The Campaign for Goldwater-Nichols

By John T. Correll

Twenty-five years ago, not everybody was in favor of reorganizing the Department of Defense.

he dominant figures in the US Sen. Barry Goldwater (l) and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Jones speak at an armed forces today are the event in 1975. A few years later they would be on the same side of a fight to reorga- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs nize the Department of Defense. Tof Staff and the combatant commanders. They, along with the President and the Secretary of Defense, what is proclaimed to be the age of and Jones were presenting their initial are the undisputed first team. Everyone “jointness.” statements on budget requirements. else is secondary, subordinate, or in The legislation that brought on the Weinberger spoke first and focused support. change is known as the Goldwater- on the Reagan rearmament program, It was not always so. As recently Nichols Department of Defense Re- which had begun the previous year. as World War II, the War Depart- organization Act of 1986, after its Committee chairman Melvin Price ment (including the Army Air Forces) sponsors in the Senate and House of (D-Ill.) asked Jones if he also had a and the Navy Department (including Representatives. It could just as well statement. “I look forward to testify- the Marine Corps) were completely have been named for Air Force Gen. ing on the budget issues,” Jones said. separate organizations. There was no David C. Jones, former Chairman of “However, there is one subject I would unified structure to which all of the the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Four years like to mention briefly here. It is not armed forces belonged. earlier, he rolled the first rock in what sufficient to have just resources, dol- Up to 25 years ago, the real cen- eventually became the Goldwater- lars, and weapon systems; we must ters of power in the Department of Nichols avalanche. have an organization which will allow Defense were the individual military Jones dropped his bombshell Feb. us to develop the proper strategy, nec- services. Since then, the roles of the 3, 1982, in unscripted testimony to the essary planning, and full warfighting Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine House Armed Services Committee. De- capability. ... We do not have an ad- Corps have been starkly reduced in fense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger equate organizational structure today.” 68 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2011 He called for major reform of established the Defense Department Staff to the commanders of the unified DOD organization, which he said and co-equal branches of the Army, and specified commands.” In fact, the was inadequate to meet requirements the Navy, and the Air Force. It was a act did not include the Joint Chiefs in for defense planning, development of start, but Eisenhower said later that the chain of command. For the next strategy, and other responsibilities. the result had been “little more than 20 years, the services exploited the He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a weak confederation of sovereign organizational arrangements, including “basically a committee” and that “if the military units.” influence on actions by the Joint Chiefs Chiefs cannot come to an agreement, a Eisenhower, declaring that “separate of Staff, to maintain their power. unanimous agreement, among the five ground, sea, and air warfare is gone “When I was the air commander in of us, we then inform the Secretary forever,” led the next attempt, which Europe, I had two bosses, the Chief of of Defense and, as appropriate, the culminated in the Defense Reorganiza- Staff of the Air Force and the unified President.” tion Act of 1958. The Army and the Air commander—the commander-in-chief, The process gave each service a Force supported the change. As before, US European Command, who is over “de facto veto,” he said, and “it is all US theater forces,” Jones said. very difficult for a Chief as head of “The Chief of Staff of the Air Force a service to say more resources ought assigned me all my people, gave all to go to another service rather than my rewards to my people, controlled his own,” he said. all my money, gave me all my equip- Jones told the committee that he ment. Obviously, he had nine times the would “work with my colleagues influence over me than [the] unified first because many of these things commander had. So he who controls can be solved by the Chiefs unani- the resources can have a tremendous mously agreeing to change. I will then impact.” work with the Administration—the Secretary of Defense and the Presi- Jones Rings the Bell dent—which may include submitting Jones was Air Force Chief of Staff legislative proposals.” from 1974 to 1978. He was appointed That was a surprise to Wein- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs by berger. Jones had told him only that President Carter in June 1978 and he intended to express “concerns reappointed for a second term in about how the system operated.” June 1980. Weinberger had other priorities and His relations with Weinberger did not believe organization was a and the Reagan Administration were problem. His attention was on the clouded from the beginning. Shortly rearmament program and distractions after the election in November 1980, were