Enacting Virtue

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Enacting Virtue ENACTING VIRTUE Margaret Róisín Hampson UCL A thesis presented for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September 2017 I, Margaret Róisín Hampson, confrm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confrm that this has been indicated in the thesis. ……..………………………………………………… 1 2 ABSTRACT Tis thesis is about how we develop as moral agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on which fourishing depends. Aristotle’s account of how this is effected is familiar: we become virtuous through practice of the actions in which virtue fnds its expression. But how should we understand the difference between the doings of the learner and the activity of the virtuous agent, and what is it that happens when a learner does these things that results in her realisation of virtuous activity? Whilst both agents perform virtuous actions, the two are engaged in different activities: one is in the process of acquiring a disposition, the other is engaged in its exercise. But we can also see each as related to the actions they perform in different ways. Te learner is not yet the author of her actions in the strict sense that the virtuous agent is, who chooses these actions as an expression of a settled way of seeing and valuing things; indeed, the learner’s actions stand in the relation of copy to those of the virtuous agent, or so I argue. How, then, does the learner’s practice of these alienable actions result in her becoming an author of virtuous actions in the strict sense? I argue that by seeing the learner as engaged in the imitation of a virtuous agent we can begin to explain this transition. In imitating a virtuous agent and adopting her perspective, the learner is positioned so as to perceive the value of virtuous action, and thus to discover its attraction. With the aid of Aristotle’s psychological works, I offer a picture of the learner’s habituation which shows how it is that through acting, her perceptions, desires and other capacities are shaped in such a way that she comes eventually to perceive things and to act in the way that the virtuous agent does. 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................... 8 A Note on Pronouns ............................................................................................................................. 10 List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 11 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 13 Becoming Virtuous ........................................................................................................................... 13 Nicomachean Ethics II 1 .................................................................................................................... 15 Chapter Overview ............................................................................................................................ 17 1 BECOMING A VIRTUOUS AGENT ................................................................................................ 21 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 21 1.2 Te Acquisition of a State of Character ........................................................................... 22 1.2.1 Virtue as a Non-Rational State ................................................................................ 23 1.2.2 Virtue as a Rational or Intellectual State ............................................................... 26 1.2.3 A Stalemate .................................................................................................................. 29 1.3 Becoming a Virtuous Agent, Engaging in Virtuous Activity ...................................... 30 1.3.1 Te Human Good and Virtuous Activity .................................................................. 30 1.3.2 Te Activity of the Virtuous Agent ............................................................................. 32 1.3.3 A More Neutral Starting Point ..................................................................................... 34 1.4 Virtuous Activity is Realised through Practice ............................................................... 35 1.5 Te Nature of the Process Revisited ................................................................................. 38 1.5.1 We Should Not Assume Tat Habituation Is Non-Rational ................................. 39 1.6 What Happens When We Do Just and Temperate Tings? ...................................... 47 2 PRACTICE AND PRAXIS ................................................................................................................ 48 2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 48 2.2 Nicomachean Ethics II 4 .................................................................................................... 49 2.3 Te Challenge and the Form of the Solution .................................................................. 51 2.3.1 Some Desiderata ........................................................................................................... 53 2.3.2 Te ‘Possibility’ Reading ........................................................................................... 54 2.3.3 Te ‘Process’ Reading ................................................................................................. 58 2.4 Te Disanalogy ..................................................................................................................... 62 2.4.1 A Change of Subject .................................................................................................. 63 2.4.2 A Continuation of the Argument: Te Truth Conditions of the Adverbs ... 66 5 2.4.3 Te Full Solution ........................................................................................................ 67 2.5 Practice and Praxis ................................................................................................................ 68 2.5.1 Te Priority of Praxis ................................................................................................. 