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Forms of Goodness : the Nature and Value of Virtue in Socratic Ethics. Scott .J Senn University of Massachusetts Amherst

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Forms of Goodness : the Nature and Value of Virtue in Socratic Ethics. Scott .J Senn University of Massachusetts Amherst University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-2004 Forms of goodness : the nature and value of virtue in Socratic ethics. Scott .J Senn University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Senn, Scott .,J "Forms of goodness : the nature and value of virtue in Socratic ethics." (2004). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2378. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2378 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FORMS OF GOODNESS: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VIRTUE IN SOCRATIC ETHICS A Dissertation Presented by SCOTT J. SENN Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2004 Department of Philosophy © Copyright by Scott J. Senn 2004 All Rights Reserved FORMS OF GOODNESS: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VIRTUE IN SOCRATIC ETHICS A Dissertation Presented by SCOTT J. SENN Approved as to style and content by: Gareth B. Matthews, Chair C. c Vere C. Chappell, Member Department of Philosophy DEDICATION To Russell E. Senn, my first philosophy teacher ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS "I have to speak to you of one who was in many ways the greatest man that ever lived[. Thus begins an account of Platonic thought by John Burnet (1928) that inspired the work whose product is the present paper. Burnet's iconoclastic views on Plato and Socrates are now considered passe; but they revitalized my interest in these philosophers at a time when I was unsure of which area of academic philosophy best suited me. Burnet's views made me notice and take seriously a set of fascinating questions and facts that I had never considered, and probably would never have seriously considered had I not bothered to review Burnet's case firsthand. Moreover, knowing that such an able and venerable scholar had come to some of the same controversial conclusions heartened me psychologically when the strength of my actual arguments could not. There has been for me a great advantage in that my graduate career has coincided with such a fertile time for Socratic scholarship. So I acknowledge my debt to the other Plato scholars from whom I have benefited directly or indirectly. A number of them are named here in the Bibliography; there are surely others. I am grateful to Plato, such as it them all. Whatever our ultimate disagreements, my understanding of misinterpreted Plato, the fault of is, was built largely on their work, though if I have course is wholly mine. Feldman The germ of my thesis was presented in a term paper I wrote for Fred ask Fred to read any of the drafts in his 1997 Virtue-Ethics seminar. Though I did not v of the present paper, his critical disposition and demand for clarity have influenced my work greatly and will continue to do so. Gary Matthews, "in the likeness of Mentor both in form and also in voice," helped me through the labor I experienced in bringing into the world a thesis that would be philosophically interesting and about which I could be truly excited. He accomplished this solely through asking the right questions at the right times—so great and so Socratic is Gary's wisdom when it comes to didactic guidance. My thesis would have been lifeless and not worth defending had it not been for this guidance. Gary's patience and care as a Plato scholar and his consistently concise yet warm style of writing and speaking are inspirational. I try to follow his example, well aware that few ever master the wisdom that in him seems so natural. I thank Casey Perin for being such an active member of my dissertation committee and cheerfully helping me in other ways during what, I know, for him was a busy year. He provided very useful feedback on an earlier draft of a portion of this paper, causing me to clarify and recast some of my main arguments. and his I greatly appreciate Vere Chappell's participation on my committee encouraging words. It is extremely reassuring that such a learned and experienced scholar respects my own work. Bruce Aune, formerly a member of my committee, but recently and deservedly draft of this paper. His retired, graciously spent some of his retirement reading a feedback was helpful, encouraging, and much appreciated. role in the committee and especially for I thank Marios Philippides for his Plato's Greek wherever I translated it. This suggesting that I include in the dissertation vi suggestion forced me to review all of my translations and to correct several minor errors. Also, I am greatly honored to have Professor Philippides' approval of my translations; the challenge of living up to his strict standards is well-known and well- respected among his students and