MEMORIALS on MOROCCO \ in Ltel't 6T1utfjgfe 1M Fi).£Ifw.Cjtaclj and Fl..Ndep.£Ftdence (DESTOUR) (ISTIQLAL)
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J I Democratic Party of Independence (Hizb Choura_...- Istiqlal) MEMORIALS ON MOROCCO \ in ltel't 6t1UtfJgfe 1M fi).£IfW.CJtaclj and fl..ndep.£ftdence (DESTOUR) (ISTIQLAL) BEFORE RESORTING TO THE U. I. O. Morocco and the Arab League called in vain for , amicable mediation of ·U.S.A. with a view to settling the Moroccan problem . Published by the office of the D. P. 1. English Edition Juanary 1952 THE RESPONSIBiliTIES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM Before appealing to li.N.O. the Arab League decided, during its session of March 1951, to address itself directly to France for a solution of the Moroccan problem. So every member state of the Arab League submitted to the French Government a memorandum on the Moroccan problem. No answer was forthcoming. Since the approaches made by the states of the Arab League separately to the French Government had no result, those states then had recourse to the mediation of a third power with a view to bringing France to envisage a satisfactory solution 'of the Moroccan problem. Here are the very terms in which, during a press conference held in Ihe Palais de Chaillot, H.E. Abdurrahman Azzam Pacha, General Secretary of the Arab League, made public his attempts at a mediation with France, before appealing to D.N.O.: "The Moroccan question", he said, "had been in need of a solution for many years. This was recognised by President Roosevelt in 1942 at Casablanca when he promised the Sultan independence in exchange for the cooperation of his people in the allied cause. During the last five years, the Arab League has tried to find a peaceful solution to that problem. It had recourse to different means, among others to the inter- vention of a third party. The United States and Brazil were approached for this purpose with a view to a mediation. AU these attempts proved to he vain. The repression, oppression and humiliation of the Moroccan people went on. Last winter, General Juin took a certain number of steps to an end to the ·drive of Moroccan nationalism, especially by trying to depose the Sultan ..." On December 6th, 1951, H.E. Azzam Pacha made the following cnlightning declarations to the Parisian newspaper "Liberation" about the American mediation solficited by the Arab League. To the question of the French newspaper: "Did you not consider any other solution before appealing to U.N.O.?" H.E. Azzam Pacha answered: "I spoke to the Americans on the subject. .. They declared that it was not an opportune moment to bring it up. I tried to get the United States and Brazil to mediate ... They both declined. It is now the turu 0; the French Government to face its responsibilities. In the present state of things. we have decided, as far as we are concerned, to bring Ihe discussion hef'ore the next General Assembly, of the United Nations and to do our utmost to prevent U.N.O. eluding the discussion." Such declarations, apart from the fact that they correspond to those made on the 13th December 19,51 at the tribune of U.N.O. by the spokesman of the American delegation, define the responsibilities of the U.S.A. in regard to the Moroccan problem. The United States have done everything, behind the scenes as well as in the committees and in the General Assembly, to avoid this problem being brought to public debate. By declaring themselves, through their delegation to U.N.O., the advocates of "semi-official negotiations" between the Sultan and the French Government with a view to certain so-called "democratic" ref'orrus , the U.S.A. upheld whole-heartedly the French Colonialism I '<:.•• -2- which is more than ever attached 10 the status quo in a Morocco subjected to the protectorate regime since the treaty of March 30th, 1912. What is nothing less than surprising in the official position adopted by the U.S.A. in the Moroccan affair, is that they claim to have been led to it, on one hand by their concern to safeguard the "powers and responsibilities" of the General Assembly by "respecting the principles of the Charter of the United Nations", and, on the other hand, by the desire to defend the "higher interests of the Moroccan people"! So the United States prove to be more royalist than the King, that is to say more Moroccan than the Moroccans themselves! But this does not gull anybody. The delegations to U.N.o. understand perfectly the Lrue motives of the position of the United States of America in the Moroccan affair. When tbe spokesman of the Czech delegation succeeded the American delegate at the tribune of the General Assembly, did he not in fact that very day give public uttera nee to what everyone was thinking