They supported the air component in the west, into doctrine as proven methods for integration. merging joint fires with joint air component ele- Joint special operations doctrine is being revised ments. Their complex support to the land compo- with joint fire support scheduled to be included. nent in the south required a more detailed infra- These are the first areas in which these new meth- structure of command and control elements and ods should be addressed. Related joint doctrine liaison, ensuring the appropriate expertise. must eventually be revised as service doctrine is Special Operations Forces learned valuable modified in this collaborative effort. lessons in both Afghanistan and Iraq that must be Progress should be institutionalized by ex- institutionalized. Capabilities cannot be devel- tending joint fires expertise to SOF headquarters, oped after a crisis occurs. JFQ formalizing the links between U.S. Special Opera- tions Command and the Air Force and updating joint doctrine for the next conflict.

Special Operations Forces made dramatic progress in joint integration by the end of combat operations in Iraq. No longer seen as fighting

68 JFQ / issue thirty-five MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY

Tracking aircraft and ships aboard USS Blue Ridge, Transforming Tandem Thrust ’03. U.S. Air Force (SteveU.S. Air Force Cline) Joint Warfighting Capabilities

By SCOTT E. JASPER

he global war on terrorism deterring and defeating enemies that has validated the need for rely on surprise, deception, and asym- accelerating military trans- metric warfare. T formation. The national se- Military transformation is the curity strategy directed the process to process of rendering previous methods examine how enemies may fight, of warfare obsolete by changes in oper- rather than where and when, reaffirm- ational concepts, organizational struc- ing a shift from threat-based to capa- tures, and technologies. U.S. Joint bilities-based planning. Moreover, the Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Staff are working under guidance Armed Forces to first “pursue the from the Office of Force Transforma- global war on terrorism” and second tion and the Chairman to improve “strengthen joint warfighting capabili- joint warfighting capabilities through ties.” Those capabilities are critical in initiatives such as joint force command and control, dominant maneuver, and rapid decisive operations; standing Captain Scott E. Jasper, USN, is associate dean of the School of International joint force headquarters; and joint ex- Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and formerly served as deputy perimentation with emerging tech- for joint experimentation at U.S. Pacific Command. nologies in events such as Millennium

issue thirty-five / JFQ 69 ■ JOINT WARFIGHTING

in experimentation developed the JMF Training Philippine concept, defined as a package of soldiers, Enduring 20,000 personnel from designated Freedom. component ready forces. It is augmented by supporting commands, coalition partners, and a center of excellence coordinated group of international, nongovernmental, and private sector organizations from which a joint task force commander can tailor task forces for a range of missions. The key realization of the joint mission

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY force was that interoperability linkages are at the heart of increased JTF effectiveness, specifically data-sharing and command and control challenges. Thus strategies to improve operations must strengthen links between task force and component headquarters. Leveraging transformation on the operational level to achieve interoper- Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (EdwardFleet Combat Camera Group, G. Martens) ability is consistent with the American way of war and crisis resolution outlined in An Evolving Joint Perspective, re- Challenge. Transformation documenta- The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) cently approved by the Joint Require- tion has identified various capabilities joint mission force (JMF) developmen- ments Oversight Council. The required to dominate across military tal experience can assist in identifying architects of the JMF concept realized operations, including standing, deploy- revolutionary breakthroughs that that relationships on joint and service able command and control systems, yield measurable shifts in joint war- headquarters staff levels foster trust rapidly deployable and sustainable mis- fare. The command approach is mov- and confidence in joint warfighting. sion-oriented and tailored joint forces, ing from visionary concepts toward PACOM established standing com- pervasive targeting, shared situational simple, practical, implemental solu- mand and control relationships for cri- awareness, precision effects, strategic tions to current interoperability prob- sis response by designating primary JTF mobility, and layered force protection. lems. Spiral development with re- headquarters, service or functional The challenge is systematically gional operational forces in joint component commanders, and require- prioritizing, testing, and fielding broad exercises validates results among those ments for force structure and reaction capabilities while avoiding theoretical charged with executing the intent of a times. The application of strategies to and bureaucratic pitfalls in concept commander and speeds the fielding of combine technological advances and and architecture developments. In ad- solutions to the hard spots that pre- organizational augmentation, doctri- dition, getting these capabilities to vent seamless joint operations. nal standardization, and mission-ori- warfighters in a timely fashion is criti- ented training evaluations can provide cal, particularly in the information age Joint Mission Force near-term improvements that seriously with its rapid and compressed changes. Commander, Pacific Command, change the conduct of joint warfare. Service transformation roadmaps indi- called for a seamless joint-combined Compelling questions include cate that future development of robust response force with sufficient flexibil- which areas to focus on first, the best platforms and potential capabilities in- ity to meet national objectives in 1999. forums for testing experimentation clude unmanned, stealthy, long-range That force would be capable of accom- strategies, and how to measure im- sensor, and deep-strike systems to plishing missions across a range of op- provement. The immediate focus counter enemy strategies as well as erations, from complex contingencies should be on fixing deficiencies in other innovative technologies. How- to humanitarian assistance. It could joint interoperability, then on capabil- ever, only by solving joint system in- serve as the leading edge in a conflict. ities to execute joint mission essential teroperability problems will the awe- The intention was eliminating service and service training tasks under future some power of joint synergy be barriers and segmented components. It threat scenarios. Exercise and training achieved across the battlespace with also sought advances in speed of reac- venues sponsored by the Joint Staff these platforms and capabilities. tion, command, and decisionmaking, can test capability initiatives with a Among lessons from Afghanistan is a which commanders were expected to regional audience. Assuring full inter- realization that joint system interoper- implement by fiscal year 2003. operability across DOD requires ability is key to operational success. Bimonthly seminars and a table- top game with warfighters and experts

70 JFQ / issue thirty-five Jasper expanded venues such as distributed global positioning, and surface-to-air Afghanistan also demonstrate the need global command and control exercises missiles and anti-air artillery. They for an effective multinational, multia- and national training programs linked could deny precision targeting by con- gency approach to complement a ro- to regional commands. Recent propos- cealment and deception and deny at- bust and versatile joint force tool kit als for a joint national training capa- tack by hardening underground facili- ready to be employed at a moment’s bility support this need. Success can ties, dispersing ground forces, and notice. Humanitarian emergencies cre- be gauged by measures of effectiveness collocating with civilians. ated by typhoons, earthquakes, or vol- related to tempo, responsiveness, flexi- Enemy strategies could include canoes may explode into a cata- bility, and cost. The Joint Staff per- means to undermine national will at strophic stage in days, leaving little spective offers clearly definable attrib- home and among allies. Misinforma- time for the international community utes. Future warfare and crisis tion campaigns that take advantage of to assemble a coherent response. A rap- resolution must be integrated, self- the Internet and human exploitation idly tailored, jointly trained, multia- synchronized, continuous, simultane- methods that use hostages or refugees gency, multinational force will not just TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ous, distributed, effects focused, as human shields could manipulate happen; it must be thoroughly devel- knowledge based, network centric, public opinion. Likewise, insurgent, oped, preferably before the crisis. and nonlinear. By assigning metrics to paramilitary, or guerrilla tactics such as The Defense Planning Guidance these categories, an assessment of systematic ambushes, hit and run at- for fiscal year 2004 directs regional shifts in the conduct and character of tacks, and killing zones could protract commanders to create standing joint war could be provided. conflict and erode public support. At- force headquarters by fiscal year 2005 tacks on infrastructure by computer in accordance with the lessons of Mil- Defeating Enemy Strategies network or biological agents that dis- lennium Challenge. JFCOM envisions Knowing how the other side rupt or destroy information, trans- a flag officer-led, 55-member standing might fight yields insights into the portation, energy, economic, or other joint force command and control ele- joint capabilities required to maintain nodes could paralyze the Nation with- ment (SJC2E) at each command, which a competitive advantage. Potential en- out channeling animosity against a would serve as a full-time core of func- emies could comprehend joint doc- visible enemy. tionally organized and skilled joint trine and refuse to fight on our terms. Understanding the depth of op- planners. The element would use stan- Their strategies could seek to dissuade, posing capabilities provides rigor in dard operating procedures and com- delay, or disrupt military intervention crafting an examination. Falling barri- mand and control systems in a collab- by the United States while raising the ers in cost and global marketing prac- orative environment to perform political, economic, and military costs. tices will grant enemies access to com- contingency planning. The employ- An enemy could use terrorism, commit mercial off-the-shelf technologies such ment concept models the deployable atrocities, and leverage weapons of as wideband communications and JTF augmentation cell, which rapidly high-resolution imagery. They turns a JMF-type service headquarters insurgent, paramilitary, or guerrilla will outsource, buy, or steal into a joint team. However, the stand- capabilities to fight in space ing joint force command and control tactics could protract conflict and and cyberspace, domains tra- element would empower decision su- erode public support ditionally dominated by the periority for effects based operations United States. Joint warfight- through development of an opera- mass destruction asymmetries at home ing capabilities need to be tested tional net assessment based on a politi- and abroad while seeking surprise against this highly capable threat cal, military, economic, social, infra- through delivery systems such as scuba under possible conditions across the structure, and information analysis of divers, crop dusters, and container range of military operations. Achieve- the enemy. ships. They will attempt to counter ment and sustainment of joint preem- PACOM planners considered es- asymmetrical U.S. strengths in power inence will not only ensure decisive tablishing a standing joint force head- projection, space, stealth, precision, in- response but also dissuade enemies quarters from theater assets but de- formation operations, and strategic lift. from embarking on the road to con- cided against it because of manpower The principal enemy focus is flict. constraints. They selected a hybrid likely to be countering access to the re- concept of developing the joint com- gion of conflict. In the littoral, multi- Interoperability Shortfalls mand and control capabilities of desig- layered coastal defenses consisting of The joint mission force concept nated single-service headquarters aug- submarines, small boats, anti-ship mis- recognizes that an enemy may put a mented by battle-rostered augmentees siles, and mines could deny force de- premium on continual assessment of from other services. Planners focused ployment and concentration. Ballistic developing crises and the ability to on the fact that combined doctrine, and cruise missiles could threaten commit an effective, properly tailored, command and control mechanisms, bases, stocks, and ports. Over land, en- and fully integrated JTF in days, not and shared training and experiences emies could counter airpower superior- weeks. Complex multinational military were lacking for rapidly assembling a ity by integrated air defense systems, operations such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and

issue thirty-five / JFQ 71 ■ JOINT WARFIGHTING

accessible links provide external access F–15, Cope Tiger ’03. to both unclassified and classified sites, depending on the Internet security level, while keeping the procedures easily distributable to all official parties. In late 2001, PACOM approved the standard operating procedures for mandatory use in all JTF exercises and operations. Besides standardizing procedures for complex interoperability- dependent tasks, it identifies activation and augmentation requirements, in-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY cluding the deployable augmentation cell that immediately provides key joint planners to service-based JTF and battle staff rosters that source critical personnel by service and specific skills.

Combat Camera Squadron (JeffreyCombat Camera Squadron A. Wolfe) This cell has been in existence for years st 1 at PACOM, but it has now been refined and implemented with common procedures and collaborative tools. It is a po- military coalition. The joint mission and control exercises; refine, develop, tential precursor to the standing joint force objective was crafted to enhance and package joint mission essential force command and control element. JTF speed of action, precision, and mis- tasks; and modify PACOM training to Common headquarters procedures. sion effectiveness. Achieving this ob- include integrating experimentation. The PACOM model has been selected jective began with identification of the These strategies are outlined below as the prototype for developing com- top challenges to rapid, seamless joint with examples of how they can em- mon standard operating procedures and combined operations. power DOD-wide standing joint force for JTF headquarters, the basis of Input from theater staffs together headquarters implementation. SJC2E. JFCOM has drafted procedures with operational lessons and readiness for review by unified commands that reports produced an initial list. The could serve as an integrating challenges are JTF headquarters activa- applying joint doctrine and joint factor across service and tion and augmentation; common tactics, techniques, and procedures command bounds. The capa- standing operating procedures and bility for internal linkage collaborative tools; multilevel security can solve interoperability challenges using a compact disc pro- procedures; a common operating pic- vides unlimited capacity to ture; standard command, control, Develop common procedures. The identify region-specific parameters communications, computers, and in- first implementation strategy produced such as command relations or com- telligence (C4I); adequate training for JTF procedures. They were established munication activation templates while complex interoperability issues; inte- using diverse standard operating proce- mandating procedures for complex grated force protection and rules of dures and developed in functionally or- tasks such as joint fires and missile de- engagement; underdeveloped infor- ganized workshops. They were tested fense. Applying joint doctrine and mation operations; strategic lift fore- with joint task force and service com- joint tactics, techniques, and proce- casting; contingency contracting; and ponent headquarters in a third JMF dures can solve interoperability chal- host nation support. The challenges wargame and validated in Cobra Gold lenges. As JFCOM continues to were refined and prioritized in a sec- and Tandem Thrust. Totally joint stan- demonstrate the merits of experimen- ond theater flag officer-led JMF dard operating procedures design starts tal concepts in information manage- wargame in May 2000. Conference with the intent of the commander, de- ment, fires coordination, net assess- members concluded that significant scribes how the task force fights in ment, and effects planning, proven joint interoperability improvements boards and cells, details standardized procedures must be spirally integrated come from routine interactions of internal staff procedures, and transmits for a common JTF headquarters. Ac- commanders and staffs. information management techniques. ceptance of these new procedures by This unique standard operating proce- warfighters on the operational and Implementing the Concept dure is a compact disc linked with tactical levels can be realized in work- Four primary strategies were cre- checklists, templates, and references for shops and exercises to facilitate imple- ated to improve on the challenges and access to over 1,300 pages of data. Web mentation of standing joint force implement the JMF concept: develop headquarters within two years. common procedures; develop effective Standardized Web management. A C4I architecture through command key component of information

72 JFQ / issue thirty-five Jasper

Task Force 51, Iraqi Freedom. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY U.S. Navy (Tom Daily)U.S. Navy (Tom

management procedures is the Web the SJC2E Web site can generate infor- a multinational force headquarters for site. Service sites lack consistency, mation management standardization crisis action situations. prove difficult for training distributed across the defense establishment. The team engages in concept de- and rotational users, and fall short in Headquarters linkages. PACOM di- velopment conferences on multina- optimizing data access. The JMF site of- rected the development of separate tional force procedures in concert with fers a simple intuitive layout and stan- multinational force procedures that are semiannual workshops. Singapore dard appearance for concise display based on the JTF model but focus on hosted a recent exercise, Tempest Ex- and information in three clicks. Web multinational operations on the coali- press Four, and acted as lead nation for centric information pull is sustained by tion or combined task force level. combined task force headquarters with links to supporting sites and pages. The These procedures are more generic and participation from 30 nations of the site provides for the routine, timely, include broad operational considera- multinational planning and augmenta- and remote manipulation of informa- tions that partners can readily imple- tion team. The focus was headquarters tion content by subject matter experts. ment. Overarching operational start activation and crisis action planning Realizing that the site architecture does points (common frames of reference) procedures for a peacekeeping scenario not satisfy service-directed specifica- that include a lead nation concept, that included combating terrorism. The tions, PACOM has promulgated de- common command or control-coordi- Singaporean general who acted as tailed and required certification criteria. nation relationships, standardized event commander thought that Tem- Certification guidance covers Internet combined task force headquarters or- pest Express was the best training he re- or Web compatibility and the layout to ganization, common planning and de- ceived prior to serving as combined include window size, color, typography, cisionmaking processes, and clarity of task force commander in East Timor. By and graphic format. Further require- terminology set the foundation for implementing multinational standard ments specify site identification, global unity of effort within the task force. operating procedures across regional navigation structure using tabs, local The centrifuge for multinational force commands, planners can develop rela- navigation structure using scrolling standard operating procedures devel- tionships and become adept at forming lists, event awareness indicators for opment has been the PACOM multina- multinational, operational-level head- classification, current conditions and tional planning and augmentation quarters under common doctrine. time zones, and functional enhance- team program, which focuses on devel- ments such as search aids and self-serv- oping a cadre of military planners ice updating. Adapting these criteria to from nations with Asia-Pacific interests who are capable of rapidly augmenting

issue thirty-five / JFQ 73 ■ JOINT WARFIGHTING

Effective C4I Architecture The second implementation strategy established a series of command and control exercises (C2Xs) to develop C4I architecture. The program validates the command and control preparedness and proficiency of primary JTF and component commander staffs by executing basic procedures using fielded and experimental tactical systems and applications, documenting subsequent shortfalls and work- MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY arounds, and identifying solutions and associated timelines. The exercises are short, vignette-driven drills conducted originally as stand alone events and now in concert with major joint exercises. Focus and objectives alternate between communications networks and systems architectures, decision tools, and processes. Initial exercises have progressively refined procedures and interoperability. For example, C2X One revealed that JMF-designated division headquarters need the standard C4I equipment normally apportioned on the corps level to act as force commander. Funding was identified for deployable global command and control system terminals and classified Internet rout- ing network backbones. C2X Four tested the joint air operations center capability to create a common operating picture, use deployable video tele- conferencing systems, and issue air tasking orders via a split Internet protocol configuration on the global broadcast system. Planning for C2X Seven was conducted with same-time Internet protocol-based voice and chat Predator UAV, collaborative tools. This exercise will Enduring Freedom.

continue experiments with active Lock) (JeremyCombat Camera Squadron T. st bandwidth monitoring and control 1 technology in support of Web centric information dissemination and knowledge management. These exercises service or functional component com- control delineate a strategy for fielding continue to demonstrate the value of manders on the other, can be elimi- technology. A global exercise program routinely testing, ensuring, and en- nated by a worldwide C2X program. can facilitate technology induction as hancing individual JTF unit capability Deployable joint command and con- well as the coupling of command and to actually conduct command and trol is the solution for this element control procedures in regional scenario control in expected crisis scenarios. and is expected to provide standard- vignettes. The barriers to connectivity be- ized hardware and software for JTF- The obvious winners of Millen- tween the JFCOM-designed and imple- level command and control functions nium Challenge include the joint en mented standing joint force command and support. Testing compatibility route mission planning and rehearsal and control element in regional com- with permanent, transiting, or rota- system near term as well as the joint mands on one side, and theater JTF tional component commands is imperative for interoperability. Draft requirements for deployable command and

74 JFQ / issue thirty-five Jasper

be matched to key tasks such as command and control or fires, with corresponding criterion-derived metrics to evaluate initiative performance in theater-specific scenarios. Building on the PACOM approach, the Joint Staff is working on a set of joint capability de- scriptions for approval by the Joint Re- quirements Oversight Council. By analyzing military operations across commands and identifying an array of JMETL-based metrics, standards can be

provided for the council to compare TRANSFORMATION MILITARY recommendations for change in doctrine, organization, and technology. Creating universal metrics for joint force development could furnish quantitative measures for Joint Vision 2020 concepts and architectures. In addition, Stryker brigade future warfare and crisis resolution at- combat team. Public Affairs Detachment (RhondaPublic Affairs M. Lawson)

th tributes formerly identified could be 28 both linked to tasks and assigned metrics to measure improvement. Implementation will link joint fires initiative. The former affords col- three primary designated JTF headquar- command and staff planning and exe- laborative operating environment ters: I Corps, Seventh Fleet, and III Ma- cution and address joint training. De- functions over international maritime rine Expeditionary Force. liberations on improving interoperabil- satellite radio in airborne deployment Mission essential tasks with con- ity examined mandatory alignment of operations. The latter has an integrated solidated standards were derived from joint and service rotational readiness suite of situational awareness and sample scenarios by the JTF staffs for periods and multiple service training knowledge-enabled tools to manage forcible entry or foreign consequence events but found them too difficult be- time sensitive targets. Inclusion of cause of tempo, funding, and coalition partners in the global C2X creating universal metrics could simulation limitations. New net- program would facilitate multinational furnish quantitative measures for worked architectures could bring interoperability to include testing of together forward JTF headquar- PACOM-type combined operations Joint Vision 2020 concepts ters (such as Seventh Fleet) with wide area and Asia Pacific area network distributed components at major systems. The first encourages separate, management. The joint mission essen- training centers to perform high inten- simultaneous views of communities of tial task list was approved for immedi- sity, combat-related tasks such as fire interest while the second provides fire- ate and mandatory use in all PACOM support or battlespace maneuver. Sim- wall-protected, multilevel access por- exercises and operations in 2001. It of- ulation can augment live force short- tals for posting and sharing informa- fers a basis for developing training ob- falls while exploring conceptual revo- tion in a collaborative Web network. jectives and articulating operational re- lutionary platforms, such as cruise quirements. Command determination missile submarines, future combat sys- Refine, Develop, Package of specific criteria (the actual level of tem platforms, or advanced theater The third strategy led to the joint performance such as hours, days, or transport aircraft. mission essential task list (JMETL), a percentage) for standards, based on unique document that delineates pack- mission analysis, provides a bench- Integrating Experimentation aged, mission-oriented training stan- mark for measuring unit performance. The fourth strategy modified dards common for JTF headquarters. In the end, a performance matrix PACOM training by integrating experi- Early JMF workshops postulated theater grades JTF headquarters readiness. mentation into exercises for evolution- threat scenarios for 2003–2015 and Mission-oriented tasks with crite- ary gains in warfighting. Mature near- identified the core missions that would ria could be translated into measures of term technology insertions could be constitute over 90 percent of the opera- performance for evaluating the JFCOM evaluated for accelerated fielding at for- tions expected within the area of re- standing joint force command and ward deployed headquarters. Experi- sponsibility. Based on core competen- control element-related experimenta- menting while exercising leads to spiral cies, specific missions were assigned to tion. Specific technological, organiza- technology enhancements that can aid tional, or procedural initiatives would seamless JTF operations. For example,

issue thirty-five / JFQ 75 ■ JOINT WARFIGHTING

and gain better battlespace situational Patrolling Souda Bay, Crete, Enduring awareness in rugged terrain, urban jun- Freedom. gles, and rural camouflage. The PACOM approach to finding simple and practical solutions to interoperability problems and integrating them into exercises will better prepare operational forces. New technologies and processes must be balanced with service training requirements. How- ever, warfighter endorsement of prototype joint experimentation will accel-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY erate technology acquisition and procedural adaptation, paramount to ensuring joint preeminence. The spiral testing and fielding of initiatives in joint and multinational exercises, to include live fire events, will facilitate transparency and confidence among the joint and combined forces respon- U.S. Navy (John Gaffney) sible for responding to a crisis.

Implementation strategies for the during Cobra Gold ’02 in Thailand, need for a formal process of assessing joint mission force highlight proven conducted with III Marine Expedi- experimentation. Joint training and ex- ways to prioritize, test, and field new tionary Force as deputy combined task perimentation specialists assigned to capabilities. Efforts by U.S. Pacific force headquarters, a number of tech- each regional combatant command Command to develop the prototype nologies were exposed to operational could assist in grading technology infor the joint mission force headquar- scrutiny, with use of new procedures for sertion capacity to achieve JMETL crite- ters confirm the value of the JFCOM JTF headquarters and JMETL standards ria, eventually enhancing implementa- standing joint force command and (26 specific tasks). tion of the standing joint force control element for interoperability. To meet the challenge of C4 command and control element con- Future application of this element equipment and procedures in Cobra cept, which is heavily dependent on should facilitate rapid implementation Gold, installation of the bandwidth emerging technology. across regional commands. Subsequent monitoring and control system meas- identification and correction of barri- ured the volume of combined opera- Operational Experimentation ers to interoperability of the element tions-wide area network applications These implementation strategies through expanded national and global and demonstrated utility to poten- have achieved tangible advances in JTF training and experimentation venues tially control targeted applications, speed, precision, and effectiveness pri- will assure the vital transformation of while the theater automated profiling marily because they were developed joint warfighting capabilities. JFQ system visually represented civil-mili- and executed by warfighters who de- tary and information operations ob- pend on JMF-related policies, proce- jectives through relevant vectors that dures, and technology. Developing the provided progressive views of key bat- SJC2E concept in exercises with real tlespace metrics. forces will assure headquarters activa- Against the challenges posed by a tion and planning. Focusing on inter- common operating picture, joint fires, operability in complex tasks under dif- and intelligence, surveillance, and re- ficult conditions will guarantee decisive connaissance, the installation of auto- action joint force execution. For exam- mated deep operations coordination ple, the joint mission essential task list system terminals enabled situational added responsibilities for examining awareness and report visualization for doctrine linked to technology to inte- Special Operations Forces. For the diffi- grate and synchronize fires and maneu- culties of common collaborative tools, ver. Experimentation on procedures the introduction of defense collabora- and technologies is needed to facilitate tive tool suite servers enabled NetMeet- coordination of fire control measures ing chat, voice, and video collaborative sessions, with server etiquette and protocol. Exercise lessons revealed the

76 JFQ / issue thirty-five MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Stepping Outside Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Michael Sandberg) the Reality Box

By MARK R. LEWIS and JOHN C.F. TILLSON

system resembles a chain make the chain stronger. It is futile to in that it is only as strong strengthen links that are stronger than as its weakest link. Con- the weakest link. Regardless of the A sider the example of de- number of aircraft and ships in the fense transportation. Regardless of the system, if the ports cannot deal with capacity of aircraft and ships to carry arriving troops and equipment, military forces, system throughput throughput will be limited. will be limited if ports cannot handle Most DOD missions are per- what is debarked. A chain is strength- formed by a system of systems in ened by reinforcing the weak link; al- which each subsystem is an interlock- ternatively one could disassemble the ing and interdependent process operat- chain, replace the weak link, and thus ing in concert with other systems and subsystems within their parent systems. They all come together to ac- Mark R. Lewis is a member of the strategy, forces, and resources division at the complish a task. Each subsystem plays Institute for Defense Analyses; John C.F. Tillson is also a member of the research a role in the overarching system, but staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses and has served in the Office of the none can complete the mission on its Secretary of Defense. own strength alone.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 77 ■ THE REALITY BOX

Transformation Goals Planning guidance released in April 2003 called for U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the services to address six goals (and joint operating concepts) in an annual endeavor to produce transformation roadmaps. The Secretary of Defense established critical operational goals in the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, using roadmaps to focus on developing service-unique capabilities to: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ■ protect critical bases of operations ■ project and sustain forces in distant anti-access/area denial environments and defeat anti-access and area denial threats ■ deny sanctuary through persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engage- Airborne surveillance, ment by high-volume precision strike Enduring Freedom. ■ assure information systems to con-

duct effective information operations in an (WilliamCommunications Squadron Greer) th

attack 48 ■ enhance capabilities and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure ■ leverage information technology discrete tasks in common. Every organ- system? Can a component be bypassed and innovative concepts to develop inter- ization and the overall system must or its output improved in other ways? operable joint command, control, commu- have both a tasking mechanism and a The concept that the six goals are nications, computers, intelligence, surveil- feedback loop to enable accurate assess- missions performed by a system of sys- lance, and reconnaissance architecture and ment and responsive reengagement. tems that are only as adept as its weak- capability to include a tailorable joint oper- Similarly, acquiring targets is only est component exposes a flaw in the ational picture. one major task under the Quadrennial call to “develop service-unique capa- To meet those goals, a service or bilities necessary to agency can assume that each goal describing the mission in terms of a system meet the six critical operational goals.” statement is a mission—a set of tasks of systems identifies cause and effect and subtasks that must be accom- How can a service plished in a structured way. know where to For instance, the essential task of Defense Review. Intelligence systems focus until it knows how its systems the third goal is denying sanctuary to must process information from surveil- contribute to the overall mission? an enemy. Several tasks and implied lance systems, tracking systems must Moreover, how will DOD know how systems are cited in the goal statement. retain targets, engagement systems to allocate resources to reinforce the Surveillance, tracking, and engagement must be able to deliver the desired ef- weak links? systems are subtasks of the overall mis- fect, and maneuver systems must be sion. Furthermore, there are implied appropriately positioned in the battle- System of Systems tasks in each specified system that may space. In addition, both combat sup- Describing the mission in terms of use the output of other systems and port and combat service support sys- a system of systems identifies cause subsystems or contribute to them. tems must sustain operations. Denying and effect relations between entities in Surveillance requires multiple sys- sanctuary also requires complex inter- the system and allows commanders on tems of various components, both serv- action by these various systems. all levels to monitor contributions to ices and agencies, to provide continu- desired outputs. The areas ripe for ous and near-complete information. To The Weak Link breakthrough or transformational solu- cover potential sanctuaries and furnish Once the six transformational tions are best found once these com- useful, timely information, this task goals are understood as missions exe- plex missions are presented as systems will likely require multiple, comple- cuted through a system of systems, the of systems. Then detailed analysis can mentary ground, sea, air, and space ca- next step is determining where to find the weak links—or the hidden po- pabilities, which in turn call for sepa- focus the effort to transform the larger tential in the system. rate commands and agencies to execute system. Where is the weak link? Are The challenge of diagramming there components that can be lever- complex missions is not limited to aged to increase the capacity of the

78 JFQ / issue thirty-five Lewis and Tillson

Each conventional solution-seeking Cargo awaiting transport, Dover Air process entails mission analysis that Force Base. describes assumptions, limitations, and problems or constraints that bound the range of solutions. Because such methods include operational risk assessments, they are conservative and take identified limiters as a given. Although some attention is paid to replacing assumptions with facts, the primary aim is identifying limiters to planning with complete

situational understanding. Thus the TRANSFORMATION MILITARY processes are not designed to produce transformational solutions, but instead point to the most effective course of action while minimizing risk. That is reasonable in the context of operational planning, and it almost always generates a conventional solution.

