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Ignorance Or Irony in Plato's Socrates?

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Ignorance Or Irony in Plato's Socrates? Ignorance or irony in Plato’s Socrates?: a look beyond avowals and disavowals of knowledge Author(s: Senn, Scott J. Sociedade Internacional de Platonistas; Imprensa da Universidade de Published by: Coimbra Persistent URL: URI:http://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/34676 DOI: DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_13_5 Accessed : 4-Oct-2021 20:09:17 The browsing of UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina and UC Impactum and the consultation and download of titles contained in them presumes full and unreserved acceptance of the Terms and Conditions of Use, available at https://digitalis.uc.pt/en/terms_and_conditions. As laid out in the Terms and Conditions of Use, the download of restricted-access titles requires a valid licence, and the document(s) should be accessed from the IP address of the licence-holding institution. Downloads are for personal use only. The use of downloaded titles for any another purpose, such as commercial, requires authorization from the author or publisher of the work. As all the works of UC Digitalis are protected by Copyright and Related Rights, and other applicable legislation, any copying, total or partial, of this document, where this is legally permitted, must contain or be accompanied by a notice to this effect. impactum.uc.pt digitalis.uc.pt JOURNAL DEZ 2013 ISSN 2079-7567 eISSN 2183-4105 PLATO I3 Established 1989 http://platosociety.org/ Papers William H.F. Altman “The Missing Speech of the Absent Fourth: Reader Response and Plato’s Timaeus-Critias” David Levy, “Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination and Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias.” Nathalie Nercam, “En tout et pour tout (Théétète 204a-210b)” Matthew Robinson, “Competition, Imagery, and Pleasure in Plato’s Republic, 1-91” Scott J. Senn, “Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and Disavowals of Knowledge” INTERNATIONALPL PLATO ATO SOCIETY Société Platonicienne JOURNALInternationale Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra Coimbra Universiy Press Scott J. Senn | 77 Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and Disavowals of Knowledge1 Scott J. Senn, Longwood University, [email protected] “elenctic” discussion; his exhortation to virtue AbstrAct is not aimed just at getting his interlocutors to understand that virtue—whatever it is!—must My central thesis is that Socrates of Plato’s be pursued first and foremost. The elenchus, “early” dialogues believes he has the very I argue, is only a prerequisite for understanding wisdom he famously disavows. Eschewing the much more substantive lessons of his the usual tack of analyzing his various avowals exhortative practice, which produces “the and disavowals of knowledge, I focus on greatest good”—indeed “happiness” itself. other claims which entail a belief that he This interpretation, I explain, goes hand in has wisdom par excellence—not just self- hand with Socrates’ belief that he is a “good awareness of ignorance and not just so-called man”, invulnerable to injury, who rationally elenctic wisdom. First, I correct the common and independently always makes unerring misimpression that Socrates is willing only to decisions aimed at justice. In light of such ask but not to answer questions. Indeed, he beliefs, as well as his fearless claims about describes his own answers as a crucial part others’ injustices, I offer a plausible explanation of his exhortative message, which, I show, of why Socrates denies having bona fide involves not just an exhortation to participate in wisdom and being a “teacher” of it. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_13_5 78 | Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and Disavowals of Knowledge PROTARCHUS: Why, then, did you your- highlighting one feature of the typical way self not give an answer to yourself, Socra- in which the “paradox” has been presented tes? SOCRATES: No [reason] why not. in scholarship over the past couple decades: Do, however, have a part of the logos with the scholarship is not of course monolithic, [me]. (Philebus 54b)2 but there is a discernable tendency to fetishize knowledge-claims: in recent decades, the “pa- SOCRATES: If you don’t wish to answer, radox” of Socrates’ ignorance has often been then I’ll answer for you…. (Apology 27b8-9) presented as an at least prima facie incon- gruity between Socrates’ claims of ignorance versus his claims of knowledge.8 I, however, Three decades ago, when Gregory Vlastos want to argue that, in order to get a full appre- wrote his paper titled “Socrates’ Disavowal of ciation of what and how much Socrates thinks Knowledge”, he could