DOCSLIB.ORG

The Iraq Coup of Raschid Ali in 1941, the Mufti Husseini and the Farhud

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Iraq Coup of Raschid Ali in 1941, the Mufti Husseini and the Farhud The Iraq Coup of 1941, The Mufti and the Farhud Middle new peacewatc document cultur dialo histor donation top stories books Maps East s h s e g y s A detailed timeline of Iraqi history is given here, including links to UN resolutions Iraq books Map of Iraq Map of Kuwait Detailed Map of Iraq Map of Baghdad Street Map of Baghdad Iraq- Source Documents Master Document and Link Reference for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Zionism and the Middle East The Iraq Coup Attempt of 1941, the Mufti, and the Farhud Prologue - The Iraq coup of 1941 is little studied, but very interesting. It is a dramatic illustration of the potential for the Palestine issue to destabilize the Middle East, as well a "close save" in the somewhat neglected theater of the Middle East, which was understood by Churchill to have so much potential for disaster [1]. Iraq had been governed under a British supported regency, since the death of King Feysal in September 1933. Baqr Sidqi, a popular general, staged a coup in October 1936, but was himself assassinated in 1937. In December of 1938, another coup was launched by a group of power brokers known as "The Seven." Nuri al-Sa'id was named Prime Minister. The German Consul in Baghdad, Grobba, was apparently already active before the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, soliciting support for Germany and exploiting unrest. [2]. Though the Germans were not particularly serious about aiding a revolt perhaps, they would not be unhappy if it occurred. In March of 1940 , the "The Seven" forced Nuri al-Sa'id out of office. Rashid Ali Al Keilani was made Prime Minister. However, in February of 1941, Raschid was forced to resign in favor of Taha Pasha al Hashimi. Raschid Ali and a group of officers plotted to eliminate the British supported monarchy and the regent, Abd-ul Ilah as well as Taha Pasha. The Mufti - Apparently the coup was in great part the initiative of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin El Husseini. Husseini had fled the wrath of the British in Palestine, where he was wanted for his central role in the Palestinian "Arab Revolt." The Mufti had visited the German Consul General, Dohle, in Palestine on July 21, 1937, and is thought to have been in the pay of the Germans since that time. He is reputed to have met Adolf Eichmann in Palestine, when Eichmann had traveled there (in September or October of 1937) with another SS officer, Herbert Hagen, to investigate the possibility of deporting German Jews to Palestine. Based on war crimes testimony and the Eichmann trial transcripts, it appears that Eichmann and the Mufti later enjoyed a close relationship. [3] Husseini wrote in his memoirs: Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world. I asked Hitler for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem in a manner befitting our national and racial aspirations and according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews. The answer I got was: 'The Jews are yours. Husseini fled Palestine in October of 1937, following the murder of the British Commissioner of the Northern District (Galilee), Lewis Andrews. The Mufti and a number of members of the Arab Higher Committee fled to Beirut, and then in October 1939, following the outbreak of World War II, they moved to Baghdad. The Iraqi government financed the Mufti, and the Mufti endeavored to use Iraqi dissatisfaction to oust the British and advance the Palestinian cause as well as the cause of the Axis. However, on the whole most of the anti-British faction regarded the war as an opportunity to advance their own cause, whoever won. The Mufti, however, considered a British victory in the war as contrary to Arab interests. It should be pointed out that whilst the Mufti was certainly pro-Axis by choice, that was not true of the entire Palestinian leadership, including his cousin Jemal, who favored a deal for Palestine with Britain. According to a diplomatic observer, the Mufti favored the Arabs joining the axis and the USSR, then an ally of Germany, in a general war against the France and Britain. [4] Husseini was being supported, morally and apparently financially, from Berlin and Rome. On August 26, 1940, Husseini had sent his secretary Kemal Hadad to Berlin. Hadad acted as a liaison between the Axis powers and four pro-Nazi staff officers known as the " the Golden Square" (Salah al-din al Sabag, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Kemal Shabib). [5] Hadad made another trip in December of 