Combat Camera Squadron (DominicCombat Camera Squadron Hauser) In identifying facts, limitations, st 1 constraints, and assumptions, current processes define the reality box in which a solution might take shape. identifying the system of systems. The Operational concepts also pose The effort is focused on defining the web of relationships linking tasks and problems. France invested significant dimensions. If one conceives of the so- systems must be perceived in enough resources in the Maginot Line during lution as a sphere and the reality box detail to enable understanding that a the interwar years without resolving as a cube, the task becomes stuffing change in one dimension may res- the fact that defensive barriers can be the largest possible sphere into the onate throughout the system. Only breached or avoided. It was faced by cube. The result is either the largest when processes, subsystems, and rela- the demands of a fortified force versus possible reality box (which is desirable tionships among them are identified a mobile reserve. Failure to resolve this because the bigger the box, the bigger can the overarching process be traced tension, rather than technology, which the sphere that fits inside) or fitting a to find constraints inhibiting mission was at least on a par with that of Ger- solution into a constrained reality box performance. Problems can be associ- many, led to defeat. (which means effectively using all ated with hardware, resources, organi- Problems can exist in many di- available resources). The existence of zations, policy, or doctrine. Choke- mensions—technology, organizations, such a box, however, is rarely ques- points that impede the system can and policy as well as operational con- tioned or even recognized. indicate problems that cannot be re- cepts and doctrine. Once the system The reality box concept is related solved normally and call for transfor- of systems is understood, the effort to outside-the-box thinking but is not mational solutions. shifts to finding problems that restrict identical. The term outside the box has Sometimes commanders do not the potential or opportunities to en- come to mean unconventional ap- have needed technology or resources. hance capability by restructuring it. Its proaches to solving problems. Suppos- For example, night vision devices rep- problems are identified. The challenge edly its origin is a parlor game that resented a breakthrough that denies is eliminating those things that in- presents players with nine dots sanctuary in darkness. Suddenly an hibit the performance of the overarch- arranged in a 3 by 3 square. The object enemy could be seen at night, boost- ing system, clearing the way for trans- is connecting nine dots with four ing capability and effectiveness. formation. straight lines without lifting the pencil At other times the problem is or- from the paper. The only solution is ganizational. The Goldwater-Nichols The Reality Box drawing lines outside the box. Today Act sought to change the way that the With mission statements dia- the phrase is used as a hortative: think defense establishment does business. grammed, the primary issue is finding outside the box. But it rarely offers direc- By strengthening the operational problems in the system. Surveying de- tion—it simply means considering al- chain of command and eliminating cisionmaking processes is the point of ternatives. Such thinking can be un- stovepipes to enhance jointness, this departure in creating a methodology to guided and result in plans that drift in law overcame friction between unified identify breakthroughs. The processes white space. Any breakthroughs would commanders and the services. are ways to think about solving prob- be serendipitous. Hence the need for lems presented by a mission statement the reality box concept to direct efforts and discovered in mission analysis. toward transformational solutions.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 79 ■ THE REALITY BOX

Vehicles arriving in Kuwait, Iraqi Freedom. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Combat Camera Squadron (Tammy L. Grider) (Tammy Combat Camera Squadron st 1

The image of a solution stuffed in- the reality box is exhausted, some lim- puncture? Are the facts really facts, or side a reality box enables the visualiza- iters must be relaxed enough to allow are they assumptions? By definition, tion of concepts of potential and fric- expansion for the solution to fit. That transformational solutions fall outside tion in the context of developing might mean requesting added re- the reality box. This is the nature of a breakthroughs. The space between the sources to use in mission accomplish- breakthrough; it penetrates limiters solution sphere and the box represents ment, redefining the mission objec- that box in solution sets. potential; the sphere has room to grow tive, or rethinking the level of risk Even though processes like the before it contacts the limiting box acceptable. The result is that the reality joint operation planning and execu- walls. The task of conventional plan- box is stretched to enable the solution tion system or the Army decisionmak- ners is fitting a solution sphere into ing process may not lead to that space defined by the box. Expand- by definition, transformational transformational solutions, ing the sphere as far as possible repre- they may be a reasonable sents a qualitative refinement of the solutions fall outside the reality box start in building the reality solution within the limits discovered box. This step is critical be- through mission analysis. to fit inside the box. This effort will cause it offers an exquisite definition Similarly, points where the solu- not cause breakthroughs because it of reality. Ultimately what one does tion sphere makes contact with the in- does not fundamentally alter the way with the completed box is what distin- side of the box can be understood as solutions are shaped. guishes transformational solution problems that hamper system perform- A distinction can be made be- seeking from conventional decision- ance; the solution sphere wants to ex- tween conventional problem solving making processes. pand but is constrained. Those points and a method that might produce a of friction are generally regarded as an breakthrough. Instead of accepting the Identifying Assumptions unmovable part of the box and efforts limitation, transformational solution Care is taken to identify assump- usually turn to expanding the sphere seekers look at points of contact to de- tions on the situation and environ- into empty spaces. When every option termine the nature of the constraint. Is ment in mission analysis. An assump- for developing a solution to fit inside the sphere rubbing against an actual tion is a statement or condition limiter or merely the fabric of assump- accepted as valid without any substan- tions covering holes between facts? Is tiation or proof. It is a supposition the point of friction vulnerable to

80 JFQ / issue thirty-five Lewis and Tillson

Underlying reasons are lost as assump- Tactical automated sensor system, Iraqi tions pass down the chain. Soon they Freedom. become facts. Similarly, policy constraints take on a life of their own. Sometimes unbreakable rules arise for lack of focus on the overall system, which reinforces the need for a systems diagram that enables planners to trace undesirable effects in the system to an original conflict and to judge the validity of the assumption.

Windows of Opportunity TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Transformational solution seekers, unlike planners, think that holes in the box are windows of opportunity. Covered only by assumptions, these are points where the box becomes vulnerable to breakthroughs. When assumptions are identified, addressing them is a straightforward process. If the source of conflict is clear and the choice deliberate, organizations can weigh options, make informed decisions, then adopt ways to mitigate the consequences. Transformational solution seekers look specifically for assumptions that can be broken with transformational solutions. The box represents reality, but conditions that define reality—political, social, economic, military, and other factors—are complex adaptive systems that change human and envi- ronmental interaction. Indeed, technology develops and scientific understanding evolves. Thus the bases of assumptions constantly change. Ac- cording to one analyst, “Assumptions

Combat Camera Squadron (MatthewCombat Camera Squadron Hannen) that were valid yesterday can become st 1 invalid and, indeed, totally misleading in no time at all.” Thus, while the next phase is beginning to generate solu- about current or future situations held takes shape, planners naturally seek to tions that fit in the reality box, the to be true that replaces the unavailable identify holes and plug them. At first transformational solution begins by facts. Identifying assumptions is vital they use assumptions, replacing them identifying assumptions. in planning and pivotal in military when they acquire facts. If assumptions are identified, the transformation. In dealing with recognized as- challenge is straightforward. Unfortu- Valid assumptions combine with sumptions, facts must be scrutinized. nately, it is not easy to identify as- facts to become the framework that Often they are deeply held convictions sumptions that point to transforma- shapes the reality box. The structural whose basis is not understood. Hidden tional solutions. Planners need a integrity of the box is relevant to plan- assumptions are insidious because they different way to locate assumptions to ners. From their perspective, holes are take considerable effort to expose. break. First, they must understand the windows of vulnerability through Constraints may be based on assump- system of systems so the web of tasks, which an unforeseen event could com- tions that are seemingly unbreakable organizations, and relationships that promise the solution. Thus as the box rules. Commanders are advised in Joint interact to accomplish the mission be- Pub 5.00-1, Joint Doctrine for Planning, comes clear. Today this web of interac- to consider “assumptions handed tion takes place within the reality box, down from higher echelons as facts.”

issue thirty-five / JFQ 81 ■ THE REALITY BOX

OH–58 crews, Iraqi Freedom. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Combat Camera Squadron (Tammy L. Grider) (Tammy Combat Camera Squadron st 1

and problems that limit the ability of problems that hinder attaining organi- what to transform to, the theory offers the system can be seen as points where zational goals. Simply put, this theory a technique for deciding changes in the system meets the box. Problems provides analytical tools to answer policies, practices, and measures. Fi- can arise from conflicts over choices three questions: nally, it provides a way of deciding regarding policy, organization, doc- ■ what to transform—causes of prob- how to transform. trine, technology, or resources. Thus lems faced by organizations and systems, the next step for transformational so- conflicts that prevent eliminating problems, Military transformation calls for lution seekers is using the reality box and explicit and implicit assumptions un- breakthroughs in problems con- to identify problems in the system and derlying conflicts fronting the Armed Forces. Opera- then focusing analysis on them. ■ what to transform to—changes that tional goals should be regarded as mis- resolve problems and facts that can replace sion statements that describe a system Analytical Tools or modify faulty assumptions of systems. The services bring unique ■ how to achieve transformation—obsta- Most management concepts deal capabilities to these goals, but they in- cles to change, finding means to overcome with transforming corporations, but them, and taking the necessary steps. teract within the context of a larger they offer little insight into the system. Thus the system must be dia- process. Among them is the theory of The first step is identifying prob- gramed in a manner that illustrates its constraints, which began as a tech- lems that affect organization. Once constraints across the defense commu- nique based on scientific method that identified, the theory of constraints fa- nity. Developing transformational ca- could be applied to industrial produc- cilitates the recognition of assump- pabilities without such an understand- tion. It developed into an approach for tions, policies, practices, and measures ing runs the risk of suboptimizing or analyzing organizations to address that cause them. To remain abreast of squandering resources. JFQ evolving reality, one must identify what to change. Then, in deciding

82 JFQ / issue thirty-five MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Information

Joint air operations center, Millennium Operations Challenge.

99th Communications Squadron (Molly Gilliam) and Millennium Challenge

By MARK W. MAIERS and TIMOTHY L. RAHN

illennium Challenge, a was focused on operational net assess- joint exercise hosted by ment, identifying critical nodes, the U.S. Joint Forces Com- range of options, second- and third- M mand (JFCOM) in sum- order effects, and unintended conse- mer 2002, examined how far the quences. The services mounted live ac- Armed Forces could go in implement- tions with combat assessments and ing Joint Vision 2020 and executing employed effects-based operations to rapid decisive operations within this pursue experimentation goals. decade. One goal was to develop rec- From the outset of the exercise it ommendations on doctrine, organiza- was apparent that information operation, training, manpower, logistics, per- tions could produce decisive effects in sonnel, and facilities. Exercise live play the fight. These efforts integrate military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, operational Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Maiers, USA (Ret.), was the information operations security, and computer network opera- supervisor and Major Timothy L. Rahn, USAR, served in the combatant command tions. They affect the enemy informa- information operations cell during Millennium Challenge. tion environment while not affecting

issue thirty-five / JFQ 83 ■ MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

friendly audiences. Ultimately, these staff worked with organizations exter- ease and streamline the restrictive secu- operations seek to influence enemy de- nal to the joint task force to accom- rity accesses for existing capabilities. cisions and opinions in ways favorable plish these tasks. The need to fix information oper- to national objectives. Growing pains appeared as the ations is understood on the national Another goal of the exercise was exercise progressed. It became clear level. Requirements and instructions integrating information operations in that the information portion was not for military information capabilities rapid-decisive and effects-based opera- vigorous enough to gain and sustain are clearly and consistently outlined in tions constructs to gain and maintain information superiority. As such, oper- recent defense guidance as follows: information superiority. The concept ations directly reflected the situation ■ Operations will be synchronized of operations was the initial step in the in the defense establishment. Capabil- with multinational and interagency part- experiment and adhered to current ities are not well understood by all ners as required. doctrine. It involved testing the stand- planners and leaders. There are dis- ■ Information operations may evolve

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), parate service centric information op- into a separate mission area requiring the which provided combatant command- erations capabilities, with little agree- services to maintain appropriately designed ers with a trained, equipped, and per- ment on how they should be used organizations and trained specialists. ■ manently constituted joint organiza- together in support of joint opera- The ability to conduct information operations has become a core DOD compe- tion. This headquarters was intended tions. During the exercise, Joint Pub tency. to reduce lag time for setting up a JTF 3-13, Information Operations, was in ■ It is imperative to maintain an un- headquarters to conduct operations. the process of rewrite, with over 200 surpassed capability to conduct information Once the exercise began, the staff was critical comments on the first review. operations. augmented to form a cross-functional DOD Directive 3600.1, though not yet published, was in its seventh The Challenges there was no national doctrine, revision. The services and U.S. Millennium Challenge provided a strategy, or process promoting Special Operations Command test for finding solutions to the chal- were responsible for tactics and lenges of information operations. integrated information operations doctrine, JFCOM for testing Given a near-peer competitor and the and experimentation, and U.S. requirement to conduct rapid decisive body composed of five groups: opera- Space Command for computer net- operations in the future, how can actions, plans, information superiority, work defense and attack. The informa- tions be measured to determine when information/knowledge management, tion operations study that Defense information operations are effective? and a command element, which Planning Guidance directed was not Many believe information superiority, worked without formal or informal yet complete. like air superiority, can be gained only barriers. for limited periods, so a reliable way of Thus information operations sup- Setting the Stage measuring success is needed. Compar- ported the joint task force in an envir- As exercise planning commenced, ing measures of performance and effec- onment heavily reliant on informa- there was a lack of overarching national tiveness offers a way of identifying tion and information systems. Both policy, with no national doctrine, strat- when windows of information superi- were meant to increase knowledge of egy, or process promoting integrated in- ority exist. an enemy and to protect command formation operations. The interagency It became obvious during the ex- and control and situational aware- coordination and approval process was ercise that the organization was inade- ness. Information superiority is geared to separately established Presi- quate for information operations. achieved by negating enemy capabili- dential directives concerning functions Functional aspects were dispersed with ties until the Armed Forces dominate such as contingency operations and no one commander coordinating activ- the information domain without ef- critical infrastructure protection. SJFHQ ities, and information operations were fective opposition. and the component commands did not only partially represented by the joint Most information operations staff have enough trained and experienced psychological operations task force, members were part of the information personnel to conduct full spectrum in- which is equally important to plans superiority group. Primary duties formation operations. Inadequate re- and information superiority. Early in under the original concept were syn- sources existed for producing effective the exercise the JTF commander recog- chronizing information operations, perception management results such as nized information operations as a cap- maintaining the operational net as- integration of cultural intelligence, psy- stone element of combat power both sessment, developing the effects task- chological operations (PSYOP), public in the lethal and nonlethal sense. ing order, integrating information ef- affairs, and civil affairs. There was insuf- Information operations cell. The or- fects into the overall mission, ficient intelligence support for technical ganization combined enabling effects, assessing the effects of information options in conducting a computer net- guidance/intent, and the critical infor- operations, and identifying intended work attack and for integrating and mation requirements list in the infor- and unintended enemy reactions. The conducting operations with coalition mation operations part of the effects and allied information operations players. In addition, there was a need to

84 JFQ / issue thirty-five Maiers and Rahn

nodes, and outside influences on the Launching Dragon Eye, Millennium Challenge. joint task force. Cyberwolf. Computer network attack activity in blue force systems and subsystems was measured using Cyber- wolf. The software had the desired effect by getting organizations to change information conditions in the theater. It identified network scans and potential intrusion, but it was not the only indicator. It was adequate only when combined with information external to

the serviced network. Cyberwolf was a TRANSFORMATION MILITARY qualified success. Injects were limited to the first phase of operations prior to H hour. They sensitized the JTF staff to a dependence on digitized information handling and highlighted the fact that a change in information conditions im- pacts, but is not understood by, mid and upper levels of leadership. Every component has the authority to change the conditions, normally in concert with joint task force computer network U.S. Air Force (JohnU.S. Air Force Houghton) operations, which maintains a common operating picture. In Millennium Chal- lenge, components changed conditions tasking order. It was not envisioned as resulting in attrition as opposed to tar- without consulting outside organiza- an annex or stand-alone plan, but as geting the systems that had the most tions or considering the global ramifica- an integration of operations across the bang for the buck. tions in a stressed environment. priority effects list that components Defense information operations. The The relevance of information use in developing plans in support of exercise focused almost exclusively on conditions in this exercise, where in- the order. The assessment process the attack and exploitation capabilities formation workspace was the primary would be critical and should be driven of offensive information operations; means of JTF command and control, by the objectives of JTF commanders little defense was played. There was reveals that the entire process should and not exclusively by a list of effects. minimal cyber event reporting and be reviewed and synchronized. During Network analysis. Future cells must none in the joint operational area. the exercise, workspace used the secret be furnished with suitable analytical Internet protocol router products. A full network map of the few defensive information operations network (SIPRNET) with- communications architecture and were built into the exercise design out a redundant system. complete analysis of the regional infra- Disconnecting systems, as structure should be primary tools in required under informa- understanding enemy targets. Addi- Similarly, red forces made only a slight tion condition Charlie, is not an op- tionally, strategic influence analysis effort to dazzle and jam space assets. tion. Commanders will face this same modeling of political and economic Future JTFs must consider the reality of problem in the future should an networks is needed. Only partial ver- the threat to networks, nodes, and enemy find the means to degrade sions of these products were available transmission centers. During the exer- friendly databases, nodes, and trans- as separate networks in the exercise, cise, asymmetric attack on friendly op- mission capabilities. with no initial analysis on how they erations was unrealistic compared with were interconnected. Subsequent tar- the scope of the simulation. Space and Information geting analysis by the joint force air While few defensive information Operations component commander, combined air operations were built into the exercise U.S. Space Command provided a operation center, and JTF joint intelli- design, the cell did work on defensive space and information operations ele- gence support center were not syn- issues. It tracked trends in analyses of ment on the level of the combatant chronized. The combined air operation friendly networks, communication commander during Millennium Chal- center used the Telescope system, lenge to give enhanced support to while the joint intelligence support rapid-decisive operations, effects-based center relied on the Adversary software operations, and operational net assess- tool. The latter performed marginally, ment. It contributed personnel and

issue thirty-five / JFQ 85 ■ MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

had nominal responsibility as part of the real-world live fire portion. How- ever, an analysis of the total radio frequency spectrum was needed to identify the part the enemy was using and the part JTF was using. The information operations cell conducted an initial analysis but could not gain sufficient intelligence to create a viable tool for attacking or exploiting enemy use of the radio spectrum. The ability to understand, exploit, deny, and protect

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY across the full range of frequencies must be considered in future exercises, experiments, and real world events. Technical Skill Sets Manning information operations cells is a challenge. During the exercise the cell had electronic warfare special- Joint enroute mission ists from the Navy and Air Force, a planning and rehearsal PSYOP officer, two computer network system-near term. operations planners (a marine and an

Combat Camera Squadron (LisaCombat Camera Squadron M. Zunzanyika) airman), but no dedicated planners for st 1 deception or operational security. In addition, there were no dedicated targeteers or intelligence support person- supported the information operations proven invaluable and should be part nel. All operators were specialists in in- cell, which must be available in every of future JTF operations. formation and service-specific JTF operation. In the near term, infor- Analysis tool development. Current capabilities, but few had significant mation expertise should be provided to information operations doctrine and backgrounds, and all had difficulty un- combatant commanders from the rela- most of the tools that supported plan- derstanding the larger concept. This tively small pool of expertise in DOD. ning involve a mechanical, stovepiped problem will persist until the services However, expertise will eventually need approach based on the joint operation further develop career patterns for to become resident in the commander’s planning execution system. Informa- planners. Key personnel and skill sets staff to provide full integration into tion operations do not fit that mold. are required for SJFHQ and informa- both deliberate and crisis planning. Analysis of the problem of isolating tion operations components: External organization support. Cen- unfriendly command and control ■ information operations specialists ters of excellence were mentioned fre- yielded various methods by which an who have expertise in areas such as elec- quently during the exercise, but their enemy obtains information and makes tronic warfare and computer network oper- capabilities were not drawn upon. decisions. The information operations ations and a general understanding of infor- Agencies could reasonably be ex- staff evaluated physical contacts, the mation capabilities and centers of pected to be available over SIPRNET, electromagnetic spectrum, hard copy excellence that can provide in-depth analy- but private sector resources such as media, and intelligence apparatus. The sis for planning ■ educational institutions would not in associated nodes were identified, planners able to use information operations in support of the overall JTF a classified scenario. Furthermore, which eventually linked to the targets plan, understand their capabilities and ap- posing specific questions would vio- necessary to focus on a specific enemy plication on the national level, and develop late operational security. Connectivity capability. The team avoided stovepip- measures of performance and execution with agencies such as Joint Warfare ing in its approach to the problem, re- ■ special technical operations plan- Analysis Center, Joint Information sulting in integrated and synchronized ners who understand technical operations Operations Center, joint task force solutions. The development of this for- capabilities and how they can support in- computer network operations, 1st In- mal approach to analysis of the infor- formation operations formation Operations Command, mation environment will be critical to ■ intelligence analysts who specialize Fleet Information Warfare Center, future JTF operations. in intelligence but grasp the requirements Central Intelligence Agency, and De- Spectrum analysis and deconfliction. for planning, executing, and assessing information operations fense Intelligence Agency would have A requirement for a joint restrictive ■ system of systems analysts who are frequency list or spectrum manager experts on the operational net assessment was identified early in the exercise. A database and have sufficient knowledge of joint force air component commander

86 JFQ / issue thirty-five Maiers and Rahn information operations to support planning the JTF level. A joint information opera- operations as a key element of combat and analysis activities tions task force (JIOTF) would fill this power. The information operations su- ■ effects assessors who can evaluate need. pervisor was a primary staff position the effectiveness of information operations Two concepts are essential in con- with functional responsibilities that both generally and in relation to the over- sidering information operations on the included: all plan. JTF level. First, combatant command- ■ furnishing CJTF with information There are five core capabilities of ers must have a strategy in place, clar- operations optimized to furnish planning, information operations divided into ify the JTF role in achieving the strat- coordination, integration, and synchroniza- two camps. On one side are technolo- egy, and accept the strategy as critical tion across the spectrum of conflict gists, who provide electronic warfare ■ to objectives. Second, the role of infor- spanning the CJTF joint operational and computer network attack/defense area with a process harmonized across agen- mation operations cannot be simply to affect the electromagnetic spectrum cies and services, capable of providing sup- an afterthought addressed immediately port to other agencies in their missions and information systems. On the other TRANSFORMATION MILITARY before a conflict. Shaping and influ- ■ are humanists, who conduct PSYOP, providing a focus for information encing activities must occur continu- military deception, and operations se- operations in every medium (land, sea, air, space, and information) curity to influence foreign decision- ously throughout peace, crisis, and ■ focusing the command on translat- makers and protect friendly decision- combat. It is almost impossible to change a popular negative view of JTF ing information operations from an enabler makers. Unifying both groups into a into a fully integrated capability efforts once shots are fired. single core of specialists is key to un- ■ providing CJTF and component derstanding the capabilities that must Organization commanders with capabilities, limitations, be integrated on all levels of warfare. and employment considerations (second- The need for JIOTF as part of a JTF and third-level effects) to employ informa- A Joint Task Force staff is critical to establish and main- tion operations. tain the knowledge superiority needed One important observation in Mil- Millennium Challenge high- to execute rapid decisive operations. lennium Challenge was the require- lighted challenges and areas for future Lessons from Allied Force and Endur- ment on the part of the blue force for a experiments and games. According to ing Freedom together with observa- central coordinator on the JTF level. the JTF commander, information oper- tions from Millennium Challenge un- Only PSYOP was addressed formally on ations are a “capstone element of derscore the need to solve this the command level by the joint psycho- combat power . . . both lethal and non- challenge. Lingering Cold War mental- lethal....We must condition the ities still generate operation plans world to accept [information opera- focused on brief, single-dimen- information operations were not tions] as an essential element.” Any- sion combat in which deception, one with responsibility for conducting completely integrated into the diversion, and feint opportunities such operations must have the requi- are lost. JIOTF should be based on overarching JTF plans site authority and assets. Because the plans and operations. The focus operations form a component of joint must be on enabling the lethal and logical operations task force. During the warfighting that remains in a gray nonlethal capabilities of information exercise, information operations area, there is a gap in its effective em- operations for joint warfighters. achieved component-level status with ployment. The challenge is bridging Future experiments should ad- respect to responsibility but lacked the that gap and bringing the full poten- dress the need to organize a joint in- resources and authority to be genuinely tial of those capabilities to bear formation operations task force to effective. Functional aspects were dis- against enemies. JFQ persed. Because information operations focus on information operations as an were part of the information superiority element of combat power. The task function, they had no direct representa- force would be constituted by mem- tion at the table and were not com- bers of combatant command staffs, pletely integrated into the overarching augmented by information operations JTF plans, and thus were not fully lever- assets from U.S. Strategic Command as aged for expertise and use. The after ac- required. The responsibilities of the tion report noted that senior exercise JIOTF commander would include as- mentors, the joint task force com- sisting CJTF planning for information mander, and the combatant com- operations, monitoring execution of mander all agreed that information op- specific actions, and assessing meas- erations needed a centralized ures of performance and execution. commander to coordinate activities on Millennium Challenge revealed the important functions that JIOTF brings to the table because the JTF commander recognized information

issue thirty-five / JFQ 87 ■ MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY

Ground Radar

Manpack terminal, Surveillance Enduring Freedom. and Targeting 55th Signal Company (Jeremy Colvin) By PRICE T. BINGHAM

eveloping the capability to ground forces. Although many quickly defeat an enemy on thought those operations would re- land, with fewer and more quire a large number of heavily armed D agile forces, is a significant troops in close combat, logistic diffi- challenge for the military. Desert culties and the concern over casualties Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Free- made such operations unsuitable in dom, and Iraqi Freedom involved se- three of the four conflicts. Those reali- verely punishing or defeating enemy ties will likely have an even greater impact in the future because of the threat of anti-access capabilities and weapons Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, USAF (Ret.), is the former chief of the current of mass destruction. doctrine division in the Airpower Research Institute at the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education.

