»-r

/Jo, 5^0

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE: ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S

DISSENT ON THE VIETNAM WAR—I966-I968

Craig W. Cutbirth

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 1976

An'nrnvprl hv T)r»r».toral nmrtmi ttee* i q

ABSTRACT

The Vietnam war -was one of the most hitter and divisive

issues of the turbulent 1960’s. One American leader -who

interacted with this issue was Robert F. Kennedy, United States

Senator from New York. He was an ambitious man who had been the

second most powerful man in the country during the Administration

of John F. Kennedy. He was an acknowledged presidential aspirant.

His actions and pronouncements attracted widespread attention—a

source of potential benefit and danger for him.

Kennedy planned his statements on the war with the utmost

caution. He was particularly aware of the consequences of a

personal break between himself and President Iyndon B. Johnson,

wham Kennedy disliked and mistrusted. Accordingly, this study

began with the assumption that Kennedy's planning involved the

creation of a strategy through which he approached the Vietnam

,issue.

Three of Kennedy's anti-war pronouncements were examined in

this study. Each was considered an expression of Kennedy's

rhetorical strategy.

The nature of strategy was an object of some attention in

this study. It was noted that the term has been used in a

seemingly-contradictory manner. Accordingly, an attempt was made

to clarify the nature of rhetorical strategy. It was determined

that strategy is created to achieve some goal, and is implemented by certain tactics designed to energize audience support for the li

rhetors position, thus achieving the desired goal. Each tactic

employed by the rhetor relies on arguments or constraints

designed to affect the audience in the desired manner. Within

this framework, each of Kennedy’s anti-war statements was

examined and evaluated.

Kennedy did utilize a strategic approach to Vietnam. Despite his planning, he was forced into active opposition to President

Johnson. »

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although this manuscript bears my name and I accept responsibility for what is contained therein, I am not yet egocentric enough to deny the contributions of certain individuals. Initially, let me express my heart­ felt thanks to the members of my committee who have lived with this under­ taking almost as intimately as have I. Their suggestions bear the credit for whatever merit this work may have. I am particularly grateful for the wisdom of Dr. Raymond Yeager, who seemed to know exactly when to make entreaties and when to issue orders. The most important person to whom I am indebted is one who was never consulted as to the wisdom or necessity of completing this project. Her reading of it will be her introduction to its contents. Yet it would not, could not, exist without her. The contributions of my mother, Virginia A. Cutbirth, do not lend themselves to neat categorizations or acknowledgements. Her role in shaping my educational career, and my life, is beyond measure. My thanks to her is inexpressible.

BOWLING GREEN UN1V. LIBRARY 37$.r//

s) ' (\, 3/ ò

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii CHAPTER 1. A STRATEGIC STUDY OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY...... 1 INTRODUCTION...... 1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM...... 3 METHODOLOGY ...... 5 JUSTIFICATION ...... 5 REVIEW OF LITERATURE...... 7 2. THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE...... 1-3 3. A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE OF ROBERT KENNEDY...... 28 KENNEDY’S REPUTATION...... 29 KENNEDY’S AMBITION...... 37 KENNEDY’S CONFLICT WITH LYNDON B. JOHNSON ...... 40 KENNEDY AND VIETNAM...... 46 4. TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT POSITION...... 57 THE EXIGENCE...... 57 FACTORS RESTRAINING INVOLVEMENT...... 63 FACTORS COMPELLING INVOLVEMENT...... 65 FIRST BREAK: FEBRUARY 19, 1966 ...... 67 THE AFTERMATH...... 73 A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ...... 75 SUMMATION...... 84 EVALUATION...... 85 5. OPEN DISSENT...... 91

bowling green univ. library V

CHAPTER PAGE THE EXIGENCE...... 91 EFFORTS FOR PEACE...... 93 THE WAR AT HCME...... 94 ROBERT F. KENNEDY ANDV IETNAM...... 96 KENNEDY AND JOHNSON: THE BREAKING POINT...... 97 MARCH 2, 1967 ...... 102 THE AFTERMATH...... 113 A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ...... 118 SUMMATION...... 125 EVALUATION...... 126 6. ALL OUT AGAINST JOHNSON...... 130 THE EXIGENCE: VIETNAM, I967-I968 ...... I3I EFFORTS FOR PEACE...... 132 THE WAR AT HCME...... 133 THE TET OFFENSIVE...... 135 ROBERT F. KENNEDY:I 967-I968 ...... 137 FEBRUARY 8, I968...... 1^ A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE . . . .'...... 151 THE AFTERMATH...... 15^ 7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. I58 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 168 1

CHAPTER 1

A STRATEGIC STUDY OP ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Introduction

"It was a glittering time. They literally swept into office, ready, moving, generating their style, their confidence. They were going to get America moving again." With these words David Halberstam captured the spirit of the early Kennedy administration. "These were brilliant men, men of force, not cruel, not harsh, but men who acted, rather than waited. There was no time to waste, history did not permit that luxury; if we waited it would all be past us."2 In response to this spirit, the early 1960's found the United States embroiled in a period of reform, of change. Action became the byword of the era. "The challenge awaited and these men did not doubt their capa­ city to answer that challenge . . . ."^ Fifty mile hikes, men in space, freedom riders--all became symbolic of the new spirit. As John Kennedy said in his inaugural address, the torch had been passed to a new gener­ ation of Americans. It remains now for history, the history which earlier would not let them wait, to judge the actions of the new generation. Among the actions undertaken by the Kennedy administration was a strengthening and expanding of the American military commitment to oppo­ sition to Communist expansion. This opposition was keynoted by Kennedy's approval of the invasion of Cuba, by his actions in the missile crisis, 2

by the Alliance for Progress, and by the American military presence in Southeast Asia. Kennedy's Administration left the United States with a legacy that influenced the course of history. This legacy is complex, but at this time that legacy seems largely influenced by the Vietnam war. The war, "like the transcendent issues of slavery, free silver, and prohibition Zj. in other times . . . came to dominate American lives in the 1960's."

It was not just the war, of course, that was tearing at the fabric of this society; there were many other factors that contributed to the division: the spiritual vacuum that seemed to accompany material affluence and technological success, the great racial sores in the country, the hypo­ crisy in much of American life. But finally, it was the war that magnified all faults, that eroded if not destroyed the faith of so many people in this country. 5

Widespread controversy accompanied the Vietnamese conflict, contro­ versy which grew even as the war grew. The American people were presented with a variety of explanations for the involvement in the small Asian country, along with equally diverse solutions and plans for extrication. Swept up in the currents of controversy over Vietnam was Robert F. Kennedy, "a figure wholly unique in our country"^:

. . . after 1964, when the brush-fire war in Vietnam became a conflagration, when black and student militancy turned to violence, when fear and discontent pervaded the land despite all our power and affluence—and America changed—he, more than any other public figure, was able to communicate across the barricades of rising hostility. 7

Robert F. Kennedy's emergence as an anti-war leader is surprising for several reasons. Kennedy had helped determine this country's position towards Vietnam in the early 196O’s. He was a major factor in making 3 Vietnam part of the legacy of John F. Kennedy. Moreover, Robert Kennedy initially supported Lyndon Johnson's efforts in Southeast Asia. Kennedy’s support waned, however, as the conflict grew in the middle sixties, and Johnson came to rely on policies significantly different from those of o John F. Kennedy. Ultimately, Robert Kennedy openly opposed the policies o of Lyndon B. Johnson. The split between Robert F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson was more than a disagreement of politicians over policies. The uncertain relation­ ship between the two men dominated the Democratic party, and much of the national interest, from 1964 to 1968. Despite periodic attempts by both men to deny its existence, their mutual dislike was well-known, and car­ ried with it the danger of a party-shattering battle between them:

To the public, the two were brooding generals of hostile armies camped in the same city, skirmishing on occasion, making spor­ adic attempts at negotiation, while each prepared for the ulti­ mate clash in which one would emerge the victor. Their feud had its stormy and quiescent stages, its periods of sharp con­ frontation and attempted accommodation; but the over-all trend was toward gradual breakdown. 10

Statement of the Problem

Robert Kennedy was not the first Democratic Senator to oppose President Johnson’s war policies, nor were his policies particularly rad­ ical. In many instances, Kennedy raised points that "other senators were making as a matter of course." Yet, "more than any other person, Ken­ nedy was responsible for the massive shift in opinion" by the American people concerning the conflict. 12 Although Senators "like Wayne Morse and J. William Fulbright, had from the first opposed President Johnson’s dispatch of ground forces and bombing," nJ

BOWLING GREEN UNIV. LIBRARY 4

. . . neither was a political leader with any important nat­ ional following. And though many well-known political and intellectual figures joined the "peace movement," their im­ pact was minimal until Robert Kennedy placed himself, in effect, at the head of the President's opposition. 14

Kennedy's pivotal role stemmed from his enormous national follow­ ing, He was John F. Kennedy's political heir. Millions regarded him as "an actual. de facto, future President.This fact gave Robert F, Kennedy political power and influence far beyond that of "a junior Sen­ ator from New York." Kennedy "was a folk hero, a pop icon, a symbol of political opposition and glamorous royalty; he was his brother's brother, his family's heir, and his party's prince. Kennedy was constantly in the public eye. His actions were sub­ jected to the widest possible scrutiny; he attracted attention in all he did:

On November 18, 196M-, for example, the Houston Chronicle ran an eight-column, banner headline: KENNEDY WILL NOT OPPOSE JOHNSON IN '68. That a major newspaper, twelve days after Lyndon Johnson had been elected by a margin of 16 million votes, felt such a denial rated major news play, seems in­ credible; but it was not atypical. 1?

Not all of the attention generated by Kennedy was favorable. An element of the electorate regarded him as a ruthless opportunist, intent on furth- 18 ering his own interests regardless of the cost to others. In this man­ ner, Kennedy's political power was also a political liability:

. . . Kennedy was invariably attacked as having personal and political motivations for making the same criticisms of policy that Mansfield, Fulbright, and a score of other senators were making .... 19

Herein lies the dilemma faced by Robert Kennedy as he criticized 5 the policies of a man he was known to dislike. Due to the aura of the Kennedy name, his ideas received far greater distribution and attention than those of the average politician and had an unusually important impact on the mood of the nation. At the same time, "every time Kennedy made a political move it was interpreted as laying the foundation for a challenge to the President. Of interest to rhetorical analysts is Kennedy’s reaction to this dilemma. He was aware of his love/hate relationship with the electorate. He was also a man with definite Presidential aspirations. 22 The Vietnam war as administered by President Johnson presented Kennedy with a situa­ tion from which he could not retreat. He had to become involved, although to do so was to invite a dangerous administration counterattack which might precipitate a final break between Kennedy and Johnson. It seems reasonable to assume that Kennedy approached the Vietnam issue warily, according to some plan or strategy. It will be the central function of this analysis to determine and evaluate Kennedy's strategy as revealed in his major statements during the period 1966-1968.

Methodology

The analysis of rhetorical strategy as a critical method mandates that the critic make two fundamental assumptions. Initially, the critic must accept the idea that strategy is a legitimate concept; that rhetor­ icians actually wield the tools of persuasion in a strategic manner. The second assumption is that the strategy used in a persuasive effort can be I discovered and evaluated by the critic. ----- The initial methodological task confronting this undertaking is to 6 explain and apply these assumptions, for if they are invalid or are some­ how inappropriate to Robert Kennedy, then further consideration of analy­ sis of rhetorical strategy as a methodology for this study is meaningless With this theoretical foundation clearly established, the critic may con­ sider more specific, practical aspects of strategy. The practical characteristics of rhetorical strategy are discov­ ered by asking certain pertinent questions about the concept. ^Generally, the critic needs to determine the generic nature of strategy and make any necessary distinctions between the general concept of strategy and the more specific sub-group called rhetorical strategy^ ^The critic must also note the relationship between strategy and the conditions which produce the emergence of strategy^ Similarly, the relationship between strategy and the implementation of strategy should be explored.* / As a final con­ sideration, the critic must establish the basis for evaluation of strat­ egy^ ^Chapter two of this analysis will deal with these questions. The subsequent chapters will examine Kennedy from a strategic perspective and deal at length with his dissent from the Vietnam policies of Lyndon J ohnson.

Justification

This undertaking is warranted on three grounds: the man, the -A issue, and the approach. The unique position occupied by Robert F. Ken- r - J nedy has already been noted, as well as the singular effect of his dis­ sent on the American political situation. He was a significant leader of a large element of the anti-war movement and ultimately sought the Presidency, in part due to the constraints of the issue of Vietnam.

4 7

The significance of this issue needs little elucidation. Although the direct military involvement of the United States ended in 1973» the final takeover of the South by the Communists in 1975 was a severe blow to United States foreign policy. Thousands of Americans died in Vietnam, billions of dollars were expended, and the Vietnam issue was significant in three presidential elections. The intangible costs of the war—dissat' isfaction, alienation, disillusionment—will probably never be accurately measured. They exist nonetheless. Thonnsen, Baird, and Braden speak of "men whose oratory was promp­ ted by the ebb and flow of major events which have determined the destiny of nations"; situations in which "the man and the issue met, and that issue gave free rein to the man's vision and his skill in the use of the .spoken word."^ Robert F. Kennedy was such a man, Vietnam was such an issue. The two deserve study, not in isolation, but together. Consideration of the methodology employed here also serves to justify this study. Kennedy will be viewed from a strategic perspective, which, by itself, is not an unusual procedure. However, before utiliz­ ing analysis of rhetorical strategy as a methodology, this inquiry will embark on an in-depth examination of the concept of rhetorical strategy. By clarifying and perhaps standardizing an approach to rhetorical strat­ egy» this study, it is hoped, may make a significant contribution to the field of speech.

Review of Literature

Materials pertinent to this study may be organized around three subject heads: those dealing with Robert Kennedy; those dealing with the Vietnam war; and those dealing with rhetorical strategy. In each instance there appears to he sufficient materials available to support this under­ taking. General literature abounds with treatments of Robert F. Kennedy. He was a subject of much study and speculation during his lifetime, and as a result there is a rich legacy, of books, articles, interviews, and even parodies. These stem from widely varying sources and reflect the somewhat diverse range of opinion concerning Robert Kennedy. Of greatest value to this study are the works of the "unbiased"sources—reporters and observers of the American political scene—whose journalistic abilities and objectivity have been previously demonstrated. David Halberstam’s numerous works on Kennedy are valuable, as are the treatments of Theodore White and Stuart Gerry Brown. An "inside" view of Kennedy is provided by Theodore Sorensen, Jack Newfield, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William Vanden Heuvel, and Milton Gwirtzman. Although these individuals were close to Kennedy and part of his "inner circle," their objectivity is surprisingly impressive when compared with the sub­ jectivity of the journalistic group. Of greatest concern to. this study, of course, are the specific instances in which Robert Kennedy interacted publicly with the Vietnam issue. Happily, his discourses are readily available. Most of his major addresses were printed in the Congressional Record. The Federal Deposit­ ory of Records in Waltham, Massachusetts, has on file most of Robert Kennedy’s press releases and statements. Unfortunately, Kennedy’s pri­ vate papers were not available to the public when the research for this study was conducted. 9

There is surprisingly little available in the way of rhetorical analysis of Robert Kennedy. The available sources indicate no disserta­ tions in the speech field devoted to him. While several master's theses center on Kennedy, none examines him in the context of his Vietnam dis­ sent, and none utilizes rhetorical strategy as a subject of study. Accordingly, this study is unparalleled in its subject and approach. It is not easy to find data from which to write even a short sum­ mary of the United States' involvement in Vietnam. The difficulty lies not in the paucity of analyses of that involvement, but in the compet­ ence and objectivity of those providing the analysis. As demonstrated in Daniel Ellsberg's essay, "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine," even the popular or "official" histories of the conflict are open to 24 question. At this writing, the best overall history of the Vietnamese con- 25 flict seems to be Chester Cooper's The Lost Crusade. The book reveals the perspective of a career diplomat but seems to avoid identification with any particular theory of or approach to explaining the war. More­ over, Cooper goes beyond the mere recollection of details and presents a clear explanation of events. Of particular value to this study is the Vietnam Chronology detailed by Cooper. Moreover, the works of Daniel Ellsberg, David Halberstam, Arthur Schlesinger, and Prances Fitzgerald provide valuable supplemental material on the war. A brief perusal of material in the speech field reveals an in­ creasing interest in the study of rhetorical strategy. Recent journal articles provide evidence of the popularity of the approach. These will provide a definite background for the methodology of this study, as well 10 as a framework against which this author’s conception of strategy may be tested.. 11

FOOTNOTES David Halberstarn, The Best And The Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 38. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. ^Jack Newfield, Robert F, Kennedy; A Memoir (New York: Dutton, 1969) , p. no. ■^David Halberstam, "The Vietnamization of America," Playboy. January, 1971, P. H8. ^Edwin Guthman, We Band of Brothers (New York: Random House, 19^9), p. 328. 7Ibid. 8jules Witcover, 85 Days; The Last Campaign of Robert F. Kennedy (New York: Ace Publishing Company, 1969), p.22. ^William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own: Robert F, Kennedy, 1964-1968 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970) , p. 225. ■^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 245. 11 Stuart Gerry Brown, The Presidency on Trial; Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 Campaign and Afterwards (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1972), p. 24. 12Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 226. 13Ibid.

“•^Robert S. Bird, "At Home With The Heir Apparent," Saturday Evening Post. August 26, 1967, p. 28, ^Newfield, p. 18. ^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 264. ^Theodore C. Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy: A Peaceful Revolution for the Seventies (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1969), p. 29. l^Penn Kimball, Bobby Kennedy and the New Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 63. 12

^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 264. 21 Oriani Fallaci, "Robert Kennedy Answers Some Blunt Questions," Look. March 9, 1965, P° 64. 22gorensen, P. 94. ^Lester Thonnsen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. Braden, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970), — J ^Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 42-136. 25ghester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1970)» 13

CHAPTER 2

THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Critics have become enamored, with assessing the strategic impli­ cations of rhetorical activity. The terms "strategy of" or "strategies for" appear with some regularity in recent publication lists.Despite this interest, little theoretical treatment of strategy has appeared. Some writers avoid formal consideration of "rhetorical strategy" alto- 2 gether, using the term without defining it. Those who choose to define 3 strategy often do so in a cursory manner. Perhaps because of this lack of theoretical groundwork the term seems not to have been used consistent­ ly—at least on the surface, [~Andrews,^ Cheseboro,-^ and Patterson,among others, see strategy

as an external influence on discourse. They focus on rhetoric as a means of accomplishing a desired end or goal, and describe individual rhetorical acts as parts of a process or campaign to achieve the goalT^

Subsequent evaluation of these acts, if it exists at all, centers on their success or failure in realizing the goal. Rhetoric is thus seen as part 'of strategy. ------Micken,*'7 and Jensen, fi on the other hand, view strategy as an internal element of rhetoric. While not ignoring the larger framework noted above, they focus primarily on the effects of rhetorical acts, describing and evaluating the techniques employed by the rhetor to achieve these results. In this way, strategy is a part of rhetoric, 14

Given this difference of opinion, it is not unreasonable to suppose that confusion may arise regarding the exact nature of rhetorical strategy. It would therefore seem appropriate to begin this analysis with a detailed treatment of the strategic perspective as a means of viewing rhetorical activity. Such an approach should deal with the nat­ ure of strategy, how strategy is created and implemented, the relation­ ship between rhetoric and strategy, and those factors of strategy which may be relevant to the critic as a means of evaluating rhetorical trans­ actions. A series of statements will be presented as a means of develop­ ing the strategic perspective.

Strategy is a Plan for Achieving a Goal

This idea is consistent with common definitions of strategy. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary suggests that strategy is

The science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford maximum support for adopted policies in peace or war. 9

Presumably, the way a nation or group of nations employs the forces mentioned constitutes strategy. Subsequent Webster definitions, "A care­ ful plan or method"^ and "The art of devising or employing plans, or strategems, towards a goal”^"'1' support this idea. Strategy would thus appear to be the plan or method by which means to an end are employed. r ^JThese definitions clearly indicate the goal orientation of strategy^ The political, economic, psychological, and military forces are not organized idly, but to provide "maximum support for adopted policies." The implication here is that strategy is purposeful, 15 directed at accomplishing specific ends. It may be further suggested that a single strategy may pursue several goals, or that a single goal may be sought by several strategies. If this situation occurs it is logical to presume that one strategy or goal will be regarded as "primary" by the strategist. Secondary strat­ egies or goals may appear inconsistent with one another but they should prove consistent with the primary strategy or goal. It is also of interest to note the relationship between goals and the strategies they inspire. ^Strategies flow from goals, A strategy is

the creation of the goal it pursues. If the goal did not exist,neither would the strategy. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect that strategies will "fit" or be consistent with the goals they serveT^ If this is a valid assumption, one would expect that the selection of a goal or goals automatically excludes some possible strategies from use. This selection/exclusion process is rooted in past experience, custom, law, or even physical properties.^A~candidate seeking office is an example. The accustomed strategy for pursuing such an end is the political campaign. There may be other possible methods of securing public office, but the "expected" means of so doing is by running for office. Any radical de- parture from this framework might be viewed with suspicion. \

Strategies are Implemented by Tactics

Webster suggests that a tactic is "a device for accomplishing an end." 12 If one relates this definition to the previous analysis of strat­ egy» it is possible to conclude that the specific political, economic, psychological and military activities undertaken to support the adopted 16

policies are tactical implementations of strategic choices.^ They are the things for which strategy plans, the devices which strategy organ­ izes. They are that which strategy marshalls towards the goal, and are employed systematically rather than haphazardly. In this framework strat­ egy is seen as a plan for achieving an end and tactics are the specific methods employed in the process of achieving that end. There are no limitations on the number of tactics employed by a ' specific strategy; nor are there any set limitations on the number of i times a particular tactic may be employed. The only guideline in each i i instance is the judgment of the person directing the strategy. L3 As strategy flows from goals, so tactics flow from goals and strategies. The commentary on appropriateness of strategy to goals also applies to tactics. They must fit the goals and strategies they serve. Moreover, it is apparent that the selection of certain goals and strate­ gies almost mandates the selection of certain tactics. To return to the previous political example, it is almost unthinkable for a candidate run­ ning for office not to utilize the mass media in some way—billboards, posters, newspapers, radio and television. Further, there are certain groups to be addressed, certain principles to be upheld. These are ex­ pected tactics in political campaigns.

Goals, Strategies, and Tactics Emerge from an Individual's Perception of a Situation Which Requires Action

"'Situation" is here viewed as the setting or context within which and because of which activity occurs. This interpretation parallels the "scene" of Kenneth Burke, the properties of which he describes thusly: 17

From the motivational point of view, there is implicit in the quality of a scene the quality of the action that is to take place within it. This would be another way of saying that the act will be consistent with the scene. 13

That is the basic idea of the following statement: An individual (or a group of individuals; or a nation or group of nations, for that matter) perceives the existence of a scene or situation, characterises it, and acts in a manner consistent with that characterization. Characterization of the situation determines the "quality" of the scene or situation for a given actor. This immediately narrows the range of possible responses to those which are appropriate to or consistent with the identified sit­ uation. The individual determines, consciously or unconsciously, the appropriate response (goals, strategies, tactics). This process may be relatively short or it may drag on for con­ siderable lengths of time, depending on the nature of the situation. If it is a familiar situation, one which the individual has encountered and dealt with previously, one would expect the process to proceed smoothly and quickly. If the situation is more complex, involving many factors, or if the situation is unfamiliar, identification of it and selection of the proper response may prove more difficult. A final factor to be considered in the relationship between sit­ uation and response is the relationship between the situation and other situations the individual may be involved in. It may be presumed that more important situations will receive more careful scrutinization and more delicate handling than those of lesser importance. Emphasis should be placed on the role of subjective perception in this process. It is well known that two individuals observing the same event will often disagree on what they have observed. They may not agree 18 that anything has happened, at all. They may disagree about the nature of what has happened. They may disagree on responses to it. One may readily expect to find individuals faced with the same or similar situ­ ations acting in totally different ways, depending on differences in perception and identification. In sum, individuals are faced with situations which they may per­ ceive as mandating some response on their part. The nature of that re­ sponse, its forms, methods, and intended results, are largely determined by the individual’s identification of the situation. The relationship of that situation to others currently experienced by the indiviual also affects the creation of the response.

Rhetorical Goals, Strategies, and Tactics Emerge from Rhetorical I Situations ----- 1

The concept of rhetorical situation utilized here comes from Lloyd Bitzer's work in this area. Bitzer contends that rhetoric comes into being as a response to a rhetorical situation, and exists "for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task."In­

In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by direct application of energy to objects, but by the crea­ tion of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bring­ ing into existence a discourse of such character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it be­ comes mediator of change. In this sense, rhetoric is always persuasive. 15

Three constituents of a rhetorical situation are isolated: Exigence, Audience, and Constraints. Bitzer defines exigence as 19 "an imperfection marked by urgency...a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be."^°

Although there may be several exigences operating in any situation, "there will be at least one controlling exigence which functions as the organ.i zi.n g principle." 17 Bitzer theorizes further that the exigence "may or may not be perceived clearly" by those in the situation, and that it "may be strong or weak depending on the clarity" of the partici- *1 o pants' perception and "the degree of their interest in it..." Bitzer cautions that

An exigence which cannot be modified is not rhetorical; thus whatever comes about of necessity and cannot be changed...are exigencies to be sure, but they are not rhetorical. Further, an exigence which can be modified only by means other than discourse is not rhetorical; thus, an exigence is not rhetorical when its modification requires merely one's own action or the application of a tool, but neither requires nor invites the assistance of discourse. An exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse. 19

In Bitzer*s framework the audience "must be distinguished from a body of mere hearers or readers," for they consist "only of those per­ sons capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change." 20 Failure in either capacity removes the audience from the rhetorical situation. Constraints, according to Bitzer, are:

...made up of persons, events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decisions and action needed to modify the exigence. Standard sources of constraint include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the like; and when the orator enters the situation, his discourse not only harnesses constraints given by the 20 situation but provides additional important constraints— for example, his personal character, his logical proofs and his style. 20

Constraints are further divided into two classes:

...(l) those originated or managed by the rhetor and his method (Aristotle called these "artistic proofs"), and (2) those other constraints, in the situation, which may be operative (Aristotle’s "inartistic proofs"). 22

The final elements of the rhetorical situation are discovered "when the orator, invited by the situation, enters it and creates and presents dis­ course; then both he and his speech are additional elements."^ The rhetorical situation is prescriptive in relation to the dis­ course it produces. "Although the rhetorical situation invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response...it invites a...response that fits the situation." 24 To accomplish this, Bitzer suggests that the 'Situation must somehow prescribe the response which fits." 25 Although the process may sound simple, Bitzer cautions that "situations exhibit structures which are simple or complex, and more or less organized."4 The complexity of the situation depends on the number of factors it contains. Organization or structure of a situation is more complicated, for any situation, simple or complex, may be tightly or loosely structured:

Situations may become weakened in structure due to complex­ ity or disconnectedness. A list of eauses includes these: (a) a single situation may involve numerous exigences; (b) exigences in the same situation may be incompatible; (c) two or more simultaneous rhetorical situations may •compete for our attention, as in some parliamentary debates; (d) at a given moment, persons comprising the audience of situation A may also be the audience of situations B, C, and D; (e) the rhetorical audience may be scattered, 21 uneducated, regarding its duties and powers, or it may dissipate; (f) constraints may be limited in number and force, and they may be incompatible. This is enough to suggest the sorts of things which weaken the structure of situations. 27

At this juncture it would seem helpful to explain exactly how rhetorical goals, strategies, and tactics emerge from rhetorical situations. The process is roughly as follows: A potential rhetor encounters a rhetorical situation and determines his position regarding the exigence or exigences in that situation. He decides if they should be removed, modified, defused, or dealt with in any manner. This pro­ cess establishes the goal or goals of the rhetor. (Recall, that the rhetor may establish several goals regarding the exigence or exigences in a given situation.) The rhetor then identifies and analyzes the aud­ ience provided him by the situation, and determines an approach or approaches to galvanize the audience's support for his position. This is the creation of a rhetorical strategy. (Recall again that there may be many strategies involved.) The rhetor then surveys the rhetorical options available to him—the forms of reaching the audience. He selects those he deems appropriate and prepares to use them. These are his rhet­ orical tactics. For each tactic used, the rhetor determines its role in implementing the strategy. Perhaps a single tactic will suffice to imp­ lement the strategy. Perhaps there will be many tactics involved, so that the strategy may be implemented in steps or stages. The rhetor then utilizes his tactics, by delivery of a speech, by writing material, or whatever—by actually engaging in a rhetorical act. In so doing he relies on specific rhetorical techniques. These specific techniques may be seen as the implementation of the tactic. Finally, the rhetor must 22 assess the impact of his activity, re-checking his perception of the strategy and its components, determining if his strategies and tactics were appropriate to the situation, and monitoring any change in the situation as a result of his activities. He may have to formulate new strategies and tactics as a result of these changes. In this manner, rhetorical situations and the strategies they produce are organic, on­ going processes. I would add a final consideration regarding the rhetorical sit­ uation and the discourse it inspires. One can reasonably expect to see multiple strategies and tactics at work in situations involving major policies or decisions, particularly when those policies or decisions affect segments of the public. This idea is expressed by Charles U. Larson :

With rare exceptions, significant changes in attitude, behavior, belief, or action are probably not the result of a "single shot" or single message appeal. If this were the case, persuasion would be hopeless. It would imply that people are so fickle and changeable that they bounce from pro to con minute by minute; and it would be meaningless to try to persuade them to do anything, for at any time another persuader could happen along, deliver a single message, and undo all the work done by the first persuader. 28

It also seems probable that major decisions regarding public policy could arouse more adverse opinion and involve more diverse groups of people than less important decisions. This, too, warrants the use of multiple strategies and tactics in dealing with the situation.