1940 because "funds were running low." [6] In February of 1941, Haddad again traveled to Berlin with a letter requesting military aid. The British had been following the career of the Mufti with concern. In May 1940, the British Foreign Office had allegedly refused a proposal from the the Vaad Leumi (Jewish national council in Palestine) that they assassinate Haj Amin al-Huseini. However, in November, Winston Churchill approved the plan. According to a different account, it was David Raziel, imprisoned leader of the Jewish Irgun underground, who himself proposed the plan, writing from his jail cell. Eventually, the plan was changed to a mission of sabotage in Iraq. In May 1941, several members of the Irgun including its leader David Raziel were released from prison and flown to Iraq for this purpose. The mission was abandoned when Raziel was killed by a German plane [7] The Coup - On April 1, 1941, the "Golden Square" and the chief of staff of the Iraqi army staged the coup, and appointed Rashid 'Ali al-Keilani head of the government. Nuri as Said was forced to flee Iraq along with the regent and young king Faysal II. On April 3, a letter from the German Secretary of State Von Weizacker answered Haddad's letter favorably, but the letter arrived after the coup. Rashid 'Ali stated on April 10 that he would honor the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, apparently fearing British reprisals .On April 16, Rashid responded to a request for landing of British troops at Basra cautiously. He replied that they could land, but must embark immediately for Palestine or Egypt. The British began landing troops on April 16 or 18 at Basra, at first in compliance with Rashid Ali's conditions, and later in violation of the conditions, since the troops did not leave. The British played for time and made pretences of accepting the new situation. However, reinforcements from India kept arriving at Basra. The Iraqi government was also trying to buy time, and entered into a pretence of Turkish mediation of the crisis. However, the Iraqi representative in Turkey, told the German Ambassador von Papen, that there would be no compromise with the British. Raschid Ali had already asked the Italians for military aid at the end of March, and likewise, Hitler decided on April 10 to send military aid to the Iraqis. However, the shipments took several weeks. The German foreign office got a report from General Keitel of a large shipment, including, for example, some 15,000 rifles and about 800 machine guns. Arms were shipped from Saloniki and through Turkey and Syria. The shipments from Syria were sent as a consequence of the agreement between the Vichy leader Darlan and Hitler as to general collaboration between Vichy and Germany. In the same agreement Vichy also agreed to allow German aircraft to base and stage through Syria on their way to Iraq, though there would be some pretence involved, so that the Vichy government could plausibly deny to Britain that it was assisting the German war effort. The French also rationed German fuel supplies, and as the Luftwaffe was unable to obtain fuel from Persia or elsewhere, this hampered their effectiveness. A second group of British troops landed at Basra on April 28, and the Iraqis protested. On the evening of April 29, about 9,000 troops of the Iraqi army surrounded the RAF air base at Habaniyeh and the next day the Iraqis ordered that no flights were to take off. However, the Iraqis had insufficient force. The move was instigated by the "Golden Square" officers. Rashid Ali himself apparently wanted to avoid antagonizing the British and wait for supplies from the Germans. The British strike back - The British struck to lift the siege of Habanniyeh, remove Rashid Ali from power and restore the pro-British government. Though they were initially unable to move from Basra overland, because of the weather and because Iraqis had cut lines of communication, the British were able to use the RAF at Habbaniyeh and Shaiba effectively, and began attacking on May 2. They had about 90 aircraft, mostly antiquated, but these included a number of Wellington bombers[8]. The RAF struck the Iraqis surrounding Habbaniyeh The Iraqis used their air force [9], very sparingly and not very effectively. At the same time, relatively small numbers of British reinforcements were ferried by air from Basra. Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and artillery proved ineffective. By May 6 the Iraqi force was defeated and the siege of Habbaniyeh was abandoned, though the roads were still blocked. The RAF also destroyed most of the Iraqi air force on the ground by about May 8. German Aid - During this time, several German officers and diplomats were seconded to Iraq to oversee Luftwaffe operations and the arms supply. Dr Fritz Grobba, the former consul, now returned to oversee the arms shipments and a Major Hansen was sent to oversee the transfer of aircraft.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Personalities and Perceptions: Churchill, De Gaulle, and British-Free French Relations 1940-1941" (2019)