88 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bingham

erector launchers are being used increasingly to improve survivability. JSTARS is unique in its ability to turn reliance on vehicular movement into an information advantage in both peace and war. With ground radar, the system can reliably detect, accurately locate, and precisely track vehicles from a significant standoff distance within a large coverage area even in darkness and bad weather. It can identify vehicles being tracked. Data on movement

can be used to cue unmanned aerial ve- TRANSFORMATION MILITARY hicles with high-resolution but limited fields-of-view electro-optical/infrared sensors. This information, especially when collected over days or weeks and used as the context for integrating other forms of data, can provide unprece- Scud missile bunkers, dented situational awareness of threats Desert Storm. and opportunities. If a vehicle being tracked by ground radar is identified as hostile, the E–8 crew and capable communica- U.S. Navy tions make it possible to exploit this real-time information by supporting air and missile attacks before the vehi- Military transformation is feasible Enabling Transformation cle can threaten friendly forces. In a in part because of wide-area, high-per- Ground radar can enable military development with major implications formance ground moving target indi- transformation because almost every for such targeting, tests in the afford- cator (GMTI) radar capabilities. Today army, even primitive forces such as the able moving surface target engagement the E–8 joint surveillance target attack Taliban, relies on vehicular movement program have shown that ground th radar system (JSTARS) of 116 Air for offensive and defensive operations. radar information can be used in guid- Control Wing is their principal source. Before the massive and heavily mecha- ing seekerless weapons in standoff, all- Various systems will offer such capa- nized Easter offensive by the North weather attacks against moving vehi- bilities in the future including Global Vietnamese in 1972, their operational cles. This capability, applicable to the Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, B–2 joint direct attack munition bombers, F–35 joint strike fighters, JSTARS is unique in its ability to turn and missile systems, could F/A–18E/F and F/A–22 aircraft, aerial reliance on vehicular movement into reduce civilian casualties, common sensors, multi-sensor com- collateral damage, and air- mand and control aircraft, and space an information advantage craft losses. Moreover, pre- based radars. cise strikes on vehicles in all Ground radar disrupts and dislo- effectiveness depended largely on lo- weather from standoff ranges might cates enemy forces through the inte- gistic support along the Ho Chi Minh inhibit an enemy from risking militar- gration of maneuver and standoff at- trail. Commanders have used move- ily significant movements. tacks. Using these means rather than ment to gain advantages in force ra- Perhaps the transformational im- mass and attrition can transform war tios, position, and surprise, but during portance of radar ground surveillance by making it possible to defeat land the 20th century most armies came to and targeting such as the affordable forces quickly and decisively with rely on motorized vehicles. Today that moving surface target engagement pro- fewer and lighter forces while reducing dependence is greater than ever. Vehi- gram can be appreciated by recogniz- risks to military and civilian personnel. cles furnish not only mobility but ing the limitations that faced the Despite this potential, use of E–8 heavy firepower, armored protection, Armed Forces before those capabilities ground radar systems in recent con- and logistic and engineering support. existed. Available sensors in the form flicts reveals obstacles that will require And with the capability of the Armed of human sight and cameras could lo- a transformation in training. Forces to precisely attack fixed targets, cate moving vehicles but only at short vehicles such as missile transporter ranges and in daylight and fair weather. Commanders were thus denied situational awareness on the location, movement, and strength of

issue thirty-five / JFQ 89 ■ GROUND RADAR

enemy forces. Fighter bombers on against air forces. Radar made it possi- manning the Combined Air Opera- armed reconnaissance sorties provided ble to detect, locate, and track aircraft tions Center were reportedly unfamil- the only means for detecting and tar- flying in a large airspace even when iar with the system. geting individual vehicles before they light and weather were poor. As early could engage in close combat. as the Battle of Britain, where radar The Gulf War Unfortunately, armed reconnais- provided unprecedented wide-area sit- Because JSTARS was intended to sance has proven inefficient and often uational awareness, the use of maneu- counter the Warsaw Pact, many be- ineffective in finding and attacking ver by the Royal Air Force to engage or lieved that it was no longer needed mobile forces. The limited fields of avoid enemy aircraft was enhanced with the end of the Cold War. How- view of a fighter-bomber pilot was one and the danger of surprise was re- ever, the employment of two prototype reason armed reconnaissance fell duced. When radar was applied to E–8A aircraft during the Gulf War short. Limited vision made it necessary weapons, it became possible to pre- quickly proved otherwise. During their

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY to fly many sorties to search a large cisely target aircraft from a significant attack on Al-Khafji only two weeks area for vehicles. It also made it neces- standoff distance in both darkness and after the system reached the theater, sary to search at low altitudes where an bad weather. the Iraqis learned that they could no aircraft was exposed to short-range air Today ground moving target indi- longer assume that moving at night defenses. Even when many sorties cator radar offers similar capabilities protected them from detection and at- could be flown and the losses from air against vehicles that move over a large tack. E–8A ground radar made it possi- defenses were acceptable, operations in area. In contrast to air warfare, how- ble to locate enemy units and target World War II, Korea, and Vietnam ever, only U.S. and allied forces (sev- them with devastating air strikes before demonstrated that armed reconnais- eral European nations and NATO they could close with Coalition forces. sance failed to locate and attack suit- members) have these high-perform- In addition to enhancing the efficiency able targets. Camouflage, concealment, ance systems. Moreover, even if an and effectiveness of air attacks, many and deception often caused fighter- enemy obtained such technology, it deep within Kuwait, the system helped bombers to miss suitable targets or at- would not gain an advantage because Coalition leaders understand that the tack invalid ones like decoys or previ- the effective operation of the systems, Al-Khafji attack was not a feint de- ously destroyed vehicles. More unlike radar against air forces, requires signed to mask a larger offensive. importantly, enemy land forces were an air- or space-borne platform, and During an offensive in some of able to reduce the risk of detection and the Pentagon can deny the ability to the worst weather of the war, E–8A attack by moving during darkness or operate such a platform. Yet despite ground radar quickly revealed enemy bad weather. the immense potential of ground radar efforts to reposition their forces, pro- The inability of the Air Force to for transforming operations, a review viding advancing Coalition land forces find and target vehicles before they of recent conflicts reveals that realizing with information to defeat the Iraqi approached friendly land forces helps it has been slow. Iraqi Freedom is not maneuver before it became a serious explain why it was necessary until re- addressed here, but early reports indi- threat. When the Iraqis began pulling cently to find opposing land forces cated that fully utilizing radar surveil- out of Kuwait, GMTI radar surveillance through contact with friendly land lance and targeting capabilities re- indicated that a large-scale withdrawal forces, why until then victory de- mains a problem. Some personnel pended on close combat, and how that created its own problems. Prevail- ing in close combat usually called for heavy land forces, which led to con- Desert Storm cerns over casualties. Deploying those he United Nations called on Iraq to withdraw its invasion forces from forces also required significant time Kuwait in August 1990. Then, in response to requests by Saudi Ara- and resources. However, radar ground T bia, the United States formed a coalition and sent troops to the re- capabilities provide effective and effi- gion. The United Nations authorized the use of force if Iraq did not with- cient alternatives to relying on both draw by mid-January 1991. Coalition forces of some 700,000 were fielded by close combat and visual armed recon- January 1991, including 540,000 Americans. Desert Storm commenced on naissance. January 17 with airpower focused on enemy air defenses before turning to With the development of the af- infrastructure, oil refineries, and military targets. The ground offensive fordable moving surface target engage- began on February 24. Kuwait City was liberated in three days and the oper- ment program, high-performance ation ended after only 100 hours. Although no official statistics exist, the es- ground radar surveillance and target- timated level of Iraqi forces in theater ranged from 180,000 to 630,000 with ing systems are transforming opera- 8,000 to 100,000 casualties. In contrast, the Coalition lost only about 300 tions against armies much as radar did troops. A Security Council resolution in April required Iraq to destroy or render harmless its chemical and biological weapons, halt its nuclear weapons development, and eliminate its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. JFQ

90 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bingham had begun and provided targeting data the system during combat and explain developing the ground order of battle, to support air attacks along the so- its capabilities, the Coalition quickly which significantly aided the employ- called Highway of Death. Despite the exploited advantages in ground surveil- ment of airpower. description of attacks on that escape lance and targeting. Civilians the Serbs used for pro- route, relatively few Iraqis were killed tection were another factor. Their pres- there; throughout the war they rarely Kosovo ence led NATO to require positive vi- stayed in place once their vehicles In the case of radar ground surveil- sual identification before attacking were targeted. Moreover, had the lance and targeting, Allied Force did targets to reduce harm to noncombat- ground offensive not been suspended not begin where Desert Storm left off; ants. Operations revealed that ground after only 100 hours, surveillance and JSTARS was not used to its full potential radar surveillance could play a valu- targeting support might have played a to help target mobile Serbian land able role in target identification by major role in preventing Republican forces. To some extent the failure to ex- providing cues to airborne forward air

Guard divisions from escaping intact. ploit the system from the outset of hos- controllers and operators of unmanned TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Ground radar surveillance and tar- tilities can be explained by major dif- aerial vehicles on locations where geting contributed to Desert Storm by ferences between the conflicts. movement was occurring. JSTARS, defeating enemy land forces despite Unlike the terrain in Kuwait and Rivet Joint, forward air controllers, major handicaps. One was that only southwestern Iraq, which is relatively C–130 command and control aircraft, two prototype systems were available, flat desert, Kosovo is mountainous U–2s, and Predator unmanned vehicles and they did not reach the theater with heavy foliage that increased were all linked. These cues made for- until just before the air offensive. How- screening and made it more difficult ward air control and unmanned aerial ever, thanks to heroic efforts by the for E–8A ground surveillance to detect, vehicles more efficient since targeteers locate, and track mo- did not have to conduct the initial JSTARS was not used to its full potential bile forces, especially search for movers using limited fields- from the orbit assigned of-view sensors. to help target mobile Serbian land forces to the system. Another Another difference was the impact difference was that Ser- of basing on JSTARS employment. Swiss JSTARS team, composed of military bian forces faced little immediate dan- and Austrian refusal to allow over- and contractor personnel, one of the ger from a land force. Thus they had flights required E–8s to fly a long dis- two systems flew every night of the scant need to move to develop advan- tance to reach an orbit from their base war. But with only one system airborne tages in mass, position, and surprise. in Germany, which reduced on-station and only at night, it was impossible to By remaining dispersed they could time and increased air refueling. provide continuous ground radar cov- avoid providing the large number of Similarities to the Gulf War also erage. Consistency was further reduced lucrative moving targets JSTARS de- limited the initial contribution of the because commanders had urgent re- tected in the Gulf War. system. Even though JSTARS was no quirements across the theater for its The lack of enemy land forces longer a prototype, the fleet consisted unprecedented system capabilities. contributed to the failure of NATO to of only four operational systems; thus E–8As were often tasked during a sin- perform intelligence preparation of for most of Allied Force only two sys- gle mission to conduct surveillance the battlespace until it was too late. tems were deployed in theater. But, as from the far west of Iraq (to look for Currently, only land components in Desert Storm, the team excelled in Scuds) to the border between Kuwait make such preparations. Task Force generating sorties between February and Saudi Arabia (where the Al-Khafji Hawk, the deployment of two battal- 22 and June 28, 1999, flying 83 sorties attack took place). ions of Apache and other helicopters for a total of 730.7 on-station hours. Since the system was still in devel- together with infantry, tanks, artillery, Yet even with this level of effort, the opment during the invasion of Kuwait, engineer, and headquarters assets, pro- another handicap was widespread un- vided NATO airmen with expertise in familiarity with JSTARS. As the joint force air component commander noted, “We who were responsible for planning and orchestrating air opera- Allied Force tions had little appreciation of the sys- fter the failure of negotiations at Rambouillet in March 1999, NATO tem’s capabilities and limitations.”1 launched an air campaign designed to compel President Slobodan Lack of familiarity extended to crews, A Milosevic of Yugoslavia to end abuses against ethnic Albanians by which had to be trained while the sys- Serbian forces in Kosovo. Air strikes continued for 78 days and were halted in tems were en route to the theater. early June when Milosevic acceded to NATO demands to withdraw from the Even the concept of operation had province. The Alliance generated over 38,000 combat sorties without any not been fully developed. But thanks to combat losses in the largest operation in its history. Allied Force was the third the ability of the JSTARS team to refine largest strategic application of U.S. airpower since World War II at the time, exceeded only by the Vietnam War and Desert Storm. JFQ

issue thirty-five / JFQ 91 ■ GROUND RADAR

JSTARS landing, Iraqi Freedom. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Air Control Wing (Tom McKenzie) WingAir Control (Tom th 116

limited number of aircraft and the dis- Desert Storm. Nor were crews initially dilemma. If they maneuvered in re- tances involved prevented JSTARS prepared to help forward air controllers sponse to the offensive, they were visi- from providing 24-hour coverage, with information on movement. ble to ground radar; but if they did not which allowed Serbian forces to move Like Desert Storm, operational ex- move for fear of being detected, they without the risk of being detected, lo- perience gave NATO commanders, handicapped their ability to achieve cated, or tracked by radar. staffs, and aircrews the opportunity to the force ratios and position needed to A further similarity to the Gulf learn more about system capabilities defeat the light Kosovar forces with War was the lack of familiarity with and an appreciation of its contribution minimum casualties. As the JSTARS system capabilities and limitations on to air operations. Fighter pilots recog- squadron commander put it, “The the part of those responsible for air op- nized that the capability of JSTARS to Serbs got smart—they realized that erations. That may explain why JSTARS detect, locate, and track vehicular when they moved, they died; they at- was not deployed early in the crisis movement eliminated the need for in- tempted to move in smaller numbers— when vehicular information could efficient visual search and reduced de- that didn’t work either. JSTARS was have revealed the magnitude of the Ser- ception by decoys and camouflage. able to see what was going on, share bian deployment. Once deployed, un- During the conflict, the system began the information, bring iron on target, familiarity also contributed to delays in to cue both forward air controllers and and help bring an end to the including the system in the air tasking unmanned aerial vehicles on the loca- conflict.”2 According to the NATO air order and to placing the system in a tions of vehicular traffic, allowing for component commander, Lieutenant less than ideal orbit. Choosing orbits more effective and efficient targeting General Mike Short, Serb forces “got for surveillance of rough terrain re- of Serbian forces. spanked from JSTARS and [unmanned quires special software to ensure that Another similarity was weather in aerial vehicle] cross cues.”3 the screening of key areas such as road the initial phases, which resembled The dilemma that faced the Ser- segments will be minimized. Lack of fa- what the ground offensive experienced bians may have been key to their deci- miliarity caused the system to be used in the Gulf War. When conditions im- sion to withdraw from Kosovo. After initially for only surveillance and not proved, the so-called Kosovo Libera- the conflict, the Supreme Allied Com- targeting. Because the small number of tion Army began an offensive that mander Europe reaffirmed the value of operational aircraft constrained train- forced the Serbs to move and mass. the system, testifying that “JSTARS was ing, some crewmembers were unfamil- Even though the offensive was not a big winner for us here. It is also all- iar with targeting capabilities used in powerful, it enabled E–8 surveillance weather; it really helped us understand and targeting capabilities to present what was going on both in the early Serb forces with an operational stages and in the late stages.”4

92 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bingham

Afghanistan The threat the Northern Alliance pre- are well planned and capabilities such One difference in Afghanistan was sented was sufficient to cause Taliban as unmanned aerial vehicles, U–2s, the delay in deploying JSTARS, which and al Qaeda forces to move and con- and Special Operations Forces comple- did not arrive in theater until after sev- centrate and to rely on vehicles for ment radar surveillance. eral weeks of combat. Although the firepower and armor, making it easier The Way Ahead Commander, U.S. Central Command, to detect, locate, track, and target reported to President George Bush that them. Enhancing the contribution of GMTI radar is essential to an inte- he needed the system operating in the ground radar information to targeting grated network that provides situational environment, much of the Taliban and was the fact that almost no one except awareness and the ability to attack 6 al Qaeda vehicle movement had ceased the Taliban or al Qaeda had vehicles. across a large area before enemy units by the time it was available. Nevertheless, fear of hitting civil- can close with friendly land forces. At The President recognized the rele- ians influenced the rules of engage- the same time, experience shows that vance of movement, according to a re- ment and exploitation of ground the learning curve for exploitation of TRANSFORMATION MILITARY porter: “Our strategy is to...get the radar targeting. Reportedly, positive such capabilities has not been steep, bad guys moving. We get ’em moving, with many of the same problems we can see them, we can hit them.”5 GMTI radar is essential to an arising in each conflict. To some The Chairman also perceived the need integrated network that provides extent the learning problems can to attack mobile rather than fixed tar- be traced to the unprecedented gets but realized, “We’ve got a military situational awareness nature of ground radar and the that does great against fixed targets. limited numbers of systems avail- We don’t do so well against mobile tar- identification was required to select able for training. But a greater reason is gets. You’re not going to topple a civilian vehicles for air attack, often the profound difference between peace- regime with this [fixed] target list.” by land forces that actually saw the time training and combat. Despite the delay, JSTARS opera- targets. Such rules not only handi- The value of wide-area ground tions were similar to previous conflicts. capped an asymmetrical advantage, radar is more apparent on the opera- For example, the system was not de- but also put military and civilian per- tional than tactical level of war. The ployed in numbers sufficient for personnel at greater risk. Deploying eyes preponderance of training involving sistent coverage. And like the final days on the ground in proximity to an such surveillance and targeting capa- of Allied Force, ground radar data cued enemy is dangerous. Moreover, when bilities is neither joint nor focused on the employment of other sensors, such vehicles are allowed to escape, their the operational level; service training as high-resolution but soda-straw potential remains intact. And when centers are geared toward combat by a fields-of-view sensors. Another encour- the enemy in question is al Qaeda, single service, though forces from aging similarity was system reliability. Americans around the world are fur- other services occasionally participate. From November 7, 2001, to April 27, ther endangered. And with a focus on combat, the im- 2002, E–8s flew 249 missions (100 per- The terrain in Afghanistan also portance of pre-hostility ground radar cent of those scheduled) and 245 (98.4 made screening a challenge, as it did surveillance is neglected. Moreover, percent) were effective. Of the final 189 in Kosovo. But it was not a major much combat training is devoted to missions, 188 (99.5 percent) were effec- problem initially, given the relatively the tactical level, ignoring the role of tive. Yet like Kosovo, the distance the flat areas where Northern Alliance the operational level in determining aircraft had to fly to reach an orbit re- forces fought Taliban and al Qaeda when, where, or whether engagements duced on-station time and increased air forces. Moreover, even the ability to must be fought. For example, the Na- refueling requirements. screen radar surveillance and targeting tional Training Center is focused on Like the Gulf War and the final could be offset because it also con- the training brigade or lower echelons days of Allied Force when the Kosovar strained vehicle movement. Thus ter- to fight regimental-size opposing offensive occurred, the presence of rain can actually enhance radar sur- forces in close combat. friendly land forces greatly enhanced veillance and targeting when orbits Although this center provides one the air operations JSTARS supported. of the few opportunities for the Air Force to train against a realistic opposing land force, it is usually confined to close air support. Moreover, according Enduring Freedom to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, hen the Taliban in Afghanistan failed to deliver terrorist leaders “The results [of close air support in ex- and close their training camps in the wake of 9/11, the United ercises] are never fully appreciated. If W States initiated air strikes in early October 2001 to support resist- we attrited the red force with air, then ance by the Northern Alliance. The Taliban regime fell from power by Decem- they’d never get engaged on the ber and the operation was subsequently focused on stabilization and recon- ground. When you think about what’s struction. Periodic efforts to kill or capture al Qaeda and Taliban members the lesson taught to generations of continued, however, such as Operation Anaconda in March 2002. JFQ

issue thirty-five / JFQ 93 ■ GROUND RADAR

opportunity to learn in peacetime how Global Hawk, Enduring Freedom. to fully exploit ground radar surveillance and targeting.

Training is an essential prerequi- site for the military transformation in meeting the strategic implications of enemy land forces. Commanders must use joint training to integrate land and air forces by using maneuver and standoff air attack to create an in- tractable operational dilemma for an

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY enemy while maneuvering to avoid close combat, except when overwhelming advantages and close combat make contributing to campaign objectives worth the risks. A commander attempting to create such a dilemma will soon find that enemy vehicular movement provides a more reliable means for assessment than attrition. For example, when the

Combat Camera Squadron (Reynaldo Ramon) Combat Camera Squadron objective is stopping movement, st 1 ground moving target indicator radar will quickly reveal whether the attack was successful. And thanks to this sur- young soldiers, [it’s] ‘Y’all got these air- need to train like we fight and fight veillance, it is possible to make this as- planes but they’re no help to me.’”7 like we train, and too often we don’t.”8 sessment in real time, even in darkness Such training clearly does not support The strategic plan for transforming and bad weather. With the realistic the operational level, in which target- training makes establishing a joint na- joint training the transformation in ing combat units and, often more im- tional training capability a top priority. training is designed to achieve, com- portantly, logistic support can elimi- This would provide tools to train regu- manders should become confident nate the need for close combat. Given larly with forces from multiple services that it is feasible to quickly defeat op- the single service, tactical, and close using live-fire and training simulators. posing land forces using fewer and combat orientation for most peacetime It also includes augmentation by com- lighter land forces. JFQ training, it is not surprising that learn- puter-generated synthetic forces, ing to fully exploit radar ground sur- which would provide the realistic oper- NOTES veillance and targeting capabilities has ational-level environment needed to 1 Charles A. Horner, “An Information Su- been largely confined to on-the-job put the tactical level into perspective. periority Lesson,” ISR Journal, vol. 1, no. 1 training during conflicts. Clearly, a joint national training capa- (January/February 2002), p. 17. The Pentagon is reportedly con- bility would provide commanders an 2 Tony Capaccio, “Northrop Grumman sidering a project known as T2. The Joint Stars Led Most Lethal Attacks on Secretary of Defense noted that “we Serbs,” Bloomberg News (June 29, 1999). 3 Briefing, 93d Air Control Wing, Robins Air Force Base, May 31, 1999. 4 Wesley K. Clark, testimony before the Iraqi Freedom Senate Armed Services Committee, July 1, 1999. he U.N. Security Council found in November 2002 that Iraq remained 5 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New in material breach of resolutions banning weapons of mass destruc- York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 153, T tion. Later in the month inspectors returned to verify the disarma- 174. ment efforts. But members of the Security Council were divided over whether 6 “Targeting Improving; No Problems Baghdad was cooperating with the inspections. In March 2003 the United with Coordination, Rumsfeld Says,” Aero- States, which had begun to deploy forces to the region, suspended negotia- space Daily (November 20, 2001), p. 4. tions and demanded that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq within 48 hours or face 7 “CAS Role Damaged by Staffing, Train- war. When he refused to comply, U.S. and allied forces launched combat oping Structure, Jumper Says,” Aerospace Daily erations. Organized enemy resistance ended by mid-April. Approximately (February 27, 2003), p. 4. 8 467,000 Americans and 43,000 coalition troops were deployed during the “Joint National Training Capability: The Next Wave in Transformation,” Inside combat phase of the operation. JFQ the Pentagon (February 20, 2003), p. 1.

94 JFQ / issue thirty-five U.S. Air Force (GregU.S. Air Force L. Davis) Centralized Control/ Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward Reach By MARK G. DAVIS

he phenomenon of political and mili- demonstrated that technology can provide com- tary leaders reaching forward into the manders on all levels with immediate situational realm of tactical operations has existed awareness and that joint publications can offer T since Thucydides. It differs today be- doctrine on every aspect of operations. Moreover, cause of technology, doctrine, and the current op- warfare is no longer controlled under the same erational environment. Enduring Freedom model that prevailed throughout most of the 20th century. Commanders can anticipate conducting operations in an environment in which political Major Mark G. Davis, USA, is a student at the School of Advanced Air goals are vague; domestic and international sup- and Space Studies who has previously served in a variety of special port is tentative; and casualties are dutifully operations assignments. avoided. To redress this dilemma, DOD has spent

issue thirty-five / JFQ 95 ■ CENTRALIZED CONTROL/DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

billions on command, control, communications, Action Armed Forces. It is therefore imperative that computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon- the Air Force core tenet of centralized control and naissance (C4ISR) systems. As a result, centralized decentralized execution be modified to reflect the control and decentralized execution pursued by principles outlined in joint doctrine. Centralized the Air Force is not valid in view of joint doctrine planning and direction is consistent throughout and the emergence of effects-based operations. joint doctrine and clearly shows that this tenet is contradictory to the basic command and control Takeoff to Landing tenet outlined. The first doctrinal issue is the inconsistency From a joint perspective, centralized control between centralized control and decentralized and decentralized execution is illogical and can- execution and the joint precept of centralized not exist together because control is about execu- planning and direction. As a reaction to the tion and is inherent in command, as explained in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for from a joint perspective, centralized control and Joint Operations. An aircraft is under centralized direction virtu- decentralized execution is illogical and cannot ally from takeoff to landing exist together through a series of control functions: Joint force commanders and bombing of Vietnam during Rolling Thunder in JFACC maintain operational or tactical control of 1971, the Air Force altered the concept of cen- each aircraft on the air tasking order; the airman tralized control to include decentralized execu- is required to execute only those missions derived tion. Since then, centralized control and decen- from the air tasking order or in the case of time tralized execution has been accepted by the sensitive targets when directed by joint com- service as the best way to employ airpower. By manders; the airman must adhere to the instruc- contrast, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the tions as outlined in the airspace control order and Armed Forces of the United States, establishes that special instructions; to receive direction and guid- centralized planning and direction is “essential ance the airman must communicate over the the- for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all ater air-to-ground system, which exists to expe- forces available.” What is more, Air Force Doc- dite the ability of joint commanders to control air trine Document (AFDD 1), “Air Force Basic Doc- operations; and finally, if the aircraft is conduct- trine,” states that “centralized control is the best ing close air support, it must receive clearance way to employ air power,” which would be op- from an air or ground controller before releasing posed by the Army and Marine Corps, which uti- its ordnance. The only decentralized aspect in lize centralized planning and this mission scenario is the tactics involved in direction and mission-type striking the target, and even then rules of engage- orders to employ forces. ment could be a controlling factor. Because senior officers Another clear discrepancy between joint and of the Air Force are routinely service doctrine involves control of airpower. selected as joint force air AFDD 1 is unequivocal in insisting that “Air and component commanders space power must be controlled by an airman.” By (JFACCs), it is essential that comparison, Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command its doctrine and execution and Control for Joint Air Operations, states that a methodologies mirror those joint force commander will assign responsibilities prescribed in joint doctrine. for air operations to a commander with the pre- Its tenet of centralized con- ponderance of air assets and skill to control joint

Signal Company (Andres J. Rodriguez) trol is not a recognized term air operations.” Moreover , when “a JFACC is not th

55 in joint doctrine and is caus- designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control Gardez Valley, ing confusion not only joint air operations.” Joint doctrine makes it quite Afghanistan. within the Air Force but throughout the joint clear that centralized planning and direction of community. The following statement is an exam- joint air operations can be assigned not only to ple of the dichotomy between Air Force and joint airmen, as Air Force doctrine would seem to doctrine. Joint Pub 1 states, “Unity of effort, cen- imply, but to senior officers from the Army, Navy, tralized planning and direction, and decentral- and Marine Corps with control over substantial ized execution are key considerations in joint op- air resources and requisite qualifications. erations.” Where conflict arises between service and joint doctrine, joint doctrine takes prece- Centrifugal Force? dence, according to Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Command relationships are another doctrinal issue that generates concern. Joint Pub 3-0 outlines four relationships: combatant command,