Rhetorical Strategy is a Potential Tool of Criticism

Utilization of the strategic perspective as a means of studying 23 discourse requires the critic to answer a series of interrelated ques­ tions. Initially, the critic must determine the elements and factors of the rhetorical situation?) What factors of the situation were perceived as exigences by the rhetor? How were these factors created? Was the situ­ ation simple or complex, structured or unstructured? ^The critic mu* ~ then question.the strategy or strategies that emerge from the goal?J Can these strategies be determined? Which strat­ egy was primary? How were the strategies created? Were they simple or complex? How effective were they in modifying the exigence? Were they appropriate to the situation and the audience? jT major area of analysis should be the tactics employed by the rhetor?^ What were the main tactics? Did they "fit" the situation? Did they "fit" the strategy? What were the roles played by the various tac­ tics? How were they created? Did they further the strategy? The critic will also wish to examine the techniques employed by the rhetor in util­ izing his tactics. Did the intended responses materialize? How did they affect the audience? What specific actions were taken by the rhetor to implement his tactics? The critic will wish finally to examine the effect of the rhetor /' and his discourse on the situation?) What impact did they have? What counterattacks, if any, did the rhetor provoke? Were there subsequent alterations of goals, strategies or tactics? In determining the overall evaluation of discourse by means of the strategic perspective, the critic will simply wish to ask—how effec­ tively did the rhetor meet the situation? The strategic perspective provides a basis for answering this question. 24

THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE REVISITED

This analysis initially posited the idea that strategy was used inconsistently—at least on the surface. The examination of strategy just completed clearly indicates that this inconsistency is only on the surface.^Strategy can justifiably be seen as both an external and inter­

nal element of rhetoric. It is external in the sense that rhetoric is employed to further a strategy for affecting a rhetorical situation. Thus, a specific rhetorical act is part of a strategy, or a tactic for implementing the strategy. Strategy is also an internal element of a rhetorical act in that the techniques of persuasion are used strategically or purposefully. Thus, the critic is justified in looking at a rhetorical act from either the internal or external frame of reference. The entire strategic perspective is as follows, assuming a single, overriding goal, strategy, and the use of a single tactic?^

A rhetorical situation is perceived by a rhetor. The rhetor establishes a goal for himself in regards to modification of the situ­ ation. To achieve the goal, the rhetor adopts a strategy or plan. To /implement the plan, the rhetor devises or selects tactics. Each tactic is used according to a plan, and each tactic’s plan is implemented via persuasive techniques. A diagram of a potential strategic perspective ¡^of a rhetorical situation follows. In viewing the diagram which follows, it must be kept in mind that the components of rhetorical strategy exist in a rhetorical situa­ tion as perceived by an orator or rhetor. jjThe individual’s perception -- will significantly affect his determination of goals, strategies, tactics, 25 purposes and. constraints. These, in turn, help reveal rhetor's percep­ tions

Goal: In a rhetorical situation, the goal of the rhetor is to achieve an interaction between the audience and an exigence. Only the audience can achieve the modification of the exigence desired by the rhetor. Thus, the goal is paramount in the creation of goals, strategies, tactics, and the like.

Strategy: A plan or method of achieving the desired modification. The strategy flows from the goal, and may be simple or complex.

Tactics: Depending on the strategy or strategies selected by the rhetor, the tactics used to implement the strategy may also be simple or complex. There may be a single tactic, a few, or a long, sustained campaign. Each tactic, however, plays a role in implementing the'strategy of the rhetor.

Purpose: This is the role of the tactic in implementing the strategy. Specifically, in a rhetorical situation in which the rhetor engages in a long, complex, persuasive campaign, there may be several tactics, each with a different purpose, but each designed to help implement the strategy

Constraints: To a rhetorical analyst, the constraints of the tactics used by the rhetor are vitally important. Literally, they are the things the rhetor utilizes to convince the audience to interact with the exigence and modify it. Once again, in any particular tactic, there may be many constraints or only a few. FOOTNOTES

James R. Andrews, "The Practical Strategy: Richard Cobden's Arbitration Speech of 1849, "Western Speech,Winter, 1968, pp. 27-35; James R. Andrews, "The Passionate Negation: The Chartist Movement in Rhetorical Perspective, "QJS, April 1, 1973, PP« 196-208; James R. Andrews, "Coercive Rhetoric Strategy in Political Conflict: A Case Study of the Trent Affair," Central States Speech Journal, Winter, 1973, PP« 253~26l; Robert J. Brake, "The Porch and the Stump: Campaign Strat­ egies in the 1920 Presidential Election," QJS, October, 1969, PP. 256- 267; James W. Chesebro, "Rhetorical Strategies of the Radical-Revol­ utionary," Today's Speech, Winter, 1972, pp. 37“47; J. A. Hendrix, "The Shivercrat Rebellion: A Case Study in Campaign Speaking Strate­ gies," Southern Speech Journal, Summer, 1968, pp. 289-295; J. Vernon Jensen, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Thomas H. Huxley and Robert G. Ingersoll: Agnostics and Roadblock Removers," Speech Monographs, March, 1965, PP. 59-68; Ralph A. Micken, "The Triumph of Strategy in the Senate Debate on the League of Nations," QJS, February, 1951, PP« 49-53; J. W. . Patterson, "Arthur Vandenberg's Rhetorical Strategy in Advancing Bipart- ison Foreign Policy," QJS, October, 1970» PP. 284-295« ^Robert J. Brake, "The Porch and the Stump: Campaign Strategies in the 1920 Presidential Election," QJS, October, 1969, PP. 256-267; J, A. Hendrix, "The Shivercrat Rebellion: A Case Study in Campaign Speaking Strategies," Southern Speech Journal, Summer, 1968, pp. 289- 295; J« Vernon Jensen, "The Rhetorical Strategy of Thomas H. Huxley and Robert G. Ingersoll: Agnostics and Roadblock Removers," Speech Mono­ graphs , March, 1965, PP. 59-68. ^James W. Chesebro, "Rhetorical Strategies of the Radical Revol­ utionary," Today's Speech, Winter, 1972, pp. 37-47. -— ^Andrews, loc, sit. ■^Chesebro, loc. sit. ^Patterson, loc. sit. ^Micken, loc. sit. ^Jensen, loc. sit. ^Philip B. Gove, (ed), Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Diction­ ary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1969). l^Gove, loc. sit. -^Gove, loc. sit. 27 12Gove, p. 897. ■^Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1969) pp. 6-7. -¡-^Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation, "Contemporary Rhetoric: A Reader's Coursehook, ed. Douglas Ehninger (Glenview, Illi- nois; Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972), p. 41. 15Ibid. ■^Bitzer, p. 43.

17Ibid. l8Ibid.

19Ibid. 20Bitzer, p. 44. 21Ibid. 22Ibid. 23lbid. ^Bitzer, p. 45. 23ibid. 28Bitzer, p. 46.

27Bitzer, p. 47. v__ 28Charles U. Larson, Persuasion: Reception and_Responsibility (Belmont, California : Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1973)» P»i62 28

CHAPTER 3

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE OP ROBERT KENNEDY

The general framework for a strategic study having been estab­ lished, it seems appropriate to move into more specific analysis of the subject of this study—Robert F. Kennedy. In so doing, one must care­ fully consider the factors just discussed and decide at which point entrance into the strategic framework is most logical. An earlier notation asserted that Robert Kennedy was not a "typi­ cal" or "ordinary" Senator. It would therefore seem appropriate to consider the factors setting Kennedy apart from "ordinary" politicians, for these were factors which Kennedy brought to any situation he entered. If Kennedy’s entrances into situations were planned, these factors should have been taken into consideration as he formulated his rhetorical strat­ egies and tactics. The relevant factors seem to have been Kennedy's reputation, his ambition, and his relationship with Lyndon Johnson. To analyze these items the best process seems to be first to explore the nature of these specific factors and then speculate as to the obligations or restraints they placed on Robert Kennedy. To facilitate analysis of Robert Kennedy with respect to the Vietnam issue, Kennedy’s involvement in the decision-making process leading to that conflict will also be examined 23

Kennedy's Reputation

In the early years of Robert F. Kennedy's tenure as Attorney General, one of the more frequent criticisms directed at him by liberals was his seeming reluctance to champion Civil Rights activities in the South.1 Jack Newfield, then actively engaged in Southern Civil Rights activities, was one of those who found fault with the Attorney General's position. In later years Newfield worked with Kennedy, studied him, and repudiated his earlier conclusions:

There was one obligatory paragraph that every journalist who liked Robert Kennedy felt compelled to write. It was a defensive ritual, a ransom paid to the reputation that followed Kennedy wherever he went. The shock of unrecog­ nition when you finally got to know Kennedy was universal, and so the obligatory paragraph always managed to sound the same, no matter who wrote it. 2

One "journalist who liked Robert Kennedy" was Jules Witcover of the Los Angeles Times. He, too, felt the need for the "obligatory paragraph":

One of the newsmen had talked of the relationship between the reporter of integrity and Robert Kennedy ... "I hope I don't have to cover Kennedy too much," he said, "because he gets to me—you have to guard against liking him too much." It was an admission some reporters would never have made, either because they didn't like him, or more frequently, they liked him too much and showed it, by becoming de facto members of the entourage. Within the press corps, there were those known to be "soft on Bobby,” but it was easy to be that way, especially in the later years and months. 3

The picture presented by Newfield and Witcover is, however, incomplete. Just as there were journalists who were "soft" on Kennedy, so there were others who were "hard" on him. Those who disliked Kennedy also wrote paragraphs, indeed even pages and chapters and books 30

explaining and justifying their dislike of him. No careful researcher of this man can fail to be impressed by the deep division of opinion sur­ rounding him. Almost every publication, pro-Kennedy or anti-Kennedy, deals extensively with Robert F. Kennedy, the man. Henry Fairlie ex­ plains that "the man keeps getting in the way of the politician . . . everyone was always wondering what made Robert Kennedy tick, as if he 4 were a time bomb, as some indeed regarded him . . . ." Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Kennedy’s reputation consistently colored interpretations of his actions; thus this reputation should be examined. Plumbing Robert Kennedy's character reveals one quality, one characteristic which transcends the others—ruthlessness. The most common invective cast at him was that he was ruthless, capable of committing any act, of trampling any individual, to further his own ends. Newfield noted that, "It was almost a fad to hate him."^ The roots of this extraordinary feeling may be traced to twin sources: Kennedy's personality and his government service. The personality of Robert Kennedy may be aptly described as enig­ matic. "He was not just complex, he was contradictory. His most basic characteristics were simple, intense, and in direct conflict with each other. He was constantly at war with himself.An examination of Ken­ nedy's background may prove useful in finding an explanation for his complexity. Robert F. Kennedy was the seventh of nine children, destined to be the "runt of the litter." Smaller, less physically able than the rest of his family, he sought to establish himself through sheer determination and effort: 31

Bobby's "struggle to survive" began young. From an early age he exhibited an unusual physical assertiveness and tenacity. At four, he infuriated Joe Junior and Jack one day by repeatedly jumping off their sailboat in Nantucket Sound in a memorable swim-or-sink effort. As JFK wryly recalled, Bobby's determination showed "either a lot of guts or no sense at all, depending on how you looked at it." 7

In later life he was to retain this tenacity of purpose, so that he was "surrounded by "an air of white-knuckled tension" that was "intimidating o to many people." He was able to bring his capacity for single-minded intensity to every controversy in which he was embroiled, adopting .. "a blunt, unyielding, uncompromising set of attitudes" that some obser­ vers found "infuriating and even offensive .... Because of this, he fwasj called ruthless. There was another quality of his complex nature which contributed to Kennedy the man. His intense, sincere Catholicism reinforced other parts of his personality, giving him a "strong sense of Good and Evil" and a "tendency towards quick, moralistic judgments.Commenting on her husband, Ethel Kennedy once noted that, "For him, the World is divided into black and white hats . . . Bobby can only distinguish‘good men and bad, good things and bad."^ The mixed harvest of such a personality is noted by William Shannon:

Once he identifies an injustice, Kennedy loathes it with rare intensity and works relentlessly against it. A moral­ istic, judgmental viewpoint can often though not inevitably lead to arrogance, self-righteousness, and over-simplifi­ cation of what is complex. Kennedy has been guilty of these failings at times but less so of late than in the early years of his career. Notwithstanding these offsetting weaknesses, Kennedy’s moral force remains one of his major sources of strength. It gives purpose to his other qualities such as courage, loyalty, and intelligence. It is what makes Kennedy a solid man to rely upon in a crisis. 12 32

Kennedy can thus be seen as "not one but many personalities."13 Intense, moralistic, competitive—it is not surprising that such a man would make enemies. However, this alone does not adequately summarize Kennedy's reputation as a factor in his career. Penn Kimball noted in 1966 that Kennedy's "present and his future are to an astonishing degree bound up in his past. Most of the major criticisms directed against him 14 today were first leveled five to ten years ago."

It was during this period, from 1952 to 1961, that the classic images of Robert Kennedy were shaped, and were never to be totally erased; taunting underworld figures during the McClellan committee's investigation into labor racketeering; warning Hubert Humphrey, "We'll get you," at the i960 Los Angeles convention after finding out Humphrey would not support his brother; jabbing a finger into Chester Bowles' stomach, and telling him he was not in favor of the Bay of Pigs invasion, no matter what he thought in private; testifying in defense of legislation with wide provisions for wiretapping. 15

These "classic images" of Kennedy were influenced £0 no slight degree by the fact that "almost all his roles and jobs had a high, built- in potential for conflict and controversy . . . as a consideration of his career will reveal. Upon graduation from Virginia Law School in 1951» Robert Kennedy decided on a career in government service. His specific choice was a job in the Department of Justice. After managing his brother's success­ ful Senatorial campaign the following year, Robert Kennedy was recommended as an assistant counsel to the staff of Senator Joseph McCarthy's Sub­ committee on Investigations,, Although the Senator was a friend of the Kennedy family, he did not recruit Robert Kennedy for the position, nor did Kennedy assume the role out of loyalty to the Wisconsin Senator, 33 although he did. feel that investigation of communist influence in govem- ment was a necessary and laudable task. 17 A scant six months after joining the McCarthy forces, Kennedy resigned after warning the Senator that his investigations were getting out of hand. He warned McCarthy of the excesses of his chief counsel— 18 Roy Cohn. The temper of the committee's investigations also alarmed the three Democratic Senators serving with McCarthy—McClellan, Jackson, and Symington. They, too, left the committee in protest, but returned a few months later, bringing the younger Kennedy with them as chief minority counsel. In this new role Kennedy was instrumental in drafting the com- * 19 mittee’s final report, which proved critical of McCarthy and Cohn. In spite of this, Kennedy was to be tied to McCarthy and McCarthyism, a 20 stain which was with him for the rest of his life, Kennedy's next governmental role was also investigative, and again controversial. Continuing his association with Senator McClellan, Kennedy became chief counsel for the "Rackets" Committee. In this new capacity, Kennedy became noted for his dogged pursuit of Teamster offic­ ials Dave Beck and James Hoffa. It was in this setting that Kennedy's "ruthless" image began to germinate. The hearings "produced the rapid- fire, combative questioning" that quickly became Kennedy's trademark and 21 "laid the foundation for the sterotype that he was ruthless." An ex­ cerpt from Kennedy's cross-examination of Beck may help to show how this may have happened:

"What was his (Shefferman’s) position with Sears, Roebuck?" Bob asked. "I can't answer that," Beck said. y*

"You don't know what Mr. Shefferman's position was with Sears, Roebuck?" "No, I cannot." "You have no idea?" "No, I do not." "You have no idea?" "I do not have an idea of his official position; no." "Do you know what services he performed for Sears, Roebuck?" "Well, let me answer it this way. I don't know where you are going or where you intend to go—" "Yes, you do, Mr. Beck," Bob interrupted. "And I say I don't!" Beck shouted. "I am not contradicting you. Don't say that I know when I do not answer the question." "Then answer the question," Bob said evenly. "All right," Beck said, his voice rising. "I tell you I do not know." "Answer the question." "All right, I am not going to answer the question because I don't know. I am going to answer the question in this manner: I must decline to answer the question because this committee lacks jurisdiction or authority under Articles I, II and III of the Constitution; further, I decline to answer because I refuse to give testimony against myself, and invoke the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and further because the question is not relevant or pertinent to the investigation." "Answer the question." "I have answered the question. Do you want me to read it again? I will. I must decline to answer the question because this commit­ tee lacks jurisdiction . . . ," 22

Although it may very well be true that when "Senator McClellan took over the chairmanship of the subcommittee and Bob became chief coun­ sel . . . McCarthy's mishandling of his investigation and his demagoguery 35 23 were never very far from their minds," J Kennedy was nonetheless criti­ cized for going to extremes, a criticism which may have been justified. Robert Kennedy pursued James Hoffa relentlessly, continuing to do so during his tenure as his brother’s Attorney General. The important aspect of Kennedy's service as chief counsel to the McClellan committee is not whether the committee went to extremes— in light of the anti-McCarthy feeling among certain elements almost any aggressive investigation could be confused with McCarthyism—but that he was perceived as going to extremes. This was the image he established and carried with him in later years. The justification or non-justifi­ cation of the image is extraneous to the existence of the image. What is important is that this image was carried by Kennedy into rhetorical sit­ uations . The image of the ruthless Robert Kennedy was cemented in his service as his brother's manager in the i960 presidential campaign. Here his moralistic, right-or-wrong viewpoint was wedded to his strong compet­ itiveness and sense of family responsibility to create a man to whom victory was the paramount, if not the only, concern. His philosophy was best expressed in a statement he made to a group of New York reform dem­ ocrats during the I960 primary elections: "Gentlemen, I don't give a damn if the state and county organizations survive after November and I don't give a damn if you survive. I want to elect John F. Kennedy Pres- ident." 24 Theodore Sorensen, certainly no foe of the Kennedys, explained Robert Kennedy's campaign management this way:

Bob Kennedy's reputation as a tough and sometimes abrasive campaign manager was fully deserved. Other men in the Kennedy camp performed well, but the hard decisions and 36

skillful judgments that produced victory were all made by the two older brothers. RFK had neither the time nor the temperament to spend much effort slapping politicians* backs or buttering up their pride. He had no interest in long talk fests, endless griping, and selfish demands that occupied so much of professional politics. He considered his task not winning friends for himself but winning dele­ gates for his brother. "It doesn’t matter if they like me or not," he once said, "Jack can be nice to them." 25

The point is that irrespective of Robert Kennedy’s personality, his role as campaign manager in a difficult election placed him in a precarious, controversial position. Perhaps a man of different tempera­ ment might have handled the assignment differently—certainly not every manager of difficult presidential campaigns makes the enemies Robert Kennedy made. The concept of Robert Kennedy handling unpleasant tasks on behalf of his brother continued after he became Attorney General. In reality, Robert Kennedy was almost an assistant President. He was his brother’s closest advisor, and was perhaps the second most powerful man in Washing- ton. As such, he was uniquely capable of performing the "dirty work" for John F. Kennedy. It could be safely assumed that his decisions mir­ rored the wishes of the President, but he could act as a buffer for the President, sparing him the direct contact with those he had to disappoint. It was "his function to be the lightning rod that deflected hostility, 27 and to say no to all the anxious people who wanted to hear yes." The results were almost inevitable. There was "the Good Jack and the Bad Bobby."28 The violence accompanying the "freedom riders" in the south in 1961 as explained by analyst Samuel Lubell, is a case in point:

On the whole . . . the Freedom rides do not seem to have hurt 37

President Kennedy in the South. The American voter has always made excuses for the Presidents he likes, and it is "brother Bobby" in the Attorney General's office, rather than President Jack who has been blamed for how the Ala­ bama bus violence was handled. 29

The picture of Robert Kennedy is now somewhat clearer in focus. He had the ability to alienate subordinates as well as the opportunity to do so. The tag "ruthless" was applied to him with some regularity, and his reputation appears to have been deserved. Thus, upon entering any rhetorical situation, Kennedy should have realized that his motives might be suspect, that he was confronted with barriers that other men did not have to consider.

Kennedy's Ambition

For most of his public career Kennedy could be relatively uncon­ cerned about his reputation, for he served the interests of other men, advancing political careers that were not his own. This was particularly true of his service to his brother;

Unlike other politicians who deal with the electorate from the start of their careers, Robert Kennedy had been essent­ ially a private man for most of his sixteen years in govern­ ment. His only real constituency was his brother, John, and cast in the role of a behind-the-scenes lieutenant, his function was not to be popular, but to get things done. After 1963» when he decided he must become a public man with his own constituency in order to pursue his aims, all that changed. 30

His brother's death changed Robert Kennedy's life entirely and presented him with a difficult decision. Previously his ambitions had been not for himself but for his brother. His power had come not from his own accomplishments, significant though they were, but from his 38 brother's stature. With his brother now dead, Robert Kennedy was faced with an almost unreal situation. From the second most powerful man in Washington he plummeted to almost nothing. 31 His solution was to resign his Attorney Generalship and to continue as a Senator the pursuit of his brother's policies as he saw them. An examination of the Kennedy family reveals the motivation for such an action. As John Kennedy took over the reins of the Presidency, it was observed that:

When the Kennedys are described as a dynasty, the word is not used in a loose, figurative sense. Before young Joe's death, the family expected the reserved and studious Jack to be a writer or a teacher. But when young Joe died it was assumed that Jack, as the next son in line, would take his place and carry out young Joe's lofty political ambi­ tions . 32

Thus, in keeping with this "tradition," Robert Kennedy naturally gravi­ tated towards the field of politics. The growth of Robert Kennedy's political power was Aided consid­ erably by the actions of the American public following President Kennedy's assassination. Almost immediately after the assassination a "Kennedy Legend" began to grow. The young President was instantly memorialized; his administration was compared to "Camelot"; there was "almost a stampede to name or rename structures and geographic features, to dedicate articles, books, and TV documentaries to the fallen President's memory." 33 The very name Kennedy took on a new aura; suddenly it represented something very good in American politics, an excellence of performance. Naturally, some of the adulation paid the memory of John Kennedy had a beneficial impact on the career of his younger brother. Analyst William Shannon referred 39

to Robert Kennedy as the "heir apparent" of the Kennedy Administration, 34 a judgment that was shared by significant numbers of political observers. Robert Kennedy "assumed leadership not only of the family but of a sub­ stantial portion of the Democratic party. It would be unfair and inaccurate to suggest that Robert F. Ken­ nedy cold-bloodedly capitalized on his brother’s legend, although those advancing the "ruthless" explanation certainly interpreted his actions that way. Robert Kennedy, in a "personally written" speech to the Free University of West Berlin in 1964, expressed his emotions thus:

There were many who felt . . , that the torchbearer for a, whole generation was gone; that an era was over before its time .... But I have come to understand that the hope President Kennedy kindled isn’t dead, but alive . . . The torch still burns, and because it does, there remains for all of us a chance to light up the tomorrows and brighten the future. For me, this is the challenge that makes life worthwhile. 36

He expressed somewhat similar sentiments later that same year in celebra­ tion of his election to the U. S. Senate: "I believe this vote is a man­ date to continue the efforts begun by my brother four years ago—the effort to get something started in this country ... ,"37 Kennedy’s desire "to continue" on behalf of his brother led him naturally to look beyond the Senate in his quest for power. "Obviously, I feel strongly about certain things," he once said, "and the presidency is the place you can do the most to get things done."3^ Life magazine reported in 1966 that "In the councils of the Kennedy family they speak with easy good humor of ’the Restoration.' What they mean is the return of the Kennedy banner to the White House,"39-" Presumably the Kennedy carry­ ing that banner would be Robert, So commonplace was the assumption that 40

Robert Kennedy was seeking the Presidency that A. James Reichley could write in 1968 that "millions of Americans have come to regard his event­ ual election as almost a certainty.

Kennedy's Conflict with Lyndon B, Johnson

The fact that both Robert Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson occupied positions of considerable authority in American government was, in itself, sufficient to insure some degree of conflict between them. Theodore Sor­ ensen, commenting from the unique position of having worked with and advised both men (although he must be seen as a Kennedy partisan), theo­ rized that the split between Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy was not rooted in "many substantive issues. The origins were more personal and chemical, subtle, but at the same time very strong." 4l Kennedy aides William Vanden Heuval and Milton Gwirtzman explained it this way:

They were different men in almost every way. Kennedy was shy; Johnson was expansive. When Johnson talked to a man, he stroked his shoulder, pumped his arm, and talked point blank into his face. Kennedy kept a distance between himself and others. Johnson was mercurial, subject to wide swings of mood. He could curse and bully a man in the most brutal manner, and then charm him in a way that was both patronizing and effective. Kennedy's moods were private matters, hard to ascertain by any but his closest friends . , . .These personal differences made communi­ cation difficult and friendship impossible. 42

Jules Witcover added that "In background, education, modus operandi, cir- 43 cle of friends, heroes, foes, the two were utterly different men." Whatever the origins of the Kennedy-Johnson "feud," substantive disagreements between the two soon arose. Conflict with Lyndon Johnson seemingly accompanied Robert Kennedy's rise in government. For example, Kennedy could only be successful in managing his brother's i960 drive for 41

the Democratic Presidential nomination at the expense of another i960 Democratic Presidential aspirant—Lyndon B. Johnson. Indeed, Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson "came close to hating each other back in 1959 and 1960,"^ for as the struggle between John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson

reached a climax at the Democratic convention, so did the ill feeling between Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson:

When John Kennedy first approached him, Johnson was hesitant about accepting the Vice-Presidency and asked for a little time to think about it. After lunch John Kennedy sent Bobby up to Johnson’s suite to see what he had decided. Knowing his brother’s feelings about Johnson and his lack of tact in situations of stress, his choice of emissary was somewhat careless. What followed was confusion worse confounded, and no one but practiced politicians would have been able to ex­ plain their way out of it afterward. 45

This was a curious incident in American political history, one which will probably never be explained to everyone's satisfaction. The known facts are these. John Kennedy decided upon Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. As Johnson was "thinking it over," Kennedy began lin­ ing up delegate support for his nomination. Leaders of some Northern delegations expressed dismay over the selection of Johnson, and for a time it looked as if a floor fight over his nomination might develop. Kennedy sent his campaign manager to see Johnson and inform him of the possible resistance his nomination might generate. At this juncture things become somewhat confused. Did Robert Kennedy merely relay John Kennedy's message to Johnson, or did he actually urge him to withdraw his name from consideration? The answer, while important, fades in signifi­ cance beside the fact that Lyndon Johnson believed that Robert Kennedy had tried to prevent his nomination. This belief, justified or unjustified, was a contributing factor to the breakdown between the two men. During John Kennedy’s tenure as President, relations between his Vice-President and his Attorney General did not improve—if anything they grew worse. It must be remembered that during this time Robert Kennedy was de facto Vice President. He was the number two man in Washington, and he spoke with the authority of the President behind him. Lyndon John1 son, on the other hand, did not quite fit in with the new Kennedy adminis' tration; he lacked the style and grace to do so. Moreover, prior to becoming Vice-President, he had been Majority Leader of the Senate, a pos­ ition of great power in government. As Vice-President he felt, as had many of his predecessors, that he was pushed aside from much of the main­ stream of governmental power. He may have been resentful and somewhat jealous of the power of Robert Kennedy. The deteriorating relationship between Kennedy and Johnson in this period featured some rather specific overtones which an analyst may point to as benchmarks. They began to emerge during the Berlin crisis of August, 1961. Although the situation in Berlin was highly volatile, the President "quickly decided that the United States must send someone to Berlin and that Johnson, a.s the second-highest official in the nation, must be that someone." 47'

He dispatched brother Bobby—the instrument for so many unpleasant chores—to see Johnson and tell him it was the President’s command that he make the trip. The Attorney General carried out this odious mission, overriding John­ son’s continuing objections. It was a most unpleasant confrontation. That Bobby Kennedy, once again, was the agent of his brother's bad news further exacerbated his relationship with Lyndon Johnson. 48 43

As the President became more aware of the Civil Rights struggle, he created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, naming Vice Presi­ dent Johnson as Chairman. Since the Attorney General maintained super­ vision over the legal aspects of Civil Rights matters, it was natural that he be appointed to the Commission also. Again, the setting led to conflict between the two men. The Vice President was offended when the Attorney General "asked questions indicating his belief that the Committee was not operating effectively." 49'

Robert Kennedy . . . felt Johnson’s tendency was to reduce the problem of equal employment to statistics. Although major im­ provements were made in the hiring of Negroes, Bobby Kennedy felt there was too much emphasis on pretty statistical pictures and too little on progress. The President’s brother was no diplomat. He issued peremptory orders to Johnson to get mov­ ing in the employment field and Johnson resented this direction, further straining their relations. 50

