Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Self-Determination Reform

Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of

Self-Determination Reform

Aslıhan Saygılı

Submitted in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Self-Determination Reform

Aslıhan Saygılı

Conventional wisdom portrays ethnic minorities as likely victims of democratization who often fall prey to nationalist aggression fueled by power-seeking elites. Yet, history is replete with newly democratic states that have not only avoided targeted violence against ethnic "others" but also sought to reconcile with aggrieved ethnic minorities through concessions over self-determination. In light of conventional wisdom, this picture is puzzling and raises two important questions: 1) Why is self-determination reform so frequently observed during democratization periods? 2) Why do some democratizing states accommodate minority demands for self-determination while others continue to neglect minority grievances, or worse, become a breeding ground for exclusionary nationalism and minority repression?

This dissertation is dedicated to addressing these questions. To answer the rst question, I develop a novel theory of self-determination reform that explains the conditions under which government leaders develop both the capacity and incentives to introduce policies that devolve some degree of autonomy to separatist minorities. The theory pinpoints early democratization as a critical juncture where two key conditions necessary for self-determination reform - limited institutional constraints to rule and threats to elite survival - are most likely to be observed together. During early democratization, newly democratic governments are able to push forward radical policy changes without the meddling of institutionally empowered veto players, who typically gain more leverage as the democratic regime consolidates. Matching this capacity for reform are democratizers’ strategic incentives to co-opt ethnic separatists. The source of these incentives, I argue, is the emergence of threats to elite survival during the early democratization period, which may be posed by a number of anti-democratic forces including the loyalists of the authoritarian regime and coup-plotting military factions. Amidst political instability, extending an olive branch to separatist minorities helps threatened democratizers strengthen their hand vis-a-vis imminent threats to their survival by containing separatist violence in the periphery and preventing tactical alliances between center-seeking and separatist rebel groups. In certain paths to democracy, democratizers also develop reputational incentives for self- determination reform, which helps establish democratic credentials through signaling a clean break with authoritarian practices.

I test my hypotheses using a mixed-method research design, combining statistical analyses of large-N data with a detailed case study of the Philippines-Moro relations during the country’s transition to democracy in the mid-1980s. The quantitative ndings conrm my hypotheses about the domestic political conditions that are most conducive to minority accommodation, as well as the relationship between democratization and self- determination reform. The Philippines chapter illustrates how strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation drive self-determination reform in early democracies, drawing on evidence from secondary sources and semi-structured interviews conducted during eldwork in Manila. In later chapters, I turn to my second research question and explore the variation in transition outcomes for separatist minorities across democratizing states. The key insight is that conciliatory steps towards ethnic separatists is a likely outcome in all types of transition paths marked by political instability, with the exception of coerced incumbent-led transitions where the incumbent views electoral competition as the primary threat to its survival prospects. In addition to this exception, non-conciliatory outcomes may also be observed in top-down transitions led by powerful autocrats who democratize voluntarily and do so without allowing the transition process to generate any threats to their survival. Case studies of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey introduced in the last chapter help probe the generalizability of the theory and illustrate how dierent transition paths shape democratizers’ policies towards separatists disputes.

Altogether, my dissertation project presents a novel theory of self-determination reform, as well as undertaking the rst systematic analysis of the conditions under which democratization paves the way for state-minority reconciliation. More broadly, the theory and ndings also add nuance to current thinking about democratization and ethnic minorities, providing evidence that transition processes are not closely associated with minority victimization and ethnic violence as is commonly assumed. Contents

List of Tables iii

List of Figures iv

1 Introduction1 1.1 Democratizers, Separatists and The Accommodation Puzzle...... 1 1.2 Current State of the Debate...... 6 1.3 Summary of The Argument...... 15 1.4 Research Design...... 20 1.5 Dissertation Roadmap...... 23

2 Denitions and Universe of Cases 27 2.1 Denitions...... 27 2.2 The Universe of Cases...... 37

3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform 41 3.1 Three Phases of Self-Determination Reform...... 44 3.2 Elite Capacity for Reform...... 46 3.3 Elite Incentives for Reform...... 53 3.4 How the Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes Shape the Reform Process 59 3.5 Survival of Authoritarianism and Commitment Problems...... 65 3.6 Democratization: A Critical Juncture for Separatist Minorities...... 71 3.7 Conclusion...... 80

4 Statistical Analyses 82 4.1 Data and Methods of Analysis...... 84

i 4.2 Results...... 96 4.3 Additional Robustness Checks...... 121 4.4 Conclusion...... 122

5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines 124 5.1 A Brief History of the Moro Peoples...... 125 5.2 Origins of the Modern Moro Conict...... 127 5.3 Armed Separatism in Mindanao: the Moro National Liberation Front... 133 5.4 State Policy Towards the "Moro Problem" Under the Marcos Dictatorship. 136 5.5 Philippine Transition to Democracy and the Aquino Period...... 146 5.6 Conclusion...... 160

6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress 162 6.1 Democratizers vs Separatists: A Formal Model of Self-Determination Reform 164 6.2 Explaining Alternative Transition Outcomes for Ethnic Minorities..... 174 6.3 Conclusion...... 188

7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey 191 7.1 Spain’s Reformer-Driven Transition and Basque Separatism (1975-1981).. 194 7.2 Nicaragua’s Incumbent-Driven Transition and Indigenous Miskito Sepa- ratism (1979-1987)...... 203 7.3 A Negative Case: Turkey’s Transition to Democracy and the Kurdish In- surgency in the 1980s...... 215 7.4 Conclusion...... 220

8 Conclusion 223 8.1 Theoretical Approach and Main Findings...... 224 8.2 Contributions to the Literature...... 228 8.3 Policy Implications...... 231

Bibliography 233

Appendix 246

ii List of Tables

4.1 List of Hypotheses...... 83 4.2 Dependent Variable Measuring Degrees of Self-Determination Reform.. 86 4.3 Summary Statistics...... 95 4.4 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Capacity Hypotheses (H1a-b)...... 99 4.5 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Incentive Hypotheses (H2a-b-c)...... 107 4.6 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Democratization Hypothesis (H3)...... 113 4.7 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of of Self-Determination Re- form Testing the Eect of Democratization Path (H4)...... 119

6.1 Types of Democratization and Political Instability...... 182 6.2 How Transition Paths Shape Democratizers’ Response to Territorial Sepa- ratists...... 190

iii List of Figures

2.1 List of Relevant Cases, 1960-2005...... 40

3.1 Key Determinants and Phases of Self-Determination Reform...... 57 3.2 Potential Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes in Authoritarian and Weakly Democratic Regimes...... 63

4.1 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Horizontal Ac- countability Index (V-Dem)...... 101 4.2 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Institutional Checks and Balances (DPI)...... 102 4.3 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform at Dierent Threat Levels, Moderated by Regime Institutions...... 109 4.4 Predicted Probability of Dierent Degrees of Self-Determination Reform by Transition Type...... 118

5.1 Maps of the Philippines and Mindanao...... 125 5.2 Population Share of Moros in Mindanao (1903-2000)...... 130 5.3 Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-1990)...... 131

6.1 Self-Determination Reform in Stable Authoritarian Regimes...... 165 6.2 A Formal Illustration of Self-Determination Politics in Democratizing States 169 6.3 A Continuum of Minority Mobilization Capacity at Democratization Onset 178

iv Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to all the people who supported me throughout the long journey of dissertation research and writing. First and foremost, I would like to thank Page Fortna and Jack Snyder, my academic advisers at Columbia University. Page’s support, mentorship and advice throughout all the stages of the project were invaluable, and I am extremely grateful for the countless times she read my drafts and gave detailed and thoughtful feedback that helped me get to the next stage. Jack has been a wonderful mentor and our conversations always helped me think about the big picture questions, which were essential to rening the theory. I will always admire his breadth of knowledge and openness to new ideas and feel especially grateful for his support in encouraging me to engage critically with the literature on democratization, ethnic violence and nationalism. The project also beneted hugely from the guidance and advice of other professors, both at Columbia and outside. In particular, I would like to thank Michael Doyle, Robert Kaufman, Tonya Putnam and Andreas Wimmer for their time and thoughtful feedback at dierent stages of the project.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Columbia colleagues for their advice and friendship throughout the years. My sincere thanks go to Brian Blankenship, Je Lax, Egor Lazarev, Yusuf Magiya, Renanah Miles, and Laura Resnick. I am also deeply grateful to all my friends who made me feel at home away from home since I moved to New York. The life in the city would not have been the same without Ece Ertürk, Melis Duyar, Yasemin Uyar, Ayşegül Yılmaz, and Yiğit Ulucay, and I feel incredibly lucky to have been only a short distance away from Ezgi Teksoy, Ayşenur Dal, Efe Tokdemir, Korhan Koçak, Melis Laebens, and Murat Uralkan at dierent points of time during my Columbia years. I thank Zeynep Keleş for always being there for me, and feel deeply indebted to Naz Yücel for her friendship and support through all the ups and downs of my life as a PhD student.

v One of most exciting parts of this project was my eldwork in the Philippines and I owe many thanks to people who made this experience possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank Michael Buehler, Sidney Jones and Steven Rood for helping me get in touch with contacts in Manila, and to Pablo Querubin for very useful advice about doing eldwork in the Philippines. I thank the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) at Ateneo de Manila University for welcoming me as a visiting scholar and providing me access to research materials. I want to express my deepest gratitude to people who devoted time and energy to talk to me about the complexities of the Mindanao conict and peace processes that unfolded since the late 1980s, including but not limited to: Fermin Adriano, Adolfo Azcuna, Steven Rood, Binky Dalupan, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Atty. Joe Lorena, Mehol Sadain, Criselda Yabes, Eliseo Mercado, Alma Evangelista, Ishak Mastura, Jose Almonte, Edmundo Garcia, Chito Gascon and Bong Montesa, as well as anonymous interviewees. I would like to thank the Department of Political Science and the Earth Institute at Columbia University for generously supporting my eldwork trip to the Philippines.

Finally, I want to thank my beautiful family for their unwavering support, love and encouragement throughout the PhD journey. My grandfather Turgut Nasün, who passed away at the end of my rst year at graduate school, has always been close to my heart, and memories of his intellectual curiosity and extensive knowledge of politics remained a source of inspiration in all my academic endeavors. The words fail me in trying to express my gratitude to my mom and dad, Gülhayat and Nejat Saygılı. I could not have completed this dissertation without their never ending love and support, which I have always felt deeply even when we were far away from each other. I love them endlessly, and thank them both for never letting me forget that home would always be there for me. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband Baturalp Torun for making the past three years truly special and bringing to my life more love and happiness than I could ask for. He is the one who kept me positive and motivated during my most stressful times working on this project, and I will always be grateful to him for his patience and kindness, and for all the laughter.

vi To my parents, Gülhayat and Nejat Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Democratizers, Separatists and The Accommodation Puzzle

In January 1986, only a few weeks before the snap elections that paved the way for the transition to democracy in the Philippines, the separatist struggle of the Muslim Moro minority emerged as a presidential campaign issue. Anxious to hold onto power amidst escalating popular opposition to his long-standing dictatorship, President Ferdinand Marcos accused the opposition candidate Corazon (Cory) Aquino of making a treasonous deal with the Moro secessionists and promising to recognize Muslim independence in the southern island of Mindanao (Branigin 1986). While clearly exaggerated for the purpose of raising alarm among the Catholic Filipino majority, Marcos’ allegations were not entirely unfounded. Earlier that month, Cory’s brother-in-law, Butz Aquino, had own to Eu- rope to pay an unexpected visit to Nur Misuari, the exiled chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The purpose of the visit was to ask for Muslim support in the snap elections and assure the rebel leader that, once the Marcos regime was toppled, the newly democratic government would take solid steps to fulll Moro aspirations for self- determination.

During a 2006 interview on the 20th anniversary of the People Power Revolution, the MNLF chairman gave a detailed account of the meeting when asked about his memories of the revolutionary period. "You should help us save democracy," Misuari recalled being

1 Chapter 1 Introduction told by Butz Aquino, "this is the only chance to destroy dictatorship, through the ballot box" (Misuari 2006). Cory Aquino’s eorts to secure Muslim support for the 1986 election was far from an isolated incident; since the early 1980s, Marcos opponents had actively sought to form a united front against the authoritarian regime through winning over dissidents from all circles, including the Moro separatists. As a result of these eorts, Muslim groups across a broad spectrum had come to support the anti-Marcos opposition, who had largely united behind Cory in the lead up to the election. After the Misuari-Aquino meeting, the MNLF also decided to endorse the opposition’s campaign, with Misuari calling out his supporters to vote for Cory and instructing his rebel ghters to protect the ballot boxes on election day.

Interestingly, Aquino and her team’s conciliatory eorts towards the Muslim Moros continued after the People Power Revolution, which ended the twenty-year running dictatorship and initiated the Filipino transition to democracy. Once in power, Cory Aquino held her promise to support the Moro bid for self-determination, inviting Misuari to return to the Philippines and starting an ocial peace dialogue with Muslim separatists. A similar reconciliation eort was initiated towards the indigenous peoples of the Cordillera region in the north, whose leaders had recently broken away from the communist insurgency and founded their own militant organization to ght for self-determination. Such conciliatory steps taken after electoral victory indicated that the new administration’s sympathy towards autonomy demands was not merely a move to secure minority votes. Even when peace talks with the MNLF collapsed in early 1987, Aquino’s policy initiatives towards solving the "Moro problem" continued. While largely unsuccessful in ending the separatist dispute, these early accommodative policies paved the way for the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989, as well as laying a foundation for future administrations’ endeavors to introduce more comprehensive self-determination reform.

It is commonly acknowledged that, of all civil conicts, separatist struggles are particularly prone to trigger intractable, long-term conict as government leaders often

2 Chapter 1 Introduction refuse to compromise eective control over their territory (Holsti 1991; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Huth 1998; Toft 2005; Walter 2009). In his work on secessionism, Hechter (1992, 277) writes, "if there is one constant in history apart form the universality of death and taxes, it is the reluctance of states to part with territory." Nevertheless, as the Philippines case illustrates, states faced with separatist challenges occasionally adopt conciliatory policies that accommodate self-determination demands to some extent (Walter 2006, 2009; Cun- ningham 2011, 2014). While full independence as in the cases of East Timor or South Su- dan is rare, many states have oered national minorities signicant concessions over self- determination, such as administrative and scal autonomy, control over ancestral lands and regional natural resources, and measures to protect indigenous languages and cultures, among several others.

What is intriguing about the Philippines example therefore is not the accommodation of autonomy demands per se, but its timing. The fact that the onset of a reconciliation process with Moro separatists coincided with the period of democratic transition contradicts conventional wisdom about the ill fate of ethnic minorities in democratizing states. While transition to democracy is a politically and socially turbulent process in all ethnically divided societies, it is considered particularly threatening to ethnic minorities who can fall victim to xenophobic resentments of disadvantaged majorities (Chua 2004) or become a strategic target for power-seeking elites who "play the ethnic card" to mobilize popular support (Snyder 2000). Elite manipulation theories in particular lead us to expect that separatist minorities, as easy targets for populist leaders trying to attract votes through nationalist appeals, should be most vulnerable to ethnic violence and exclusionary policies during periods of democratization.

A closer look into the trajectory of separatist movements during early stages of democratization demonstrates that the Philippines example does not stand alone. In many emerging democracies, newly elected leaders have accommodated minority demands for territorial autonomy or introduced more limited reforms towards self-determination. In the early years of post-Franco Spain, for instance, the rst democratically elected govern-

3 Chapter 1 Introduction ment under Adolfo Suarez granted regional autonomy to Catalans and Basques despite erce opposition from Francoist nationalists and hard-line army ocers. In Indonesia, the Reformasi period following Suharto’s fall was marked by the adoption of accommodative policies towards separatist regions, which paved the way for East Timorese independence and special autonomy status granted to Aceh and Papua provinces. Similarly, during Mali’s transition to democracy in the early 1990s, the transitional government under Pres- ident Toure signed the National Pact with Tuareg rebel groups, which extended minority- populated regions in Northern Mali special autonomy status and development assistance. In some Latin American countries, the Third Wave brought with it new laws guaranteeing language and cultural protection for indigenous populations. Even some of what Brubaker (1995) refers to as "nationalizing states" that emerged in the post-Soviet space made concessions to separatists during democratization periods, the most notable example being Moldova’s recognition of Gagauzia as an autonomous territorial unit and the de facto autonomy granted to Transdniestrian secessionists.

In light of conventional wisdom about the threats that ethnic minorities face in democratizing states, this picture is puzzling and raises two important questions:

1. Why are self-determination reforms so frequently observed during incipient democratization?

2. Why do some democratizing states adopt such reforms that pave the way for national reconciliation while others continue to neglect minority grievances, or worse, become a breeding ground for exclusionary nationalism and minority repression?

This dissertation is dedicated to addressing these questions. I argue that early democratization is a critical juncture at which two key conditions necessary for major self- determination reform - moderate institutional constraints on elite capacity to push forward policy change and strategic incentives to co-opt aggrieved minority populations - are most likely to be observed together. During incipient democratization, newly elected leaders can push forward reform without the meddling of institutional veto players, who typically

4 Chapter 1 Introduction gain more leverage as the democratic regime consolidates. Matching this capacity for legal reform is an increased motivation to appease, rather than repress, minority populations. I contend that, contrary to conventional wisdom, newly democratic governments often develop strategic and reputational incentives to establish peaceful relations with aggrieved separatists.

The strategic rationale behind minority appeasement is tied to the fact that a heavy- handed response to minority bids for self-determination can become costly during incipient democratization - a politically unstable environment characterized by power struggles and emergence of threats to elite survival. Major threats to democratizing elites in the post-authoritarian setting often come not from autonomy-seeking minorities, but from center-seeking adversaries. I argue that, amidst political instability, conciliatory self- determination policies can help democratizing elites co-opt aggrieved minorities early on and thereby (i) contain separatist wars in the periphery and concentrate on staving o more imminent threats to center, as well as (ii) prevent the formation of anti-regime alliances between separatist groups and those who seek to overthrow the newly democratic government. Additionally, in certain types of democratic transitions where the masses play a key role in driving regime change, democratizing elites may also develop reputational incentives for minority accommodation. As a costly signal, self-determination reform can help the newly democratic leadership establish its democratic credentials and disassociate its rule from the repressive policies of the fallen authoritarian regime.

If democratization paves the way for state-minority reconciliation in the context of self-determination disputes, how can we account for the fact that some democratic transitions instead give way to status quoist policies or increased minority repression? In an eort to address this question, I expand my theory and develop conditional hypotheses that help explain the variation in transition outcomes for separatist minorities across democratizing states. Because limited institutional constraints on executive decision-making power are observed across all emerging democracies, what account for this variation in outcomes are elite incentives for minority accommodation. Although democratization is a

5 Chapter 1 Introduction period that potentially paves the way for major reconguration of state-minority relations, not all transition processes generate strategic or reputational incentives to accommodate minority populations. I argue that whether these incentives will appear during early democratization largely depends on the type of transition path that the country goes through as well as the mobilization capacity of separatist minorities. These conditions allow me to identify democratization processes that are conducive to dierent types of outcomes for ethnic minorities, such as accommodative self-determination reform, preservation of the status quo, escalation of separatist violence and/or nationalist minority repression.

In the remainder of this introduction, I rst provide a brief overview of existing studies that inform my research, which lies at the nexus of democratization, ethnic violence, and self-determination literatures. Next, I present my main theoretical arguments, elaborate on the methodological approach and conclude with a dissertation roadmap.

1.2 Current State of the Debate

My dissertation builds on two literatures that have evolved separately. The rst one is the vast literature on democratization and ethnic violence, which has shaped much of conventional wisdom about the fate of ethnic minorities in emerging democracies. The second one is the burgeoning literature on self-determination politics. Existing studies from the former literature have generated pessimistic predictions about how ethnic minorities are vulnerable to nationalist energies unleashed during democratization. Most of these studies not only fail to distinguish between separatists and other types of minorities but also ignore the accommodation puzzle that motivates my research. On the other hand, the literature on self-determination is replete with studies exploring the conditions under which autonomy demands are accommodated; however, very few studies pay attention to the critical juncture of democratization. Below I present an overview of relevant work from both literatures, pointing out some theoretical and empirical shortcomings that my dissertation seeks to address.

6 Chapter 1 Introduction

What We Know About Democratization and Ethnic Minorities

During the early 1990s, Western-led promotion of rapid democratization in Africa triggered widespread civil unrest across the continent, most notably in several conict-ridden countries where elections were regarded as the "capstone of war termination eorts" (Sisk and Reynolds 1998). In the former Yugoslavia, the outbreak of ethnic violence similarly coincided with the introduction of multi-party elections after decades under communist rule. Considerable research since then has focused on how democratic transitions aect social order and political stability in the developing world. Scholars have argued that new democracies face heightened risk of civil conict due to the lack of robust political institutions that can accommodate increased political competition, uncertainty over new elites’ commitment to democratic rule, persistence of democratic decits such as poor representation and fraudulent elections, and fragile security environments that mobilize marginalized ethnic groups (Snyder 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand 2009; Cederman, Hug and Krebs 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug 2013; Cook and Savun 2016).

Transition to democracy is a particularly turbulent process in ethnically divided societies (Horowitz 1985; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Chua 2004). Although democratic institutions can serve as a remedy for the grievances of ethnic groups who have long been marginalized under authoritarian rule, many scholars today share the conviction that the process of democratization itself is prone to ethnic conict, aggressive nationalism and anti-minority violence (Snyder 2000; Hegre et al 2001; Chua 2004; Mann 2005; Manseld and Snyder 2007; Cederman, Hug and Krebs 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug 2013). In- donesia’s democratization in 1998, for instance, saw the re-escalation of separatist violence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua and was marked by increasing inter-communal violence in several provinces. Likewise, a few months after Kyrgyzstan’s revolution in 2010, there was an explosion of ethnic clashes between the majority Kyrgyz and the large Uzbek minority in the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad. In Myanmar, the military-led political opening in 2011 was accompanied by the onset of deadly riots against the Rohingya Muslims, which started as early as 2012 and most recently culminated into an atrocious campaign of

7 Chapter 1 Introduction ethnic cleansing. Common victims and perpetrators in these examples have led scholars to conclude that, where ethnic relations sour on the path towards democracy, minorities are often the most vulnerable (Bertrand and Haklai 2013).

Several theories oer pessimistic predictions about the fate of ethnic minorities in democratizing states. In From Voting to Violence, Jack Snyder (2000) warns against the dangers of promoting democracy in economically underdeveloped, institutionally barren authoritarian contexts where elections quickly sharpen ethnic and national cleavages. He argues that, during rocky transitional periods marked by imperfect yet increased political competition, still-powerful authoritarian elites who seek to restore the old regime often "play the ethnic card" to salvage their position while rising elites nd a nationalist platform equally attractive for mobilizing popular support. With regard to the vulnerability of ethnic minorities in such settings, Snyder writes:

A very eective tool for containing popular pressure for democratization is the use of national doctrine to exclude the so-called enemies of the nation from enjoying democratic rights. Nationalist elites commonly argue that ethnic minorities, the working classes, rival elites, or other political opponents should be excluded from political participation, often alleging that these groups lack the proper national credentials and are in league with foreign powers. The tactic not only justies curtailing the democratic rights of these purported "enemies within," but just as important, it has a chilling eect on freedom of expression among all citizens (Snyder 2000, 36). [emphasis added]

As Snyder illustrates through the Yugoslavia example, where incipient democratization is marked by imperfect media markets as well as journalists and intellectuals who are eager to join the tide of nationalist myth-making, worried authoritarian elites can easily target ethnic "others" with exclusionary nationalist rhetoric to mobilize mass support and reverse the course of regime transition.