    University of Vermont ScholarWorks @ UVM UVM Honors College Senior Theses Undergraduate Theses 2019 Personalities and Perceptions: Churchill, De Gaulle, and British- Free French Relations 1940-1941 Samantha Sullivan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/hcoltheses Recommended Citation Sullivan, Samantha, "Personalities and Perceptions: Churchill, De Gaulle, and British-Free French Relations 1940-1941" (2019). UVM Honors College Senior Theses. 324. https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/hcoltheses/324 This Honors College Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for inclusion in UVM Honors College Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Personalities and Perceptions: Churchill, De Gaulle, and British-Free French Relations 1940-1941 By: Samantha Sullivan Advised by: Drs. Steven Zdatny, Andrew Buchanan, and Meaghan Emery University of Vermont History Department Honors College Thesis April 17, 2019 Acknowledgements: Nearly half of my time at UVM was spent working on this project. Beginning as a seminar paper for Professor Zdatny’s class in Fall 2018, my research on Churchill and De Gaulle slowly grew into the thesis that follows. It was a collaborative effort that allowed me to combine all of my fields of study from my entire university experience. This project took me to London and Cambridge to conduct archival research and made for many late nights on the second floor of the Howe Library. I feel an overwhelming sense of pride and accomplishment for this thesis that is reflective of the work I have done at UVM.
    [Show full text]
  • Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948
    Britainand the Arab Israeli War Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/16/4/50/161179/2536720.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020 of 1948 Avi Shlaim* At midnighton 14 May 1948, the Britishhigh commissioner for Palestineleft Palestine with all hisstaff, and twenty-eight years of British responsibilityfor Palestine came to an end. The storybegan with the BalfourDeclaration of November 1917 followed in April1920 by the San Remoconference's entrusting ofBritain with the Mandate for Palestine, so thatit wouldbe administeredaccording to the termsof the Balfour Declarationand preparedfor self-government. The way in whichthe mandatewas established left a terribleblot on Britain'sentire record as the greatpower responsible for governing the country. And therewas, to say theleast, something unusual about the way in which Britain retreated from themandate. As ReesWilliams, undersecretary ofstate for the colonies, toldthe House of Commons: "On the14th May, 1949, the withdrawal of theBritish Administration took place without handing over to a responsible authorityany of the assets, property or liabilitiesof the Mandatory Power. The mannerin whichthe withdrawal took place is unprecedentedin the historyof our Empire.' Whatwere the reasonsbehind the inexcusablyabrupt and reckless fashionin whichthe Britishgovernment chose to divestitself of the * Avi Shlaimis a Readerin Politicsat theUniversity of Reading, England. This paperwas preparedfor theconference on "BritishSecurity Policy 1945-1956" at King'sCollege, London, 25-26 March1987. The authorwould like to thankthe Economicand Social ResearchCouncil and the FordFoundation forresearch support. BRITAINAND THE ARAB-ISRAELIWAR OF 1948 51 Mandatefor Palestine? Very different answers are givento thisquestion by thetwo nations most directly affected by the British decision. On theJewish sidethe predominant view is thatBritain departed with full knowledge that the surroundingArab countrieswould immediatelyattack and in the expectationthat the Jewish population of Palestinewould be massacredor driveninto the sea.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza
    The Rise and Fall of the All Palestine Government in Gaza Avi Shlaim* The All-Palestine Government established in Gaza in September 1948 was short-lived and ill-starred, but it constituted one of the more interest- ing and instructive political experiments in the history of the Palestinian national movement. Any proposal for an independent Palestinian state inevitably raises questions about the form of the government that such a state would have. In this respect, the All-Palestine Government is not simply a historical curiosity, but a subject of considerable and enduring political relevance insofar as it highlights some of the basic dilemmas of Palestinian nationalism and above all the question of dependence on the Arab states. The Arab League and the Palestine Question In the aftermath of World War II, when the struggle for Palestine was approaching its climax, the Palestinians were in a weak and vulnerable position. Their weakness was clearly reflected in their dependence on the Arab states and on the recently-founded Arab League. Thus, when the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) was reestablished in 1946 after a nine- year hiatus, it was not by the various Palestinian political parties them- selves, as had been the case when it was founded in 1936, but by a deci- sion of the Arab League. Internally divided, with few political assets of its *Avi Shlaim is the Alastair Buchan Reader in International Relations at Oxford University and a Professorial Fellow of St. Antony's College. He is author of Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
    [Show full text]
  • Persia & Iraq Command History & Personnel
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of the Persia and Iraq Command (also known as ‘PaiForce’), an operational command in the British Army between ??. In addition, known details of the key appointments held between 1930 and 1950 are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of Persia & Iraq Command Version: 2_1 This edition dated: 5 August 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Persia and Iraq Command Modern Iraq is a country born out the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Turkey at the end of the Great War. A government for the new state of Iraq was formed in November 1920, with Emir Feisal being proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921. The United Kingdom signed a treaty with Iraq in October 1922 defining the relationship between the two sovereign states. This treaty imposed limits on the sovereignty of Iraq and maintained British interests in the country. In 1925, the area around Mosul, which was rich in oil deposits, was ceded to Iraq from Turkey.
    [Show full text]
  • Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 48
    ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 48 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First published in the UK in 2010 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All ri hts reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information stora e and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361 4231 Printed by Windrush Group ,indrush House Avenue Two Station Lane ,itney O028 40, 3 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President 2arshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 2ichael 3eetham GC3 C3E DFC AFC 7ice8President Air 2arshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KC3 C3E AFC Committee Chairman Air 7ice82arshal N 3 3aldwin C3 C3E FRAeS 7ice8Chairman -roup Captain 9 D Heron O3E Secretary -roup Captain K 9 Dearman FRAeS 2embership Secretary Dr 9ack Dunham PhD CPsychol A2RAeS Treasurer 9 Boyes TD CA 2embers Air Commodore - R Pitchfork 23E 3A FRAes :9 S Cox Esq BA 2A :6r M A Fopp MA F2A FI2 t :-roup Captain A 9 Byford MA MA RAF :,ing Commander P K Kendall BSc ARCS MA RAF ,ing Commander C Cummings Editor & Publications ,ing Commander C G Jefford M3E BA 2ana er :Ex Officio 4 CONTENTS OPENIN- ADDRESS œ Air 2shl Ian Macfadyen 7 ON.Y A SIDESHO,? THE RFC AND RAF IN A 2ESOPOTA2IA 1914-1918 by Guy Warner THE RAF AR2OURED CAR CO2PANIES IN IRAB 20 C2OST.YD 1921-1947 by Dr Christopher Morris No 4 SFTS AND RASCHID A.IES WAR œ IRAB 1941 by )A , Cdr Mike Dudgeon 2ORNIN- Q&A F1 SU3STITUTION OR SU3ORDINATION? THE E2P.OY8 63 2ENT OF AIR PO,ER O7ER AF-HANISTAN AND THE NORTH8,EST FRONTIER, 1910-1939 by Clive Richards THE 9E3E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Sykes-Picot Agreement at 100: Rethinking the Map of the Modern Middle East
    AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT AT 100: RETHINKING THE MAP OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST PANEL I: IS COLONIALISM TO BLAME? PANELISTS: SCOTT ANDERSON, AUTHOR OF “LAWRENCE IN ARABIA”; MARTIN INDYK, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; ROBERT KAGAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; DAN YERGIN, IHS MODERATOR: MICHAEL RUBIN, AEI PANEL II: THE SYKES-PICOT LEGACY, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE PANELISTS: ELLIOTT ABRAMS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS; RYAN CROCKER, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ AND SYRIA; ADEED DAWISHA, MIAMI UNIVERSITY; OLIVIER DECOTTIGNIES, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY MODERATOR: DANIELLE PLETKA, AEI 2:00 PM – 4:30 PM MONDAY, MAY 16, 2016 EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/the-sykes-picot-agreement-at-100- rethinking-the-map-of-the-modern-middle-east/ TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY WWW.DCTMR.COM MICHAEL RUBIN: Welcome to the American Enterprise Institute and our panel on Sykes-Picot at 100. I want to thank you all for being here. Of course, anniversaries matter, and this is one of the most significant anniversaries at least in the crafting of the modern Middle East. Now, the Sykes-Picot Agreement may not have been implemented as it was originally designed, but few would doubt that it has had tremendous impact on the eventual shaping of the Middle East. And I’m thrilled that we have a two-panel conference. Danielle Pletka, the vice president for foreign policy and defense at AEI, will moderate the second panel, but I’ll be talking a little bit about the history panel. My name is Michael Rubin. I’m a resident scholar here. I’m a historian by training, which means I get paid to predict the past.
    [Show full text]
  • Fantasque Time Line | 1940
    21 avril L’affaire d’Irak Arbil – Larminat réorganise ses forces. Il a prévu de faire éclater ses forces en dispositif opérationnel. Dès le lendemain, son premier groupement tactique, le GTA (A pour Algériens), descendra vers Shaykh en longeant le Tigre. Le deuxième, le GTB (B pour British, colonel Arbuthnot), se dirigera sur Dibs et Altun Kupri. Enfin, le troisième, le GTZ (Z pour zouaves), doté des véhicules les plus rapides, sera lancé en direction de Taqtaq et de Dokan. Larminat est soucieux de coopération entre alliés, mais peu convaincu de la totale sincérité britannique depuis que certains épisodes regrettables qui se sont déroulés à Dunkerque lui ont été rapportés ; de plus, comme la majorité des coloniaux, il est traditionnellement anglophobe (non sans raisons, d’ailleurs). C’est pourquoi il encadre les unités du colonel Arbuthnot entre les siennes. Il va jusqu’à lui rattacher la compagnie mobile de fusiliers-marins de Lattaquieh, en renfort de leurs éléments de reconnaissance : « La Marine – que Dieu et Maurras me pardonnent – me servira d’Œil de Moscou » ricane le général, que personne n’accuserait pourtant de sympathies pour le communisme. La progression devrait s’accélérer, puisqu’on sera enfin en Irak “utile”, où les besoins de l’exploitation du pétrole ont conduit, depuis 1920, à la construction d’un dense réseau de routes de bonne qualité. Peut-être sera-t-il aussi possible de réquisitionner dans les parcs des compagnies pétrolières des poids lourds modernes ou des tracteurs et des remorques, pour suppléer les vieux porte-chars Berliet et Saurer qui ont mal digéré le sable des déserts.
    [Show full text]
  • Bartosz Wróblewski1 Systemic Transformations in Jordan in 1951
    Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego -----ISSN 2082-1212----- DOI 10.15804/ppk.2020.06.41 -----No. 6 (58)/2020----- Bartosz Wróblewski1 Systemic Transformations in Jordan in 1951– 1957 – Unsuccessful Democracy Keywords: Jordan, the Hashemite, liberalization, Chamber of Deputies, parliament Słowa kluczowe: Jordania, Haszymidzi, liberalizacja, Izba Deputowanych, parlament Abstract The following text discusses the first attempt to transform the authoritarian Jordan mon- archy into a constitutional monarchy, in which the parliament chosen by the people was supposed, apart from the king, to serve the role of a real supervisor of the state. Such an attempt was made in 1951–1957. It ended up in a failure and, in fact, the return of the au- thoritarian methods of exercising the power. This failure resulted both from the specific circumstances of the contemporary Middle East, as well as certain permanent features of Arabic societies. Thus, it is important to trace back these events to show both the at- tempt at reforms, as well as the causes of the failure. The following text makes use first and foremost of English language resources con- cerning the history of Jordan. Also, the archive documents collected in the National Ar- chives were used, especially the ones that refer to the correspondence between the au- thorities in London and the British embassy in Amman. To understand the issue, it will be necessary to go back beyond the year 1951 and to present in brief the very process of how the Hashemite monarchy came into existence. 1 ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4436-8221, Assoc. Prof., Department of International Rela- tions and Human Rights, Institute of Political Science, College of Social Sciences, University of Rzeszow.