In the fall of 1963 the nation's capital was rocked by a scandal involving one Bobby Baker—a longtime associate and protege of Lyndon B. Johnson. Baker believed that Robert Kennedy, who, as Attorney General, had final authority to direct the investigation, was pushing it extra- hard so as to embarrass the Vice President. Johnson also "suspected that the Justice Department and Bobby Kennedy were hounding Baker to embarrass Johnson and ease him off the ticket in 1964."-51 There was added credence

for this view when Kennedy assigned several of his top lawyers to the 52 Baker case—the same lawyers he used in his pursuit of James Hoffa. The Vice President's fears may have been eased somewhat when the President announced his itinerary for his "non-political" tour of the West. The President planned especially to emphasize his Vice President's home state, Texas, with stops in Fort Worth and Dallas prior to an evening at the LBJ ranch There was probably no conceivable way the transition from the Kennedy to the Johnson administrations could have been handled to avoid causing some bad feeling on both sides. In any event, the bad feelings were certainly aroused. Johnson’s insistence on accompanying the former President’s body as it was unloaded from the plane, countermanded by the Attorney General who wanted the family’s grief to remain private; the new President's desire to move into the Oval Office faster than the old Kennedy staff could remove the former President's personal effects; the Attorney General arriving late for the first Cabinet meeting of the new administration—all were but part of a series of occurrences which tested the already-strained relations between Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. It would be unfair to the principals involved to suggest that no attempt at establishing a working relationship was made. The attempts simply did not work. Consider, for example, the new President's commis­ sioning of Robert Kennedy to undertake a fact-finding mission to South­ east Asia in January of 1964. Kennedy took the assignment seriously and worked hard on his journey. Yet on his return he was "received just once in the Oval Office—to find himself required to brief a clutch of Congress men in the new Presidential presence." Thereafter, he neither had contact with the President nor received any solicitation of his findings from the State Department. Kennedy felt that "he had been used as a decoration to paste the Kennedy name over the policies of another man."-5^3 The year 1964 also featured what was at that time the greatest disagreement and ill feelings between Kennedy and Johnson. Robert Ken­ nedy earnestly wanted to be named to the 1964 Democratic ticket as 45

Johnson's Vice President. President Johnson just as earnestly wanted to carve his own niche in history, to be elected President "in his own right" rather than on the basis of the dead President's memory. Hence, he did not want Robert Kennedy on the ticket with him. Unfortunately for both men, over-eager Kennedy partisans began a write-in campaign for him in the New Hampshire primary election. Although Robert Kennedy repudiated this effort, the President nonetheless suspected that he was behind it and resented what he saw as an attempt to deny him freedom of choice in the matter.-" Johnson found a way out of his dilemma by announcing in July of that year that he was excluding all members of his cabinet from consider­ ation for the Vice Presidential spot. Kennedy, who at that time was still Attorney General, was thus thwarted in his drive for the Vice Presidency. Johnson had informed Robert Kennedy of his decision in a face-to-face meeting on July 29. The meeting between the two was "cordial," and Kennedy later told some of his close friends that "Johnson had gone out of his way that afternoon to avoid a rupture with him.">55>

But the President could not leave it at that. On Friday, July 31» convinced that at last he had found the final solution to The Bobby Problem, he could contain himself no longer. Eight months of caution and restraint in dealing with the dead President's brother ended in explosive John­ sonian exuberance. Johnson invited newsmen to his office throughout the day to relate his showdown with Kennedy in terms that were highly favorable to himself and consider­ ably less favorable to Kennedy. Mimicry, exaggeration, over-vivid description—all Johnson's controversial tech­ niques—were brought to bear on Bobby Kennedy for the first time since the assassination in the presence of newsmen. Newspaper accounts giving the details, as supplied by the President, of the Wednesday meeting began to appear in print as Kennedy went off to Hyannisport for the weekend. Kennedy was. furious and let Johnson know about it. What­ ever slim hope existed for a Johnson-Kennedy rapprochement k6

vanished that weekend. Now, Kennedy was convinced that Johnson saw poetic justice in their face-to-face encounter in the Oval Office. Johnson wanted to humiliate him, Kennedy believed, because Johnson had not forgotten that hot day in July, I960, when Robert Kennedy , . . went to Johnson’s suite in the Biltmore in Los Angeles to tell him he did not have to run for Vice President if he did not want to risk a floor fight. 56

Thus, in only four years, their relationship had come full circle; their positions of power were reversed; each suspected the other of ob­ structing his own ambition. Given this situation, Kennedy resigned as Attorney General and sought his own position and constituency through the U. S. Senate.

Kennedy and Vietnam

There is a final factor to be explored in this section--Robert Kennedy’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict. As his brother’s principal advisor he was undoubtedly actively involved in the decisions regarding Vietnam made by the Kennedy administration. History tells us that those decisions enlarged the U. S. commitment in Vietnam, paving the way for the conflict that Robert Kennedy was later to criticize severely. Robert Kennedy's involvement with the Vietnamese situation began after the Bay of Pigs failure. President Kennedy was incensed at the unreliability of the military and intelligence predictions he had re­ ceived. He was also disillusioned with overt military activity as a counter to the appeal of Communism in under-developed nations. Charac­ teristically, he appointed a high-level governmental commission to study the situation and develop alternatives for future action. An outgrowth of this commission was the creation of the Committee on Counterinsur­ ^7 gency, of which Robert Kennedy was the most enthusiastic member:

Of all the task forces on which he served and all the special missions he performed for his brother, none aroused Robert Kennedy’s interest more than this. Other senior officials often sent deputies to represent them at meetings of the counter-insurgency committee, but he invariably attended in person. Within the government, he was regarded as "Mr. Counter-insurgency." 57

Kennedy read, and was deeply influenced by, the works of Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, and Sir Robert Thompson, architect of the successful 58 British counter-insurgency effort in Malaysia. In the end this commit­ tee recommended, with President Kennedy subsequently concurring, that the U. S. "make Vietnam a major testing area for American counterinsurgency strategy." 59 During 1961 and 1962 Robert Kennedy’s support for United States’ efforts in South Vietnam was at a peak. In one speech he made a declar­ ation which.was to haunt him later . . . "The solution lies in our winning it. This is what the President intends to do ... . We will remain here until we do."60 Partly as an outgrowth of his enthusiasm, the adminis­ tration expanded the Army's "Special Forces" units—thought to be effec- 61 tive against the type of threat facing the United States In Vietnam. Thus the Kennedy administration openly embraced counter-insurgency as an effective tool against Communism in underdeveloped countries;

It is necessary to recall now that, tack in 1961, counter­ insurgency was regarded by men like the Kennedys and the bright young men in the State Department to be an original, flexible, and even humanistic concept to remedy the Dulles' nostrums of massive retaliation and nuclear capability.- And that social and political reform was an integral part of the concept. 62 48

The impact of this last statement is sometimes lost in the well of bitterness surrounding the Vietnam war. Yet it is true that the counter-insurgency strategy was a radical departure from the thinking of the Eisenhower administration (which initiated planning for the Bay of Pigs). Counter-insurgency may well be the symbol of this "glittering time"alluded to earlier. More importantly, the counter-insurgency strat­ egy was based on the ideas of men experienced in insurgency—Mao, Che, Thompson, and others. As such, the Kennedy strategy of counter-insurgency included political and social reform as well as military action, for the theorists mentioned all emphasize non-military as well as military act­ ivities. Accordingly, Kennedy tried to get the South Vietnamese to broaden the base of their government. Kennedy’s belief in counter-insurgency (including non-military action) led him to question for the first time his earlier stand in favor of Vietnam as a test case. In a September 6, 1963 meeting of the National Security Council he raised some fundamental questions regarding the U. S. role in Vietnam. Noting the lack of willingness on the part of the Diem regime to engage in political and social reforms, Kennedy suggested that perhaps the U. S. should consider replacing him. More importantly, he suggested that the U. S. needed to decide if any South Vietnamese govern­ ment was capable of resisting Communist forces. If not, he suggested that 63 the U. S. should consider withdrawing from the area.

He also urged his brother to initiate the same kind of care­ ful and comprehensive study of this problem by all his top advisors that had served the President well in the Cuban missile crisis .... It was never launched because of Dallas. 64

With Lyndon Johnson taking over as Commander-in-Chief, Robert k9

Kennedy's role as an active participant in Vietnam decision-making came to an end. The factors Kennedy carried into any rhetorical situation he entered having been developed, a determination must be made as to the influence, if any, of these factors on the strategic choices Kennedy made. This determination will be made by examining the factors in turn and in combination. Kennedy's reputation, coupled with his admitted ambition, acted as an inhibition to his participation in the various situations confront­ ing him. He had an important ethical problem in that his character and good will were open to question. Margaret Laing, for example, noted that his "slightest move in the Senate is magnified by the microscope of public intere.t jsicj until, by sheer examination of detail, the innocent 65 can appear sinister." Kennedy's motives were suspect. There was a danger that his arguments, however well reasoned or insightful, might be dismissed as being entirely self-serving. In this way the substance of Kennedy's positions might be ignored. Kennedy seemed to know about this problem. He noted at one time that he "was so well aware of being disliked by many that"^ he was no longer surprised or disturbed by the knowledge. Indeed, the familiar charge of "ruthless" became "his favorite bitter joke..."

The old accusation still stings when he hears it used against him. But he has learned to lessen the hurt by continually, inexorably rubbing it back into potential accusers at rallies, meetings, parties. 67

Kennedy's reputation and ambition further complicated his relat­ ionship with President Johnson. Once again it appears that these factors 50

moderated, or muted Kennedy’s statements. He quickly realized—and was frustrated by the realization—that his position vis-a'-vis the President was far more newsworthy than his position on any particular issue. In other words, the press, one of Kennedy's strongest allies in attracting publicity, was concerned less with the substance of his ideas than with the difference between them and President Johnson's position. "Every speech uttered by the junior Senator from New York was . . . widely examined for anti-Johnson barbs," 68 as "hints of a Kennedy-Johnson split became one of the most sought-after news items in Washington." 69 So great was the tension that "Bobby-watchers even got excited about a speech Bobby almost made to the International Police Academy about counter-insur- „70 gency." The significance of this analysis is such that it deserves further illumination by means of an example. In February, 1957» Kennedy presented a speech at the University of Chicago regarding this country's China pol­ icy. The speech contained some criticisms of the Johnson administration, criticisms which were deleted or softened after the advance copy of the speech had been delivered to newsmen. To Kennedy's dismay, his proposals for a new China policy received only scant attention from the press, while the fact that he had initiated, then softened, criticisms of the admin­ istration was a major news story. Encountering Washington Post reporter Andrew Glass, Kennedy "began to argue heatedly with him. 'Is that all you could find in there,' Kennedy asked, pained. 'Wasn’t there anything about China worth writing about?"’ 71 It is no wonder that

There probably was not a major policy statement Kennedy made in the Senate from 1965 through 1967 that was not carefully reviewed by him or his chief aides to focus criticism on the 51

actions or policies of Johnson, or on a problem, rather than on the personality in the White House. 72

Despite this caution, "the public and. the press were conditioned by then to gauge the current temperature of the feud through Kennedy's speeches."73 It would be inaccurate to suggest that President Johnson stood idly by as Kennedy attacked his policies. On the contrary, the Presi­ dency is an office uniquely able to focus attention on itself, a capa­ bility not overlooked by Lyndon Johnson. The President frequently mounted publicity "blitzes" designed to draw attention away from Kennedy's actions. Thus Victor Lasky described the situation surrounding Kennedy’s 1966 trip to Africa:

On the eve of his departure, LBJ tried to steal Bobby’s thunder by deploring white supremacy in Africa in a speech to black African ambassadors. "It was his first speech on African policy since he became President and the first since John F. Kennedy spoke briefly on 'Africa Day' in 1961," editorialized the New York Times. "Mr. Johnson's remarks . . , were doubtless aimed at countering a feeling widespread in Africa that the Admini­ stration is no longer genuinely interested in that continent. Cynics will wonder if the attention given to Senator Kennedy's forthcoming visit to South Africa may have been a factor. 74

From the preceding analysis one would expect to find Kennedy and Johnson flailing away at each other with undisguised gusto. This was not the case. Both men were acutely aware of each other's power, and both knew that open, total warfare between them would surely split the Demo­ cratic party. Such an event could prove disastrous to both, as each would be blamed for destroying party unity. Accordingly, they went to great lengths to try to minimize their differences—in public. Paradoxically, Kennedy's dislike of the President made it somewhat 52 easier for him to change his mind regarding the war in Vietnam. As the conflict turned into "Johnson’s war," it became farther and farther re­ moved from the Kennedy administration. Thus, Kennedy could cautiously begin questioning the administration’s position regarding the conflict. As the war escalated—and popular discontent grew—Kennedy found a clear opening through which he could attack the President. In addition, the fact that President Johnson changed the charac­ ter of the war made it easier for Robert Kennedy to denounce it. John Kennedy's administration had fought a limited war, relying on anti-guer­ rilla tactics. Lyndon Johnson followed the path of escalation, and the conflict grew into a full-scale, semi-conventional war. Kennedy could justifiably claim that the war Johnson was fighting was no longer the war his brother had initiated. Thus, the war may have become a true exigence for the younger Kennedy.75 Finally, one may hypothesize that Lyndon Johnson's occupancy of the White House was viewed by Kennedy as an exigence. His desire to be president, his dislike of the current occupant, his commitment to the "Kennedy Legend" may have combined to produce yet another, perhaps strong­ er, exigence calling Robert F. Kennedy into action. 53

FOOTNOTES

^Nick Thimmisch, Robert Kennedy at 40 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), p. 26. 2 Jack Newfield, Robert Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: E.P. Dutton And Company, Inc., 1969), p. 21. 3jules Witcover, 85 Days; The Last Campaign of Robert F. Kennedy (New York: Ace Publishing Corporation, 1969), p. 288. ^Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1973),PP. 350-351» ■^Newfield, p. 32. 6Ibid.

?Nancy Clinch, The Kennedy Neurosis (New York: Grosset and Dunlop., 1969), P. 363. ^Thimmisch, p. 20. ^Thimmisch, p. 21. ^Newfield, p. 45. 110riani Fallaci, "Robert Kennedy Answers Some Blunt Questions," Look, March 9, 1965, P. 62, ^Quoted in Clinch, p. 260. ^3penn Kimball, "He Builds His Own Kennedy Identity and Power Flows Freely to Him," Life, November 8, 1966, p. 43. 14 A Ibid. ^Newfield, pp. 28-29. l6Newfield, p. 33. ^Edwin Guthman, We Band of Brothers (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), PP. 16-17. ^Guthman, p. 19.

19Guthman, p. 20 20Kimball, "He Builds His Own," p. 43. 54 ^Guthman, p. 62. 22Guthman, pp. 52-53. ^Guthman, p. 27.

24David. Halberstam, quoted in Clinch, p. 279. ^Theodore Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York: The New Ameri­ can Library, 1969), p. 48. ^William Schecter, Countdown '68; Profiles for the Presidency (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1967)» P. 219. 27David Halberstam, "Travels with Bobby Kennedy," Harpers, July, 1968, p. 56. 28Newfield, p. 33.

29Samuel Lubell, quoted in Newfield, p. 34. ^Witcover, p. 22. 31Kennedy's relationship with President Johnson will be discussed at length later in this chapter. ^2Joe McCarthy, The Remarkable Kennedys (New York: The Dial Press, I960), p. 116. ^"He Uses, and Deeply Feels,—'The Legend,'" Life. November 18, 1966, p. 40. ^William Shannon, The Heir Apparent: Robert Kennedy and the Struggle for Power (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967)» p. 1. ^Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B, Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1966), p. 339. ^Newfield, p. 32.

3?Guthman, p. 3II• ^Schecter, p. 38. ^"He Uses, and Deeply Feels," Life, p. 37. ^A. James Reichley, "He's Running Himself out of the Race," Fortune. March, 1968, p. 113. 41Sorensen, p. 87. 55

William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own: Robert F. Kennedy, I964.-I968 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., pp. 245-246. ^Witcover, p. 20. ^Hugh Sidey, "He Makes Peace with a Man He Almost Came to Hate— LBJ,” Life. November 18, 1966, p. 38. ¿^Margaret Laing, The Next Kennedy (New York: Coward-McGann, Inc., 1968), p. 177. h z vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, pp. 428-429. ^Evans and Novak, pp. 324-325. ^Ibid. ^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 249. •5°Evans and Novak, p. 318.

51Evans and Novak, p. 333- 52Ibid. 33æheodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965)» p. 26l. ^Evans and Novak, p. 440.

33jsvans and Novak, p. 447. 3^Evans and Novak, pp. 447-448.

37Shannon, p. 112. 58Newfield, p. 113. 39Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 212

6°,Sorensen, pp. I62-I63. 61 Newfield, p. 113. 62Ibid, 63,Sorensen, p. 162. 64 Ibid. 56 ^Laing, p. 304.

^Fallaci, p. 64. ^Laing, p. 334. ^Victor Lasky, Robert F. Kennedy: The Myth and the Man (New York: Trident Press, 1968), p. 254. ^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 253.

7°Lasky, p. 254. 7^Witcover, p. 24. 7 Witcover, p. 22. 73Ibid. 7^Lasky, p. 286. ^Shannon, p. 110. 57

CHAPTER 4

TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT POSITION

Robert F. Kennedy’s first significant senatorial statement con­ cerning the Vietnamese conflict was issued on February 19, 1966. For the first time, Kennedy sought a position somewhat removed from Lyndon B. Johnson’s official policy. It is to this statement that one must look first in order to construct a coherent analysis of Kennedy’s strategic choices as he opposed U.S. policies in the 196O’s, In so doing, one must develop a clear idea of the rhetorical situation in February, 1966, by examining the component parts of that situation. •

The Exigence: Robert F. Kennedy and Vietnam — 1965~66

The Vietnamese war had not been a major concern to Robert Kennedy in 1964 as he conducted his successful campaign in New York for the U. S. Senate. However, the conflict was becoming a major item on the horizon of national interest, so that Kennedy was called upon to comment on the situation: ". . . on a radio interview show two weeks before the elect­ ion, he was asked about Vietnam and gave a rather muddled and ambiguous response":

Well, I’ve given advice before as to what I think needs to be done, I think that . . . there has to be the support of the {Vietnamese) people for the military effort that is being made, ¡and there) has to be support of the people for the govern­ ment .... I think the people have to feel that there is political progress being made and that they can be protected 58

in their villages, and I think once there is that confidence, then I think the war will be won. 1

-4 At the time of this statement, October, 1964, the war was a Vietnamese war. The United States was involved heavily, but in an advis­ ory capacity. Kennedy could, and did, support such a war because it was a continuation of John F. Kennedy's basic policy of winning the war by winning the support of the population. In 1965, however, the nature and character of the war was to change drastically, and it was this change which transformed the conflict into an irresistible exigence for Robert F. Kennedy. The year 1965 witnessed the first regular American bombings of 2 North Vietnam. - Although the evidence suggests that President Johnson had planned a bombing campaign for some time,^ the initial bombings in February, 1965, came as a shock to the nation. This was the most drama­ tic escalation of the war thus far, but it was not to be the last. The President followed the bombing by steadily increasing American troop strength in Vietnam—from 23,000 men in early 1965 to 180,000 by the end of the year. 4 The new troops were not committed merely as advisors; they soon became involved in the "search and destroy" missions which signaled the transformation of the conflict into an American war.^

These actions received the almost automatic support that a major­ ity of the American people traditionally seems willing to grant any decis­ ive presidential action. But the support and enthusiasm for the war was not universal. These same actions, particularly the bombing, "created the first stirrings of an anti-war movement in America.A month after the bombings began the University of Michigan hosted a "teach-in" for 59 anti-war elements, a practice which "quickly spread in a chain-reaction 7 to several hundred other campuses." As the year wore on the protests expanded along with the war. Twice in 1965 President Johnson asked the Congress for supplemental g appropriations to continue the war and obtained them. In the fall of 1965 the first nationwide, mass demonstrations against the war were organized by the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Viet­ nam. Burring draft cards as a protest against the war and increased draft calls became popular. Two pacifists burned themselves to death, one in front of the Pentagon on November 4, the other before the United Nations o a week later. The year ended with the President declaring a bombing halt and sending representatives around the world in a search for the peace that was so earnestly, and noisily, demanded by the minority at home. The President's "peace offensive" illustrates the paradoxical nature of the Vietnamese war as waged by Lyndon Johnson. Despite the massive build-up of troops, the expansion and intensification of the bomb­ ing, and the dramatic influx of American dollars and supplies—all geared towards a successful military effort—the President steadfastly avowed that his purpose was negotiations, not a military victory. Such a posi­ tion exposed the President to criticism and dissent not usually directed against the country's leadership during wartime. Critics could legiti­ mately question whether the President was seeking negotiations arduously enough, or if his actions were conducive to negotiations. At the same time, proponents of military activity chafed at fighting a "limited war." President Johnson's peace plan was spelled out in a speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965: 60

In his remarks the President . . . emphasized, the limited nature of American objectives in Vietnam, warned Hanoi of American determination and restated his readiness to engage in "unconditional discussions" with the "governments con­ cerned." And he invited U Thant "to initiate, as soon as possible ... a plan for cooperation in increased develop­ ment" of the countries of Southeast Asia including North Vietnam. 10

The President went on to pledge American assistance for the redevelop­ ment of the area. North Vietnam’s response to the President's proposals was swift. The very next day Hanoi released its own four-point program for peace:

(l) The United States must withdraw its troops, weapons, and bases from South Vietnam and cease its "acts of war" against North Vietnam; (2) Pending unification of the country, both North and South Vietnam must agree that no foreign bases or troops be allowed on their soil and that they will join no military alliances; (3) The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front; (4) The reunification of Vietnam must be settled by the Vietnamese themselves without outside interfer­ ence. 11

Clearly, the two proposals differed. Confronted with intransigence on the part of the North Vietnamese, President Johnson adopted a carrot and stick approach by stopping the bombing at the end of the year, hoping Hanoi’s desire to avoid further 12 destruction would bring them to the conference table. The failure of this ploy became apparent with the lack of response to the "peace offen­ sive," and the President ordered a resumption of the bombing attacks. Shortly thereafter, on February 4, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its dramatic series of "Vietnam Hearings," trying to find the basis of American Vietnamese policy. These hearings provided the first formal, detailed, public debate regarding this country’s Southeast Asian 61

policy, and they captured nationwide attention. One who followed the hearings closely was Senator Robert F. Ken­ nedy. He became "absorbed by the hearings. He followed them on tele­ vision and several times went to the hearing room and stood listening among the spectators." 13 For the Senator, the hearings capped a growing discontent with President Johnson's handling of the war. For a year, since the initial bombings and troop build-ups, Kennedy "was troubled, questioning, encouraging dissent, not yet an open dissenter himself, but edging each month closer to that role." 14 A review of Kennedy's actions and statements in 1965 is essential to an understanding of his shift of opinion, public and private, regarding the Vietnamese conflict. Initially, one must understand that "President Johnson's decision to escalate heavily in February, 1965, with troops and bombing of the North fundamentally altered John Kennedy's Vietnam policy." 15 Predictably, "the move shook RFK as it did so many other Kennedy men . . . ."'L^ However,

Kennedy kept his doubts to himself, refusing to voice publicly his con­ cern that the bombing and troop build-up "was a disastrous step that would end up tearing the country and the Democratic Party apart." 17 When he did comment on the situation, he expressed support for what the United States was doing in Vietnam, generally;

Answering questions in Ithaca, New York, on February 23 (1965) he opposed the suggestion that the United States pull its forces out of Vietnam. "The United States has made a commit­ ment to help Vietnam," Kennedy said, "I'm in favor of keeping that commitment and taking whatever steps are necessary. If our word means anything, we must remain as long as it is evi­ dent that the people favor it." 18

In May of that year, when the President asked Congress for an .62

additional $700 million supplemental appropriation to continue the war, Kennedy made his first statement in the Senate concerning the conflict. He supported the supplemental appropriation, but warned, "that Congress­ ional approval of this appropriation should not be interpreted by the White House as a ’blank check'." 19 A month later, speaking at the Queens College commencement ceremonies, Kennedy struck the keynote of his 1965 Vietnam position:

It is not helpful, it is not honest, to protest the war in Vietnam as if it were a simple and easy question .... But the complexity and difficulty of any situation should not keep you from speech or action. 20

By taking this position, Kennedy supported the President's Viet­ namese policy indirectly by criticizing the methods of some of the war critics. At the same time, by making the right to dissent the focus of his remarks, sidestepped the issue of his personal beliefs regarding the 21 •conflict. Finally, by stressing the complexity of the entire situation, Kennedy left himself room to maneuver by refusing to take a firm, con­ crete stand on the central questions of bombing and troop increases. He was preparing the way for a possible break with the President in the future. In the fall of 1965» while traveling in South America, "Kennedy made it a practice, as he did on all of his foreign trips, to praise Johnson's leadership in Vietnam":

And he went to great lengths to explain the difficulties of American responsibility for peace in Southeast Asia. He emphasized that his nation's basic concern was to estab­ lish the right of a people to determine its own destiny, and he repeated the President's assurances that we would accept whatever result a free election would bring in 63 Vietnam, including the selection of a Communist government. 22

Later, on the December 5» 1965 "Meet the Press" television program, the Senator declared that "I basically support" the present policy in Viet­ nam, but expressed reservations "that not enough was being done in the economic and political fields and that the military aspects of the strug­ gle were being greatly overemphasized."23 This was as far as he would allow himself to go in expressing reservations about the war.

Factors Restraining Involvement: Reputation, Ambition, The President of the United States

The reason Kennedy muted his criticism is easily understandable given the factors Kennedy would carry with him if he entered this parti­ cular rhetorical situation as a critic. In 1965 Robert F. Kennedy was a freshman senator from New York. His campaign for that office had not been easy, and he had not emerged unscarred. His biggest obstacle in that cam­ paign had been the fact that he was regarded as a "carpetbagger" by his opponents, who sought to capitalize on the fact that Kennedy was not a full-time resident of New York state. Naturally, this reawakened all the 24 old charges of ruthlessness. Kennedy believed that an attack by him on Presidential war policies might be construed as another example of his 25 ruthless opportunism and ambition. There was also the very real factor that Kennedy was indeed ambi­ tious. He had definite designs on the White House. However, at this juncture in his career, Kennedy was anticipating a 1972 campaign, fully expecting the President to seek re-election in 1968. Thus Kennedy would almost have to support Johnson in 1968 in order to avoid alienating the 64

party whose support he would need himself in 1972. Simply put, the Sen- ator decided not to say too much that might have to be taken back later. Perhaps the primary factor restraining Kennedy's criticism in 1965 was his desire to avoid a public row with the President. Given the factors just discussed, Kennedy felt that it was inevitable that any break between himself and the President would be regarded simply in per­ sonal terms, rather than as a division over substance. Theodore Sorensen explained that

. . . any RFK advocacy of an early disengagement under the terms of a risky diplomatic settlement might well have anta­ gonized both party leaders and the general public. The press would accuse him of using the issue to attack the President personally .... 27

Kennedy aide Edwin Guthman believed that Kennedy "was restrained by the belief that if he spoke out it would only be put in the context of a 28 personal struggle with the President." Kennedy's belief that he could not speak out on Vietnam without having his ideas interpreted as a politically motivated personal attack on the President appears to have been grounded in fact. Throughout 1965» when he did differ with the President in any way, his statements "would be met with a rash of stories on the latest chapter of the Kennedy-Johnson personal breach." 29

When Kennedy made a policy statement that differed in any way from the Administration's line, reporters immediately contacted the White House to get an adverse reaction, often inflating Kennedy's remarks to provoke one. If they suc­ ceeded, they would go back to the Kennedy office for his reaction, trying to enlarge the conflict more. 30

In time, Kennedy became "almost neurotic„31 about the problem of political 65

interpretations of his proposals. He "seemed always to be deleting 32 criticism of Johnson from drafts written by his more combative staff. An episode in July of 1965 illustrates the problem Kennedy faced and his efforts to surmount it.