Exploring the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing through a historical-sociological lens, Michael Mann (2005) observes a similar relationship between democratization and nationalist targeting of ethnic out-groups. He discusses how democratic ideals of "rule

8 Chapter 1 Introduction by the people" entwined demos with the dominant ethnos in modern ages, culminating in the formation of nation-states ruled by ethnic majorities and preparing the ground for the murderous cleansing of minority populations. In Western European states where the tri- umph of class solidarities over ethnic divisions gave rise to a liberal conception of democracy, Mann argues, minority ethnic cultures were assimilated "class by class" over time through institutional coercion rather than by violent means. In sharp contrast, across the late-industrializing, multi-ethnic imperial states of Central and Eastern Europe, democratization struggles pitted local ethnicities against foreign imperial rulers, encouraging the ideal of organic nation-statism and "the notion that minorities communities and political opponents might be excluded from full membership in the nation" (Mann 2005, 64). One of Mann’s central hypotheses is that, compared to stable authoritarian regimes which govern multiethnic populations by divide-and-rule, democratizing states are more likely to become a breeding ground for exclusionary nationalisms, paving the way for the systematic cleansing of ethnic outsiders. According to Mann, the Nazi regime’s Final Solution, the Yu- goslav wars and the Rwandan genocide are all evidence of "the dark side of democratizing states."

Some scholars have also made the argument that certain minority groups are particularly vulnerable to ethnic violence in transitional contexts. Amy Chua (2004), for instance, focuses specically on the dangers of democratic transition in societies with market-dominant minorities, who have become disproportionately prosperous vis-a-vis indigenous ethnic majorities under free market conditions. Chua (2004, 6) argues that adding democracy to the picture in such settings can fuel "potentially catastrophic ethnonational- ism" by increasing the political power of impoverished ethnic majorities and pitting them against economically powerful minorities who are resented for their prosperity. Similar to Snyder, Chua emphasizes the role of opportunistic, vote-seeking elites who incite hatred against resented minorities through ethnic demagoguery, promising to return the country’s wealth to the "true owners of the nation" (Chua 2004, 10).

Existing studies shed light on the dangers that ethnic minorities face in regimes

9 Chapter 1 Introduction newly embarked upon democratization; however, they also suer from important weaknesses. One major shortcoming is the tendency among scholars to focus almost exclusively on cases of failed democratization. Most qualitative evidence for the relationship between democratization and ethnic violence is drawn from select cases in sub-Saharan Africa and post-communist Eurasia, where several underlying factors such as institutional weaknesses and high level of ethnic fragmentation shaped both the trajectory of regime change and interethnic relations in the post-transition setting. In most of these cases, explosion of large-scale ethnic violence reversed the transition process, making democratization endogenous to ethnic conict. A crucial yet hugely underemphasized characteristic of such endogenous transitions1 is that, because the prospect of redistribution to ethnic rival groups or minorities poses a major threat to authoritarian leaders’ rm grip on political power, they are inherently conict-prone. In fact, elections in such settings are often introduced by the incumbent as a pre-emptive measure to secure political survival under a weakening authoritarian regime and rarely accompanied by further reforms necessary for genuine democratization. Indeed, a recent study by Cheibub and Hays (2017, 85) shows that authoritarian leaders hold elections when they face a credible threat of being forcefully removed from oce, that is, "when a civil war is already a real possibility and elections are nothing but an attempt to avoid war."

What perpetuates pessimistic predictions about ethnic minorities in democratizing states is a shortage of rigorous empirical studies that explore the eects of regime transition on state-minority relations more broadly, rather than focusing exclusively on violent outcomes. The selection problem in the qualitative literature has also set the direction of empirical research on the subject, where scholars have predominantly used as dependent variables indicators of violence such as "ethnic war onset," "ethnic riots," or "ethnopolitical rebellion." As Bertrand and Haklai (2013, 3) note, despite being the exception rather than the norm, violent outcomes of democratization have received the most attention in the lit-

1These refer to transitions in countries where ethnic tensions are strong enough to shape the trajectory of regime change. In exogenous transitions, any mobilization that occurs along ethnic lines is peripheral to democratization processes. Expanding our focus to the latter shows that there is more variation in transition outcomes for marginalized ethnic groups across emerging democracies than existing theories acknowledge.

10 Chapter 1 Introduction erature since "they are the most obvious breakdown of ethnic relations and are more easily observable." In contrast, the empirical relationship between democratization processes and alternative transition outcomes, such as accommodative policies towards ethnic minorities, has been largely understudied.

A related problem is that empirical studies that explore violent outcomes rely heavily on measures that lump together separatist and inter-communal forms of ethnic conict, which are clearly generated through distinct causal mechanisms. Some recent studies by Buhaug (2006) and Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2010) have made exceptions to this trend, distinguishing between governmental and territorial wars in their analyses. Explor- ing the relationship between democratization and civil war onset, Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2010) show that democratic transition only predicts the onset of conicts over governance; conicts over territory - most of which involve ethnonationalist minorities with separatist demands - do not appear to be associated with regime change in any direction. This interesting nding is consistent with my observation that transition outcomes for separatist minorities vary more extensively than existing theories acknowledge.

Ted Gurr’s extensive research on minorities at risk provides support for these crit- icisms. In People versus States, Gurr (2000, 86) hypothesizes that democratization in its early stages should heighten the risk of ethnopolitical rebellion as "minority peoples or- dinarily feel a loss of security simultaneously with a transient increase in opportunities for mobilization and action." His quantitative analyses, however, demonstrate that the evidence for this argument is mixed at best: between 1980 and 1999, democratization led to an increase in ethnopolitical rebellion in the post-communist states, whereas transitions in the Third World were marked by a decline in rebellion. Gurr’s interpretation of what he calls the "postcommunist anomaly" is that serious ethnopolitical conict in these heterogenous societies was caused by the formation of new states rather than "the formation of new democracies per se" (163). It is also possible that, in some emerging democracies, aggrieved ethnic minorities do not rebel instantly at the sight of an opportunity for mobilization either because the security dilemma they face is not as severe or newly elected

11 Chapter 1 Introduction leaders take conciliatory steps early on. In fact, another key nding that Gurr presents is that a substantial number of new democracies in the 1990s introduced remedial policies to alleviate political, economic and cultural discrimination against ethnic minorities. Altogether, Gurr’s research presents a mixed record of conict and accommodation in ethnically heterogenous states that have newly embarked upon democratization, highlighting the need for further research on the conditions that shape transition outcomes for ethnic minorities.

What We Know About the Politics of Self-Determination

Surprisingly, the growing literature on self-determination has also paid very little attention to how the trajectory of separatist struggles may be reshaped at the critical juncture of democratization. Cunningham (2014, 4) denes self-determination politics as "an ongoing contest between states that want to retain territorial integrity and authority at the center on the one hand, and sub-state groups that desire greater control over their own aairs on the other." Most research on the dynamics of this contest has focused on the question why disputes over self-determination so often escalate into internal armed conict, which typically erupts through separatist mobilization in the periphery triggering a countermobiliza- tion eort by the home state (Coggins 2011). Toft (2003) theorizes that separatism leads to protracted violence when both the state and the ethnic minority perceive the disputed territory as vital to their survival interests and therefore as "indivisible." Ethnic separatists are driven by an emotional attachment to the "homeland" over which they want to gain control, Toft argues, whereas state perception of territorial indivisibility is primarily shaped by strategic concerns over precedent setting, that is, the concern that accommodating one group’s territorial demands will encourage other "potential secessionists."

Walter’s (2006, 2009) reputational theory presents similar arguments about how governments presiding over multi-ethnic populations often ght separatists in order to build a reputation for toughness and deter other minorities from mobilizing around similar demands. Based on this argument, government incentives to deter future separatists

12 Chapter 1 Introduction make accommodative policies an anomaly in ethnically heterogenous states.2 Interestingly, although Walter’s study is framed around the question of "accommodation," her theory goes only so far to identify factors that make accommodation unlikely. As such, it fails to stipulate any causal mechanism that explains why states oer autonomy concessions to separatist minorities when they do.

More recently, scholars have shifted their focus away from armed separatist conict and the question why accommodation is so rarely observed - which is a questionable claim - to the question when accommodation occurs. Cunningham (2011, 2014), for instance, looks at how the internal structure of states and self-determination groups inuence the dynamics of bargaining over autonomy demands. Her main argument is that states are more likely to accommodate internally divided self-determination movements, which are easier to "divide and conquer." When faced with rival separatist factions claiming to represent the same ethnic minority, states can use concessions strategically to strengthen the moderate factions and reduce the costs of conict without fully resolving the underlying dispute (Cunningham 2014, 6). Focusing on international factors, Grigoryan (2015) argues that the decision to oer autonomy concessions to separatists largely depends on the presence of third party states likely to support minorities’ future secessionist aspirations, as well as the balance of power between the state and the foreign-backed minority. Other studies looking at when separatists achieve concessions from their home-state have highlighted dierent factors such as presence of internal administrative units as building blocks for future sovereign states (Bunce 1999; Roeder 2007; Griths 2015), separatists’ reliance of non-violent tactics (Shaykhutdinov 2010), and external recognition of secessionist claims by powerful states (Coggins 2011).

Current literature on the politics of self-determination oers limited insight about how democratization, or regime transition in general, shapes the trajectory of separatist disputes. This gap is largely tied to two major shortcomings in existing work. First, in

2This inuential argument has been challenged in a recent study by Sambanis, Germann and Schadel (2018), who argue that Walter’s conclusions are largely driven by data errors and selection bias. Replicating Wal- ter’s analyses with original data on self-determination movements, the authors nd no support for the reputational theory of separatist conict.

13 Chapter 1 Introduction exploring the sources of variation in state responses to separatism, scholars have primarily focused on explanatory variables that show little variation over time, such as number of ethnic groups (Walter 2009) or value of disputed territory3 (Toft 2003), which fail to explain changes in government policy across the repression-reconciliation spectrum over the course of a separatist dispute. Second, little attention is given to the link between internal politics of states and the trajectory of separatist disputes; in fact, hardly any empirical studies oer a systematic exploration of how domestic political context shapes government responses to self-determination bids. An important exception to this trend is Cun- ningham’s (2014) discussion of the number of veto factions within the state, which she proposes as a key determinant of the success of accommodative bargains. Cunningham argues that states with a moderate number of veto factions are most likely to accommodate self- determination demands, since internally divided polities (e.g. consolidated democracies) have too many veto players who can block self-determination reform, whereas concessions oered by states with no veto factions (e.g. authoritarian regimes) lack credibility, and are therefore likely rejected by the separatists. Although Cunningham’s theory does not make any specic reference to regime transition, democratizing states clearly fall within the range of moderately divided states which are identied as being most conducive to accommodative self-determination reform. That said, for most transition cases where accommodative policies were observed during incipient democratization, Cunningham’s theory about the strategic use of accommodation to "divide and conquer" self-determination movements fails to capture the causal story behind accommodation. Overall, existing studies on self-determination largely fail to acknowledge that regime transition can be a critical moment for separatist struggles and to explain the association between democratization and concessions over self-determination.

3One important exception to this categorization of value of land as a time-invariant variable is the discovery of natural resources in minority-populated territories, which can increase the economic value of the territory in question and fuel separatist tensions.

14 Chapter 1 Introduction

1.3 Summary of The Argument

In his seminal work Ethnic Groups in Conict, Horowitz (1985, 580) crucially highlights that "a disproportionate number of accommodative policies have been adopted at water- shed moments of ethnic conict, especially on the eve of independence or after serious civil violence." For ethnic minorities who aspire to achieve national self-determination, historical record pinpoints democratization as another critical juncture that paves the way for accommodative policies. This empirical observation suggests that, contrary to expectations set by existing research, democratization processes often generate a political context where newly elected leaders choose to co-opt, rather than repress, autonomy-seeking ethnic minorities.

How Democratization Paves the Way for Self-Determination Reform

The main outcome of interest in my theoretical framework is self-determination reform, which refers to policy concessions over self-determination granted by the central government to autonomy-seeking minorities. Such concessions may include cultural and linguistic rights, recognition of ethnic identities, creation of an autonomous region, devolution of scal and administrative powers to existing autonomous units, as well as independence at the very extreme. As discussed in Chapter 3, my theory primarily focuses on explaining large-scale concessions that devolve a certain degree of political autonomy to the minority population.

My theory begins with the premise that, in any type of political system, government accommodation of autonomy demands occurs only when elite incentives for minority appeasement are matched by elite capacity for legal reform. Where elite incentives to reconcile with separatists are weak, the prospect of reform is low even though the ruling elite has unconstrained capacity to introduce and implement new policies as it desires. Similarly, elite incentives for minority accommodation alone cannot generate self-determination reform. For incentives to transform into actual reform, political leaders should either be able to act relatively free from institutional constraints on their rule or have opportunities to

15 Chapter 1 Introduction overcome such barriers to reform through coalition-building, issue linkages or other political maneuvers. More precisely, elite capacity is understood as the ability to push forward self-determination reform through legislative and implementation phases without interruption from institutionally empowered veto players.

I argue that, within the trajectory of separatist disputes, early democratization is a critical juncture where the two key conditions for self-determination reform - limited institutional constraints on executive power and strategic incentives for minority appeasement - are most likely to be observed in tandem. Because horizontal constraints that restrain policymakers in consolidated democracies are still in moderate levels during early democratization, elite capacity for reform tends to be high in democratizing states. Hence, in comparison to developed democracies where institutionally empowered veto players can block reforms that entail redistribution of political authority and resources away from the center towards ethnic minorities in the periphery, emerging democracies are characterized by a relatively exible politico-institutional environment that facilitates the adoption of such radical reforms. In fact, the rise of these constraints to rule from low to moderate levels during incipient democratization allows for credible reform, making it more of a critical juncture for separatists compared to other periods of political instability that authoritarian regimes may go through (which do not result in a democratization path).

Moderate institutional constraints on the executive are not sucient for accommodation to occur, however; self-determination reform also requires political motivation on the part of democratizing elite to extend an olive branch to aggrieved separatist minorities. I argue that democratization processes can generate two types of elite incentives for an appeasement policy towards ethnic separatists: strategic and reputational. Operating in a exible institutional setting that allows for radical policy shifts, newly democratic governments adopt accommodative self-determination policies primarily to co-opt aggrieved minorities and prevent separatist violence from further destabilizing an already unstable political environment (strategic incentives). There are two ways in which co-opting ethnic separatists can benet threatened democratizers who oversee a turbulent transition

16 Chapter 1 Introduction process. First, it allows for the concentration of military power, resources and planning towards the protection of the center by containing separatist wars in the periphery. Second, it helps democratizers prevent a potential alliance between autonomy-seekers and center- seekers, who would pose an even larger threat to the newly democratic government if united with separatist ghters. In addition to such strategic incentives, certain types of transitions driven by mass pressures for democratization can also generate reputational incentives for self-determination reform. In such transitions, self-determination reform helps democratizers not only contain or prevent costly separatist wars in the periphery, but also strengthen their democratic credentials by distancing themselves from repressive policies that are reminiscent of the ousted authoritarian regime.

Building o these insights, my theory proposes that self-determination reform will occur most frequently in states undergoing incipient democratization, where an institutional context favorable to major shifts in minority policy is matched by the emergence of threats to elite survival, and in some cases, of mass demands for democratic reform that makes minority repression too costly from a reputational perspective.

Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

If democratization is a critical juncture for separatist disputes, what explains the fact that accommodative self-determination policies are observed only in some nascent democracies but not in others? This is a crucial question the answer to which would help reconcile my theory with existing research that typically portrays democratizing states as breeding grounds for nationalist aggression and elite-led violence against ethnic minorities. I argue that, although high elite capacity for reform is a characteristic shared across all regimes in transition, not all democratization processes generate strategic incentives for minority accommodation tied to elite concerns over political survival - the key explanatory variable in my theory. Strategic incentives are largely shaped by the democratizing elite’s threat perception in the transitional context. Where transition processes are marked by the mobilization of center-seeking challengers who threaten the survival of the new regime, newly elected leaders follow conciliatory policies vis-a-vis aggrieved minority populations in or-

17 Chapter 1 Introduction der to avoid ghting battles on too many fronts and prevent anti-regime alliances between the separatists and center-seekers. Typically, in such politically turbulent transitions, major threats to democratizers come not from autonomy-seeking minorities in the periphery, but from center-seeking challengers who seek access to central government, such as still-powerful proponents of the ancien regime, coup-plotting factions within the military, revolutionary insurgencies, as well as oppositional factions who are discontent with the extent of redistributive reform. In some cases, international adversaries may also become a source of political instability. In between internal/external challengers who seek access to control over central power and separatist minorities whose political aspirations are conned to self-rule, the elite who oversees democratization processes strategically co-opt the latter in order to contain separatist rebellion and concentrate eorts on averting larger threats to its survival.

There are, however, three conditions under which this theoretical narrative holds: For the ruling elite to develop strategic incentives for accommodation, there should be (i) a mobilized separatist minority who is already at war with the state or can credibly threaten to launch a separatist insurgency, (ii) threats to elite survival that emerge along the path to democracy, and (iii) a democratizing elite who is more threatened by the prospect of forcefully being removed from power than by the prospect of electoral defeat in the rst elections. I argue that the extent to which these conditions hold for democratizing states can help explain the variation in transition outcomes for ethnic minorities.

Although the above conditions may hold for many democratization processes that occur in the context of on-going self-determination dispute, there are important exceptions. In countries where separatists minorities have low mobilization capacity and express their demands by non-violent means (as in the case of "cultural separatists" and some indigenous movements), democratization is unlikely to give way to large-scale autonomy concessions, given the absence of strategic incentives for minority co-optation. Similarly, the key variable that my theory emphasizes - threats to elite survival (i.e. political instability) - may be absent from some types of democratization; or, in some cases, even though

18 Chapter 1 Introduction such threats may be present, the democratizing elite may be more concerned over losing political power via electoral defeat than by threats posed by center-seekers who want to grab power by non-electoral means. Building o these insights, Chapter 6 presents a typological theory that explains how dierent types of democratization paths are conducive to dierent types of outcomes for separatist minorities, such as accommodative self-determination reform, status quoist policies or nationalist repression.

Having established mobilization capacity as a scope condition, I argue that democratic transitions that generate the most propitious conditions for major self-determination reform are those that are driven by oppositional leaders who rise to power via mass support - mass-driven democratization - or reform-minded elites from within the authoritarian regime - reformer-driven democratization. Both types contain cases of voluntary4 democratization that are typically characterized by threats to the political survival of liberal elites who initiate regime change at the expense of authoritarian elite cadres and other beneciaries of the ousted regime. Given that political instability is a common characteristic of these types of transitions, they tend to conform to the theory’s expectations and produce conciliatory policies towards minorities seeking self-determination. As discussed in Chap- ter 3, mass-driven transitions in particular are expected to be conducive to major autonomy concessions, with both strategic and reputational concerns shaping elite decision-making over minority policy.

The story is more complex for the third transition type - incumbent-driven democratization - which can occur in one of two forms: voluntary (non-coerced) or pre-emptive (coerced). I argue that transition paths where an authoritarian leader initiates a top-down democratization process voluntarily are the most conducive to a continuation of the status quo in state-minority relations. As these transitions typically occur in a gradual and controlled manner, they are marked by low levels of political instability and therefore fail to generate the strategic incentives for minority co-optation that pave the way for major autonomy concessions.

4"Voluntary" in this context means that the elite is not coerced into initiating a democratization process.

19 Chapter 1 Introduction

Policy outcomes tend to be more varied and less predictable in the case of pre- emptive transitions initiated by an authoritarian incumbent. In transitional contexts where a weakened authoritarian elite introduces multi-party elections reluctantly in response to bottom-up or international pressures for democratization, the extent to which increased political competition poses a risk to its chances of survival determines the fate of ethnic minorities. Incumbent-driven transitions where the fear of electoral defeat outweighs any other threat to the incumbent’s prospects of political survival are the most conducive to nationalist repression of ethnic minorities, which help the reluctant democratizer secure majority votes and avert further democratization (Snyder 2000). These are the high-risk - and often failed - transitions that scholars have discussed to bring attention to the risks of democratization in ethnically diverse countries. On the other hand, self-determination reform may still be observed in the case of incumbent-driven transitions of preemptive type if the authoritarian elite is more threatened by the prospect of forceful removal from power by center-seeking challengers than by electoral defeat. Where this condition holds, high levels of political instability generate incentives to co-opt the separatists by the same incentive mechanism that is observed in mass-driven and reformer-driven transitions.

1.4 Research Design

To address the rst question about what makes democratic transitions a critical juncture in the trajectory of separatist movements, I construct a mixed-method research design that leverages the cross-national variation in government responses to separatism over time. Hypotheses are tested using statistical analyses of large-N cross-national data and an in-depth case study of the Muslim Moro rebellion in the Philippines. To conduct the statistical tests, I use an updated version of Cunningham’s (2014) original dataset of self- determination movements (1960-2005), which is retrieved from Seymour, Bakke and Cun- ningham (2016). The dataset contains information on characteristics of ethnic groups with active self-determination demands and government responses to these demands. Combin- ing this information with the qualitative dataset on concessions from Cunningham (2014), I am able to construct an ordinal dependent variable that captures the degree of accom-

20 Chapter 1 Introduction modation extended to a separatist ethnic minority in a given year. In addition to main models tested on Cunnigham’s data, I also present robustness checks using a more recent Self-Determination Movements (SDM) dataset by Sambanis, Germann and Schädel (2018), which identies a larger number of ethnic groups with separatist demands and expands coverage to 1945-2012.

The ndings from tests conducted with both datasets support my main hypothesis: self-determination reform is signicantly more likely to occur in emerging democracies, in comparison to consolidated democracies and stable authoritarian regimes. To better capture the mechanisms at play in making democratization a critical juncture for separatists, I also present models that examine the eect of institutional capacity for reform and threats to elite survival on the likelihood of autonomy concessions. In support of the capacity hypotheses, the ndings show that governments adopt larger-scale self-determination reforms (e.g. creation of an autonomous region) more frequently in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule, and specically, during periods where institutional constraints increase from low to moderate levels. The ndings also show that, for moderately constrained governments, threats to elite survival signicantly increase the likelihood of self-determination reform. Finally, in support of my hypothesis about reputational incentives, I nd evidence that self-determination reform is more common in democratizing states where newly elected leaders rely on the support of revolutionary pro-democracy masses, compared to top-down transitions where elites drive the democratization process and mass mobilization is largely absent.

I next introduce a detailed case study of the Moro separatist movements in the Philippines to better illustrate the causal mechanisms that account for the positive relationship between democratization and self-determination reform. I present the Philippines case as a typical case that conforms with the expectations set by my theory. Besides secondary sources, I draw extensively on interview evidence gathered during eldwork in the Philippines. My main objective in conducting eldwork was to explore the key factors that account for the accommodative self-determination reforms that were introduced in the late

21 Chapter 1 Introduction

1980s by the Aquino government, which rose to power with the 1986 People Power Rev- olution that ended the Marcos dictatorship. To trace the causal factors behind President Corazon Aquino’s conciliatory eorts towards the Moros, I conducted semi-structured interviews with former government and military ocials, human rights activists, constitutional commissioners and rebel elite cadres who closely witnessed the trajectory of state- minority relations during the Corazon Aquino administration. The Philippines case study allows me to illustrate how threats to elite power, combined with concerns over building a reputation of commitment to democratic reform, incentivize the leadership in democratizing states to extend an olive branch to aggrieved minorities, while low institutional constraints to rule generate the conditions where these incentives can translate into actual reform. As part of the case analysis, I also explore the sources of within-case variation in state policies towards the Moro minority. Before discussing Aquino administration’s conciliatory policies towards the separatist movement, I present a detailed examination of dierent policies adopted during the Marcos dictatorship, which helps illustrate some of the arguments presented in Chapter 3 (and later developed in Chapter 6) about the conditions under which stable authoritarian regimes make concessions to ethnic separatists.

I use mini-case studies to test generalizability of the theory as well as evaluate hypotheses about when democratization processes produce accommodative minority policies as predicted or deviate from the expectations set by theory. Given the focus on the sources of variation in transition outcomes for ethnic minorities across democratizing states, the universe of cases for these qualitative analyses is restricted to state-minority dyads that have recently experienced a democratic transition. The discussion of each case is primarily focused on illustrating the link between the degree of political instability that marked a given transition path and elite incentives for minority accommodation. Case selection strategy is guided by what Seawright and Gerring (2008) refer to as the diverse-case method, which allows me to achieve maximum variance along the dimension - democratization paths - that my theory identies as the source of variation in transition outcomes for mobilized separatists. Having presented the Philippines as a case of mass-driven transition where both strategic and reputational incentives were at play in generating accommodative

22 Chapter 1 Introduction self-determination reform, I select three cases that represent other transition paths introduced in Chapter 6: i) Spanish-Basque relations in the context of reformer-driven transition (1977-1980), ii) Nicaraguan-Miskito relations in the context of pre-emptive incumbent- driven transition (1979-1987), and 3) Turkish-Kurdish relations in the context of voluntary incumbent-driven transition (1983-1987).

