Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa

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Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1984_12 Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka’s Terms and Conditions, available at http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education. The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law. Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa Alternative title Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 12/84 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid; Woods, Jeanne M. Publisher United Nations, New York Date 1984-08-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa Coverage (temporal) 1976 - 1984 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description INTRODUCTION. BACKGROUND. Umkhonto We Sizwe - the early years. Strategy and tactics: Building the Base for People's War. 1976-1978: "The African National Congress lives". THE ARMED STRUGGLE ESCALATES - 1979-1983. 1979 - Year of the Spear. 1980 - Year of the Charter. Sasol. Mass action. The racists respond. 1981 - Year of the Youth. Voortrekker. "Treason Trial." Defeat "internal settlement" scheme. Dark days for racists. 1982 - Year of Unity in Action. Increased terror. Koeberg. 1983 - Year of United Action. Defeat collaboration and build unity. Armed solidarity. BOTHA'S "TOTAL STRATEGY". Increased military spending. Transnational corporations prepared. Constitutional "reform". Aggression against neighboring States. INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY - THE "FOURTH PILLAR". A special responsibility. Danger of intervention. Fight for sanctions. Immediate tasks. Unity is crucial. Notes. Format extent 21 page(s) (length/size) http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1984_12 http://www.aluka.org UNITED NATIONS UNITED NATIONS CENTRE AGAINST APARTHEID NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* August 1984 NOV 2 6 1984 FIVE YEARS OF ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA by Jeanne M. Woods /ote: This paper is published at the request of the Special Committee against Anartheid. It was presented at the North American Regional Conference for Action against Apartheid, held at the United Nations Headquarters from 18 to 21 June 198Y. Ms. Woods is a representative of the National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation, New York. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author._/ 84-19588 *All material in these Notes and Documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated. United Nations. New York 10017 INTRODUCTION ............................ 1 BACKGROUND ....... ................................ ... 1 UmkhontoWeSizwe-theearlyyears................ 2 Strategy and tactics: Building the Base for People's War .. ..... 3 1976-1978: "The African National Congress lives" ..... ......... 4 THE ARMED STRUGGLE ESCALATES - 1979-1983 ....... .............. 5 1979 - Year of the Spear .......... ..................... 5 1980 - Year of the Charter .......... .................... 5 Sasol ............... .............................. 6 Mass action ............. ........................... 6 The racists respond. ....... ............... 7 1981 - Year of the Youth ....... .. ..........7 Voortrekker ............. ........................... 8 "Treason Trial ................................. 8 Defeat "internal settlement" scheme ....... ............... 8 Dark days for racists. .................... 9 1982 - Year of Unity in Action ..................... 9 Increased terror ............ ........................ 9 Koeberg ............ ............................... 10 1983 - Year of United Action . ........... 10 Defeat collaboration and build unity ............... 11 Armed solidarity BOTHA'S "TOTAL STRATEGY" ..................... 12 Increased military spending . ................ 12 Transnational corporations prepared ..... ............... 12 Constitutional "reform" . .................. 13 Aggression against neighboring States . ...... 13 INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY - THE "FOURTH PILLAR" . 13 A special responsibility. ......... 13 Danger of intervention. ............... 14 Fight for sanctions .......... ....................... 14 Immediate tasks . ...................... 15 Unity is crucial .............. ........... 15 Notes. ............. ................................ 16 INTRODUCTION In the five years commencing in 1979, revolutionary armed struggle against white minority rule in South Africa has escalated dramatically, shaking the very foundations of the apartheid regime. During this period, nearly 200 armed assaults and acts of sabotage by Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the military wing of the African National Congress, were documented by the South African press. 1/ Due to rigorous official censorship, countless more incidents remain unreported. This paper will examine the development of the armed struggle from 1979 through 1983. BACKGROUND Throughout the history of South Africa, examples of militant forms of struggle in the fight for freedom abound. For centuries, the Zulus, Besotho, BaPedi, Mpondomise, Batlaping and other peoples fought gallantly against the British and Dutch colonialists to preserve their land and independence. In 1879, at the Battle of Isandhlwana, King Cetshwayo's regiments armed with spears, defeated the powerful British army, marking the highest point in a 200 year protracted struggle. However, despite the great heroism and skill of the African people, by 1880, the whites had established their rule over the whole of South Africa. The Bambata Rebellion of the Zulu people in 1906, brutally put down, was the last war of resistance to be fought in the old style. 2/ Recognizing that lack of unity among the African people constituted their principal weakness, the African National Congress was founded in 1912 with the stated objective of uniting all the African people in the region to continue the anti- colonial struggle. 3/ During its early years, the African National Congress utilized primarily methods of agitation and propaganda. Later, more militant forms of struggle were employed, such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience and mass demonstrations. Year 1946 marked a turning point in the liberation movement. In that year, a strike called by the African Mineworkers Union was supported by over one hundred thousand workers. Intensified mass action was accompanied by growing unity among Africans and solidarity with both the peoples of Indian ancestry and the so-called "Coloureds". The election of the fascist Nationalist Party in 1948 accelerated the opposition to the racist r6gime. The African National Congress and its allies launched the Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws; called nationwide general strikes for political demands; led women's resistance to the pass laws and a national bus boycott. This mass upsurge culminated in the historic Congress of the People in 1955, which adopted the Freedom Charter. 4/ To the people's demands for a democratic, non-racial society, the rigime responded by arresting their leaders and charging them with "high treason" in a trial which lasted from 1956 to 1961. It was an unsuccessful attempt to intimidate the people and paralyze the movement. 5/ Meanwhile, parallel developments were taking place in the countryside, where peasants armed themselves to resist government attempts to replace their traditional leaders with puppets in the "Bantu Authorities". The most intense upsurge was among the Pondo, who developed a vast popular movement. By March 1960, thousands of peasants had established a clandestine government in the mountains, including people's courts, which evaded detection for many years. The Pondoland revolt demonstrated that the people of the countryside were ripe for armed struggle. 6/ In March 1969, the fascist South African police attacked a peaceful demonstration at Sharpeville. Sixty-seven unarmed people were ruthlessly murdered, 187 wounded. The African National Congress was banned and forced underground. In 1961, the army was mobilized on the largest scale since the Second World War to put down a nationwide strike called to protest the formation of a racist Republic. With legal forms of struggle no longer possible, the African National Congress placed armed struggle on the agenda. 7/ Umkhonto We Sizwe - the early years On 16 December 1961, the first explosions of Umkhonto We Sizwe (popularly known as "M-K") heralded a new era in the liberation struggle. To the oppressed masses of South Africa, the M-K Manifesto declared: "The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back
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