72 2.6 Te Explanatory Task .......................................................................................................... 74 3 CONTINUITY AND DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................... 75 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 75 3.2 A Requirement of Continuity ........................................................................................... 76 3.3 Te Continuity Worry ........................................................................................................ 77 3.4 Jimenez’ Underlying Concern: Radical Discontinuity ................................................ 81 3.4.1 Mechanical Action ..................................................................................................... 81 3.4.2 Discerning Action ...................................................................................................... 88 3.5 Virtuous Motivation ........................................................................................................... 90 3.6 Te Texts do not Mandate the ‘Virtuous Motivation’ View ....................................... 92 3.7 Leaving Room for Development and Discovery ........................................................... 98 3.7.1 Te Bump in the Carpet ........................................................................................... 99 3.7.2 Te Picture of Habituation ..................................................................................... 101 4 IMITATING VIRTUE ................................................................................................................. 104 4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 104 4.2 Imitation and Moral Development ................................................................................ 105 4.2.1 Imitation and Development Before Aristotle .................................................... 108 4.2.2 Imitation and Character Models in NE IX and X ............................................. 111 4.3 Mimēsis in the Poetics .......................................................................................................... 113 4.4 Fossheim and Te Desire to Imitate ................................................................................ 117 4.4.1 Assessment of Fossheim’s Account ....................................................................... 120 4.5 Learning through Imitation .............................................................................................. 121 4.5.1 Imitation and Attention to Virtuous Action ...................................................... 122 4.6 Imitation and the Virtuous Agent’s Perspective ........................................................... 125 4.6.1 Perceiving Together .................................................................................................. 127
Recommended publications
  • Plato Journal
    DEZ 2013 ISSN 2079-7567 I3 eISSN 2183-4105 Established 1989 http://platosociety.org/ Papers William H.F. Altman “The Missing Speech of the Absent Fourth: Reader Response and Plato’s Timaeus-Critias” David Levy, “Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination and Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias.” Nathalie Nercam, “En tout et pour tout (Théétète 204a-210b)” Matthew Robinson, “Competition, Imagery, and Pleasure in Plato’s Republic, 1-91” Scott J. Senn, “Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s Socrates?: A Look Beyond Avowals and Disavowals of Knowledge” INTERNATIONAL PLATO SOCIETY PLATO INTERNATIONAL PL ATO Société Platonicienne JOURNALInternationale Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra Coimbra Universiy Press 2 | Enicaper ficaed susta nondin is es nonim et dolore CREDITS EditOriAL BOARD INterNAtiONAL PLATO Francisco Gonzalez SOcietY EXecutiVE University of Ottawa COmmittee (2013-16) Irmgard Männlein-Robert President: Francisco Bravo Universität Tübingen Universidad Central de Venezuela Angela Ulacco President: Gabriele Cornelli Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Universidade de Brasília Vice President: Tom Robinson ScieNtific BOArd University of Toronto Luc Brisson Ex-President: Mauro Tulli CNRS – UPR76 Centre Jean-Pépin, Paris Università degli Studi di Pisa Tomás Calvo Next President: Luc Brisson Universidad Complutense, Madrid CNRS – UPR76 Centre Jean-Pépin, Paris John Dillon Next President: Olivier Renaut Trinity College, Dublin Université Paris
    [Show full text]
  • Forms of Goodness : the Nature and Value of Virtue in Socratic Ethics. Scott .J Senn University of Massachusetts Amherst
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-2004 Forms of goodness : the nature and value of virtue in Socratic ethics. Scott .J Senn University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Senn, Scott .,J "Forms of goodness : the nature and value of virtue in Socratic ethics." (2004). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2378. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2378 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FORMS OF GOODNESS: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VIRTUE IN SOCRATIC ETHICS A Dissertation Presented by SCOTT J. SENN Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2004 Department of Philosophy © Copyright by Scott J. Senn 2004 All Rights Reserved FORMS OF GOODNESS: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF VIRTUE IN SOCRATIC ETHICS A Dissertation Presented by SCOTT J. SENN Approved as to style and content by: Gareth B. Matthews, Chair C. c Vere C. Chappell, Member Department of Philosophy DEDICATION To Russell E. Senn, my first philosophy teacher ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS "I have to speak to you of one who was in many ways the greatest man that ever lived[. Thus begins an account of Platonic thought by John Burnet (1928) that inspired the work whose product is the present paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking the Connection of Metaphor and Commonplace
