Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
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Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training oreign Affairs Oral History Pro$ect SECRETARY DEAN RUSK Interviewed by: Paige E. Mulhollan, LBJ Library Initial interview date: July 28, 19 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS Comments on Johnson All consuming commitment to job and President Tireless worker ollowed and monitored events and policies closely Impatient with delay Highly intelligent, persuasive Attitude towards foreign leaders Attitude towards cabinet members Personal attributes Johnson as Ma$ority Leader Informed him on foreign policy matters Johnson as Vice President oreign tours Curbed instincts to take leadership oreign Service liaison officer Johnson+s first days as President Rusk offers resignation Johnson,Rusk relationship Closer than with -ennedy Mutual loyal support -ennedy associates policy differences Johnson,-ennedy family relations Bobby -ennedy Johnson+s family Lady Bird Johnson 1 Johnson and foreign policy Johnson and -osygin -ept himself well informed Me.ico and /estern Hemisphere 0. Thant 2Tuesday Lunch3 National Security Council role 0se of staff 4/alt Rostow, etc.5 State relations with /hite House staff Rostow vs. Mc6eorge Bundy State,Defense relationship Johnson,State relationship SI6,IR6 Johnson+s presidential appointments Attitude toward career professionals State Department 2Planning3 6eorge Ball as 2devils advocate3 Rusk,Johnson working relationship Serious decision,making Johnson preoccupation with Vietnam Johnson in crisis situations Johnson 2in charge3 Vietnam Clark Clifford recommendation Efforts to limit Vietnam /ar Anti,war groups 0.S. press State Department and speech writing Vice President Johnson involvement -ennedy policies concerning Southeast Asia Advisor+s advice 6lobal security treaty relevance Credibility and fidelity issue and importance 0.S. strategic defensive position 6radual response policy Tonkin 6ulf Resolution Johnson and Congress Peace initiatives Seaborne mission 0.S. negotiating position 0. Thant+s involvement Adlai Stevenson Bombing North Vietnam 2 South Vietnam weakness -osygin+s presence in Hanoi Soviet role in North Vietnam Bombing pauses Arthur 6oldberg tour Ho Chi Minh 6eorge Ball and devil+s advocate Civilian Americans and South Vietnamese Press obsession with bad news /ashington,Hanoi channel Polish message to Hanoi Manila Conference Harriman mission Trang,John 6uthrie channel 4Moscow5 Phase A,Phase B formula Harold /ilson,-osygin e.change Johnson,Ho Chi Minh letter , 1967 San Antonio formula -issinger,Romanian channel South Vietnam elections Limitations on 0.S. influence in 0.S. government 6lassboro meeting 2/ise Men3 meetings Tet Offensive Clark Clifford+s disillusionment Johnson announces partial bombing halt Johnson decides not to run for another term Vietnam Talks to end war Vance issue President+s ob$ection to Paris as site Instructions and Harriman and Vance North Vietnamese attitude Bombing halt agreement Russian involvement South Vietnamese reluctance Madame Chennault Ni.on briefings on situation President Ni.on carries on talks The world after Vietnam orces of ree Asia strengthened Militant Chinese communism 3 Nuclear weapons threat Vietnam , military vs. Political problems Coordinator in /ashington /ar aims and peace aims Contacts with Hanoi Interdepartmental interests Ambassador and embassy role 6uerrilla warfare Vietnamese armed force buildup 2Vietnamization3 and 2Americanization3 Casualties Military tactics /arsaw talks 0.S.,China relations Steps to improve relations Peking vs. Taiwan Change in 0.S. public attitude British policy Chinese intervention in -orea Taiwan problem China scholars+ views Chinese activity in Southeast Asia Johnson and Laos 0.S.,Russian conversations 6eneva Conference , 1962 Hanoi uncooperative 0.S. Laos bombing program Prince Souvanna Phouma Hanoi+s use of Laos for infiltration route 0.S.,Laos commitment Johnson and Thailand Southeast Asia Treaty member SEATO treaty 0.S. obligations under treaty oreign reaction to 0.S.,Vietnam /ar No public criticism from those with troops in South Vietnam Okinawa Needed for security of free Asia Discussions with Japan 4 Johnson involvement Indonesia Sukarno problem Malaya confrontation Change in Indonesia -orea President Park Involvement in Vietnam North -orean bellicosity Pueblo incident Russian mediating role Regionalism in Asia concept Australia and New Zealand attitude Asian Development Bank Johnson support India food problem 0.S. interests India,Pakistan feud. Tashkent Latin America Alliance for Progress Congressional interest Johnson role Punta del Este meeting , 1967 Middle East 1967 Arab,Israeli /ar Soviet mischief Johnson role Strait of Tiran Jewish community and Democratic Party Russian interest -osygin role 6lassboro meeting Cease fire efforts Secretary 6eneral of the 0N withdraws 0N forces Nasser+s role our Power talks 0.S. planes for Israel Johnson+s five