Adam Walinsky had worked for several days on a speech about guerrilla warfare, scheduled to be delivered by Kennedy on July 9 at the International Police Academy. The final draft contained several direct criticisms of the Administration’s Vietnam policy, including the passage: "Victory in a revolutionary war is not won by escalation, but by de-escalation .... Air attacks by a government on its own villages are likely to be far more dangerous and costly to the people than is the individual and selective terrorism of an insurgent movement . . . ." Kennedy approved of the text, his office mimeographed copies, and they were delivered, by messenger to newspaper and wire service offices in Washington. But before the speech was actually given, Kennedy personally deleted the critical pas­ sages and did not deliver them. The wire services, however, had already written and moved on their tickers lengthy dis­ patches about the speech, leading with the "break" with the Administration over Vietna/n. 33

Factors Compelling Involvement: Leadership, the Hearings, Domestic Programs

Given Kennedy’s predilection towards avoiding an open conflict with the President, two questions arise concerning his February 19, 1966 statement. Why did he feel compelled to speak at all? What did he hope to accomplish with his statement? Previous analysis has established that Kennedy was privately critical of President Johnson’s military activities in Vietnam. They represented a clear departure from John F. Kennedy’s program. However, although these things were apparent to Robert Kennedy throughout I965, he was able to restrain his criticism despite his private misgivings. 66

Three factors were significant in pushing Kennedy into open dis­ sent. Initially, Kennedy’s position as a national leader demanded that he establish a clear position regarding the Vietnamese conflict. "He could not stay aloof from the issue, for it was the most debilitating problem of his country." 34 The second factor compelling Kennedy to speak out on the Vietnam situation was the 1966 Vietnam Hearings conducted by Senator Fulbright’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As noted before, Kennedy followed the hearings closely, and the parade of government witnesses confirmed his judgment "that though the Administration said its goal was negotia­ tions to end the war, no real thought had been given to the terms of any settlement."^

The final day of the Vietnam hearings was Friday, Febru­ ary 18, and Dean Rusk was the witness. The national television audience was treated to a skillful debate between two Southerners, two Rhodes Scholars, the man John Kennedy appointed Secretary of State, and the man he almost appointed to that position. For a while, Rob­ ert Kennedy, absorbed, occasionally muttering at Rusk’s unflappable image, watched the civilized diplomatic duel between the two men on the portable television set in his office. Kennedy felt that Fulbright, McCarthy, Morse, and the other doves on the committee were too vague and intellectual, and failed to ask the most vital concrete questions. What was the future role of the NLF going to be? And what was the United States prepared to give up in order to get a negotiated peace in Vietnam? 36

The final factor compelling Kennedy’s participation in the Viet­ nam debate was his perception of the impact of the war on domestic pro­ grams which he favored. Kennedy was heavily immersed in President Johnson’s "Great Society" programs. He had a genuine feeling for the groups that the Johnsonian programs were designed to help—the poor, the 67

black, and the young. 37 In August of 1965 the nation experienced the most destructive riot in its history, as the Los Angeles community of Watts exploded into violence which left "34 killed, 1,032 injured, almost 4,000 arrested, almost $40 million worth of property destroyed." Kennedy’s reaction was to call for increased federal measures to eliminate the roots of the un­ rest; lack of opportunity, lack of adequate living conditions, lack of education. 39 As the war began to drain more and more of the nation’s financial resources, Kennedy realized that it "stood in the way of all that needed to be done at home. ... In civil rights, in housing, in education, 40 in health care, in rebuilding our cities, and in alleviating poverty."

... . the cost of the Vietnam war was deterring the Con­ gress from adequately funding these programs. It was slowing the addition of new programs. It was monopoli­ zing the attention and energy of the government. It was increasing the bitter resentment not only of the young who faced military service, but also of the poor and the black whose expectations had been aroused but unfulfilled. 4l

These were the elements, coupled with Kennedy’s innate disaffec­ tion with the military measures being taken in Vietnam, that led to his break with Lyndon B. Johnson’s policy. That break was evident in his statement of February 19» 1966.

First Break: February 19, 1966

Kennedy’s rather short (42 paragraphs) statement expressed only a few ideas. His initial comments reflected his earlier practice of re­ ferring to the Vietnamese issue within the context of the right of dis­ sent. He alluded to the Foreign Relations Committee hearings as "another 68 chapter in a great tradition. For the Senate Chamber still echoes to the distant ringing of the great issues of the past." 42 After a brief summation of past Senate debates and an allusion to national figures who took unpopular positions in these debates, Kennedy made a strong appeal for the right of dissent, linking it to the continuation of democracy. He concluded the opening section of his statement with a summation of the role of the Senate in promoting and encouraging dissent, and stressed its responsibility for making independent judgments. The second major segment of Kennedy’s statement was his develop­ ment of the importance of the Vietnam question:

Shall we then debate with force and passion the issues of labor relations and housing and trade—while the great issues of peace and war are allowed to pass in silence? Shall we discuss the standard of living of our constituents —while policies which affect their very existence go un­ discussed? To do so would be the gravest departure from our duties as representatives of the people of the American states.

Before launching directly into a description of the Vietnamese situation, however, Kennedy made a final appeal for toleration of dissent. "We are all patriots here. We are all defenders of freedom. We are all Ameri­ cans" :

To attack the motives of those who express concern about our present course—to challenge their very right to speak freely—is to strike at the foundations of the democratic process which our fellow citizens, even today, are dying in order to protect.

After a final quotation from Thomas Jefferson on the toleration of dissent, Kennedy listed the reasons for his concern about Vietnam. The casualties, the destruction of Vietnam, the negative goal of anti-communism, 69 the effect of the war on the United. States' relationship with Communist China, the effect of the war on domestic programs were all listed by the Senator as reasons for his concern about the conflict:

But the central question before us now—the area of greatest present concern for the Senate, and what we must discuss at all levels of government—is our pol­ itical strategy in the war in Viet Nam; not simply how to move, but in what direction we wish to move. (emphasis in original)

With this Kennedy moved on to the third, central, idea of his statement: determination of United States goals in Vietnam and how best to achieve those goals. Dispensing with the myth that negotiations them­ selves are a goal—"negotiations or discussions, are only a means by which ultimate goals can be reached"—Kennedy asked, "What, then, are our goals in Viet Nam?"

The Secretary of State and others have stated objectives in general terms. They are the independence of South Viet Nam— or, at least, its independent right to determine its own future. They are to halt the aggression from the North and to prove to China that a policy of subversion in other lands will not work. These are worthy objectives. All are impor­ tant. The question remains, however, under what realistic terms and conditions they can be advanced in Viet Nam.

In discussing the achievement of these goals, Kennedy outlined "three routes before us; military viotory, a peaceful settlement, or withdrawal." He disposed of the last route immediately:

The last is impossible for this country. For the United States to withdraw now, as I said last May, would be a repudiation of commitments undertaken and confirmed by three administrations. It would flatly betray those in Viet Nam whom we have encouraged by our support to resist the forces of Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Unilateral withdrawal would injure, perhaps irreparably, the principle of collective 70

security, and. undermine the independence of small nations everywhere in the world. And it would offer no hope for a reasonable accommodation with China in.the future.

Kennedy then concerned himself with "the open avenues—military victory or a peaceful settlement." Pursuing a military victory, Kennedy prophesied, would be a dangerous course for the United States to embark upon. It would require that "much of Viet Nam be destroyed and its people killed" in addition to a long-range American occupancy of South Vietnam. It would further entail the "growing risk of widening war—with North Viet Nam, with China, even with the Soviet Union," which could result in a nuclear catastrophe. Despite these dangers, Kennedy warned, the United States might have to seek military victory, for "the intransigence of our adversaries may leave us no other alternative." Regarding a peaceful settlement through negotiations, Kennedy acknowledged that this was the expressed goal of the President. He went on to deal at length with the concept of "unconditional discussions";

This means simply that we will neither demand nor yield specific formal commitments before bargaining begins. In fact, both sides must come to any discussion with at least one basic condition; one irreducible demand; one point they will not yield. For the United States it must be that we will not turn South Viet Nam over to the North. For North Viet Nam it must be that they will not accept a settlement which leaves in the south a hostile government, dedicated to the final physical destruction of all Communist ele­ ments, refusing any economic cooperation with the North, dependent upon the continued presence of American military power. These conditions, these minimum terms, can be breached only at sword’s point; only by driving the adversary's forces from the field. For either side to yield its min­ imum conditions would be in fact to accept a defeat. If v;e intend to deny these minimum conditions to our 71

adversaries, then we must defeat them completely, (sic) If this is what we intend, we should understand it clearly —and undertake it with resolution. After declaring that "A negotiated settlement means that each side must concede matters that are important in order to preserve positions that are essential" (original emphasis) and warning that negotiations may yet prove impossible, Kennedy went on to propose "a middle way, that an end to the fighting and a peaceful settlement can be achieved." Kennedy advanced, the basic premise, based on the experiences of the "dozens of countries which might be the target of Communist aggression or subversion," that "men and nations will not willingly choose to submit to other men from other lands." For explanation, Kennedy noted that "in Indonesia, in Algeria, and in the Central African Republic the Chinese have suffered enormous defeats . . . because the people of these lands preferred to run their affairs in their own way . . . ." The heart of Kennedy's proposals was found in his next major idea concerning what needed to be done with the "discontented elements in South Viet Nam, Communist and non-Communist, who desire to change the existing political and economic system of the country." Once again Kennedy listed three alternative courses of action—killing the malcontents, turning the country over to them or admitting them "to a share of power and responsi­ bility." As before, Kennedy dismissed two alternatives and dealt exten­ sively with the third, as the "heart of the hope for a negotiated settle- ment":

It is not the easy way or the sure way; nor can the manner or the degree of participation now be described with any pre­ cision. It may come about through a single conference or many meetings, or by a slow undramatic process of gradual accommo­ dation. It will require enormous skill and political wisdom 72 to find the point at which participation does not bring domination or internal conquest. It will take statesman­ ship willing to exploit the very real differences of ambition and intention and interest between Hanoi and Peking and the Soviet Union. It may mean a compromise government fully acceptable to neither side. It cer­ tainly means that we must take considerable risks in the expectation that social and economic success will weaken the appeal of Communism—and that sharing the burden and the satisfaction of helping to guide a nation will attract hostile elements toward a solution which will preserve both the independence of their country and their new found share of power. And we must be willing to face the uncer­ tainties of election, and the possibility of an eventual vote on reunification. We must be prepared to think about what kind of relationship such a reunified country would have to the United States, to Communist China, to the Soviet Union, (original emphasis)

Kennedy continued his analysis with the assertion that the settle ment must include international guarantees for the agents involved, bal­ anced, verified stages of withdrawal of foreign forces, and international supervision of elections. The proposal was wrapped up by the acknowledge- ment that "such a settlement would not end our burden or our vigilance in Vietnam," for the United States had pledged to provide economic aid to North Vietnam and help repair the destruction of the South. Kennedy’s statement concluded by returning to the role of the Senate as a forum for the discussion of "a framework within which a settlement would be acceptable":

That is why discussion and debate in the Senate are now so important. We stand at the doorway of great decisions and fateful action. To decide in ignorance is to risk disaster. But if we now can clearly define our ends in South Viet .Nam, if we can at least begin discussing what our future relations with mainland China are to be, if we can adapt our means to those ends, and, most important, if we can use only that force—and no more—that is needed to accomplish these objec­ tives , then there is hope that they may be achieved without prohibitive cost to ourselves, to the people of Viet Nam, or to the peace of the world, (original emphasis) 73

The Aftermath

The days following the issuance of the statement were marked by confusion. The Johnson Administration clearly regarded the statement as the harbinger of a direct attack by the Kennedy camp. Accordingly, the administration responded with an intense counterattack, as the President’s aides, advisors, and Cabinet officials found reasons why Kennedy’s pro­ posals were unacceptable. They were virtually unanimous in the judgment that Kennedy's proposals would lead to a Communist takeover of the South. Kennedy himself, returning home early from a family skiing vacation in Vermont, sought to clarify his position. With the help of a few friends in the Johnson administration, he tried to paper over his differences with the President. The entire episode must be viewed as a setback for Robert F. Kennedy. Political columnist Kenneth Crawford of Newsweek magazine summar­ ized the feelings of many when he wrote:

It is impossible to classify the Bobby Kennedy who emerged from last week's peace-in-Vietnam episode. He could be a dove, hawk, fox in the chicken coop or just a mixed up kid. While it was going on he was all but smothered by the em- . brace of the doves. When it was all over, the hawks hoped he was back on their roost . . . ." 43

The extent of the Administration's counterattack was imposing, although President Johnson refrained from public participation. Under Secretary of State George Ball and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, both former members of the Kennedy Administration, led the attack, charging that Kennedy was selling out South Vietnam to the Communists. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, returning from Vietnam, delivered the 7^

most telling blow. Kennedy’s proposal, the Vice-President declared, would be like putting a fox in the chicken coop, with the predictable 44 result. Kennedy’s statement, as interpreted by the Administration and the press, did not receive widespread public or Senatorial support. He immediately tried to clarify his position, but in so doing "left the im- 45 pression that he was waffling." The issue on which the disagreement between Kennedy and the Admin­ istration centered was the role of the National Liberation Front in the peace negotiations and any subsequent government. The Johnson Administra­ tion had maintained that the NLF could be represented by the government 46 of North Vietnam during the negotiations. Their interpretation of Ken­ nedy’s proposals was that he was not only advocating that NLF representa­ tives participate in the negotiations, but that they also be guaranteed a. 47 place in the government of postwar South Vietnam. The watershed of Kennedy’s "clarification" of his statement came on February 22, three days after the initial statement had been issued. The Senator appeared on the Today program to explain that he was not really splitting with the Administration over Vietnam. Later in the day he held a press conference, then several telephone interviews with reporters, all 48 in an attempt to reduce the distance between himself and the Administration. Kennedy’s efforts towards reconciliation with the President were aided in no small way by the efforts of White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers. 497 Acting as an intermediary between the President and the Senator, Moyers constructed an "official" interpretation of Kennedy's remarks, one that both men could accept: 75

During the course of that day in telephone interviews with reporters and in conversations with White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers, he offered additional interpretations. He suggested a Laos-type settlement in which Communists, anti-Communists, and neutral fac­ tions shared power by agreement without elections. He also suggested a United Nations or Southeast Asian regional group to administer South Vietnam until elec­ tions were held. Such an arrangement would be similar to the interim supervision of the Dominican Republic by the Organization of American States. Later that day, he called a press conference in which he said he was not insisting on any of these alternatives. His view, he said, was not that the Viet Cong should "automatically have" a share of power in the interim government, but rather that they should not be "automatically excluded" from having it. The issue, he suggested, could be set­ tled at the peace conference. 50

In final news conferences, Kennedy and Moyers capped the proceedings as follows: Moyers — "If Senator Kennedy did not propose a coalition gov­ ernment with Communist participation before elections are held, there is no disagreement," Kennedy — "I find no disagreement between what Mr. Moyers said and what I have said.This was the end of a rather con­ fusing period, although discussion and interpretation of Kennedy's re­ marks and motives continued for some time.

A Strategic Perspective

A full understanding of what Kennedy was trying to accomplish with his statement and with his subsequent "clarifications" requires a strategic analysis. The information provided thus far in this analysis is sufficient to permit such an undertaking, and the strategic framework has been provided previously. In following that framework, one must first determine Senator Kennedy's primary goals during the period in question. It seems clear that Kennedy's major concern during the 1965-66 76

■ period, was maintaining his position as a bona fide national leader, a potential president. His ambition was generally accepted, and he already had a large political following—the millions previously referred to who regarded him as a certain future president. These millions looked to Kennedy for the kind of leadership traditionally associated with the Pres­ idency. As already noted, however, circumstances were such that Kennedy could not realistically expect to bid for the White House until 1972. Thus, his task was to maintain his leadership. In order to hold his position, Kennedy had to speak out on the issues of national concern. Herein was the heart of his dilemma. If Ken­ nedy parroted the policies of the Johnson Administration, he would be in danger of losing his independent political identity. At the same time, if he spoke out against those policies, he would bring about the disaster of a split between himself and the President. Since Kennedy was not the leader of the Democratic Party, or an independent leader of the Senate, it was vital that he avoid alienation of the President. Thus, to maintain his leadership, Kennedy had to adopt a strategy that would enable him to maintain both his independence and his relations with the President. One may readily observe how this goal and this strategy would eli­ cit many sub-goals and secondary strategies. Kennedy’s alliance with his senior New York colleague, Jacob Javits, is a case in point. Javits was a respected member of the Senate, and his friendship, or at least his lack of ill will, could help Kennedy’s relations with the Senate "club," the informal leadership of the Senate. Thus, Kennedy made overtures, successfully, towards Javits. It is possible to view this occurrence strategically, with Kennedy developing the goal of good relations with the 77

Senate leadership, the strategy of building a relationship with Javits, and the tactic of actually working with him on matters of mutual interest and benefit. In so doing, Kennedy would be serving the goal of maintain­ ing his national position by not alienating the Senate. It is possible to view most of his actions during the 1965-66 time period as tactics serving his strategy of maintaining both his inde­ pendence and good relations with Johnson and his primary goal. His leg­ islative proposals, his speeches, his trips abroad, all may be viewed as tactics furthering his strategy and goal. In this sense, one must view the February 19, 1966 statement as a tactic serving the aforementioned strategy and goal. This is not to say that the speech served only those things, but that they were the primary factors in Kennedy's mind. His actions of clarification and reconciliation after the statement was issued support this analysis. The situation eliciting Kennedy's initial Vietnam statement can he regarded as confused, or "unstructured" in the Bitzerian sense. There were several things which can be considered exigences—the war itself, the bombing, Kennedy’s dissatisfaction with the hearings, his perception of the war's impact on domestic programs. Any one of these, indeed all of them, were "imperfections marked by urgency" which could he called exi­ gences. However, from Kennedy's actions immediately prior to the release of his statement, it seems apparent that the hearings themselves provided the necessary or final impetus for his statement. It was his concern that the Vietnam debate was not dealing with the most important questions of the controversy that motivated Kennedy to try to change the situation. This was his concern as he watched the hearings. Thus, one may assign the ?8

role of "primary" to this exigence in this situation. This is not to discount or in any way detract from the importance of the other factors. However, although Kennedy had been privately critical of President John­ son’s expansion of the war throughout 1965, at no time did he issue the type of statement that he did in February of 1966. Moreover, Kennedy’s statement did not deal extensively with bombing, and he mentioned the impact of the war on domestic programs as one of a series of reasons for concern over the war. The thrust of Kennedy’s statement deals with negot­ iations and the positions of both parties in possible negotiations. This must be seen as the major exigence affecting Robert F. Kennedy at that time. The question now arises as to whether Kennedy’s goal was a rhetor­ ical goal. This clearly seems the case if one examines the thrust of Kennedy’s statement. Although it was not directed at the Senate in a presentation on the floor of that chamber, Kennedy clearly sought in both his introduction and his conclusion to bring the Vietnam debate to the Senate. Moreover, he stressed the need for the Senate to make independent judgments and decisions concerning Vietnam, and not rely exclusively on the decisions of the Executive branch of government. By giving his state­ ment to the press, Kennedy was following accepted Senate procedure, and assured himself of the maximum possible exposure and circulation of his remarks. Had he been trying to influence the Administration directly, one would expect him to take his arguments directly to the President or his advisors. However, Kennedy sought the intercession of a third party, the Senate, in order to bring about the change he desired.- This is defin­ itely a rhetorical situation. 79

With Kennedy’s goal established and its rhetorical nature demon­ strated, it is now necessary to ascertain his strategy encompassing the use of the statement as a tactic. Again relying on the statement itself as an indication of Kennedy’s intentions, one can see clearly that his strategy was one of moving away from the President’s position without precipitating an open break with him. Indeed, Kennedy appeared to go to great lengths to minimize his differences with the President. Since he was trying to correct a deficiency in the Administration’s thinking, one might expect him to attack the Administration directly. Kennedy did not do this, however, and his failure to do so points to ah important fact regarding his handling of this particular situation. Despite his differ­ ences with the Administration, and despite his desire to modify the dis­ cussion of the Vietnam issue, Kennedy was not prepared to break with the Administration. Thus, his approach to the situation, to the use of the statement as a tactic, was consistent with his ultimate strategy of not alienating the President. He was not prepared to declare his independence at the price of breaking with the President. Accordingly, one must view this as the strategy governing the use of the February, 1966 statement— create a debate about negotiations by discussing alternatives, but do so in a manner that the Administration can accept. The final step in a strategic analysis of the February, 1966 statement is to examine the constraints used by Kennedy within the state­ ment to make it serve the ends he sought. There are several such cases worthy of extended analysis. Initially, one notes that Kennedjf accepted the goals of the Johnson Administration regarding the Vietnam war. In answer to his own question, "what, then, are our goals in Viet Nam?,’’ 80

Kennedy declared that "the Secretary of State and others have stated objectives in general terms," and that "all are important." At yet another point in his discourse, as he explained the three alternative courses of action before the United States in Vietnam, Kennedy stated, "President Johnson has made clear, on behalf of the United States, in every forum of the world, that this country seeks the other road; the road to negotiated settlement." Thus, Kennedy made sure that there would be no break between himself and the Administration as to the goals of the United States effort in Vietnam. He took pains to point out that the President had spoken "on behalf of the United States" and had done so "in every forum of the world." There can be no doubt that Kennedy had accep­ ted the Administration as his spokesman regarding the goals of the United States. Accordingly, one may view this as a constraint used by Kennedy to demonstrate his support for the Administration. This constraint was used prior to Kennedy’s own proposal for allow­ ing dissident elements in South Vietnam a share of the government. After explaining his position, Kennedy again tried to establish his solidarity with President Johnson. He stated, "I would stress that such a settle­ ment would not end our burden or our vigilance in Viet Nam. President Johnson has made clear that we are ready to help with economic aid for North Viet Nam." Thus, Kennedy used this constraint twice in his Febru­ ary 19, 1966 statement—before and after his most controversial proposal as he tried to dovetail his position with the President's. In this man­ ner, Kennedy could be regarded as trying to add to the President's program, rather than trying to replace it with one of his own. A second constraint used by Kennedy was the manner in which his 81

statement was introduced.—his emphasis on the right of dissent and his attempt to associate himself and his proposals with the American tradi­ tion of debate. By so doing at the start of his statement, Kennedy appeared to be trying to make his remarks less sinister, less threatening. Moreover, by using lengthy quotations from Oliver Wendell Holmes and Thomas Jefferson on the necessity of dissent and the toleration thereof, he appeared to be trying to make his remarks more legitimate. Once again, this tactic was used to minimize the significance of the differences, Kennedy was trying to avoid a political interpretation of his comments. A third constraint used by Kennedy was the manner in which his statement was released. "There was no sense of tension . . . before he read his statement. His mood, and his staff's mood, was relaxed."-52' The statement was read to reporters in Kennedy’s office. There was not tele­ vision time purchased, and Kennedy did not answer questions about his statement. He released it, then left Washington for Stowe, Vermont, on a family skiing trip. The point to be made here is that Kennedy could have made a much bigger publicity splash had he so desired. Instead, he issued the statement with a minimum of fanfare. In this manner, Kennedy tried to avoid political interpretation of his remarks, A rather important constraint used by Kennedy in this situation was a heavy reliance on logic and logical appeal. The statement was almost devoid of emotion, despite the fact that the war was a very emotional issue. Indeed, Kennedy went to great lengths to make his positions sound extremely logical. On two occasions, in discussing United States policy generally and in probing the future role,of the "dissident elements in South Vietnam" he developed the concept of three alternatives, then 82 dismissed two of them as unfeasible or undesirable. Logically, the alter­ native left must be pursued. Kennedy used his dismissal of military vic­ tory and withdrawal as a means of establishing the logic of his chosen alternative for dealing with the dissident elements in South Vietnam. He was able to dismiss the alternatives of killing the dissidents or surren­ dering to them on the basis of his earlier commentary on withdrawal and seeking a military victory. In sum, on the level of pure logic, Kennedy's proposals were most compelling. Kennedy did not confine his use of logic merely to showing the correctness of his choice. He continued to rely on logic to develop the appeal of his proposals. His treatment of "unconditional" negotiations is a case in point. Kennedy quite logically dismissed the idea that nego­ tiations could ever he "unconditional" and went on to show how each side must have basic conditions as they enter into negotiations. Kennedy also logically explained how neither party could be expected to enter into dis­ cussions if the price of doing so was to abandon their basic conditions, for to do so would amount to defeat. Kennedy's use of logic in this situation was an example of his restraint. By staying aloof from the emotional give and take of the Viet­ nam controversy, Kennedy appeared to have been attempting to add credence to his arguments. Moreover, the lack of emotion by Kennedy may indicate that for him the issue had not yet become an emotional concern. Jack New­ field wrote that Robert Kennedy was an emotional man, whose concern about problems arose from an emotional identification with issues. 53 Perhaps this lack of emotional commitment helps explain why Kennedy' restrained himself in his Vietnam criticism. 83

It seems probable, however, that Kennedy relied, extensively on logic as a means of moderating the impact of his statement. An extremely emotional treatment of the Vietnam issue by Kennedy was more likely to elicit a defensive reaction from the Administration than a calm, reasoned discourse might. Further, Kennedy seemed committed to discussing alter­ natives; an emotional statement would be more likely to identify him with one particular alternative and leave him less room to maneuver. Certain­ ly, Kennedy's round of "clarifications" would have been far more difficult had he committed himself to a particular course of action. There are two other choices made by Kennedy in his 1966 statement that are worthy of mention, for they help explain the defensive reaction of the Johnson Administration. During Kennedy's analysis of the three alternative courses of action facing the United States in Vietnam, even though Kennedy accepted the goals of the Johnson Administration, he intro­ duced his three alternatives by stating, "The question remains, however, under what realistic terms and conditions they can be advanced in Viet­ nam," (emphasis added) Kennedy's use of the term "realistic" could have been interpreted as-an indirect criticism of the Johnson Administra­ tion's policy as being unrealistic. Although the idea of realistic alt­ ernatives is not carried through in the statement, Kennedy's concluding commentary on using only the force necessary to achieve our goals and no more could also be interpreted as an indirect criticism of the military build-up and escalation of the war. Kennedy's second "erroneous" decision is much clearer in retro­ spect. His proposals regarding the role of the National Liberation Front and the "other dissident elements" in a Vietnam settlement were

BOWLING GREEN UNiV. LIBRARY 84

extremely vague. By trying to avoid criticizing the President on speci­ fic measures, Kennedy may have left himself open to attack; for his pro­ posals were not concrete, his ideas were not solidly delineated and explained. Thus, a hostile Administration could, and did, interpret his ideas in a manner not particularly complimentary to Kennedy.

Summation

In outline form, the strategic analysis of Robert F, Kennedy’s February 19, 1966 Vietnam statement is as follows:

Goal: Maintenance of Kennedy’s position as a national leader.

Strategy: Speaking out on national concerns; demonstrating his independence but avoiding an open break with the President,

Tactic: Kennedy’s February 19, 1966 Vietnam statement.

Purpose: Kennedy sought to change the nature of the nationwide debate on Vietnam by discussing the basis of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Constraints: Accepting the Johnson Administration’s goals; concerning himself with the historic right of dissent; the use of logic; the pre­ presentation of vague proposals; relying on indirect criticisms of the President’s policy. 65

Analysis of the Statement

Robert F. Kennedy's February 19, 1966 statement on Vietnamese policy must be viewed as a strategic failure. In terms of furthering his primary goal of maintaining national leadership, it is hard to see how this statement, and particularly its aftermath, helped his leadership position. Indeed, the fact that the statement failed to receive much popular support is an indication of its failure. 54 His specific goal of influencing the debate about Vietnam was similarly unmet by this statement. Many of Kennedy's Senate colleagues expressed reservations similar to those expressed by the Administration, 55 and Kennedy himself fell silent for the next year. Both his general, primary goal and his specific, secondary goal were ill-served by his vacillation in the face of the Johnson Administration's counterattack. The confusing sequence of interpretation, reinterpretation, clarification, and reclarification did not demonstrate the type of leadership tradition­ ally associated with presidential candidates. Moreover, the aftermath, as noted by Crawford, left the country confused as to Kennedy's actual posi­ tion regarding peace talks. Again, this was not a position from which he could hope to have much substantive influence on policy. Kennedy’s failure to achieve his goals can be traced to the fail­ ure of his strategy. The strategy itself—taking an independent position without breaking with the President—may have been sound enough, but one must wonder if this were a realistic consideration for Kennedy. Given his past relationship with President Johnson, and the intense scrutiny given to all of Kennedy’s statementsand positions by the press, Kennedy's attempt in this situation appears to have been naive. 86 It appears that Kennedy simply misread the situation,

Kennedy didn’t appreciate the significance of what he was about to say. In private conversation with his aides be­ fore his press conference on Saturday, February 19, he was skeptical whether his statement would arouse much interest. The proposal he was about to make had already been made by Eugene McCarthy, without attracting a single headline.

Perhaps he was unaware of or simply misjudged the sensitivity of the Johnson Administration to even indirect criticism of its policy. How­ ever, given the past record of suspicion and mistrust between Kennedy and Johnson, failure to anticipate the virulence of the Administration's reaction was an inexcusable omission on Kennedy’s part. Further analysis reveals that Kennedy may not have totally mis­ judged the nature of the Administration’s reaction. Most of the con­ straints used by Kennedy in his statement were defensive in nature. That is, they were designed to prevent misinterpretation, to prevent a split with the President. However, given the ultimate effect of the statement, these tactics must be considered inadequate to implement Kennedy's strategy. Given the situation in the United States at the time, it is pos­ sible to conclude that Kennedy simply failed in his implementations of his goals and strategies. It was impossible for him to deliver this type of analysis without precipitating a break between himself and the Administration, and the specific constraints used in the statement were insufficient to prevent an Administration counter-attack. It is tempting, but erroneous, to dismiss the entire episode as a failure, although at the time Kennedy’s statement was regarded as "the greatest faux pas of his career."'57^ From a rhetorical point of view, the things Kennedy did correctly he did very well. There is no fault in his Q7 development of his logical appeals, or his attempts to tie his proposals to President Johnson’s policies; they simply did not work because they were inappropriate to this particular situation. Any constraint selec­ ted by Kennedy would probably have had the same effect as the ones he did use. It is also to Kennedy’s credit that he recognized his mistakes quickly, and tried to remedy them. There is no doubt that at this junc­ ture of his career, Kennedy was unwilling to break with President Johnson over the issue of Vietnam. In fact, he was ready to sacrifice some of his own prestige and following to avoid this state of affairs. Whatever his confusion or misunderstanding of the impact of his statement, Kennedy was clear in his vision of his primary goal and strategy. 88

FOOTNOTES

' ' 1-1 Jack Newfield., Robert Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: E. P. Duttòn & Go., Inc., 1969), p. 119. 2Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1970), p. 572. ^Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Bostoni Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 265. ^Cooper, p. 572-574. A -^Cooper, p. 574.