bothersome. Jones approached Secretary of De- Jones, who was a few months fense designate Weinberger about Sen. Sam Nunn, as the ranking Democrat away from retirement, had decided on the Senate Armed Services Commit- defense reorganization. Weinberger he could wait no longer to speak up. tee, appointed a task force to work on the had other priorities, and an impasse His testimony introduced the issue controversial plan. developed. but it did not immediately put it fully Meanwhile, congressional conser- into play. Change would take several vatives who thought Jones had been years and strong commitment from the Navy was opposed. Gen. Carl A. too closely aligned with the Carter both houses of Congress. “Tooey” Spaatz, who had been the Administration and deferred too readily first Air Force Chief of Staff, offered to Carter policies urged Reagan to dis- Previous Attempts a radical opinion from retirement— miss him and appoint a Chairman more Organizational unification of the “complete integration” of the armed attuned to Reagan’s priorities. Reagan armed forces was attempted before, forces into a single service. decided to keep Jones to the end of his by President Truman in 1947 and The new legislation did not go that term, which ran until June 1982. In his President Eisenhower in 1958. Prior to far, but it did take the individual services memoirs, Weinberger referred to Jones World War II, coordinating the plans out of the chain of command. The ser- as “the holdover Chairman of the Joint and operations of the separate armed vices retained their roles as specified by Chiefs of Staff.” services was not an issue. Army and law, but the operational missions were As his retirement in June 1982 ap- Navy missions seldom overlapped. Joint assigned to unified and specified com- proached, Jones continued to press operations became common during the mands on a geographical and functional the reorganization issue. He followed war, especially in the “island-hopping” basis. The function of the services was up his surprise testimony in February campaigns in the Pacific. to organize, train, and equip forces for with articles in a business publication, Truman wanted to replace the “an- the combatant commands. Directors & Boards, and in Armed tiquated defense setup” with three The subsequent implementing direc- Forces Journal. He made headlines coordinated military branches under a tive, signed by Secretary of Defense after a breakfast meeting with report- Department of National Defense. The Neil H. McElroy, introduced ambiguity. ers Feb. 17 at which he said parochial compromise—the Navy being vehe- It said, “The chain of command runs interests of individual services some- mently opposed to unification—was the from the President to the Secretary of times overwhelmed what was best for National Security Act of 1947, which Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of overall defense. AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2011 69 One of the few military leaders Additional evidence of the problem and blocked the efforts of White and agreeing with Jones was Army Chief was supplied by Operation Urgent Nichols to get a bill through Congress. of Staff Gen. Edward C. Meyer. In an Fury in Grenada in 1983, where in Tower retired in early January 1985 Armed Forces Journal article in April several instances the services could not and was replaced by Sen. Barry Gold- 1982, he said, “The changes urged by communicate with each other because water (R-Ariz). Both Goldwater and General Jones, while headed in the their equipment was not compatible. the ranking SASC Democrat, Sen. right direction, do not go far enough.” Sam Nunn of Georgia, were strongly After retirement, Jones sharpened Catching On With Congress in favor of defense reorganization and his attack. In a New York Times Maga- The defense reorganization cause appointed Locher to head a task force to zine article in November 1982, he took root on Capitol Hill, owing much work on it and report directly to them. said the defense budget “is derived to the efforts of two congressional The issue percolated steadily through mainly from the disparate desires of staffers, Archie D. Barrett of the House 1984 and into 1985 and continued to the individual services rather than from a well-integrated plan based on serious examination of alternatives.” He added that “it is an uphill struggle for any- one—including a Secretary of Defense—to gain real control of our defense establishment.” “To eliminate service domina- tion of the channels of military

CENTCOM commander Army Gen. Tommy Franks (r) and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (l) at a press briefing in 2002. Rumsfeld inflated the role of combatant com- manders in an attempt to keep the Joint Chiefs marginalized, and Franks ran with it. advice to the Secretary and the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—rather than the five-man committee of the Chiefs—should represent the