claim (1994, 39)3 that he knows, we need to pay more attention, than “the standard view” of such disavowals was is now usually given, to other kinds of eviden- that Socrates does not mean by them what ce. Vlastos’s observations in a 1957 address he says.4 Today, due in no small measure are, in this connection, worth reviewing: “… to Vlastos’s work, it might well be said that [N]o man ever breathed greater assurance that the standard view has been reversed.5 I shall his feet were planted firmly on the path of argue in this paper, however, that there are right. He never voices a doubt of the moral important passages in Plato’s early dialogues rightness of any of his acts or decisions, never that are familiar enough but have unfortu- betrays a sense of sin. He goes to his death nately been discounted or misinterpreted by confident that ‘no evil thing can happen to a Vlastos and many of those who have followed good man’ (Apology 41D)—that ‘good man’ his lead. Careful reexamination of these is himself.” (1971, 7).9 Such observations are passages strongly suggests that we ought to crucial in my own attempt to revive the for- consider a return to the formerly “standard merly “standard view”. view”. Besides discounting or misinterpre- ting crucial evidence, one factor that led to the abandonment of that view was its being SECTION 1). READINESS TO virtually identified with what was in fact ANSWER QUESTIONS. only one possible version of the view: viz., that of Norman Gulley (1968, 64ff.). After This brings me to the first familiar pas- marshalling all the evidence which suggests sage that I want to reconsider. Let me in- that Plato’s Socrates6 cannot in his familiar troduce it by noting how remarkable it is disavowals mean what he says, I shall sug- that Vlastos—in “Socrates’ Disavowal of gest some plausible reasons for the frequent Knowledge”, published three decades after disavowals that avoid the problems found in the address from which I just quoted—can Gulley’s particular interpretation of them. so confidently cite (1994, 40) Aristotle in su- The “paradox”7 in Socrates’ alleged igno- pport of his view that Socrates’ disavowals rance is familiar enough, so I shall not bo- are sincere: so Vlastos explains that “…for ther to start with reviewing the interpretive Aristotle the reason why Socrates ‘asked problem in detail. Let me instead begin by questions, but did not answer them’ is that Scott J. Senn | 79 ‘he confessed he had no knowledge’ (Soph. “<33b1-2> …I am ready to answer ques- El. 183b7-8)...” (1994, 16 n. 47).10 “Socrates”, tions for rich and poor alike, <33b2-3> Vlastos tell us, “does not answer questions, and I am equally ready if anyone prefers does not expound his ‘wisdom.’ Pieces of it to listen to what I have to say and answer spill out in elenctic arguments, leaving the my questions.” (Tredennick/Tarrant 2003) interlocutor wondering how much is being held back” (1991, 35).11 “<33b1-2> … I hold forth myself for both Rather than simply taking Aristotle’s word a wealthy person and a poor one similar- for it that Socrates “asked questions but did ly to question, <33b2-3> and if anyone not answer them”, one might well stop to con- wishes to hear the things I have to say by sider—or reconsider—whether it was actually answering.” (Senn) the case. A close look will show that it was not true of at least Plato’s Socrates (even though The accuracy of mine and Tredennick/Tar- Plato does make it clear12 that it was indeed rant’s translation of the first clause (33b1-2) an impression some had of the man). But it is well-confirmed by a number of venerable is not Socrates’ (or Plato’s) failure to be clear commentators,15 and so it is a little surpri- about the matter. It is of course true that in sing to see it still so often mistranslated in the Plato’s dialogues Socrates happens oftener to manner of Grube/Cooper.16 The second clause be the questioner than the respondent.13 But (33b2-3), however, is trickier. According to there are more than just a couple instances John Burnet, there is a hyperbaton here: he where Socrates expresses his willingness to says the “answering (apokrinomenos)” belongs answer as well as ask.14 Unfortunately, one with Socrates’ “I say (legō)”, not with the “any of the most relevant instances is a very fami- (tis)” interlocutor (1924, 138-139). So Burnet liar passage indeed, but the passage is all too would hold that our popular translators have often either overlooked or obscured (uninten- got 33b2-3 wrong—that Tredennick/Tarrant tionally), mainly (I suspect) because of how and Grube/Cooper’s “answer my questions” it is usually translated and interpreted. The should rather be “hear what I say in reply” passage is Apology 33b1-3. (sc., to their questions, the ones mentioned Below is, first, the Oxford Classical Text of in 33b1-2).
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