    [Show full text]
  • The Baghdad Set
    The Baghdad Set Also by Adrian O’Sullivan: Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–45 (Palgrave, 2014) Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45 (Palgrave, 2015) Adrian O’Sullivan The Baghdad Set Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45 Adrian O’Sullivan West Vancouver, BC, Canada ISBN 978-3-030-15182-9 ISBN 978-3-030-15183-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15183-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019934733 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
    [Show full text]
  • Sketch P . 334), 338 192 ; Proposed Withdrawal of Greek Troops from , AAMIQ (Sketch P
    INDEX AACHRAFIYE (Sketch p. 416), 41 8 ALBANIA—continued AAL, EL (Sketch p . 334), 338 192 ; proposed withdrawal of Greek troops from , AAMIQ (Sketch p . 516), 53 5 12, 16 ; British air support in, 22-3 ; Italian offensive AANOUT (Sketches pp. 462, 475), 460, 461, 464, 47 5 in, 25 ; proposed Greek-Yugoslav offensive, 26 , AAQLIYE (Map p . 482), 471, 472 27, 40, 41, 43 ; Greek withdrawal, 46, 54, 76-7 , Aba, British hospital ship, 214n 80, 93 ABABY, JEBEL (Sketch p . 381), 383 Alcides, Norwegian tanker, 188 ABADAN (Sketch p . 533), 532 ALCOHOL, 105, 206, 258 ABBOTTSMITH, Sgt J ., 547 ALDRIDGE, Gnr J ., 121, 122 ABD EL KAMH (Sketch p . 353), 35 3 ALEPPO (Map p. 339 ; Sketch p . 478), 327, 330, 331 , Abdiel, British mine-layer, 239, 243, 244, 251n, 305 441, 479, 480, 511, 512, 517, 519, 534, 535, 546 ABDUL ILLAH, AMIR, 19 9 ALEXANDRETTA, 18 8 ABETZ, Otto, 329 ALEXANDRIA (Sketch p . 298), 17, 23, 30, 31, 151, 170, ABEY (Sketches pp . 462, 504), 473, 496, 500, 502, 503 , 174, 177, 202, 211, 227, 238, 239, 243, 251n, 291 , 504, 50 5 292, 298, 302, 305, 306, 311, 318, 320, 513n, 55 9 ABou ATRIZ, JEBEL (Sketch p . 393), 393, 394 ALEY (Sketch p. 504), 480, 53 5 ABou NmA, TEL (Sketch p . 357), 356 ALIAKMON-OLYMPUS LINE, see OLYMPUS-ALIAKMON ABOU ZARE, WADI (Sketch p. 381), 380, 38 5 LINE ABU KEMAL (Sketch p. 478), 479 ALL&KMON RIVER (Map p . 34 ; Sketches pp. 4, 75), 3 , ABYSSINIA, 7, 320, 321n, 334, 342, 441, 529, 555, 562 , 4, 8, 29, 32, 34, 40, 46, 54, 55, 56, 58, 66, 68, 71, 73 , Italian defeat in, 197 ; British army strength in, 53 1 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 90, 92, 93, 94 , ACRE CONVENTION, 513-14 ; administration of, 515-22 158, 165n ; 19th Brigade crossing, 87-8 9 ACROPOLE PALACE HOTEL, 24, 155 ; site of Lustre ALIKAMBOS (Sketch p.
