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Soutr#Yafrlca EPISCOPfnCHU~HMEN SOUTr#YAfRlCA \.4 W.st 11th SftH. • New York, N, y, loon phone, (2t2j 4iNJ066 - FDr A Free SOIItbem AMell- Eastertide 1977 SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA? Meetings between representatives of five Western powers and officials of the South African regime have stirred a rash of reports and rumours about a breakthrough in settling the issue of Namibian independence. None of the participants is saying very much, although there has been a flood of leaks, mainly from .sources close to the South African-sponsored Turnhalle conference in the Namibian capital of Windhoek. The burden of stories appearing in the Western press is that South African Prime Minist­ er' Balthazar Johannes Vorster has yielded to pressure from the five mem~ bers of the United Nations Security Council - the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada - and that a number of concessions have been or ' are close to being made by the regime which illegally occupies the International Territory of Namibia in defiance of the lawful authority,the United Nations. There were two meetings in Cape Town in April, and future five power 'de­ marches' upon Vorster are forecast. US Vice President Walter Mondale is talking y.1ith the South African chieftain in Vienna on 19 May and US am­ bassador to the UN Andrew Young visits Johannesburg on 21 May. The UN conference on Zimbabwe and Namibia underway in the Mozambique capital of Maputo 16-21 May will exert an influence on events. London OBSERVER journalist David ~artin writes from Maputo that the 'un­ derstanding' between the West and Vorster includes: - Pretoria's acceptance of 'an internationally acceptable solution' and the principle of UN involvement in nation-wide elections in Namibia 'held under universal suffrage without literacy qualifications'. United Nations Security Council resolution 385 of January 1976 demands 'United Nations supervision and control' of elections, a position the US government and the others claim to support. Vorster resists this and it appears the West is aC90mmodating with some kind of UN presence inside Namibia, a far cry from the UN's conce.pt of total construction of a coun­ try-wide electoral system 'and seeing the vote through to a fair and hon­ est conclusion. The Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES reports Pretoria insists 'The UN presence .... would, however, have to be restricted to an observer, rather than a supervisory role'. The RAND DAILY MAIL says 'It may be that the Western powers themselves will offer, to exercise supervisory functions on the UN's behalf'. i , " 'Control', tJ:i'g 'J ke'y woX'd caref'ully introduced by the UN, has been obdu­ rately ignored by the Western governments) evenfro!l)., the mqmerit resolu­ tion 385 was passed with their concurrence. TheUN ~ Cci'uncil for Namibia, specifically set up by the world. body to administer Namibia and help it toward independence, is being calculatedly by-passed. The West wants ' to keep control in the Security Council where it has the veto. - the South African regime would hold off on passing legislation in its parliament that would create an 'independent South West Africa' as re­ quested by the 11 'ethnic' groups of the Turnhalle. This looks like a concession, but read it with: - 'South Africa intends to establish a central administrative authority to govern the country before independence'. The RAND DAILY MAIL says the composi tion of such a caretaker administra­ tion is open, with participation perhaps by a multi-racial advisory coun­ cil, maybe including Turnhal1e delegates. It f s obvious vJhere 'control' is going to be. (eontinued~ ovep) ~. • SQu1zn Af;riqSl woule;! wi thdraw ;f~()m N{l.JIl;i.biq, in. stag~s, "in Qonsu,l tatio.n with those · mainly involved "' . The SUNDAY. TIMES writes that 'The West, it was said, was also willing to adopt a softer line on the UN demand for an immediate South African mili­ tary withdrawal from the territory' and that 'The West's position amounts to a request to South Africa that it continue its mandate until elections are held' . -'All people and parties would be free to participate in the elections', and there would be freedom of speech and assembly. With South Africa's history of harassment, managed tribal elections and outright repression and with Pretoria's grip on Namibia assured during any 'transition' period, free elections are an impossibility. South Af­ rica's police, military, intelligence and subversive forces and the all­ pervading South West Africa administration are intact. The Western pow­ ers, with their three-nation veto (however much they may dislike to use it) keep the situation managed in New York. - South Africa will release Namibian political prisoners and detainees. Pretoria has repeatedly stated that it holds no political prisoners or detainees. All South Africans and Namibians incarcerated are 'criminals'. It appears that the elections being talked about would be for a constitu­ ent assembly empowered to draft a constitution. SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia, is not mentioned in the 'under­ standing' but presumably will be allowed to take part in the electioneer­ ing and voting. SWAPO's information secretary in London declared that his organization would not participate under a 'caretaker administration'. The SWAPO Mission to the UN issued a statement On 6 May, reaffirming the party's pledge to accept elections. It brought the issue back to funda~ mentals: 'South Africa has no legal or moral right to dictate her own con­ ditions to the international community regarding elections in Namibia ...