1.5 Dissertation Roadmap

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the denitions of key concepts essential to the theory of self-determination reform. It starts by discussing the attributes of separatist minorities that distinguish them from the broader universe of ethnic minorities. It also provides denitions for democratization and accommodative self- determination reform, which can become intertwined processes according to theory.

Chapter 3 introduces a novel theory of self-determination reform. In contrast to studies that start with a broad theoretical framework and dive deeper into causal mechanisms later on, I build the theory by introducing rst the two mechanisms that help establish a relationship between democratization processes and state-minority reconciliation. The rst section outlines the elite capacity argument about how regimes with limited institutions constraints on executive power actually provide more propitious conditions for large-scale autonomy reforms with redistributive eects. Next section presents arguments about domestic political conditions that are conducive to strong elite incentives for co- opting separatist ethnic minorities, focusing on the role of political instability and threats to elite survival. The rest of the chapter explains how democratization makes a critical juncture for separatist movements as a politically turbulent period where elite capacity for introducing and implementing self-determination reform is matched by increased incentives to prevent an escalation of separatist conict in the periphery. The chapter also incorporates a detailed discussion of how authoritarian regimes respond to separatists during periods of political instability, explaining why such contexts may not be as conducive to self-determination reform despite the appearance of elite incentives for minority accom-

23 Chapter 1 Introduction modation.

Chapter 4 tests the hypotheses developed in the theory chapter using quantitative analyses of large-N cross-national data. The rst set of statistical models evaluate my broader arguments about the role of regime institutions and domestic threat environment in shaping the prospects of self-determination reform. I predict that large-scale self- determination reform such as the creation of an autonomous region is more likely to occur in states with low or moderate institutional constraints to rule (e.g. authoritarian or democratizing states) compared to those where the executive branch is more constrained in its capacity to oer such concessions due to the presence of institutionally empowered veto players (i.e. advanced democracies). I also predict that periods of political instability are more conducive to self-determination reform because threats to elite survival that mark these periods create strategic incentives to co-opt aggrieved separatists. Next, I test the prediction that, as critical junctures where both elite capacity and incentive for minority accommodation are likely to be high, periods of democratization have a signicant positive eect on the likelihood of achieving major autonomy concessions. Distinguishing among transition paths, the nal set of models explore whether mass-driven transitions, which are conducive to reputational incentives for accommodation, are more likely to generate self-determination reform.

Chapter 5 introduces a case study of the Moro separatist movement in the Philip- pines drawing on original interview data. After providing a brief historical overview of the separatist movement, I turn to a detailed discussion of Aquino administration’s policy towards the Moro separatists during the Philippine democratization in the mid-1980s. The aim of the case study is to illustrate the causal mechanisms that help explain the accommodative self-determination policies introduced during Aquino’s term, which paved the way for the creation of a Muslim autonomous region in Mindanao. In light of my theory, I specically explore the extent to which threats to elite survival that emerged in the early post-Marcos period shaped the newly democratic government’s strategic incentives to accommodate Moro demands for autonomy.

24 Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 6 aims to reconcile my theory of self-determination reform, which pinpoints democratization as a period conducive to accommodation of minority demands for self-determination, with existing studies that portray democratization as potentially threatening to ethnic minorities. The rst part of the chapter presents simple game theoretical models that formalize the logic of self-determination reform in emerging democracies and illustrate how the changes in key parameters generate alternative outcomes such as preservation of status quo or nationalist repression of minority peoples. As such, the models help deliver a detailed outline of the scope conditions under which my theory applies to democratizing states. Next, I draw on the vast literature on democratization paths to discuss how these conditions may only hold for certain types of transitions while missing in others. The bulk of the chapter explains how mass-driven and reformer-driven transitions, typically marked by rise of threats to the survival of democratizing elites, generate propitious conditions for accommodative self-determination reform, whereas the outcomes of incumbent-driven transitions tend to vary more, depending on the causes behind the incumbent’s decision to democratize as well as its perception of survival risks associated with entering into an electoral competition.

In Chapter 7, I introduce additional case studies to provide further qualitative evidence in support of my theory as well as to evaluate some of the arguments developed in Chapter 6 about the sources of variation in transition outcomes for ethnic minorities. I use the Spanish and Nicaraguan cases to illustrate the relationship between threats to elite survival that marked the transition periods in these countries and autonomy concessions that were oered during the same period to the Basque and indigenous Miskito separatists. The chapter also presents a case study of Turkish policy towards the Kurdish minority during the country’s transition to democracy in the early 1980s, the aftermath of which was marked by an escalation of separatist conict. As a negative case that contradicts the theoretical expectations set in Chapter 3, the Turkey case helps illustrate the importance of transition paths in shaping the trajectory of state-minority relations.

Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of the study’s theoretical contribu-

25 Chapter 1 Introduction tions to the literature as well as policy implications.

26 Chapter 2

Denitions and Universe of Cases

This chapter starts by introducing the concepts essential to my theory of self-determination reform, which provides a novel understanding of the conditions under which states adopt conciliatory policies towards ethnic minorities who demand self-rule. It provides a clear denition for separatist minorities, which is the term I use to refer to minority populations who are in the receiving end of concessions, and for democratization, which is the critical juncture that my theory identies as conducive to an increase in both elite incentives and capacity for accommodation of minority demands. It also introduces the concept of self-determination reform, identifying the types of government policies that are considered as accommodative towards minority demands for self-determination. Following the denitions of key concepts, the chapter establishes the scope conditions and presents the universe of cases that the theory addresses.

2.1 Denitions

Separatist Minorities

There are two common characteristics that are shared across all ethnic minorities: a subjective sense of commonality based on the belief in shared descent and culture, according to

27 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases the Weberian denition of ethnicity1, and numerical inferiority relative to a majority population. While the rst characteristic helps dierentiate ethnic groups from other types of social formations such as nations, tribes, clans, and so on, the latter highlights the distinction between ethnic minorities and ethnic groups. By denition, an ethnic group can be considered as a "minority" only in the presence of at least one dominant ethnic group who lives within the boundaries of the same political unit and has a demographic advantage vis- a-vis ethnic populations of substantially smaller size.2 Beyond these two dening elements, there are many distinguishing features shared among subsets of ethnic minorities that can form a basis for dierent typologies. Ethnic minorities have been further distinguished by scholars on the basis of their degree of access to state power, geographical concentration, transnational ties with a kin state or a "national homeland," socio-economic status, as well as the historical trajectory of their recognition as a minority.

When studying government policy towards ethnic minorities in any type of polity, one useful criterion for the categorization of minority subjects is the nature of the relationship they seek to establish with the state and larger population. Laponce (1960, 12-13), for instance, proposes an interesting distinction between "minorities by force" and "minorities by will." Minorities by force are unwillingly relegated to minority status despite their desire for integration into the broader society; hence, their political demands are typically focused on attaining equal civil, political and socio-economic rights with the majority

1Max Weber was one of the pioneers of the subjectivist conceptions of nationhood and ethnicity. He dened ethnic groups as "human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration;" further elaborating that "this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists" (Weber 1978 (1922), 389). This rejection of tracing ethnic group formation to the existence of objective dierences between groups and emphasis on the socially constructed nature of ethnic identity has laid the foundations of the "constructivist consensus" among scholars of ethnicity, largely discrediting primordialist and perennialist approaches (Brubaker 2009; Wimmer 2013). For instance, one of the most commonly used datasets on ethnic groups, the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010), identies groups following the subjectivist denition of ethnicity. 2Minority status is dicult to determine in ethnically fragmented states that host hundreds of dierent ethnicities and multiple ethnic majorities. In such cases, minorities may be identied subjectively on the basis of both numerical inferiority and political disadvantage vis-a-vis historically dominant ethnic groups. For instance, in Nigeria, the country’s three largest ethnic groups (Yoruba in the West, Igbo in the East and Hausa-Fulani in the North) are commonly considered as "majority groups" given their numerical dominance in their respective regions, although none of them constitute the majority of Nigeria’s population in absolute terms (Osaghae 1991).

28 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases population as well as legal provisions that guarantee non-discrimination (Jackson-Preece 2008). Minorities by will, on the other hand, seek recognition as a distinct cultural group; hence, equality before law and eorts to root out discrimination fail to fulll these groups’ political aspirations. How these minorities choose to preserve and promote their distinct identity may range from basic demands for cultural and language rights to ethnonationalist eorts to establish an autonomous or independent governance unit that is congruent with the group’s cultural boundaries.

In his study of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995) similarly distinguishes among ethnic minorities on the basis of their mode of incorporation into the nation-state and its eect on "the sort of relationship they desire with the larger society." He argues that those who were incorporated through the voluntary immigration of individuals and families form loose associations and wish to be integrated into the larger society as full members. Col- lective political demands expressed by these minorities are often limited to greater recognition of the group’s ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, positive steps towards ending prejudice and discrimination and special reforms to reduce barriers to political representation. Quite distinct from these immigrant groups are national minorities, which Kymlicka denes as territorially concentrated groups "who formed functioning societies on their historical homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state," their incorporation typically occurring involuntarily through conquest, colonization or imperial cession of territory (Kymlicka 2001, 54). Similar to minorities by will, national minorities "wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies" (Kym- licka 1995). Given the additional criteria of territoriality and demands for self-governance, "national minorities" that Kymlicka identies3can be considered a subtype of "minorities by will."

3Other scholars have used the term "national minority" to refer more specically to minority peoples with transnational ties to an ethnic kin population. Gurr (2000, 17) for instance, denes national minorities as "segments of a trans-state people with a history of organized political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside." Focusing specically on the nationalizing states of post-Soviet Eurasia, Brubaker (1995) similarly uses the term to refer to a subgroup of national minorities who have strong ties to an external "national homeland." My use of the term throughout the dissertation relies on Kymlicka’s more extensive denition.

29 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases

I use the term "separatist minorities" to refer to a subset of national minorities. Separatists are also geographically concentrated in areas they consider as their ancestral homeland, reside in states they have been involuntarily incorporated into and have a subjective yet strong sense of ethnocultural distinctiveness they want to preserve. Yet, a key characteristic that distinguishes them from the broader set of national minorities is an active political agenda towards self-determination. The title "separatist" implies that the members of a national minority are not only discontent with the status quo regarding their capacity to self-govern, but also pursue self-determination goals through non-violent or violent means. So dened, minority groups whom I identify as "separatist" largely overlap with what some scholars refer to as self-determination movements or groups. Cunningham (2014, 4), for instance, uses the term self-determination groups to refer to sub-state populations who "desire greater control over their own aairs, which at the extreme can entail demands for their own independent state." The Center of International Development and Conict Management’s (CIDCM) data on self-determination movements relies on a similar denition, identifying as a self-determination movement any attempt by territorially concentrated ethnic groups to achieve greater autonomy or independence from the central government through conventional political means, militant strategies and/or organized armed violence (Marshall and Gurr 2005). Based on this denition, my universe of cases detailed below excludes ethnic minorities who can no longer be considered as "separatist" due to having received substantial government concessions in the recent past.4

One diculty with studying how democratization aects separatist minorities is the concern that the emergence of self-determination claims may be endogenous to democratization. While I try to account for this potential problem in the empirical section, an overview of the historical record shows that endogeneity is not a major cause for con-

4What I do not exclude from the case universe are cases of "latent separatism," where a minority’s capacity to organize around an ethnonationalist agenda is overwhelmingly suppressed by a repressive state. An example is the Kurdish separatist movement in Southeastern Turkey became largely non-existent after the heavy-handed suppression of multiple Kurdish rebellions during the 1920s and 1930s. It was only in the late 1970s that the long-dead Kurdish separatism began to resurrect in Turkey, entering an exceptionally violent phase from 1984 onwards with the launching of a full-scale insurgency. During the period of "repressive peace" in between, the Kurds in Turkey were not able to pursue an active separatist agenda, although the seeds of separatism remained present. Given that opening of the political space often brings these movements to life, these cases are of interest to my theoretical discussion.

30 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases cern. Although democratization has a clear eect on opportunities for ethno-nationalist mobilization, its eect of claim-making is much less obvious; in fact, it is surprisingly rare for an ethnic minority to make self-determination claims for the rst time with the onset of democratization. Most self-determination reforms adopted during early democratization are reactive in nature; that is, separatism is already alive at the onset of authoritarian demise - at dierent levels of extremity in dierent contexts - and the political elite who oversees the transition process responds to that challenge. The emergence of "new separatists" during the period of regime transition has only occurred in cases where democratization was concomitant with national independence (e.g. Myanmar), which relegated territorially concentrated ethnic groups to minority status within the new nation-state and gave rise to separatist movements by fueling ethnic security dilemmas and minority grievances over loss of autonomy. That said, in the majority of cases where regime transition and nation-/state-building processes did not overlap, the elite in democratizing states found itself having to manage protracted separatist conicts that had arisen as a reaction to authoritarian repression and been on-going ever since at dierent levels of intensity.

Throughout the paper, I use the terms "separatist" and "autonomy-seeking" interchangeably. However, I refrain from using the term "secessionist," since my case universe includes a broader set of minority populations whose self-determination demands range from cultural autonomy to secession at the very extreme. Even for ethnic minorities whose leaders are known to have expressed secessionist goals, the use of the term may be problematic given that there is often disagreement among minority factions in terms of degree of self-determination rights that should be sought and the goals of most factions typically change over time as a result of interactions with the government, rival factions and other key actors who interfere in the process (e.g. foreign supporters).

Accommodative Self-Determination Reform

My theory of self-determination reform introduced in Chapter 3 aims to provide a new framework for understanding when states accommodate self-determination demands. The rst step essential to developing this framework is to identify what is meant by accom-

31 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases modation. For the purposes of this project, I use the concept of accommodative self- determination reform5 to refer to any policy concession over self-determination granted by the central government to autonomy-seeking minority populations. This broad denition encompasses cultural reforms that intend to guarantee the protection of minorities’ distinct ethnic identity, language and practices, as well as political concessions that devolve a certain degree of autonomy to separatists within the territory they consider as their ancestral homeland. The latter typically involves the formation of administrative and legislative apparatuses in minority-dominated regions, which exercise certain degrees of autonomy in areas of regional administration, scal policy, economic and agricultural development, extraction of local resources, education, health and other social services, as well as legal and religious aairs. The major dierence between the two is that political accommodation is more dicult to achieve; it not only implies a substantial loss of territorial control for the central government, but also generates redistributive consequences due to the partial transfer of political and scal authority to the regional elite. On the other hand, minority demands for cultural autonomy, such as the right to education in national language or legal guarantees for the protection of indigenous cultures and traditions, have relatively minor implications for central authority and are therefore easier to meet.

By denition, accommodative self-determination reform requires the expression of demands from those who are being accommodated; hence, I do not consider the establishment of a federal structure or any other type of decentralization reform as accommodation unless such reforms were introduced at least partially to assuage autonomy demands of ethnic minorities. The Colombia example helps clarify this distinction. In the 1980s, the highly centralized Colombian government launched a process of decentralization, which became consolidated in the 1991 Constitution. The political, administrative and scal reforms introduced in the new Constitution devolved a substantial degree of autonomy to provinces and municipalities in managing local resources, collecting taxes, providing public services in education and health among others as well as promoting com-

5I use the term interchangeably with "self-determination reform," "accommodation" and "concessions" at parts.

32 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases munity participation in local public decision-making. While the process worked in favor of indigenous claims to self-determination through enhancing local autonomy (Van Cott 2001), it does not count as "accommodation" by my denition of the term, since Colombia’s decentralization involved a comprehensive reconguration of the country’s territorial- administrative system that was not set in motion in response to indigenous people’s bid for self-determination. What I consider as accommodation within the same context are more specic constitutional provisions that established indigenous territories, recognized the languages of indigenous peoples as ocial within their territories and granted local authorities rights to exercise certain jurisdictional functions (Colombia Const., Chapter XI).

So dened, self-determination reform also excludes more limited, integration- oriented reforms that aim to correct past wrongdoings and end systematic discrimination against ethnic minorities, such as armative action, or those that allow for broader representation of minority interests in central policy-making or legislative processes. It also excludes reforms that do not specically address a minority’s demands for self-determination. A hypothetical example helps clarify both points: If the Turkish government removed the 10 percent electoral threshold that historically prevented Kurdish parties from entering the parliament, it would not be considered as accommodation of Kurdish self-determination demands. An electoral reform of that nature would not only fail to extend any form of autonomy to the Kurds, but also benet other numerically disadvantaged groups in the country, thereby being hardly suggestive of an intent to accommodate Kurdish self- determination demands.

Finally, for accommodation to occur, concessions do not have to be oered specically to those who claim to represent the minority population, e.g. a political organization or rebel group, nor meet all self-determination demands expressed by dierent segments of the minority population. To put it simply, if the majority of the separatist minority demands 10, and the government concedes 2, we have observed accommodation, albeit one that is unlikely to end the separatist struggle. Additionally, while accommodative

33 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases policies can constitute a key improvement in state-minority relations, they bring about a successful resolution of separatist disputes only in some cases. In post-Franco Spain, for instance, accommodative reforms introduced in the 1978 Constitution, which granted the Basques nationality status and recognized them as as autonomous community, were largely protested by the Basque Nationalist Party for being imposed upon the minority population in a top-down manner; 1978 to 1980 were in fact the deadliest years of Basque separatism spearheaded by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna6 (ETA). Similar dynamics were observed in other democratizing states marked by accommodative eorts on the part of the newly elected leaders. Building on these insights, I refrain from treating accommodation and violence as mutually exclusive outcomes.

Democratization

In his inuential study Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Joseph Schumpeter (1942, 269) denes the "democratic method" as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote." Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, the dominant practice among political scientists has been to dene democracy and democratization in procedural terms. The essence of democratic rule, by this denition, is free and fair elections which entitle all the adult population to choose chief executives and legislatures. "Freeness" and "fairness" of elections carry with it the additional expectations that multiple candidates will freely compete for votes and "the results of those elections will be honestly counted and honored through turnover in government" (Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 4). So dened, democracy also requires the presence of institutional guarantees of political and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, access to alternative sources of information, and the ability to form and join organizations, which are necessary to sustain public contestation and political competition (Dahl 1971).

Compared to more substantive denitions of democracy, which have normative connotations about what an "ideal democracy" should look like, the procedural denition

6Basque Homeland and Liberty.

34 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases is a minimalistic one with relatively observable benchmarks (Huntington 1991). Never- theless, since authoritarian regimes rarely disappear instantly with the introduction of a perfectly competitive electoral system, scholars have proposed contending views over how to identify transitions to and from democratic rule. O’Donnell et al. (1986), for instance, identify as the critical point in the process of democratization the conduct of free and openly contested "founding elections." Huntington (1991, 9) similarly argues that the replacement of an authoritarian government through "free, open, and fair election" marks the key moment of democratization, although the overall transition process is often much more "complex and prolonged." While adopting a procedural denition of democracy as well, Haggard and Kaufman (2016, 5) stress that identifying democratic transitions via institutional benchmarks is not always an easy task, given that the major components of procedural democracy - competitive elections and opportunities for public contestation - are continuous variables, and in some transitions, changes along these dimensions may occur incrementally over time rather than through a decisive break with authoritarian practices.

Recognizing that regime transitions are too messy to be pinned town to a certain moment in history, other scholars have relied on more minimalist denitions of democratization. Snyder and Ballentine (1996, 6), for example, dene states as democratizing if they have recently adopted one or more of the attributes of procedural democracy, "even if they retain important non-democratic features." Snyder (2000, 26) adopts a similar denition, referring to democratizing regimes as a very broad category that includes states like "the former Yugoslavia just before its breakup in 1991, when elections were contested for the rst time in circumstances of somewhat freer speech, yet electoral fairness and the rule of law were hardly established." In everyday usage as well, the term democratization is used rather loosely at the sight of regime-initiated liberalizing reforms or rst elections after authoritarian rule regardless of whether the "free and fair" threshold is actually met. While such minimalist denitions make it relatively easier to identify states as democratizing, they risk conating actual democratizers who open up the space for political competition with those who adopt nominally democratic institutions while taking precautionary mea-

35 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases sures to prevent any loss of real power to potential competitors.7 This may be problematic from a theoretical standpoint, given that the latter merely move from from one form of authoritarian rule to another (competitive authoritarianism), rather than towards any form of democracy that meets the minimum standards of procedural denition.8

The question then is whether to dene democratization on the basis of any move away from authoritarian rule in the direction of what may become a democracy in the future, or in terms of a more decisive institutional change that meets the minimum requirement for democratic rule, which is competitive elections. I maintain that how one answers this question depends on the purposes of one’s project; when studying the determinant of successful transitions to democracy, for instance, it is more appropriate to adopt the more demanding denition. On the other hand, for studies that explore the eects of democratization on a certain outcome rather than its causes, it can make more sense to consider less decisive steps towards democracy as "democratizing," particularly if the theory at hand stipulates a causal mechanism that might as well operate between limited reforms short of competitive elections and the outcome of interest.

Given that my study examines how democratization processes aect state responses to minority demands, I adopt the minimalist denition of democratization. Similar to Sny- der and Ballentine (1996), I dene states as "democratizing" if they have recently undergone a regime change by adopting some dening characteristics of mature democracies (e.g. multiparty elections, institutional constraints on executive power, measures to protect civil liberties, etc.) even if they retain certain non-democratic practices. The emphasis on regime change is an important part of my denition; in order to avoid referring to

7Similarly, a minimalist denition of democratization puts in the same category liberalizers and democratizers. Highlighting the crucial distinction between the two, Huntington (1991, 9) denes liberalization as "the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections," which may involve restoration of some civil liberties, opening up previously censored issues for public debate, ease of restrictions on civil society formations, release of political prisoners, and other steps in a democratic direction. While democratization involves "bringing about the end of the non- democratic regime" as a rst step, Huntington argues, liberalization is often perceived by the authoritarian elite as a way of defusing opposition to the regime through limited reforms and without introducing truly competitive elections, which could cause them to surrender real power to the oppositional forces. 8In their work on competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way (2002) bring up a similar point when discussing the "democratizing bias" among scholars who wrongly assume that hybrid regimes that mix authoritarian and democratic features are moving in a democratic direction.

36 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases minor institutional changes in dictatorships as democratization, I only refer to states as democratizing if the regime has undergone an observable transformation and transitioned from autocracy to either a hybrid regime (i.e. partial transition) or a democracy (i.e. full transition). I utilize the commonly used Polity scores to establish thresholds for regime transition, as described in the next section.

Although referring to partial transitions as cases of democratization may be subject to criticism, my theory partially circumvents the conceptual pitfalls of this minimalist denition of democratization. It does so by emphasizing the variation across transition paths, as detailed in Chapter 6, rather than referring to democratizing states as one broad category. Within this framework, most "partial" transitions that are initiated by the incumbent authoritarian regime yet fall short of meeting the minimum standards for democracy are considered as a separate category, rather than being excluded from the category of "democratizing states" altogether. Additionally, statistical analyses in Chapter 4 rely on alternative operationalizations of democratization in order to avoid denition-related biases in ndings.

2.2 The Universe of Cases

As described in the Introduction, this study addresses two interrelated research questions. The rst one focuses more broadly on the conditions under which large-scale self- determination reform occurs, with a particular focus on the eect of democratization processes on state-minority interaction. The universe of cases relevant for this broader theoretical framework includes all state-minority group dyads where the latter is mobilized around an active self-determination agenda, pursuing extended autonomy from the state by violent or non-violent means. Statistical models introduced in Chapter 4 compare across these dyads for the period between 1960 and 2005 and test the hypothesized relationship between democratization and self-determination reform, along with other hypotheses about the mechanisms that account for this relationship.

Derived from theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that pinpoint early de-

37 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases mocratization as a critical juncture for the attainment of self-determination goals, my second research question turns attention to explaining the variation in transition outcomes for separatist ethnic minorities. The hypotheses about the sources of this variation can be tested via comparison across all countries that have (i) an on-going self-determination dispute with a minority population, and (i) a recent democratization experience. Here, the above denitions of "separatist minorities" and "democratization" allow me to identify the universe of relevant cases. As a result of my minimalistic denition of democratization, the universe of cases includes partial and full democratic transitions as well as cases where a state begins to move towards democracy yet fails to democratize due to authoritarian reversal (i.e. failed transitions).