^Newfield, p. 120. 7Ibid. 8Cooper, p. 574-575. 9Cooper, p. 575. ■'■°Cooper, p. 330. 11Cooper, p. 331. 12Cooper, p. 351. j ^William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own; Robert F. Kennedy, 1964 - 1968 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 213. JV ^Theodore Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy; A Peaceful Revolution for the Seventies (New York": The New American Library, Inc., 1969)» p. I63. 1-5ibid. ^^Sorensena, p. 163. 17Ibid. ■æVanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 215-216. ■^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 216.

20Newfield, p. 120-121. 89

^Newfield., p. 121. ^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 217. 23vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 217-218. cVanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 39. 25sorensen, p. 92. ^Sorensen, p. 93. 27sorensen, p. 97. ^^Edwin Guthman, We Band of Brothers (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), P. 319. 29jules Witcover, 85 Days; , The Last Campaign of Robert F. Kennedy (New York: Ace Publishing Corporation, 1969), p. 22-23. Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 253» in* ^Ijfewfield, p. 122. JZyan&Qn Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 253. 33Newfield, p. 122. ^victor Lasky, Robert F, Kennedy: The Myth and the Man (New York: Trident Press, 1968), p. 254. 55vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 219. ^Newfield, p. 124. 5?Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 71-115, passim. ^Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), P. 30. 59Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 86-87.

^Sorensen, p. 165.

41Ibid. ^^Statement of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, February 19, 1966. All subsequent quotations from Senator Kennedy's statement are from the "offi­ cial" copy of his statement, available from the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, Waltham, Massachusetts. 90

’ ¿^Kenneth Crawford., "Bobby on Vietnam," Newsweek, March 7, 1966, P. 33. , ^Guthman, p, 320, ^-5lbid, / 46pbid. ! ^miiam V. Shannon, The Heir Apparent: Robert Kennedy and the > Struggle for Power (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967), p. 104, aC\48Ibid<

i ^Patrick Anderson, The Presidents' Men (Garden City, New York: / DoublecLay and Company, Inc., 1969)» P. 417-419. ^Shannon, p. 104-105. ^Anderson, p. 4l8. ■^^Newfield, p. 124. ^Newfield, p. 124. •^Sorensen, p. 164.

■55ibid. •^Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1966), p. 569. ■5?Witcover, p. 19. 91

CHAPTER 5

OPEN DISSENT

Despite efforts at reconciliation of the positions of President Lyndon B. Johnson and Senator Robert F. Kennedy regarding the proper course for the United States in Vietnam, the junior Senator from New York was classed as an opponent of the Administration’s war policy. Although Kennedy had not broken openly with the President, he continued to act in an independent manner. On February 26, 1966, a scant week after his first Vietnam speech, Kennedy attended, for the first time, a meeting of the p "peace bloc" of Senate doves. He was besieged by "influential citizens" 3 who "urged him to speak up" on matters concerning the war.-' However, Kennedy returned to his previous custom of speaking about the war in only a guarded manner, if at all. This pattern was broken—cleanly—on March 2, 196?. Kennedy was now clearly committed to the anti-war camp. As such, his speech on this date is a logical second tactic to be examined within the context of an analysis of his strategy. As before, it is necessary to establish the context or rhetorical situation which elicited Kennedy’s speech.

The Exigence

The War in Vietnam

Expansion of the Vietnamese conflict continued throughout 1966. In that year 200,000 American troops were sent to Vietnam, bringing the 92

total United. States forces in Vietnam to 389,000.^ The mood of the John son administration seemed especially "hawkish" in the spring of 1966. In March, General Maxwell Taylor advocated the mining of Haiphong har- 5 bor. In April, the State Department warned that opposition airplanes could expect "no sanctuary" from American pursuit, even if that pursuit led to mainland China itself.8 The entire year, according to commanding

General William Westmoreland, "was the year of the Allied offensive 7 against the Communists"' :

Before the year was out, the United States had nearly four hundred thousand troops in Vietnam, its soldiers outnumbering the ARVN and the enemy forces in the south. In one year American spending on the war leaped from one hundred and five million dollars to two billion dollars a month—a sum whose equivalent would have paid every South Vietnamese more than a hundred dollars a year. 8

The hawkish public approach to.the war continued into the summer. In June the United States bombed oil installations on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong,a major escalation of the war. July witnessed talk by the leaders of South Vietnam of a possible invasion of the North. Despite the military activities in Vietnam, the internal politi­ cal gyrations of the Vietnamese government all but eclipsed the military as the focus of world attention. The spring of 1966 brought the "Bud­ dhist crisis," which nearly fomented a civil war in the South. March, April, and May were months of grave political instability in South Viet­ nam, stemming from South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky’s decision to relieve a popular corps commander—Nguyen Ganh Thi. This move enraged the Buddhists, who demanded a return'to civilian rule.11

Demonstrations occurred in almost every major city in the South, 93 centering m the old. Imperial capital of Hue. 12 Due to United. States association with the Ky regime, some of the demonstrations took on a pronounced anti-American flavor.^5 Before this protest subsided, the anti-Ky elements controlled large parts of Da Nang and Hue. American and South Vietnamese soldiers were thus forced to recapture territory from the dissident South Vietnamese, with the predictable result that little effort was made against the Communist forces operating in Vietnam.

Efforts for Peace

It may be a coincidence, but it was not until after the Buddhist crisis that the first attempts to settle the war peacefully began. In June of 1966, six months after the conclusion of the earlier bombing pause and "peace offensive," United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge began a series of secret meetings with Polish represen- tatives in an attempt to lay the groundwork for a formal peace conference. 14 This quest for negotiations continued throughout the summer and fall of 1966. In July Prime Minister Indira Ghandi of India urged a re-opening of the Geneva conference, which had temporarily eased the Vietnamese cri­ sis during the 1950’s. In August,. Thailand proposed an all-Asian confer­ ence to settle the war. In September, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg advanced a plan for a step-by-step, mutual de-escalation of the conflict. In October, the United States emerged from the Manila conference pledged to withdraw all of its forces from 15 South Vietnam within six months of an agreement to end hostilities. These overtures, however, were rejected by the North Vietnamese. The key element of difference between the United States and the 94

North Vietnamese turned on the United States bombing of the North. North Vietnam demanded that the bombing be stopped "indefinitely and without conditions," before the negotiations began. The United States position held that the bombing could not be halted until after "fruitful" negoti- ations began. 16 This was the deadlock which characterized the period 1966-67.

The War at Home

The controversy the war produced within the United States expanded as steadily and inexorably as the war itself. Kennedy's February, 1966 statement was followed by Senator J. William Fulbright’s lecture series on "The Arrogance of Power," which was destined to become a best selling book. The year drew to a close with congressional elections which would "be interpreted as a referendum on Johnson's presidency . . . ."^7 More­ over, since the Johnson administration had become "increasingly preoccu­ pied with the Problem of Vietnam," the elections were seen by many "as an indication of public feeling about the war."}-8 Surprisingly, much of the political activity of the "peace move­ ment" received its impetus from the Democratic party itself, “where at least one hundred candidates ran for office on peace platforms in twenty states’’^9 :

Major challenges were mounted in Oregon, Massachusetts, New Jer­ sey, Washington state, New York, Connecticut, and California, and the war was a significant issue in races in Montana, Ten­ nessee, Illinois, Michigan, and elsewhere. In Wisconsin, Demo­ crats at a state convention in June passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire after overwhelmingly defeating by a voice vote a proposal to include a conciliatory paragraph praising Johnson for his "restraint" and his "efforts to achieve a just and 95 honorable peace." In Dearborn, Michigan, Mayor Orville Hub­ bard arranged for a referendum on the war. The question he placed on the ballot asked voters, "Are you in favor of an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam so the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems?" . . . the peace campaigns in 1966 were clear evidence that Vietnam was beginning to dominate, and would eventually obsess, American politics at every level. 20

As the intensity of the anti-war political challenge grew, it was only a matter of time before the Johnson administration launched a power­ ful political counterstroke—the spectre of American dissonance serving as a stimulus to further efforts by the Communists. Thus, the administra­ tion sought to undermine the credibility of the dissenters and protesters by claiming that their actions undermined attempts to establish peace talks. In other words, "As an issue, the war was a hornets’ nest . . . ,22 The 1966 election results illustrated the complexity of the issue. The results, "a clear setback to the Democratic Party and to President Johnson," revealed "an indisputable discontent with the leadership" of the President "but failed to say anything unarguable about the war" 23J :

Reading the returns correctly was not easy ... In Dearborn, Michigan, where the war had been the subject of a direct referendum, the vote against.immediate withdrawal had been 20,667 to 14,124, at least theoretically a victory for the President. At the same time one could not dismiss the fact that nearly 40 per cent of the voters had rejected the leaders of both political parties, voting for an immed­ iate end to the war .... Opponents of the war who had attempted to make it an open issue in 1966 could point to the near misses of several peace candidates, especially Rob­ ert Scheer, but the overall effect was disappointingly vague. 24

The challenge to the war in 1966 was more than simply political, however. Some anti-war activists preferred a more direct expression of 96 their views. In 1966 and. 1967 there were numerous protests and demon­ strations, some of which had an alarming tendency to become violent. A 1969 report of the Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confron­ tation commented that "in the past three years, protest against American involvement and conduct in Vietnam has become so familiar to our national life that it has almost acquired the status of an institution."2^ As in the past, much of the impetus for the protests was provided by the col­ lege students, many of whom faced the question of "not merely whether to lend approval to the American effort, but whether to lend it their bodies and perhaps their lives.Not surprisingly, the campus was a hotbed of anti-war activity during 1966-67. It may belabor the obvious, but protest against the war, as well as the violence which frequently accompanied the demonstrations, became part of the lives of most Americans. Accordingly, the war, along with its domestic manifestations, came to dominate American attention.

Robert F. Kennedy and Vietnam

Robert F. Kennedy's relative silence on Vietnam during the period 1966-67 must be characterized as "brooding":

He made no formal speeches about the war. When questioners, and sometimes hecklers, asked him about Vietnam, he gave vague and sometimes evasive answers like, "I have some reser­ vations about the government’s policy," or "These are all complicated matters." 27

A good example of Kennedy's feelings during this period was provided by Jack Newfield, who recalled a conversation he had with Kennedy in Decem­ ber of 1966: 97

"You haven’t said anything for a year. When will you talk again?" I asked. He replied: "If I became convinced that by making another speech that I could do some good, I would make it tomorrow. But the last time I spoke I didn't have any influence on policy, and I was hurt politically. I’m afraid that by speaking out I just make Lyndon do the opposite, out of spite. He hates me so much that if I asked for snow, he would make rain, just be­ cause it was me. But, maybe I will have to say something. The bombing is getting worse all the time now." 28

Thus, although Kennedy kept silent about Vietnam, it was still an issue of some importance to him. He remained concerned about the war, but held his peace due to his poisoned relationship with President Johnson. In one instance, in September of 1966, he almost spoke out in support of French President Charles de Gaulle’s offer to mediate between the United States and the North Vietnamese. However, when Kennedy was ready to re­ lease his statement, President Johnson "had categorically dismissed de Gaulle’s suggestion," Accordingly, "Kennedy felt that his words could serve no purpose," and he chose to drop the matter. 29

Kennedy and Johnson: The Breaking Point

When considering the nature of Kennedy’s relationship with the President of the United States during 1966 and early 1967, one must re­ call that although the two men "papered over" their differences after Kennedy's February 19, 1966 statement, they did not arrive at a true accommodation. Their dislike and mistrust of one another continued. Al­ though it may be true that an eventual break between the two was inevit­ able, Kennedy restrained himself during the rest of 1966. This restraint seems remarkable considering the nature of the war in 1966. It is apparent that Kennedy viewed the expanded United States 98 involvement in Vietnam with alarm—albeit a largely private alarm. How­ ever, as the war expanded throughout 1966, the conflict became inextric­ ably linked with President Johnson; hence the sobriquet "Johnson's war." This was a significant development for Robert F. Kennedy, for it helped free him from his earlier enthusiastic support of the conflict. Simply put, in 1966, when the conflagration became "Johnson's war," it was different from "Kennedy's war" earlier in the decade. Moreover, Kennedy's dislike of the President "made it easier for him to change his mind about Vietnam the more he thought of it as Mr. Johnson's war."^ Still, for most of 1966, Kennedy remained silent, speaking only in answer to speci­ fic questions on the war posed to him in question and answer sessions. There were exceptions to Kennedy's policy of silence. Although not as detailed and significant as his February statement, they did re­ veal his thinking about the war. In April of 1966 he commented briefly on the State Department's "no sanctuary" announcement. He expressed some concern that there was "still great political instability in South Viet­ nam" and suggested that military escalation could not provide the Viet­ namese with internal political stability. This stability, he observed, was essential to the military effort. He also expressed concern that not enough consideration was being given to possible Soviet and Chinese res­ ponses to the "no sanctuary" doctrine. Kennedy's conclusion, however, admitted that "there is no quick or easy answer to Viet Nam" and reaf- firmed his support of "our basic policy" there. 31 Following the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in June of 1966, Kennedy released a statement in which he expressed the belief that "all Americans are concerned at this expansion of the war." Lest this be 99

interpreted, as criticism of the President, Kennedy quickly added his hope "that the predictions" that the bombing would slow the rate of North Viet namese infiltration and resupplying of the south "will prove to be realis- tic ones."32 Thus, Kennedy resumed his old, sniping approach to the sub­ ject of the Vietnamese war. He questioned specific tactics and develop­ ments of the war. He clung to the counter-insurgency position of John Kennedy. He refused to repudiate the war itself or the man who directed it. An explanation of Kennedy’s behavior may be found by examining his reputation during the period in question. Specifically, in the fall of 1966, Kennedy became embroiled in the "Manchester controversy" which surrounded the publication of a book detailing the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The book, The Death of a President, had been written by William Manchester, who had been personally selected for the task by Jacqueline Kennedy. Upon its completion, Mrs. Kennedy found certain seg­ ments of the book objectionable, and sought to have them removed. When the author resisted, court action was threatened—and headlines were made. As de facto head of the family, Robert Kennedy supported his bro­ ther's widow and became the "official" family spokesman on the issue. This was a "no win" posture for Kennedy, but he accepted it, even though it meant watching his personal popularity embark "on a downward plunge."33

'The poisonous fallout from this controversy did more than anything else to affix the image of ruthlessness on Bob Kennedy"34.

He was accused of seeking censorship by injunction, breaching his contract, and using the book to spread derogatory views on President Johnson . . . .Then at the peak of his popularity, Bob Kennedy suffered in silence the paradoxical accusation that he had sought to repress a book that in fact was basically 100

friendly to the Kennedys. Manchester, who publicly compared the Senator to Hitler in 1967, would support him for the Presi­ dency in 1968; but by then permanent damage had been done. 35

One can imagine the frustration Kennedy expressed during this period. The war he found fault with was now clearly identified with President Johnson, yet, due to political reality and his own credibility gap, he had to refrain from attacking it. This paradoxical situation led Kennedy to conclude that "it was a good time to get away,and he ar­ ranged to take a European tour in early 1967. In this manner, he sought relief from the pressures at home. It is no surprise that the relief turned into controversy, and February of 1967 found the Senator and the President eyeball to eyeball once again. In Europe, Kennedy experienced firsthand the European absorption in the American war in Asia. He was continually questioned about the conflict, his views regarding it, and the prospects for peace.Al­ though his talks with scholars, students, and foreign leaders touched on many topics, the Vietnam war predominated. For example, during an exten­ ded conversation with President Charles De Gaulle, "their entire conver­ sation concerned Vietnam."^8 It was while in France that Kennedy became enmeshed in the "ulti­ mate controversy" with President Johnson. During a meeting with Etienne Manac’h, Director of Asian Affairs for the French Foreign Ministry, Ken­ nedy was told that on the basis of a recent conversation with the North Vietnamese, Manac’h believed that a unilateral bombing halt might trig­ ger peace negotiations. An American State Department official, present during the Kennedy—Manac’h meeting, cabled the information back to Washington. The cable was mishandled by the State Department, so that 101

the information was released to Newsweek magazine. The story broke just as Kennedy returned to this country, and an enraged Lyndon Johnson "immed­ iately assumed that Kennedy had leaked the story,"59 On February 6, 1967, the Senator and the President met in what proved to be a pivotal confron­ tation :

The meeting exploded in anger and political threats. The Presi­ dent did not realize that the State Department ("your State Department," each termed it) had received the message from its Paris Embassy and leaked it without Bob’s ever knowing about it. A U.S. victory in Vietnam, said the irate President, would soon end RFK’s political future. "All you dove politicians will be dead in six months," he thundered. 40 The discussion degenerated into an argument over who had reques­ ted the meeting. The President said that he had not invited Kennedy—Kennedy had asked to come. The senator said it would not happen again. Before Kennedy left, Johnson urged him to tell waiting reporters that every possibility for peace talks was being pursued. Kennedy said he could not do that because he knew it was not true. The newspaper stories that appeared later indicated that Ken­ nedy had called Johnson an "S.O.B." Kennedy had not used offensive language, but the heat of the meeting was too intense to contain behind the closed doors of the White House, and rumors about the confrontation were widely reported. As far as Kennedy was concerned, he had learned one thing—the prospects for peace were dim and the President was committed to a course that made them even dimmer. 41

"The emotion of February overflowed into March," 4? and Kennedy began work on what was to become his major statement on the Vietnamese conflict. Throughout the month of February Kennedy worked on the speech, with the predictable result that press speculation about the nature of his forth­ coming address was rampant.^ "Close advisors warned Kennedy that another statement criticizing the Administration would subject him to new tor­ rents of personal abuse,but he remained adamant in his resolve to speak out. Not even last-minute intercession by some of his friends in 102

the Johnson administration—notably Averell Harriman—deterred him. On the contrary, these efforts led him to regard the speech as a matter of honor, for "Kennedy’s anger over what Johnson was doing overcame these personal considerations,"^ Thus, on March 2, 1967» Kennedy ended speculation about

his feelings on the Vietnam war by presenting a lengthy address in the Senate.

March 2, 19&7

Kennedy’s March 2, 1967 speech began with the familiar pattern of speaking favorably about President Johnson.

I discuss this war knowing that its tangled and resistant com­ plexities make judgment difficult and uncertain; and knowing, therefore, of the grave and painful responsibility home by the President of the United States. As he must make the ultimate decisions, he is also entitled to our hopeful sympathy,our understanding, and our support in the search for peace. And even though we debate, as we must, the wisest course toward settlement in Vietnam, there is no comfort for our adversary in these councils. Nearly all Americans share with us the determination and intention to remain in Vietnam until we have fulfilled our commitments. There is no danger of any division— in this Chamber or in this country—now or in the future—which will erode American will and compel American withdrawal. Nor are we here to curse the past or to praise it. Three Presidents have taken action in Vietnam. As one who was involved in many of those decisions, I can testify that if fault is to be found or responsibility assessed, there is enough to go around for all —including myself. 46

After a short description of the American effort in Vietnam, punctuated with the observation "and still there is no peace," Kennedy went on to affix the blame for the war’s continuation on the North Vietnamese, for "If our enemy will not accept peace, it cannot come." Kennedy refrained from launching an extended polemic at the North Vietnamese, however, and he quickly established the basis or nature of his 103

concern with the present American peace efforts in Vietnam:

Yet, we must also look to ourselves. We must have no doubt that it is not our acts or failures which bar the peace; that there is nothing we have left undone which we might have done. Our own course must be subject to a ceaseless and critical examination, not with certainty that change will bring success, but in order that our own people can take comfort and strength from the knowledge that America has taken every step, done every act, and performed every deed within its power to put an end to this distant and ferocious war.

Kennedy justified his concern by urging the Senate to "reflect for a moment not on the wisdom and necessity of our cause nor on the valor of the South Vietnamese, but on the horror":

For although the world’s imperfections may call forth the acts of war, righteousness cannot obscure the agony and pain those acts bring to a single child. The Vietnamese war is an event of his­ toric moment, summoning the grandeur and concern of many nations. But it is also the vacant moment of amazed fear as a mother and child watch death by fire fall from the improbable machine sent by a country they barely comprehend. It is the sudden terror of the official or the civil guard absorbed in the work of his vil­ lage as he realizes the assassin is taking his life. It is the refugees wandering homeless from villages now obliterated, leav­ ing behind only those who did not live to flee. It is the young men, Vietnamese and American, who in an instant sense the night of death destroying yesterday’s promise of family and land and home. It is a country where young men have never lived a day in peace and where families have never known a time when it was not nec- cessary to be afraid. It is a land deafened by the unending crescendo of violence, hatred and savage fury; where the absorb­ ing goal for millions is not to live well or to improve their lives, but simply to survive.

Because of this situation, Kennedy urged that "All we say and all we do must be informed by our awareness that this horror is partly our respon­ sibility; not just a nation’s responsibility but yours and mine." Although he acknowledged that "power is the instrument of war and devastation the 104 product of power," and that "many . . . restraints have been carefully imposed by the President," Kennedy declared that "our apprehension of this war’s agony now joins with other mounting urgencies to command us to seek every opportunity, open every door, tread every path which may lead to the end of the war." The "other mounting urgencies" were the next subject Kennedy dealt with. "We are now steadily widening the war in order, we are told, to increase the costs to Hanoi. Yet, in our concern with the price our adver­ sary must pay, let us not omit our own costs from the war’s account." The specific costs listed by Kennedy were fourfold: (l) that the extreme physical destruction of South Vietnam would make the ultimate rebuilding of the country difficult; (2) that the war was a barrier to "fresh under­ standing and diminishing tension" between the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) that the war was diverting the attention of the United States away from the Western Alliance; and (4) that the war was "diverting resour­ ces which might have been used" to "enhance the quality of our national life" by eliminating poverty and improving education. Kennedy was careful to reaffirm the point that "we are willing—we must be willing—to pay all these costs if the alternative is surrender or defeat." However, he pointed out that the costs were "borne in pursuit of what Secretary McNamara has called limited objectives . . . which, our government has always said, can best be achieved at the conference table." Thus, Kennedy established a prelude for the heart of his address:

... we are now at a critical turning point in pursuit of our stated limited objectives: balanced between the rising pros­ pects of peace and surely rising war, between the promise of negotiations and the perils of spreading conflict. For our attacks are mounting in intensity, just as the evidence mounts 105

that a new, and more hopeful moment of opportunity for settle­ ment has been at hand .... I speak today for this purpose: to explore the possibilities of peace which recent weeks have illuminated.

Kennedy began by presenting an overview of his entire program, succinctly stating the main suggestions he was going to advance:

The steps I am suggesting are intimately related. They stand together, each dependent on the other. It will do little good to go to the conference table if discussions are simply used to mask continued escalation of the war. Nor will negotiations be fruitful unless they lead to a reasonable and honorable settle­ ment with some hope of lasting peace. Therefore, I propose that we test the sincerity of the statements by Premier Kosygin and others asserting that if the bombardment of the North is halted, negotiations would begin—by halting the bombardment and saying we are ready to negotiate within the week; making it clear that neither side will substantially increase the size of the war in South Vietnam—by infiltration or reinforcement. An interna­ tional group should be asked to inspect the borders and ports of the country to report any further escalation. And under direction of the United Nations, and with an international pres­ ence gradually replacing American forces, we should move toward a final settlement which allows all the major political elements in South Vietnam to participate in the choice of leadership and shape their future direction as a people.

Such actions, Kennedy asserted, would move the United States in the direc­ tion of the "three stages toward final resolution of the war": beginning negotiations, halting escalation of the war, and the final peace agree­ ment. Kennedy devoted the rest of his speech to an explanation of these three stages and how his program could bring about their actualization. First, he repeated, "we must get to the negotiating table" (orig­ inal emphasis). For this, he suggested, we must be willing to halt the bombing of the North. Kennedy did not lightly advance this proposal, and he spent considerable time justifying it to his listeners. He based his optimism on the statement in London by Soviet Premier Kosygin that a halt 106 in the bombing was "necessary to enable talks between [North Vietnam] and the United States to take place." Kennedy clearly regarded Kosygin’s statement as a signal to the United States:

This declaration comes from a man of enormous authority in the communist world, whose country helps sustain North Viet­ nam’s effort. It does not demand that we withdraw our forces, slow do™ our military effort on the ground, or even halt the bombing of South Vietnam. It does not demand an indissoluble and binding guarantee that we will never use our planes again at any future time no matter what our adversary does to en­ large his effort or change the nature of the war. Demands and replies must be understood in the context of the present situation, not a drastically different one which may or may not be created in the future by our adversary. There is no longer a demand that we accept any terms or conditions, such as the Four Points, in advance of talks. We are simply in­ formed that "to enable talks" we should stop bombing- something we have done before.

Kennedy stated that "the same message has come to us in recent weeks from friends and adversaries alike, in public interviews and private communi­ cations." Because of this, in concluded, "the moment of promise . . . may have come." Kennedy openly recognized the risk that such a course of action would entail, but he urged the Senate to remember the Cuban missile crisis which President Kennedy dealt with "by accepting at face value those posi­ tions of our adversaries" which promised settlement. "Such a proven tech­ nique might well yield fruitful results .... Certainly it is worth trying." Kennedy next argued for the bombing halt by suggesting that the United States had very little to lose by making that gesture, for "if their statements and our hopes are founded in reality, discussions may begin." If not, he suggested, ”we will have proven to ourselves and our friends io? around, the world that we are willing to take the initiative for peace; that it is our adversary, not America, that bars the way," "We were willing to do this a year ago," Kennedy argued, "even without the evidence we now have that an end to bombing attacks on the North may well bring negotiations .... Why then do we not try again in this far more hopeful situation?" Eager to avoid misunderstanding of his proposals, Kennedy re-empha­ sized that "if discussions are used [by Hanoi] only as a pretext to enlarge the conflict" in Vietnam, the United States could resume the bombing. "We should be generous in our search for peace, but I am also aware of the precedent of Panmunjon," Kennedy concluded his analysis of the merits of continued United States bombing of North Vietnam with a rather lengthy treatment of the im­ pact of a bombing halt on the United States military effort in Vietnam. In so doing, Kennedy made his first direct attack on President Johnson’s pol­ icy. "President Johnson told us at Johns Hopkins that we began bombing North Vietnam in 1965 for three purposes":

The first was "to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam"—assuring them they would not be abandoned. The bombing did help give such assurance. Now, however, we have 400,000 fighting men in the South, a far more effective and continuing proof of our commitment and determination. Second, in the President’s words, we wanted "to convince the leaders of North Vietnam . . . {that] we will not he defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw . . . .” That purpose is also served by the enormous commitment of men, lives and resources which we have made to South Vietnam since the bombing began. If our adversary has seen his hopes for victory destroyed, it is primarily because of the skill and bravery of our forces on the ground. Moreover, there is every sign that the bombing itself is now an insuperable obstacle to negotia­ tions and that the North Vietnamese feel it impossible to dis­ cuss peace while bombs are falling on their country; just as the bombing of Britain only united resistance; just as we 108 would join in unyielding determination if bombs were falling on Detroit or Chicago. The third purpose, the President said, was "to slow down aggression." The bombing of the North would, it was hoped, reduce the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the communist forces in the South. A year ago, General Ridge­ way—the commander of our last ground war in Asia—predicted that air attacks could not stop the infiltration of men and supplies through the scattered jungles, trails and hills of Southeast Asia. It had not worked, he pointed out, even in the more open countryside of Korea.

This last idea, that the bombing was ineffectual in slowing the rate of infiltration into the South, was expanded upon by Kennedy. He cited the opinions of Secretary of Defense MacNamara, General James Gavin, and Ambassadors George Kennan and Edwin 0. Reischauer as well as that of Gen­ eral Ridgeway. By so doing, Kennedy attacked a cornerstone of the Johnson administration’s policy. Kennedy made a final appeal for support for the bombing halt:

Certainly it is not weakness for this enormous nation to take a generous step toward ending this war. It is not bravery to refuse an act which may save thousands of lives with little risk to ourselves. Can anyone believe this nation, with all its fantastic power and resources, will be endangered by a wise and magnanimous action toward a difficult but small adversary? last week, commenting on the period of the New Year’s truce, Prime Minister Wilson said that "one single simple act of trust could have achieved £peace]". We can— and should—perform that act.