•• it is the duty and responsibility of the United Nations to decide on the modalities and time-table for the electoral process'. The statement concluded: 'In the meantime, the struggle continues. We expect the Security Council to meet in the near future to take up the question of Namibia. We are also consulting about the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly to review the critical situation in Namibia. ' SWAPO continues to grow inside Namibia. Its national conference in late March in Katutura township outside Windhoek enlarged the national execu­ tive committee to include representatives from six political groups that within the past five months have joined SWAPO. These are located in the central and southern regions of the Territory, further proving the lie of the South Africans and the Turnha11ers that SWAPO is an Ovambo tribal organization. Shortly after the Katutura congress, yet another group - representing 17,000 Hereros - announced its affiliation with SWAPO. This group stands in opposition to Turnhal1e delegate Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the man widely considered to have the nod as the first president of South West Africa/Namibia under the South African-nurtured scheme. SWAPO's congress created new executive posts and strengthened regional councils. It confirmed once again the overall leadership of President Sam Nujoma and ather officers in exile, underlining as in the past the integrity of the party within and outside the boundaries of Namibia. SWAPO concentrated on its political program, a chief element of which is aimed to change Namibia's two economies - one wealthy, white-owned and based on exploitation of the country's natural resources, the other poor, black and subsistence, forcing the million black Namibians to depend on jobs in white-controlled mines, ranches and fishing and other industries. SWAPO envisions a radical restructuring of Namibian society, creating a people's ownership of production and exchange, a balance between agricul­ ture and industry, thus reversing the colonial practice of resource ex­ traction and neglect of farming (which makes Namibia largely dependent on South Africa for food. SWAPO plans to make Namibia an agriculturally self-sufficient nation. TFJ.E NEW YOI}}<'. x'IMES,. r€porting on President Jirruny Cart.er.'s reply. to a question on a te'ZevisiolrinteruielJJ sholJJ in Los Angeles on l7 May: 'Mr. Carter said theJi.Vit1e ' .. President lJJouZd teZl the South Afnaan Zeader: "If you don't do somethirii/"about . Namibiq lJJ(}'Zl take strong aation aaainst ?IOU in the Uftite.d . Nat.ians " ThE llnes,i- dent sa"td hOlJJever that"sMrt of lJJar"'1;here mas ~"tttle the un"t1;ea i:i"tates aou7,.a ao to forae 'the'Seuth A~riaan Government to Aat. ' Southern Africa has been a veritable treasure trove of the minerals so vital for the highly industrial­ ized societies of the West. Gold and diamonds are but the most exotic. Copper, zinc, lead, coal abound. Titanium, germanium ,chrome , manganese and on and on. Western dependenoe on these resources and the high prof­ its realized by extracting them with the benefit of low-paid, captive black labor have elicited from Western governments and ! multi-national corporations +, . the most strenuous reaction i to the obvious pressure on ! the South African regime for change short of war - economic sanctions. A rapidly growing entice­ ment to industry and in­ vestment is the relative newcomer in the minerals treasure hunt - uranium. South Africa is well on the way to becoming the world's chief producer; included in that calculation is the oc­ cupied Territory of Namibia. Namibia is one of "the world's major sources of uranium ore. The Rossing mine not far from the port city' of vJalvis Bay 'is producing (and said . by the British journal SPECTATOR to be the largest on the planet). Prospects are enormous: the entire wes"t-central region of Namibia, in the vastness of the Namib desert, appears to be car'peted with the strategic ore. Mul ti­ national corporations, many of them South African, are conducting wide­ scale explorations, lured by the five-fold price rise in uranium over the past four years, the global" urge for nuclear "power and weapons (Preto~ia t alr.eady has nucleaX" l'dli tary capability! says French Prime Hinister Ray-· rr~ond Barre) and inteI'naLional bus ines s I estimate that Namibia I s political future will be held securely within the Western capitalist orbit.
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