    RETHINKING THE CONNECTION OF METAPHOR AND TOPOS MAREIKE BUSS & JÖRG JOST RWTH AACHEN 1. Introduction Having survived the «death of rhetoric» (R. BARTHES 1985: 115), metaphor has become the centre of intensive research by philosophers of language and linguists in the twentieth cen- tury. Nowadays it is widely accepted that metaphor is not reducible to «a sort of happy extra trick with words» (I. A. RICHARDS [1936] 1964: 90), but is rather said to be a funda- mental principle of linguistic creativity with an invaluable cognitive function and heuristic potential. Topos or rather commonplace has, in contrast, a predominantly negative connota- tion in everyday and scientific language. Topos, which originally designated the place where to find the arguments for a speech, has become the cliché, the worn out phrase, or the stereotype. Nevertheless, there are numerous critical studies focusing on topoi in their heu- ristic and argumentative function. Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric is one of the first and most important ‘textbooks’ for speech production. Following Aristotle, the purpose of rhetorical speech consists in persuading by argumentation. In this respect he defines rhetoric as «the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.» (Rhetoric I, 1355b/14,2). Now, persuasion presupposes – as any perlocutionary act – that the utterances have been under- stood by the audience, in short: it presupposes (text) comprehension.1 When analysing the first three phases of rhetoric – heuresis, taxis and lexis – two features in particular stand out on account of the role they play in argumentation: topos and metaphor, which are treated in the heuresis and the lexis.2 Metaphor works in a heuristic and aesthetic manner, while topos operates in a heu- ristic and logical manner.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtue and Rights in American Property Law Eric R
    Cornell Law Review Volume 94 Article 14 Issue 4 May 2009 Virtue and Rights in American Property Law Eric R. Claeys Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 889 (2009) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol94/iss4/14 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RESPONSE VIRTUE AND RIGHTS IN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW Eric R. Claey4 INTRODUCTION: ON VIRTUE AND FRYING PANS In Plato's Republic, Socrates persuades his conversationalists to help him construct a city organized around commerce. Glaucon, who has an idealist streak, dismisses this city as a "city of pigs."1 In re- sponse, Socrates sketches for Glaucon an ideal city ruled by the most virtuous citizens-the philosophers. 2 To make the city as just and har- monious as possible, the philosophers abolish the institution of pri- vate property. They require the auxiliary citizens to use external 3 assets only in cooperation, to contribute to common civic projects. This conversational thread presents a tension that is simply un- solvable in practical politics in any permanent way. Politics focuses to an important extent on low and uncontroversial ends, most of which are associated with comfortable self-preservation.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Mimesis
    Rethinking Mimesis Rethinking Mimesis: Concepts and Practices of Literary Representation Edited by Saija Isomaa, Sari Kivistö, Pirjo Lyytikäinen, Sanna Nyqvist, Merja Polvinen and Riikka Rossi Rethinking Mimesis: Concepts and Practices of Literary Representation, Edited by Saija Isomaa, Sari Kivistö, Pirjo Lyytikäinen, Sanna Nyqvist, Merja Polvinen and Riikka Rossi Layout: Jari Käkelä This book first published 2012 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2012 by Saija Isomaa, Sari Kivistö, Pirjo Lyytikäinen, Sanna Nyqvist, Merja Polvinen and Riikka Rossi and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-3901-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-3901-3 Table of ConTenTs Introduction: Rethinking Mimesis The Editors...........................................................................................vii I Concepts of Mimesis Aristotelian Mimesis between Theory and Practice Stephen Halliwell....................................................................................3 Rethinking Aristotle’s poiêtikê technê Humberto Brito.....................................................................................25 Paul Ricœur and
    [Show full text]
  • Linguistic Patterns of Viewpoint Transfer in News Narratives
    Cognitive Linguistics 2019; 30(3): 499–529 Kobie van Krieken* and José Sanders Smoothly moving through Mental Spaces: Linguistic patterns of viewpoint transfer in news narratives https://doi.org/10.1515/cog-2018-0063 Received 1 June 2018; revised 18 December 2018; accepted 20 December 2018 Abstract: This article presents a Mental Space model for analyzing linguistic patterns in news narratives. The model was applied in a corpus study categoriz- ing various linguistic markers of viewpoint transfers between the mental spaces that readers must conceptualize while processing news narratives: a Reality Space representing the journalist and reader’s projected here-and-now view- point; a News Narrative Space representing the newsworthy events from a there-and-then viewpoint; and an Intermediate Space representing the informa- tion of the news actors provided from a temporal viewpoint in-between the newsworthy events and the present. Viewpoint transfers and their markers were examined in a corpus of 100 Dutch crime news narratives published over a period of fifty years. The results reveal clear patterns, which indicate that both linguistic structures and narrative-based as well as genre-based inferences play a role in the processing of news narratives. The results furthermore clarify how these narratives have been gradually crystallizing into a genre over the past decades. These findings elucidate the complex yet fluent process of conceptually moving between mental spaces, thus advancing our understanding of the rela- tion between the linguistic and the cognitive representation of narrative discourse. Keywords: viewpoint, mental spaces, news narrative, tense, temporal adverbs 1 Introduction A considerable proportion of human communication takes place in narrative formats (Bruner 1991).