96 JFQ / issue thirty-five Davis

Desert Storm. DOD (Kimberly Yearyean)

operational control, tactical control, and support. Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom? Centralized control is missing from that menu Have the joint air operations planning process, air and its ambiguous definition in AFDD 1 might tasking order cycle, theater air-to-ground system, leave some airmen guessing. Does the Air Force and C4ISR fusion capabilities within the air tenet of centralized control bestow command au- weapons operation center subsumed all responsi- thority over assets once aircraft are aloft or does bility from subordinate air commanders on the execution authority and responsibility continue wing and squadron level and made joint com- to reside with joint commanders? As noted, when manders the focal point for every aspect of air op- taken as a whole, this tenet confuses the issue of erations? As Joint Pub 3-56.1 states, “The JFACC control, which according to Joint Pub 3-0 is in- directs...the air operations plan [centralized herent in command. Joint doctrine satisfactorily planning] and a responsive and integrated control addresses the level of control of forces delegated system [decentralized execution].” Again, joint to joint commanders by establishing relation- doctrine refers to centralized planning, not cen- ships for particular missions or operations, and tralized control, and additionally describes the centralized control is not among them. theater air-to-ground system as the method for The third issue deals with decentralized exe- utilizing decentralized control. That system en- cution and the realities of modern air operations. ables joint commanders to exercise control over Air Force doctrine defines decentralized execution the air and space environment, control air mis- as delegating “execution authority to responsible sions to achieve assigned air operations objectives, and capable lower level commanders...to and finally produce command, control, communi- achieve span of control and to foster initiative, sit- cations, and computers systems that enable the uational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.” control of assets. It would be difficult to describe Does this statement accurately reflect the realities the theater air-to-ground system as anything but a of air operations since Deliberate Force, Allied tool for joint commanders to extend control over the execution of air operations. The military reluctantly turned to decentralized execution in the past because technology did

issue thirty-five / JFQ 97 ■ CENTRALIZED CONTROL/DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION U.S. Army (Brandon R. Aird) Kirkuk, Iraq.

not exist to provide an integrated network to have the authority to play JFACC, wing com- control operations. Today, unity of effort is mander, and tactical fighter pilot. achieved not by decentralized execution but A fifth issue is focused on the principles of through an elaborate system of systems that en- war, specifically unity of command. In Joint Pub ables centralized planning and direction on the 3-0, unity of command means that “all forces op- highest levels. The spirit of decentralized execu- erate under a single commander with requisite au- tion resides in senior commanders issuing mis- thority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a sion-type orders to subordinates and allowing common purpose.” In comparing this tenet with them to develop plans and execute missions unity of command it might be concluded that it is based on the mission and intent of higher com- merely a duplication of a principle of war, readily mand, as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0. The joint air acknowledged as the enduring bedrock of doc- operations planning process, air tasking order trine. Centralized control and decentralized exe- cycle, and theater air-to-ground system have cution is not necessary when such principles are usurped this precept of joint operations. Decen- already inherent in joint operations. tralized execution is established joint doctrine, The final doctrinal issue deals specifically but it would appear that the Air Force tenet of with the emergence of effects-based operations centralized control is inconsistent with its spirit and its impact on centralized control and decen- and the realities of modern joint air operations tralized execution. These operations are con- that require centralized planning and direction. ceived and planned in a systems framework that The fourth issue that invalidates the tenet of considers the full range of direct, indirect, and centralized control and decentralized execution is cascading effects by the application of military, that doctrine allows joint commanders to reach diplomatic, psychological, and economic instru- forward. This is best illustrated in Joint Pub 3-0: ments. They embrace the notion that political, “JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redi- economic, and diplomatic considerations are rect efforts, and direct coordination among subor- more important than military conquest. They dinate commanders...in addition the command represent a top-down process rather than usual authority [combatant command] provides the bottom-up operations. JFCs unlimited authority to direct every aspect of Because of casual linkages among target sets the operation.” Until doctrinal changes are imple- and the danger of objective fratricide, effects- mented, joint force commanders will continue to based operations must be orchestrated by a centralized planning and execution authority that has situational understanding of every aspect of

98 JFQ / issue thirty-five Davis

control, could lead to tactical and operational considerations that define strategy, sometimes called tacticization of strategy. Traditionally, the levels of war are depicted as a pyramid with the strategic level on top and the operational and tactical levels in subordinate positions. Today, the lines separating these levels are difficult to discern. Codifying centralized control in doctrine will further confound an already complicated situation. On the strategic level, centralized control influences decisionmaking in three ways. First, the operational level will be less critical because sensors and shooters are becoming strategic. Secondly, centralized control and the emphasis on the capability to destroy targets with precision-guided munitions will result in strategic success without first identifying political goals. Finally, centralized control increases the likelihood of intervention by political and military leaders removed from the fight. The danger of centralized control is subverting long-range strategy that looks beyond the capabilities of weapons platforms and destruction of targets. Combat Camera Squadron (KenCombat Camera Squadron Bergmann) st 1 Centralized control and decentralized execu- Ramstein air base, tion is not possible in an environment in which Allied Force. political factors nullify military efficiency and the diplomatic, informational, economic, and emerging joint doctrine enables commanders to military campaign. Such operations will add myr- reach forward and direct air operations. In the iad players to the targeting process to include event, neither technology nor the environment economists, nongovernmental officials, bankers, invalidate centralized control and decentralized lawyers, and politicians. It will require microman- execution in military operations; rather it will be agement of air operations and demand enhanced joint doctrine and the emerging strategy of ef- C4ISR systems to control all aspects of ground, fects-based warfare that will decide its fate. JFQ sea, and air maneuvers. It would be impossible for it would be impossible for centralized control and decentralized execution to coexist with a true effects-based campaign

centralized control and decentralized execution to coexist with a true effects-based campaign strategy construct. The areas highlighted above have emphasized the tactical and operational friction points that arise when contrasting centralized control and decentralized execution with the concepts codified in joint doctrine. The most significant danger facing the joint community is not the impact that this tenet will make on tactical and operational warfighting methods, but how it will affect the strategic thinking by senior political and military leaders. Centralized control and decentralized execution, and specifically centralized

issue thirty-five / JFQ 99 Operational

DOD (Dean Wagner) Command and Control in the Information Age By MILAN N. VEGO

major tenet of command and control could find themselves resembling the former So- is centralized direction and decentral- viet military and paying a heavy price in the ized execution. But there has been quest for absolute certainty and control. steady movement in the last decade A Centralization toward increased centralization on all levels. This trend should be arrested and the German-style Authority is concentrated in a single com- task-oriented command and control from top to mander and headquarters under centralized bottom adopted. Otherwise the Armed Forces (order-oriented) command and control. One actor determines objectives and directs their accomplishment. Centralization ensures unity of Milan N. Vego teaches in the Joint Military Operations Department at effort through unity of command, facilitates de- the Naval War College and is the author of Naval Strategy and cisionmaking, offers effective use of forces and Operations in Narrow Seas. assets, eliminates uncertainty, and maximizes

100 JFQ / issue thirty-five V ego

control. But subordinate commanders do not The German army demonstrated the applica- have much latitude in decisions and suffer from tion of task-oriented command and control and low morale and motivation. Under centralized the impact of being abandoned by its strategic command and control, detailed orders can per- leadership. Its successes in 1939–41 resulted from suade tactical leaders against taking advantage of the freedom of action that Adolph Hitler and the changing circumstances. supreme command gave operational commanders. The Soviets used centralized command and Army commanders were issued instructions and control during World War II by issuing binding not detailed orders. Moreover, the Fuehrer did not orders to field commanders. The result was com- unduly interfere in operations during the Polish manders who would not campaign. These practices eventually gave way to overcentralized command and consolidate and exploit more intrusive orders after the start of the inva- combat success because sion of Russia. In the first major German defeat at control undermines morale and they could not act with- the gates of Moscow, Hitler took command, turn- encourages an unwillingness out orders. Moreover, ing the army general staff into a de facto personal to act independently American and British staff as he had the supreme command. forces relied extensively Hitler centralized policy and strategy and on directive orders in also made operational decisions. He increasingly 1944, which explains their almost six-month ad- bypassed the supreme command and army group vance from Normandy to the German border, de- commands. Task-oriented command and control spite superiority in men and matériel. was abandoned and he issued detailed orders The more political the objective, the greater down to mid-level echelons, which allowed for the need for centralized command and control. no interpretation. Hitler directed group com- The lack of common operational concepts and manders that a certain city must be held or that doctrine requires more centralization on all lev- a corps or division must hold its occupied posi- els. Additionally, poorly educated and trained tion. His experiences as a soldier during World subordinates can be controlled only by detailed War I formed the basis of his decisions. Like orders. Centralization is also essential when lead- Stalin, he rarely allowed a withdrawal from un- ers will not accept errors by their subordinates, tenable positions, leading to large losses on the especially in crises that might lead to hostilities. eastern front in 1942–45. During the Cold War, national command authori- Today operational commanders often bypass ties on both sides controlled the actions of their immediate subordinate commanders and issue di- commanders. Centralization is suitable when sit- rect orders to tactical commanders in the field, as uations such as fixed defense evolve slowly. It is Allied Force and Enduring Force illustrated. This also suited to the unique limitations of peace op- circumstance prevailed because of the inability or erations which, in turn, can severely influence unwillingness of operational commanders to del- freedom of action on the ground. egate authority. In general, leaders bypass subordinates because they distrust their competence. A The Trend narrow tactical perspective is another reason for The most serious current problem in the micromanagement despite lessons of the past, Armed Forces is the trend toward overcentralized which indicate that such practices are invariably decisionmaking on the operational and strategic detrimental to an organization in combat. levels. Centralized command and control may Overcentralized command and control un- not preclude the defeat of a capable enemy, but it dermines morale and encourages an unwilling- extorts a price. For example, in the initial phase ness or inability on the part of subordinates to of the German invasion of Russia in 1941, Joseph act independently and take responsibility for Stalin and his military advisors tried to run the their actions. Among other concerns, eliminating war by themselves with catastrophic conse- independent action leaves no reliable way to quences. The Soviet high command made all the gauge promotion potential of junior and mid- strategic decisions. Subordinates were not allowed level leaders. to exercise their initiative. Stalin personally or- Advances in communications allow senior dered ill-conceived counteroffensives and forbade leaders to observe events in near real time from withdrawals, resulting in the encirclement of thousands of miles away. This promotes a false hundreds of thousands of men who were de- impression that remote headquarters can perceive stroyed by fast-advancing enemy armor. Yet de- the situation better than tactical commanders on spite monopolizing decisionmaking, the high the scene. Consequently, not only must tactical command had little effect on the outcome. commanders report to operational commanders, but the latter often issue orders to the tactical level. Intermediate commanders are bypassed and relegated to being information administrators as

issue thirty-five / JFQ 101 ■ COMMAND AND CONTROL U.S. Marine Corps (Mauricio Campino) Intelligence briefing, Iraqi Freedom. more senior leaders immerse themselves in de- by orbiting satellites. His headquarters was net- tails. Networking supposedly promises decentral- worked via satellite with headquarters in Kuwait ization, affording greater initiative to subordi- and Uzbekistan. nates. Evidence suggests the opposite: theater Experience proves that theater commanders commanders increasingly use information tech- have less need for real-time knowledge than sub- nology to make decisions that would normally be ordinate commanders. Also, at theater level, the the province of tactical commanders. volume of the real-time information available makes it more difficult to focus on operational in- Real-Time Knowledge stead of tactical aspects of the situation. During During Enduring Freedom, senior leaders in Millennium Challenge, tactical units received or- the United States not only observed but also sec- ders from senior levels, sometimes without the ond-guessed subordinate commanders. Comman- knowledge of intermediate commanders. Com- der, Central Command, reportedly exercised di- puter networks can apparently turn the tradi- rect command in real time over forces in tional chain of command into a web of command Afghanistan from headquarters in Florida. He could also monitor images of the battlefield from unmanned aerial vehicles that were retransmitted

102 JFQ / issue thirty-five V ego

Press conference on commanders in Vietnam used helicopters as air- Operation Anaconda. borne command posts to direct commanders on the ground. Technology enabled senior leaders to make purely tactical decisions. During the Kosovo conflict, General Wesley Clark, USA, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), interfered with the responsibilities of the joint force air component commander at Allied Force South. The personal relationship between these leaders was accordingly troubled. Clark reportedly selected fixed targets, stipulated the means to attack them, and aborted attacks on targets in progress. Regional commanders seem unwilling to delegate authority through intermediate levels of DOD (R.D. Ward) command. In the Persian Gulf War, Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM), was also the commander of the Kuwaiti theater of operations that is deemed highly desirable. Yet it is an illu- as well as de facto land component commander, sion to think that senior leaders can grasp tactical with his forward headquarters at Riyadh. In the intricacies better than their subordinates. Nor can conflict against Serbia in 1999, SACEUR ran day- they take advantage of their fleeting opportuni- to-day operations rather than delegating responsi- ties on the ground. bility to his subordinate, the commander of Al- During World War II, Admiral Chester lied Forces Southern Europe. He also got bogged Nimitz, the theater commander in the Pacific, down in making tactical decisions instead of de- and Admiral Raymond Spruance, the fleet com- voting himself to strategy and policy as the senior mander, realized their commanders on the scene NATO military officer. were best suited to make tactical decisions. In Enduring Freedom, Allied Forces Central Nimitz reportedly left commanders alone because Command ran the war from some 8,000 miles looking over their shoulders inhibited them. As away. The distance between headquarters and long as commanders had the responsibility, they subordinates on the ground still matters even in had the freedom to do what they thought best. At the information age. Greater distance means less the same time, both leaders made recommenda- ability to make timely decisions. Distance also af- tions by radio if local commanders were over- fects the performance of respective staffs, largely looking opportunities. Nimitz and Admiral because of different battle rhythms caused by dif- Joseph King, the Chief of Naval Operations, al- ferent time zones. lowed freedom of action but were not slow to in- The human dimension of leadership is tervene or relieve a commander. largely ignored by apostles of information war- Technology is a two-edged sword, especially fare. Senior commanders should be close to battle when developments lend themselves to ever where subordinates can see them. This can en- greater centralization and, in extreme cases, to hance morale and build trust. Hence theater- battlefield micromanagement. Some 130 years strategic commanders could establish a subordi- ago, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke warned nate theater of operations command or combined that the most unfortunate senior commander is joint task force prior to hostilities. This command one who suffers under close supervision and must would be directly accountable to the theater- continually give an account of his plans and in- strategic commanders and responsible for day-to- tent. This supervision may be exercised through a day planning and execution of joint and com- delegate of the highest authority at his headquar- bined operations or campaigns. Such a solution ters or by a telegraph wire attached to his back. In in Kosovo and the combat phase of Enduring such cases, all independence, rapid decisions, and Freedom would have relieved the theater-strategic audacious risk—without which no war can be commander of direct involvement in tactical won—cease. matters. At the same time, intermediate commanders could improve their control over forces Delegating Authority by their proximity to the fight. Moreover, theater- Operational commanders who specify every- strategic commanders could devote time and en- thing for subordinates will get lost in myriad de- ergy to strategic and operational affairs in their tails and lose their perspective. They will also risk areas of responsibility. losing the trust of their subordinates and undermine the basis of their decisions. Senior army

issue thirty-five / JFQ 103 ■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

EOD team, Iraqi Freedom. Combat Camera Squadron (BillyCombat Camera Squadron Johnson) st 1

Targeteering or vulnerabilities. Today, many parties from the Another result of the increased centralized Joint Staff in Washington to tactical commanders command and control is that the planning and and agencies in the field are involved in target de- execution focus is almost exclusively on targets to velopment, selection, and approval. be degraded, neutralized, or destroyed, not the Allied Force and Enduring Freedom are the objectives and tasks to be ac- latest examples of the targeteering approach to targets are often selected complished. Targets are often warfare. In the former operation, SACEUR pressured planners to produce a list of 5,000 targets. first, then the search starts selected first, then the search starts for objectives. This vio- After being informed there were not that many in for objectives lates the foundation on which Serbia, he reduced the number to 2,000. Many tar- the regressive planning process gets eventually attacked were unrelated to military rests. The ultimate operational or strategic objec- capabilities. The targeting process involved nu- tive is determined first for a major operation or merous planners at the Pentagon and elsewhere in campaign. Afterward, intermediate major tactical the United States as well as Great Britain, Supreme or operational objectives must be resolved as well. Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, U.S. European The main reason for the excessive focus on Command, and the combined air operations cen- the targeting process among U.S. planners is the ter in Italy. And worse, selection and approval uncritical acceptance of the flawed five-ring the- were time-consuming, politicized, and random, ory. The most serious error is belief that each ring which resulted in ad hoc targeting. consists of a single or many centers of gravity. In Each strike in Enduring Freedom was ap- practical terms, these centers are targets to be at- proved by CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. tacked. It is wrong to suppose these centers are Military lawyers vetted targets on all echelons vulnerabilities. With this belief, the logic of what from the Pentagon and unified command level to constitutes a center of gravity is turned on its the combined air operations center in Saudi Ara- head. It is directly related to one’s objective. In an- bia and carrier battle groups and ground forces in alyzing enemy critical factors, a center of gravity is Afghanistan. The Joint Staff selected targets while invariably found among its tangible and intangi- Navy and Air Force planners abroad, chiefly in ble strengths whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction would prevent it from accomplishing its objective, not critical weaknesses

104 JFQ / issue thirty-five V ego

selected for component tasks. The focus must be on targets whose destruction or neutralization would cause a ripple effect and lead to accomplishing the assigned task. Focusing on targeting makes it harder to determine whether and when an objective has been reached. It also wastes time and resources. As Kosovo demonstrated, emphasizing targets instead of objectives and tasks can lead to attrition warfare on the operational and strategic levels. This outcome may not be critical in operations like Enduring Freedom, where victory is assured, but could have serious consequences when an enemy is stronger. Moreover, targeteering directs almost all the attention of the operational com- Signal Company (Ronald Mitchell)

th manders and their staffs to the tactics of weapons 55 and platforms instead of the operational and Briefing in Bagram, strategic situation. Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, determined how strikes would be Task Orientation carried out, prepared daily air tasking orders, and The Armed Forces could meet the challenges established aircraft packages for given missions. of information technology by reinforcing the However, in contrast to prevalent practices, target tenets of centralized control and decentralized ex- selection—creating a joint prioritized list for both ecution found in joint doctrine. Decentralization ground and air targets—was made by CENTCOM is often regarded as synonymous with Auftragstak- for four months until Anaconda in March 2002. tik, the concept of task-oriented command and Often intelligence and advances in shortening control. Its prerequisites are understanding the the time to carry out strikes were degraded by de- nature of war, a common operational and tactical lays in obtaining approval from senior command- outlook, common doctrine and vocabulary, a ers. In addition, many attacks on time-sensitive high degree of professional education and train- targets failed because controllers from the Central ing, and the highest degree of leadership by sen- Intelligence Agency or Special Forces had to get ior commanders and their subordinates. approval from Tampa. Decentralization of large formations during One solution is putting target selection at the the Wars of German Unification (1864–71) re- end of the planning process, not the front. Objec- sulted from the increased range and lethality of tives and tasks should dominate planning. Target- weapons, railroads, and telegraphs. The effect was ing should be decentralized with higher levels of a larger theater in which armies were deployed command less involved in tactical and technical and maneuvered. Commanders were unable to details. Control on the operational and strategic fully observe or control their forces. Another ef- levels should be exercised through appropriate fect was the intensity of combat and need to dis- guidance and rules of engagement. The result perse forces over the theater. Moltke recognized would be faster decisions on target selection and that the flow of information would never be fast attack. Specifically, the process should reside with enough to allow control by commanders at head- service or functional component and joint task quarters in the rear, even with the telegraph. He force commanders. In issuing strategic guidance, thus fostered independence of thought, believing the national, alliance, or coalition authorities that officers must act on their own at times. They should specify desired strategic endstates, objec- should not wait for orders when no orders can be tives, and limitations on which categories and in- given. Their efforts are most productive when fol- dividual targets can be attacked. Afterward, the- lowing the intent of the senior commander. ater commanders should specify detailed targeting Task-oriented command and control is based limitations in their operational guidance. on the conviction that subordinate levels of com- Estimates of the situation, when conducted mand act more quickly than higher levels in by commanders and their staffs, would ensure changing situations because of their proximity. that the focus is firmly on objectives and tasks, On the level of execution, knowledge of the vari- not targets. Hence objectives and corresponding ous aspects of the situation are far greater than on centers of gravity should be determined first. senior levels. Hence the assumption is that deci- Then the main tasks and component (partial) sions are generally sounder on the tactical level tasks can be determined for each objective. Subse- than tactical decisions made on the operational or quently, a target list can be developed and targets higher echelons. Independence of action also can

issue thirty-five / JFQ 105 ■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

Planning room aboard USS Harry S. Truman, Iraqi Freedom. Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Michael W. Pendergrass)Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Michael W.

motivate subordinates. The Germans believed a fa- weakness, insecurity, and mistrust between senior vorable situation could not be exploited if com- and subordinate leaders. These factors lead to sus- manders waited for orders. Senior level command- picion or disobedience. Both the incompetence of ers and low ranking soldiers recognized that subordinates and the interference of senior com- omission and inactivity manders in purely tactical matters can signifi- the limitations of task-oriented were worse than resorting cantly reduce the scope of task-oriented com- to the incorrect expedi- mand and control. command and control are ent. Commanders on all Rapid technological advances are pulling the found in mistrust between levels had latitude for ini- conduct of war in contradictory directions. Senior tiative and prompt ac- commanders can observe events in near real time senior and subordinate leaders tion, on their own au- and almost instantaneously control them from thority if necessary. their headquarters, as seen in Allied Force and En- Inaction was considered criminal, but deeds were during Freedom. Yet this does not justify unnec- to be performed in consonance with objectives set essarily usurping authority on the tactical level. by senior commanders, who were obliged to inter- Today commanders can intervene faster but vene when subordinates endangered the mission. should do so only when subordinates endanger The application of task orientation for com- the mission. mand and control is particularly suitable when Despite technological advances, terrain and objectives are predominantly military, combat is distances matter, as witnessed in Afghanistan and intensive, and changes of situation are rapid and Iraq. The nature of war today is essentially the often drastic. It is less applicable in scenarios re- same as it was for Clausewitz and Moltke. Propo- quiring immediate action or where an error can nents of information warfare ignore the wisdom lead to severe political or strategic consequences. of Clausewitz by trying to limit warfare to fixed The scope of the subordinate’s independent ac- values and physical quantities. Wars will continue tion must be reduced when the senior command to be characterized by friction, uncertainty, and authority must coordinate the actions of adjacent chaos. It is a mistake to believe that advances in or friendly forces. communications will make it otherwise. Among other things, the limitations of task- oriented command and control are found in personal rivalries, unhealthy self-esteem, character

106 JFQ / issue thirty-five V ego

functions on the operational and strategic levels of command. Yet success in war demands sound balance between centralized and decentralized command and control. Experience has shown that when fighting highly capable and resource- ful enemies, excessive centralization has never been an answer if the victory must be won decisively with the fewest friendly losses. While proponents of information warfare claim that their goal is furthering decentralized decisionmaking on all levels, the trend is in the opposite direction. Tactical commanders should not be passive observers and mere transmitters of orders. As freedom of action is diminished, they cannot exercise initiative to achieve the intent of senior leaders. In addition, officers who are unac- customed to acting independently may fail to take prudent risks as senior commanders. U.S. Air Force (DeliahU.S. Air Force Castillo) The emphasis on information technology Aviano air base, and targeteering is troubling for several reasons. Allied Force. Targeteers reduce the art of war to a process of Perhaps the chief argument for German- collecting information on specific categories and style, task-oriented command and control is that individual targets that are attacked with little re- friction and the fog of war are best mastered by a gard to their relationship to objectives and tasks. high degree of independence. Detailed tactical Selection is unwieldy, time-consuming, and inef- picture technology should be used to monitor un- fective. Excessive focus on targeting means that folding events by senior officers who intervene the perspective of operational commanders and only when necessary. Morale and motivation re- their staffs is becoming tactical. A targeteering ap- main enormously valuable. Psychological factors proach carried to its logical conclusion can only cannot be dismissed, as some proponents of in- result in a war of attrition on the operational and formation warfare may believe. Vietnam revealed strategic levels when fighting against a relatively the folly of overestimating technology and equat- stronger and more competent enemy. ing leadership with management. Measurable or The problems of centralized command and quantifiable methodologies have replaced human control could be solved by adopting the tenets of analysis, individual initiative, and independence task-oriented command and control. This means of execution. Yet the focus of command and con- accepting that war is not a science but an art. trol on any level should be the human element, Friction and the fog of war are inherent in com- not technology that supports it. Mastering tech- bat. Advanced information technologies can re- nology does not make leaders successful. duce uncertainty but not eliminate it. The more complex the technological innovation, the Out of Focus higher the friction. Technology is only a means The true nature of war is often misunder- to an end, not an end in itself. Hence operational stood or ignored. The aphorisms of Sun Tzu are command and control must focus on those ele- taken literally while the dicta of Clausewitz are ments of combat power, leadership in particular, considered irrelevant in the information age. The that will enhance the ability to fight and win de- importance of technological innovations is recog- cisively with the fewest losses. Education and nized, while human and psychological factors of training are critical to applying task-oriented command and control are neglected. Senior lead- command and control on all levels of war. JFQ ers are apparently unwilling to delegate authority and establish intermediate levels of command or use existing echelons. In addition to interfering in the purely tactical decisions and actions of subordinate commanders, there is a growing trend to bypass tactical commanders and deal with subordinates or individual soldiers on the ground. Recent successes over weak, technologically backward, and largely passive enemies seem to have convinced many observers that information technology reinforces the need to centralize

issue thirty-five / JFQ 107 U.S. Army Revisiting the Korean Tree-Trimming Incident

By RICHARD A. MOBLEY

n August 1976, two Americans were killed down the tree. The incident represents a case while supervising a work party at Pan- study in crisis planning and joint operations prior munjom. The incident involved a detach- to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I ment of U.S. soldiers who were trimming a The attack is worth studying because the poplar tree in the joint security area to improve United States extracted an apology, albeit weak, visibility between checkpoints when North Ko- from the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, who rean troops attacked them. In response, the characterized the incident as regrettable. But the United States raised the defense readiness condi- official records, which began to be declassified in tion, reinforced the peninsula, and chopped 1994, shed new light on the incident. They reveal profound uncertainty about the intent of Py- ongyang but an equally deep American desire to Commander Richard A. Mobley, USN (Ret.), served as chief of indica- retaliate. Indeed, simply chopping down the tree tions and warning at U.S. Forces, Korea, and is the author of Flash Point was the mildest action considered by the National North Korea: The Pueblo and EC–121 Crises. Security Council. Washington wanted to keep

108 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mobley

close tabs on the operational commander; its de- to “stir up world opinion more vigorously” by sire to send the right signal had not wavered since publicizing “U.S. criminal barbarities.” He sought Vietnam. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs and General to “make the Korean question the focal point of Richard Stilwell, USA, Commander in Chief, attention both in Asian and world affairs.” In United Nations Command (UNC), were con- daily broadcasts, Pyongyang accused America of cerned about rapid escalation and protecting the creating a grave situation. Shortly after an ex- force chopping down the poplar. Evidence also change of fire along the demilitarized zone on Au- suggests the desire to deter through exceptional gust 5, North Korea claimed that the United States measures taken for weeks after the tree was felled.1 and South Korea had “completed war preparations,” the first such statement since 1969.3 The Korean Context An assessment by the Central Intelligence The so-called second Korean War ended by Agency concluded that there were two proximate 1976. Hundreds of provocations along the demili- causes for increasing tension in the joint security tarized zone (DMZ) and in the South subsided. area. Pyongyang wanted to support its claim that Pyongyang did not re- the United States was the major danger on the the Central Intelligence Agency peat earlier acts such as peninsula. The Nonaligned Movement summit in the attempted assassina- Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was meeting when concluded that Pyongyang tion of President Park the incident occurred, would provide the venue might have been attempting to Chung Hee, seizure of for the assertion. In addition, Pyongyang might influence the 1976 election USS Pueblo, or shootdown have been attempting to influence American of a Navy EC–121 aircraft opinion during the 1976 election. with 31 crewmen on board. Indeed, the situation calmed enough by August 18 1970 for President Richard Nixon to order the North Korea revealed its sensitivity in mid- withdrawal of 7th Infantry Division. August. A few days before the incident, United Although the Central Intelligence Agency Nations Command sent unarmed Korean mainte- did not believe Pyongyang intended to invade, it nance workers to determine how to remove the warned “We are not at all sanguine that [intelli- tree. Communist guards warned them to leave it gence sources] could provide a clear and timely alone. As a compromise, the command planned warning of a North Korean attack.” At that time, to trim rather than chop down the tree. That over half of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was would allow UNC checkpoints 3 and 5 to see combat ready and within 50 miles of the demili- each other at the least. The command accord- tarized zone. The intelligence community held ingly dispatched a 15-man tree-trimming team “that Pyongyang could mount a sizable attack (three officers, five laborers, and seven security with little or no warning.”2 troops) into the joint security area at 1030 hours The communist propaganda intensified in on August 18. March 1976 with Kim proclaiming his intention The report on the incident relates a dramatic series of occurrences over a six-minute period. Two KPA officers and nine guards appeared. When informed by the Americans that the tree was only being trimmed, a communist officer voiced his approval and the guards began to offer advice. But at 1050 hours the North Koreans ordered the work to halt and threatened the UNC personnel. Thirty guards appeared and attacked Captain Arthur Bonifas, the detachment commander. Witnesses saw them bludgeon Bonifas with the blunt end of an ax as he lay on the ground. The communists also attacked First Lieu- tenant Mark Barrett and other soldiers with axe handles and clubs. Photos reveal two instances where seven and nine KPA guards clustered around soldiers and struck them with ax handles and clubs as well as their feet and fists. Bonifas and Barrett died at the scene and several other Americans were injured.