In identifying relevant cases, I rely on information from two datasets. First, I use the regime transition (regtrans) variable from the Polity dataset to identify democratizing states. I include in my case universe all states that have undergone a major or minor democratic transition, dened by the Polity dataset as "at least a three-point POLITY value change in three years or less from autocracy (i.e., a negative or zero POLITY score) to a partial democracy (POLITY values +1 to +6) or full democracy (POLITY values +7 to +10)" (Marshall et al. 2017, 35). In line with the denition provided above, smaller positive changes in a country’s Polity score that fall short of regime transition are not considered as democratization. Next, I use Cunningham’s (2014) data on self-determination movements to match countries that have recently experienced democratization with ethnic minorities in those countries that had an active self-determination agenda during the transition period. The universe of cases is displayed in Table 2.1.

Although adopting a minimalist denition of democratization helps mitigate the concern over leaving out relevant cases, the universe of cases presented here likely does not capture all cases that fall within the scope of this study. There are several reasons to suspect undercounting. The rst one is that the data on active separatist minorities only span the period from 1960 to 2005. Matching these groups with Polity transitions therefore excludes from the case universe earlier transitions that mark the rst wave of democratization, as

38 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases well as more recent democratization processes. Another possible source of incomplete case universe is the use of Polity data for the identication of relevant cases, which rely on a particular denition of democracy. Other datasets coding regime type using dierent denitions could potentially generate a dierent set of relevant cases.

I develop two approaches to determine the set of relevant cases that might have been left out of the case universe. First, to identify the potentially excluded relevant ethnic groups with separatist demands, I use a dierent dataset on self-determination movements by Sambanis, Germann and Schädel (2018), which identies a larger number of separatist ethnic groups and expands coverage to 1945-2012. Second, I use an alternative, widely used dataset on regime characteristics by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (hereafter CGV) to use a dierent operationalization of democratization when establishing the case universe. The CGV dataset relies on a more minimalistic conception of democratization in comparison to the Polity dataset and is therefore likely to capture additional relevant cases.9 Alternative case universes identied as such are presented in the Appendix.

9While the Polity scores (ranging from -10 to +10) quantify several components a country’s political setup, including competitiveness of participation, characteristics of executive recruitment and protection of civil liberties, and identify regime transitions with reference to value changes along these components, the CGV dataset provides a dichotomous measure of regime change that mainly focuses on the staging of free elections and evidence of electoral turnover.

39 Chapter 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases

Figure 2.1: List of Relevant Cases, 1960-2005

40 Chapter 3

A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

This chapter presents a novel theory of self-determination reform. The rst section briey describes the political process of self-determination reform, detailing the steps involved in the devolution of autonomy to separatist minorities. Next, I identify and discuss the conditions under which the key decision-makers involved in this process develop both the capacity and incentives that are necessary to push forward self-determination reform. A key insight from this discussion is that authoritarian or weakly democratic regimes undergoing a period of political instability provide the most propitious conditions for self- determination reform. Building o this proposition, I then present more nuanced theoretical arguments about why democratization, as a particular episode of political instability, is a critical juncture in the trajectory of separatist disputes.

While "the right to self-determine" is commonly conceptualized in broad terms and encompasses limited forms of cultural autonomy that fall short of enabling self- governance, my theory focuses primarily on explaining substantial reforms that devolve a certain degree of territorial autonomy to the minority population. The discussion starts with the insight that such reforms with signicant redistributive implications in terms of political authority and state resources are more easily introduced when the ruling elite governs under limited institutional constraints to its rule (Cunningham 2014; Albertus

41 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

2015). In authoritarian states where power is concentrated in the hands of a few, self- determination reform may be introduced without much of a hassle even when it faces opposition from certain segments, such as nationalist politicians who may be ideologically opposed to state recognition of ethnic cleavages or military or business elites who want to protect their economic interests in the resource-rich territories inhabited by the minority population. The same applies to what I refer to as "weakly democratic states" such as nascent democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes, in which institutional checks and balances are underdeveloped or ineective in limiting authoritarian practices. On the other hand, passing autonomy reforms is a lot trickier in advanced democracies where horizontal accountability is high and institutionally empowered veto players can block policies that decentralize state power and resources. Self-determination reform is therefore more likely to occur in regimes where limited institutional constraints to rule enhance elite capacity to adopt large-scale changes with redistributive consequences. My theory adds further nuance to this insight by distinguishing between regimes with low and moderate institutional constraints to rule, which are characteristic of fully authoritarian states and weakly democratic states respectively, and explaining why elite capacity for self-determination reform tends to be higher in the latter.

Even though self-determination reform may be easier to introduce in the absence of strong institutional constraints to rule, political leaders with unchecked power do not always have the motivation to accommodate aggrieved separatists. In fact, given the lack of a culture of respect for minority rights characteristic of such regimes, they rarely do so unless there is a substantial increase in the perceived costs of ghting the separatist minorities in the periphery. I argue that the ruling elite’s domestic threat environment is key to understanding such shifts in the perceived costs of separatist war. In an authoritarian or weakly democratic state where institutional barriers to reform are limited, the rise of threats to elite survival may pave the way for substantial policy concessions to ethnic groups who are suciently mobilized to sustain an armed separatist conict, yet pose a more limited challenge than those who threaten the ruling elite’s political power. Doing so not only allows the threatened elite to avoid ghting battles at multiple fronts, but may

42 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform also prevent the formation of an alliance between autonomy-seekers and center-seekers through coopting the former into the coalition of regime supporters. In short, while elite capacity for self-determination reform is a function of regime institutions, elite incentives to introduce such reform largely depend on the rulers’ perception of their domestic threat environment.

Building o these insights, I argue that large-scale self-determination reform occurs most frequently in authoritarian or weakly democratic states undergoing a period of political instability, where an institutional context favorable to reform is matched by the rise of existential threats to the ruling elite. The next question I address is the following: If threats to elite survival is the key determinant of conciliatory responses to separatist conict, what makes democratization more of a critical juncture for separatist minorities than other periods of political instability observed in non-democratic or weakly democratic settings? I oer two explanations that pertain to elite capacity and incentives for reform respectively. First, even if threats to elite survival incentivizes an authoritarian leadership to co-opt aggrieved minorities in the periphery, its accommodative initiatives towards self-determination are likely to be perceived as non-credible due to the lack of institutional mechanisms that prevent their arbitrary rescission. Hence, in the absence of a broader process of democratization reform that imposes some constraints on authoritarian rule, self-determination reform may be rejected by separatist rebels and fall at in the implementation phase. Such obstacles to reform are less likely to occur in cases where authoritarian instability paves the way for the onset of a democratization process, in which the broader politico-institutional changes initiated by the ruling elite partially mitigates its commitment problem and allows for the introduction of more credible reforms.

Second, certain democratization processes may generate non-strategic incentives for minority accommodation in addition to the strategic ones that originate in elite concerns over political survival. This is particularly true of mass-driven democratization, which is typically spearheaded by pro-democracy elites who have long stood in opposition to the authoritarian regime and come to power with the support of revolutionary

43 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform masses who demand reform. Where the masses play a crucial role in driving the democratization process, newly democratic leaders who succeed the authoritarian elite can develop reputational incentives to reconcile with separatist minorities. In such contexts, self-determination reform aids new elites in not only avoiding the costs of dealing with separatist conict in an already turbulent political setting, but also in strengthening their democratic credentials through distancing themselves from the repressive policies of the ousted authoritarian regime.

3.1 Three Phases of Self-Determination Reform

Devolution of political autonomy to separatist minorities is a form of political decentralization, which Brancati (2006) denes as a "vertical division of power among multiple levels of government that have independent decision-making power over at least one issue area." In the case of territorial accommodation, decentralization policy specically targets an ethnic minority whose representatives express strong demands for local autonomy. Once established, autonomous subunits gain some degree of independent legislative power on local matters while also enforcing within their territory the laws and policies decided at the national level. Given that such decentralization curbs central government’s authority over territories inhabited by the minority population and is a harbinger of substantial redistribution towards the autonomous subunit, large-scale self-determination reform does not come about easily. In most cases, it is a complex process that occurs through three key phases:

• Decision-making Phase: In the rst phase, political decision-makers develop incentives to meet separatist minorities’ demands for autonomy to some extent. In any type of regime, these incentives appear when costs of minority repression outweigh costs of accommodation.

• Legislative Phase: This is where incentives for accommodation translate into constitutional or legislative reform, which stipulates the extent and degree of territorial autonomy to be devolved to minority-inhabited regions as well as setting the terri-

44 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

torial boundaries of the new autonomous unit. All institutional changes that a given autonomy arrangement entails are provided legal foundation at this stage.

• Implementation Phase: Autonomy concessions are institutionalized during the implementation phase. This is often initiated with the establishment of administrative and legislative apparatuses (e.g. local parliaments or councils) in minority- populated regions, which are devolved a certain degree of autonomy in various matters such as scal and budgetary policy, provision of education, health and other public services, judicial and religious aairs, regional development and environmental planning, management of water, energy and natural resources, and so on.

The theory presented in subsequent sections details the conditions that allow for the completion of all three phases of self-determination reform, through which separatist minorities gain legal recognition of their right to self-govern and see these concessions materialize through changes in their local political and administrative apparatus. The outcome I seek to explain is limited to institutionalized concessions over self-determination that allow for a certain degree of autonomous self-governance in minority-inhabited regions; as such, the determinants of how successfully self-determination reform is implemented or whether it allows for eective self-rule fall outside the scope of my study. The decision to focus less on such long-term outcomes of the implementation phase is theo- retically justied. Although a successful case of reform would see the establishment of a fully functioning autonomous unit or contribute in other ways to the minority population’s ability to self-govern, such ideal results are not easily achieved. In many cases, institutional weaknesses, lack of state capacity, inadequate government transfers and corrupt bureaucracies interfere with the implementation of decentralization reforms, at the end of which an autonomous yet heavily dysfunctional subunit is established. In such cases of poor implementation, autonomous units fail to govern their territories eectively, suer from poor provision of public services due to the lack or misuse of resources, are ruled by corrupt local elites who are empowered at the expense of the minority population and become a breeding ground for many ills including poverty, crime, illegal economic ac-

45 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform tivities, and terrorism. While the central government may be accused of failing to provide the necessary infrastructure, resources and training for the autonomous unit to function properly, there are many factors that interfere with the establishment of a well-functioning autonomous subunit and a poor outcome cannot be interpreted as a lack of accommodative intent on the part of the government. Hence, autonomy arrangements that are introduced yet poorly implemented are also discussed as cases of accommodative self-determination reform.

My theory begins with the premise that large-scale self-determination reform occurs when elite incentives to co-opt separatist minorities are matched by a capacity to adopt and implement an autonomy law or agreement. If incentives are non-existent or outweighed by the perceived costs of accommodating separatist demands, the prospect of self-determination reform ends in the decision-making phase. In other words, for the reform process to move forward, elite incentives to assuage separatist demands need to appear rst and tilt the balance in favor of an accommodative position. Where that happens, the legislative phase begins and the elite’s capacity to push forward and implement its reform agenda in favor of minority self-rule becomes consequential. The argument I develop in the following sections is that self-determination reform is most likely to be adopted during periods of political instability in authoritarian or weakly democratic states. While threats to elite survival that mark periods of political instability increase the costs of ghting a separatist war in the periphery, thereby generating incentives to introduce accommodative self-determination policies, limited institutional constraints to rule in the absence of strong democratic institutions facilitates the adoption and implementation of these policy concessions.

3.2 Elite Capacity for Reform

Elite capacity to pass reforms that devolve some degree of autonomy to separatist minorities largely depends on the institutional makeup of a political regime. In particular, institutional constraints to executive power determine the extent to which chief political actors

46 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform can inuence the processes that produce or obstruct pro-minority reform. As for any type of policy change, elite capacity for self-determination reform is most limited in advanced democracies where reform processes may be blocked or overturned by institutionally empowered political actors such as the legislature, judiciary, members of a coalition government, the military and so on. Accommodative initiatives by a political party in a coalition government may be blocked by the other parties in the coalition, for instance, or an autonomy law passed by the parliament may later be overturned by the country’s constitutional court or a second legislative chamber in a bicameral system. More commonly, a strong legislature largely representative of majority interests may obstruct reforms that decentralize power and redistribute substantial amount of state resources towards minority-inhabited regions. Because such institutionally empowered bodies can hold up policy change, self- determination reform in democratic states only becomes possible through persuading veto players not to obstruct the legislative phase of self-determination reform. In her discussion of how internal politics of states aect self-determination policy, Cunningham (2014, 28-9) explains this dynamic with an illustrative example:

Because all veto factions are necessary for policy change, consensus-building must take place before the state can actually change policy. Generating support for policy change among veto factions typically entails oering some compen- sation in exchange for supporting the policy (such as side-payments that can be either monetary or policy-oriented). For example, in 2001 the Socialists made concessions over environmental policy to the Green Party in France in exchange for the Green Party’s support of Prime Minister Jospin’s autonomy deal for Corsicans seeking greater self-determination.

Even when the executive has incentives to devolve autonomy to ethnic minorities, the process of accommodation may be blocked by a veto faction who favors a non- conciliatory policy towards the separatists or deems the autonomy arrangement in violation of existing law or the Constitution. A recent example of aborted accommodation was observed in the Philippines. In 2008, the Philippine government drafted the Memoran- dum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) during peace negotiations with the

47 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist rebel group that had broken away from the MNLF in the late 1970s and pursued insurgency operations since then. The MOA-AD, which would have expanded the territory and control of the existing autonomous region, was seen as the most crucial step towards conict resolution since the 1996 Peace agreement, which had lost eect with the declaration of an all-out war against the MILF by the Joseph Estrada administration in the early 2000s. A day before the agreement was scheduled to be signed, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a temporary restraining order and eventually declared the document unconstitutional, accusing the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process of stepping beyond its legal authority and committing "grave abuse of discretion" for failing to consult the Court in devising the autonomy deal.

In contrast, elite capacity for self-determination reform tends to be relatively high in the absence of powerful veto players who can limit executive power, which is characteristic of a variety of authoritarian regimes. The common characteristic among all types of authoritarianism is the weakness of institutional checks and balances, which generates low horizontal accountability and limited institutional constraints to rule. Under fully authoritarian regimes, for instance, the distinction between decision-making and legislative phases of self-determination reform is almost non-existent. Where a dictator, single-party regime or military junta develop strategic incentives to devolve autonomy to a separatist region, the decision often becomes the law without much deliberation. The conclusion of a peace deal between the authoritarian government and separatist rebel groups is sucient to change the politico-administrative structure of a minority-inhabited territory. In some cases, these changes are adopted into law swiftly via executive decree, not even passing through nominally democratic institutions.

Regimes that have a mix of authoritarian and democratic features are also characterized by a higher elite capacity for self-determination reform compared advanced democracies. One type of regime that falls in this in-between category is democratizing states, where the elite who oversees the process of regime transition typically enjoys a high level of discretion in decision-making in the early post-authoritarian period. Broad political

48 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform and institutional reforms undertaken as part of the democratization process increase constraints to rule from low to moderate levels at the outset of the transition, which may increase further as the newly democratic regime consolidates over time. Another type is hybrid (i.e. competitive authoritarian) regimes, which combine the key procedural element of democracy - multi-party elections - with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Most hybrid regimes impose limited institutional constraints on the executive, given that they are not truly democratic and typically characterized by "electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence" that skew the playing eld in favor of incumbents (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). In the case of hybrid regimes, democratically elected incumbents who extend their tenure and capture de facto state power via authoritarian practices resemble fully authoritarian leaders more than democratic ones in terms of their capacity to push forwards reforms they wish to implement.1 A key dierence, however, is that both hybrid regimes and democratizing states tend to have a relatively higher number of veto factions than fully authoritarian regimes, which makes it more accurate to categorize the former as regimes with moderate institutional constraints to rule.

It is important to underline that the capacity argument applies to large-scale autonomy reforms with redistributive consequences, which may threaten the interests of some political actors who would try to block the reform process if they were institutionally empowered to do so. A common example of signicant reforms that draw such opposition is the formation of an autonomous region in a historically unitary state. On the other hand, less redistributive forms of self-determination reform, such as cultural and language rights or extension of administrative powers of an existing autonomous unit, are easier to introduce in general and may not be as dependent on the degree of institutional constraints to rule. Consequently, these types of reforms occur also frequently in advanced democracies.

Altogether, these arguments yield the following hypothesis:

1This is particularly true of hybrid regimes where the incumbent and its ruling clique rely on a strong governing party, which facilitates legislative control by winning consecutive elections, retaining majority status in the legislature, and systematizing the process of executive succession to prevent elite splits and inghting (Levitsky and Way 2010, 63-4).

49 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

Hypothesis 1a. Self-determination reform is more likely to occur in regimes with low institutional constraints to rule (e.g. fully authoritarian states).

That the structural conditions are more favorable to large-scale policy changes in the absence of checks on elite power is, in fact, not a novel observation. In an inuential study about land reform, Albertus (2015, 60) discusses how autocratic rule increases the chances of land redistribution, which "requires signicant political concentration and administrative capacity." His theory emphasizes the role of limited institutional constraints to political rule as the reason why land redistribution is historically a lot more common under autocracy; land reform, Albertus argues, is often used by authoritarian leaders to curb landed elite power through redistribution of land to the rural poor. In her book about the politics of self-determination, Cunningham (2014) similarly argues that institutionally empowered veto factions, which are characteristic of advanced democracies, pose a major constraint on the ruling elite’s ability to accommodate self-determination demands. Adding nuance to this argument, Cunningham proposes a non-monotonous, inverse U- shaped relationship between the degree of internal division within the state and minority accommodation, arguing that self-determination reform is most likely in moderately divided states with some veto faction but not too many. The key prediction here is that accommodation is also unlikely in extremely authoritarian regimes with no veto factions, given that any policy concessions oered under such conditions will lack credibility and therefore fail to contain separatist conict.

Interestingly, the reasoning underlying Cunningham’s hypothesis that a moderate number of veto factions is most propitious for self-determination reform is tied to elite incentives for reform, and not capacity:

While internal divisions create a potential for deadlock within the state, some barriers to policy change enhance the credibility of the state as a bargaining partner because they make reneging on concessions that have been made more dicult than if the state were unitary. State credibility is important because if SD groups see the state as non-credible, they will either openly eschew accom-

50 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

modation attempts, or not make adjustments to their behavior in response to accommodation. If SD groups do nothing in response to accommodation that leads to lowered costs of the dispute on the state, then non-credible states have few incentives to pursue accommodation in the rst place, as it is an ineective strategy for them (Cunningham 2014, 75-6). [Emphasis added]

That self-determination reforms are eective in lowering the costs of an on-going dispute only if they are credible is a strong and potentially misleading assumption. Even if commitment problems may lead to the rejection of an autonomy deal by those who are most committed to the separatist cause, there are almost always some opportunist factions who will settle for a lesser deal than what they had envisioned. There are, in fact, several historical examples of authoritarian regimes that unilaterally passed self-determination reforms, which were completely mistrusted by the zealots but nevertheless succeeded in helping the government buy o some minority elites through oering them local positions of power. A striking example is Ferdinand Marcos’s creation of two nominally autonomous local governments in 1977 via executive decree, which basically served a "divide and conquer" purpose by empowering "martial law collaborators and rebel defectors" in some Muslim-populated regions of the southern Philippines (Eder and McKenna 2004). The reform was eective in lowering the costs of the dispute for the authoritarian state, although it had been rejected by rebel leaders who refused to betray the cause for personal gain and demanded the full implementation of the original peace agreement that promised meaningful autonomy to the Moro Muslim population.

There is nevertheless some merit to Cunningham’s emphasis on the role of commitment problems in aecting the likelihood of self-determination reform. Where elite incentives to accommodate are present, government eorts to introduce and implement autonomy deals will be more likely to succeed if the elite can credibly commit to keeping reforms intact. This is not because a non-credible government will not adopt self- determination reforms that it knows will be ineective, as Cunningham argues, but rather because non-credible reforms are more likely to be rejected by key factions within the

51 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform minority population whose cooperation is necessary for the implementation of an autonomy arrangement. For instance, in March 1974, the Ba’ath regime promulgated the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Autonomy Act, which was negotiated with 600 independent and anti- Barzani Kurds and imposed upon Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (Stanseld 2003, 76). The latter not only opposed the proposal due to disagreement over the status of oil-rich Kirkuk but also deeply mistrusted the Ba’ath regime; ultimately, the KDP’s rejection of the autonomy arrangement and the subsequent resumption of military hostilities obstructed the implementation of the proposed autonomy law. As such, commitment problems can limit non-democratic leaders’ capacity to implement self-determination reforms even when there is an intent to accommodate on the government side.

Although the theoretical story about elite incentives underlying Cunningham’s hypothesis seems problematic, the prediction itself may be on spot. Self-determination reforms may be observed less in highly centralized authoritarian regimes, where non- credible reforms may be rejected by some minority factions and fail in the implementation phase shortly after they are adopted. Alternatively, the absence of institutional constraints to rule can also proxy for a political context that generates no incentives to appease separatist rebel groups. Extreme concentration of power in the authoritarian government, which is a common characteristic of centralized autocracies, can make those in power feel secure and trivialize the costs of ghting a separatist war in the periphery. Conse- quently, the ruling elite in highly centralized autocracies may lack the incentives for self- determination reform altogether; in such cases, regime strength and low cost of ghting the separatists, rather than the elite’s inability to make credible promises to them, would explain the absence of accommodative eorts. In the following section, I discuss in detail how these costs can turn non-trivial with the emergence of threats to regime stability, generating incentives for the threatened elite to make amends with separatist minorities in order to avoid ghting on too many fronts at once.

To sum up, whereas high institutional constraints to rule can obstruct self- determination reform in the decision-making or legislative phases due to inghting within

52 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform the government side, low institutional constraints to rule can make the reform process fail in the implementation phase due to lack of cooperation from the minority side, or concentrate so much power in the center that ghting the separatists is preferred over accommodation. Together, these insights yield the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b. Self-determination reform is more likely to occur in regimes with moderate institutional constraints to rule (e.g. weakly democratic states such as hybrid regimes and nascent democracies).

3.3 Elite Incentives for Reform

High elite capacity to push forward policy change is a characteristic shared across all regimes with low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule. So dened, the list includes a variety of regime types including personalist and single-party dictatorships, military regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes as well as nascent democracies. That the structural conditions in these regimes enable the ruling elite to initiate and implement changes in minority policies does not suggest, however, that self-determination reform is deterministic. If the elite lacks the incentives to extend an olive branch to separatist minorities in the rst place, self-determination reform will not occur regardless of how favorable the institutional setup is to large-scale policy changes.

In an application of selectorate theory to domestic revolutionary threats, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2009) argue that "self-interested leaders take actions in anticipation of political threats from any source so as to diminish the risk that they will lose oce." In theorizing about how incentives form in the decision-making phase of self-determination reform, I similarly assume political leaders to be rational, utility maximizing actors whose policy response to separatist challenges is primarily shaped by concerns over maintain- ing political power. In the case of authoritarian or hybrid regimes where central authority is strong and the ruling elite does not face any credible threats to its survival, what determines the likelihood of concessions over self-determination is the military balance of power between the government and separatist rebels. This is because, absent a sense of

53 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform vulnerability to center-seeking challengers, the only major costs that an authoritarian elite may expect to incur through a military response are the material costs of ghting a separatist insurgency, such as potential loss of control over the disputed territory or international sanctions from a foreign sponsor. All other expected costs of repression that restrain government responses to aggrieved minorities in advanced democracies, such as loss of minority votes or reputational costs of state violence, will be less relevant for elites with a rm grip over the state apparatus. Feeling unthreatened in their position of power, authoritarian elites often show little concern over separatist rebels destabilizing the periphery or entering into anti-government alliances with other dissident segments of the population. If powerful both militarily and economically, such states may also be unresponsive to calls for better treatment of its minority population, dismissing the name and shame eorts of transnational advocacy networks or diplomatic pressure coming from neighboring states with kinship ties to the ethnic minority. Hence, unless aggrieved minorities can ght a separatist war so eectively that a non-conciliatory response risks incurring heavy costs from ghting, self-determination reform is an unlikely outcome in stable non-democracies.