privately? "Morocco", he then said, "plays, and has to play, an important part in Atlantic strategy, for the French Government has allowed the United States of America to settle on Moroccan territory to establish their aeronautical bases there. \Vith the approbation of the French Govern- ment, the United States are turning Morocco into an important supple- mentary base for aggression. So then, Morocco is being changed against her will... Peace is at stake in Morocco, by the sole fact, among others, that military bases are being established there at the present moment and this, as I have said, against the will of the Moroccan people." This is unfortunately true and explains the American vote for the adjournment of the debate on the Moroccan problem. It is obviously not a question of the principles of the Charter, or of the higher interests of the Moroccan people, or even of the French, but only of the strategical interests of the U.S.A. in the Maghreb. It is precisely because of these very interests - and for no other reason - that the mechanism of the "Atlantic solidarity" was brought into play at the moment of the vote on the Moroccan affair at U.N.o. Already before the poll of December 13, 1951, it was said in the French press that the position of the United States of America depended, 10 a great extent, on strategical considerations. Thus, "Le Moude" wrote, on October 25, 1951, under the striking headline: "The Moroccan Affair, a Crucial Test of Atlantic Solidarity": "...\Vill anybody in Cairo doubt that this manoeuvre of dissociation ... constitutes a crucial test of Atlantic solidarity? Already now it is perfectly normal that London and Paris should agree upon mutual moral support. It remains to see what decision Washington will take ... "A mere abstention from the vote on a possible inscription of the Egyptian complaint would be considered as its manifest approbation ... II depends mainly on the United States whether the policy of cooperation with the Shereejau authorities practised by France in Morocco will continue to develop in an atmosphere of peace and justice, The support by Washington of the French thesis as to the incompetence of the United Nations to treat the Moroccan question would probably suffice to avoid the calling into existence of a dispute up to now imaginary. But can one count on the American delegation to assume a clear standpoint in this respect? In any case, they are now given an excellent occasion to put in action this Atlantic solidarity which the U.S. are constantly admonishing their friends to give proof of." It is now a known fact that the United States did not act otherwise -~3- by voting - and inciting certain delegations to vote - for the French colonialist thesis and against that upheld by 23 States in favour of the Moroccan independence. Thus, it has become obvious that, in the eyes of the Amer-icans, Atlantic solidarity PREVAILS over rights and liberties of oppressed peoples. The foreign press did not fail to emphasiie this. As an example, we quote the important English Conservative paper, "The Economist" which gives the following explanation of the Franco-Anglo-American solidarity concerning Morocco: "In short, from the diplomatic point of view, the French thesis concerning MOrocco is supported by the British in exchange for Franco- British sOlidarity on Egypt - and Sudan - while both powers are supported by the United States, partly in the interest of allied security, partly in application of the principle of the inviolability of treaties." (Translated from Fr ench.) It is impossible to be clearer or more precise. "La Tribune de Lausanne" wrote in its turn, on December 16th, 1951: "England and the United States have not abandoned their principal partner in the Atlantic pact, any more than colonial and ex-colonial powers like Holland and Belgium." So it is by strategical and colonial solidarity that certain states, big and small, have voted in favour of the provisional adjournment of the inscription of the Moroccan question of the agenda of C.N.a. As for the American press itself, it did not conceal, before the adjournment, what was going to be the attitude of the government of the United States. The Washington Post which is known to be the interpreter of the opinion in official circles, expressed itself as follows on the eve of the discussion at U.N.a.: <What attitude ought we to take? To us, the situation presents two sides. On one hand, we must not hesitate a single moment to vote against the Egyptian resolution ... "But the Uniied States would not be trne to herself it she restricted herself te wrecking the Egyptian "manoeuvre" ... "She has always proved to be a good friend of France, and we think she would not dispute a new help (for the sake of her own interest) ..