Trimming tree in DMZ. U.S. Army

issue thirty-five / JFQ 109 ■ KOREAN TREE-TRIMMING INCIDENT

On August 18, the Secretary of State, Henry Demilitarized Zone Kissinger, telephoned President Gerald Ford in Kansas City, where he was attending the Republi- can convention. Other members of the cabinet, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Sea of Japan including the National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, were located in the capital, though the r e v i R Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was at

m i j

m home in Michigan recovering from surgery. Ford I Demilitarized Zone decided not to return to Washington but directed (4 kilometers wide) Demarcation Line the cabinet to formulate a strong response. With this tasking, Kissinger chaired a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) late in the afternoon. 38th Parallel The Central Intelligence Agency decided that Panmunjom the attack was premeditated. Although Pyong- (Joint Security Area) Tongduchon (U.S. 2d Infantry Division) yang did not want war, it was looking for an excuse that Kim Chong Il could use at the Non- REPUBLIC OF KOREA alignment Movement summit to denounce the H Uijongbu an United States in an attempt to weaken its resolve R (I Corps [ROK–US] CFA) Y ellow Sea ive r over Korea. Moreover, the intelligence briefing indicated that North Korea could engage in fur- Seoul 0 Miles 50 (UNC/CFC/USFK/EUSA) ther controlled acts of violence, depending on 0 Kilometers 50 the response to the tree-trimming incident. Kissinger guided the Washington Special Ac- tion Group through various courses of action that would “be a good lesson for them....The impor- A response to the attack was approved within tant thing is that they beat two Americans to two days and ready for execution in three. Be- death and must pay the price.” He added, “It will cause of the 13-hour time difference, activity in be useful for us to generate enough activity so theater occurred as Washington slept. During the that the North Koreans begin to wonder what day, the command sent back operational reports those crazy [Americans] are doing or are capable and forwarded photos of the event. Moreover, var- of doing this election year.” With this mindset, ious responses to the incident were considered, in- he endorsed some options, deferred others, and cluding chopping down the tree. In addition, Stil- ignored a third set.4 well proposed issuing a strongly worded protest to The Secretary of State proposed resurrecting Kim Il Sung in his notional role as supreme com- an exercise involving unarmed B–52s flying over mander of the Korean People’s Army. Korea. The Department of State had earlier opposed such a move to avoid provoking China. Kissinger urged alerting the bombers, and Admi- ral James Holloway, the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, agreed. The exercise could be conducted within three days. The Secretary also recommended raising the defense readiness condition, which was striking because it would have been the first time it was changed in response to activity in North Korea. After Holloway explained the impact of going to DEFCON 3, he urged that it be raised that night. After reviewing other options, the Washing- ton Special Action Group decided to augment United Nations Command with F–4 aircraft from Japan, including Wild Weasels armed with anti- radiation missiles. Other actions would be considered, such as deploying F–111s from the United States, but they would have to await their next meeting, scheduled for the following morning. Finally, the group agreed that the tree must be cut North Koreans attacking. down. It also concluded that Stilwell should U.S. Army

110 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mobley

communicate directly with Kim Il Sung; it denied Despite its bravado in public, the commu- his proposal to protest. nists reacted defensively to the increased defense With these decisions, a flurry of messages readiness condition. Kim Il Sung put the army, was released overnight to unified and specified Worker-Peasant Militia, and Red Guard Youth on a commanders. DEFCON 3 was set for Korea and war footing. Pyongyang conducted civilian air F–4s were ordered to Osan, B–52s on Guam and raid drills on August 20. While divisions along the F–111s at Mountain demilitarized zone were immobile, naval and air Park wanted to teach the North a Home Air Force Base force units went on alert. A total standdown in lesson “without use of weapons” were alerted, and the tactical air activity began on August 18 and con- USS Midway carrier tinued until August 23, perhaps because of the in- task group in Yokosuka clement weather in the North. These actions were was readied for deployment. Meanwhile, both characterized by Stilwell as “reactive, urgent, and Stilwell and the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Mis- defensive,” indicating “genuine apprehension sion were scheduled to brief President Park on the over possible UNC retaliatory military actions.” following day. Meanwhile, Stilwell met with Park, who con- curred with American actions. Deliberate and August 19 calm throughout the meeting, Park wanted to American forces went to DEFCON 3 early on teach the North a lesson “without use of August 19. The balance of the day was spent weapons.” Referring to the posturing by Washing- reaching this level. Major General John Singlaub, ton after the seizure of USS Pueblo, he warned that USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea, noted that a show of force by itself would not persuade. He other steps to enhance readiness quickly followed: warned that United Nations Command must be Nuclear and conventional artillery and missiles of fully prepared should North Korea attempt to pre- various calibers were carried forward by road and hel- vent the tree from being cut down. To guarantee icopter to prepared concrete bunkers. Listening posts that outcome, Park offered to integrate 50 special just south of the DMZ were activated and reconnais- forces who had multiple black belts into the sance patrols were mounted....A quick scan of tacti- ranks. When Stilwell suggested that the operation cal radio net produced a multi-band cacophony of Ko- might occur too quickly for the North to respond, rean and American voices. This was obviously not a Park opined that it would be better to conduct an training exercise.5 operation that punished the KPA guards without using firearms. Stilwell agreed to consider the Pyongyang sent conflicting signals but its offer, and ultimately these special forces person- media remained defiant, faulting Washington for nel were integrated into the operation as regular provoking the incident as a pretext for war. Com- liaison soldiers. ments before the Military Armistice Commission A preliminary plan emphasizing speed and on August 19 presented a similar view, including surprise was completed that night. An engineer a claim supported by photographic evidence that force with 50 to 60 unarmed ROK soldiers would its soldiers had also been injured. conduct the operation on or after August 21. North Koreans taking Backup would include the authorized 35-man se- axes from work crews. curity force, an infantry company from 2d In- fantry Division stationed near the joint security area, a Korean infantry company, a Korean or American rifle company in UH–1 helicopters over the southern approach to the demilitarized zone, and a task force of one mechanized infantry and two tank companies located south of the Imjin River. The operation would take 45 minutes and commence between 0720 and 0730 hours. Stilwell also addressed the risk of escalation, a concern that was raised in Washington on August 19. If the communists threatened to defeat the South Korean special forces unit, Stilwell would introduce the American rifle company with clubs to allow ROK troops to withdraw. If the North re- sorted to pistols, United Nations Command “could respond with mortar and artillery fire on known or suspected North Korean installations U.S. Army

issue thirty-five / JFQ 111 ■ KOREAN TREE-TRIMMING INCIDENT

Holloway then went through a list of other measures to be implemented coincident with or independent of efforts to chop down the tree, including firing an Honest John surface-to-surface missile or artillery barrage. Both suggestions had disadvantages: the former was inaccurate and the latter invited counterfire. Nevertheless, Kissinger asked the Joint Chiefs to consider artillery fire against the communist barracks just outside the joint security area. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, offered another option as the meeting continued: a SEAL operation against an unspeci- fied target along the west coast of North Korea. “They would be wondering what happened and who did it.” Holloway balked. He believed that this option posed a danger: “If we pick a target which is significant in their view we would have a 50 percent chance of doing it without getting U.S. Army some people killed. The North Koreans are in a Attackers dispersing. high state of alert...we might have difficulty getting the guys out.” Kissinger remained focused just outside the joint security area to allow the on the artillery barrage.8 UNC troops to withdraw from the fight.” How- This last WSAG meeting ended with a deci- ever, if the North actually attempted to overrun sion to continue contingency planning and move the joint security area in a concerted ground at- the F–111 aircraft and USS Midway. The group tack, Stilwell warned it would be “ill advised” to sensed the need to do something quickly and try to stop the onslaught in this particular area. have precise guidance for Stilwell in case the situ- He recommended using the backup forces to facil- ation escalated. But an exchange between the Sec- itate withdrawal of U.N. forces from the joint se- retary and one member revealed the concern that curity area while delivering heavy artillery fires on events could get out of control. Kissinger opined, KPA targets outside the area: “If the other side “One always assumes the unlimited willingness of starts shooting, the mission becomes one of rapid opponents to take risks....We are 200 million extraction of our forces from close contact, relying people and they are 16 million.” In response the primarily on artillery covering fires.”6 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East The WSAG meeting on August 19 began Asia and Pacific Affairs, Morton Abramowitz, said, with a contentious discussion of possible actions. “They could overawe us locally.”9 Kissinger had heard radio reports on a Pentagon The Deputy National Security Advisor, statement that military action was inconceivable. William Hyland, observed that strong differences Determined to signal U.S. anger, he warned that existed in Washington over the plan developed “the President will hit the ceiling when he hears by Stilwell. He reported that the Joint Chiefs sup- that, because I told him we would be discussing ported the plan: possible military actions and that is what the out of loyalty to the field commander and in recogni- President wants.” On that note, the Secretary re- tion that we must make a strong show of manhood in peatedly steered the meeting to military rean area we were driven out of two days ago. The sponses with admonitions on failing to act: “If we Chiefs, however, recognize that there are severe risks do nothing they will think of us as the paper and there could be casualties. Bill Clements does not tigers of Saigon....If we do nothing there may support the Stilwell plan; he feels it will lead to a 7 be another incident and then another.” major fight and that the Koreans are in effect baiting The Washington Special Action Group rean attack....The third option would be to ignore the viewed the proposed B–52 missions. Holloway ex- tree and [later] attack the North Korean barracks with plained that the aircraft would fly from Guam to artillery fire. A further option unanimously opposed by within 43 miles of the demilitarized zone and Clements, the Chiefs, and I think Habib would be to drop their radar bombs before returning. To en- conduct an artillery attack at the same time we were sure that North Korea discovered the bombers, the chopping down the tree....A final option would be to Joint Chiefs would have them fly high enough to conduct the Stilwell tree chopping plan and, if it runs be detected on radar. Kissinger agreed to clear the into trouble, to withdraw and then attack the North proposal with the President. Meanwhile, F–111s Korean barracks with artillery.10 and the USS Midway task group deployed.

112 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mobley

Chiefs at midmorning on August 20. That afternoon, five groups of four F–111s would start arriving in Osan from Idaho. The F–4 squadron had arrived the previous day. The carrier task group would be underway for the Tsushima Straits within the next few hours, comprising USS Mid- way and its air wing, four frigates, and a cruiser. Stilwell completed the planning and movement of forces in country. Under the final plan, according to Singlaub, disparate units had to move simultaneously: Altogether, a force of 813 men would be involved. ...Task Force Vierra...would conduct the actual tree cutting . . . three batteries of American 105mm howitzers were to be moved across the Freedom Bridge north of the Imjin River. Another three batteries of ROK heavy artillery would be positioned just south of the river in clear view of North Korean positions. The

U.S. Army gunners, Stilwell said, would have “rounds in the tube U.S. soldiers returning and hands on the lanyards.”11 two days later. And a lot of events would be occurring simultane- The proposal to shell the barracks was re- ously in the air. Singlaub continued: viewed by the Joint Chiefs, who cautioned [A] reinforced composite rifle company . . . would be against it in a starkly-worded memorandum. orbiting aboard twenty Huey helicopters a few hun- While there was suffi- dred meters south of the DMZ, supported by twelve Stilwell and Singlaub shared cient artillery for the AH–1G Cobra gunships. Tank-busting F–4 Phantoms mission (batteries along the concern “that the operation would be prowling at a slightly higher orbit. F–111 the demilitarized zone medium strategic bombers would orbit still higher, stood a fifty-fifty chance of could destroy the target and be clearly visible to Korea radar....At the pre- with a hundred rounds), starting a war” cise moment of the tree chopping...B–52 bombers resorting to artillery dur- from Guam would be moving ominously north up the ing the operation would Yellow Sea on a vector directly to...Pyongyang. In leave the force vulnerable to retaliatory fire. the Sea of Japan . . . [USS] Midway would launch Moreover, the barracks would probably be vacant. forty aircraft that would vector north above interna- More critical, the communists enjoyed a 4 to 1 tional waters.12 ratio in artillery tubes in the immediate area. Stilwell and Singlaub shared the concern Implementing the Plan over escalation. As the latter subsequently noted, Despite these differences, Washington “It was my estimate, shared by many of the staff, adopted the plan on August 19. The Joint Chiefs that the operation stood a fifty-fifty chance of approved the proposal from Stilwell with guid- starting a war.” If the communists attacked and ance that it be conducted “quickly and aggres- tried to overwhelm the tree-chopping forces, Stil- sively” starting at 0700 hours (local time) on Au- well planned for rapid extraction of the team gust 21. They also agreed that two KPA drop under artillery covering fire. barriers should be eliminated unless it delayed On the evening of August 20, key members the cutting operation or increased risks. The same of the UNC staff manned the command center in message directed Strategic Air Command to initi- preparation for the next morning. To preclude ate B–52D training sorties along the demilitarized Washington micromanagement, they cut poten- zone at 0630 hours on August 21. The first cell of tial communications links between the President three bombers would fly at medium to high alti- and subordinate commands. tudes to facilitate radar detection. The flights For Washington, the balance of the day would continue through August 25 with a daily passed uneventfully now that the key decisions visit by a cell. U.S. Pacific Command would pro- were made. However, two F–4Es equipped with tect the bombers using fighter combat air patrols. GBU–15 laser guided bombs were ordered to fly United Nations Command likely received the to Osan. The Joint Staff considered destroying the flash precedence approval message from the Joint poplar tree or a North Korean target with the guided bombs, and the aircraft may have been sent with that in mind.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 113 ■ KOREAN TREE-TRIMMING INCIDENT

Enter Paul Bunyan would need its own access road. On September 6, The tree chopping was planned to start at 1976, the sides agreed to the basic division. 0700 hours, August 21 (1800 hours, August 20, Pyongyang remained on a heightened state Washington time). The North Korean guards ap- of alert as negotiations continued in part because peared surprised and did not interfere. Although U.S. Forces remained at DEFCON 3. Yet within at one point 50 KPA soldiers gathered just outside days of chopping down the tree, Commander in the joint security area, they did not enter it. Chief, Pacific Command, and the Joint Chiefs Pyongyang immediately demonstrated a began thinking about an end to the crisis. Train- more conciliatory attitude, requesting a meeting ing sorties by B–52s over Korea dropped from of the Military Armistice Commission only hours daily to weekly. Only two or three bombers after the tree was chopped down. In the 15- would fly in each cell, and F–4 aircraft equipped minute conference, the senior KPA officer deliv- with GBU–15 bombs departed in early September. ered a high-level message to Stilwell flagged from The Joint Chiefs evidently tried to release Kim Il Sung as supreme commander. It admitted other assets to DEFCON 4. The Kadena-based F–4 that “It is regrettable than an incident occurred.” contingent would soon depart but leave its Wild It proposed that “an effort must be made so that Weasels behind. Along with 14 of the 20 F–111s, such incidents may not recur....” In a second these aircraft would depart in mid-September. The note, the KPA representative added that the tree six remaining F–111s would deploy to Australia trimming was a serious provocation. The embassy for an exercise in October. The USS Midway carrier commented that the meeting was “calm and task group would remain on station in the south- quiet.” The national-level review also commented ern approaches to the Tsushima Strait. that the letter from Kim Il Sung was “exception- Singlaub ordered U.S. Forces Korea to really mild, almost conciliatory in tone.” main at DEFCON 3 until September 8, when the North Korean media also avoided escalation. North agreed to a set of new security procedures The authoritative Nodong Simmun stressed keep- for the joint security area. With the lowered de- ing the peace and coverage of the incident be- fense readiness condition, USS Midway returned came somewhat more restrained. Nevertheless, to Japan. United Nations Command pushed for punish- Lessons Learned ment of those guards responsible for the murders and guarantees that the incident would not be re- A formal apology on the part of North Korea peated. Pyongyang counterproposed that person- is rare. How did the United States manage to get nel on both sides be physically separated along one? While at the time many decisionmakers be- the demarcation dividing North and South. lieved the incident was deliberate, some saw the Guards would henceforth be located only in their American deaths as an accidental rather than will- respective zones of responsibility. North Korea ful act. And still others thought that the event was would remove guard posts and barrier gates from a provocation that got out of control. Since Kim Il the UNC portion of the joint security area but Sung had not planned for the situation to result in the loss of life, he could admit that it was regrettable. He did not have a vested interest in opposing or retaliating for cutting down the tree. The operation succeeded because the stan- Engineers cutting down disputed tree. dard of success was low. The United States did not expect a reaction by the communists other than passivity as the tree was felled. No reparations or return of crewmen had to be negotiated. Ironically, one of the last crises Kissinger faced involved the same country as the first. As National Security Advisor, he had helped formulate the response to the downing of an EC–121 reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969. To be credible, he said the United States must react to provocations quickly, even when the desired forces are not available. Accordingly, he originally pushed to chop down the tree on August 20 and was determined to avoid the impression of posturing like earlier responses in similar crises. The Secretary of State knew what he wanted out of the WSAG meetings. While endorsing the chopping down of the tree, he proposed other U.S. Army

114 JFQ / issue thirty-five Mobley

to deter escalation. Moreover, President Ford restrained the communists by taking the unusual step of increasing the level of defense readiness. And for a leader whose center of gravity was his army, Kim Il Sung was far more threatened by this development than by naval and air operations following the capture of USS Pueblo and loss of the EC–121 aircraft. The Nation had learned from its earlier encounters with Pyongyang. JFQ

NOTES

1 These events are recounted in John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Cen- tury (New York: Summit Books, 1991). 2 Central Intelligence Agency, “DMZ Incident,” Au- gust 18, 1976, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ford Presidential Li- brary), box 10. 3 Ibid.

U.S. Army 4 Minutes of Washington Special Action Group, Securing the area. “Korea-North Korea Tree Incident 8/18/76 (2),” August 19, 1976, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and Pacific (Ann Arbor: Ford Presidential Library), box 10. measures, such as increasing defense readiness 5 Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, pp. 371–72. and B–52 training missions. Kissinger simply ig- 6 Message from Richard G. Stilwell, “Joint Security nored more extreme courses of action proffered Area Incident,” August 19, 1976, Presidential Country by the Joint Chiefs. Both the relatively small na- Files for East Asia and Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ford ture of the provocation and the desire to avoid es- Presidential Library), box 10. calation were partly responsible for limiting the 7 Minutes of Washington Special Action Group, scope of potential reactions. August 19, 1976. Planning for responses to the incidents in- 8 Ibid. 9 volving USS Pueblo and the EC–121 aircraft was Ibid. 10 Memorandum from William Hyland to Brent complex because the options ranged from shoot- Scowcroft, “Korea-North Korea Tree Incident 8/18/76 ing down fighters to attacking every North Ko- (2),” August 19, 1976, Presidential Country Files for East rean fighter base. A simple plan was selected to Asia and Pacific (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ford Presidential chop down the tree. The hardest part, moving Library), box 10. ground forces into position, was firmly controlled 11 Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, p. 373. by the land component commander. Organizing 12 Ibid., p. 373. B–52s, F–4s, and F–111s did not appear that difficult. But if the Joint Chiefs had intended to direct the capabilities in the theater, doctrine and planning would have been severely tested. However, since artillery was the weapon of choice in the event of escalation, contingency planning by one service was much easier to execute. Recalling the micromanagement by officials in Washington who had reacted to the seizure of Mayaguez the previous year, Stilwell took steps to head off the tendency to skip echelons in the command and control system with high-level queries.

The response to the tree-trimming incident succeeded because it was well planned, simple, and executed to achieve surprise. The operation generated sufficient forces and a state of readiness

issue thirty-five / JFQ 115 The Origins

of Effects-Based National Air and Space Museum Operations

By PHILLIP S. MEILINGER

ffects-based operations are defined by Airmen have always aspired to conduct ef- U.S. Joint Forces Command as “a set of fects-based operations, although they did not use actions planned, executed, and assessed that term. During most of World War II, the ana- E with a systems perspective that considers lytical, cognitive, and intelligence tools needed to the effects needed to achieve policy aims via the determine the effectiveness of air operations were integrated application of various instruments of lacking on the strategic level. As a consequence, power.” The success of any military action is cal- airmen began doing what they could by resolving culated in terms of furthering political objectives. a torrent of tactical and technical problems. They counted things, substituting quantification for evaluation. In addition, they assumed that enemies were a mirror image of themselves. Today Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), is deputy director of the aero- there are more efficient ways of evaluating ef- space center at Science Applications International Corporation and the fects-based operations, yet there is still a search editor of The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. for a methodology to apply them.

116 JFQ / issue thirty-five Meilinger

Lieutenant Colonel Springs in the propeller assembly had failed and Edgar Gorrell of the Army replacements were back ordered. The parts were Air Service wrote the first made in Pittsburgh, but the factory was closed be- American concept paper re- cause of floods. This seemed significant. If one garding strategic bombing wanted to achieve air superiority, perhaps it was while serving in France dur- only necessary to destroy one factory rather than ing World War I. It was strik- every enemy airfield or aircraft. ingly similar to the work of Although this scenario may appear too sim- air theorists during World plistic as a basis for military doctrine, there was War II. More importantly, more to it. America and much of the world expe- Gorrell touched on the pre- rienced the Great Depression during the 1930s. cepts of effects-based opera- Businesses and financial institutions failed. Major tions. He noted the stale- powers were brought to their knees without a mate on the Western Front shot being fired. Economies are delicate systems. and the toll inflicted on the If the desired effect is rendering an enemy inca- Allies by German artillery. pable of waging war, strategic bombardment may But the millions of enemy devastate its economy. Victory may follow. But shells that rained down were infrastructures are huge and one might not be made at only a few factories. able to attack every factory, power station, rail If they were eliminated, pro- line, bridge, and steel plant. What targets are the duction would cease. In most important or vulnerable? The example of other words, if the desired propeller springs provides a clue because it im- effect was silencing enemy plies there are key nodes within an economic sys- National Archives Under Allied bombs, guns, attacking German am- tem on which it depends. All targets are not cre- 1944. munition plants would have ated equal. The springs became a metaphor for a the same effect as destroying artillery tubes. The way of looking at air warfare—the search for the same was true of other critical war industries. strategic bottleneck. Gorrell argued that there were a few indis- Prior to World War II it was difficult for air- pensable German economic targets without men to obtain information on the economies of which the war could not be fought. Though potential enemies. There were no resources for vague about targets, he identified four industrial such intelligence, and American isolationism regions.1 Those who followed him in the next made such an endeavor inappropriate. Instead, two decades did little better. Billy Mitchell wrote the officers at the Air Corps Tactical School simply that air forces could strike “manufacturing looked at the industrial northeast and gathered and food centers, railways, bridges, canals, and data on power grids, steel mills, oil refineries, and harbors.”2 transportation systems. Even more significantly, they tried to discover how systems worked. In A Metaphor of Air War short, air leaders had an inherent belief in the im- The doctrine with which the United States portance of effects-based operations and a rudi- went into World War II largely offered lists of mentary understanding of how systems should be standard targets. Army Field Manual 1-5, Employ- measured and evaluated. They did not, however, ment of Aviation of the Army, stated “important ob- have the analytical tools to conduct that meas- jectives may be found in the vital centers in the urement and evaluation. enemy’s line of commu- When Europe went to war in September all targets are not created equal nication and important 1939, an air war plans division was established in establishments in the the War Department to devise target sets in the economic system of the event the United States entered the war. The ini- hostile country.” Besides focusing on enemy tial effort was small and hesitant, but business- forces, this publication suggested targets such as men, engineers, and other members of the private rail lines, bridges, tunnels, power plants, oil re- sector were soon contacted. In some cases they fineries, and similar objectives. But more imagi- studied factories in Europe that American banks native ideas were germinating elsewhere. helped finance or construction companies helped Two events occurred at the Air Corps Tactical build. In others, experts simply explained how School, one minor and out of proportion and the U.S. systems operated, assuming that those in Ger- other more significant. The instructors-cum-pilots many were similar. This was largely a hit-or-miss at the school found their planes grounded. approach, often depending on businessmen. There was an obvious risk of what can be called the blueprint availability syndrome, in which the type of intelligence gathered shapes one’s view of

issue thirty-five / JFQ 117 ■ EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

“A Bridge Too Far.” National Archives

a system. If planners had ample data on the Ger- the clever use of analogies. In dealing with this mass man ball bearing industry, they might put too of inexactitudes and approximations the social scien- much emphasis on its contribution to the war ef- tist finds himself in a position of no special advan- fort while missing other target systems. tage over the military strategist or any intelligent lay- Other bodies were formed to study the Ger- man; and an elaborate methodology may even, by man economy. One was a group of American virtue of a considerable but unavoidably misdirected business executives, lawyers, and economists who momentum, lead the investigator far afield.3 were known as the Committee of Operations An- To overcome these limitations, analysts initially alysts and another was the Enemy Objectives looked for information in enemy newspapers and Unit in London, which advised Allied air leaders periodicals as well as from business and industrial for the balance of the war. experts as noted above. Such poor sources led to These groups studied the German economy the misconception that the German economy to determine the most lucrative targets for air at- was hard pressed and thus was susceptible to attack. Unfortunately, they lacked the data to make tack with devastating results. For most of the war reasoned judgments. As the official history of Germany actually had remarkable slack. Because Army Air Forces put it: Allied economies had been put on a wartime ...there existed in almost every instance a serious footing, it was assumed that the enemy had as shortage of reliable information, and the resulting la- well. But in fact, it had not. For example, auto- cunae had to be bridged by intelligent guesswork and mobile manufacturing, the largest industrial sector of the German economy in 1930s, barely ran at half capacity.