On the other hand, in turbulent authoritarian or hybrid regimes where the ruling elite is concerned over threats to its survival, the risk of losing control over minority- inhabited territories is not the only cost associated with an on-going separatist war in the periphery. I argue that the elite’s perceived vulnerability to threats to its survival can have a critical catalyzing eect on conciliatory steps towards armed separatists. In politically unstable contexts, major threats to the ruling elite come not from autonomy-seekers in the periphery but rather from center-seekers, which may include revolutionary insurgencies, coup-plotters from within the incumbent’s winning coalition, foreign adversaries who conspire to depose the regime, as well as popular pressures for leadership change (i.e. threat of mass revolution). Where such oppositional forces gain strength and begin to pose an existential threat to the elite in power, the latter may develop incentives to co-opt challengers with more limited political agendas. The main proposition here is that separatist conict is often perceived as the "lesser of all evils" in a volatile domestic threat environment, since self-determination is less resemblant to a zero-sum game than existential threats to politi-

54 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform cal survival that the ruling elite struggles to contain.

Throughout the chapter, I use the concept of "threats to elite survival" interchangeably with "political instability." When using these concepts, I specically refer to the threat of irregular leadership change, dened by Beger et al. (2014, 1) as the "unexpected removal of the principal political leader through means that contravene a state’s conventions and law." I identify two key mechanisms through which concessions to separatist minorities may serve political leaders’ eorts to overcome such threats to their power. First, by containing separatist conict in the periphery to some extent, it allows the ruling elite to concentrate its power and resources to ght o more severe threats to its control over the center. For instance, consider an authoritarian state where the government has long engaged in coun- terinsurgency eorts against both center-seeking rivals who want to rule over the country and autonomy-seeking rebels whose demands are conned to self-rule. In this context, any event that amplies the ruling elite’s perception of threats to its rule from center-seekers may incentivize it to appease the latter in order to avoid ghting multiple battles while in an insecure political position. This happened in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, for instance, when the civil war with the US-backed Contras had become increasingly concerning for the Sandinista regime. This sense of vulnerability to center-seeking rivals was key to autonomy concessions given by the Sandinista leadership to the indigenous Miskito peoples, who were also ghting the government at the time but posed a much lesser threat to elite survival than the Contra guerrilla forces.

Second, self-determination reform can also aid the ruling elite in preventing the formation of a strategic alliance between autonomy-seekers and center-seekers, which might further weaken the central government. History is replete with rebel groups with distinct political agendas joining forces to topple down a common enemy. After 17 years of civil war in Ethiopia, the Marxist-Leninist Derg regime under Chairman Mengistu was overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was a large coalition of rebel groups that were united under the leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As early as 1984, the TPLF leadership had prepared and released a

55 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform proposal calling all rebel groups to form "a united front grounded on a "minimum program", with the single purpose of smashing Mengistu’s dictatorship" (Milkias 2003, 14). Similarly, in the northern Philippines, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) fought alongside the communist New People’s Army (NPA) against the Marcos dictatorship until it broke away in 1986 to operate as an independent rebel organization. During politically turbulent periods in particular, such strategic alliances may strengthen the ruling elite’s incentives to co-opt the challengers with relatively more moderate demands in an eort to divide and conquer the united opposition against its authority. In Nicaragua, the Miskito rebels’ decision to join forces with the Contras during the early 1980s was a key catalyst in spurring Sandinista regime’s eorts to seek peace with the indigenous minority population, which led to the formation of two separate autonomous regions along the Caribbean coast in 1987.

Altogether, these arguments yield the following hypothesis about the role of domestic threat environment in shaping elite incentives to appease separatists:

Hypothesis 2a. Threats to elite survival increase the ruling elite’s expected costs from an armed conict in the periphery, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of self-determination reform as a conciliatory step towards separatist minorities.

To sum up, while political leaders in certain types of regimes may be relatively un- restrained in their capacity to legislate and implement self-determination reforms, whether or not they have the motivation to do so largely depends on the broader political environment within which they govern, and in particular, their perceived vulnerability to threats to their political survival. The more the ruling elite sees itself at risk of losing oce to center-seeking rivals, the larger are its incentives to co-opt aggrieved separatists who can further destabilize the political environment if not appeased. Amidst political instability, self-determination reform helps to avoid the costs of ghting multiple enemies at once as well as to preempt the formation of strategic alliances among them that might further weaken the center. Figure 3.1 presents an illustrative summary of these arguments. As shown, elite incentives determine what happens in the decision-making phase of reform,

56 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform whereas elite capacity can impact both legislative and implementation phases.

Figure 3.1: Key Determinants and Phases of Self-Determination Reform

In light of the capacity and incentive arguments presented above, I expect regime institutions to moderate the positive eect of political instability on the likelihood of self- determination reform, which yields two additional hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2b. Controlling for all else, the positive eect of threats to elite survival on conciliatory policies towards separatists will be more pronounced in states with low institutional constraints to rule. Hence, across all regime types, self-determination reform is most likely to occur in fully authoritarian regimes undergoing a period of political instability.

Hypothesis 2c. Controlling for all else, the positive eect of threats to elite survival on self- determination reform will be more pronounced in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule. Hence, across all regime types, self-determination reform is most likely to occur in hybrid regimes and democratizing states2 undergoing a period of political instability.

Hypothesis 2b and 2c focus on the interaction between the two key conditions that

2Although regime transitions including democratization are commonly treated as a proxy for political instability, not all transition paths are marked by an emergence threats to elite survival. In the Third Wave of democratization, for instance, a number of transitions that were initiated and overseen by the authoritarian incumbents occurred gradually and were marked by limited threats to the center. According to Hypothesis 3a, self-determination reform is an unlikely outcome in such relatively stable transitional settings due to lack of incentives for minority appeasement.

57 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform pave the way for large-scale self-determination reform, namely, threats to political survival posed against the ruling elite (incentive condition) and a politico-institutional setting where the rulers govern under low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule (capacity condition). Both suggest that, under high institutional constraints to rule, which are characteristic of consolidated democracies, elite incentives to reconcile with separatist minorities amidst political instability have a higher risk of failing to translate into self-determination reform due to opposition from institutionally empowered veto players. Hypothesis 2c adds nuance to this argument by paying attention to the varieties of non-democracies and emphasizing the commitment problems that may block the implementation of self- determination reform in fully authoritarian regimes. Where institutional constraints to rule are absent or considerably weak, self-determination reform may be similarly prone to failure despite the presence of elite incentives to contain separatist disputes amidst political instability.

As Hypothesis 2c suggests, the role of political instability in shaping self- determination policy may be more pronounced in hybrid regimes and democratizing states than in fully authoritarian regimes where "possibilities of power alternation rest primarily outside of elections, and lie with the leader’s health, choice of successor, conicts within the inner circle, or a combination of these" (Way 2004, 147). Apart from having a relatively higher degree of institutional constraints to rule, a distinguishing feature of these regimes is electoral competition (even if it may be unfair), which makes it procedurally possible for the opposition to take power from the incumbent. Given this alternative route to the incumbent’s downfall, it should be made clear that I do not consider electoral defeat among threats to elite survival that dene political instability. Although the possibility of electoral defeat may generate a sense of insecurity for the ruling elite in hybrid regimes and nascent democracies, it is not a source of political instability by itself.

This is not to suggest that the prospect of electoral defeat has no eect on the trajectory of separatist disputes. On the contrary, in a competitive authoritarian regime where the ruling elite governs in a relatively stable political environment yet faces the risk of

58 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform losing an upcoming election to the opposition, state-minority relations may be aected substantially. However, in such cases, the outcomes may be driven by dierent causal mechanisms and how the center responds to an on-going separatism problem crucially depends on other factors such as the size of the minority population, which shapes the ruling elite’s concerns over securing minority votes, and the responsiveness of the majority population to nationalist propaganda and "scapegoating" of ethnic minorities, which may favor minority repression as an electoral strategy. In Chapter 6, I discuss these alternative outcomes more systematically in the context of incipient democratization, which is a context where electoral competition and high levels of political instability may be observed concurrently.

3.4 How the Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes Shape the

Reform Process

My theory identies periods of political instability as propitious for self-determination reforms that devolve a substantial degree of political autonomy to separatists. When matched with high elite capacity for reform under low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule, which is characteristic of a variety of authoritarian and weakly democratic regimes, threats to elite survival can pave the way for self-determination reform by generating incentives to contain separatist conict. This section adds nuance to the theory by further dier- entiating among episodes of political instability that these regimes may go through and discussing why some are more conducive to self-determination reform than others. The main argument is that, in comparison to periods of instability that result in authoritarian survival, those that pave the way for a democratization process constitute more of a critical juncture for separatist movements.

Threats to elite survival can originate in many sources in authoritarian or weakly democratic regimes. An economic crisis can hit the country and shake the coalitional foundations of the regime, reducing authoritarian rulers’ ability to provide patronage to their key constituents and exposing them "to defection from within the business sector and

59 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform protest from below" (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 267). Foreign adversaries can fuel political instability by assisting opposition groups and conspirators in deposing the incumbent as well as providing nancial and military assistance to rebel groups. In the absence of such obvious catalysts, political instability can still arise due to inghting between the ruling elite and members of its winning coalition, such as party ocials, the heads of the armed forces or landed elites. In fully authoritarian regimes, elite splits may also occur within the ruling cadres between soft-liners who want to liberalize the regime and hard-liners who "prefer to continue enjoying the perquisites of unchallenged authoritarian rule (O’Donnell et al. 1986, 16). In democratizing states that have recently undergone regime transition, loyalists of the ousted regime may conspire against the new leadership, seeking to restore authoritarian rule.

How the ruling elite deals with political instability and the extent to which it suc- ceeds in averting threats to its rule can have important implications for the prospect of self-determination reform. In fact, this variation largely explains why self-determination reform is not deterministic even in a context that seemingly generates the perfect conditions for reform, that is, low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule combined with a threatened incumbent dealing with center-seeking rivals and autonomy-seeking minorities all at once. Although threats to center may incentivize the ruling elite to appease the separatists and thereby move the process along the decision-making and legislative phases, the successful completion of the reform process crucially depends on how receptive the minority population is to proposed concessions. For the implementation of autonomy arrangements stipulated by reform, there should be sucient cooperation from the minority people, and more specically, the rebel groups who claim to represent them. This is crucial given that an autonomy arrangement rejected by the majority of groups who demand autonomy cannot practically come into eect. I argue that the amount of support among the separatists for self-determination reform, which facilitates implementation, largely depends on the regime outcome that is observed following a period of political instability marked by threats to elite survival. For authoritarian incumbents, these turbulent periods can result in one of the following:

60 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

• The incumbent regains power by defeating challenges to its rule and tightens its grip on power (authoritarian consolidation);

• A rival authoritarian faction ousts the incumbent from power via military coup or coerces it into a negotiated exit (authoritarian replacement);

• The incumbent initiates a top-down process of liberalization/democratization in an eort to fend o threats to its rule (incumbent-driven democratization);

• The incumbent loses power to "democratizers from within," which refers to pro- reform regime insiders who replace3 the incumbent and initiate a top-down democratization process (reformer-driven democratization);

• The incumbent loses power to "democratizers in opposition," which refers to opposition leaders who overthrow the authoritarian leadership with the support of revolutionary masses and oversee a bottom-up democratization process (mass-driven democratization).

The list above species the various outcomes of political instability in fully authoritarian and competitive authoritarian states4, which are governed by dierent regime institutions and rules but largely resemble in terms of their rulers’ dictatorial leanings and disbelief in democratic institutions and practices. It is important to note that only the rst scenario - authoritarian consolidation - is likely to reinstitute political stability given the incumbent’s success in eliminating threats to its rule, usually secured through a brutal military crackdown that prevents their resurgence in the short term. On the other hand, other four outcomes may be conducive to a new episode of political instability marked by a continuation of threats to elite survival. In the case of authoritarian replacement, for instance, a military faction that has staged a successful coup may be overthrown by a rival faction before it has a chance to consolidate its rule. In nascent democracies where democratization processes are overseen by elites who have forced the incumbent out of power (as in the cases of reformer- and mass-driven democratization), the new elite may govern amidst

3Replacement can occur through a military coup, negotiated exit or the incumbent’s death. 4Although competitive authoritarian regimes are procedurally democratic, I place them under the category of "non-democratic regimes" in Figure 3.2 given that the potential outcomes of political instability episodes that these regimes experience are similar to those that occur in fully authoritarian regimes.

61 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform threats to its power and go through its own episode of political instability similar to the one it had created for the ousted authoritarian leadership. For democratizing elites, political instability either ends in full or partial democratic consolidation, whereby newly democratic elite averts threats to its rule and moves forward with the democratization process, or with authoritarian backsliding, in which authoritarian institutions are restored either by the newly elected leaders themselves or rival anti-democratic factions who manage to oust them from power.

Figure 3.2 displays all potential outcomes of political instability episodes outlined above.5 Given the theoretical focus on the ruling elite’s responses to separatism, the list excludes two extreme outcomes that can result from political instability, state failure and foreign invasion, in which the central government ceases to function as a sovereign political body. If my theory holds, elite incentives to appease armed separatists should increase at the onset of all political instability episodes identied above. Regardless of who is on the receiving side of threats to survival - a weak authoritarian incumbent (as in Episode 1) or a newly democratic elite (as in Episode 2) - the increased costs of ghting a separatist war in an already turbulent political setting generate strategic incentives to co-opt the separatists via concessions over self-determination.

5The diagram shows ve potential outcomes of political instability for Episode 1, which begins in a non- democratic regime, and three potential outcomes for Episode 2 (and on-going Episode 1 for incumbent- driven democratization), which occurs in democratizing states. Among these eight outcomes, those displayed in dashed-line boxes identify outcomes that are conducive to a consecutive episode of political instability.

62 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform Figure 3.2: Potential Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes in Authoritarian and Weakly Democratic Regimes

63 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

That said, for some of the episode outcomes identied above, the process of self- determination reform has a higher risk of being aborted before its nal phase - implementation - sees completion. As discussed earlier, separatists’ refusal to cooperate in the implementation phase might obstruct self-determination reform despite conciliatory ef- forts from the government. This potential obstacle to reform is more likely to be observed in cases where a period of political instability results in the survival of authoritarianism in some form. As shown in Episode 1, authoritarian survival occurs when the sources of political instability are overcome by the authoritarian incumbent, as well as when the incumbent is defeated and replaced by a rival authoritarian faction. A similar outcome may be observed in emerging democracies too, in the form of authoritarian backsliding. In any of these scenarios marked by the survival of authoritarianism, the reform process may fail in the implementation phase due to commitment problems. Even if the ruling elite develops strategic incentives to accommodate separatist rebels amidst political instability, its reform initiatives may be deemed non-credible under authoritarian rule and fail to generate enough support from rebel groups or local elites whose cooperation is necessary for eective devolution of autonomy to the minority-inhabited region.

In contrast, the onset of democratization processes during or following a period of authoritarian instability can mitigate such commitment problems and facilitate the implementation of autonomy laws proposed by the government. The key mechanism here is the emergence of new veto players with the broader political and institutional reforms undertaken as part of the democratization process, which raises the level of horizontal accountability from absent or low to moderate levels. These changes in the institutional context may help assure the minority population that reforms adopted and implemented cannot be reversed easily. Hence, compared to autonomy concessions oered by threatened authoritarian elites in other periods of political instability, reform initiatives undertaken by a democratizing elite (who may or may not be the incumbent itself) have more credibility, and therefore a higher likelihood of securing minority cooperation in the implementation phase.6

6This prediction applies particularly to periods of incipient democratization following the downfall of an

64 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

Democratizers’ ability to make relatively more credible commitments is only part of the explanation for why democratization is more of a critical juncture for separatist minorities than other episodes of political instability that non-democratic regimes may experience. Another factor that contributes to this variation is that, unlike threatened authoritarian elites who resort to cooptation tactics merely out of strategic concerns, democratizing elites may also develop reputational incentives to establish peaceful relations with ethnic minorities. These incentives are particularly salient in contexts where regime change is driven by popular demands for democratic reform. In mass-driven transitions, newly elected leaders may fear that minority repression will weaken their support base by signaling a continuation of authoritarian practices and policies. In an eort to avoid such costs, democratizing elites may adopt accommodative steps towards autonomy-seekers, which help them signal their commitment to democratic reform and distance themselves from repressive policies reminiscent of authoritarian era.

In the following sections, I present a more detailed discussion of these arguments, which pinpoint democratization as a critical juncture for separatist minorities.

3.5 Survival of Authoritarianism and Commitment Problems

In all types of regimes marked by low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule, it is possible for a politically turbulent period to ultimately result in the survival of authoritarian rule. As discussed, in non-democratic regimes, a political instability episode may potentially generate two outcomes that t this denition: the threatened incumbent can manage to overcome threats to its rule and consolidate power (authoritarian consolidation); alternatively, it can face defeat and be replaced by a rival authoritarian faction (authoritarian replacement). In emerging democracies, replacement may occur in the form of authoritarian backsliding if anti-democratic factions recapture state power, dismantle authoritarian regime, during which political elites who oversee the transition process come only under moderate institutional constraints to rule. Democratic consolidation (displayed in Figure 3.2 as an outcome of Episode 2), on the other hand, may have a lesser eect on the prospects of self-determination reform, given that the ruling elite’s capacity to legislate reform in the rst place may begin to decline as institutional constraints on executive power increase further.

65 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform the already weak democratic institutions and push the regime down the road towards a dictatorship. In the case of incumbent-driven democratization, backsliding may also result from the ruling elite’s decision to reverse the democratization process that it had initiated itself.

Consider rst the case of authoritarian consolidation. During the period of political instability that precedes this outcome, threatened authoritarian leaders may oer concessions over self-determination to appease separatist rebel groups so that they can concentrate eorts on staving o larger threats to their political survival. In such contexts, separatist rebels who have long distrusted the authoritarian government are likely to perceive its concessions over self-determination as both half-hearted and non-credible. While some moderate factions or opportunistic leaders within the separatist movement may respond positively to these eorts, hard-liners will consider the incumbent’s reform initiatives as falling short of meaningful autonomy and therefore refuse to support the process. More importantly, dominant rebel groups who have a lot to lose from demobilization will refuse to cooperate towards the implementation of autonomy reforms if they fear that the incumbent may rescind these concessions once it triumphs in the power battle against larger threats to its rule. Given such commitment problems, top-down self-determination reforms may be rejected by major separatist groups whose cooperation is critical for their successful implementation. As such, in the absence of larger institutional reforms that mitigate the incumbent’s commitment problem by changing the rules of regime, self-determination reform may fall at even before authoritarian leaders reinstitute political stability via con- solidating power. Once authoritarian consolidation occurs, the elite’s strategic incentives to appease the separatists may be lost as well.

An illustrative example is the failed implementation of the autonomy provisions stipulated by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which was signed in July 1987 in the hope of ending Sri Lanka’s increasingly violent separatist conict. Fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and government forces had escalated rapidly in spring 1987 when the Sri Lankan army launched a large-scale military oensive in the Jana peninsula

66 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform in order to recapture territory from the LTTE. With a growing refugee problem and under increasing pressure from its own Tamil population to intervene on behalf of the Sri Lankan Tamils, India pressured the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene to end the operations and negotiate a political settlement. The end result was the peace accord signed between the two states, which provided for a number of concessions to Tamil separatists including devolution of autonomy to Provincial Councils, formal recognition of Tamil as an ocial language and the Northern and Eastern Provinces as "areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people," and the merger of these two provinces into an administrative unit to be represented by a single provincial council, subject to a referendum to be held in the eastern province only (Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement).

Threats to Sri Lanka’s ruling elite from multiple directions at the time help explain this abrupt shift in the ocial strategy towards Tamil separatists. Since the promulgation of the 1978 constitution by the United National Party (UNP) government, which had come to power with a landslide victory in the 1977 elections, the Sri Lankan regime had become increasingly authoritarian under an "executive presidency with quasi-dictatorial powers" (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014, 95). Around the time that the Accord was signed, Pres- ident Jayewardene’s UNP had been ruling the country for a decade, having extended its tenure for an additional six years with a rigged referendum in 1982 (DeVotta 2001, 91). With consecutive elections for the Presidency and Parliament scheduled to take place in 1988 and 1989, the ruling UNP elite’s position in power was threatened by strong opposition parties such as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which had become increasingly popular while "the deteriorating state of the war-weary Sri Lankan economy had cast a dark shadow over the electoral prospects of the UNP" (Premdas and Samarasinghe 1988, 684). A more substantial threat that spurred the Sri Lankan government to seek peace with the LTTE, however, was the possibility of an Indian intervention in the Tamil-inhabited territories in northern Sri Lanka. The threat became all the more concerning in June 1987 when the Indian government mounted an airdrop of relief supplies to aid the Tamil population in Jana, which was under blockade by the Sri Lankan army.7 Undertaken by the

7The relief mission was India’s second attempt to provide humanitarian aid to the besieged Tamils. Earlier,

67 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

Indian air Force, the operation clearly aimed to signal India’s resolve in protecting Sri Lankan Tamils from state violence, alerting President Jayewardene to the threat of more active Indian intervention in the conict (Orland 2011, 98).8

Although the UNP government took some rst steps towards self-determination reform in accordance with the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, most notable of which was the 13th Amendment to the Constitution which set up the Provincial Coun- cil system, major concessions that promised autonomy to Tamils ultimately failed in the implementation phase due to LTTE’s rejection of the agreement’s terms. The main objec- tions raised by the LTTE leaders shows that the rebel group deeply distrusted the government’s intentions and perceived its reform agenda as non-credible: "Tamil groups had not been consulted and were being confronted with a fait accompli; the promise of a larger unit of devolution was conditional, and could prove illusory; the quid pro quo appeared to be the acceptance of lesser powers; the time frame for disarmament envisaged the end of the struggle even before the Tamils could be reasonably convinced the accord would be faithfully implemented" (Tiruchelvam 1987). As a result, the LTTE refused to cooperate towards the implementation of the accord and began to ght the Indian peacekeeping troops who were deployed to oversee Tamil disarmament. Between 1987-1990, LTTE’s eorts to spoil the top-down imposition of autonomy arrangements led to the eventual failure of the provincial council system in the merged Northern and Eastern provinces, which had

India had also sent a otilla of unarmed ships to deliver supplies to Jana, which was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy. 8Another looming threat to the center, albeit dormant before the signing of the Accord, was the People’s Liberation Front (JVP), a Marxist/Leninist militant organization which also adhered to a Sinhala nationalist ideology. After attempting an unsuccessful insurrection in the early 1970s, JVP had re-created itself as a political party that secured the support of a large Sinhala constituency, only to be forced to go underground again in the mid-1980s after being banned by the government (Venugopal 2010). Arguably, for the Sri Lankan government, one advantage of appeasing the Tamil separatists was that "the security forces so long garrisoned in the North to confront the Tamil militants would be withdrawn to the South where their presence was much more needed in view of the likelihood of the recrudescence of the JVP insurrectionary movements in future" (Chattopadhyaya 1994, 84). That said, JVP’s decision to launch a new armed revolt in 1987, which came in response to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the subsequent deployment of the Indian peacekeepers in the north, casts doubt on the idea that the government’s decision to accommodate the Tamils might have been partially informed by its strategic calculations about the JVP threat. On the contrary, the prospect of Tamil autonomy introduced by the Accord is what allowed the JVP to exploit Sinhalese nationalist sentiments and launch a second armed insurgency after years of inactivity, albeit one that was short-lived and brutally crushed by state security forces in 1989.

68 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform been the only concrete step taken towards greater Tamil self-determination. Under the imminent threat of a militarily superior LTTE taking over the province by force, anti-LTTE factions who had been elected into the Northeastern Provincial Council made an attempt to declare independence, which led to the dissolution of the provincial council in June 1990 and brought the region back under the central government.