operational side, while the ser- DOD photo by Helene Stikkel C. vice Chiefs should continue to Armed Services Committee and James draw criticism from the Pentagon. Navy represent the administrative side of R. Locher III of the Senate Armed Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. charged our military organization,” he said. Services Committee. that empowering the Chairman of the Army Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., Barrett, a retired Air Force pilot, Joint Chiefs at the expense of the military who replaced Jones as Joint Chiefs had written a paper at National De- services would create “a Prussian-style Chairman, did not agree. In November fense University in 1981 critical of general staff.” Armed Forces Journal 1982, he told Congress the consensus the undue influence of the individual reported, “Secretary of Defense Caspar of the Joint Chiefs was that “sweeping services on defense decision-making. Weinberger, the Secretaries of the Army, changes to 10 USC are unnecessary.” It was published as a book in 1983 Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman (Title 10 of the US Code is the legal with an introduction by Jones. At his of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed basis of organization for the services instigation, the HASC investigations on one point: Capitol Hill proposals to and the Department of Defense.) subcommittee held the first hearings on reorganize the US military establishment Retired Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, defense reorganization and introduced aren’t necessary.” who had been Chairman from 1970 to the first legislative proposal. Barrett On the other hand, in a February 1974, was considerably more caustic. had great credibility with the subcom- 1985 report from the Center for Stra- “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of mittee chairman, Rep. Richard C. tegic and International Studies, six Staff, with respect to those in uniform, White (D-Tex.), and with Rep. William former Secretaries of Defense (Robert has all the authority he is willing to F. Nichols (D-Ala.), who succeeded S. McNamara, Clark Clifford, Melvin take,” Moorer said. White as chairman in 1983. R. Laird, Elliott Richardson, James R. In December, Jones told the Senate Locher was a West Point graduate Schlesinger, and Harold Brown) en- Armed Services Committee reform of who, in his own words, “spent 10 years dorsed reform, including designation the Joint Chiefs was “the most impor- as a ‘whiz kid’ system analyst” in the of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of tant defense issue facing the Congress Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff as principal military advisor to and the nation. It makes issues [such in the 1960s. His first boss at the the President and Secretary of Defense. as] the MX [missile] and others pale SASC, Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), At the direction of Goldwater and in comparison.” was against defense reorganization Nunn, Locher fashioned an instrument 70 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2011 with which to bludgeon the opposi- bill, sponsored by Nichols, still a in the history of the American military tion. It was a 645-page “staff study,” leading champion of reform. As Gold- since the Continental Congress created published in October 1985, reviewing water and Nunn pressed forward, they the Continental Army in 1775.” the problem and offering options for received welcome support from the The final Goldwater-Nichols leg- reform. Packard Commission, chaired by David islation, patched and repatched many A deliberate tactic, devised by Nunn Packard, the legendary co-founder times to accommodate compromises, with Goldwater’s concurrence, was of Hewlett-Packard who oversaw the was 162 densely printed pages long. that the staff study would propose creation of a new system acquisition Among the provisions of the act: extreme measures that would make process when he was deputy secretary It gave the Defense Secretary “full the actual provisions later introduced of defense in the early 1970s. His power over every facet of the Depart- seem less radical by comparison. One commission’s report on defense man- ment of Defense.” This confirmed a such suggestion was to increase the agement was mostly about acquisition Presidential directive of 1953 and put stature of the combatant commanders reform but it included a chapter on it into law for the first time. in the field by making them senior in military organization and command. The Joint Chiefs Chairman was rank to the service Chiefs. Packard’s recommendations tracked designated principal military advisor The study also proposed disbanding along with Goldwater and Nunn: to the President, the National Security the Joint Chiefs of Staff and replac- Strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Council, and Defense Secretary. The ing them with an advisory council Chiefs and give more power to the Joint Staff was assigned to work for of four-star military officers on their commanders of the unified and speci- the Chairman. last tours of duty before retirement. fied commands. It established the position of vice This idea had been around for a long In March, the SASC overrode Penta- chairman of the Joint Chiefs, first filled time, advocated with minor differences gon objections and passed the bill, 14 to by Air Force Gen. Robert T. Herres. in detail by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, zero. Syndicated columnists Rowland It clarified the chain of command, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Sen. W. Stu- Evans and Robert Novak slammed from the President to the Secretary of art Symington, Secretary of Defense the decision the next day, blaming Defense to the unified and specified Harold Brown, and in 1982 by Army