118 JFQ / issue thirty-five Meilinger

Measures of Merit The Tedder Plan Economic analysts became increasingly capa- At Casablanca in January 1943, Franklin ble of understanding effects-based operations. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed that the This was due partly to their criteria and method- objective of the combined bomber offensive was ologies for gathering information on the German “the progressive destruction and dislocation of economy, accessing it, and then looking at tar- the German military, industrial, and economic gets. They examined factors such as total produc- system, and the undermining of the morale of tion of a given commodity, minimum operational the German people to a point where their capac- requirements, surplus capacity, ability to substi- ity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”4 tute other materials, time needed to repair facili- This was a highly and perhaps deliberately ties, damage sustained, and the ratio between ambiguous directive that allowed readers to take pool and production. The last factor identified away from it what they wished. Air Chief Marshal commodities that could be Arthur Harris of Bomber Command saw the order essentially, measures of merit stockpiled for an apprecia- to undermine enemy morale as a vindication of ble time. Thus oil was ini- night area-bombing. To Lieutenant General Carl linked objectives to targets tially considered a large Spaatz, senior American air commander in Eu- pool, so its destruction rope, the operative phrase was “the progressive would have little immediate effect. Similarly, U- destruction” of economic and industrial infra- boat production was slow, with most submarines structure—the mission of daylight precision on active service or in port. Thus hitting the fac- bombing. General Dwight Eisenhower, who be- tories that manufactured them would not be deci- came Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord, sive. On the other hand, aircraft were expended was focused on the need to invade. In his view, quickly in combat and there was no pool on the main function of bombers was supporting the which to draw. Destroying the plants that built assault on the French coast to ensure that “armed them would have a rapid effect. resistance was fatally weakened.” Once planners determined key nodes, indus- By early 1944, planning for the invasion was tries, and commodities, they had to answer two in full swing, and the question of a combined questions. Were air strikes destroying the targets? bomber offensive to complement landings arose. If they did, were they having the predicted ripple American analysts revised estimates of German effect throughout the war machine? oil supplies and decided reserves were not as large Estimating if bombers were actually de- as originally thought. If true, refineries should be- stroying their targets was difficult. Data on accu- come the top priority for Allied bombers. If the racy was hard to obtain, and the extent of de- lifeblood of the economy stopped pumping, the struction when bombs hit was not obvious. Like entire war machine would collapse—one of the today, assessing bomb damage was as much art stated goals at the Casablanca conference. as science. Post-strike aerial photography, for ex- Other air planners focused on the German ample, indicated that attacks on ball bearing fac- rail network. Troops, supplies, equipment, and tories in Schweinfurt in 1943 caused extensive raw materials moved primarily by train. If railway damage. After the war, however, it was learned lines were cut, the German war machine would that many bombs detonated on top of buildings, come to a halt together with the entire economy. collapsing the roofs. The results looked impres- The debate tended to break along national lines, sive from the air, but only 5 percent of the ma- with Americans backing the oil plan and most chines on the floor were damaged and most British, notably Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, were quickly repaired. deputy supreme Allied commander, advocating Beyond this level of analysis, intelligence and the rail plan. planning agencies had to confront the subject of The argument ended in March 1944 when indirect effects, which required measures of merit. Eisenhower opted for the rail plan. The deciding Although the term was popularized earlier by the factor was time. For Ike, measures of merit re- total quality movement, the concept was under- quired air superiority to isolate the beachhead stood in World War II. Essentially, measures of area from enemy reinforcements. He wanted that merit linked objectives to targets. But the specific capability for the invasion and not at some point type of evidence analysts should examine to deter- in the following weeks. Although he agreed with mine if targeting strategies were achieving their Spaatz that the collapse of the oil supply would political goals remained a thorny issue. be catastrophic for the German war machine, that could not be expected until the autumn, too late for Normandy. The rail plan won the day because it promised a solution to immediate problems—the effects desired by Eisenhower.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 119 ■ EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Remagen. National Archives

Yet there was even that Zuckerman was mistaken. By using more disagreement on the rail data on air operations in his sample, Eaker dis- plan. If the desired effect covered that bridges were not as difficult to hit as was halting traffic, what previously thought, especially with medium

U.S. Air Force parts of that system rather than heavy bombers operating at high alti- Planning air operations. should be targeted? Possi- tudes. In addition, marshalling yards could often bilities included rail cars, locomotives, repair fa- be repaired within days while it generally took cilities, round houses, marshalling yards, and rail- several weeks to repair a bridge. way bridges. These findings became important as planners Solly Zuckerman, a primatologist in the Uni- grappled with preparations for Overlord. If the de- versity of Oxford before the war, worked for Ted- sired effect was isolating the beachhead by pre- der in the Mediterranean theater. He studied rail- venting German reinforcements from reaching road bridges versus marshalling yards in Sicily and the area—Eisenhower’s goal—how best could air- on the Italian mainland in 1943 and concluded power achieve it? Tedder and Zuckerman, now in that the latter were more desirable targets simply London, dusted off their earlier analysis and again because they were larger. Given the inaccuracy of pushed for marshalling yards. Spaatz and his plan- Allied bombers, bridges were small and took dis- ners, led by Charles Kindleberger and Walt Rostow proportionate tonnages to knock out. Because the of the Enemy Objectives Unit, disagreed. Using marshalling yards were expansive, bombers were extensive analysis from the Mediterranean, they more likely to hit something of value, thus bomb- argued for a bridge campaign. ing these yards was more efficient.5 Tedder agreed Like the broader question of oil versus rail, and directed his planners accordingly. the more specific issue of railways generated bit- When Tedder and Zuckerman left the the- ter debate for the next four decades. In the event, ater, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, USA, the new air leaders resolved the dilemma in their usual commander, reviewed the decision. He concluded manner by bombing both marshalling yards and bridges. There was enough Allied airpower by mid-1944 to follow several targeting strategies. By

120 JFQ / issue thirty-five Meilinger

D-Day, Ninth Air Force alone, with more than but when Enigma was adopted, they paid more 4,000 aircraft, was larger than the entire combat attention. By February, a study of the traffic re- strength of the Luftwaffe. vealed the role coal played in the economy, virtu- It would be unwise, however, to pass over ally powering all industries and providing 90 per- this question too quickly. Determining whether cent of energy supplies. Coal moved almost Zuckerman or the Enemy Objectives Unit was exclusively by train once the rivers and canals correct had more than academic interest. Plan- were mined by Bomber Command. When the rail ners will not always have infinite air assets at plan took effect, coal movement slowed down. their disposal. As seen over the past decade, those The implication was clear: to deliver a death blow assets may be limited by political considerations to German industrial production and military ca- and not a lack of airframes. In such cases, air pabilities, the Allies had to stop the flow of coal. planners should know how to achieve the great- That meant stopping the trains. est effect to fulfill policy objectives. In essence Tedder had been right all along, only for the wrong reasons. Neither he nor his Picking the Right Objective planners identified coal as the commodity that Zuckerman and Rostow published memoirs made the enemy function. His plea for a cam- after the war, attacking each other with gusto. paign against German railways (as opposed to Their supporters and detractors entered the fray, those in France, which had been the centerpiece but one of the more insightful accounts came of pre-invasion bombing) emphasized disruption from Henry Lytton, an of the flow of reinforcements and supplies. The the wrong measures of merit will economist on the War goal of an expanded rail campaign was to “rapidly Production Board and produce a state of chaos which would vitally affect defeat effects-based operations the Economic Warfare not only the immediate battle on the West Wall, Board. It is not just his but also the whole German war effort.”7 Since coal conclusions on the relative importance of bridges was never mentioned, Tedder was not interested versus marshalling yards that are of interest, but in studying intelligence related to its shipment. his insights into the methodology and assump- But when examined almost by accident in tions of the respective protagonists.6 February 1945, the significance of coal quickly Lytton considered what were being used as became apparent. The evidence had been there measures of merit. Zuckerman was interested in all along; it merely required someone to establish the density of bomb patterns within designated coal as the crucial link and identify the desired target areas. Marshalling yards were large; thus a effect with an appropriate measure of merit— much higher percentage of bombs fell in that halting its movement by rail. Once this key rela- area than when the target was a small rail bridge. tionship, desired effect, and metric were articu- Kindleberger and Rostow were more concerned lated, the bombing campaign could be focused with effects. If only one bomb out of a thousand on achievement. hit a bridge and dropped it, that was preferable A further consideration highlights the some- to having all the bombs landing within the con- times serendipitous nature of war. The railway fines of a marshalling yard and leaving even one system did not adopt the Enigma code to secure rail line intact. The enemy assessment was the its reports at such a high level of classification, same. The German officer in charge of the Italian but because bombing had knocked out the tele- transport system stated that strikes on mar- type network as well as most telephone lines and shalling yards destroyed goods and rolling stock even the postal service. Otherwise Enigma proba- but not tracks, which in any event could be bly would not have been used, and the Allies quickly repaired. would never have been curious enough to look In short, the objective was stopping trains, into the movement of coal by train. not putting a certain percentage of bombs within a grid. Choosing the wrong measures of merit will Technological War defeat effects-based operations. In early 1945, Although targeting was a key factor in ef- Tedder received unexpected support. The Allies fects-based operations in World War II, questions had broken the Enigma codes and produced what remain. Was there a particular node the heavy was called Ultra intelligence. However, the Ger- bombers should have concentrated on? Con- man rail system, which had been using teletype tenders for this magic bullet were oil, coal, rail or telephone to transmit reports, began using lines, electricity, and ball bearings. Were these tar- Enigma in January 1945. Signals intelligence per- gets really key or panacea targets, the derisive term sonnel largely ignored messages on rail traffic, of Arthur Harris? In his view, the German economy was so large, complex, and redundant that only its wholesale destruction would bring the country to its knees.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 121 ■ EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

economy of Germany, but the head of its armaments production was confused.

While effects-based operations were at the root of what airpower was intended to achieve, planners went to war without precedent for determining objectives, targets, and measures of merit for strategic bombing. At the same time they had almost no experience in gathering intelligence for such campaigns. These processes, both requiring substantial resources and skill, had to be created anew. Although mistakes were made, one must not underestimate the task of collecting economic intelligence and then planning and conducting an economic warfare air campaign. Analytical tools have improved dramatically. Unfortunately, questions over effects-based operations persist: the adequacy of intelligence, the lack of cultural sensitivity, the risk of studying in- puts rather than outputs, and the need for models to account for cognitive, cultural, political, and social factors. These are serious questions, National Archives/U.S. Army Air Forces National Archives/U.S. and their solutions are not obvious. Raid on Germany. Airmen have always desired to conduct successful effects-based operations. For much of the The German perspective on the Allied air of- first century of airpower that aspiration was out fensive is instructive. Albert Speer, Minister of Ar- of reach because of technological limitations on maments and War Production, later wrote: aircraft and weapons as well as inadequate intelli- I shall never forget the date May 12 [1944].... On gence and analytical tools. Now those tools and that day the technological war was decided. Until technology are beginning to catch up. JFQ then we had managed to produce approximately as many weapons as the armed forces needed in spite of NOTES their considerable losses. But with the attack of nine 1 Maurer Maurer, The U.S. Air Service in World War I, hundred and thirty-five daylight bombers of the volume 2 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, American Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants in 1978), pp. 141–57, reprints the Gorrell memorandum. central and eastern Germany a new era in air war 2 William L. Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Develop- began. It meant the end of German armaments pro- ment and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and duction.8 Military (New York: Putnam’s, 1925), pp. 126–27. 3 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army On the other hand, Speer later wrote Hitler about Air Forces in World War II, volume 2 (Chicago: Univer- the bombing of rail lines on the Ruhr: sity of Chicago Press, 1948–58), p. 369. We are on the verge of the most serious coal produc- 4 Ibid., p. 305. 5 tion crisis since the beginning of the war....For more Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 209–10, 220–23. than six weeks now, in the matter of transport the 6 Henry D. Lytton, “Bombing Policy in the Rome Ruhr has become more and more cut off from the and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of World areas it supplies....It is clear from Germany’s overall War II: Bridge-Bombing Strategy Vindicated—and Rail- economic structure that in the long run the loss of the yard Bombing Strategy Invalidated,” Military Affairs, industrial area of Rhineland-Westphalia would be a vol. 47, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 53–58. Lytton’s title mortal blow to the German economy and to the con- pretty much says it all. duct of the war.9 7 Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945, volume 4 Further confusing matters, when Speer was (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. interrogated following the war, he stated that the 290–92, contains Tedder’s “Note on Air Policy to be crucial targets that should have been attacked Adapted with a View to Rapid Defeat of Germany,” more vigorously were chemicals, ball bearings, dated October 25, 1944. and electrical power, implying that they were 8 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: more important than oil or coal. It would seem Macmillan, 1970), p. 346. that not only were the Allies uncertain about the 9 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, pp. 349–56, contains a letter from Speer to Hitler dated November 11, 1944.

122 JFQ / issue thirty-five Marine Division Combat Camera (Brian L. Wickliffe) st 1 Systems Integration and the New American Way of War

By P AUL BRACKEN

here is a new American way of war. As necessary, but it leaves out one critical element— seen in Afghanistan and Iraq it in- how the blocks are put together. In a networked volves winning with smaller, more force it is more important than ever to ensure T agile forces, where jointness and net- proper coordination and timely integration of as- working combine to produce large-scale gains in sets. This is what gives the big payoffs. warfighting. Using this experience to transform Transformation involves various building the defense and intelligence communities for net- blocks and different ways of combining them, worked operations is one of the biggest manage- here designated as systems integration. But orga- rial challenges ever undertaken. nizational skills and capabilities for systems inte- Many plans focus on building blocks like gration have not kept pace with the requirements doctrine, organization, and technology. That is of the new way of war. Current frameworks and tools reflect the industrial era when most of them were created. That world no longer exists; new Paul Bracken is professor of management and political science at Yale approaches are needed. University and the author of Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Instead of focusing on systems integration, Power and the Second Nuclear Age. transformation is too often regarded as a choice

issue thirty-five / JFQ 123 ■ SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

between incremental and revolutionary ap- and the brightest investment bankers, strategic proaches to change. Stated in these terms, the in- planners, and technical experts, the transforma- cremental approach often wins out because it ap- tion nearly destroyed the firm. In five years it be- pears to be less risky and radical. came a pale image of its former self and was But these choices—incremental versus revo- forced to auction off key divisions at fire sale lutionary change—offer an inadequate concept of prices to avoid bankruptcy. transformation. Overlooking the interdependence Organizations can only manage so much of the building blocks ignores one key aspect of change at a time. Most leaders understand this, networked operations. The sharply increased de- and that is why, practically speaking, an incre- gree to which military tasks are carried out by dif- mental approach nearly always prevails. ferent organizational Incremental change has been the historical incremental change has been the units amplifies the im- approach to military transformation. For exam- historical approach to military portance of coordina- ple, the tank was first introduced without chang- tion. Without it, each ing the organization or tactics for land warfare. It transformation unit will go it alone, took nearly two decades after developing the tank thereby losing the for organization and tactics to catch up. Even tremendous benefit of networking. The incre- when they did change during World War II, the mental-revolutionary model all but guarantees a German army looked much as it did during lopsided organization whose performance is lim- World War I, with masses of infantry and horse- ited by its least effective parts. Systems integra- drawn supply trains supporting tanks. Similarly, tion tools must be sharpened and a systems inte- the airplane transformed combat at sea only after gration framework should replace the choice years of incremental experimentation. In the between incremental and revolutionary ap- United States and Japan fleet battle tactics did not proaches to transformation. develop until the 1930s. There are two major problems with an incre- Alternative Paths mental approach. First, military transformation The incremental-revolutionary model misses now rests on smaller force structures than the a key feature of networked operations: change in case studies of the tank and airplane. This re- one part of the organization affects other parts. moves the cushion that reduces risk. The United This is true in combat operations, acquisition, States developed innovative technologies in virtu- and intelligence. An incremental or evolutionary ally every war from the Civil War to Vietnam. But approach tackles problems serially through small- more than technological innovation, America scale improvements in existing processes and used mass—measured in men and dollars—to bat- technologies. The focus is on local expertise, and ter an enemy into submission. If technology did the changes are small enough that outside organi- not do the job, as in Vietnam, mass would, or so zational units are not usually involved. it was thought. Large force structures provided a By contrast, the revolutionary or radical ap- huge redundancy against technological failure. proach involves strategic leaps to overhaul an or- That reduced risk and made the incremental ap- ganization across the board, which may mean proach safe. Because technological failure was off- changing doctrine, organization, and technology set by massive force structures, mission success simultaneously. This approach requires extensive did not depend on the complete success of inno- financial and intellectual capital: sizable budgets vation, whether tanks, laser guided munitions, or because projects are expensive and intellectual armed helicopters. capital because risks are high. Consultants, tech- A second problem is that the Armed Forces nical experts, strategic planners, and others are are far more tightly coupled than ever before. A necessary to advise leaders about the risks. breakdown or performance lag in one part of the AT&T in the 1990s offers an example of revo- force could check the performance of the whole lutionary transformation. It undertook radical organization because of increased interdepend- change in its core technology, moving to digital ency. Networking interconnects the forces and fiber optics from copper analog circuits. A new links them to supporting systems, such as logistics CEO revolutionized the personnel system, termi- and intelligence. That increases performance and nated 60,000 employees, and made it obvious that the chances of mission success, but it also intro- loyalty to workers was a thing of the past. The cor- duces a risk that was not present in earlier episodes poration entered a new business area, cable televi- of innovation and transformation-network risk, sion, taking on massive debt in the process. the chance that some part of the organization will The result was indeed a revolutionary trans- not keep up with the others. formation of AT&T. But despite hiring the best Relatively simple incremental transformation strategies worked in the past because various elements of the military were not tightly coupled.

124 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bracken

Monitoring exercise aboard USS Coronado. U.S. Navy (Andrew Meyers)

Such approaches are not likely to be as effective review by those not immediately involved with again, which is important to understand. Histori- them—or if they do, the reviews tend to be cur- cal studies of innovation offer insight into a sory rather than disciplined. The focus is honing world that no longer exists, an era of loosely cou- the asset one knows and optimizing it to perfec- pled mass forces where change was slow. Bureau- tion. But what happens when tightly coupled cratic resistance was a big obstacle in this world units or activities use this approach? because change threatened established routines. The Japanese electronics industry is a partic- Although bureaucratic reluctance still exists, ularly good case since it sparked the fascination it is not the problem it was. The defense and in- of the American business community with incre- telligence communities recognize the need for mental approaches to transformation in the change. They want to do their best, but they are 1980s. Japanese electronics companies dominated not sure how. The issue is less one of bureaucratic the world. They came out of nowhere to seize the resistance than of factoring a complex problem high ground of innovation in low cost, high qual- into digestible bites. These are tasks carried out by ity production. linked organizational units. All relevant parts When the DRAM chip was invented in the must work together. For example, suppressing United States in 1969, Japan took the idea and enemy air defenses may involve a combination of put it through incremental product improve- air, space, and special operations forces. Deciding ments. The five electronics giants—NEC, Toshiba, who does what, when, and how is a factoring Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi—copied the ap- problem, meaning it requires breaking down a big proach other Japanese companies used in the problem into manageable parts. Coordination is 1970s in automobiles, steel, and ships. “Get a needed to make the assignment, monitor execu- good design from anywhere and improve it con- tion, and synchronize the actions of many sub- tinuously” was the doctrine. Japan used an incre- units. In such situations incremental approaches mental approach to pummel its rivals in America to transformation can be dangerous. and Europe. Its global market share of chip production rose from 26 percent in 1980 to 49 per- Transformation in Japan cent in 1990. One drawback with incremental approaches But during the 1990s the competitive envi- to transformation is that they nearly always focus ronment changed. The cheap capital that fi- attention on assets at hand rather than how they nanced R&D and plant expansion in Japan van- are put together with other building blocks. Be- ished as its banks nearly went bankrupt from cause changes are small, they usually do not get a

issue thirty-five / JFQ 125 ■ SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Integration Tools Choosing between incremental or revolutionary approaches is not the right framework for managing transformation. Systems integration, linking separate parts of an organization so weaker ones do not limit improving ones, is key. Since the Armed Forces are moving to more networked operations, this approach can be applied throughout the defense and intelligence communities from the highest levels to the lowest. Three areas for improvement can be identified. On one level they might be considered as mundane parts of nuts-and-bolts activities like outsourcing and software, which usually do not get high-level attention. But downplaying them is a mistake. Poor integration in general, and certainly in outsourcing and software, wastes capital est Squadron, Detachment 2 (Michaelest Squadron, Ammons) T

th better deployed elsewhere. Moreover, innovations 28 can disproportionaly improve the benefits of net- F–16 dropping joint working because they crosscut nearly every aspect direct attack munition. of military transformation. overlending to government-targeted industries. The industrial era was built on optimization, Employment at the big five grew while the econ- not innovation. Competitive advantage came omy did not. It became politically impossible to about by grouping production factors in an opti- lay off workers. mal way, such as steel and labor. Tools of systems The American electronics industry staged a integration reflected the loose coupling of assets. comeback in the 1990s by beating the Japanese at The defense budget was restructured using one systems integration. In U.S. firms, unlike those in such tool in the planning, programming, and Japan, different organizational units—R&D, pro- budgeting system in 1961. Strategic nuclear duction, or marketing—were tightly coupled so forces, conventional forces, and logistics were the interactions among the parts were managed treated as separate factors, the steel and man- to sharpen competitive advantage. power of war. This approach assumed that, like Japanese companies covered the R&D water- the industrial corporation on which it was mod- front. American rivals focused only on those seg- eled in 1947, DOD was a machine whose assets ments in which demand could be separately improved and combined to choosing between incremental was growing and produc- achieve a seamless whole. What happened in the or revolutionary approaches tion advantages existed. Air Force, for example, did not much affect the Firms guaranteed lifetime Navy under that kind of integration. is not the right framework employment in Japan. The difficulty was that as complexity and Companies in the United specialization increased, innovation become States targeted hiring in specialty skills for the more important than top-down optimization. But chip business. Japanese firms did everything old tools of systems integration, such as optimiza- themselves. American firms competed in key tion and the planning, programming, and budg- links of the value chain and outsourced the rest. eting system, had no way to incorporate the pay- Incremental change rewards those who un- off from innovations or networked forces. As a derstand existing processes. If the environment result it became harder to allocate resources in a does not change, and if structures hold stable, way that encouraged military transformation. that works well. It favors a stable workforce, long The planning, programming, and budgeting production runs, and long-term suppliers. U.S. system largely ignores synergies from network ef- companies understood both the economic and fects and understates their payoffs. Its replace- cultural differences in the American economy: its ment is not a new accounting system, but better dynamic labor markets, flexible contracting, and horizontal integration to enable innovation. tradition of risk taking. But they did not just rec- Mechanisms to do that have sprung up in recent ognize them as building blocks. They integrated years in response to increased complexity and them into a tightly coupled business model. tighter coupling. But they have not been identified in a systematic way to aid in transformation. For example, joint commands, integrated product/process teams, intelligence fusion centers,

126 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bracken

Setting coordinates for Dragon Eye, Enduring Freedom. U.S. Marine Corps (Kenneth E. Madden)

standing joint task forces, and integrating organi- Personnel must be trained on the new ap- zations are all mechanisms for horizontal coordi- proaches to systems integration. Looking at the nation. They are more commonly used today attributes of these approaches—information vol- than ten years ago because the new way of war, as ume, cost, and dependence on information tech- shown in Afghanistan and Iraq, requires more in- nology—allows leaders to choose. Rather than de- tegration. And computer tools are mechanisms of bating incremental or revolutionary alternatives, integration. GroupWare, collaboration technolo- attention would be far better committed to gies, and other systems help solve problems in co- choosing among integration alternatives matched ordinating different units. They are also a re- to the tasks of a networked force. sponse to growing complexity and tighter coupling of activities. Outsourcing Information Technology The trouble is that these integration mecha- Complex organizations require complex sup- nisms and computer tools are not seen as part of ply chains. Outsourcing is too important in the a larger theory for factoring complex problems new way of war to be left to contractors. But where strong interdependencies exist. Acquisition when complexity makes a field opaque, leaders specialists, for example, see the benefits and limi- have difficulty allocating resources in a rational tations of integrated product/process teams. But it way that improves the performance of the whole rarely occurs to them that there are other coordi- organization. nation mechanisms. Liaison offices, fusion cen- Information technology (IT) contractors, for ters, joint task forces, and specialized coordinat- example, are critical for networked operations being organizations such as the Joint Staff offer cause they operate and even own many of the different approaches to integration. networks that are the backbone of the new way of There are many ways to put it all together. war. But IT outsourcing is unlike contracting for Which is best depends on considerations such as catering or janitorial services. Rather, it is a highly the degree of complexity, the amount of subunit fragmented industry that causes bewilderment. interdependence, the degree of information to be Yet managing it is as important as managing an shared, and the cost. There is no single best way. ammunition supply system. The natural tendency It depends on the problem and the budget. is to deal with complexity by outsourcing it. While that gets rid of the problem, outsourced

issue thirty-five / JFQ 127 ■ SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Software needs to be put on as solid a foundation as platforms. As a discipline, software is only fifty years old, half the age of the aircraft industry and a small fraction of shipbuilding. It has very different traditions than the platform industries. For example, when an airplane crashes there is a well-developed approach to determine the cause. Teams of engineers and safety experts in- vestigate what went wrong and why. Their findings are reported to manufacturers and to Air Force and Navy organizations that exist for the purpose of making sure the lessons are factored into maintenance and training. In the future, software crashes could be more deadly than airplane crashes. Such failure could cause more loss of life if, for example, a recon- Signal Company (Michelle Labriel) th

55 naissance network crashed during a battle. Yet M93A1 FOX, nuclear there is no comparable mechanism with the so- biological chemical phistication or experience as those the Air Force reconnaissance or Navy have for understanding airplane crashes. networks are part of the total defense system. system, Enduring Indeed, software does not even have a tradition Leaders need to direct a networked organization Freedom. of post mortem analysis of analyzing past failures. the same way the Pentagon directs the building of After an intelligence setback, it is routine for the the joint strike fighter or a new radar. intelligence community to search for ways to im- Outsourcing often leads to a confusing mix- prove the process. But in a world where net- ture of systems, personnel, and sites. Some IT worked operations are key, no such cultural ap- staff members are civilian employees, some are proach is being created for one of the key military personnel, and some are private contrac- ingredients that run networks—software. tors. Responsibility is spread across so many indi- A related issue is productivity and network viduals and organizations that getting a handle manning levels. For example, as part of the effort on it is hard. This degree of opaqueness would to develop efficient platform manning require- not be tolerated on the battlefield. Yet informa- ments, the Navy DDX program will have about tion technology is an important contributor to one half of the crew size of earlier ships. Similar what happens on the battlefield. programs exist in other services. Yet there is little What is needed is for government organiza- attention to efficiently manning computer net- tions to develop an IT outsourcing review that works. Network operations centers have become clearly maps this part of the defense value chain so complicated that they add enormous staffs. to overall performance. Moreover, the desktop of a network professional outsourcing often leads to a That would catalog exactly is often a confusing hodgepodge of icons and yel- which activities are critical, confusing mixture of systems, low Post-it notes. If any battle is fought with such what firms are doing the a system, senior commanders will immediately personnel, and sites work, performance bench- see the potential for disaster. Yet combat is likely marks, and the company to use such systems because computer networks innovation record. Some of the most important are becoming so integral to joint warfighting. outsourced IT networks need to be analyzed as much as the organization of joint forces. This Streamlining networks, making them as effi- could be an opportunity for major innovations. cient as fighting forces, offers a great systems in- Software tegration opportunity that will pay off because it affects so many areas of the new way of war. Sys- At the heart of network centric warfare is tems integration is a powerful framework for con- software, the glue that links the forces. Yet its im- sidering alternative transformation strategies. It portance is often overlooked because the Depart- highlights critical areas such as better integration ment of Defense, the services, and the intelligence tools, information technology outsourcing, and community are platform focused. They have a his- software that need more sober analysis to meet tory of concentrating on airplanes, ships, and the challenges of military transformation. JFQ satellites. They do not yet understand the significance of network operators, whose efforts could be deciding factors in future mission success.

