Marines from Company G and Company E, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, being interviewed pier side following rescue operation of merchant vessel SS Mayaguez, May 20, 1975 (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library) The Mayaguez Incident A Model Case Study for PME By Gregory D. Miller any Americans are familiar into the curriculum. Despite existing highlights the value of a thorough histori- with the basic facts of the scholarship on the Mayaguez, it is not cal education, as well as the danger of too M Cuban Missile Crisis, a case a particularly well-known case among much distance between the strategic and that is canon in many military institu- decisionmakers, and less so among the operational levels. Despite the President’s tions and civilian programs that teach public. Even at the war college level, ability to micromanage at the tactical level, history, political science, or decision- too many students are unaware of the the lack of understanding between the making. This article contends that 1975 event, much less the details that strategic leader and operational planners the Mayaguez Incident (May 12–15, make it such a valuable case study. almost resulted in a more significant crisis. 1975) is an even more useful case, This does not suggest eliminating the This article is organized according and all levels of professional military Missile Crisis study, but the challenges to the three core courses in the Joint education (PME) should incorporate it and lessons of the Mayaguez Incident Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) should be just as familiar to senior curriculum, though this information military and civilian decisionmakers. is applicable to all military institutions. This article highlights the criti- The main sections below examine the Dr. Gregory D. Miller is an Associate Professor of Leadership Studies at the Air Command and cal elements of the case, intended as relevance of the case for the study of his- Staff College. an instructor’s supplemental guide. It tory, strategy, and operational planning. 36 JPME Today / The Mayaguez Incident and PME JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 The article concludes with some final that they would endanger the crew, still War. And the poor use of historical anal- thoughts about the case, intended as believed to be on the island. Of the 11 ogy by President Ford’s advisors makes it questions for seminar discussion and for helicopters in the first wave, only 4 were particularly valuable for students. future research. available to bring in the second wave The Historical Context: Cold War due to both mechanical issues and taking vs. Local Conflict. It is important to Background enemy fire. When the second wave did understand the strategic environment Some consider the Mayaguez to be arrive, it delivered fewer than half the surrounding any historical study. This the last battle of the Vietnam War, and Marines as originally planned. historical context puts the case in perspec- those who died during the operation Less than 20 minutes after the tive and is helpful for understanding the are part of the Vietnam War Memo- first wave of Marines landed, the mindset of the decisionmakers, particu- rial in Washington, DC.1 The final Cambodians released the crewmem- larly President Ford and the NSC. U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam on bers, none of whom was on Koh Tang. Gerald Ford had been President for April 29–30, 1975—just 2 weeks prior The USS Holt arrived and found the only 8 months since Richard Nixon’s to the Mayaguez Incident—certainly Mayaguez empty, and it began towing August 1974 resignation, and the coun- influenced how the National Command the ship away from Koh Tang. Because try was still reeling from Watergate and Authority perceived both the crisis and of the rescue of the ship and crew, the Vietnam War. Ford had yet to be the need to respond quickly and with President Ford canceled the third wave tested on foreign policy, and he wanted force. Because there are already several of Marines and tasked the remaining to show himself to be capable of making detailed accounts of the crisis, this helicopters with extracting more than difficult decisions. He retained many of section provides a brief overview of the 200 Marines from the island, although Nixon’s advisors, most notably Henry main events and decisions.2 this took more than 5 hours. In the con- Kissinger serving as both Secretary of On May 12, 1975 (at roughly fusion of the extraction, three Marines State and National Security Advisor,3 and 0318 EST), the SS Mayaguez, a U.S. were left behind and are presumed to Secretary of Defense Arthur Schlesinger. container ship, was seized off the coast have been captured and executed. Ford also faced a minor crisis of le- of Cambodia. U.S. officials believed The operation ended with the crew gitimacy. He was not Nixon’s first Vice initially that Khmer Rouge forces were and ship rescued, but with 41 U.S. President, but took over when Spiro moving the ship and the 40-person crew Servicemembers dead and three helicop- Agnew resigned over tax evasion. Thus, to Kompong Son, a port on mainland ters destroyed. Upon completion of the Ford was the first unelected President of Cambodia. Later, during the rescue op- operation, the Ford administration saw the United States. eration, U.S. officials believed both were a temporary increase in public opinion Regionally, on April 17, 1975, on Koh Tang, an island 32 miles off the and an enhanced U.S. reputation with Cambodia fell to the Communist Khmer coast of Cambodia. its allies. Despite being a political and Rouge. Two weeks later, Saigon fell to President Gerald Ford learned of strategic win, the operation was rife with the North Vietnamese, and the United the situation at his morning briefing. At flaws, and this contrast is one reason it States fully withdrew from Vietnam as noon, roughly 9 hours after seizure of is such a valuable case study for future part of Operation Frequent Wind. The the ship, he convened the first of four decisionmakers. United States still generally viewed all National Security Council (NSC) meet- communists as part of a unified bloc, ings before he approved the military Theory and History but what the NSC did not know at the plan. Military operations began at 1700 There is often a tension within PME time of the Mayaguez Incident was that EST on May 14 and involved the USS over what to teach, and many see history Cambodia ramped up its defense of Koh Holt securing the ship and Marines land- as easily replaced with topics that are Tang after the fall of Saigon out of fear ing on Koh Tang to occupy the island more valuable, or more “timely,” such as of growing Vietnamese power. While the and rescue the crew. Because there were counterinsurgency after 2004, or great Khmer Rouge shared a communist ideol- not enough helicopters to deliver all power competition after 2018. What the ogy with the North Vietnamese, both the Marines at one time, the operation Mayaguez case does, even more than the groups were nationalistic and in competi- required three waves of helicopters from Cuban Missile Crisis, is illustrate why an tion with one another over a variety of Thailand. However, it was a 4-hour accurate use of history is so important issues, including the islands near where round trip, meaning the first one-third for senior leaders. the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez. of the planned force would be on its own Lack of awareness over the Mayaguez Globally, the Cold War was still in a until the next wave arrived 4 hours later. Incident is particularly troubling consid- period of relative détente, especially after Immediately upon landing on Koh ering the poor use of history by strategic the opening of U.S. relations with China Tang, the Marines encountered heavy re- decisionmakers during the crisis. The case in February 1972 and the signing of the sistance, as much as five times larger than itself is a valuable lesson in history, com- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agree- anticipated. The expected pre-landing ing as it does on the heels of the Vietnam ment and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty strikes did not occur out of concern War and in a transition point of the Cold with the Soviets in May 1972. But there JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Miller 37 Section of negative contact sheet for White House Photography Office roll A452 includes President Gerald Ford, Chief of Staff Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, and Vice President William Rockefeller, on day 3 of Mayaguez discussions, May 1975 (David Kennerly/Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library) was still Cold War competition. The and how to apply these historical analo- what was technically still a state of war Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was gies effectively.6 between the United States and North falling apart after France’s June 1974 The most pressing analogy that the Korea. In contrast, the Mayaguez was withdrawal,4 and communists took over NSC used during the discussions is the a commercial ship, and it is still unclear in Ethiopia in September 1974. The USS Pueblo case 7 years prior, in which where it was seized and whether it was Ford administration was also concerned North Korea seized a U.S. intelligence even flying an American flag at the time by reports that North Korea sought sup- vessel and held the crew for 11 months. of its seizure,8 meaning the Cambodians port from China and the Soviet Union Ford’s advisors brought up the 1968 might not have realized they were seizing for some type of military action against incident on multiple occasions.