    [Show full text]
  • Diegesis – Mimesis
    Published on the living handbook of narratology (http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de) Diegesis – Mimesis Stephen Halliwell Created: 17. October 2012 Revised: 12. September 2013 1 Definition Diegesis (“narrative,” “narration”) and mimesis (“imitation,” “representation,” “enactment”) are a pair of Greek terms first brought together for proto- narratological purposes in a passage from Plato’s Republic (3.392c–398b). Contrary to what has become standard modern usage (section 3 below), diegesis there denotes narrative in the wider generic sense of discourse that communicates information keyed to a temporal framework (events “past, present, or future,” Republic 392d). It is subdivided at the level of discursive style or presentation (lexis ) into a tripartite typology: 1) haple diegesis, “plain” or “unmixed” diegesis, i.e. narrative in the voice of the poet (or other authorial “storyteller,” muthologos, 392d); 2) diegesis dia mimeseos, narrative “by means of mimesis,” i.e. direct speech (including drama, Republic 394b–c) in the voices of individual characters in a story; and 3) diegesis di’ amphoteron, i.e. compound narrative which combines or mixes both the previous two types, as in Homeric epic, for example. From this Platonic beginning, the terms have had a long and sometimes tangled history of usage, right up to the present day, as a pair of critical categories. 2 Explication The diegesis/mimesis complex is introduced by Socrates at Republic 392c ff. to help categorize different ways of presenting a story, especially in poetry. His aim is to sketch a basic psychology and ethics of narrative. From Republic 2.376c ff. Socrates has been concerned with the contribution of storytelling in general, poetry (the most powerful medium of verbal narrative in Greek culture) in particular, to the education of the “guardians” of the ideal city hypothesized in the dialogue.
    [Show full text]
  • Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule of Law Maureen B
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 79 | Number 3 Article 2 3-1-2001 Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule of Law Maureen B. Cavanaugh Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 577 (2001). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol79/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ORDER IN MULTIPLICITY:* ARISTOTLE ON TEXT, CONTEXT, AND THE RULE OF LAW MAUREEN B. CAVANAUGH* Justice Scalia has made the question of textual interpretation tantamount to a referendum on whether we are a government characterizedby the "rule of law" or the "rule of men." Aristotle is frequently quoted in support of statements about the rule of law and methods of statutory interpretation. While frequent, quotation of and reliance on Aristotle has been selective. The dichotomy between methods of interpretationand the rule of law turns out to be a false one. This Article examines Aristotle's theories of interpretation,especially his analysis of homonymy, non-univocal uses of the same word, to show that not all homonyms are random. Aristotle's contribution,that associatedhomonyms allow us to understand related ideas, along with his principles of language and logic, permit us to address the central question of how to interpret a text.
    [Show full text]
  • The Parts We Skip: a Taxonomy of Constitutional Irrelevancy
    1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19 6:34 PM THE PARTS WE SKIP: A TAXONOMY OF CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCY Peter Beck* I. A “VERSION” OF THE CONSTITUTION On January 6, 2011, for the first time in the history of Congress, the Constitution was read out loud on the House floor.1 “We hope,” said Rep. Bob Goodlatte, who organized the event, “this will inspire many more Americans to read the Constitution.”2 There are millions of pocket-sized Constitutions in circulation; millions of Americans could have taken Goodlatte’s advice and followed along in their copies of the text.3 Speaker of the House John Boehner began the reading: “We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union . .”4 In a show of bipartisanship, the reading alternated between Republican and Democratic members. After Boehner finished the Preamble, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi took over: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . .” Then Rep. Cantor, “No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years and been seven years a citizen of the * With thanks to Jill Hasday and the editors of Constitutional Commentary, Meredith Foster, Akhil Amar, and, especially, Lizzy Beck. 1. Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html. 2. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th CONG., READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 157, at H53–62 (COMM. PRINT 2011).