In light of the earlier discussion about the eects of authoritarian consolidation on elite incentives to contain separatist conict, it is not surprising that the Sri Lankan decision to rescind autonomy concessions came at a time of relative political stability after the ruling UNP elite had managed to retain the party’s majority status in the parliament in the 1989 elections, crushed the JVP-led insurgency in the South, and most importantly, convinced India to withdraw its peacekeeping troops from the island. That said, similar obstacles to self-determination reform may arise when the incumbent fails to consolidate power or reinstitute stability, as in the case of authoritarian replacement. This regime outcome occurs when authoritarian leaders fail to survive threats to their rule and lose power to center-seeking rivals who aspire to install their own non-democratic government. Simi- lar to authoritarian governments in decline, new authoritarian leaders often have strategic incentives to contain separatist ghting in the periphery so that they can deal with more imminent threats to their power, such as a countercoup by the loyalists of the old regime. While the new elite may change the rules of the regime in a way that reects its own vi- sion of non-democratic governance (e.g. a Marxist-Leninist takeover), it makes no more of a credible bargaining partner than the one ousted from power given that authoritarianism still survives in some form. Absent some mechanism through which the new authoritarian elite can commit to not rescind autonomy concessions as soon as it consolidates its rule, separatist rebels are likely to perceive the reform initiatives as non-credible, either boycotting or sabotaging government eorts to implement them.

These insights help explain the process that led to the outbreak of the Second Iraqi- Kurdish War of 1974-1975, initiated by the failure of a peace accord that was the most comprehensive autonomy deal ever oered to the Iraqi Kurds. The agreement had been

69 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform concluded in March 1970, two years after the Ba’ath Party resumed power via military coup, and was to be fully implemented in four years. The eorts to co-opt the Kurds with substantial autonomy concessions was largely due to Saddam Hussein’s preoccupation with the "instability of the regime," and more specically, with potential threats to Ba’ath rule posed by the Communists, Nasserists and the military wing of the Ba’ath (McDowall 2004, 327). Although the government kept its word initially by implementing provisions of the accord and allowing the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to exercise de facto autonomy in major Kurdish provinces, there was no institutional guarantee that these reforms would remain in place. Hence, the relations between the Baath government and Barzani’s KDP began to deteriorate in 1971, as soon as it became clear to the KDP leaders that the government would take measures to limit the autonomy promised to the Kurds, particularly in disputed areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk. Not surprisingly, the 1974 Autonomy Law that was promulgated by the Iraqi government fell short of the initial agreement and was ultimately rejected by Barzani, marking the failure of a four-year process towards Kurdish self-determination.

Similar processes may bring about the failure of self-determination reform in democratizing states, which are typically marked by high levels of political instability and threat of authoritarian backsliding. Particularly during the early phases of democratization, the elites who oversee the transition process are vulnerable to coup threats by the loyalists of the old regime or factions within the armed forces who are opposed to regime liberalization. Amidst such threats to their political survival, which also threaten the success of the broader democratization process, newly elected leaders (or those who oversee the transitional government) may adopt a policy of reconciliation towards aggrieved separatist minorities who pose a lesser threat to the center than their anti-democratic rivals. In this context, the elite’s failure to avert threats to its survival will likely mark the end of an on-going process of self-determination reform. This may occur due to the re-emergence of commitment problems with the restoration of authoritarian rule; alternatively, authoritarian leaders who bring down the nascent democracy may altogether lack the incentives to appease the separatists, thereby preferring a military solution over an accommodative re-

70 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform sponse. Either way, the prospect of self-determination reform is likely to become slimmer in the case of authoritarian backsliding as well.

3.6 Democratization: A Critical Juncture for Separatist Minorities

There are two key dierences between periods of democratization and other political instability episodes in non-democratic regimes, which make the former more conducive to self-determination reform. The rst one relates to elite capacity to push reform through the implementation phase: compared to threatened authoritarian leaders who govern without any constraints to rule, the political elite in nascent democracies enjoy a higher level of credibility and are therefore more likely to succeed in securing minority cooperation in the implementation phase of self-determination reform. The second one relates to elite incentives for reform and aects the decision-making phase: in addition to strategic incentives for minority co-optation that originate in concerns over political survival, democratizers may also develop reputational incentives to adopt accommodative policies towards autonomy-seekers. Together, these dierences help explain why democratization makes more of a critical juncture in the trajectory of separatist disputes than other episodes of political instability, opening up a window of opportunity for ethnic minorities to achieve self-determination goals.

3.6.1 How Democratization Processes Facilitate Credible Commitment to Re- form

As the Sri Lanka and Iraq examples show, even in politically turbulent non-democracies in which the ruling elite has both the institutional capacity and strategic incentives to accommodate the separatists, self-determination reform may fail in the implementation phase due to commitment problems. Under continued authoritarian rule, dominant separatist rebel groups who ght on the minority’s behalf perceive the reform process initiated by the incumbent or a similarly authoritarian leadership that replaces it as non-credible, often rejecting the autonomy arrangements stipulated by reform legislation and resort- ing to violence to block their top-down implementation. The main argument I develop

71 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform in this section is that, in non-democratic states where an episode of political instability paves the way for democratization rather than resulting in authoritarian survival, such obstacles to state-minority reconciliation can be partially mitigated. This owes primarily to the emergence of new institutional mechanisms in the context of democratization that can guarantee to separatist minorities that autonomy concessions are sticky and will not be rescinded once the dust of regime transition settles. Once assured that any territorial autonomy devolved to them cannot be taken away easily, separatists are likely to opt in to the reform process and cooperate with the government towards the implementation of autonomy arrangements.

Theoretical arguments presented earlier in the chapter about the relationship between low institutional constraints to rule and elite capacity for reform are relevant here. Drawing on Cunnigham (2014), Hypothesis 1b stated that self-determination reform is more likely to occur under institutions that generate a moderate level of horizontal accountability, that is, when institutional constraints on the executive are neither too restrictive nor entirely absent. A key dierence between a ruling elite operating under no constraints to rule (e.g. fully authoritarian regimes) and one who may be constrained at a moderate level (e.g. competitive authoritarian regimes and nascent democracies) is that, while both have a relatively high capacity to push forward large-scale self-determination reforms compared to political leaders in advanced democracies, the latter has the additional advantage of being able to credibly commit to keeping these reforms in place over the long run. This insight is key to understanding why early democratization is a critical juncture for in the trajectory of self-determination disputes.

During incipient democratization, broader institutional transformation brought about by regime change generates new constraints on executive decision-making, pushing horizontal accountability from low to moderate levels. This occurs through an increase in the number of veto players, which "enables the empowerment of more heterogeneous interests among the legislature, administration, and bureaucracy, all of whose support is necessary for the implementation of a serious reform" (Albertus 2015, 68). In nascent democ-

72 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform racies, the introduction of multi-party elections empowers the legislature as a key veto player that can block reforms proposed by the executive branch. If the leading party that wins the rst elections is unable to gather enough votes to form a majority or minority government, its coalition partners can become an additional set of veto players. As the list expands, it becomes more dicult to gain approval for signicant changes to the status quo (Tsebelis 1995); that said, the very institutional setup that makes it dicult to change the status quo also prevents the easy reversal of policies that have already been legislated and implemented. Hence, the emergence of institutionally empowered veto players during incipient democratization, while making reform legislation slightly more dicult than before, enhances the credibility of democratizers’ proposed autonomy concessions to a minority population.

The reason why new democracies are characterized by moderate levels of horizontal accountability, rather than high, is tied to the fact that democratization is a slow-paced process. Even if a democratization project is ambitious and marked by eorts to establish a high level of horizontal accountability, post-transition institutional constellations in democratizing states typically resemble more to those in hybrid regimes than in advanced democracies. Particularly during the interim period between the end of authoritarian rule and the conduct of rst multi-party elections, the elite who oversees regime transition typically enjoys a signicant amount of independent decision-making power. It is common for democratizing elites to rule by a transitional government in the rst few years of the post-authoritarian period, so that they can swiftly undertake the most critical steps towards laying a strong foundation for the new regime, such as the adoption of a new constitution, restructuring of the economy or the purge of potential coup-plotters within the state bureaucracy. If armed separatist conict is perceived as a source of political instability in this context, which is often the case, self-determination reform may be adopted by the transitional government in a manner reminiscent of authoritarian rule. That said, concurrent with initial steps towards self-determination reform, democratizers also spear- head some sweeping institutional reforms that increase the number of veto players who can curb the executive’s legislative control and lay the foundations of stronger horizontal

73 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform accountability. Even if the legal foundation of autonomy reforms (e.g. a new Constitution with autonomy provisions) may be laid during the early post-transition period where the democratizing elite faces fairly limited constraints to rule, these reforms are ultimately legislated and implemented by the legislature formed after the rst elections, become subject to re-negotiation among the new veto players and may also come under judicial review once a constitutional court is set up (or resumes powers that were suspended during authoritarian rule). Comparing this changing politico-institutional context to those observed in other political instability episodes where authoritarianism survives, self-determination reforms introduced in the former are more likely to be perceived as credible by separatist minorities.

It is important to note that a credible reform process by no means guarantees that all separatist rebel groups who claim to represent the self-determination movement will agree to reconcile with the government. There may always be some extremist rebel groups who are deeply committed to secessionist ideals and reject any accommodative reform initiatives that fall short of that. Some groups may also adopt a non-cooperative position as a bargaining tactic, believing that they can gain more concessions if they bargain harder with the democratizing elite. Either way, so long as these potential spoilers are in the minority within the minority population, their eorts to block the implementation of self- determination reforms are likely to be ineective. This describes precisely the mechanism through which credible concessions operate: the stronger the perception within the separatist movement that an autonomy arrangement is credible and will be respected in the long run, the more likely the government is to co-opt a larger segment of the local minority population who is the blood and soul of the movement, and the weaker separatist rebel groups become. Even where the hard-liners within the separatist movement try to block the implementation of an autonomy reform (e.g. through boycotting the elections for the administrative apparatus of the autonomous region), their struggle to sustain the war eort is unlikely to amass support from the war-weary local population or from moderate rebel factions who nd the concessions agreeable. While separatist violence may still ensue in such contexts, self-determination reforms succeed in passing the implementation

74 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform phase with the cooperation of moderate separatists who agree to be co-opted into the new regime. Despite failing to fully contain the separatist war as intended, these reforms nevertheless lower the government’s costs of ghting by dividing the separatist movement and undermining minority support for the rebellion.

3.6.2 How Democratization Generates Additional Incentives for Minority Co- optation

Democratizers’ Strategic Incentives for Self-Determination Reform

Before presenting arguments about how democratizing elites may develop non-strategic incentives for minority co-optation, I discuss how the strategic logic of self-determination reform operates in the context of democratization. Similar to other episodes of political instability identied earlier in the chapter, democratization processes can increase the strategic costs that political leaders expect to incur from cracking down on separatist minorities. During a turbulent period marked by weakened central authority and rise of center-seeking challengers who are eager to ll in that power vacuum, ghting o separatist rebel groups in the periphery can waste time, eort and military resources that could be put to use in defending the center from more imminent threats to elite survival. It may also facilitate the formation of strategic anti-regime alliances between separatist and center-seeking rebel groups, as well as trigger widespread violence in minority-inhabited regions and strengthen the hands of rival elites who could use the "worsening security situation" as a pretext or opportunity to challenge the newly democratic leadership. Hence, as the government uses repression to establish centralized control over the periphery, it can compromise its own survival by becoming more vulnerable to threats to center.

During incipient democratization, such threats to the center often come from a wide range of actors including the loyal supporters of the ancien regime, army factions who want to capture state power, revolutionary insurgents craving for another form of authoritarian rule, as well as the disillusioned masses who are discontent with the degree of democratic reform introduced by the new elite. In the presence of more imminent threats to their

75 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform survival, newly democratic governments often develop incentives to co-opt autonomy- seeking minorities in an eort to avoid costly separatist violence in the periphery and concentrate eorts on stabilizing their rule at the center.

Strategic incentives for minority accommodation are most clearly observed in reformer-driven and mass-driven transitions, where regime change is initiated by political actors other than the incumbent. In the rst case, democratization is initiated and overseen by reformist leaders who arise either from within the authoritarian elite (e.g. Spanish transition, late 1970s; Mali’s transition, early 1990s); in the latter, opposition parties who had been sidelined under authoritarian regime come to power, often with the support of revolutionary masses (e.g. Philippines’ transition, mid-1980s; Indonesian transition, late 1990s). In both types of transitions, early post-transition period is typically marked by democratizers’ fears about still-powerful authoritarian factions who may seek to reverse the democratization process. Co-opting aggrieved ethnic minorities into the democratic consensus through an appeasement policy can help mitigate such threats by stabilizing the security situation in peripheral territories where authoritarian collapse generates political opportunity for separatist mobilization. Just as authoritarian leaders who reluctantly liberalize the regime may use nationalist doctrine "to rule undemocratically in an era of rising demands for a mass role in politics" (Snyder 2000, 24), reformist leaders who want to see their country democratize may promote pro-minority policies as a means to consolidate the regime and strengthen their hand vis-a-vis anti-democratic forces.

In a subset of transition cases where democratization is driven by mass mobilization and bring to power former opposition leaders, the appearance of strategic incentives for minority appeasement can be traced back to the pre-transition period. As the intro- ductory narrative about the Philippines’ democratization illustrates, pro-democracy elites in opposition may extend an olive branch to aggrieved ethnic minorities as a means to form a united front against the authoritarian regime. The crucial point is that these incentives tend to persist after authoritarian collapse. This is because the fall of an authoritarian regime through popular uprising typically turns loyal supporters of the old regime into

76 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform sore losers who carry the potential to conspire against the newly democratic leadership, as well as providing political opportunity for anti-state mobilization of other non-democratic forces (e.g. power-seeking military factions, revolutionary insurgencies, etc.) In such contexts, democratizers who had strategically allied with minorities under authoritarian rule will invest in conciliatory eorts to keep those alliances intact.

Crucially, strategic incentives for minority accommodation are not exclusive to cases where democratization is overseen by reform-minded elites (from autocrats’ own circle or the opposition), who may be ideologically inclined to favor pro-democracy policies. Incumbent-driven transitions, which refer to top-down democratization processes initiated by authoritarian elites, may also be conducive to self-determination reform if conditions that generate strategic incentives for accommodation, i.e. threats to power from center- seeking challengers, are observed during the transition period. For instance, Nicaragua’s Sandinista regime initiated negotiations over autonomy with indigenous peoples of the Caribbean coast during a turbulent period when the regime was under heavy international pressure for democratization and civil war with the US-backed Contras was at its peak. Similarly, the nal years of Bangladesh’s military regime in the late 1980s, which were marked by the spread of mass demonstrations demanding General Ershad’s removal from presidency, coincided with the extension of autonomy concessions to indigenous tribes of Chittagong Hill Tracts and a series of government-initiated peace talks with the separatist movement’s armed wing, Shanti Bahini. In both cases, autonomy concessions were introduced in a slowly changing political context where authoritarian incumbents had started to liberalize the regime due to pressures for democratization or legitimacy concerns, and faced threats to their power that were more imminent than those posed by autonomy-seeking minorities. Importantly, these examples demonstrate that inciting nationalist violence is not the only means that authoritarian incumbents use to manage threats to their power, even when their interests are threatened by the prospect of democratization and there is a ready-to-hit target towards which nationalist energies can be unleashed.

77 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform

Democratizers’ Reputational Incentives for Self-Determination Reform

Focusing primarily on strategic incentives, my theory proposes that extending an olive branch to separatists during a period of political instability can help threatened elites consolidate power by focusing on more imminent threats to their rule. As such, the causal mechanism operates specically through lowering the government’s costs of ghting an unnecessary war in the periphery. That said, in the context of democratization, the elite who oversees regime transition may also develop non-strategic incentives to avoid cracking down on autonomy-seeking minorities. Besides being counterproductive in the strategic sense, minority repression can generate reputational costs that newly democratic governments prefer to avoid. This particularly applies to cases where democratization processes are mass-driven and empower civil society organizations who are sympathetic to the minority cause. In such contexts, democratizing elites may develop reputational incentives for minority accommodation and introduce self-determination reform as part of an eort to strengthen their democratic credentials and distance themselves from repressive policies reminiscent of authoritarian era.

Reputational incentives for conciliatory minority policies are particularly strong in emerging democracies where the ease of restrictions on press freedom and re-appearance of civil society organizations raise awareness of ethnic minorities’ suering under authoritarian rule. During Indonesia’s democratization period in the late 1990s, for instance, extensive media coverage of past atrocities against the Acehnese and Papuan minorities increased public sympathy for the victims and generated support for reforms that will address minority grievances. In fact, one of the strategies that the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdaka, GAM) used to push forward its separatist agenda during the post-Suharto period was to prompt the democratizing elite’s reputational concerns vis-a-vis domestic and international audiences. In an eort to generate domestic pressure on the government, GAM built relationships with student activist groups and Indonesian NGOs who could investigate and report human rights abuses committed by the Indonesia military in Aceh, as well as seeking cooperation for advocacy from Aceh-based civil society groups

78 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform and international NGOs (Stanton 2016). Along with the upsurge of mass demonstrations in Aceh, GAM’s eorts to shape public sentiment played a key role in giving Indonesia’s democratizing elite an accommodative posture over Acehnese self-determination, which became materialized with the passing of a Special Autonomy Law in 2001.

In some cases, accommodative policies emerge as a derivative of other eorts to strengthen the regime’s democratic credentials. In many new democracies, transitional governments or newly elected leaders try to signal their commitment to "rule by the people" by allowing for broader participation in the democratization processes. A common example of such eorts during incipient democratization is the establishment of a representative body to write the country’s new constitution. As a signal of pluralism and fair representation, regional delegates from minority-populated areas are often invited or appointed to serve in constitutional commissions, alongside other representatives from dif- ferent segments of the population such as the working class, business groups, intellectuals, the army, civil society and the youth. The constitution-writing process thereby provides a forum for national dialogue where the minority representative can express and lobby for their self-determination demands.

An example of this was observed during Mali’s democratization in the early 1990s. The transition process began with a popular revolution against the long-standing Traoré dictatorship, followed by a military coup in March 1991 led by Colonel Touré, the head of the former presidential guard. Four months after the coup, the pro-democracy transitional government under Touré hosted a two week-long National Conference with around 1,000 delegates who had gathered from all parts of Mali. While the main purpose of the conference was to develop a new Constitution and electoral code and the separatist rebellion in the North was not on the agenda, the 192 northern delegates gathered to discuss the situation and pushed for a debate among all delegates around special administrative status for the North (Lode 2002). Although the nal document did not include any provisions on regional autonomy, the discussion of a "special status" for the North during the National Conference laid the foundations for the autonomy concessions granted by the transitional

79 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform government to Tuareg rebel groups in April 1992 (Seely 2001, 510-2).

To sum up, the emergence of strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation, combined with high capacity to push forward pro-minority reform, makes democratization a critical juncture for ethnic minorities in terms of achieving self- determination goals. This distinguishes democratizing states from consolidated democracies, where elite capacity for reform is limited due to high institutional constraints to rule although incentives to accommodate minorities may be present, as well as from stable authoritarian regimes, where the ruling elite typically lacks the incentives to reconcile with minority populations despite being unconstrained in its power to pass and implement autonomy laws. Most importantly, periods of democratization dier from other episodes of political instability that occur in non-democratic regimes, where threatened authoritarian leaders may develop strategic incentives to co-opt separatist minorities and have the capacity to legislate reform, but likely fail in the implementation phase of the reform process due to commitment problems.

Altogether, these arguments yield the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3. Within the trajectory of separatist movements, democratization is a critical juncture in which there is a likely increase in both elite incentives to co-opt separatist minorities and elite capacity to oer credible concessions over self-determination. Hence, states undergoing incipient democratization are more likely to introduce and implement self-determination reform compared to other regime types.

Hypothesis 4. Among all types of transition paths, self-determination reform is more likely to be observed in mass-driven democratization, where popular demands for democratic reform strengthen reputational incentives to avoid minority repression.

3.7 Conclusion

The chapter presented a novel theory of self-determination reform. Several key predictions emerge from the discussion. First, in non-democratic regimes where institutional constraints to rule are low and reforms can be easily adopted, the emergence of threats to

80 Chapter 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform elite survival can drive self-determination reform by increasing the government’s costs of an on-going armed separatist conict. Second, among all periods of authoritarian instability, democratization is most conducive to self-determination reform due to the structural conditions that allow reforms to be sticky and reach the implementation phase, as well as the possible appearance of additional elite incentives to establish peaceful relations with minority populations. Third, certain democratization paths generate more propitious conditions for self-determination reform compared to others. More specically, the likelihood of reform is highest in emerging democracies where the elite who oversees the transition process develop both strategic and reputational incentives to adopt conciliatory policies towards ethnic minorities. Strategic incentives primarily explain substantial concessions over political autonomy that can appease separatist rebels and thereby mitigate the government’s costs of ghting over part of its territory. Reputational incentives, on the other hand, can also explain more limited reforms that accommodate demands from non-violent self-determination movements, such as the right to receive education in the minority language or formal state recognition of indigenous religious institutions.

Overall, theoretical arguments developed in Chapter 3 challenge the common notion of democratizing states as a breeding ground for nationalist violence and minority victimization. As opposed to theories about how threatened elites in democratizing states may target ethnic out-groups as a means to consolidate political power, I argue that similar concerns about political survival can actually push the elites in the other direction and generate accommodative policies towards separatist minorities. To reconcile these arguments that appear to contadict one another, Chapter 6 examines more closely the conditions under which democratization processes generate alternative outcomes for ethnic minorities.

81 Chapter 4

Statistical Analyses

This chapter presents statistical tests of hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, which establishes a relationship between domestic politics of states and ruling elites’ incentives and capacity to introduce self-determination reform. In explaining the variation in government policy towards separatist minorities over time, my theory emphasizes two aspects of domestic politics, namely, threats to elite survival and institutional constraints on the executive. While the former incentivizes the ruling elite to contain separatist conicts and focus on more imminent threats to its rule, the latter determines how much institutional capacity it has to legislate and implement self-determination reform. My main argument is that the emergence of threats to elite survival in states with limited institutional constraints to rule, which are characteristic of authoritarian regimes and weak democracies, provides the most propitious conditions for self-determination reform. Comparing across all periods of political instability that occur in such regimes my theory pinpoints early democratization as a critical juncture in the trajectory of separatist disputes. In emerging democracies, accommodation of self-determination demands is not only be favorable to the ruling elite from a strategic standpoint, but also likely to be perceived as credible by the minority side in the context of broader politico-institutional reform that marks the early post-authoritarian period.

Table 4.1 provides a list of hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 3. Hypothe- ses 1a and 1b relate to the elite capacity argument, which suggests that large-scale self-

82 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses determination reforms with redistributive implications, such as territorial autonomy laws, are easier to introduce in regimes where the executive operates under limited institutional constraints to rule. The key dierence between the two hypotheses is that the latter predicts a non-linear relationship between institutional constraints to rule and the likelihood of self-determination reform. Just as a high number of institutionally empowered veto players may block policy concessions to autonomy-seeking minorities, their complete absence, which is typically observed in fully authoritarian regimes, may similarly pose an obstacle to self-determination reform due to the fact that any concessions oered by an executive with unchecked power will be perceived as non-credible and are therefore likely to be rejected by the minority in question.

Table 4.1: List of Hypotheses

# Relates to Hypotheses

Self-determination reform is more likely to occur in regimes with low 1a Elite Capacity institutional constraints to rule.

Self-determination reform is more likely to occur in regimes with 1b Elite Capacity moderate institutional constraints to rule.

Self-determination reform is more likely to occur during periods of 2a Elite Incentives (strategic) political instability marked by heightened threats to elite survival.

The positive eect of threats to elite survival on conciliatory policies 2b Incentives and Capacity towards separatists will be more pronounced in states with low institutional constraints to rule.

The positive eect of threats to elite survival on conciliatory policies 2c Incentives and Capacity towards separatists will be more pronounced in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule.

Comparing across all regimes, self-determination reform is more 3 Incentives and Capacity likely to occur in states undergoing incipient democratization.

Compared to top-down transitions driven by incumbent or reformist Elite Incentives 4 elites, self-determination reform is more likely to be observed in cases (reputational) of mass-driven democratization.

Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c are derived from theoretical arguments about the relationship between threats to elite survival and elites’ strategic incentives to co-opt separatist minorities. In line with my incentive and capacity arguments, I hypothesize that the positive

83 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses eect of political instability on the likelihood of self-determination reform will be moderated by regime institutions. If Hypothesis 1b about the non-linear eect of institutions holds true, self-determination reform should be most likely to occur in regimes with moderate institutional constraints to rule undergoing a period of political instability. Building o this insight, Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive relationship between self-determination reform and democratization - a politically turbulent period that is typically marked the emergence of threats to the survival of those who oversee the regime transition process, as well as an increase in the institutional constraints on executive power from low to moderate levels. Finally, Hypothesis 4 focuses on the variation across democratizing states and suggests that mass-driven transitions may be more conducive to self-determination reform than elite-driven democratization processes. In emerging democracies where pro- democracy masses have played a key role in bring about regime transition, the elite who oversees the democratization process may develop reputational incentives for minority appeasement in addition to strategic ones that arise from survivalist concerns.

To test my hypotheses, I use Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham’s (2016) data on self-determination movements from 1960 to 2005. State-ethnic minority dyads included in this data set are drawn from the Center for International Development and Conict Management’s (CIDCM) list of self-determination movements (Marshall and Gurr 2005). The unit of analysis in the study is state-minority dyad year, and the data set includes 123 autonomy-seeking minorities residing in 76 countries, generating a total of 3709 observations. In line with previous empirical research, the data set reects only periods of active separatism for each dyad, identied as years "in which some organization representing the group is making public demands on the state for self-rule" (Cunningham 2013, 297).

4.1 Data and Methods of Analysis

Dependent Variables

I code the dependent variable using data from Cunningham (2014), which provides a qualitative dataset of all government concessions introduced in self-determination disputes

84 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses from 1960 to 2005. In an earlier study using the same dataset, Cunningham (2011, 283) describes the concessions data as follows: "Empirically, concessions are made over a large range of issues related to self-determination, such as language policy, control over taxation, policing, the structure and competencies of local government, and independence. Many concessions entail the transfer of powers over multiple issues, such as cultural protection, economic autonomy, resource control, and political powers." In empirical tests that explore the conditions under which states accommodate self-determination demands, Cunning- ham (2014) utilizes dichotomous measure of concessions as the dependent variable, which does not adequately capture the degree of autonomy extended to the minority population. To be able to model this variation in accommodative outcomes, I use Cunningham’s qualitative data on concessions to construct an ordered categorical dependent variable called Self-Determination Reform, which includes four outcomes: 1. No reform; 2. Cultural reform and ethnic recognition; 3. Minor autonomy devolution; 4. Major autonomy devolution.

At the lower end of the spectrum are reforms that allow ethnic minorities to protect and advance their culture and language. Also included in this category are various forms of ethnic recognition whereby the central government ocially acknowledges the presence of distinct minority identities within the nation-state. While constituting an important milestone in the advancement of self-determination goals, these types of reforms fail to generate any meaningful opportunities for self-governance in the minority-inhabited regions. In categorizing reforms that devolve some degree of territorial autonomy to ethnic minorities, I further distinguish between minor reforms, which include economic rights, land transfers and creation of national or regional organizations that represent minority interests, and major reforms, which range from establishment of autonomous regional units to national independence. The key dierence between the two is that the latter encompasses large-scale reforms that devolve substantial autonomy to minority populations. To clarify the distinction between the categories, Table 4.2 presents a more detailed list of reforms that fall under each category, along with examples drawn from Cunningham’s (2014) qualitative dataset.

85 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses : Three semiautonomous dis- : The Tobago House of Assembly was : De facto independence. The region : The new constitution guaranteed minor- : Land granted to Mapuche Indians, as well as : Aboriginals’ legal status as protected peoples : Special autonomy law for Aceh was passed. : Law passed in the legislature to allow the ying of : Law passed to create the Saami Parliament, which was : Indian government devolved further economic powers to : Increased language rights, primarily in areas of speaking the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, increasingation powers and of control appropri- over land. Trinidad and Tobago - Tobagonians, 1980 formed, which is a local governmentChile with - an Indigenous advisory Peoples, role. 2000 development assistance and resources to establish bilingual schools. Examples from Cunnigham (2014) Dataset Australia - Aboriginals,granted 1967 through a Constitutional Referendum. Colombia - Indigenous Peoples, 1991 ity rights...and the recognition ofwhich indigenous they languages reside. as ocial inRussia the - regions in Buryat, 1993 and education in Buryat native tongue. Macedonia - Albanians, 1997 Finland - Saami, 1995 to represent the Saami inissues national concerning and international Saami connections language and andministrative attend culture. powers. to No the autonomous legistlativeIndia or - Ladakhis, ad- 2002 Bangladesh - Chittagong Hill Peoples, 1989 developed a separate government, including postalIndonesia service - and Acehnese, currency. 2001 The law allowed forsharing the and implementation direct of election Sharia Law. of the local government, revenue the Albanian ag in front ofoccassions. the cities of Gostivar and Tetovo town halls on special trict were created in thepowers Hill to Tracts region. regulate land District transfers councilsvelopment, were in education, devolved the health, area, sheries, asamong culture well others. and as religious/moral Councils law aairs, formulated andtion their order, powers. own de- budgets and hadMoldova - some Transdniester taxa- Slavs, 1992 Various forms of ethnic recognition such as the naming of Small-scale transfer of powers to existing autonomous bodies in Large-scale transfer of powers to existing autonomous bodies in Recognition of minority languages as ocial language Increased cultural protection for indigenous peoples Legal recognition of land claims, land transfers and minority popu- Extension of rights to receive education in minority language Independence (recognized or de facto) Ease of restrictions on free expression of minority identity and Creation of an autonomous region with administrative and executive Creation of national organizations or regional bodies that advance the • • • • • • • • • • apparatuses minority-inhabited regions Includes use of national symbols ethnic groups in constitutions or national laws lation’s right to use natural resources in their region minority population’s self-determination agendaadministrative (with or no legislative powers) or limited minority-inhabited regions • Table 4.2: Dependent Variable Measuring Degrees of Self-Determination Reform (DV=1) (DV=0) (DV=2) (DV=3) Category No reform Cultural reform andnic eth- recognition Minor autonomy devolution Major autonomy devolution

86 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Given that my theory specically focuses on concessions that increase an ethnic minority’s ability to self-determine, I code as "no reform" a number of concessions listed in Cunningham’s qualitative dataset, which relies on a less restrictive denition of minority accommodation. First, my denition of self-determination reform excludes elite-oriented concessions such as inclusion of ethnic minority leaders or parties in a governing coalition, given that these primarily serve the political advancement of minority elite cadres and have an unclear eect on the prospect of bringing the minority population closer to attainment of self-determination goals. I also code as "no reform" cases where an ethnic minority achieved de facto autonomy or independence in the absence of a central government. These include cases like Puntland’s declaration of autonomy from the failed state of Somalia in 1998 or the Tajiks achieving control of the Afghani government following the 1992 coup, which were achieved through regime failure and cannot be treated an explicit decision on the government side to accommodate minority demands for self-rule. On the other hand, I follow Cunningham’s approach in identifying as accommodation other cases of de facto autonomy or independence that result from a military victory by separatist rebel groups who claim to represent a minority population. Even though forcefully imposed, these concessions can be considered as major autonomy devolution due to the fact that the central government accepts the change in status quo rather than continuing to ght over the disputed territory. Overall, my data set includes 170 cases of self-determination reform1, with about 65 percent of the 138 ethnic minorities having received at least one concession throughout the course of the separatist dispute. 91 out of 170 reforms (54%) involve major autonomy devolution to the minority population; 36 (21%) are coded as minor autonomy concessions; and the remaining 43 (25%) are cases of cultural reform and ethnic recognition.

To test my hypotheses, I employ three dierent estimation methods. Given that the dependent variable Self-Determination Reform is an ordinal categorical variable, the main models utilize ordered logistic regression models. I estimate these models with dyad-

1Because of the denitional restrictions, the number is slightly lower in comparison to Cunningham’s data, which identify 189 concessions.

87 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

xed eects given the likely presence of unobserved heterogeneity across state-minority dyads as well as my theoretical focus on explaining the within-dyad variation in the occurrence of self-determination reform over time. The downside of this estimation technique is that computing ordinal logit models with unit dummies (i.e. unconditional xed eects) may be subject to incidental parameters problem, which makes unconditional maximum- likelihood estimators inconsistent even when the xed eects model is correctly specied (Neyman and Scott 1948; Greene 2010, 73). Although this problem applies specically to cases where T , the length of the panel, is very small (Greene 2001, 2002) and is shown to be negligible when T > 20 or so (Katz 2001; Greene 2004; Coupe 2005), I exercise caution in relying on the xed-eects ologit estimates and also present results from (a) standard ordered logit models without xed eects, and (a) xed-eects linear probability models (LPM), which are computed by ordinary least squares with a dichotomous dependent variable and unit dummies. The LPM is commonly used to get consistent coecients when estimating discrete choice models with panel data. The dependent variable used in the LPMs is a dichotomous measure of whether an ethnic minority received any concessions over self-determination in the year of observation. In all models, standard errors are clustered by state-minority dyad to allow for intra-group correlation of the error terms.

Independent Variables

To test the rst hypotheses (H1a and H1b) about the relationship between institutional constraints to rule and self-determination reform, I employ three variables retrieved from dierent datasets that are most commonly used to measure regime characteristics: Vari- eties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2018), Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2017), and the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Cruz et al. 2016). The rst independent variable, Horizontal Accountability Index, comes from the V-Dem and provides an aggregate measure of the extent to which dierent state institutions are capable of holding the government accountable and prevent an abuse of power. The index is an aggregation of indices that measure constraints on the executive exercised by the legislature and other oversight agencies as well as judicial independence.

88 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Although the Horizontal Accountability Index is a good proxy for the strength of checks and balances on executive power, it does not specically measure the number of institutionally empowered veto players who can block reform legislation, which is the key variable that my capacity argument emphasizes. To remedy this and ensure the robustness of ndings, I use two alternative variables to proxy for elite capacity to push forward self- determination reform. The rst one is a Checks and Balances variable from the DPI dataset, which gets a value of 1 for regimes where the executive has unchecked power and is incre- mented by one in competitive electoral systems for every additional veto player who may constrain the executive (e.g. parties in the governing coalition, opposition parties, cham- bers of the legislature, etc.). The variable ranges between 1 and 18 and is log-transformed in the models. The second variable is the 7-scale Polity measure of Executive Constraints, which refers to "the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives" that are imposed by "accountability groups," which may include the legislature, military, judiciary and other institutions (Marshall et al. 2017, 24).

To test the second set of hypotheses (H2a, 2b and 2c) about the relationship between political instability and self-determination reform, I utilize two dierent variables that proxy for elite vulnerability to threats to political survival. The rst one, Center- Seeking Armed Groups, is a restrictive measure that looks at the number of non-state armed groups ghting against the center with the aim of replacing the government or changing the regime. Using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict data (Gledtisch et al. 2002) on conict types and source of incompatibility between the ghting parties, I code a country-level variable indicating the number of center-seeking rebel groups operating within state territory in a given year of observation. The variable is only a rough proxy for political instability and fails to take into account other threats that might feed the ruling elite’s sense of insecurity regarding its chances of political survival, such as coup-plotting rival elites and foreign adversaries. To create a proxy measure that can account for dierent types of threats, I code a new variable called Threats to Elite Survival that sums the number of center-seeking armed groups, failed coup attempts and international armed conicts for each country-year. The coup data come from Powell and Thyne (2011) and interstate con-

89 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

ict data are compiled from the UCDP and Brecke (2011). Both variables range between 0 (no threat) and 8 (highest number of threats) and are log-transformed in the models.

Similarly, to test the democratization hypothesis (H3), I utilize two dichotomous variables for democratization using data from the Polity IV and the Democracy and Dic- tatorship Revisited (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009) datasets. I code the rst variable using the Polity score, which measures a country’s level of democracy on a scale that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic); the variable receives a value of 1 for all states that had at least a 2-point increase in their Polity score over the past three years, and 0 otherwise. This rst measure captures both minor and major changes in regime type towards democratic rule. There are, however, two potential issues with this measure. First, the Polity-based coding might contain information about shifts in state policy towards ethnic minorities. This is because the Polity metric from -10 to +10 quanties several components of a country’s political setup, including competitiveness of participation, characteristics of executive recruitment and protection of civil liberties, and identies regime transitions on the basis of value changes along these components. Specically, two of the component indicators used in the calculation of polity scores - PARREG (regulation of political participation) and PARCOMP (competitiveness of political participation) - are dened and coded in a way that would capture information about how ethnic minorities are treated by the government. As a result, some cases coded as a Polity transition might in fact be reective of new reforms undertaken to improve minority status. Using this variable for the study of minority accommodation could therefore be prone to tautology; even the lagged version may not fully resolve the potential for bias (Vreeland 2008). The second problem is that, due to the minimalist denition it relies upon, my Polity-based measure codes as democratization some minor changes in regime characteristics that can hardly be considered as a move towards democracy (e.g. a jump from -7 to -5 is coded as 1). To address these problems, I use the democratic transition variable from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) data set (hereafter referred to as CGV), which is a dichotomous measure that focuses on the staging of free elections and evidence of electoral turnover. Relying on a denition of democratization that focuses on institutional changes only and is not too

90 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses minimalist at the same time, the CGV transition variable helps make sure that the results do not lead to tautological inference and are robust to dierent conceptions of democratization. Similar to the Polity-based measure, the CGV variable is coded as 1 if the country has been through a transition in the past three years, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, I also code an alternative version of the CGV variable that indicates whether a country has experienced democratization in the current or past three years.

Finally, to test the hypothesis that certain transition paths may increase the likelihood of reform by generating reputational incentives for minority appeasement (H4), I construct variables that indicate whether a country goes through democratization in a given year of observation and what type. More precisely, I create two ordinal, Polity-based and CGV-based measures with three possible outcomes: no democratization (0); elite-driven democratization driven by the incumbent or reformist elites; (1) bottom-up democratization driven by the masses (2). To identify cases where the masses played a critical role in the democratization process, I rely on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Out- comes (NAVCO) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013a), which provides data on popular campaigns2 in pursuit of a variety of political objectives including regime change. I code as mass-driven democratization all observations in which a country experienced democratization that occurred in the same year as or was preceded by a campaign in favor of regime change.

Control Variables

All models include a set of group-level and country-level control variables that are potentially correlated with both the dependent variable (DV: self-determination reform) and independent variables (IV1: institutional constraints on the executive; IV2: threats to elite survival; IV3: democratization). Any control variables from models that test the eect of

2Chenoweth and Lewis (2013b, 2) dene campaigns as a "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective." They further note that "campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts." Given this denitional restriction, it is possible that the variable I construct undercounts the number of democratic transitions driven by mass pressures. The undercounting might particularly apply to certain types of revolutions that occur in the form of a spontaneous mass act rather than a pro-democracy campaign.

91 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses either IV1 or IV2 on the DV are also included in models testing the eect of IV3, since the democratization hypothesis assumes both variables to be at play in increasing the likelihood of self-determination reform during early democratization. In all models, I control for whether the state-minority dyad has recently been through a separatist war, whether the state has recently gained its independence, whether there is a federal system in the country, degree of ethnic fractionalization and income inequality. Additionally, models testing the eect of IV2 and IV3 on self-determination reform also include group-level controls for the number of separatist factions within the minority and total number of self-determination demands made by the group.

The control variable for separatist war is operationalized as a dichotomous measure of whether an armed separatist conict took place between the minority and the government in the past three years. The chances of securing large-scale concessions over self- determination are higher for ethnic groups who have the ghting capacity; at the same time, the occurrence of separatist violence is also likely to correlate with the nature of regime institutions (IV1), and specically, the extent to which the ruling elite is constrained in its ability to rely on repressive measures that may trigger a separatist rebellion. The variable is coded using data on territorial intra-state conicts from the UCDP Armed Conict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and ACD2EPR3 data (Vogt et al. 2015) on rebel groups claiming to ght on behalf of an ethnic group. Other models testing the eect of IV2 and IV3 also include this control variable given that separatist wars are more likely to erupt during periods of political instability marked by more severe threats to elite survival.

The variable new state marks countries within their rst two years of independence and is coded with data retrieved from the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Way- man 2010). The eect of new statehood on government policy towards ethnic minorities may be in either direction. Early post-independence periods may be conducive to self- determination reform if political leaders follow an inclusive nation-building strategy that recognizes ethnic cleavages; however, nation-building may also come in the form of iden-

3The ACD2EPR matches rebel groups from the UCDP Armed Conict Dataset with ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).

92 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses tity repression and decrease the likelihood of any government reform that acknowledges the presence of multiple national identities within the state. The variable is also likely to correlate with IV1, with newly independent states potentially lacking strong institutions that eectively constrain executive power, as well as with IV2, given the likely emergence of inter-elite competition over central power in new states, which may be particularly pronounced in those that form in the aftermath of imperial breakdown.

Another country-level control variable marks federal states, where central governments may be more likely to introduce self-determination reform "using the governance structures that are in place to devolve more power" (Cunningham 2014, 80). A federal system already in place may also make both the government and the majority population more open to the idea of decentralizing state authority and resources towards minority populations. Federalism may also be correlated with higher institutional constraints to rule, with local government units such as a state legislature potentially constituting an additional set of veto players. In models examining the eect of political instability on self-determination reform, federalism is also included as a potential confounder that may correlate negatively or positively with threats to elite survival. Federal states may be more immune to such threats thanks to a decentralized system that co-opts those who seek to achieve power in their localities; on the other hand, it may also generate conditions for regional actors to become an independent power house and challenge central authority.

I also control for ethnic fractionalization, which is likely associated with both the prospect of minority accommodation and regime institutions.4 The variable is expected to have a negative correlation with self-determination reform according to Walter (2009), who argues that governments residing over ethnically diverse populations will adopt non- conciliatory responses to self-determination bids in order to deter future separatists. With respect to its correlation with IV1, democratic institutions that constrain the executive are known to progress slower in ethnically divided states (Horowitz 1993; Epstein et al. 2012). The variable is included in models testing the eect of IV2 as well, given that ethnically

4Given that ethnic fractionalization indices hardly show any within-country variation over time, the variable is only included in models that are estimated without unit xed eects.

93 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses fragmented countries may be more conducive to political instability, particularly where ethnic cleavages generate a high level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). The data on ethnic fractionalization indices come from Fearon (2003).

Another country-level control is income inequality, which is a key determinant of institutional constraints on executive power according to redistributive models of democracy (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006; Boix 2003). By the same theoretical logic, high levels of inequality may be correlated with the occurrence and degree of self- determination reform as well, since large amounts of wealth concentrated in the center likely pose an impediment to concessions to minorities with substantial redistributive ef- fects. I also include the inequality variable in models testing the eect of IV2 on self- determination reform, given that attempts to overthrow the ruling elite may be more common in highly unequal societies where the expected returns to capturing the center is very high. I utilize the widely used Gini index as a measure of income inequality (UNU-WIDER 2017).

Additionally, the models testing the eect of IV2 and IV3 include two ethnic minority attributes that may be related to both self-determination reform and political instability: the degree of fragmentation within the ethnic group and the number of self-determination demands made by the group. Based on Cunningham’s (2011, 2014) argument that internally divided groups are more likely to receive concessions from the state, I add a control for the logged number of factions claiming to pursue self-determination objectives on behalf of an ethnic minority. Minority factionalization is also expected to correlate with political instability; a turbulent context where the ruling elite is dealing with existential threats to its power may provide a political opportunity for new separatist factions to form and push forward their own agenda for self-determination. By that logic, number of demands expressed by a separatist minority may similarly increase during periods of political instability. The number of demands is likely to correlate with self-determination reform as well; particularly in the case of armed separatist conict, a larger number of separatist demands may expand the bargaining range and facilitate the negotiation of a mutually acceptable

94 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses autonomy deal. The data on these minority attributes are retrieved from Cunningham (2014) and Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham (2016).

Given that the occurrence of self-determination reform in a given state-minority dyad year is likely to be temporally dependent on previous concessions to the same ethnic group (Cunningham 2011), I include in the models a control variable for the number of years since last reform and use the cubic polynomial approximation method proposed by Carter and Signorino (2010). I also include a control variable for post-Cold War period, given the spike in the number of self-determination reforms introduced in the post-Soviet states. Finally, models testing the democratization hypotheses include a lagged measure of electoral democracy index (V-Dem) to account for the correlation between a state’s regime type and the likelihood of undergoing a democratic transition. Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for all variables.

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics

Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum SD Reform (Ordinal) 3709 0.105 0.510 0 3 SD Reform (Dummy) 3709 0.046 0.209 0 1 Horizontal Accountability Index 3709 0.244 1.129 -2.12 2.23 Number of Checks 2823 3.105 2.497 1 18 Executive Constraints 3381 4.797 2.338 1 7 Center-seeking Armed Groups 3709 0.325 0.729 0 8 Sum of Threats to Elite Survival 3706 0.467 0.818 0 8 DemocratizationP olity 3630 0.097 0.296 0 1 Democratic TransitionCGV 3697 0.014 0.118 0 1 Transition PathP olity 3709 0.123 0.406 0 2 Transition PathCGV 3709 0.021 0.186 0 2 Separatist War 3709 0.193 0.395 0 1 New State 3662 0.013 0.111 0 1 Federal State 3709 0.297 0.457 0 1 Income Inequality (Gini) 3306 37.153 8.877 16.23 74.3 Ethnic Fractionalization 3665 0.535 0.227 .04 1 Factions within Minority 3680 3.394 3.260 1 39 Number of SD Demands 3709 1.652 0.756 1 5 Post Cold War 3709 0.493 0.500 0 1 Years Since Last Reform 3709 16.520 13.022 0 45

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4.2 Results

4.2.1 Testing the Elite Capacity Hypotheses: The Role of Institutions

As listed earlier in Table 4.1, my theory proposes two alternative hypotheses about the relationship between regime institutions and the likelihood of self-determination reform. Results from models testing both hypotheses are presented in Table 4.4. Models 1 through 6 employ xed-eects ordered logit models estimated with three dierent measures of institutional constraints to rule. Models 1, 3 and 5 evaluate Hypothesis 1a, which suggests a negative relationship between institutional constraints and self-determination reform based on the idea that authoritarian leaders with relatively unchecked power can more easily oer large-scale concessions to ethnic minorities when it is in their interest to do so. The results show a positive eect instead, which is statistically signicant in two of the three models. One possible explanation is that the theoretical assumption about high institutional constraints on executive power - a characteristic of advanced democracies - posing an obstacle to reform does not necessarily hold. Another explanation could be that, in line with Hypothesis 1b which builds upon Cunningham’s (2014) theory,5 there is a non- linear relationship between institutional constraints on the executive and the prospects of self-determination reform. Findings from Models 2, 4 and 6 provide strong support for the latter. The statistically signicant negative coecients of the quadratic terms for Hori- zontal Accountability Index, Checks and Balances and Executive Constraints respectively show that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between institutional constraints to rule and self-determination reform, with the probability of ethnic minorities achieving higher degree of concessions over self-determination being at its highest at moderate levels of each variable. Converting the ordered logit coecients from Model 2 into predicted probabilities reveals that, for a given country, an increase in horizontal accountability from very low to moderate levels is associated with a 6-7.5% increase in the probability of ma-

5Focusing on the role of veto factions within states, Cunnigham (2014, 76) hypothesizes that "moderately divided states will be more likely to make concessions over self-determination than either highly divided states or unitary states."

96 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses jor autonomy devolution. As horizontal accountability scores further increase and reaches the maximum value, the probability of reform falls back again by 5-6%. Similarly, Model 4 shows that an increase in the number of checks and balances from one to ve (0 to 1.6 in logged numbers) in a given country increases the probability of a major autonomy reform from around 1.3% to 3.3%.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 display graphs of the predicted probability of dierent degrees of self-determination reform conditional upon horizontal accountability indices (Model 2) and logged number of checks and balances (Model 4) respectively. Given the inclusion of xed eects in the models, the inverse U-shaped curve suggests the following: as the strength of horizontal accountability or the number of checks on executive power within a state increases from low to moderate levels, so does the likelihood of self-determination reform, but this probability falls again with an increase in institutional constraints to rule from moderate to high levels. The graphs also show that the substantive eects of institutional constraints to rule on the likelihood of self-determination reform are more pronounced for major reforms that devolve substantial autonomy to ethnic minorities compared to mi- nor autonomy reforms and cultural reforms/ethnic recognition. This nding is expected, as discussed in Chapter 3, given that my theory focuses specically on explaining "hard" concessions (i.e. creation of an autonomous government) that require consensus building among key political actors before reform can be legislated and implemented. In the case of "easy" concessions such as protection of cultural-linguistic rights or transfer of additional powers to an already autonomous unit, opposition to reform from potential veto players is expected to be milder, making elite capacity for reform high and institutional constraints on the executive a less consequential factor with respect to self-determination reform. The results presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 support the insight that elite capacity for reform matters most in determining the prospects of large-scale autonomy reform, which threaten to redistribute political authority and economic resources away from the majority-controlled center towards minority-inhabited regions.