points , 0.S. policy for Middle East November 1967 Resolution 5 Multilateral orce 4ML 5 issue NATO desire for greater participation Nuclear relevance Non,proliferation Treaty NATO De 6aulle e.pels NATO headquarters Harmel E.ercise European isolationism 0.S. force levels Balance of payments issue 6erman problem 6romyko and reunification Johnson and Soviet 0nion Soviets invade Czechoslovakia SALT Talks Europe and Vietnam /ar Swedes favor Hanoi Spanish base negotiations 4non,NATO5 0.S. favors Spain in NATO President Johnson and other issues IM -ennedy Round Trade Negotiation Committee of Ten 0.S., rench monetary issue Africa Congo troubles Organization of African 0nity Arms to Africa Rhodesia South Africa Regional foreign aid programs Congressional interest AID Johnson interest in aid program Rusk comments on problems and achievements Avoidance of nuclear war Treaties Interracial problems Developing 0.S.,developed relations Population control 6 ailure, crisis, and mistakes Bay of Pigs , greatest mistake Vietnam /ar , failure to end Cuban Missile Crisis , greatest crisis Comments and notes INTERVIEW Q: All right, sir, if we should be interrupted by anything, I can turn this off without any difficulty and can do so with ease. Let's get your identification, which ta(es very little time, on the beginning of the tape. You're Secretary of State Dean Rus(, and you served in that office longer than any other man e.cept Cordell Hull1 from the beginning of the John Kennedy Administration through the end in 19 9 of the Lyndon Johnson Administration. R0S-: That is correct. Q: Suppose we begin, as you suggested, sir, by just a general 4uestion55the type of man that you found President Lyndon Johnson to be. R0S-: /ell, Lyndon Johnson was a powerful personality and a very comple. one. I wonAt go into those general attributes which are well,known to the public, but rather reflect upon some of the qualities which struck me as one of his close associates. To begin with, he had an all,consuming commitment to his job as President. He had become President through the great tragedy of the assassination of John . -ennedy, and it was as though he felt that since he had not been the first choice for President, he was going to do everything that he possibly could to be a good President and to be a great President. He was a severe task,master, in the first instance for himself. He never spared himself, and his colleagues were an.ious from time to time about whether he might draw upon himself another heart attack. He worked late at night, he worked early mornings, he took his evening reading to his bedside with him, and that kept him up frequently most of the time until one or two oAclock in the night. He would wake up at four or five oAclock in the morning and call the Operations Room of the Department or the /hite House to see how things were going in Vietnam. /e repeatedly tried to get him to take time away from his desk or from his job, and rela. and get some refreshment, but we were relatively unsuccessful in doing so. Even when he was at the ranch the telephone was busy and he had staff present to keep in touch with what was going on. In other words he fully committed himself to his job. 7 He placed a great emphasis upon performance rather than words. I remember during the first week of his Presidency he called me on the phone one day and asked me what was being done under the Alliance for Progress. I gave him a rather general summary in State Department language, and he said very impatiently, BI donAt mean all that. I mean what are we doing,,what are we actually doingC Send me a list of the actual actions that weAre taking under the Alliance for Progress and what actions the Latin Americans themselves are taking.B And the historian will notice that when Lyndon Johnson became President the actual commitments of funds and of action under the Alliance for Progress went up very rapidly because he was interested in getting the job done. /hen India found itself in difficulty about its food problem, it was perfectly apparent that the 0nited States would not be able simply to make up IndiaAs deficiencies and that India would have to go through a revolution in its own agriculture if it were to feed itself. Lyndon Johnson assigned Secretary of Agriculture DOrvilleE reeman the task of requiring India to take ma$or new steps in the agricultural field as a condition for any substantial food assistance from the 0nited States. Now, he followed that very carefully and was concerned about the performance of India in its own behalf. He took the view that the President of the 0nited States could not be more concerned about feeding Indians than the Prime Minister of India, and unless the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in India took the steps necessary to feed their own people, there was nothing the 0nited States could do about it. He was impatient with delay. One good e.ample comes from the procedure by which we appoint Ambassadors. /hen we make a decision to send Mr.