Kennedy next dealt with the second element of his plan—interna­ tional inspection to insure that neither side took advantage of the bomb­ ing halt to improve its military position. He suggested that the United States seek "an understanding with our adversaries that neither side will substantially increase the rate of infiltration and reinforcement during negotiations." This action, Kennedy explained, would improve the

J 109

atmosphere of the peace talks, for "it is not likely that peace can be discussed effectively or with confidence while the other side is prepar­ ing for a larger war”:

Therefore, whether or not we are able to reach a specific agreement on this subject, the international inspection team which, hopefully, was established as soon as the bombing halted, would report any effort, by either side, to increase its strength while peace talks proceed. They would also moni­ tor any agreement reached during the course of negotiations on suspension of military activity, including, hopefully, a cease fire.

International participation in the peace efforts, Kennedy felt, would be a substantial benefit to the United States. Not only would their "detached and objective testimony" underscore the United States "sincerity1 but if the negotiations failed and the United States returned to the war, "we would act with far clearer international understanding of our motives and necessities." / As in the case of the previous step of his peace plan, Kennedy used a historical precedent for his suggestion—the Cuban missile crisis. He recalled that "we have both the demonstrated willingness of the United Nations to undertake such a task in another difficult situation, and proof that such inspection is technically feasible." Kennedy spoke at length regarding the third step of his peace pro­ posal : "we must know and clearly state what kind of Vietnam we would like to see emerge from negotiations, and how we propose these general objec­ tives could be best achieved" (original emphasis). Negotiations, he remin­ ded his listeners, "are not the end of the road. They are the bridge to the future of South Vietnam." In dealing with this idea,Kennedy moved directly onto the ground 110 which had proven so controversial in 1966. He seemed aware of this since he began his analysis on the defensive. "To speak of our objectives in advance of negotiations does not yield advantage to our adversary by ’show ing our cards.’ Discussions of peace and war are not poker games." "The first task for the negotiators," in Kennedy’s view, "will be to dismantle the war .

They will have to establish procedures for a cease fire, for the laying down of arms and for the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. This must be accompanied by the political steps necessary to protect the safety of all sides while the war is being dismantled. The President has clearly stated to the world that for our part we neither want nor intend to keep our forces or bases in South Vietnam once peace is secure.

Although Kennedy did not suggest that the "first task" of the negotiations would be easy, he did recognize that "more difficult and intricate is the resolution of South Vietnam’s tangled politics." He re­ peated his assertion of "a year ago" that "a negotiated settlement is a compromise." Since "we have not defeated the Vietcong, nor, as President Johnson said in his State of the Union Message, is a military victory in sight," Kennedy urged the Senate to look towards "an agreed solution which, however, imperfect, protects our basic interest in Vietnam: The self- determination of the people of South Vietnam. The only way this could be accomplished, according to Kennedy, was for the United States to accept the participation of all political elements in South Vietnam:

All the people of South Vietnam, communist and non-communist, Buddhist and Christian, should be able to choose their leaders, and seek office through peaceful political processes, free from external coercion and internal violence. All should have the Ill

opportunity to seek peacefully a share of power and. responsi­ bility through free elections. They should, determine their future and the nature of their system and resolve the question of Vietnamese reunification.

"We might begin" implementing his proposal, Kennedy suggested, "by encour­ aging the South Vietnamese government ... to begin its ovm discussion with the National Liberation Front." Moreover, the United States should be "ready to talk directly to all parties—North and South, communist and non-communist alike." Kennedy coupled his support of the "self-determination" principle with a warning about the nature of the current South Vietnamese government:

However, if we want non-communist Vietnamese to take a major role in discussions leading to a negotiated settlement—as I believe essential—and to exert effective force and influence in competition with the NLF for future leadership, we must first encourage a free political process among non-communist South Vietnamese. The military Directory is not representa­ tive of many of the non-communist political elements in South Vietnam. Even the Assembly, a significant step toward civil­ ian rule, excludes important elements of the population and, though it has taken positions independent of the military, is still far weaker than the generals.

Kennedy further declared that "to be effective," any South Vietnamese gov­ ernment "must engage in far more serious efforts at political and social reform than has any in the past." Finally, Kennedy acknowledged that there "may be a prolonged period" between "the end of hostilities and elections." This would be "a period of great importance," for "the communists would fear a takeover by the military just as we might fear a communist coup." This fear could be de­ fused, Kennedy felt, by a mutual, phased withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese forces. They could be replaced "by international forces to 112

police the cease-fire, guard, against violence and coercion, and supervise the elections." As a postscript to his explanation of self-determination in Vietnam, Kennedy dealt with the possibility that the elections might result in a communist Vietnam. This possibility, Kennedy suggested, "must be viewed against the shifting nature of world communism." In the past, he declared, "communism everywhere was guided from a single center .... A communist victory anywhere meant an automatic extension of the influence and power of the Soviet Union." Kennedy felt that this was no longer the case, that "the monolithic communist system is forever shattered." Accordingly, "North Vietnam, like North Korea, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and others can be encouraged to assert its own independence." In conclusion, Kennedy reiterated his belief that "there can be no guarantee that these suggestions toward peace will bring early negotiations or an enduring peace. That will.be in the hands of others besides our­ selves." Nonetheless, "I do not think the expansion of this war—whether by an increase of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South, or by a widening of our efforts against the North—will bring the kind of peace we seek." Regarding his peace program, Kennedy indicated that he did "not offer this program as a fixed and frozen formula":

They are suggestions to be refined and revised by the critical examination of other minds; enhanced by the imagination of the thoughtful and concerned; moulded and reworked by shifting events, the responses of other nations and the passions of peoples whose lives and homes are at stake. I believe, however, they point in a necessary direction, and may help stimulate and encourage the debate and public discourse from which truth is chaotically forged. That, after all, is the most ancient, emi­ nent and cherished obligation of this body. 113

Kennedy ended the speech on the note he had struck earlier, about seeking everywhere and in every way for peace. "The stakes are very high: They are the home of the child in a jungle village, the hunger of a man driven from his farm, the life of a young American even now preparing for the day’s battle." In the Vietnam war, Kennedy suggested, "there is great principle, and there is also human anguish. If we can protect the one and prevent the other, then there is no effort too great for us to make."

The Aftermath

The reception generated by Kennedy’s March 2, 196? speech was far different from that of his previous effort. He offered no confusing explanations and clarifications. Although the Johnson administration responded to Kennedy's statement, the response was more subdued than that of the previous year. A possible reason for this is that this time Ken­ nedy did not catch the administration by surprise. His preparation of the speech was an open secret in Washington:

The psychological and political buildup for Kennedy’s speech continued all through February, until it seemed the speech itself would be an anticlimax. There were almost daily news stories anticipating the speech, and the final break with Johnson. On February 17, the New York Post ran a five-column headline that read: "RFK Sets Major Speech on Bombing." On February 28 the Post's four-column headline read: "Senate Awaits Kennedy's Viet Speech." On February 28, press secre­ tary Frank Mankiewicz received fifty-five calls about the speech, including twenty-five from reporters representing foreign papers. 47

The administration's response to Kennedy's speech was immediate and direct. Because this speech was delivered on the floor of the Senate, Kennedy was vulnerable to immediate debate on his proposals. The 114

Congressional Record, of that date reveals that several of Kennedy’s col­ leagues asked, him to yield the floor during the speech, requests which were granted by Kennedy. These interruptions contained elements of both praise and blame. The first question addressed Kennedy came from Senator J. William Fulbright. He expressed support for Kennedy’s analysis regarding the impact of the war on United States domestic concerns. Senator Gale McGee interrupted next and objected to the apparent assumption "that if somehow we could avoid appropriations for war or avoid appropriations for defense, we would suddenly have a great deal of money available for the domestic programs at home."48 The first serious questioning of Kennedy came next from Senator Frank Lausche, who noted an apparent contradiction in Kennedy’s thinking. Lausche commented that Kennedy expressed dismay over the cost of the war to United States domestic programs but stated later that he was willing to pay any price if the alternative was surrender or defeat. Lausche also tried to establish that Kennedy's bombing halt was tantamount to surren­ der, as it would leave the men in the field defenseless. Kennedy avoided Lausche*s arguments by asking for time to complete his speech. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield then provided Kennedy with a friendly interruption. He apparently tried to anticipate—and defuse— the hostile reaction to the speech:

There will be those who read into it a divergence, a differ­ ence between the Senator from New York and the administration. I wish that they would read the speech carefully, and take note of the calm and dispassionate tone and the provocative discussion which has and will ensue from it. There is a good deal of agreement between the administration 115

and. the Senator from New York; and advice from him, or from any other Member of this body is not necessarily dissent. It can be very helpful and fruitful.

Mansfield spoke at length in this vein, dwelling on the idea that Kennedy and the administration both sought the same goal—peace—and differed only in the best means of achieving it. He characterized Kennedy’s speech as "worthy of the Senate in its best moments." Senator Fulbright quickly joined the effort to establish a perspec­ tive for Kennedy’s speech by pointing out that "there was an honest dif­ ference of opinion" regarding the effectiveness of the bombing in Vietnam. Fulbright then¿went on to "set up" Kennedy with a friendly question about compromise as a method of settling the war. The question enabled Kennedy • to repeat again his belief in the necessity of compromise and the impor­ tance of maintaining a reasonable, flexible position regarding negotiations Senator Lausche re-entered the discussion to try to pin Kennedy down regarding his proposed bombing halt. Lausche recited examples of previous attempts to encourage negotiations by halting the bombings and Kennedy agreed that they had not achieved the desired result. In an attempt to discredit Kennedy’s assertion that this time a bombing halt might be suc­ cessful, Lausche quoted the February 23, 1967 statement of Mai Van Bo, North Vietnamese Ambassador to France: "The United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was permanent and unconditional." Lausche also referred to Ho Chi Minh’s February 13, 1967 message to the Vatican that "the United States must unconditionally and definitively stop the bombing." Lausche then asked Kennedy to respond to these two messages. Kennedy chose to ignore Lausche’s first quotation and noted only that the Ho Chi Minh message did not include the word permanently. He 116 also ignored Lausche’s implication regarding the failure of previous bomb­ ing pauses to bring peace, and commented that halting the bombing was "what we were willing to do a year ago. Why are we not willing to do it today?" Lausche’s dissatisfaction with Kennedy’s response was evident in their next exchange. Lausche returned to Mai Van Bo’s statement, which did use the word permanent, and pressed Kennedy again to state why he felt that a bombing halt now would succeed where others had failed. Kennedy interrupted Lausche in mid-sentence and suggested that "there have been conflicting reports in connection with some of these matters." He then reiterated the example of the Cuban missile crisis and suggested that the United States should again publicly accept the most favorable of the con­ flicting messages. The interrogation of Kennedy was then taken up by Senator McGee of Wyoming. McGee attacked Kennedy’s perception of the importance of Kosygin’s statement. "I think Mr. Ho Chi Minh is probably a little more important in this kind of a sequence of events.” Kennedy agreed but restated his belief that Ho Chi Minh had not used the word permanently and that this was significant. He further commented that he viewed the statements by the communist leaders as a signal that they were willing to negotiate. Senator Lausche interrupted again and asked Kennedy if he advocated a permanent and unconditional halt to the bombing. Kennedy denied advocacy of such a position. Lausche then commented that President Kennedy "felt the need of stopping the expansion of communism by aggression and vio­ lence" and asked him if he supported his brother’s position. Kennedy, of course, agreed. At this juncture in the discussion Kennedy was confronted by 117 Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who debated him at length concern­ ing the wisdom of the bombing halt. Jackson noted that the United States had stopped the bombing a few weeks earlier, during the Tet holiday season, with no peace talks emerging. On the contrary, Jackson pointed out, the communists took advantage of the pause by resupplying their troops in the South. Kennedy responded by expressing his belief that the United States had resupplied their troops during this period also. Jackson felt that this was an unfair comparison because the North Vietnamese were the aggres­ sors in the conflict. Kennedy replied by reiterating his suggestion that international supervision could ensure that neither side used the bombing halt to improve its military position. Jackson agreed that that was a good idea, but that the North Vietnamese had already rejected that possibility. Moreover, Jackson stated, the United States had already implemented Ken­ nedy’s proposal during the Tet holidays. Not so, according to Kennedy, for the Tet holiday was a cease-fire, which was not his proposal. His point, he summarized, was merely that the bombing halt was worth trying now. Jackson remained unconvinced and continued along the line that Kennedy was not proposing anything new. He maintained that the Tet cease­ fire was close enough to Kennedy's proposal to indicate that the North Vietnamese were not seriously interested in negotiations. Jackson then introduced a long letter from President Johnson, dated March 1, 1967» that summarized the administration’s defense of the bombing policy. Kennedy did not comment directly on the President’s letter. The attack was suspended for a short time, as several Senators spoke in praise of Kennedy’s speech. The debate concluded with a final argument 118

by Senator McGee, who continued to question the seriousness of Kosygin’s statement. He also suggested that Kennedy’s speech cast aspersions on the seriousness of the administration’s search for peace. Kennedy res­ ponded by repeating his earlier position that the statements by Kosygin and Ho Chi Minh were significant, and that the United States had little to lose and much to gain by accepting them. The delate ended with a discus­ sion of these ideas by McGee, Senator Tydings, Senator Clark, Senator Byrd, Senator Pell, and Kennedy.

A Strategic Perspective

A strategic view of Kennedy’s March 2, 1967 speech must initially speculate as to Kennedy’s perception of the exigencies in the situation which confronted him. Previous analysis, as well as the speech itself, indicates that this exigence was threefold: the domestic cost of the war; the effect of the war on United States allies; and his perception of Presi­ dent Johnson’s eagerness to expand the war. The domestic impact of the war has been explored previously in this chapter in terms of the societal divisions it engendered. However, in the speech itself Kennedy did not refer to this division; rather, he expressed concern that expenditures for the war were retarding the ability of the United States to make progress against social problems at home. Concern for domestic priorities was a major reason Kennedy directly opposed the President in 1968.^ The roots of this concern were clearly evident in

1967. Kennedy’s trip to Europe early in 1967 had been designed to take advantage of "a good time to get away" from the "bitter and damaging dis- 119

pute with author William Manchester . . . However, while abroad. Kennedy was exposed to the growing European concern and dismay over the United States military activities in Southeast Asia. Everywhere he went the war was a subject of discussion: among students, businessmen, scho­ lars, and political leaders.It is not surprising, therefore, that Kennedy’s speech made repeated reference to foreign perspectives on the war. The third exigence perceived by Kennedy was the President’s intran­ sigent pursuit of a military solution to the conflict. Kennedy came away from his February meeting with the President with the feeling that Johnson was not committed to a peaceful settlement of the war. 52 Accordingly, Kennedy’s speech made numerous references to the idea that the United States should take every possible step towards peace. It seems apparent that the latter exigence—concern with the sin­ cerity of President Johnson's peace efforts—was the major factor which motivated the March 2, 1967 speech. Throughout the 1966-1968 period, Ken­ nedy’s relationship with the President was a major determinant of his actions. As noted in the last chapter, Kennedy sacrificed himself in 1966 to avoid a public squabble with the White House. Moreover, Kennedy re­ frained from making a speech in late 1966 on the subject of Charles de Gaulle’s peace proposals simply because President Johnson had already rejec­ ted them. Accordingly, it would take an extraordinary occurrence for Kennedy to abandon his cautious posture vis-a-vis the President. Kenne­ dy’s unsavory confrontation with President Johnson in February of 1967 appears to have been such an occurrence. There is support for this view in the recollections of two of Kennedy’s aides—William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman. Speaking of 120

this period, the two noted that

Close advisors warned Kennedy that another statement criti­ cizing the Administration would subject him to new torrents of personal abuse. The senator had no illusions .... The real problem in speaking out now was the backlash of the Manchester controversy that made Kennedy vulnerable, and the related danger in what appeared to be Kennedy’s interference, while in Europe, with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs. But Kennedy’s anger at what Johnson was doing over­ came these personal considerations. 53

It seems clear, then, that following the stormy session with Presi­ dent Johnson in February, Robert Kennedy decided to break with the Presi­ dent's war policy. Thus, the March 2, 1967 speech may he seen as the tactic chosen by Kennedy to make "it clear that the die had been cast,"-^ It must be noted, however, that while the speech was designed to dissociate Kennedy from Johnson’s conduct of the war, it was not intended as a personal repud­ iation of the President himself.^ Kennedy was still influenced by the knowledge that it was not politically feasible for him to attack the Presi­ dent on a personal basis.Accordingly, one may assign Kennedy’s speech a three-fold purpose: to break with the President on the war; to avoid per­ sonal repudiation of the President; and to protect himself as much as pos­ sible from the "torrent of personal abuse" that would follow the speech. The constraints employed by Kennedy, therefore, should conform to this pattern.

Breaking with the President

Regarding Kennedy's break with the President, his entire analysis regarding the United States bombing policy constituted the most overt evi­ dence of his independence. The President's most persistent critics had 121 attacked the efficacy of the bombing as a military tactic. Inasmuch as Kennedy echoed many of their sentiments, he clearly placed himself among their ranks. Moreover, Kennedy accepted the President’s rationale for bombing as presented at Johns Hopkins University and threw the reasons for bombing cited by the President right back at him. Although Kennedy did not refute the President’s claims in an aggressive manner, his disagree­ ment was clearly established. He further broadened the breach by using quotations from Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara to demonstrate the lack of success of the bombing in halting resupply and infiltration from North to South Vietnam. Kennedy also mentioned the bombing in his analysis of the horror of the war. This speech was the first time he publicly dwelt on the destruction and horror of the war. Moreover, for the first time, Kennedy publicly ques­ tioned the morality of the war—the right of the United States to engage in the conflict. Once again, Kennedy clearly aligned himself with Presi­ dent Johnson's opponents. Another of Kennedy’s constraints illustrated his abandonment of the President’s position. Kennedy openly suggested that Johnson adopt a policy used successfully by John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. By making repeated references to President Kennedy's handling of that situa­ tion, he seemed to imply that Lyndon Johnson was not handling foreign affairs as ably as had his predecessor. The break can also be seen in Kennedy's statement of his belief that the solution to the war lay in negotiation rather than continued escalation. Moreover, he indicated that the United States had not defeated the commu­ nists, nor were we likely to in the near future. This seemed to be a direct 122

slap at administration declarations of lights at the ends of tunnels and corners being turned. Kennedy’s disaffection with the administration was also evident in his treatment of the impact of the war on the United States’ domestic situation. The President had long since taken the line that the United States could afford both the war in Vietnam and the C-reat Society. Al­ though this matter was not the subject of a major segment of his speech, Kennedy did question the President’s assumptions in this regard. A more direct attack on the administration was contained in Kennedy’s repeated question that if we were willing to stop the bombing in the past, why were we unwilling to do so now? This question, coupled with his decla­ ration that the United States should leave no opportunity for peace unex­ plored, implied that the President was less eager to pursue peace than to wage war. As in the case of previous attacks, Kennedy’s position was more of an implication than an all-out, direct attack. Some of the other constraints used by Kennedy which implied criti­ cism of the President included his statement that the Senate was partially responsible for the continuation of the war; his suggestion that the South Vietnamese begin direct negotiations with the National Liberation Front; and his declaration that the South must more actively pursue a policy of social reform. All of these statements were challenges to the President. One observation should be made regarding the constraints marshalled by Kennedy in support of his break with the President. Save for his analy­ sis of the bombing and his questions concerning the morality of the war, Kennedy’s attacks were implications rather than accusations. As such, they reinforce the view that Kennedy sought not only to break with the 123

President, but to fulfill the other two purposes of his speech—avoid repudiation and protect himself.

Supporting the President

Kennedy clearly sought to avoid the impression that he was openly attacking the President. This is perhaps the first thing he sought to establish in his speech, for he declared his unqualified support for the United States* efforts in Southeast Asia. His suggestions were of a nat­ ure that would implement the President’s goals for Vietnam. At no time did Kennedy suggest the President’s objectives were faulty or ill-advised. Kennedy also expressed sympathy for the President’s position by praising Johnson’s efforts to achieve peace. He stated openly that it would be remiss for anyone to interpret his remarks as indicative of a lack of national will to pursue the war. On the contrary, Kennedy asked all Americans to support the President’s actions in Vietnam. Thus, Kennedy established a perspective for his suggestions—that they were an extension of the President's position rather than divergent from it. In the final analysis, Kennedy's refusal to repudiate the President is found not so much in what he said but in what he could have said but did not. By using implication and by declaring sympathy for and support of the President, Kennedy established a position from which he could criti­ cize the President but continue to support him. Only by refraining from direct attack could Kennedy maintain this position.

Self Protection

Examination of Kennedy's constraints reveals further that Vanden 124

Heuvel and Gwirtzman were correct in their assertion that Kennedy had no illusions about the reaction 'to his speech. He did a variety of things which may be viewed as self-protective, Foremost among these constraints was his use of specific, precise detail. The previous chapter established that Kennedy suffered in 1$66 from the fact that his speech was vague and thus susceptible to interpretation in ways that placed him in a bad posi­ tion. Obviously, he learned from this mistake. In this speech, Kennedy spelled out a detailed, exact program for peace. His step-by-step approach was thoroughly explained. There was no longer any doubt as to exactly what Robert Kennedy was proposing as a solution to the Vietnamese problem. Moreover, Kennedy did not simply elucidate a series of proposals; he tried to "sell" them to the Senate. To do this, he relied on opinions other than his own to demonstrate the validity of his thinking. He made extensive use of "experts" from within the administration and the military to support his ideas. Moreover, he replied heavily on historical precedent in regard to his belief that the United States should accept the more favorable of a series of contradictory messages. He further utilized historical precedent to support his contention that the United Nations could supervise the pro­ posed cease-fire. By doing these things, Kennedy seemed to try to show that his ideas were practical. Kennedy also seemed to anticipate his critics’ counterattacks and tried to pre-empt them. First, he admitted his involvement in the Vietnam decision-making earlier in the decade and indicated that if fault was to be assigned, he was due his share. Second, he stressed at length that the United States had very little to lose by a bombing halt. He made it clear that the bombing could be re-instituted if the negotiations failed to 125

materialize or were unproductive. Third, he noted the polycentrism of Vietnam might not threaten the United States. Finally, he prefaced his analysis of the future government of the South by stating that he was not showing his cards before the hand was played, as he had been accused of doing in 1966.

Summation

In outline form, the strategic perspective of Robert F. Kennedy’s March 2, I967 address to the United States Senate looks as follows:

Goal; Kennedy pursued the twin goals of maintaining his national leader­ ship and responding to his perception of new conditions surrounding the Vietnam war. His new perceptions were rooted in his trip to Europe and his meeting with President Johnson. Strategy: Kennedy’s strategy was to take an independent position regard­ ing the Vietnam war. At the same time, Kennedy wished to avoid or mini­ mize any administration counterattack. Tactic: Kennedy implemented his strategy in a speech to the United States Senate on March 2, 1967. Purpose: The purpose of Kennedy’s speech was to declare his independence from the President on Vietnam, but to avoid a personal repudiation of the President. Constraints: The major constraints used by Kennedy in his speech included the following: Attacking the efficacy of the United States bombing policy; dwelling on the horror of the war; urging the President to adopt a policy similar to John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis; attack­ ing the policy of continued escalation of the war; examining the impact of the war on the United States domestic situation; including the Senate in assigning responsibility for the war; attacking the President indir­ ectly; expressing support for the basic goals of the United States in Southeast Asia; expressing his sympathy for the President's tasks; issu­ ing very precise, specific plans for ending the war; using authorities and historical precedent to support his ideas; trying to pre-empt criti­ cism of his ideas. 126

Evaluation

Kennedy's March 2, I967 speech was a success. Unlike his perform­ ance in his previous attempt, Kennedy planned his speech and anticipated the reaction it would elicit. Although the majority of the people in the United States supported the war and the bombing, Kennedy did not lose stature as he had before. 57 The speech shows definite evidence of defensiveness on Kennedy's part. For the most part, his defensive measures seemed to have worked. Although he was questioned by administration supporters in the Senate, he was able to incorporate their criticisms into his position so that he emerged stronger, if anything, from the discussion on the Senate floor. The main failing of Kennedy's speech lay in his determination not to repudiate the President. Many of Kennedy's friends (and most of his critics) felt it was inconsistent for him to oppose the war yet support the President. However, this was the only tenable position for Kennedy to take at that time, for an open split between himself and Johnson would have shattered the Democratic party. Given this fact, there was no other course for Kennedy to take. 12?

FOOTNOTES

iWilliam Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own: Robert F. Kennedy, 1964-1968 (Garden City, New York; Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 226. o Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak, Lyndon B, Johnson; The Exercise of Power (New York; The New American Library, 1966), p. 570. ^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 226. ^Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade; America in Vietnam (Greenwich, Connecticut; Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1970), p. 5840 •^The New York Times, December 31, 1966, p. 2, col. 5« 8The New York Times, April 27, 1966, p. 1, col. 7. ^Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Ameri cans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brom, and Company, 1972), p. 3°3. 8Ibid. 9Cooper, p. 579. ^^Cooper, p. 580 ^Fitzgerald, p. 277. 12Ibid. ■^Fitzgerald, pp. 277-279. 14Cooper, p. 579. ^Cooper, pp. 58O-58I. ■^Cooper, p. 386. Thomas Powers, The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, I964-I968. (New York: "Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P. H9. l8Ibid.

“^Powers, p. 121.

20Ibid. 21Powers, p, 122. 128

22Powers, p. 122.

23?owers, pp. I32-I33. 2^Powers, pp. 133“134.

25jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, (New York: Ballantine Books, I969), p. 27. 2°Skolnick, p. 47. 27jack Newfield, Robert F. Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: Dutton, 1969)» pp. I26-I27. ^Newfield., p. 128.

29Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 227. 30yiiiiam V. Shannon, The Heir Apparent: Robert Kennedy and the Struggle for Power (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967)» p.110. -^Robert F. Kennedy, press release, April 27, 1966.

^Robert F. Kennedy, press release, June 30> 1966» 33william Schecter, Countdown *68; Profiles for the Presidency (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1967)» p. 202. ~ ^Theodore Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy: A Peaceful Revolution for the Seventies (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1969)» p. 76. 35Ibid. 3^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 227. 37Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, P. 233. 33vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 234. 39vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, P. 337. 40Sorensen, p. 91. h 1 Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, pp. 238-239. ¿10 '‘Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, P. 239. ^Newfield, p. 136.

^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 240. 129

^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 240«,

46This quotation, and all subsequent quotations from Kennedy’s March 2, 1967 address, is from the version of the speech released to the press on March 2, 1967, Copies of this release are available from the Kennedy library in Waltham, Massachusetts; Dr, Raymond Yeager, School of Speech Communication, Bowling Green State University; the Speech Instruc­ tional Center, Bowling Green State University; and the author. zx 47Newfieid, p. 136. ^This quotation, and all subsequent quotations from the debate over Kennedy’s March 2, 1967 speech, is taken from the Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st Session, March 2, 1967, pp. 5284-5296. 49sorensen, p. 100. -^Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 227. Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 232. ^“Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 239. •53vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 240. -^Sorensen, p. 91. -55ibid. -56Ibid. •57Vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, p. 240. 130

CHAPTER 6

ALL OUT AGAINST JOHNSON

On March 2, 196?, Robert F. Kennedy openly entered the ranks of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s critics. Despite his obvious attempts to minimize the significance of his action, the groundwork had been laid for the ultimate confrontation between the two most powerful national figures in the Democratic party. That confrontation came more quickly than Ken­ nedy had anticipated. Slightly more than a year after the I967 speech, Robert F. Kennedy announced his candidacy for the Presidency of the United States. Kennedy's decision was not easily made; it signified the failure of all he had tried to do since his election to the Senate in 1964. It meant that Kennedy was finally willing to risk the almost certain division of the party. It meant that at long last his feud with the President would be­ come public. It meant openly opposing a war that many felt started during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Although it may be impossible to pinpoint the date of Kennedy’s change of mind with any precision, his first major personal attack on the President's conduct of the Vietnam war came on February 8, 1968. While this speech did not signal Kennedy’s candidacy, it did represent a radical shift in his previous stance regarding the President and the war. Accord­ ingly, it offers an excellent opportunity for a third application of the strategic perspective. .■ 131

The Exigence: Vietnam, I967-I968

Americans viewing the Vietnamese situation in I967 could, for the first time, view the non-military aspects of the conflict with relative equanimity. The governmental instability of the past seemed to have been forgotten. Observers were treated to the spectacle of an orderly transfer of power through elections. The previous year’s political developments 1 had been highlighted by the election of a 117-memher South Vietnamese Con­ stituent Assembly, charged with drafting a new constitution and laying the groundwork for a return to civilian leadership. These efforts reached fruition in I967. As the Vietnamese Presidential election drew near, the United States government seized upon it as an indication that United States policy in Vietnam was successful. "The public relations machine of the United States mission went into high gear on the subject of the election . . .