the hyperactive committee staff for commands. The Joint Chiefs Chair- Chief of Staff Meyer. a measure that “clearly would move man is not in the chain, nor are the Goldwater declared that unity of toward a unified general staff with the service Chiefs. command “means there is only one Chairman of the Joint Chiefs elevated It increased the authority, respon- Chief and he’s over all the Indians—no and individual service Chiefs and Sec- sibility, and powers of commanders of matter what tribe.” retaries downgraded. That would mark the unified and specified commands. final victory for McNamara’s whiz It made joint duty assignments The Final Push kids, the super-bureaucrats, against mandatory for promotion to general The SASC began markup of the the uniformed professional military.” officer ranks. reorganization bill—getting it down Goldwater, infuriated all over again Crowe, the first Chairman to hold on paper in the form it would be intro- by the accusation he was being led authority under the act, made a point duced—on Feb. 4, 1986. The previous around by his staff, gruffed, “These of including the service Chiefs in any evening, an explosive meeting took lies make me mad as hell!” action where they had a significant place in the Pentagon between the Joint In his radio address April 5, Presi- interest. “If we have a disagreement, Chiefs, Goldwater, and Nunn, who had dent Reagan urged Congress to approve then I know I’ve got in my back pocket come over for a final consultation. reorganization, citing the Packard the authority to resolve it,” he said. Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., the new Commission. White House officials “They know it, too.” But “I cannot get Chairman, supported the legislation. said Reagan’s endorsement, despite along without the help of the Chiefs, The Air Force Chief, Gen. Charles A. Weinberger’s objections, reflected his regardless of what the law says.” Gabriel, did not say much. commitment to curb waste, abuse, and The Gulf War in 1991 was both test The others were opposed and said Pentagon inefficiency. and validation for Goldwater-Nichols. so in no uncertain language. The “The most demonstrable example hot-tempered Goldwater took their Redistributing the Power was seen in the role of the Chairman criticism as an attack on his efforts Both the Senate and the House of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. to make improvements and roared, approved reorganization bills, which Colin Powell,” said Bernard Trainor, “If you think you can bully Sam and were merged in conference in Sep- retired Marine Corps general turned me, you are mistaken.” tember. The final version was named New York Times correspondent. “As a The next morning, the SASC re- for Goldwater and Nichols at the sug- result of Goldwater-Nichols, [Powell] ceived eight letters from military gestion of Sam Nunn. The conference wielded power and influence beyond leaders, seven of them “quarrelsome bill passed and was signed into law by that exercised by previous Chairmen. or contentious,” according to Locher, Reagan Oct. 1. He was the politico-military maestro who was present for both the evening Goldwater was exultant. “It’s the of the Gulf War. His fellow members meeting and the markup. Only Crowe’s only goddamn thing I’ve done in the of the Joint Chiefs were relegated to letter was in favor. “I will not be de- Senate that’s worth a damn,” he said. onlookers who simply provided the flected or sidetracked in this effort even House Armed Services Committee forces.” if I get a letter a day from everyone Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) was even As for Gen. H. Norman Schwarz- in the Pentagon,” Goldwater snapped. more effusive, calling it “one of the kopf, the combatant commander in In the House, four reorganization landmark laws of American history” the Gulf, “he was king in the Kuwaiti proposals were merged into a single and “probably the greatest sea change theater of operations,” Trainor said. AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2011 71 “All within his domain had to do his Army task force, deployed to Albania When it suited his purposes, Rums- bidding.” but not engaged, and several months feld emphasized the role of combatant away from being ready to begin combat commanders to keep the Chairman and Converting the Critics operations. the Joint Chiefs out of the advisory In the years following adoption of The net benefits of Goldwater-Nich- loop. He did so notably with Army Goldwater-Nichols, opinion within the ols are clear, but there is a downside. Gen. Tommy R. Franks of US Cen- military swung in favor of the changes Breaking the power of the service tral Command during operations in and kept on swinging. It soon became Chiefs also reduced the strategic contri- Afghanistan in 2001. difficult to find anyone who thought bution of those who were outstanding Franks was proud to be a commander the act was a bad idea. enough to rise to the top in the Army, “who fought the wars” and held the Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., former Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. service Chiefs in contempt. According Army Chief of Staff, had been among As noted by retired Lt. Col. Stephen to Shelton, Rumsfeld’s offer of direct those whose opposition raised Gold- Melton of the Army Command and access “inflated Tommy’s head about 10 water’s ire at the evening meeting in General Staff College, the Goldwater- hat sizes, because he was now ‘above’ February 1986. In 1995, Wickham told Nichols Act “diminished the role of the the Joint Chiefs and working directly Locher the act “has achieved 80 percent Pentagon by making the operational for ‘the man.’ ” of its objectives and will go down in commanders the primary war planners” In September 2001, the Joint Chiefs history as a major contribution to the and “relegated the military’s strategic requested a briefing from Franks. nation’s security.” center—the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Shelton thought it “was a productive There was no relenting, though, from military departments—to an advisory give-and-take exchange,” but Franks Moorer, who had nailed his colors to and supporting role.” had no interest in the comments of the mast. “I don’t think it accomplished “As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the Chiefs. anything,” he said in a 1990 interview. the service Chiefs no longer have any Franks complained that “we endured In 1996, on the 10th anniversary of motivation or real opportunity to focus an hour of this aimless dialogue, a waste Goldwater-Nichols enactment, Gen. on grand strategy or strategic issues, of time that neither the Secretary nor John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the because they’ve been relegated to the I could spare.” The next day, Franks Joint Chiefs, graded the main provi- program business,” said retired Air said the service Chiefs who had been sions of the legislation at a National Force Maj. Gen. Charles D. Link, a at the briefing “came across like a mob Defense University symposium and highly respected analyst of military of Title 10 motherfuckers.” assigned an overall grade of B. He gave roles and missions. In other instances, it was the combat- top marks for better military advice to ant commanders who got the Rumsfeld civilian leaders, for strengthening of Known and Unknown Pressures treatment. In October 2002, for no the combatant commanders, and for It is little remembered today that dur- apparent reason other than impulsive improved effectiveness of military ing the run-up to Goldwater-Nichols, arrogance and a display of personal operations. To get straight As, he said, some concern was expressed that power, Rumsfeld put out a memo the services had to work harder to strengthening the Joint Chiefs Chair- forbidding combatant commanders to develop a shared vision of the future. man would correspondingly weaken use the title “commander in chief” or Joint Forces Quarterly published a the position of Defense Secretary. “CinC,” which had been in use since special issue on the 10th anniversary During his second tour in that office before World War II. Rumsfeld said the of the act. For his contribution, Jones from 2001 to 2006, Donald H. Rums- only CinC was the President. chose to go with an edited and abridged feld demonstrated that the Secretary The Chairmen who followed Shelton version of his article from the New York holds the trumps, anytime he wants often found their opinions and advice Times Magazine in 1982, indicating to use them. discounted as Rumsfeld dominated all his commitment to reform. In 1990, Rumsfeld systematically undercut channels to the White House. It was not Weinberger published memoirs of his the authority of the Chairman and until after Rumsfeld’s departure that seven years in the Pentagon. He did consolidated power in his own hands. much of the status of the Chairman of not even mention Goldwater-Nichols. At his first meeting with Army Gen. the Joint Chiefs was restored, during The tacit assumption of Goldwater- Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint the tour of Adm. Michael G. Mullen. Nichols was that whereas the service Chiefs, Rumsfeld told him, “You Today, few would argue with Wil- Chiefs in the old days could not escape are not the advisor to the National liam J. Perry, Defense Secretary from parochialism and self-interest, the Security Council,” before conceding 1994 to 1997, who said the Goldwater- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the that Title 10 of the US Code did give Nichols Act was “perhaps the most combatant commanders, when em- Shelton that responsibility. Rumsfeld important defense legislation since powered by the act, would rise above next suggested that Shelton give his World War II.” service bias. advice to the President through the On the 25th anniversary of its adop- That would not always be the case. Secretary of Defense instead of di- tion, Goldwater-Nichols has regained In Operation Allied Force in Serbia rectly. Shelton declined. According its course, and the organization and in 1999, airpower was the only force to Shelton, Rumsfeld was greatly function of the Department of Defense engaged in the 78-day operation that “concerned with marking his territory are a closer approximation of the bal- ended with Serbian surrender. Never- like a little bulldog.” ance of power ordained by the act. n theless, the unified force commander, Army Gen. Wesley Clark, insisted John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a that the decisive factor had been the contributing editor. His most recent articles, “Showdown in Berlin” and “The Astro impending threat of a brigade-sized Chimps,” appeared in the September issue. 72 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2011