128 JFQ / issue thirty-five Trends U.S. Marine Corps (Brian L. Wickliffe) in Future Warfare By CHRISTOPHER J. BOWIE, ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR., and

ROBERT E. MULLINS

he United States has engaged in several the Armed Forces are likely to remain militarily conflicts since the Cold War. It built a committed for many years. coalition to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, Recent conflicts offer insights on the con- T conducted an air campaign against duct of war in the early 21st century. These trends Serbia with its NATO allies to halt ethnic cleans- are drawn from high-intensity combat operations ing in Kosovo, and defeated the Taliban in over a relatively modest timeframe. Trends over Afghanistan as part of the global war on terror- the last decade will probably endure for another ism. And it has launched an invasion of Iraq to ten years and underscore the relevance of strate- overthrow Saddam Hussein. While these inter- gic realities, military capabilities, and enabling ventions have failed to bring peace to the world, technologies for the future. Some Basic Assumptions Christopher J. Bowie is deputy director of strategic planning on the Air Staff and formerly worked for Northrop Grumman; Colonel Robert P. War will continue to be an instrument of na- Haffa, Jr., USAF (Ret.), is director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis tional power. The fact that there have been four Center and has taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy; and Robert E. major conflicts since the Cold War may be evi- Mullins is a senior analyst at Northrop Grumman and previously was dence enough that the near-term future is un- a member of the permanent research staff at the RAND Corporation. likely to be peaceful. Trends revealed in these

issue thirty-five / JFQ 129 ■ FUTURE WARFARE

conflicts will not be rapidly overtaken by revolu- were organized as the result of an ad hoc ap- tionary new technologies. Those analysts who proach to securing international support for mili- have studied the revolution in military affairs in tary operations led by United States. Rather than an historical context argue that technical break- the long-term arrangements that typified past al- throughs are not sufficient in themselves to bring liances, future coalitions are likely to be tempo- about an entirely different way of warfighting. rary liaisons, with some partners proving more Corresponding organizational and doctrinal faithful than others. changes require twenty or thirty years to take In contrast to the Cold War, recent allied root, mature, and evolve into new capabilities. contributions have largely come in the form of Trends in warfare can be plotted across a political support and access to facilities rather range of conflicts. The diversity of the conflicts than combat forces. Trends in coalition warfare argues in favor of capabili- have revealed widening disparities in capabilities the distinction between ties for both high-intensity that will cause allies in the future to fall farther command and control and and small-scale contingen- behind, although niche capabilities such as spe- cies. Asymmetry is a com- cial operations forces will remain valuable. execution is increasingly modity that will be coveted Evidence underscores the potential for mili- blurred, mainly because of by the United States and its tary showstoppers arising from political issues, enemies. A conventional the tyranny of distance, and constraints on infra- real-time operational pictures imbalance will induce po- structure. Efforts to obtain political access can be tential enemies to wage complicated, especially for conducting offensive asymmetric warfare. The Armed Forces must be operations. Moreover, Asia has a much lower base prepared to confront such threats. The task is ex- density and less developed infrastructure than Eu- amining trends that describe enemy actions in re- rope and the Middle East. Although anti-access cent conflicts and point to areas in which Wash- threats were limited in recent conflicts, power ington can increase its competitive advantages. projection will be confounded by improved An analysis of future warfare cannot review enemy capabilities. all aspects of military strategy and operations. Enemies have sought to evoke global criti- For example, increased reliance of land, sea, and cism and weaken coalition resolve by exploiting air operations on space-based assets is difficult American sensitivity about casualties and interna- to weigh. Moreover, areas such as information tional aversion to collateral damage. Failing that, operations, air and missile defense, and post- enemies have sought to reduce the vulnerability conflict operations do not readily lend them- to coalition action through air defense, camou- selves to trend analysis but are also clearly wor- flage, concealment, deception, dispersal, mobil- thy of serious evaluation. ity, and hardened facilities. Weapons of mass de- Hindsight is not always accepted as useful in struction have cast a long shadow in recent years, developing recommendations on the conduct of and proliferation may be the response to the con- future war. After all, there is the old adage that ventional military dominance of the United the military often prepares to fight the last war. A States. The consistency of these trends suggests corollary may be that little can be learned from that similar challenges may arise in the future. past conflicts because of their uniqueness. While recent conflicts have been unique, evidence sug- New Ways of War gests that the historical record is relevant. Two consequences of increased situational awareness and their implications for time-critical Political-Military Trends strike operations in the future warrant attention. The location of recent conflicts suggests a First, the rapidly improving speed at which tar- shift from Europe toward Asia, a region of vast gets can be generated and attacked by a combina- economic importance and diverse security chal- tion of battle management, sensor, and strike lenges. Whatever a future war in that region platforms has compressed what is known as the might look like, it will not resemble an intense kill chain. For example, while the targeting battle in Europe from large fixed bases dispersed process took weeks in operations against Iraq in over relatively short distances envisioned over 1991, it was reduced to 45 minutes or less by the last half century. 2003. Second, the distinction between command America depended on alliances such as and control and execution is increasingly blurred, NATO for collective defense during the Cold mainly because of real-time operational pictures War. In three post-Cold War conflicts, coalitions of the battlefield as well as the role of civilian and military leaders in issuing targeting guidance. The latter trend resulted in a creeping centralization of command and execution as the rear echelon reaches forward to the battlefield in near-real

130 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bowie et al. U.S. Navy (Rob Gaston) Combat direction center aboard USS Enterprise. time. Because of the enhanced political content Long-range operations are an outgrowth of of conflict in a world of instantaneous informa- the access problem and migration of conflict to tion, centralized execution will often accompany distant and remote regions. During the Cold War, centralized control. planners developed concepts of operations based The deliberate planning process is a legacy of on the premise that forward operating bases the Cold War that sustains a predilection for would be available to both launch and sustain scripted as opposed to dynamic military opera- combat. From the Gulf War to Afghanistan and tions. However, in the nonlinear and fluid operat- Iraq, the trends suggest that this assumption is in- ing environments that will characterize future bat- creasingly risky. As a hedge, provision must be tlefields, renewed emphasis on adaptive planning made to project firepower over long distances. For and dynamic operations is necessary. Experiences example, problems regarding access to forward in Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, bases in 2001 and 2003 resulted in emphasis on and Iraqi Freedom underscore this trend. For ex- carrier-based aircraft, long-range bombers, and ample, 20 percent of targets were selected after air- aerial refueling. craft launch during the Gulf War, whereas 43 per- While rapidly deployable, highly maneuver- cent were selected once planes were airborne over able ground forces that can leverage the effects of Kosovo. In Afghanistan 80 percent of carrier-based modern precision weaponry are integral to dy- sorties were launched without designated targets. namic military operations against elusive ene- The statistics for Iraqi Freedom are likely to be mies, there is a mismatch between slow-moving consistent with this trend. and late-deploying heavy land forces and the de- Throughout the conflicts, combat losses were mands of the future operating environment. In statistically insignificant despite the enemy objec- addition, the ways of delivering firepower have tive of causing heavy casualties to hasten termi- changed. As the Secretary of Defense observed: nation. The reasons lie in a combination of new “Looking at what was overwhelming force a operational capabilities, highly survivable combat decade or two decades ago, today you can have platforms, and guidance systems to limit the vul- overwhelming force, conceivably, with lesser nerability of U.S. forces. numbers because the lethality is equal to or greater than before.” The ground force employed

issue thirty-five / JFQ 131 ■ FUTURE WARFARE

Underpinning this promise are technologies to create network-centric architectures consisting of high-quality sensors and rapidly transmitted data that will be fused and integrated at command and control centers. Conflicts since the Gulf War witnessed growing integration of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. In the future, less expensive, more capable, and lighter sensors will support networking intelligence-quality sensors on the battlefield. Assuming that data streams from myriad sources can be rapidly integrated, commanders will enjoy greater situational awareness. From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo, and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan but reinforced in Iraq, low-observable aircraft were used with revolutionary impact. Low-observable technologies applied to combat aircraft have allowed them to U.S. Air Force (StacyU.S. Air Force L. Pearsall) operate with relative impunity against sophisti- Searching Abu cated air defenses. The ability of stealth aircraft to Ghurayb market. operate independently has reduced the require- in Iraqi Freedom was lighter than and half the ment for considerable resources to escort attack size of that in Desert Storm, but it had a more aircraft. Electronic warfare assets were used in ambitious mission. support of stealth aircraft but were more critical in enabling non-stealth aircraft—the mainstay of Technological Advantages the current force—to survive in nonpermissive Precision-guided munitions have emerged as environments. Emphasis on airpower-centric the centerpiece of a new revolutionary style of air campaign plans will demand renewed investment warfare. One trend since the Persian Gulf War has in stealth and electronic countermeasures. been the steadily increasing place of these Unmanned aerial vehicles have demon- weapons in the percentage of munitions deliv- strated their increasing operational utility in the ered: 8 percent in Desert post-Cold War era, particularly when enabled by less expensive, more capable, Storm, 30 percent in Al- advances in satellite guidance and communica- lied Force, 60 percent in tions, computerized flight control systems, and and lighter sensors will support Enduring Freedom, and sensor technology. Indeed, unmanned systems as- networking intelligence-quality 70 percent in Iraqi Free- sumed new roles because of improvements in dom. Other trends are range, endurance, on-board sensors, and data sensors on the battlefield the growing number of transmission. Though only one vehicle, the Pio- precision-guided muni- neer, was deployed in the Persian Gulf War, ten tions delivered per sortie and the increasing per- types were used in Iraq in 2003 to provide situa- centage that can be delivered in adverse weather, tional awareness in a cluttered battlespace. And ranging from 13 percent in the Gulf War to 90 while they were used principally in earlier con- percent in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, the flicts for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- trend points to new capabilities derived from in- sance, they had evolved into sophisticated, air- creased payload fractionation (delivering larger breathing, hunter-killer platforms by 2001. amounts of smaller unguided weapons) and mass precision (rapidly releasing large numbers of The Future weapons). In Iraqi Freedom, a smaller organiza- The new way of warfare exhibited over the tion delivered twice as many munitions per day last decade is not compatible with the clash of in- as the air component in Desert Storm. terstate armies that prevailed during the Cold Another advantage stems from the quantity War. Indeed, as opposed to the Eurocentric vision and quality of sensors and their integration into of warfare encompassing large armies and vital systems and networks. The trend toward network- interests, the strategic center of gravity has centric operations is advanced by a promise of in- moved to uncertain threats emanating from Asia. formation dominance and situational awareness. This trend has been accompanied by a change in the way allies are selected: a trend in favor of temporary coalitions and ad hoc partners who are valued for their political and diplomatic support rather than direct military participation.

132 JFQ / issue thirty-five Bowie et al.

F–16 over Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom. U.S. Air Force (SuzanneU.S. Air Force M. Jenkins)

Meanwhile, enemies of the future could in- Battle management indicates that the trend clude rogue states, nonstate actors, and possibly a toward centralized execution is a growing reality. peer competitor, all poised to undermine the use Finally, the most prominent tendencies in force of force by the United States, with the objective deployment and employment include an in- of exploiting sensitivities to casualties, interna- creased role for naval and air forces to project tional public opinion, and battlefield vulnerabili- power quickly from a distance, a diminished em- ties. In addition, enemies can be expected to ex- phasis on slow-moving, heavy ground forces re- ploit the multifold dimensions of the access quiring a large footprint in favor of agile fixing challenge by confounding U.S. capabilities to forces, and continued means and measures to project and sustain military power in the region lower the risk of American casualties. of conflict. Most ominously, events in Iraq sug- With regard to technology, the trend has gest that enemies may possess and use weapons been dominated by the use of precision muni- of mass destruction, the mere possibility of which tions. They not only hit their targets, lowering will deter some courses of action, limit basing op- the level of effort and minimizing collateral dam- tions in theater, compel the focus on counter- age, but also reduce capabilities that must be de- force missions by targeting weapons of mass deployed. But such weapons are not useful without struction, and frustrate campaign-level force precise information. They are linked to improved employment options. targeting guidance aided by high-quality sensors, Militarily, there has been a dramatic trend stealth and electronic jamming, and unmanned away from scripted plans and operational orders vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and recon- to a fluid, nonlinear, and adaptive battlespace in naissance as well as hunter-killer roles. which targets are generated while attack platforms are en route. Factors that account for this The United States has fielded impressive ca- approach to target generation begin with require- pabilities to meet the challenges of the post- ments for extended reach in recent operations. Cold War era, including the global war on ter- Added to the tyranny of distance is the elusive rorism. However, the road ahead appears ever nature of enemy forces and sketchy target sets more demanding in terms of both the diversity characterized by fleeting opportunities, which are of the threats and enemy capabilities. Such con- masked by deception. These factors are offset by siderations suggest that the United States must an order of magnitude improvement in situa- prepare for uncertainty by investing in concepts, tional awareness that enables commanders on all capabilities, and technologies to sustain compet- levels to view the battlespace and intervene in itive advantages. What will ultimately be re- near-real time. quired are agile, access-insensitive forces that project power across great distances with little reliance on externals. JFQ

issue thirty-five / JFQ 133 Commonwealth troops entering Iraqi refinery.

The Other Gulf War Museum Imperial War British Intervention in Iraq, 1941

By DOUGLAS PORCH

raqi Freedom offers not only a reprise of un- anti-British Arab nationalist, who threatened finished business from the Persian Gulf War, British interests. The occupation would also strike it is the third invasion of Iraq by Great a blow at terrorism orchestrated by a charismatic I Britain since independence in 1932. During Islamic cleric. Finally, intervention would protect World War II, Winston Churchill ordered his oil reserves vital to the war effort. commander in chief, Middle East, General Sir Churchill forced the offensive on Wavell, Archibald Wavell, to march on Baghdad. The rea- who favored a diplomatic approach. The general son for intervention was strikingly similar to that argued against an invasion in terms that mirrored advanced more than fifty years later: to preempt recent objections—he lacked the resources to add Axis support for Rashid Ali el Gailani, a violently Iraq to a long list of military commitments. He believed intervention would make the region less secure because Iraqi antagonism was linked to Douglas Porch is professor of national security affairs at the Palestine. Wavell urged accepting a Turkish offer Naval Postgraduate School and the author of Path to Victory: to mediate so London could take care of pressing The Mediterranean Theater in World War II. affairs elsewhere.

134 JFQ / issue thirty-five Porch

The Origins When the war cabinet recommended sending a The British accorded sovereignty to Iraq in division from India to occupy Basra, Wavell ob- 1932, making it the first former Turkish colony in jected that British troops would only enflame na- the Middle East to gain independence. However, tionalism. His decision left RAF bases in Iraq vul- because Basra and Baghdad were important as an nerable, guarded only by a locally recruited air link and land passage between India and constabulary with armored cars. British-controlled Palestine and the Suez canal, a After the fall of France, the Italian declara- treaty that permitted Commonwealth troops to tion of war, and the RAF victory in the Battle of transit Iraq also required Baghdad to “give all aid, Britain, the focus of the war shifted to the eastern including the use of railways, rivers, ports, and Mediterranean. Iraq was merely one piece in a airfields” in the event of war. Iraq undertook to complex geopolitical jigsaw puzzle that ran from provide security, especially protecting the Cairo to Tehran. And while Britain had strengths, pipelines that ran from the Mosel and Kirkuk oil- most notably the Royal Navy based in Alexandria, fields in northern Iraq to Haifa on the Mediter- its principal vulnerability was the volatility of a ranean. By 1937, the British presence had been region ripe for Axis exploitation. reduced to two Royal Air Force (RAF) bases, one at Religion and Politics Shaibah, close to Basra, and the other at Hab- baniya, on the Euphrates near Baghdad. Of particular concern was the intrigue by Yet anti-British sentiment persisted, espe- Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, cially in the army, whose officers resented foreign who sought refuge in Baghdad after being exiled influence, took offense at the refusal to provide in 1937. His delicate features and gentle manner arms, and opposed Jewish emigration to Pales- accentuated by deep blue eyes, trim goatee, and tine. But little could be done because the calm voice, concealed a zealous and violent na- Hashimite monarchy was imported from Saudi ture. A former Ottoman artillery officer turned Arabia in the wake of World War I and did not teacher, al-Husseini was sentenced to ten years in have deep roots in the country. It was weakened prison by the British for his part in anti-Jewish by association with the British and utterly de- riots in 1920 in Jerusalem. In a gesture of mis- pendent on the army to keep order, especially placed leniency, he was pardoned and stood for after both the Assyrian rebellion in 1933 and the grand mufti in the following year, an office that tribal rebellions of 1935–36 normally went to jurists who arbitrated disputes Iraq was obligated by treaty were crushed. In this tumult, by interpreting Koranic law. The British calculated that there was nothing to side with Britain when Iraqi officers organized a secret society known as the to lose in allowing al-Husseini to play the role World War II broke out Golden Square and kept an since he had no adherents in the Arab commu- eye on the throne to monitor nity. This proved to be a mistake. As grand mufti, the slightest pro-British tilt. Distrust of Great he was poised to exploit Arab-Jewish tension that Britain led many Iraqis to attribute the automo- began with the exodus of Jews to Palestine in the bile accident that took the life of King Faisal in 1930s. His anti-British and anti-Semitic rhetoric 1939 to British agents. His demise cleared the way found an audience in a growing middle class, for the Golden Square to act as the principal which, ironically, had prospered as the result of power broker in the country. Jewish economic activities. As president of the Iraq was obligated by treaty to side with Supreme Muslim Council, he controlled religious Britain when World War II broke out. But the schools and courts as well as trust funds that government of the four-year-old king, under di- spread his message in Iraq and Syria. He also rection of an uncle who served as regent, proved launched attacks on Jewish settlements and assas- too feeble to surmount the opposition of the sinated moderate Arabs who urged compromise prime minister. A lawyer and cofounder of the but were marginalized by terrorism and Islamic Muslim Brotherhood, whose cells were active fundamentalism. across the Middle East, Rashid Ali el Gailani was a Moreover, the mufti benefitted from a de- passionate supporter of the Arab cause in the face cline in British fortunes. After 1938, Germany, of Zionist penetration of Palestine. Early Axis tri- Italy, and even Spain fueled Arab nationalism with umphs and the arrival of an Italian armistice radio broadcasts, cultural subsidies, and anti-Se- commission to monitor the Vichy military in mitic literature that was translated and distributed Syria emboldened Rashid Ali. British insistence through schools by al-Husseini. Palestinians imi- that Iraq break diplomatic relations with Italy tated fascist organizations and praised Nazi racial brought the situation to the brink in early 1941. laws, dreaming of a day when Germany and Italy would eject the British and the Jews from the Mid- dle East. The evenhandedness of Great Britain found few takers in the region. Palestine was rife

issue thirty-five / JFQ 135 ■ BRITISH INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

Middle East Theater—World War II

Black Sea SOVIET UNION

Istanbul

Ankara TURKEY Izmir Caspian Sea

Mosel SYRIA Tehran Nicosia Kirkuk CRETE CYPRUS Tigris LEBANON Beirut PERSIA Mediterranean Sea Baghdad Damascus Habbaniya Haifa PALESTINE Amman Jerusalem IRAQ Alexandria Euphrates Port Said TRANS-JORDAN

Suez Basra Cairo SAUDI ARABIA KUWAIT

0 250 Miles Persian EGYPT Gulf Pipeline Red 0 250 Kilometers Sea

with rebellion with the outbreak of war in 1940. The coup in Baghdad threatened British in- Some 20,000 British soldiers maintained order be- terests by severing the air link and land route between Muslim extremists and Jewish militants, tween India and Egypt, endangering supplies who conducted raids as far away as Syria and from the northern oilfields on which defense of Lebanon. In late 1940, the British discovered that the Mediterranean depended, and allowing a na- the Iraqi army was training a unit of Palestinians tionalist success in Iraq to subvert the tenuous and Iraqis to fight for the mufti. The ambassador position of Great Britain in Egypt and Palestine. to Baghdad reported that, so long as London re- Against this threat, Wavell argued that his hands fused to adopt a more pro-Arab policy in Pales- were full in spring 1941. He evacuated three divi- tine, “in Iraq, we get the disadvantages.”1 sions and an armored brigade from Greece and Arab nationalist feeling within the army, in- prepared to defend Crete against German assault. trigue on the part of the grand mufti, and anti- An offensive against Italian forces in East Africa British posturing by Rashid Ali combined to bring was about to start. Moreover, a little-known Iraq to the brink of civil war. On the night of enemy general, Erwin Rommel, had launched a March 31, 1941, tipped off that officers planned surprise offensive into Cyrenaica in March with a to move against him, the regent escaped across reinforced German and four Italian divisions, the Tigris in a motorboat and made his way to driven to the Egyptian frontier, and invested the RAF base at Habbaniya, from which he was 36,000 British troops at Tobruk. To Wavell, even flown to Basra and asylum on board HMS with enough forces on hand, this was hardly the Cockchafer. On April 3, Rashid Ali el Gailani seized moment to ignite Arab volatility. power with the help of army and air force officers of the Golden Square and proclaimed a national Intervention defense government. He warned the British am- Wavell contended that he had more impor- bassador against intervention in internal affairs tant fires to put out, which brought his relation- and dispatched a force to Basra to block British ship with Churchill to the boil. On the surface, troops from landing. the prime minister and the general should have gotten along famously. Both were aristocrats and

136 JFQ / issue thirty-five Porch

Interviewing Persian forestall Axis intervention and force Baghdad to officer. break with Italy, eliminate Rashid Ali and al-Hus- seini, reinforce British rights of transit, and bring Turkey into the war with Mosul as the prize. On orders of the chiefs of staff, Delhi landed a brigade at Basra on April 30, the vanguard of 10th Indian Division, which was en route to Iraq. Rashid Ali, who preferred to avoid confrontation until he could solidify support, decided that time was not on his side. As a result, he assembled a brigade armed with artillery to eliminate the air base at Habbaniya before it could be reinforced. In London, the April 30 news that a large Iraqi force had invested Habbaniya caused the chiefs to exult that their intervention in Basra had caused Rachid Ali’s plot to go off at half-cock before the Axis could organize support for the regime. But in the short term, it was unclear who had preempted whom. Habbaniya was an airfield that housed a training school of 1,000 airmen together with 9,000 civilians, many British depend-

Imperial War Museum ents. It was defended by a seven-mile iron fence and constabulary of 1,200 Iraqi and Assyrian levies backed by armored cars under a British lieu- veterans of the Boer War and World War I as well tenant colonel. Even an attacker with a poor as authors and historians with prodigious memo- grasp of tactics had to realize that eliminating the ries. Both realized they were fighting a conflict water tower or power station at Habbaniya would that required difficult strategic choices. And both compromise any resistance. had a proclivity for unorthodox solutions tem- The best defense of Habbaniya lay in air- pered by common sense. But that was the end of power. But the task was left to half-trained stu- their similarities. dent pilots flying a fleet of 78 mostly obsolete bi- Churchill was a man of strategic imagination planes, some hastily rigged to carry bomb loads who demanded enthusiasm that bordered on as small as 20 pounds, hardly more than air- zealotry from subordinates. Wavell was a meticu- launched grenades. The arrival of eight Welling- lous planner with a talent for ton medium bombers from Egypt capable of de- the Iraqi air force rendered administrative detail. He was livering 4,500-pound bomb loads, a few Gladiator much more attuned to the biplanes and Hurricane fighters, the warhorse of a good account of itself, complexities of an operation the Battle of Britain, and 300 soldiers airlifted especially against student than to its visionary possibili- from the RAF base at Shaibah afforded some pro- ties. Although regarded as a tection against two battalions that invested the pilots in trainers premier army trainer, Wavell base on April 30. A buildup of Iraqi forces outside was too cerebral and taciturn the base to brigade size led the commander at for Churchill. Conversely, the prime minister Habbaniya, Air Vice-Marshal H.G. Smart, to con- constantly meddled in campaign planning and clude that attack was the best form of defense. initiated courses of action from 3,000 miles away, At 0500 hours on May 2, the bombers and often in excruciating detail. Wavell responded by fighters struck Iraqi forces, who answered with an shielding information from London. This lack of artillery barrage on Habbaniya. The Iraqi air force, transparency markedly increased the distrust that based outside Baghdad at Rashid, rendered a good Churchill harbored for his commander in chief, account of itself, especially against student pilots Middle East. in trainers. Smart directed subsequent attacks on By early 1941, Churchill was beyond tempo- Rashid and lines of communication. Fast twin-en- rizing. “War,” he said, “is a contest of wills.”2 He gine Blenheim medium bombers with 1,000- had chosen to make a major commitment to the pound bombs, escorted by long-range Hurricanes, eastern Mediterranean—against the advice of his arrived from Egypt to pound airfields in Baghdad chiefs—because there Britain could take the of- and Mosel, where a small Luftwaffe detachment fensive and showcase its value as an ally of the was based. After four days of bombing and raids United States. By vigorous action, he would dis- by the King’s Own Royal Regiment, the Iraqis tance himself from the appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain. An invasion of Iraq would

issue thirty-five / JFQ 137 ■ BRITISH INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

overtaxed garrison to invade Iraq. He reluctantly assembled 5,800 men (known as Habforce) in Palestine under Major General J.G.W. Clark for the march on Baghdad. Churchill became so an- noyed at the dispatches from Wavell and the lack of preparation by 1st Cavalry Division in Pales- tine, much of it on horseback and without anti- aircraft guns, that he came close to sacking him. The preventative invasion of Iraq caught Germany off guard, mainly because its diplomats and military were divided over the question of exploiting Arab nationalism. The foreign office in Berlin had been in contact with the mufti. But Hitler preferred to leave policy formulation on the Mediterranean and Middle East to Rome. The Wehrmacht high command, whose views on Ital- ian competence are unprintable, supported Arab nationalist movements to undermine Britain. Nevertheless, the Iraqi rebellion surprised the Germans, who were engaged in ending campaigns in the Balkans and Greece, mounting an assault on Crete, and planning Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia scheduled for June 1941. Admiral Jean Darlan, reeling from the Royal Navy attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir near Oran in July 1940, offered to release Vichy war stocks in Syria, including aircraft, permit passage of Ger- man war matériel across Syria, and provide an air link for German support to Rashid Ali from Axis- occupied Rhodes. Imperial War Museum Floating bridge By the time Hitler declared that the Arab lib- near Basra. eration movement was a natural ally, Churchill withdrew, leaving burning trucks and exploding had preempted Axis intervention. Nor did Iraq ammunition along the road to Baghdad courtesy further its cause by mistakenly shooting down of the Royal Air Force. the plane with Major Axel von Bloomberg, a Ger- man negotiator sent to coordinate military sup- Axis Intrigue port. Despite efforts by Rudolf Rahn, the German The defence committee in London, armed representative on the Italian armistice commis- with Ultra intercepts detailing pleas from Iraq for sion in Syria, to run trains of arms, munitions, Axis support, and worried by broadcasts by the and spare parts to Iraq through Turkey and Syria, mufti calling for jihad against “the greatest foe of and the intervention of Axis planes, the five Iraqi Islam,” obliged a reluctant Wavell to invade be- divisions and 60 serviceable aircraft were no fore the enemy organized support for Rashid Ali. match for a force of 200 aircraft. Habforce, spear- For his part, Wavell argued in favor of accepting a headed by the Arab Legion, reached Habbaniya Turkish offer to mediate the crisis on the basis of on May 18 after crossing 500 miles of searing a cessation of hostilities against a promise by desert in a week. By this time, RAF bombers had Rashid Ali that Axis forces would not be allowed annihilated the Iraqi air force and extended at- into Iraq. Churchill rejected this option but left tacks to Syrian bases that serviced Axis planes. open the possibility of ceding Mosul to Turkey as Many members of the Iraqi regime applied for encouragement to enter the war. Axis propaganda Syrian visas. extolling Rashid Ali gave the impression that London had coordinated his coup with Berlin Occupation and Rome. The British occupied Basra in mid-May The prime minister had no intention of al- 1941, asserted their rights under the 1930 treaty, lowing the new regime to pull in Axis reinforce- lifted the siege of Habbaniya, and temporarily ments or encourage imitators among nationalist averted Axis intervention. But their next move officers and supporters of the grand mufti in was intensely debated. In London the chiefs of Egypt. But Wavell argued without avail against stripping Palestine and the Trans-Jordan of its

138 JFQ / issue thirty-five Porch

units supported by Italian aircraft on the out- skirts of the capital. To avoid urban warfare, Clark bluffed; an interpreter called the headquarters of Rashid Ali with exaggerated claims of British strength. The Iraqi leader, who was de- moralized by the lack of Axis support, fled to Per- sia with the rump of the Golden Square and the grand mufti in tow. The British signed a lenient armistice that allowed the Iraqi army to retain its weapons and return to their barracks. Wavell left the administration of Baghdad to Iraqis. The pro- British regent regained the throne on June 1, but order disintegrated as Jewish merchants became targets of outraged nationalists and free-lance looters. The British army, camped outside the city, did not intervene. Regime change in Iraq created dominoes. Un- settled by the Vichy invitation for Germany to use Syrian air bases and goaded by the Free French under Charles de Gaulle, Churchill ordered the invasion of Syria and Lebanon, which fell in mid- July after a six-week campaign. In August, British and Soviet forces invaded Persia, overthrowing Reza Shah and replacing him with his son, Mo- hammad Reza Pahlavi. Axis attempts to stoke Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism to undermine the British base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean had been quashed. Fast Forward The American campaigns against Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden offer a reprise of the crusade by Churchill against Rashid Ali and the grand mufti in 1941. The three arguments the President advanced in 2002 for regime change in