    [Show full text]
  • The Earliest Translations of Aristotle's Politics and The
    ECKART SCHÜTRUMPF THE EARLIEST TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTle’S POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY 8 MORPHOMATA LECTURES COLOGNE MORPHOMATA LECTURES COLOGNE 8 HERAUSGEGEBEN VON GÜNTER BLAMBERGER UND DIETRICH BOSCHUNG ECKART SCHÜTRUMPF THE EARLIEST TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLe’s POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY WILHELM FINK unter dem Förderkennzeichen 01UK0905. Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt der Veröffentlichung liegt bei den Autoren. Bibliografische Informationen der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen National­ biblio grafie; detaillierte Daten sind im Internet über www.dnb.d­nb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte, auch die des auszugweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen Wieder gabe und der Übersetzung vorbehalten. Dies betrifft auch die Vervielfälti­ gung und Übertragung einzelner Textabschnitte, Zeichnungen oder Bilder durch alle Verfahren wie Speicherung und Übertragung auf Papier, Transparente, Filme, Bänder, Platten und andere Medien, soweit es nicht § 53 und 54 UrhG ausdrücklich gestatten. © 2014 Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn Wilhelm Fink GmbH & Co. Verlags­KG, Jühenplatz 1, D­33098 Paderborn Internet: www.fink.de Lektorat: Sidonie Kellerer, Thierry Greub Gestaltung und Satz: Kathrin Roussel, Sichtvermerk Printed in Germany Herstellung: Ferdinand Schöningh GmbH & Co. KG, Paderborn ISBN 978-3-7705-5685-4 CONTENT 1. The earliest Latin translations of Aristotle— William of Moerbeke 9 2. Nicole Oresme 25 3. Leonardo Bruni’s principles of translation 28 4. Bruni’s translation of Aristotle’s Politics 33 5. The political terminology in Bruni’s translation— a new Humanist concept of res publica? 39 6. The controversy over Bruni’s translation— contemporary and modern 65 Appendix 77 Bibliography 78 This study goes back ultimately to a response I gave on two pa­ pers presented on “Translating Aristotle’s Politics in Medieval and Renaissance Europe” at the “International Conference on Translation.
    [Show full text]
  • Pilgrimage and Its Paratexts
    PILGRIMAGE AND ITS PARATEXTS By RENÉE JANE STANTON A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of English Literature School of English, Drama and American and Canadian Studies University of Birmingham September 2015 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Dedication For Jeremy – my book for you. Acknowledgements Firstly I would like to thank very warmly my PhD supervisors at the University of Birmingham, Michael Toolan and Deborah Longworth, who, in their very different ways, helped me focus my thinking. Their time, dedication and expertise have been much appreciated. I would like to say a particular thank you to Gill Hanscombe who responded generously to my enquiries and whose interest and encouragement was so helpful. Also I would like to express my gratitude to Scott McCracken and Becky Bowler at the University of Keele for their welcome on my research visits. Their support, advice and willingness to share their knowledge have been invaluable. Thanks go to the members of the Dorothy Richardson Society whose work I have listened to and read and whose conversations and company I have enjoyed.
    [Show full text]
  • Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology by JW
    Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology by J. W. Mackail Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology by J. W. Mackail [We have both a 7 bit version and an 8 bit version. The 7 bit version does not contain accents, the 8 [binary] bit version does] This is the 8 bit version. SELECT EPIGRAMS FROM THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY By J. W. Mackail First Published 1890 by Longmans, Green, and Co. Etext prepared by John Bickers, [email protected] and Dagny, [email protected] SELECT EPIGRAMS FROM THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY EDITED WITH A REVISED TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES BY page 1 / 371 J. W. MACKAIL Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. PREPARER'S NOTE This book was published in 1890 by Longmans, Green, and Co., London; and New York: 15 East 16th Street. The epigrams in the book are given both in Greek and in English. This text includes only the English. Where Greek is present in short citations, it has been given here in transliterated form and marked with brackets. A chapter of Notes on the translations has also been omitted. {eti pou proima leuxoia} Meleager in /Anth. Pal./ iv. 1. Dim now and soil'd, Like the soil'd tissue of white violets Left, freshly gather'd, on their native bank. M. Arnold, /Sohrab and Rustum/. page 2 / 371 PREFACE The purpose of this book is to present a complete collection, subject to certain definitions and exceptions which will be mentioned later, of all the best extant Greek Epigrams. Although many epigrams not given here have in different ways a special interest of their own, none, it is hoped, have been excluded which are of the first excellence in any style.
    [Show full text]