colleagues. This reminds me of a significant debt I owe to Stanley R. Szuba, my first teacher of ancient Greek. Were it not for his demand for rigor both in translating and in interpreting the philosophers I studied under him, my understanding of and respect for the language would not have been nearly as deep as they are. My good friends W. Ben Bradley and Erik Wielenberg have each set and continue to set an example worthy of emulation. They are philosophers and teachers of the first rate, and it is my honor and pleasure to know them so well and to thank them for their help and encouragement. Beth Ellena's selfless and cheerful help in quickly solving printer- and copier- related problems allowed me to produce in a timely manner the many copies of this and previous versions of this paper that I needed in the weeks before my Defense. Lastly and mostly, I thank Maria Estellanna Ciccone, who has been my constant companion in the years during which I wrote this paper. With intelligent conversation and buoyant humor, she kept my mind alive and sharp during what were otherwise dreary days of writing and research. She has been so supportive in so many ways, I would not have finished without her. vii ABSTRACT FORMS OF GOODNESS: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VIRTUE rN SOCRATIC ETHICS MAY 2004 SCOTT J. SENN, BA., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews As traditionally interpreted, Socrates in Plato's early dialogues believes virtue is practical wisdom, valuable primarily as a means to happiness, but he has little or nothing to say about what constitutes happiness. I defend a novel interpretation on which Socrates believes happiness consists in being virtuous and virtue is philosophical knowledge. My interpretation makes better sense of all of Socrates' claims. Chapter I introduces the exegetic problem and summarizes my solution. Chapter II shows that virtue in Plato's Euthvdemus is knowledge of good and bad. It also shows that the value Socrates attributes to it there is instrumental. However, though Socrates does argue that virtue is necessary for happiness, he does not consider it instrumentally sufficient for happiness. Socrates claims that virtue is sufficient for In the Apology and Crito , however, III shows. I argue that the happiness and that it cannot be taken away, as Chapter value makes its sufficiency-claim comes from Socrates' belief that virtue's intrinsi c viii possessor happy, supporting this with other evidence from the Apology and Crito . Based on this evidence, I conclude that virtue is for Socrates the sole intrinsic good. Chapter IV shows that Socrates thinks he possesses knowledge of good and bad. Socrates expresses a paramount desire to philosophize, even after death if possible; he must therefore expect that philosophizing will yield further results. Given that virtue is Socrates' sole ultimate end, I conclude that virtue in Plato's early dialogues consists in philosophical knowledge, including but not limited to knowledge of good and bad. Chapter V shows that Socrates' belief in the invulnerability of the virtuous cannot be fully explained unless he believes that death cannot take away one's knowledge. I show that Socrates' claims about death in the Apology and Crito uphold this interpretation. I also show how my interpretation of Socrates' views about death can be used to corroborate Chapter Ill's main conclusion. Tying together Socrates' views on virtue, death, and philosophy, Chapter VI explains Socrates' belief that injuring others injures the agent: By diminishing one's pool of potential interlocutors, injuring others fails to maximize one's philosophical knowledge. IX 8 CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS •• CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION j Notes 12 II. THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND BAD 1 Introduction jg The Worthlessness of Wealth etc 21 The Worth of Wisdom 24 No Such Thing as Luck: The Argument at Eud. 279c5-280b3 25 More Resources Do Not Mean Greater Success: The Argument at Eud. 280b5-281e5 32 Problems in Specifying Which Wisdom is Inherently Helpful 35 Passage Out of the Labyrinth: Knowledge of Good and Bad 37 Wisdom Alone is Not Instrumentally Sufficient for Success 39 Notes 42 III. VIRTUE AS THE ULTIMATE END IN THE APOLOGY AND CRITO 59 Introduction 59 Why Attend to Virtue? 59 Consolation for the Virtuous: Their Invulnerability 61 The Virtuous Risk and Do Not Risk "Injuries" 62 Do the Virtuous Risk Living Unlivable Lives? 63 May the Virtuous Be Made Unhappy "by Accident"? 64 Do the Virtuous Risk Losing Minor Intrinsic Goods? 64 If Only Instrumentally Good, is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? 66 The Virtuous Risk Losing Extrinsic but Not Intrinsic Goods 68 The Virtuous Do Not Fear the Many At All: Virtue Cannot Be Taken Away 72 Goodness of Soul as the Sole Ultimate End 75 Can Bodily Deterioration Make the Virtuous Unhappy? 76 Notes 79 x 8 IV.
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