While in private the American officials expressed anxiety about the possibility of election fraud and Viet Cong terror­ ism, in public they claimed the election as the crowning achievement of the Vietnamese government: the GVN would he a real democracy with a real constitution. The message, as received by the American public, was that the United States was generously bringing all the virtues of its own political system to this underdeveloped country, that it was creating a democracy to win the Vietnamese people away from Communist totalitarianism. 2

Despite the publicity blitz concerning the election, the war con­ tinued to capture much of the world's attention. "The year of 19&7 was . . . not the year of the election but the year of the war."3 Simply put, the old pattern of military escalation combined with clarion calls for peace continued. The military escalations of 19^7 were significant. 132

As in the past, the record of the war’s expansion was written most clearly in the United States bombing policy. During 19 67, the number and variety of targets assigned to American pilots grew beyond all previous dimensions. In March, American planes attacked formerly exempt North Vietnamese industrial targets. In April, there were Air Force strikes at power plants in Haiphong, followed shortly thereafter by missions against North Vietnamese airfields. In both instances, these were the first such attacks. The month of June witnessed American bombs falling on Russian ships in Haiphong harbor, raising the prospect of a Soviet-American con-

¿L frontation. Beneath the cover of the dramatic air war, the ground operations continued. In May, American ground forces invaded the Demilitarized Zone, again for the first time in the war.-^ In November, the possibility of an & kuLexican. incursion into Cambodia was openly discussed. During the year, 7 troop levels reached a new high of over 500,000 men.

In 1967 the "Free World Forces" in Vietnam—Americans, Viet­ namese, and Koreans, with additional small contingents of Australians, Thais, and Filipinos—had reached a combined total of 1,300,000 men: one soldier for every fifteen people in South Vietnam. 8

Efforts for Peace

The familiar pattern of 1965 and- 1966 was repeated in 1967, with attempts being made to achieve peace. These attempts, however, paled in comparison to the military exertions of the year. Evidence indicates that "the Administration, as of late 1966 and early 1967, was just not interested in negotiations to the extent necessary to prevent military action from interfering with or even negating diplomatic initiatives."9 133 United States Ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, expressed the pre­ vailing view in the Johnson administration when he predicted "sensational military gains" for allied forces in 1967 and expressed his judgment that peace talks would probably never happen, that the war would eventually "simply fade away."111 Nonetheless, efforts to initiate negotiations were made, including bombing halts, an exchange of letters between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh, Soviet Premier Kosygin’s visit to the United States, and activity by the United Nations. 11 These efforts failed, however, and Americans became accustomed to endeavors to find a military solution to the war.

The War at Home

As the war continued throughout 1967, and expanded, so did the efforts of those who opposed it. Although violence and demonstrations con­ tinued to capture much of the nation’s attention, some less obvious but significant developments occurred within the anti-war movement. During this period, an important, albeit subtle, change occurred in the composi­ tion of the anti-war faction. Robert F. Kennedy was not the only prominent American publicly to condemn the war in 1967. Even before Kennedy spoke, 462 members of the 12 faculty at Yale urged the President to stop the bombing. A month later, 400 ex-Peace Corps volunteers echoed the call for a bombing halt. 13 Dr. Martin Luther King called the United States "the greatest purveyor of vio­ lence in the world today, and suggested civil disobedience be used to halt the conflict in Vietnam. 15 Captain Howard Levy was court-martialed for refusing to train Special Forces corpsmen for Vietnam duty. A full- 134 page ad. in The New York Times revealed the existence of a group called Business Executives Move for Peace, which "represented a major loss of support for the war in the community that had hacked it with the fewest reservations. The point to he made here is that disaffection with the war, while still centered in college campuses, had spread to other elements of society, including some who had previously supported the war. In April, the demon­ strations centered in New York and San Francisco, where 125,000 and 30,000 people, respectively, expressed their desire for peace. In New York, the demonstrators were led by Dr. Benjamin Spock and Dr. Martin Luther King, neither of whom represented the more radical elements of society. 18 Perhaps the most dramatic event of the year occurred in October, when "anywhere from thirty to 75,000 demonstrators crossed the Arlington Memorial Bridge, some to picket and demonstrate against the Pentagon, others to stone it."19 Needless to say, this event captured headlines and evoked worldwide commentary on the war. The importance of the anti-war movement during 1967 lies in two areas. First, events of that year illustrated the cosmopolitan nature of the movement. The wide range of interests, classes, and professions parti­ cipating in anti-war activities served as a rebuttal to the charge that opposition to the war was limited to radical college campuses. Second, those who added their voices to the anti-war chorus in 1967 were respected individuals. Drs. King and Spock, the Yale faculty, former Peace Corps volunteers—all commanded a degree of respect. They helped legitimize the movement. 135

The Tet Offensive

"It was days before anyone could see the Tet offensive in perspec­ tive—perhaps weeks,"21 The events of January 29“31» 1968, came as a total surprise to the Allied military command. 21 A massive, coordinated offen­ sive by the North Vietnamese and Viet Gong was launched against practically every major city in the South. "The combined force of eighty-four thousand men simultaneously moved into five out of the six cities, thirty-six out of the forty provincial capitals, and sixty-four district capitals .... elements of eleven NLF battalions entered Saigon." 22 Of foremost concern to Americans, of course, was the fact that the American Embassy in Saigon was attacked—and occupied briefly by the dissi­ dents. Nineteen Viet Cong commandos entered the Embassy compound and fought with troops there for six hours. Moreover, bases such as Da Nang, Ghu Lai, and Phi Bai, familiar to most observers as strongholds of the American military presence in Vietnam, were under heavy attack. After the initial shock of the offensive wore off, the Allied forces repulsed the communists, sometimes easily, sometimes with great difficulty, but always successfully. In strictly military terms the attack "was a complete . . . failure.”2-^

But the facts were less important than the psychology, and psychology left the enemy in command. Of their "psychological victory," Mr. Johnson was to be the chief victim within two months. For, as the Tet offensive was slowly, inexorably crushed, he could not then envision either Party or nation repud­ iating its wartime chief. 24

The American response, however victorious in the long run, reminded one observer of "the fury of a blinded giant. Forced to fight in the 136 cities, they bombed, shelled, and strafed the most populous districts as if they saw no distinction between them and the jungle."2--’ This emotion was brought home to most Americans in the words of an American officer who directed operations to recapture a city from the enemy. During the fight, the city was reduced to rubble. The American officer explained to a tele- vision reporter, "We had to destroy it in order to save it." Thus, although a military failure, the offensive was a psychological success for the Viet Cong due to its "electric effect on popular opinion in the United States."2?

The banner headlines and the television reports of fighting in the cities brought the shock of reality to what was still for many Americans a distant and incomprehensible war. The pictures of corpses in the garden of the American embassy cut through the haze of argument and counterargument, giving flat contradiction to the official optimism about the slow but steady progress of the war. 28

The impact of the Tet offensive, however, was not limited to a psycho logical impact on the "typical" American:

For the first time the major news magazines, Time, Life, and News­ week, began to criticize the war policy overtly; television com­ mentators such as Walter Gronkite, who had always backed the admin­ istration, now questioned whether or not the war could be won. In spite of the President’s attempts to reassure the public and to reduce the offensive to the dimensions of an incident, the opinion polls showed that public confidence in the President’s handling of the war had dropped to a new low of 35 percent. Even the most "hawkish" of the congressmen registered this disenchantment, as did the President's close advisers, particularly Dean Acheson, Mc- George Bundy, and the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford. 29

Thus, "Tet was the final blow to the sagging credibility of the Johnson administration . . . Almost overnight, the presidential campaign of Senator Eugene 137

McCarthy, which, "at the moment of Tet . . . stood at ground zero,"3} sud­ denly came to life. Tet ignited "the train of events that was to lead a month later to Johnson’s decision to curb the bombing of North Vietnam and to withdraw his candidacy for the 1968 election.”32 Truly, the Tet offen­ sive was an extraordinary event.

Robert F. Kennedy: I967-I968

Kennedy and the Presidency

Following his break with the President’s war policy on March 2, 1967, Robert F. Kennedy moved away from his earlier reticence on the Viet­ nam issue. He continued, however, to attack the policy of the Johnson administration rather than the President himself. As the urgency and in­ tensity of the war as an issue increased throughout 1967, this position became more and more difficult for Kennedy to maintain. 1968 was an elec­ tion year, and in 1967 some dissatisfied Democrats began searching their party for an alternative to Lyndon B. Johnson. Anti-war and anti-Johnson Democrats met Kennedy wherever he trav­ eled in 1967. The fundamental contradiction in his supporting the Presi­ dent while opposing the President’s war policy was continually thrown up to him. Throughout the year, and increasingly with the approach of the Presidential primary season, "Robert Kennedy was clearly a man in turmoil."33

1967 was a bad year for Robert Kennedy. As a man of action, he craved clean-cut decisions. But as a realist, he could see no way to decision .... Over and over again he would cover the same ground. The same considerations were always in his mind, and they added up to paralysis. First, there was the personality of Lyndon Johnson, a man who governed the United States in a style that deeply disturbed him. Next was the war in Vietnan, which he called a waste, an extravagance, an 138

excess, a diversion of all the country's resources to a folly which was crippling it to deal with the problems at home. But then came the problem of actually challenging Johnson— how could a Democrat, within his own party, eliminate a Demo­ cratic President who wanted to be re-elected? 34

The pressure on Robert Kennedy peaked during the summer and fall of 1967. Allard Lowenstein, with whom Kennedy had become friendly a few years previously, approached him with an appeal to oppose the President in the primary elections. Kennedy refused, and Lowenstein went on to ramrod the campaign of Eugene McCarthy. Kennedy's refusal of Lowenstein indicated that he continued to be­ lieve that it was not prudent to challenge an incumbent President from within the Party. Kennedy’s actions during this period reflected this belief, as did his statements. At no time did Kennedy support the concept of a unilateral American withdrawal from the conflict. In no instance did he suggest that he would not support President Johnson’s bid for re-elec­ tion in 1968, even after McCarthy decided to run. Accordingly, despite his inner turmoil, Kennedy was not yet ready to "impale himself on the poignard of the war. 35 Yet, the turmoil within Kennedy continued. In October of 1967 he authorized a meeting of his friends and advisors in which a possible Ken­ nedy challenge to the President was discussed. Nothing was settled, save 36 the decision to make some discreet inquiries among prominent politicians. In December, another meeting was held, which was really more of a debate between whose who felt Kennedy should oppose the President and those who felt such ah action would be suicidal. At the end of the meeting Kennedy remarked, "We haven’t decided anything—so I guess I’m not running."37 139 1968 began, therefore, with a troubled Robert Kennedy determined, for the moment, not to oppose Lyndon Johnson, Then came the Tet offensive. The Tet attacks provided the catalyst for Kennedy’s decision to run for the Presidency. Although, like most Americans, Kennedy did not immediately recognize the importance of the Tet offensive, his reaction was negative. In a bitter speech delivered in Chicago on February 8, 1968, Kennedy finally abandoned his restraint and attacked the President on a more personal basis. Moreover, as Kennedy came to realize the impact of the Tet offensive on the candidacy of Eugene McCarthy, it became clear to him that the Democratic Party in 1968 was destined to be a divided Party regardless of any action by himself.^ Thus, it was inevitable that he

would enter the Presidential contest. After Tet, the only question was when.

Kennedy and Vietnam

The preceding chapter indicated that Robert F, Kennedy’s unquali­ fied support of the American effort in Vietnam ended on March 2, 1967. Accordingly, he was able to speak out more frequently—and critically—in 1967 than he had in the past. He assumed a more active role in the anti­ war movement in the summer of that year. On August 6, 1967, Kennedy appeared on the NBC television program Meet the Press. He was questioned by news correspondents about his per­ ceptions of the problems in Vietnam and of the domestic problems in the United States. In the course of the discussion, Kennedy acknowledged that "I have some disagreements as far as Vietnam is concerned, and I have some ideas as to how the struggle can be terminated . . . ." 39 140

The core of Kennedy's concern, as indicated in the interview, was the war's diverting of resources away from American domestic priorities. While not degrading the American effort in Vietnam, Kennedy urged that "the same effort, the same kind of commitment must be made for our own people who still suffer a great deal . . . from unemployment, from lack of education, from lack of opportunity. . . His position was that ". . . if it is going to be a question of one or the other—and I would hope it would not come to that—then I would put the priority here in our own country": 41

I would hope that we could also meet our commitment in Viet­ nam, but I would only favor doing more in Vietnam when the people of South Vietnam do more. I would like to answer this question completely because I think it goes to the heart of what the future of the country is going to be. I would like to see the people of South Vietnam do more. I am distressed that our casualties continue to go up and theirs continue to go down. Our casualties are higher than theirs. This is different than it was a year ago. I think they should be doing some of the fighting; I think they should be carrying the war. I think they should make efforts for political, econ­ omic and social reform within South Vietnam. As President Kennedy said in 1963, we can help them win it, but we can't win it for them, and I think that they should carry the burden of the fighting and we should help them, but I should like to see the South Vietnamese regiments, the South Vietnamese divisions up by the DMZ carrying the fight to the North Vietnamese. 42

Later that same week, on August 11, Kennedy released a statement which expressed his dismay "at the course of political developments in Vietnam; and most recently the course of the national election." 43J Ken­ nedy was clearly worried about the Johnson Administration's preoccupation with the military aspects of the war. He declared that he did not be­ lieve that "the answer to . . . Vietnam" was "solely—or even primarily— 141

military. Such efforts . . . are meaningless without those social and political efforts which turn the hope for a better society into an achievement."44 The focus of Kennedy’s statement was that the principle of self- determination, which had been cited by President Johnson as a reason for the American presence in Vietnam, had been threatened "by the actions of the South Vietnamese government."^.

There is mounting and distressing evidence of efforts to interfere with the free choice of the people. Candidates have been barred because their views were "unacceptable," though they were loyal citizens. One of them led the country a few years ago; another was Finance Minister until late last year, earning high praise for his performance from Vietnamese and American officials. Yet both were ruled off the ballot by the Assembly, under heavy pressure from Vietnam’s chief of military police. 46

As he had the previous week, Kennedy expressed concern over the lack of effort by the South Vietnamese army. He noted that American draft calls were higher than those of the South Vietnamese, as were American casualties. He also expressed his belief that the pacification program was failing. 47 Nonetheless, Kennedy felt that the grim military picture should not overshadow "the impact of an unrepresentative election." 48 :

For without self-determination, the rulers of South Vietnam will have denied their people the very rights for which more than 12,000 Americans have died. We would no longer have a common purpose with the government of Vietnam. For our com­ mitment is to the Vietnamese people—not to any government, not to any generals, not to the powerful and privileged few. 49

Kennedy issued a brief statement on the subject of the Vietnamese elections on September 5» after the results had been tabulated. He was clearly disappointed at the outcome, but took a hopeful approach to the 142

future. "However one views the events leading to Sunday’s election, there is now an elected government m South Vietnam." 50 He noted that "no other country can tell General Thieu or Marshall Ky how to conduct their affairs" but warned that "continuation of the extraordinarily large investment of the United States in Vietnam in men and money must be conditioned on the fulfillment of their responsibilities''-^!«

Those responsibilities include the start of genuine land re­ form, an end to virtually unrestrained corruption and a sub­ stantial improvement in the economic life of the villages. The election could lead as well to the opening of meaningful negotiations with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, and hopefully the new government will outline basic peace terms which hold out to all elements in the country the possibility of ultimate participation in its political life. Only when a people believe in their government and share a common purpose with it, can they be expected to fight for its preservation. Without programs to achieve these goals which are both realistically planned and energetically pursued, the elections will have solved very little and the war will con­ tinue to be more and more an American war, with our share of the casualties increasing as the Vietnamese effort declines. But if the newly elected leaders can take these steps, they can lead their people to peace and security, 52

On November 26, 196?, Kennedy appeared again on a network interview program—CBS’s Face the Nation. This time his comments were viewed within the context of the upcoming presidential election. From the start of the questioning, the correspondents expressed interest in a possible Kennedy candidacy. The first question directed towards Kennedy dealt with the in­ consistency in his position of continually criticizing the war while sus­ taining his support of the Johnson-Humphrey ticket in 1968. Kennedy’s response is indicative of his thinking at the time:

When I criticized the war in Vietnam in a major speech back in February, 1966, after the initial stories, it was placed purely- -the stories that were written, the comments that were made were 143

just on the basis of a personality struggle between President Johnson and myself. And it has been true, really, of the period of the last 18 months or last year that it has always been on the basis of the fact that I would like to still have President Kennedy President of the United States, a resentment of Johnson as President of the United States. It has never really been analyzed, on the basis of what my criticism and the source of my criticism—or the basis of my criticism. I think that having it a personality struggle rather than an issue question has been damaging to the country as a whole and damaging, really, to the consideration of these matters. So I think that if I decided to run, or if I ran for President of the United States in the Democratic Party, I would not strengthen the question of these issues or the dialogue that is taking place in connection with these issues, but in fact I would weaken it. It would immediately become a personality struggle. 53

The interview quickly fell into a pattern in which the correspon­ dents questioned the motives for Kennedy's actions over the past year and Kennedy refused to acknowledge that he was contemplating a campaign for the Presidency. Fully two-thirds of the interview consisted of this frame work. It was not until the program was into its last segment that Kennedy was able to express his views on Vietnam as a policy question. When fin­ ally given the opportunity, he delivered his longest statement of the ses­ sion, in which he reaffirmed his concern over the transformation of the conflict into an American war, and again urged more vigorous action by the South Vietnamese governments54 Kennedy's final 1967 comment on the war came with the publication of his book To Seek a Newer World.He devoted an entire chapter to the Vietnam question, and it represented the most thorough, detailed treat­ ment of the subject that Kennedy ever offered. He began by noting that "behind the clamor of combat, Vietnam is still a revolutionary war”:

For if these conflicts are called wars, and have deep inter­ national consequences, they are at the same time not wars, and their outcome is determined by internal factors. Their 144

essence is political. They are struggles for the control of the government, contests for the allegiance of men. Allegi­ ance is won as in any political contest, by an idea and a faith, by promise and performance. Governments resist such challenges only by being effective and responsive to the needs of their people. 56

Winning allegiance of a people, he suggested, could not be' done through military action. The best hope for success lay in "’the other war,’ the political contest for the allegiance of the people of Vietnam, that is in fact the war."-57 His plan of action for that war included a wide range of programs for political, social, and economic reform within South Vietnam. Such actions, Kennedy maintained, would also strengthen the "military" war.38 The final resolution of the conflict, he suggested,

rested upon a negotiated settlement. In analyzing the prospects for nego­ tiations, he reiterated his analysis of March 2, 1967. Overall, Kennedy's interaction with the Vietnam issue in 1967 was not only fruitful, but frustrating. It was fruitful in that for the first time he expressed a fully developed, detailed plan for settling the con­ flict. It was frustrating in that he was drawn, inexorably, into the Presidential politics of the upcoming year.

All Out Against Johnson; February 8, 1968

On February 8, 1968, Robert F. Kennedy spoke at a Book and Author luncheon in Chicago. He used the occasion to vent his long-repressed feelings about the President's conduct of the Vietnam war. He called for an end to "the mask of official illusion with which we have concealed our true circumstances, even from ourselves."39 He began with a recapitulation of the official "reports and predictions of progress": 145 In April our conur.and.ing general told, us that "the South Viet­ namese are fighting now better than ever before . , . their record in combat . . . reveals an exceptional performance." In August another general told us that "the really big battles of the Vietnam war are over . . . the enemy has been so badly pummeled. he’ll never give us trouble again." In December, we were told that we were winning "battle after battle," that "the secure proportion of the population has grown from about 45 percent to 65 percent and in the contested areas the tide continues to run with us."

Declaring that "those dreams are gone," Kennedy explained that the Tet attacks "have demonstrated that no part or person of South Vietnam, is secure

. . . the events of the last two weeks have taught us some­ thing. For the sake of those young Americans who are fighting today, if for no other reason, the time has come to take a new look at the war in Vietnam; not by cursing the past but by using it to illuminate the future. And the first and necessary step is to face the facts. It is to seek out the austere and painful reality of Vietnam, freed from wishful thinking, false hopes and sentimental dreams.

The facts, he asserted,' must be "stripped of deceptive illusions. It is time for the truth." Kennedy then sought the truth by attacking the illusions. In his mind these illusions numbered five. First, "that the events of the past two weeks represent some sort of victory." Second, "that we can win a war which the South Vietnamese cannot win for themselves." Third, "that the unswerving pursuit of military victory, whatever the cost, is in the interest of either ourselves or the Vietnamese people." Fourth, "that the American interest is identical with—or should be subordinated to—the selfish interest of an incompetent military regime." Fifth, "that this war can be settled in our own way and on our own terms." Kennedy dealt with the question of who would emerge "victorious" 146

from the Tet offensive in several ways. initially, while admitting that "the Vietcong will not be able to hold the cities," Kennedy declared

they have demonstrated despite all our reports of progress, of government strength and enemy weakness, that half a mil­ lion American soldiers with 700,000 Vietnamese allies, with total command of the air, total command of the sea, backed by huge resources and the most modem weapons, are unable to secure even a single city from the attacks of an enemy whose total strength is about 250,000. It is as if James Madison were able to claim a great victory in 1812 because the Brit­ ish only burned Washington instead of annexing it to the British Empire.

He dealt next with the "terrible losses" that "the enemy suffered":

They cannot, however, be as devastating as the figures appear. The Secretary of Defense has told us that "during all of 1967 the Communists lost about 165,000 effectives," yet enemy main force strength "has been maintained at a relatively constant level of about 110,000-115,000 during the past year." Thus it would seem that no matter how many Vietcong and North Vietnam­ ese we claim to kill, through some miraculous effort of will, enemy strength remains the same. Now our intelligence chief tells us that of 60,000 men thrown into the attacks on the cities, 20,000 have been killed. If only two men have been seriously wounded for everyone dead—a very conservative esti­ mate—the entire enemy force has been put out of action. Who, then, is doing the fighting?

The next issue Kennedy dealt with in determining whether the Tet offensive was. a victory for the United States was "that the Communists expected a large-scale popular uprising which did not occur." He ridiculed the notion "that we should claim victory because a people whom we have given sixteen thousand lives, billions of dollars and almost a decade to defend, did not rise in arms against us." The real issue, he suggested, was that the South Vietnamese did not rise to attack the Viet Cong, for this demon­ strated that "none of the population is secure and no area is under sure 14?

control." To Kennedy, this again pointed to the problem of trying to solve an essentially political conflict by military action. "It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot." This analysis led neatly into Kennedy’s discussion of a second mis­ conception, that the United States rather than the South Vietnamese could win the war. He reiterated his belief that "it is their war and they must win it," and expressed his view that the South was not winning the war at all. He was appalled that

The South Vietnamese Senate, with only one dissenting vote, refuses to draft 18 and 19 year old South Vietnamese, with a member of the Assembly asking, "why should Vietnamese boys be sent to die for Americans."—while 19 year old American boys fight to maintain this Senate and Assembly in Saigon. Every detached observer has testified to the enormous corrup­ tion which pervades every level of South Vietnamese official life. Hundreds of millions of dollars are stolen by private individuals .and government officials while the American people are being asked to pay higher taxes to finance our assistance effort. Despite continual promises the Saigon regime refuses to act against corruption. Late last year, after all our pressure for reform, two high army officers were finally dismissed for "criminal" corruption. Last month these same two officers were given new and powerful commands. In the meantime, incorruptible officers resign out of frus­ tration and defeat.

Kennedy dwelt at length on the corrupt nature of the Saigon regime, for in his mind it was "the source of the enemy’s strength . . . more than anything else, the reason why the greatest power on earth cannot defeat a tiny and primitive foe";

You cannot expect people to risk their lives and endure hardship unless they have a stake in their own society. They must have a clear sense of identification with their own government, a belief they are participating in a cause worth fighting for. Political and economic reform are not simply idealistic slogans or noble goals to be postponed until the fighting is over. They are the principal 148 weapons of battle. People will not fight to line the pockets of generals or swell the bank accounts of the wealthy. They are far more likely to close their eyes and shut their doors in the face to the government— even as they did last week.

Kennedy quickly presented his analysis of the third illusion, the cost of unyielding pursuit of military victory. He catalogued the physi­ cal destruction that the fighting had brought to Vietnam and lamented that "it is the people we seek to defend who are the greatest losers" in the war. He also expressed his concern at the apparent subordination of moral standards to the pressures of immediate considerations:

Last week, a Vietcong suspect was turned over to the Chief of the Vietnamese Security Services, who executed him on the spot—a flat violation of the Geneva Convention on the Rules of War. Of course, the enemy is brutal and cruel, and has done the same thing many times. But we are not fighting the Communists in order to become more like them—we fight to preserve our differences. Moreover, such actions—like the widespread use of artillery and air power in the centers of cities—may hurt us far more in the long run than it helps today. The photograph of the execution was on front pages all around the world—leading our best and oldest friends to ask, more in sorrow than in anger, what has happened to America?

The fourth illusion Kennedy discussed concerned the nature of the American interest in Vietnam. He described as a "pretension" the idea that "the battle for South Vietnam is in reality the beginning of a Great Soc- ity for all of Asia," for "we cannot build a Great Society there if we cannot build one in our own country." He further debunked the notion that "the war in Vietnam will settle the future course of Asia":

The truth is that Communism triumphed in China twenty years ago and was extended to Tibet. It lost in Malaya and the Philippines, met disaster in Indonesia, and was fought to a standstill in Korea. It has struggled against governments 149

in Burma for twenty years without success, and it may strug­ gle in Thailand for many more. The outcome in each country depends and will depend on the intrinsic strength of the government, the particular circumstances of the country, and the particular character of the insurgent movement.

"Our present course," he warned, "promises only years and decades of fur­ ther draining conflict on the mainland of Asia. . . Kennedy did not try to deny that there was an American interest in Vietnam, but he suggested that it had already been met:

VJe have an interest in maintaining the strength of our commit­ ments. . . . With all the lives and resources we have poured into Vietnam, is there anyone to.argue that a government with any support from its people, with any competence to rule, with any determination to defend itself, would not long ago have been victorious over any insurgent movement, however assisted from outside its borders?

The final illusion Kennedy exposed dealt with the ability of the United States to impose peace conditions on the North Vietnamese. This course of action, he suggested, was reserved for "the triumphant . . . who crush their enemies in battle or wear away their will to fight." Ob­ viously, this had not yet happened in Vietnam. Moreover, Kennedy was quick to point out that there was little likelihood of Its ever happening:

For twenty years, first the French and then the United States, have been predicting victory in Vietnam. In 1961 and in 1962, as well as 1966 and I967, we have been told that "the tide is turning"; "there is ’light at the end of the tunnel’, "we can soon bring home the troops—victory is near—, the enemy is tiring." Once, in 1962, I participated in such predictions myself. But for twenty years we have been wrong. The history of conflict among nations does not record another such lengthy and consistent chronicle of error. It is time to discard so proven a fallacy and face the reality that a military victory is not in sight, and that it probably will never come.

As a result, Kennedy suggested, the United States must now actively seek 150 peace through a negotiated, settlement. "We can no longer harden our terms everywhere Hanoi indicates it may be prepared, to negotiate. ... We may have to make concessions and. take risks. ..." This was the only way that the negotiations, which Kennedy called a "basic necessity," could take place. The last segment of Kennedy’s speech contrasted the five illusions with "some basic truths about the conflict" in Vietnam;

First, that a total military victory is not within sight or around the comer. ... Second, that the pursuit of such a victory is not necessary to our national interest. . . . Third, that the progress we have claimed toward increasing our control over the country and the security of the population is largely illusory. Fourth, that the central battle in this war cannot be meas­ ured by body counts or bomb damage, but by the extent to which the people of South Vietnam act on a sense of common purpose and hope with those that govern them. Fifth, that the current regime in Saigon is unwilling or in­ capable of being an effective ally in the war against the Commun­ ists. Sixth, that a political compromise is not just the best path to peace, but the only path. . . . Seventh, that the escalation policy in Vietnam ... is in­ juring our country through the world. . . . Eighth, that the best way to save our most precious stake in Vietnam—the lives of our soldiers—is to stop the enlargement of the war, and the best way to end casualties is to end the war. Ninth, that our nation must be told the truth about this war, in all its terrible reality, both because it is right—and be­ cause only in this way can any administration rally the public confidence and unity for the shadowed days which lie ahead.

Kennedy returned to the idea of truth in his conclusion, once again 151

disparaging "a policy founded on illusion." "For today as it was in the beginning, it is the truth that makes us free."