    [Show full text]
  • Europa Magazine
    WW2 : Europa Magazine Europa Magazine 2001 - “COMPANY BRIEFING: Is it Done Yet?” (Commentary) Carl Kleihege - “FROM THE EDITOR: Long Shadows” (Editorial) Frank Watson - War in the Desert – “INSIDE EUROPA: Near Rating: Not Rated Yet Price Price £5.95 Ask a question about this product ManufacturerGAMES RESEARCH AND DESIGN Description 2001 - “COMPANY BRIEFING: Is it Done Yet?” (Commentary) Carl Kleihege - “FROM THE EDITOR: Long Shadows” (Editorial) Frank Watson - War in the Desert – “INSIDE EUROPA: Near East Notes - Europa Evolution” (Designer Notes) John Astell and Frank Watson - “HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: Arab Lands Between the Wars” (Historical) Frank Watson - “FACTS BEHIND THE COUNTERS: The Iraqi Army” (Historical) James A. Broshot and Frank Watson - “EUROPA ALOFT: The Iraqi Air Force in 1941 - Yes! We Have No Scuds - Yet!” (Historical) James A. Broshot - “EUROPA ALOFT: 4th Flying Training School” (Historical) James A. Broshot - “EUROPA BIOGRAPHY: Fawzi Al-Qawukji - The Lion of Damascus” (Historical) Frank Watson - “EUROPA BIOGRAPHY: Haj Amin al-Husseini - The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem” (Historical) Frank Watson - “EUROPA BIOGRAPHY: Harry St. John Philby” (Historical) Frank Watson - “EUROPA BIOGRAPHY: Rashid Ali el Gailani - Fifth Corner of the Golden Square” (Historical) James A. Broshot - “EUROPA BIOGRAPHY: Fritz Grobba” (Historical) Frank Watson and James A. Broshot - War in the Desert – “OPERATIONS: Using (and Abusing) the Iraqis in WitD” (Strategy) Frank Watson - “FACTS BEHIND THE COUNTERS: Habforce in Iraq” (Historical) Frank Watson - War in the Desert/Wavell's War – “EUROPA BATTLE SCENARIO: Iraq - Rashid Ali and the Golden Square” (Scenarios) Frank Watson - “ORDERS OF BATTLE: Afghanistan in World War II” (Historical) John Astell, Frank Watson and James A.
    [Show full text]
  • The History of Sunni and Shi'i Arab Identities in Iraq, 1861–2014
    The Struggle Over the State: The History of Sunni and Shi‘i Arab Identities in Iraq, 1861–2014 Emily K. Bader Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in International Relations–History under the advisement of Lidwien Kapteijns April 2018 © 2018 Emily K. Bader Bader 2 Acknowledgments I would not have been able to tackle this immense challenge if it were not for the countless people who have supported me along the way. I would like to start by thanking my parents, Wendy and Bruce, my brother, David (and of course, our beloved dog, Cassie) for their love, encouragement, and as always, humor. My family has taught me compassion, tenacity, and resilience—all of which were necessary to finish this thesis. Thank you for always supporting me, even when my ambitions involve words like “conflict” and “reporter.” Thank you to my mom, a Wellesley woman herself, who, when I called her several months ago in a state of panic that I would not be able to finish asked me, “well do you want to finish?” and when I answered of course said, “then finish it!” Thank you to my dad for always answering the phone with a joke, for sending me pictures of the dog, and for reminding me that I need to sleep. Funding my penchant for doing work at Starbucks did not hurt either. Thank you to my friends, both near and far, without whom I would likely have ended up as a ball of stress by now. Thank you for the countless texts and phone calls cheering me on, even when halfway around the world, for taking time out of your own hectic schedules to check in with me, for bringing me homemade smoothies at my thesis carrel, and even offering to do my laundry (an offer that, while greatly appreciated, was not taken up on) and so much more.
    [Show full text]