Imperial War Museum Iraq—preempting Saddam Hussein before he ac- Guarding oil facilities, quired weapons of mass destruction and the Abadan. means to deliver them, the link between Iraq and staff argued for continued pounding of the Iraqis terrorism, and the danger that a region contain- to “defeat and discredit the leaders in the hope ing 20 percent of world oil supplies could fall that Rashid’s government would be replaced.”3 under the control of a regime that might employ For his part, the commander in chief, India, the resources for malevolent purposes—mirror made a case for marching to Baghdad followed the points Churchill made in a different yet simi- by the military occupation of northern Iraq, lar context over sixty years ago. which offered the only long-term guarantee In 1941, Iraqi resistance against even a against Axis intervention. Churchill compro- hastily organized, underarmed, outnumbered, mised, ordering Clark to march Habforce to and poorly supplied force proved illusory, much Baghdad but at the same time assuring Wavell as Iraqi resistance collapsed in the Persian Gulf that he would not have to commit scarce forces War. Nevertheless, the debate in London on how to a long-term occupation of northern Iraq until far to go proved remarkably similar to 1991. Un- Rommel was defeated. like President George H.W. Bush, however, The Iraqi army, fighting from behind de- Churchill opted for regime change over the ad- fense lines along canals and fields flooded by vice of his commander, who was content with water from tributaries of the Euphrates, put up a discrediting the leadership in the hope that Iraqis respectable resistance against Habforce, which di- would take matters into their own hands. Despite vided into columns and advanced from three di- inflammatory nationalist rhetoric, support for the rections. On May 30, Habforce scattered the Iraqi regime of Rashid Ali proved as shallow among Iraqis as nostalgia for Saddam today.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 139 ■ BRITISH INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

the army and administration, and electoral fraud to ensure that only supporters of the regent served in parliament. Stable government under the British brought a welcome alternative to the turmoil of the 1930s, but the long-term benefits were less certain. The regime reinforced its ties with tribal chiefs and favored landowners. Peas- ants fled to the burgeoning slums of Baghdad. Sunni politicians allowed Shias and Kurds only cosmetic participation in the political process. The democratic impulse in Iraq was stillborn, while the monarchy labored with little success to build a popular following. The army, courted as a symbol of national unity by the monarchy and considered a requirement for internal order by the British, retained its grip on areas traditionally difficult to govern. This proved a costly solution. Archibald Wavell. Imperial War Museum A growing effendi class of educated mid-level pro- fessionals and army officers attracted to pan-Arab ideas and agitated by the continued conflict in Lessons of History Palestine articulated their discontent. The army A more important question is what Britain removed the monarchy in 1958, and Iraq entered gained from preventative war. The short answer is a period of murderous instability from which Sad- that London solidified its position in the Middle dam Hussein emerged in 1979 to seize power. East by preempting Axis intervention and also bought time to bring a major ally on line, re- The challenge is translating victory over Sad- versed the tide of war in the Mediterranean the- dam Hussein into a program that will stabilize a ater that in spring 1941 strongly favored the Axis, region inclined toward effervescence and avoid and emerged among the victors of World War II. the need for a repeat intervention. The British ex- But even before the war ended, British power in perience reveals that regime change alone is no the Middle East had begun to wane, beginning in panacea. While it will eliminate the immediate Palestine. Iraq, Iran, and Egypt were in turmoil by problem, it will not lead to lasting change unless the 1950s. Iraq is placed on a more democratic footing, and The prevailing verdict on British interaction the festering sore in the region—the Israel-Pales- with Arab countries during World War II is that tine dispute—is equitably resolved. JFQ by invading Iraq and Persia, exiling the mufti, sponsoring Zionist counter- NOTES terror groups, and using the prevailing verdict is 1 Mohammad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military in heavy-handed tactics in that London fueled the Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London: KPI, 1982), Egypt, London fueled the pp. 171–79. flames of Arab nationalism flames of Arab nationalism 2 Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Wavell in the Middle East, and Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism. 1939–1941 (London: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 203. Those actions ultimately 3 I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle compromised long-term re- East, volume 2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Of- gional interests. Stability in the Middle East, the fice, 1956), p. 186. British ambassador to Baghdad argued in 1941, 4 Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932–1958 (Ox- hinged on Palestine. No amount of intervention ford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 235. to produce regime change elsewhere would resolve that problem. At least one writer argues that Wavell was correct, that Turkish mediation and the threat of British force could have produced a compromise that would have preserved British forces for more pressing operations and limited Arab resentment against colonialist policies.4 Although few lifted a finger to defend Rashid Ali and the Golden Square, the years from 1941 to 1945 became known to Iraqis as the second occupation, a time of reconstruction characterized by heavy British troop presence, deep purges in

140 JFQ / issue thirty-five OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN ■

General Wallace Martin Greene, Jr. (1907–2003) Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

VITA

orn in Waterbury, Vermont; attended University of Vermont (1925–26); graduated from Naval Academy (1930); basic school, Philadelphia (1931); Marine barracks, Portsmouth (1931–32); sea school, San Diego (1932); USS Tennessee (1932–34); Pensacola, Quantico, and Lakehurst (1934–36); chemical warfare school, Edgewood Arsenal; Guam (1936–37); 4th Marines, Shanghai (1937–39); junior course, Quantico (1939–40); 1st Marine BBrigade, Guantanamo (1940–41); 1st Marine Division, Quantico and New River (1941); naval observer, London; British amphibious warfare and demolition schools (1941–42); G–3, 3d Marine Brigade, Western Samoa (1942–43); G–3, V Amphibious Corps, Hawaii and Marshall Islands (1943–44); G–3, 2d Marine Division, Saipan and Tinian (1944); plans and policies division and personnel department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1944–46); amphibious training command, Little Creek (1946–48); G–3, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor (1948–50); chief, combined arms section, Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1950–52); National War College (1952–53), special assistant to Joint Chiefs of Staff for NSC affairs (1953–55); assistant commander, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune (1955–56); commanding general, recruit training command and recruit depot, Parris Island, and Camp Lejeune (1956–59); assistant chief of staff (G–3), deputy chief of staff for plans, and chief of staff at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1959–64); 23d Commandant of the Marine Corps (1964–67); died in Alexandria, Virginia.

The Commandant is not a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs. But when matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps are under consideration, then the Commandant meets with the Joint Chiefs and holds co-equal status with regard to such matters....The Chiefs are advisors. They shape their advice for the good of the country—not on the basis of priority for what their respective services may want. And they are united as never before—more objective than ever before....Each of us expresses any opposition he may have to a particular proposal, with full supporting detail, during JCS meetings. That’s when it should be done, when we’re shaping our recommendations, not after they’ve gone to the Secretary or the President....When asked, and during our deliberations, each of us states his views as a member of the JCS and as a service chief....But these are views and recommendations. They are not decisions. The decisions are made by the Commander in Chief.

—Wallace M. Greene, Jr., “How the Joint Chiefs of Staff View Their Dual Roles,” Armed Forces Management (December 1967) U.S. Marine Corps Museum Portrait by Everett Raymond Kinstler

issue thirty-five / JFQ 141 CJCS Essay Competition

The 23d annual2004 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition was held on May 20–21, 2004, in Washington. This event was established by General David Jones, USAF, the 9th Chairman, to challenge students at the intermediate and senior colleges to write original essays on significant aspects of national security strategy.

N FIRST PLACE ESSAYSN LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOWARD D. BELOTE, USAF (National War College) “The Political Role of Regional Combatant Commanders”

and LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE W. SMITH, JR., USMC (Marine Corps War College) “Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation)”

N SECOND PLACE ESSAYN COMMANDER STEVEN W. KNOTT, USN (U.S. Army War College) “Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation”

N THIRD PLACE ESSAYN LIEUTENANT COLONEL LING WEE LEE, REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE AIR FORCE (Air War College) “War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World”

142 JFQ / issue thirty-five OFF THE SHELF ■

BOMBING SERBIA Last exit INTO SUBMISSION in Belgrade. A Review Essay by CONRAD C. CRANE

NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment by Benjamin S. Lambeth Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001. 276 pp. $20.00 [ISBN 0–8330–3050–7]

The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did by Stephen T. Hosmer Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001. 155 pp. $20.00 [ISBN: 0–8330–3003–5]

AP/Wide World Photos

he conflict in Kosovo spawned T numerous accounts of NATO air- electronic warfare and suppression of air would cause immense hardship and power in Allied Force. Even though two defenses, flexible targeting of ground imperil their rule. Milosevic believed his RAND Project Air Force studies tout the forces, and interoperability. Serb air war-weary people would support a deci- success of bombing in persuading Presi- defenses remained a threat throughout, sion to avoid more intensive bombing; dent Slobodan Milosevic to agree to a set- and the air war had almost no effect on moreover, he could maintain that the tlement, there are significant differences actions by Serb forces within Kosovo. new terms were less severe than the con- in their analyses. But their conclusions Despite these deficiencies and the wrong ditions offered at Rambouillet. Unlike are provocative and troubling. strategy, the ability of airpower to destroy Lambeth, Hosmer believes the gradual Benjamin Lambeth is a well regarded fixed dual military-civilian infrastructure increase in bombing allowed pressure to expert on Soviet airpower and recent air targets in Yugoslavia, helped by the build, which would not have happened if campaigns. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A indictment of Milosevic and the loss of Short had been allowed to hit harder ear- Strategic and Operational Assessment is an international support, eventually induced lier. It also ensured the solidarity of the expanded version of a chapter in The the dictator to accept the terms offered by Alliance, which was the center of gravity Transformation of American Airpower, pub- the Alliance. for the coalition. lished in 2001. The author details the While the strength of the analysis The authors differ over the lessons debate between General Wesley Clark, by Lambeth is its operational assessment for jointness. Lambeth laments the loss of USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, of Allied Force, Stephen Hosmer the ground option at the beginning of and Lieutenant General Michael Short, advances a particularly comprehensive the air campaign. But its main use would USAF, the air component commander. strategic analysis of the air war impact in have been to prevent Serb ground targets The former favored concentrating on Serb The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic from dispersing to hide from bombs, and forces in Kosovo, while the latter wanted Decided to Settle When He Did. He sets out the errant strategy achieved the desired to destroy high-value targets in Belgrade to explain why Milosevic did not settle results anyway, though with considerable with heavy attacks. Lambeth considers earlier or hold out longer and argues delay. Some have argued that signs of an the eventual campaign—the combined that the Serb leader believed that accept- impending land invasion helped per- approach developed by Clark with incre- ing the Rambouillet terms would endan- suade Milosevic to settle, but Lambeth mental escalation intended to maintain ger his regime and that NATO could not discounts the possibility because no Allied solidarity—as a mistake influenced conduct a sustained air campaign ground attack could have been executed by exaggerating the impact of airpower because of Russian pressure and coali- for months. Hosmer, in contrast, con- on the Dayton Accords. tion weakness. He expected to get better cludes that the ground threat persuaded Lambeth does not consider the dis- terms by holding out. the Russians to abandon the Serbs and jointed air operations launched to help Hosmer argues that Milosevic and voice dire warnings of an intense NATO Kosovo worthy of the designation cam- his henchmen eventually conceded assault, magnifying Serb fears of attack paign. But the bombing revealed weak- because they viewed the Allied offer of and of diplomatic isolation. The motiva- nesses in NATO capabilities, especially June 3 as an ultimatum preceding a geno- tions and effects of Russian actions cidal air campaign that would devastate deserve further study. Yugoslavia. The gradual Allied buildup, By contrast, Stephen Hosmer takes escalating attacks, and bombing of targets the lessons learned too far, reading into Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, USA that the Serbs considered to be civilian (Ret.), is the author of American Airpower persuaded them that the coming assault Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 143 ■ OFF THE SHELF history that airpower had been the main observers recall the horror of Hamburg coercive instrument in Japan, Korea, Viet- and Dresden or Tokyo and Hiroshima— STATECRAFT AND nam, Iraq, and Bosnia. Still, the experi- memories that are actually evidence of ence of Kosovo offers provocative insights the coercive influence of airpower. MARITIME POWER for the future. As much as Lambeth wants Hosmer argues that the attacks on A Book Review by to use the Gulf War as the model for the infrastructure also pressured Milosevic by proper application of airpower, future weakening his control mechanisms and THOMAS G. MAHNKEN opponents are much more likely to be as imposing costs on Serbian political elites, smart as the Serbs than as inept as the but the core of the campaign involved Seapower as Strategy: Navies and Iraqis. And Lambeth concedes that politi- disabling an economy already eroded by National Interests cal constraints will probably make gradu- sanctions. The author deserves praise for by Norman Friedman alism the standard method for applying locating Serbian sources, which if Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. military force. He wants the Air Force to believed, reveal that the fear of mass 352 pp. $36.95 increase its targeting capabilities against death or destruction was crucial to NATO [ISBN: 1–55750–291–9] ground forces but acknowledges that air- success. Even if the goal of air attacks was power “is, at bottom, a blunt instrument coercion by increasing civilian hardships, designed to break things and kill people” it would still raise normative issues on the noted observer of naval and maritime and had its greatest effect against use of such a strategy. One Pentagon A affairs, Norman Friedman has pro- Yugoslavia’s dual-use infrastructure. Lam- spokesman speculated that the main rea- duced a score of books and is a regular beth is not prepared to consider the son for air effectiveness “was the increas- contributor to the Proceedings of the U.S. implications of such an airpower strategy, ing inconveniences that the bombing Naval Institute. In Seapower as Strategy: but Hosmer is. He concludes that “attacks campaign was causing in Belgrade and Navies and National Interests, he explores or threats of attacks on ‘dual-use’ military other cities.” The inconveniences the strategic implications of naval power targets may be the most effective—and in included nationwide power disruptions and echoes a maxim of Francis Bacon: some instances the only feasible way—to and the destruction of petroleum refiner- “He that commandeth the sea is at great coerce enemy decisionmakers to termi- ies, half of the television and radio broad- liberty and may take as much or as little nate conflicts and crises rapidly on terms casting capacity, and more than half of of the war as he will.” acceptable to the United States.” Ameri- the bridges over the Danube. The author maintains that the flexi- can political leaders must avoid incurring The implications of a strategy that bility inherent in seapower is its greatest international and legal obligations that targets infrastructure and threatens civil- strategic asset. The way that navies con- could limit such targeting options, while ians, even when it represents an optimum tribute to success has changed little, military leaders must continue to pursue use of airpower, are troubling. The U.N. according to Friedman. Drawing on ways to limit collateral damage and civil- International Criminal Tribunal consid- events of the past three centuries, he dis- ian casualties. ered investigating allegations of war cusses how navies engage enemy fleets, Echoing Giulio Douhet, Hosmer crimes stemming from those attacks, and conduct blockades and embargoes, pro- argues that infrastructure attacks can a committee of the British parliament tect against invasion forces, and project quickly end wars and save both friendly observed that the Allied action was “of power overseas. and enemy lives. He is surprised that Serb dubious legality in the current state of The heart of Seapower as Strategy is leaders viewed NATO air attacks as international law.” Beyond such criticism, an analysis of maritime power in two unconstrained while American airmen the air campaign generated a severe back- world wars and the Cold War. Moreover, chafed under what they regarded as debil- lash against the West in Serbia. Rather Friedman looks at the role it might have itating restrictions. However, many Euro- than producing a quick victory, such a played through a consideration of peans and most of the Third World held course of action may in fact encourage strategic alternatives available to bel- positions similar to the Serbs. U.S. leaders potential enemies to develop weapons of ligerents. He concludes, for example, must realize that the international com- mass destruction. Some believe that this that the Gallipoli landing was flawed in munity views bombing differently. While rationale motivates North Korea, most of execution, not concept. Had that am- briefers at the Pentagon stress the accu- whose cities were destroyed by American phibious operation succeeded, it might racy of precision guided munitions, other airpower between 1950 and 1953. JFQ have kept Russia in the conflict, thus relieving German pressure on the western front. In opening up the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube, it might also have allowed the Entente to knock Austria-Hungary out of the conflict. NDU Press On the other hand, Friedman may be too critical of the British commitment to the European continent, which robbed On the Web London of flexibility. He argues that Great Britain could have, or indeed For more on current NDU Press titles visit the National Defense University Web site on the Internet Lieutenant Commander Thomas G.Mahnken, USNR, is the author of Uncovering Ways of at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941.

144 JFQ / issue thirty-five OFF THE SHELF ■ should have, allowed Germany to over- have frequently been reluctant to seek run France. But while the British might decisive victories. CHINESE NAVAL have survived such a disaster, as it did in Friedman tends to generalize when 1940, statesmen and soldiers clearly it is unwarranted. Is it really true that POWER found this outcome unacceptable. That only rarely, if ever, has the United States was not because of ignorance of fought to gain or retain territory? And A Book Review by seapower, but instead a recognition of the the result of Enduring Freedom seems to LARRY M. WORTZEL dire consequences of German dominance. contradict the claim that “we now lack In fact, this case illustrates that those the mass necessary to overrun, let alone The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy nations that possess seapower are not occupy, even a moderate-size country.” Enters the Twenty-First Century always at liberty to take as much or as lit- Moreover, he poses strange assertions, By Bernard D. Cole tle of the war as they wish. including that North Korea and India Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001. Another focus of Seapower as Strategy were in cahoots with Iraq during the Per- 288 pp. $34.95 is coalition warfare. Friedman finds a nat- sian Gulf War. The latter point is particu- [ISBN: 1–55750–239–0] ural division of labor between maritime larly misplaced given that traditionally power and continental allies. The United neutral India took the unprecedented o fill a gap in literature on the Peo- States, like Britain in the past, should step of granting landing rights to the ple’s Liberation Army (PLA), The Great remain an offshore balancer, with its United States during Desert Shield. But T Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the allies fielding the bulk of land forces. placing such reservations aside, Seapower Although perhaps correct in theory, the as Strategy is a valuable synthesis of three Twenty-First Century by Bernard Cole sur- author ignores the practical difficulties of centuries of war at sea. JFQ veys the maritime tradition, defense base, such a division. Continental allies have and role of seapower in China. Despite its been reluctant to supply cannon fodder strengths, some of the judgments found for a distant maritime power. Just as in this book on the long-term intentions Britain discovered in the Napoleonic era, of the naval buildup are questionable. monetary inducements and naval support The author—who teaches at the National Missing War College and served as a surface war- are often not enough to maintain coalitions. A maritime power must often put fare officer—believes that China has lim- boots on the ground as much to demon- an issue? ited goals while others, such as the strate political commitment as to ensure reviewer, think they have strategic ambi- military effectiveness. tions. But no one who follows maritime Friedman is best when he turns to Copies of back numbers of strategy and Chinese military affairs should ignore this book. technology and force structure. Two JFQ are available in limited appendices, worth the price of the book, Cole thinks that a combination of offer a wealth of knowledge for laymen quantities to members of the strategic view, budget constraints, foreign relations, and domestic political affairs as well as experts. He speculates on the Armed Forces and public relevance of traditional concepts for net- means China will modernize its force to work-centric operations, which he notes institutions. Please send become a strong regional rather than resemble conventional naval warfare. global navy. And he does not anticipate Unfortunately, he does not pursue the your request to the Editor at Beijing projecting its power around the world in the future. The author bases this theme. More debatable is his contention the address or FAX number that contemporary trends decrease the conclusion in part on the contention that value of landpower and airpower and listed on the masthead. China has not traditionally maintained increase that of seapower. He may be an overseas military presence. right, but Kosovo and Afghanistan sug- There is little doubt about the long- gest otherwise. term Chinese military involvement in the The author offers little critical construction of launch facilities for inter- analysis of the theory of seapower mediate range ballistic missiles in Saudi advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, with Arabia; there may still be PLA personnel its emphasis on decisive fleet engage- supporting them. The Tan-Zam railway ment. Friedman chastises Britain, for between Tanzania and Zambia was built example, for failing to press home mari- by Chinese engineers as a foreign aid time victories, yet he sidesteps the ques- project. The Chinese People’s Volunteers tion of why a nation with seapower who invaded Korea remained on the often fails to seek out and destroy ene- peninsula for years after the war. And mies. Great Britain relied on the Royal there were some 50,000 Chinese soldiers Navy not only for power projection, but in North Vietnam during the Indochina also to safeguard its shores from inva- conflict, and PLA forces constructed a sion. It is very well to claim that “it is our task to ensure that a decisive battle goes our way,” but such statements are Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, USA (Ret.), is vice not helpful to leaders charged with pro- president of the Heritage Foundation and viding national security. It is not sur- served previously as director of the Strategic prising that dominant maritime powers Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

issue thirty-five / JFQ 145 ■ OFF THE SHELF

WARS AND RUMORS PLA destroyer visiting Guam. OF WARS A Book Review by JAMES JAY CARAFANO

The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 by Henry G. Gole Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003. 256 pp. $34.95 [ISBN: 1–55750–409–1]

rawing on archives at the U.S. Army D War College, Henry Gole has provided a revisionist interpretation of war planning on the eve of World War II. In The Road to Rainbow he argues that serious planning for coalition warfare began earlier than commonly assumed. In making his case, Gole assembles a wealth of new material on American preparations for global war, though his conclusion that U.S. Navy (Nathanael T. Miller) Army leaders were then capable of meeting the challenges of a two-front war will road across northern Laos toward the survey of the major PLA sources in the likely spark lively debate. Thai border. On such matters Cole seems original language. War plans are developed in a shad- to accept the official Chinese party line; Scholarship aside, Cole is right owland. Preconflict planning does not part of his analysis minimizes the long- when it comes to military-technical usually capture the attention of historians term military designs of Beijing. analysis. The Chinese defense industrial for a good reason. The actions of states in The interpretation of Asian history base remains weak. Moreover, Beijing a conflict often diverge from prewar in The Great Wall at Sea is also question- has focused on other sectors, perhaps at thinking. Strictures considered inviolable able. Chinese fleets carrying invasion the expense of near-term military expan- fade once the first shot is fired. Nations at forces attempted to penetrate Japan in sion. As the author observes, China is war find themselves acting in ways that 1274 and 1281. Only a typhoon, the buying what it needs for the navy. they would not countenance in peace- proverbial kamikaze (divine wind), Because it cannot manufacture sophisti- time. Conversely, unconstrained plan- stopped their assault. The establishment cated turbine engines and power sys- ning without oversight tends to diverge of trading colonies around Asia and the tems, it must depend on foreign sources. from the art of the possible to little more Middle East were also based on naval It is also unable to build precision target- than an academic exercise. Plans are so power. Admiral Zheng He (1371–1433) ing and combat management systems dissimilar from combat that they usually led seven expeditions. His fleets included and so depends on the West and Russia. become footnotes to history. One excep- hundreds of ships and thousands of Thus the picture is mixed. When it tion is the Schlieffen Plan, which some troops dispatched to impose the will of had the strongest fleets in the region, believe was a catalyst for World War I. the Middle Kingdom on trading states. China exercised suzerainty over its neigh- Gole contends that the United States When a Chinese admiral showed up with bors. Today it is seeking an indigenous was better prepared for war than histori- more ships than had ever been seen and naval industrial complex. There is no rea- ans previously thought. Sidney Aster, for landing forces larger than the local mili- son to think that Beijing will limit its example, concluded in Military Planning tary, requests for commercial treaties ambitions once its goals are met. All and the Origins of the Second World War invariably followed. This hardly consti- those interested in maritime power that “Americans felt so secure after the tutes a pacific maritime tradition. should read this book. However, its judg- First World War that their planning, until Moreover, Cole does not examine ments on long-term intentions should be 1938, was small scale and focused on Chinese literature, but relies extensively tempered by further study of Chinese hypothetical hostile powers.” Not so, on translations by the Foreign Broadcast military and naval history. JFQ according to Gole. At least as early as Information Service and other sources. 1934 the military was looking at realistic There is no reference to Chinese work in options for fighting Japan and later Ger- the notes or bibliography. When authors many. Long before Admiral Harold Stark, lack a working knowledge of the vernac- ular of their research, they normally enlist the services of a collaborator with the requisite linguistic skills. For this Lieutenant Colonel James Jay Carafano, USA lapse, the Naval Institute Press bears (Ret.), is the author of After D-Day: Operation some of the blame for not insisting on a Cobra and the Normandy Breakout.

146 JFQ / issue thirty-five OFF THE SHELF ■

Chief of Naval Operations, promulgated analyses of prewar planning root out such war college students. Many of these offi- his famous Plan Dog memorandum in material in detail. Arming Against Hitler: cers had also attended the U.S. Army 1940, Army thinking envisioned a two- France and the Limits of Military Planning General Command and Staff College front war, the need for coalition partners, by Eugenia Kiesling is one work that ven- where the study of coalition operations and defeating Germany first. tures into this area. Gole largely missed during World War I led to the conclusion Sorting through the contents of 25 his chance. that “if we have to go to war again, let’s footlockers at the U.S. Army War College, Finally, the general conclusion of do it without the allies.” Gole found student papers from 1934 to this book will likely provoke discussion. In a work of related interest, Allies 1940 on allied participation. Much of the Gole finds that the skills of coalition war- and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, research evaluated the Color Plans, prede- fare were ingrained in war college stu- the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in cessor to the better known Rainbow dents and suffused in the thinking of the World War II, Mark Stoler looks at plan- Plans, which a joint Army-Navy board Army Staff. If true, it is unclear why par- ning from 1939 to V–J Day. While finding began drafting in April 1940. While the ticipation in coalition planning in the that the military was not devoid of intel- papers concerned exercises, Gole claims opening years of the war was so flawed. lectual horsepower to conceptualize that they were relevant to war planning. The Army advocated a cross-channel global warfare, he perceives less coher- Before World War II, the college was invasion in 1942, which would have ence than The Road to Rainbow would lead located at Washington Barracks (now Fort resulted in one of the greatest military readers to expect. Lesley J. McNair). Much of the research disasters in history. The poor performance There are wars and rumors of wars— was done at the behest of the War Depart- of American soldiers in North Africa and there are war plans. Each has a place ment, which tasked students to examine should have been sufficient proof that in military history. The Road to Rainbow is strategic planning. When the college they were not ready. In addition, if plan- a powerful reminder that coalition plan- closed its doors in 1940, faculty and ners had such a thorough conception of ning is essential to grooming strategic many graduates were assigned to the war global war in 1939, why were they outar- leaders. The years leading to World War II plans division. In addition, students who gued and outflanked by British planners provide a valuable case study on harness- worked on Allied planning advanced to at the Casablanca Conference in 1943? ing the instruments of national power in fill senior command and staff positions Gole rightly draws attention to stu- a changing world. JFQ (Gole provides a detailed list of graduates dent work on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Yet in an appendix). too much can be made of the musings of The Road to Rainbow contains a wealth of new information, but the book misses opportunities to explore its subject in detail because of its problematic organization and the failure to make full use of the research material on hand. Part one sketches the state of military preparedness, general staff planning, and educational activity between the wars. While interesting, this history is rehearsed elsewhere. It would have been more helpful if integrated into analyses of war planning exercises to illustrate the influence of real world events and Look for constraints on student thinking. The core of this book covers each year of the curriculum, from the study of war with Japan in 1934 to requirements for hemispheric defense in 1939. The balance of the chapters summarize events Joint Force after the outbreak of hostilities and activities of the War Department. This chrono- JFQ logical approach is tedious, and overarching themes of the work are easily lost. The archives of the U.S. Army War Quarterly College also include instructor critiques, student comments, and interaction with on the the War Department. This data provides evidence for assessing the worldview of men who fought long and hard on two fronts and shaped the Cold War. The Joint Doctrine Web site plans should be sifted not only for insights on operational thinking but for notions on technological advances and geopolitics, as well as the assumptions http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm that underpinned military decisions. Few

issue thirty-five / JFQ 147