February 8, 1968: A Strategic Perspective

It is difficult to assign a clear goal or purpose to Robert F. Kennedy’s February 8, 1968 statement on Vietnam, This difficulty is not unanticipated, for the statement reflects the inner turmoil Kennedy exper­ ienced at that time. The judgment of those privy to Kennedy's thinking in early 1968 is unanimous that he was in the process of deciding to enter the Presidential contest, although he had not made his final decision at the time of this speech.80 Indeed, while in Chicago, Kennedy sought the 61 counsel of Mayor Richard J. Daley concerning his Presidential prospects. However, Kennedy clearly seems to have been in a process of tran­ sition, and this speech may be seen as part of the transformation of Ken­ nedy from a "national leader" into a Presidential candidate. It is also clear that Kennedy expressed his genuine anguish about the war, so that this speech may have been almost a catharsis for him in that he at last vented his suppressed feelings about the conflict. In the final analysis, it seems best to consider this speech as an indication of Kennedy’s evol­ ution into a Presidential candidate. When one views the February 8, 1968 speech in this perspective, as the tactic of a Presidential aspirant, its overall purpose comes clear. Kennedy was definitely attacking the Johnson Administration—directly. Thus, the purpose of this tactic was to ’cake the offensive against the conduct of the war and the man who directed it. For the first time, Ken­ nedy did not qualify his criticisms with disclaimers. Indeed, Kennedy did 152

not just criticize, he attacked. He did not offer advice, he made demands The extent of Kennedy's attack was clearly revealed in his constraints. Initially, one is struck by the utter lack of any statement of sympathy or support for President Johnson. The speech was devoid of the previous almost ritualistic statements that "all Americans support the efforts of President Johnson." Similarly, the speech contains no refer­ ence to the President as a man who desired peace. On the contrary, the speech painted a picture of the President as one who was engaged in weav­ ing the "mask of official" illusion that Kennedy found so dis-tasteful. These two constraints permeated the speech and were directly critical of and antagonistic toward President Johnson. A third offensive constraint in Kennedy's speech was his barely concealed accusation that the Johnson Administration had lied to the Amer­ ican people. His repeated quotation of Administration prophecies of suc­ cess, of Administration analysis of the Tet offensive, followed by attacks on the quotations, indicates the aggressive nature of his speech. His direct calls for the "truth" in Vietnam and his distaste for the illusions he sought to dispel clearly imply that the Administration had been less- than-honest with the American people. A fourth offensive constraint found in the speech was Kennedy's demands on the President. Unlike previous efforts, this speech did not add to the discussion on Vietnam. Kennedy did not offer alternatives or suggestions. Rather, he dealt with truths and lessons to be learned from the conflict. These were presented in an unequivocal manner, as basic, indisputable facts. The very tone of the speech illustrates a final constraint used 153 by Kennedy on February 8, 1968. His bitterness and disillusionment was obvious. He repeatedly made reference to the men fighting in Vietnam and to those who had died there. He referred to the Saigon regime as incom­ petent and corrupt. He painted a picture of the horror of the war and of the destruction of South Vietnam. In short, his speech was primarily emotional. For him, the war had become an emotional issue, and the speech indicated that he could no longer keep his emotions in check. An outline of a strategic perspective of Kennedy’s February 8, 1968 speech would look as follows:

Goal: Kennedy pursued at least twin goals in I968. First, he maintained his traditional goal of retaining his position as a national leader. Second, he was in the process of becoming a Presidential candi­ date. Strategy: Kennedy used the Tet offensive as an occasion to vent his feelings. Tactic: Kennedy selected the Book and Author luncheon in Chicago as an occasion to express his views. Purpose: The speech was designed to attack the President; sever Kennedy's ties with the Administration; and express his inner turmoil over the war. Constraints: The major constraints used by Kennedy included the lack of sympathy or support for the President; the failure to praise the Administration’s efforts to secure peace in Vietnam; the implication that the President had lied about the war; the demands made by Kennedy, rather than suggestions; and the bitter, disillusioned tone of the speech. 154

The Aftermath

Unlike previous Kennedy statements on Vietnam, the February 8, 1968 speech did not elicit Administration counterattack. Indeed, the speech did not receive the nationwide attention his previous efforts received. In part, this was due to the nature of the scene in early 1968. Kennedy was one of many who spoke against the war at this time, and while his remarks were significant in retrospect, at the time they were some­ what passed over. Nonetheless, this speech represented a Rubicon for Kennedy. It was his first overt attack on President Johnson. It was not the attack of a man who would support the President for re-election later that same year. A mere five weeks after the speech, Kennedy announced his candi­ dacy for the office of President of the United States. 155

FOOTNOTES

•^Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake; The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p.323. ^Fitzgerald, p. 324. -^Fitzgerald, p. 339. ^The New York Times, June 4, 19Ó7, P. 1» col. 8.

•^Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade; America in Vietnam (Greenwich, Connecticut : Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1972), p. 588. ^The New York Times, November 29, 1967» p.l» col. 4.

?The New York Times, August 4, 1967, p. 1, col. 5. ^Fitzgerald, p. 342. ^Cooper, p. 400. 10Cooper, p. 584. UIbid. ^2The New York Times, January 16, 196?, p. 3» col. 3. 1-^The New York Times, February 9» 1967» p. 4, col. 4. 4 ¿1 William L. O’Neill, Coming Apart; An Informal History of America in the 1960*s (Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1971)» P» 338. •i^The New York Times, April 2, 1967, p. 1» col. 3. l60’Neill, p. 338. *?Thomas Powers, The War at Home; Vietnam and the American People, I964-I968 (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P._197. -^The New York Times, April 16, 1967, p. 1» col. 3. 190'Neill, p. 340. 20T'heodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New. York; Pocket Books, 1970), p. 3. ¿^Fitzgerald, p. 389. 156

^Fitzgerald, p. 388« 23yjhite, p. 12. 2S/hite, p. 13.

23pitzgerald, p. 392. 26Ibid. 2?Fitzgerald, p, 393. oO ^Fitzgerald, p. 393“394. ^Fitzgerald, p. 394. 3°Don Oberdörfer, TSTl (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Com­ pany, Inc., 1971), p. x. 31White, p. 9. 32Fitzgerald, p. 394. 33jupes witcover, 85 Days; The Last Campaign of Robert F. Kennedy (New York: Ace Publishing Corporation, 1969), p.'l6. ■Aihite, p. 195.

33pjhite, p. 197. 38White, p. 196. 37White, p. 197. 38White, p. 198. 39neet the Press (New York: National Broadcasting Company, 1967) ^°Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^statement of Robert F. Kennedy, August 11, 1967. ^Ibid. ^ibid.

46Ibid. 157

t 47’ SO xtatement of Robert F. Kennedy, August 11, I967. 48Ibid.

49Ibid. ^Statement of Robert F. Kennedy, September 5» 1967. Ibid . 52Ibid. 33pace the Nation (New York; Columbia Broadcast System November 26, 1967). -^Ibid.

-55jRobert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World (Garden City: New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967). 38Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World, p. 172-173. ^Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World, p, 178. 38Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World, p. I83. . -59-T^jsf and aqq subsequent quotations in this section, is taken from the version of Kennedy’s February 8, I968 speech as printed in the Congressional Record for that same date. Copies of the speech are avail­ able from the author; the Speech Instructional Center at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio; and from Dr. Raymond Yeager, Col­ lege of Communication, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio. 8oSee White; Witcover; Jack Newfield, Robert F. Kennedy: A Memoir; William Vanden Keuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own: Robert F, Kennedy 1964-1968. 61 White, p. 198. 158

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study has been concerned with the interaction of one man— Robert F. Kennedy—with one issue—the Vietnamese war—from 1966 to 1968. The basic assumption of this analysis was that Kennedy approached this issue warily; He planned his interaction with this issue and his inter­ action was therefore strategic. Accordingly, this study began by explor­ ing the theoretical nature of strategy in general and then moved to a more specific analysis of the nature of rhetorical strategy. The insights derived from this analysis were then critically applied to Robert Kennedy’s strategy in his Vietnam dissent. Rhetorical strategy was seen as a method or plan for meeting a rhe­ torical situation. Lloyd Bitzer's conception of a rhetorical situation, combined with Kenneth Burke’s analysis of scene, formed the foundation for the author’s method of evaluating rhetorical strategy. Of particular importance were Bitzer’s components of the rhetorical situation—exigence, audience, and constraints—along with his dictum that when a rhetor entered a situation he became part of it. The methodological approach utilized in this study maintained that a rhetorical strategy is a plan for achieving a rhetorical goal—that is, rhetorical strategy is designed to energize an audience to remove an exi­ gence. The specific audience interaction with an exigence can be called 159

a goal; the plan for initiating that interaction can be termed a strategy; and the specific rhetorical act designed to bring about that interaction, as a whole or in part, can be called a tactic. In any situation, the strategy can be implemented by a single tactic or by several, depending on the nature of the situation. The key to the evaluation of a rhetorical strategy is the tactic itself. The tactic chosen by the rhetor fulfills some purpose in terms of implementing the strategy. In pursuing his chosen tactic the rhetor uti­ lizes constraints designed to affect the audience in the desired manner. By examining these constraints one may account for success or failure of the strategy and tactic. Application of this framework to Robert F. Kennedy and the Vietnam war required an extensive examination of the man himself. When Kennedy entered a rhetorical situation and became part of it, he changed the situ­ ation significantly by his presence. As Jack Newfield explained, "The news wasn’t the substance of the position Kennedy was taking, but rather the fact that he was moving to take that position."1 It is somewhat surprising to discover how very much the Robert Ken­ nedy of 1966-1968 was dominated by the Robert Kennedy of 1955~19^5* He was, to a considerable degree, a prisoner of his own past. The elements of his past which were of greatest concern to him involved his reputation of ruthlessness and his relationship with Lyndon B. Johnson. As an earlier chapter explained in detail, Kennedy was a ruthless man. He tended to see the world in black and white. He divided people in­ to two groups—friends and enemies. He was an achiever, a driver, a man­ ager. He got things done. These qualities served him well in his early 160

career as an investigator, a campaign manager, and. as Attorney-General and. "assistant President." They served him less well as a United States Senator, Throughout his career, Kennedy was a powerful figure. He effect­ ively discharged the responsibilities of whatever position he occupied. As a member of the Senate, however, the nature of Kennedy's power changed. In the past, he had either worked directly with people in positions of authority or else he had exercised authority himself. His constituency had largely been one man—John F. Kennedy. As a Senator, his relationship with President Johnson denied him access to the center of power in the country. Accordingly, Kennedy worked to establish a new constituency, based on the almost magic aura of his name. His new power rested on the fact, noted by Newfield, that he commanded public interest and attention. His task was always to focus that attention on the issues he felt were important. Of course, not all of the attention directed at him was favorable. An element of the population viewed him with intense dislike and mistrust. His popularity was unstable, rising and falling from time to time in con- junction with the controversies he entered. Thus, the attention he com­ manded was not always beneficial to him or his causes since it exaggerated his failures as well as his successes. Kennedy also strove to focus attention on the substance of his positions. Newfield’s comment was well taken; the news Kennedy made lay in the fact that he took certain positions. All too often, the substance of his views was lost or interpreted as another indication of his ruth­ lessness 161

Kennedy’s relationship with President Johnson compounded his dif­ ficulty. The two men suffered from a deep-seated, personal antagonism which dated back to John F. Kennedy’s campaign for the i960 Democratic Presidential nomination. This antagonism grew during the Kennedy adminis­ tration and carried over into the period of concern to this study. The justifiability of the mistrust between the two men is of no concern to this study. The important, crucial fact is that it existed and was a factor that Robert F. Kennedy had to deal with to establish, and maintain, his new power. Accordingly, it was an important element in his planning for any rhetorical situation. The rhetorical situation presented by Vietnam introduced other sig­ nificant factors into Kennedy’s planning. First, although the United States’ involvement in Vietnam began in the 1940’s, most Americans were not concerned with the conflict until the administration of John F. Ken­ nedy. President Kennedy expanded the American military presence in the eurea and the war was identified with his administration. Second, the most enthusiastic supporter of the American efforts in Vietnam in the early 1960’s had been Robert F. Kennedy. Thus, criticism of the war could prove to be an embarrassment for Kennedy. In sum, when preparing to enter the Vietnam rhetorical situation, Robert F. Kennedy had a number of factors to consider: his own reputation; his relationship with President Johnson; the Kennedy administration’s re­ cord in Vietnam; and his own public statements of support for the conflict. These factors remained basically constant. There were, of course, the added factors presented by the war itself. Accordingly, the Vietnam war presented Kennedy with a complex rhetorical situation. 162

Examination of the major tactics Kennedy used to dissent on the Vietnam war from 1966 to I968 results in several overall conclusions. First, Kennedy was a strategist. There were numerous examples of Ken­ nedy’s changing the content or wording of his speeches in order to reduce his criticism of the President. There were also examples of Kennedy re­ fusing to deliver already-prepared speeches because he felt they would not benefit the situation. Second, throughout this period, Kennedy seemed obsessed with his relationship with President Johnson. In 1966 and I967 it was clearly the major or organizing element in the exigence he confronted. Thus, he could not and did not approach the exigence of Vietnam directly. He saw it always within the context of the larger exigence presented by the fact that Lyndon B. Johnson occupied the White House. It was not until the Tet offensive of I968 that Kennedy was able to elevate the Vietnam exigence to a position of greater importance than the Johnson exigence. This is not meant to suggest that Kennedy was not concerned with the Vietnam exigence. On the contrary, his statements during this period reflect a growing concern and disillusionment with the war. The point is simply that the war did not become the overriding or organizing exigence until I968. In 1966 and 1967» although genuinely concerned about the war, Kennedy tempered his criticism to avoid a public row with the President. A third conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that Kennedy's strategy changed. He made conscious, rhetorical decisions. In I966, for example, he sought an independent position on the war. Events at that time forced him to retreat, and he had taken a deliberately gen­ eral and vague approach to the question. In 1967» when Kennedy spoke on 163

the war in the Senate, he took a far different approach. He was very specific and detailed in his prescription for ending the war. Perhaps the major change observed during this period was that Ken­ nedy shifted from a defensive strategy to an offensive strategy in his approach to the Vietnam situation. In 1966 and I967 he was concerned that his remarks would be interpreted as undermining the President. Thus his criticisms were indirect, subtle. He avoided attacking the President on a personal basis and made an effort clearly to state his support of the President and the war. By I968, he was doing exactly the opposite. He ridiculed the idea that the Johnson administration was actively seek­ ing peace. He attacked the predictions of success offered by the admin­ istration. He accused the President of lying to the American people. He made demands rather than suggestions. Instead of trying to tailor his ideas to the goals of the President, he attacked the goals as unreason­ able and unattainable. Another change observed was in the type of constraints Kennedy selected. In 1966 he had relied almost exclusively on logical appeals. He deliberately sought to avoid becoming entangled in the emotion of the issue. In I967 and I968, however, he became progressively more emotional as he appealed for support of his position. Not surprisingly, it was dur­ ing this period that his differences with the President became more appar­ ent. As Kennedy drifted farther and farther away from President Johnson, politically and personally, the target of his attacks changed. In 1966 and 1967 he had studiously sought to avoid personal attacks on the Pres­ ident. In 1968, his entire speech could be seen as an attack on the 164

President. The final conclusion of this study must pertain to an overall eval­ uation of Kennedy as a rhetorical strategist. The results of this evalu­ ation are (frankly) mixed. Evaluation of his 1966 effort is easy. It was a failure. Kennedy himself acknowledged this by his actions immediately following the speech and in his private conversations with friends. His I967 address to the Senate was more successful in that he was able to present a coherent program for ending the war. Moreover, he was able successfully to defend his ideas from the administration’s counterattack. The war, of course, did not end in 1967, and Kennedy's program was not adopted by the Johnson administration. Nonetheless, Kennedy added to the dialogue on the war and increased the pressure on the administration more actively to pursue peace. Kennedy’s I968 speech is nearly impossible to evaluate. It was delivered during a time of great turmoil. It was a signal that Kennedy was no longer going to support the President personally. Shortly after the speech, Kennedy significantly altered the situation by becoming an active candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States, It is interesting to note that the speech which achieved the grea­ test degree of success for Robert Kennedy was the one in which he put the most effort into planning. Both the 1966 and 1968 speeches were given in response to developments in the war—the Vietnam hearings of I966 and the Tet offensive of 1968. In 1967, when confronted with significant develop­ ments—the "leak" of the peace feeler, and his unsavory meeting with the President—Kennedy did not react to them. Rather, he planned his speech 165

carefully, amid wide speculation about it. The result was a coherent, defensible position on the conflict. The fact remains, however, that Kennedy was unsuccessful in chang­ ing the Johnson administration’s war policy. If any of his actions could be construed as affecting the President's decision-making on the conflict, it could only be his active campaign against the President in the Spring of 1968. Yet, in another sense, Kennedy could not have undertaken a Pres­ idential campaign in 1968 had he not made the speeches analyzed by this study. Had he remained silent, he would not have been an effective, viable national leader. His 1967 speech provided the groundwork for his entire position on Vietnam. His 1968 speech clearly wedded him to the dissident elements of society which opposed the continuation of the conflict. If one examines Kennedy’s speeches not as ends in and of themselves—each designed to eliminate the exigence and modify the rhetorical situation— but as part of a process for eliminating the exigence presented by Viet­ nam, they can be seen in a more favorable light. Kennedy definitely did increase the pressure on the President. Ultimately, in March of I968, the President bowed to that pressure and actively searched for peace.

Implications for Further Research

The conclusions of this study lead, as always, to more questions. There are several which seem especially pertinent. The first deals with the methodology of this study. This has been a study of rhetorical strat­ egy. The framework for study conceived by this author needs to be repli­ cated. The very fact that Kennedy was such a famous figure makes it easy to assign motives for his actions. If this methodology is truly effective, 166

it should, he applicable to others whose motives may not be as evident. At best, this study has scratched the surface of Robert F. Kennedy. He was a complex, confusing, fascinating human being. Truly to understand him, a study of all of his actions needs to be undertaken. Realistically, it is impossible to isolate one issue or one speech from the milieu of Kennedy's actions during his Senate years and expect to learn very much about the man. Accordingly, this study has presented an insight into Kennedy, but has refrained from drawing hard and fast conclusions about him as a human being, save for the most obvious. Finally, Kennedy’s personal papers were unavailable for this study. This may or may not be significant. Any strategic analysis would benefit from having Kennedy’s perspective on the actions he undertook to end the war. Such a perspective is needed to authenticate the findings of this analysis. There are probably other questions pertinent to this study, but these are the ones of greatest concern to the author. This undertaking was not begun in sympathy with Robert F. Kennedy. However, in the course of its completion, the author has come to realize that Robert Kennedy was a human being with strengths and weaknesses, with laudable traits as well as those of lesser'regard. A veritable jungle of material concerning Robert Kennedy exists. No doubt, more will be written in the future. It is sincerely hoped that this study may be of some bene­ fit to those who seek to understand Robert F. Kennedy and the Vietnam war. 167

FOOTNOTES

\jack Newfield, Robert F. Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 136. 2William Schecter, Countdown *68; Profiles for the Presidency (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1967), p. 202. 168

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Anderson, Patrick. The Presidents' Men. Garden City, New York: Double- day & Company, Inc., 1969. Brown, Stewart Gerry. The Presidency on Trial: Robert Kennedy's 1968 Campaign and Afterwards. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1972. Bryant, Donald C. (ed.). The Rhetorical Idiom. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958. Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley and Los Angeles; Uni­ versity of California Press, 1969. ______. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Chester, Lewis, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of I968. New York: The Viking Press, 1969. Clinch, Nancy G. The Kennedy Neurosis. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1973. Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade; America in Vietnam. Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1972. Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. The Elephants and the Grass. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. De Toledano, Ralph. R.F.K., The Man Who Would be President. New York: Putnam, 1967. Effros, William G. (ed.). Quotations Vietnam: 1945-1970. New York: Random House, 1970. Ehninger, Douglas. Contemporary Rhetoric: A Reader's Coursebook. Glen­ view, Illinois; Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972. Ellsberg, Daniel. Papers on the War. New York: Simon and Schuster, I972. Evans, Rowland, and Robert Novak. Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1966. 169

Fairlie, Henry. The Kennedy Promise. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Ine., 1973« Fisher, Charles W. Minorities, Civil Rights, and Protest. Belmont, California: Dickinson Publishing Company, 1970. Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake; The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. Gove, Philip B. (ed.). Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1969. Guthman, Edwin. We Band of Brothers. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Halberstarn, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hayes, Harold (ed.). Smiling Through the Apocalypse. New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1971. Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967. Hoffman, Paul. Moratorium: An American Protest. New York: Tower Publi­ cations, Inc., I97O. Hofstadter, Richard, and Michael Wallace (eds.). American Violence. New York: Vintage Books, 1971. Holland, DeWitte (ed.). America in Controversy. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company, 1973« Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., Ï969. Hudson, James A. RFK: 1925-1968. New York: Scholastic Book Services, 1969. Hymoff, Howard, and Phil Hirsch (eds.). The Kennedy Courage. New York: Pyramid Books, 1965. Isard, Walter (ed.). Vietnam: Some Basic Issues and Alternatives. Cam­ bridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1969. Jansen, Godfrey. Why Robert Kennedy Was Killed. New York: Joseph Okpaku Publishing Company, Inc., 1970. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Popular Library, 1971. Kail, F. M. What Washington Said. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. 170 Kennedy, Robert F. To Seek a Newer World. Garden City, New York; Double- day & Company, Inc., 1967. Kennedy, Rose F. Times to Remember. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974. Kimball, Penn. Bobby Kennedy and the New Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Ï969• Knightley, Philip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovan- ovich, 1975. Laing, Margaret. The Next Kennedy. New York: Coward-McGann, Inc., 1968. Lasky, Victor. Robert F. Kennedy; The Myth and the Man. New York: Tri­ dent Press, 1968^ Mailer, Norman. Miami and the Siege of Chicago. New York: New American Library, Inc., 1968. Manchester, William. The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973« Manning, Robert, and Michael Janeway (eds.). Who We Are. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. McCarthy, Joe. The Remarkable Kennedy's. New York: The Dial Press, i960. Newfield, Jack. Robert Kennedy: A Memoir. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., I969. Oberdörfer, Don. TETi Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971. O’Donnell, Kenneth P., David F. Powers, and Joe McCarthy. Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. O'Neill, William L. Coming Apart; An Informal History of America in the I960's. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Powers, Thomas. The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964- 68. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973. Reischauer, Edwin 0. Beyond Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York : Bantam Books, Inc., 1968. Rosenberg, Milton J., Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse. Vietnam and the Silent Majority: The Dove's Guide. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. 171

Salisbury, Harrison E. Behind the Lines-Hanoi. New York: Harper and How, 1967. ______(ed.). The Eloquence of Protest. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972. Schaap, Richard. R.F.K. New York: The New American Library, 1967. Schecter, William. Countdown '68; Profiles for the Presidency. New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 19&7• Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The_Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1948. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966. .______. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973. Shannon, William V. The Heir Apparent: Robert Kennedy and the Struggle for Power. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Skolnick, Jerome H. The Politics of Protest. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969. Sorensen, Theodore C. The Kennedy Legacy: A Peaceful Revolution for the Seventies. New York: The New American Library, 1969. Stein, Jean. An American Journey: The Times of Robert Kennedy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970. Thimmesch, Nick, and William Johnson. Robert Kennedy at 40. New York: W.W. Norton, I965. Thonssen, Lester A., A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. Braden. Speech Criti­ cism. New York: The Ronald Press, 1970. Vandenbosh, Amry, and Richard Butwell. The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. Vanden Heuvel, William, and Milton Gwirtzman. On His Own; Robert F. Kennedy, 1964-1968. Garden City, Hew York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970. White, Theodore H. The Making of the President I960. New York: Atheneum, 1961. ______. The Making of the President 1964. New York: Atheneum, 1965. ______, The Making of the President I968. New York: Atheneum, 1969. Wicker, Tom. JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1972. 172

Wise, David. The Politics of Lying. New York: Random House, 1973- ? Witcover, Jules. 85 Days; The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy. New \ York: Ace Publishing Corporation, 1969. Zinn, Howard. Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

Magazines

Andrews, James R. "The Practical Strategy: Richard Cobden’s Arbitration Speech of 1849," Western Speech, Winter, I968, pp. 27“35. ______. "Coercive Rhetoric Strategy in Political Conflict: A 'Case Study of the Trent Affair," Central States Speech Journal, Winter, 1973, PP- 253-261. _____ . "The Passionate Negation: The Chartist Movement in Rhetorical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Speech. April, 1973» PP. 196-208. Beisecker, Thomas. "Verbal Persuasive Strategies in Mixed-Motive Interactions," Quarterly Journal of Speech, April, 1970» PP. 149-160. Bird, Robert S. "Robert F. Kennedy: At Home with the Heir Apparent," Saturday Evening Post, August 26, 1967. pp. 28-35. Brake, Robert J. "The Porch and the Stump: Campaign Strategies in the 1970 Presidential Election," Quarterly Journal of Speech. October, 1969, PP. 256-267. "Broadside by Bobby: Excerpts from Address," Newsweek, February 19, 1968, p. 24. Burgess, Parke G. "Crisis Rhetoric: Coercion vs. Force," Quarterly Journal of Speech. February, 1973» PP* 61-73. Chesebro, James W. "Rhetorical Strategies of the Radical-Revolutionary," Today's Speech. Winter, 1972, pp. 37“46. Crawford, Kenneth. "Bobby on Vietnam," Newsweek, March 7, 1966, p. 33. "Draft-Kennedy Conclave," New Republic, October 14, 1967, pp. 10-14. "Embarrassing Mr. Kennedy," America. March 18, 1967. pp. 366-367. Fallaci, Oriani. "Robert Kennedy Answers Some Blunt Questions," Look, March 9, 1965» PP. 60-63. Galati, Michael. "A Rhetoric for the Subjectivist in a World of Untruth: the Tasks and Strategy of Soren Kierkegaard," Quarterly Journal of Speech, December, 1969, pp. 372-380. l?3 Halberstam, David. "Travels with Bobby Kennedy," Harpers Magazine, July, 1968, pp. 51-66. ______. "The Vietnamization of America," Playboy, January, 1971, pp. 117-118. "He Strives to Bring About 'The Restoration,’" Life, November 18, 1966, P. 37. "He Uses—and Deeply Feels—The ’Legend*" Life. November 18, 1966, p. 40. Hendrix, J.A. "The Shivercrat Rebellion: A Case Study in Campaign Speak­ ing Strategies," Southern Speech Journal, Summer, 1968, pp. 289-294. Holland, Virginia. "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkian Method," Quarterly Journal of Speech, December, 1953, pp. 444-450. Hosterman, Craig. "Some Mass Communication Strategies of the Extreme Right," Indiana Speech Notes. February, 1974, pp. 1-7. Jensen, J. Vernon. "The Rhetorical Strategy of Thomas A. Huxley and Robert G. Ingersoll: Agnostics and Roadblock Removers," Speech Monographs. March, 1965, pp. 59-68. "Kennedy for President: A Buildup Starts for *72," U.S, News and World Report, May 10, 1965, PP. 49-50. "Kennedy Initiative," Nation, March 7, 1966, p. 253. "Kennedy Quandary," New Republic, February 3, 1968, p. 7. Kiker, D. "Robert Kennedy and the What If Game," Atlantic, October, 1966, pp. 66-70. Kimball, Penn. "He Builds His Own Kennedy Identity and the Power Flows Freely to Him," Life, November 18, 1966, p. 43. Kopkind, Andrew. "He’s a Happening: Robert Kennedy’s Road to Somewhere," New Republic, April 2, 1966, pp. 18-22. Micken, Ralph A. "The Triumph of Strategy in the Senate Debate on the League of Nations," Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1951, pp. 49-53. Miller, H.H. "Kennedy in *68?" New Republic, October 15, 1966, pp. 11—13- Newfield, Jack. "Bobby Phenomenon," Nation, November 14, 1966, pp. 505“ 507. Patterson, J.W. "Arthur Vandenburg's Rhetorical Strategy in Advancing Bipartisan Foreign Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, October, 1970, pp. 284-295. 174

Reeves, R. "Making of a Candidate, 1968," New York Times Magazine. March 31, I968, pp. 25-27. Reichley, A. James. "He’s Running Himself Out of the Race," Fortune, March, I968, pp. 112-114. Roberts, S.V. "Bobby Kennedy's Shadow Cabinet," Esquire, September, 1966, pp. I68-I69. "Senator Robert Kennedy Explains His Position," (interview), U.S. News and World Report, March 14, 1966, pp. 68-70. Shannon, William V. "Bob Kennedy's Future," Commonweal, March 18, 1966, pp. 686-687. ______. "Making of President Robert Kennedy," Harpers, October, I966, pp. 62-68. ' Sidey, Hugh. "Bobby and the Political Battle Between the Generations," Life, July 1, 1966, p. 340. ______, "He Makes a Truce with a Man He Almost Came to Hate—LBJ," Life, November 18, 1966, pp. 38“39. Simons, Herbert W. "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1970» PP. 1“11. ______.. "Persuasion in Social Conflicts; A Critique of Prevailing Conceptions and a Framework for Future Research," Speech Monographs, November, 1972, pp. 227-247. Smith, T. "Bobby's ''Image," Esquire, April, 1965» pp. 62-63. Swanson, David L. "The New Politics Meets the Old Rhetoric: New Directions in Campaign Communication Research," Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1972, pp. 31“40. "Vietnam: Pro and Con of Kennedy's Peace Plan," U.S, News and World Report, March 7» 1966, pp. 104-107. Weaver, W., Jr. "Will the Real Robert Kennedy Stand Up?" New York Times Magazine, June 20, 1965, pp. 8-9.

Newspapers

■The New York Times. April 27, 1966. The New York Times. December 31» 1966. 175

The New York Times. January 16, I967. The New York Times. February 9» 1967. The New York Times. April 2, 1967. The New York Times. April l6, I967. The New York Times. June 4, I967. The New York Times. August 4, 1967. The New York Times, November 29, I967.