Models 7-10 estimate the same models using alternative specications. Results from

97 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses both standard ordered logit models (no xed eects) and LPM with xed eects are largely consistent with earlier ndings. The only exception is Model 7 where the coecient of the quadratic term lacks statistical signicance. That said, the second model estimated without xed eects (Model 8), which uses the DPI’s checks and balances variable instead of the V- Dem measure, supports the ndings and provides some evidence that regime institutions can also account for the variation in self-determination reform across state-minority dyads. As expected, self-determination reform is more likely to occur in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule such as hybrid regimes and democratizing states, compared to those that have a very low or very high number of institutionally empowered veto players, which refer to fully authoritarian states and advanced democracies respectively. Com- paring across all models, both types of ordered logit estimations (with and without xed eects) and LPMs produce similar eects in magnitude. Mirroring ndings from Model 3, Model 8 predicts a 1.9% increase (from 1.4% to 3.3%) in the probability of major autonomy reform as the number of checks and balances go up from one to ve; in the LPM using the same covariates, the predicted change in probabilities is an increase from 3.5% to 6.2%.

Overall, although Hypothesis 1b nds support across all the models, substantive eects of regime institutions on the prospects of ethnic minorities achieving self- determination goals seem fairly small. This is consistent with ndings from Cunningham (2014) who tests Hypothesis 1b using the same independent and dependent variables as in Model 8 and reports that "states with only one veto faction have about a 4.5% chance of making a concession to a self-determination group in a year,... while those with ve internal veto factions have about an 8% ...chance of making any concession."6 In light of theory, these ndings are not too surprising given that institutional constraints to rule only proxy for elite capacity to introduce reform, which may not matter at all if elite incentives to accommodate ethnic minorities are absent in the rst place. Next section examines more closely how the latter shapes the prospects of self-determination reform.

6Cunningham (2014) estimates for the marginal eects of the ’checks’ variable are higher than what I nd, despite the similarities between her model and Model 8. This is likely caused by dierences in model specica- tion and the fact that Cunnigham uses a less restrictive coding of concessions and a dichotomous dependent variable.

98 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses ∗∗ + ∗∗ 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.02 + ∗∗ + + + ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01 (0.03) (0.05) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.13 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.40 0.45 -0.17 -0.55 1.41 0.80 + + ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.12 0.16 0.03 -0.15 -0.03 (0.43) (0.39) 0.37 -0.82 -0.11 0.90 ∗ ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ 1.08 (0.09) 1.95 0.85 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ (0.13) (0.73) 0.82 ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.18) (0.01) 1.12 ∗∗∗ 0.93 0.87 1.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 (0.33) (0.83) (0.42) (0.03) 1.14 FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM + ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.76 1.18 (0.26) (0.09) (0.01) -0.03 1.17 + ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ (0.37) (0.36) (0.12) (0.01) (0.59) (0.57) (0.66) (0.70)(0.25) (0.58) (0.28) (0.58) (0.30) (0.21) (0.31) (0.22) (0.25) (0.02) (0.26) (0.02) (0.19) (0.24) (0.01) (0.02) (0.52) (0.53)(0.98) (0.59) (0.97) (0.54) (1.28) (0.51) (1.23) (0.52) (0.95) (0.21) (0.98) (0.21) (0.65)(0.09) (0.02) (0.80) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) -0.04 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 ) 0.84 V-Dem ) 0.39 ) 0.28 1.93 Polity IV DPI 1) − t ( Horizontal Accountability Index ( Horizontal Accountability squared -0.94 Ethnic Fractionalization Years Since Last Reform 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 Checks and Balances ( New StateFederal StateIncome Inequality 1.41Constant -0.14 1.20 0.03 1.17 -0.40 1.10 -0.45 1.45 -0.20 1.23 -0.20 0.60 1.05 1.21 0.12 0.15 Checks and Balances squaredExecutive Constraints squaredSeparatist War -0.79 1.23 Post Cold War -0.18 0.88 Executive Constraints ( Table 4.4: Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Capacity Hypotheses (H1a-b)

99 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 3.38 3.68 4.10 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 2.63 2.94 3.31 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 7.57 7.95 8.42 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 4.85 5.23 5.70 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 5.84 6.19 6.67 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 5.71 6.06 6.54 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 2.78 3.14 3.56 ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 001 . (1.08) (1.01)(1.08) (1.46) (1.01)(1.07) (1.45) (1.46) (1.00) (1.03) (1.45) (1.45) (1.71) (1.01) (1.44) (0.49) (1.71) (1.01) (0.53) (0.49) (1.71) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55) 0 p < ∗∗∗ , 01 . 0 p < ∗∗ , 05 . 0 p < ∗ , 10 . 0 p < Cut Point 1Cut Point 2Cut Point 3Group Fixed EectsNumber of ObservationsGroup-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a+ 2.87 measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. 3.23 3.64 3156 Yes 3156 Yes 2492 Yes 2492 Yes 2952 2952 Yes 3156 Yes 2492 No 3156 No 2492 Yes Yes

100 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Horizontal Accountability Index (V-Dem)

Predicted Probabilities for Major Autonomy Reform (95% CIs) .15

.05 Pr(SD Reform Level==3) Pr(SD Reform

-2 -1 0 1 2 Horizontal Accountability Index

Predicted Probabilities for Minor Autonomy Reform (95% CIs) .15

.05 Pr(SD Reform Level==2) Pr(SD Reform

-2 -1 0 1 2 Horizontal Accountability Index

Predicted Probabilities for Cultural Reform (95% CIs) .15

.05 Pr(SD Reform Level==1) Pr(SD Reform

-2 -1 0 1 2 Horizontal Accountability Index

101 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Institutional Checks and Balances (DPI)

Predicted Probabilities for Major Autonomy Reform (95% CIs) .05

.04

.03

.02

.01 Pr(SD Reform Level==3) Pr(SD Reform 0

0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 Checks and Balances (logged)

Predicted Probabilities for Minor Autonomy Reform (95% CIs) .05

.04

.03

.02

.01 Pr(SD Reform Level==2) Pr(SD Reform 0

0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 Checks and Balances (logged)

Predicted Probabilities for Cultural Reform (95% CIs) .05

.04

.03

.02

.01 Pr(SD Reform Level==1) Pr(SD Reform 0

0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 Checks and Balances (logged)

102 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

4.2.2 Testing the Elite Incentives Hypotheses: The Role of Political Instability

Models reported in Table 4.5 test Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c, which focus on the role of political instability in incentivizing the ruling elite to co-opt aggrieved minority populations. Models 11 and 14 test Hypothesis 2a by examining the relationship between self- determination reform and the two independent variables that proxy for political instability: (i) the logged number of center-seeking armed groups, and (ii) the logged number of sum of all potential threats to elite survival including center-seeking insurgencies as well as other domestic and foreign adversaries. The coecient for both variables are negative and lack statistical signicance. A possible explanation for this nding is that the domestic political threat environment does not have a uniform eect on government policy towards separatist minorities across all types of regimes. In fact, this is expected. As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, threats to elite survival are expected to pave the way for accommodative self-determination reform only in cases where the executive operates under low-to-moderate institutional constraints to rule, which enables the ruling elite to turn its strategic incentives for minority appeasement into actual reform. Building o this insight, Hypotheses 2b and 2c focus on the interaction between institutions and threats to elite survival, predicting that the former will moderate the eect of the latter on self-determination reform.

Model 12 tests Hypothesis 2b by including an interaction term between Center- seeking Armed Groups and Horizontal Accountability Index. Model 15 tests the same hypothesis using the alternative measure of political instability, Threats to Elite Survival. Specif- ically, the models examine whether the hypothesized positive relationship between political instability and self-determination reform will be more likely in authoritarian regimes where institutional constraints to rule are either absent or very weak. The coecients for the interaction terms lack statistical signicance in both models; analyses of marginal eects also show no support for Hypothesis 2b.7 This is not surprising in light of earlier

7Some scholars argue that statistical signicance of the coecients can be misleading when interpreting interaction terms and one should also examine the marginal eect of the key independent variable for the observed range of the modifying variable (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012).

103 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

ndings about the inverse U-shaped relationship between institutional constrains to rule and self-determination reform, which suggests that making a simple distinction between states with low and high constraints to rule is not sucient to understand the conditions under which reform is most likely. To capture more accurately how institutions moderate the relationship between political instability and elite incentives for co-opting separatist minorities, we need to pay attention to the middle category of hybrid regimes and weak democracies, in which the ruling elite operates under a moderate degree of institutional constraints to rule.

Hypothesis 2c best captures the key prediction from my theory of self- determination reform, that is, conciliatory steps towards separatist ethnic minorities should be most likely in contexts where moderate institutional constraints to rule are matched by a threatened ruling elite who struggle to keep the center in order by stabilizing the periphery. To test this hypothesis, I estimate models with a three-way interaction term that multiplies the threat variable with the Horizontal Accountability measure8 and its quadratic term.9 In Models 13 and Model 16, which use alternative measures of political instability, coecients of the interaction terms are statistically signicant at the 0.001 and 0.05 levels of signicance respectively. As shown in Models 17 through 20, the nding is robust to alternative model specications.

Interpreting the coecient of a three-way interaction term can be dicult. To facilitate interpretation of ndings, Figure 4.3 visualizes the marginal eects of threats to elite survival on the probability of self-determination reform at dierent levels of horizontal accountability (low, moderate and high). Given that the horizontal accountability index is a continuous measure, I construct low/moderate/high categories on the basis of the mean and standard deviation of the horizontal accountability variable (Low = Mean - 1SD; Moderate = Mean; High = Mean + 1SD). On the left side are graphs of predicted probabilities obtained from Model 13; on the right side are those from Model 16. Given that the

8When operationalizing institutional constraints to rule in the interaction models, I use the V-dem measure of horizontal accountability instead of the DPI variable, because the latter only have data for 1975 onwards while the V-dem variable goes back to 1960. 9All models that include the three-way interaction term and the coecients are highlighted in Table 4.5.

104 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses dependent variable for self-determination reform is an ordinal measure, predicted probabilities are estimated separately for the three reform outcomes: major autonomy reform (top graph), minor autonomy reform (middle graph), and cultural reform/ethnic recognition (bottom graph).

In line with Hypothesis 2c, the two graphs on top show that an increase in the severity of threats to elite survival has a signicantly more pronounced positive eect on the likelihood of major autonomy reform in regimes with moderate levels of horizontal accountability, such as hybrid regimes and democratizing states, than those with low or high levels of horizontal accountability, which are characteristic of fully authoritarian regimes or advanced democracies respectively. For states with moderately accountable governments, there is a sharp and steady increase in the probability of substantial autonomy devolution to separatist minorities as threats to elite survival increase.

Model 13 nds that the predicted probability of self-determination reform by moderately accountable governments is 5.4% when there are no center-seeking rebel groups operating within the state, around 12% if there is one rebel group seeking to overthrow the government, and 22% in cases where the government is dealing with as many as 4 center- seeking groups at once. Similarly, results from Model 16 reveal that in a given state with moderate horizontal accountability, the predicted probability of major autonomy reform, which is 5.9%in the absence of any threats to elite survival, goes up to 16.3% when the number of threats increases from zero to four, and up to around % 22 when the number of threats reaches a maximum of eight. This positive trend is also observed in the case of states with low levels of horizontal accountability, namely fully authoritarian regimes, although the eect of threats to elite survival in increasing the probability of reform is substantially weaker.10 This is in line with theoretical insights presented in Chapter 3: although politically turbulent authoritarian regimes provide propitious conditions for reform in terms of capacity and incentives for minority accommodation, self-determination reform is more

10This is inferred from a comparison between the slopes of the red and blue lines in the top graphs in Figure 4.3.

105 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses prone to fail in the implementation phase due to commitment problems.11 On the other hand, for states with highly accountable governments, there is no positive relationship between threats to elite survival and the likelihood of self-determination reform. In fact, the slightly negative slope of the green line suggests that the likelihood of self-determination reform decreases as threats to elite survival increase in highly accountable regimes such as advanced democracies, although the size of the eect is low. The appearance of one center-seeking rebel group decreases the predicted probability of reform from around 4% to lower than 1% (Model 16).

A key insight from Figure 4.3 is that the moderating eect of regime institutions on the relationship between political instability and self-determination reform is strongest in the case of reforms that involve a major devolution of political autonomy to separatist minorities. As shown in the middle and bottom row of graphs, in the case of small-scale reforms that decentralize political authority to a lesser extent (e.g. establishment of regional councils with an advisory role) or do not entail any autonomy devolution at all (e.g. recognition of minority native tongue as an ocial language), the size of marginal eects does not change as much conditional upon the degree of institutional constraints to rule. This is expected in light of theory and earlier ndings, which showed that the inverse U-shaped relationship between institutional constraints and self-determination reform is weaker in the case of such small concessions compared to larger-scale autonomy reforms. The absence of a marked dierence between the slopes of lines representing dierent types of regimes - distinguished in terms of horizontal accountability - is consistent with the observation that the prospect of such "easy" concessions is less dependent on the degree of institutional constraints on executive power.

11More specically, commitment problems make separatist minorities unlikely to cooperate with a fully authoritarian government in negotiating an autonomy deal (or implementing one) given the latter’s inability to credibly commit to not reneging on the deal. My theory suggests that the presence of some institutional constraints on executive power, which decreases the perceived risk of government reneging on an autonomy bargain, remedy such commitment problems.

106 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses + ∗ ∗ + + 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ + 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 ∗ + ∗ ∗∗ 0.99 0.12 0.12 0.55 0.02 0.53 0.63 -0.57 ∗∗ ∗ ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ 0.21 0.18 0.03 -0.14 -0.18 -0.03 -0.53 -0.44 0.45 (0.44) (0.44) 1.07 -1.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ + 1.23 (0.41) (0.31) (0.01) 0.72 -0.76 ∗ + 1.38 1.14 1.11 1.20 (0.32) (0.46) (0.32) (0.01) 0.74 ∗ + 1.27 (0.41) (0.41) (0.57) (0.37) (0.02) ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ + ∗∗ 1.31 (0.46) (0.33) (0.02) (0.32) (0.34) (0.13) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM ∗ 1.37 1.24 1.87 1.17 (0.39) (0.53) (0.36) (0.04) (0.41) (0.36) (0.40) (0.38) (0.18) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) ∗ + 0.32 0.34 (1.40) (1.38) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63) (0.66) (0.65) (0.63) (0.22) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.50) (0.50)(0.99) (0.51) (1.00) (0.52) (0.96) (0.52) (1.00) (0.52) (1.00) (0.24) (1.00) (0.24) (0.66) (0.02) (0.69) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.45) (0.49) (0.58) (0.33) (0.03) Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 1) − t ( Threats * Hor. Acc. -0.03 -0.46 -0.77 Center-seekers * Hor. Acc.Center-seekers * Hor. Acc. * Hor. Acc.Threats * Hor. Acc. * Hor. Acc.Electoral Democracy Index 0.15 -1.71 -0.55 -0.82 -1.00 Separatist War 1.26 Horizontal Accountability squared -0.66 Factions within Minority 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.00 Ethnic Fractionalization New StateFederal State 1.89 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.65 Center-seeking Armed Groups -0.71 -0.47 1.66 Horizontal Accountability Index 0.66 0.65 Threats to Elite Survival -0.39 -0.22 1.15 Table 4.5: Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Incentive Hypotheses (H2a-b-c)

107 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses + ∗ ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 0.04 ∗ ∗∗ 0.07 0.09 (0.04) (0.04) 0.04 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.86 3.20 3.52 3.89 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.91 3.26 3.57 3.94 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.04 1.11 3.89 4.25 4.67 + ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ 0.12 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 2.91 0.81 3.26 3.68 -0.04 ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.89 3.59 3.94 4.36 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.04 1.10 4.37 5.15 4.73 + ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ 0.12 0.13 0.15 2.67 0.82 3.44 3.03 -0.04 ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)(0.16) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.16) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)(1.14) (0.27) (1.14)(1.14) (0.29) (1.07) (1.14)(1.13) (0.21) (1.16) (1.07) (1.13) (0.21) (1.20) (1.16) (1.05) (0.01) (1.14) (1.20) (1.15) (0.01) (0.57) (1.14) (1.19) (0.56) (0.57) (1.12) (0.55) (0.58) (0.56) -0.04 001 . 0 p < ∗∗∗ , 01 . 0 p < ∗∗ , 1) − 05 t . ( 0 p < ∗ , 1 . 0 p < Income Inequality Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a measure+ of years since last reform with cubic splines. Number of SD DemandsPost Cold War 0.06 0.04 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 Constant Years Since Last ReformCut Point 2 0.15 Cut Point 3Group Fixed EectsNumber of Observations 3.71 4.13 3146 Yes 3149 Yes 3149 Yes 3146 Yes 3149 Yes 3149 3149 Yes 3149 No 3149 No 3149 Yes Yes Cut Point 1 3.36

108 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform at Dierent Threat Levels, Moderated by Regime Institutions

Predicted Probabilities for Major Autonomy Reform (95% CIs)

.4 .4

.3 .3

.2 .2

.1 .1 Pr(SD Reform Level==3) Pr(SD Reform 0 0 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2

Number of Center-seeking Armed Groups (log) Number of Threats to Elite Survival (log)

Predicted Probabilities for Minor Autonomy Reform (95% CIs) .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 Pr(SD Reform Level==2) Pr(SD Reform 0 0 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2

Number of Center-seeking Armed Groups (log) Number of Threats to Elite Survival (log)

Predicted Probabilities for Cultural Reform (95% CIs)

.4 .4

.3 .3

.2 .2

.1 .1

0 0 Pr(Sd_Conc_Ordered==1) 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2

Number of Center-seeking Armed Groups (log) Number of Threats to Elite Survival (log)

109 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

What this fails to explain, however, is why the rise of threats to elite survival have a much less pronounced eect on the probability of smaller concessions compared to major autonomy reform when we look at states with moderate levels of accountability.12 A plausible explanation is that these small-scale reforms would fall short of facilitating a successful bargain between the government and separatist minorities amidst political instability. In a turbulent context where the center is weak and the ruling elite is vulnerable to threats to its survival, separatist minorities may also nd opportunities for violent mobilization and are unlikely to be co-opted through easy concessions that fall short of meaningful autonomy. The ndings can be evidence that, when dealing with more substantial threats to their rule than those posed by ethnic separatists, political leaders have no choice but to oer substantial autonomy concessions to the latter to be able to contain or prevent separatist conicts in the periphery.

4.2.3 Testing the Democratization Hypothesis: A Critical Juncture for Sepa- ratists?

Results from earlier models have shown that accommodative self-determination reform is most likely to occur during periods of political instability in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule. This key nding provides preliminary evidence in favor of the two conditions for minority accommodation that my theory emphasizes. While threats to elite survival that emerge amidst political instability generate the strategic incentives for co-opting separatist minorities, regime institutions that moderately constrain executive power provide the ruling elite with the capacity to legislate and implement reforms that will also be perceived as credible by the minority populations. The next set of models presented below test Hypothesis 3, which focuses on early democratization as a critical juncture where both capacity and incentive conditions are expected to be met. While institutional reforms undertaken as part of the democratization process raise the level of

12In other words, the fact that there is not a substantial dierence in slopes for dierent types of regimes does not explain why the slope of the red line, which represent states with moderate levels of horizontal accountability, is not that steep to begin with. This shows only a small amount of change in the likelihood of small-scale concessions as number of threats to center increases.

110 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses horizontal accountability from low to moderate levels and generate the conditions for credible reform, democratizers’ sense of vulnerability to threats to their political power in the early post-authoritarian period makes them prone to extend an olive branch to separatist minorities in an eort to avoid ghting battles at multiple fronts.

Models presented in Table 4.6 test the democratization hypothesis using dierent model specications as well as alternative measures of the independent variable. In Mod- els 21-24, coecient estimates are obtained from xed-eects ordered logit models using Polity- and CGV-based indicators for democratization. In all models except Model 21, the coecients for the democratization variable are positive as expected and statistically signicant. Model 22 predicts around a 2.5% increase in the probability of major autonomy reform following a recent increase in a state’s Polity score by 2 points or higher. On the other hand, results from Model 24 show that, for any given state, having experienced a democratic transition over the past three years increases the predicted probability of major autonomy reform from 2.4% to around 10%. The relatively smaller marginal eect in the former model can be explained by the fact that, due to its unrestrictive coding, Polity-based indicator might be capturing a lot of minor democratization cases that do not involve any changes in regime institutions or the domestic threat environment (i.e. cases with no shifts in elite capacity or incentives for reform). The CGV variable, on the other hand, only includes cases of democratic transition and is therefore a better proxy of politico-institutional changes in a state that might also transform state-minority relations. Not surprisingly, the marginal eects from both models are smaller when we look at minor autonomy reforms and cultural reforms, the probability of which increases by only around 2% in case of a recent CGV transition.

A comparison of coecient estimates in terms of eect size also shows that democratization experience in the past ve years is a weaker predictor of self-determination reform than having gone through democratization over the past three years. This is in line with case study ndings presented in later chapters, which show that newly democratic governments typically introduce pro-minority reforms within the rst few years of

111 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses the transition. My theory oers several explanations for why conditions for major autonomy reforms may become less propitious as a democracy ages. In some contexts, democratic regime may consolidate over time, raising institutional barriers to large-scale self- determination reform with the emergence of new veto factions that constrain executive power. That said, even in cases where the transition generates a competitive authoritarian regime rather than a fully democratic one and elite capacity to push forward reform re- mains high, self-determination reform may become less likely due to the disappearance or weakening of threats to elite survival that mark the early post-authoritarian period, which results in elites losing their strategic incentives to co-opt aggrieved minorities. With either mechanism at play, a distant democratization experience is expected to have less predictive power with respect to timing of self-determination reform than a more recent one.

Results from standard ordered logit models and LPMs also support the ndings. Estimated without xed eects, Models 25 and 26 show that democratization variables also hold explanatory power with respect to cross-dyad variation in self-determination reform. The predicted probability of major autonomy reform for states that underwent democratic transition in the past three years is around 6% higher than that for states with no recent democratization experience (Model 26). Similarly, the LPM estimates indicate a strong positive association between democratization and the likelihood of any level of self- determination reform. For any given dyad, democratic transition in the past three years increases the predicted probability of reform by around 9% (Model 28).

112 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses + ∗∗ 0.02 0.09 -0.00 ∗ + ∗∗∗ 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.63 1.26 ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ 0.090.81 0.04 1.28 0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 (0.47) (0.46) 0.70 + ∗ + ∗∗∗ 1.14 (0.49) (0.30) (0.03) 1.86 -0.04 + ∗ ∗ + 1.15 (0.49) -0.04 (H3) ∗ ∗ ∗∗ 1.23 (0.33) (0.22) (0.01) -0.04 FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM ∗ ∗ 0.50 0.53 -0.13 -0.16 1.19 (0.35) (1.34) (1.27) (1.38) (1.31) (0.42) (0.40) (0.06) (0.05) (0.54) (0.54)(1.03) (0.55) (1.06) (0.55) (1.00)(0.64) (0.23) (1.00) (0.63) (0.23) (0.84) (0.64) (0.02) (0.83) (0.64) (0.02) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) -0.04 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 1) − t (past 5 years) 1.21 (past 3 years) 1.74 ( (past 5 years)(past 3 years) 0.57 0.91 CGV CGV 1) − t ( P olity P olity CGV-based Indicators Democratic Transition Democratic Transition Polity IV-based Indicators Democratization Democratization Covariates Electoral Democracy Index Separatist War 1.20 Federal State 0.12 0.21 0.10 0.10 0.56 New StateEthnic FractionalizationIncome Inequality 1.54 1.30 1.84 -0.67 -0.76 Factions within Minority 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 Number of SD Demands 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 Table 4.6: Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Democratization Hypothesis

113 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses ∗ + ∗∗ 0.01 0.04 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 0.08 (0.04) (0.04) 0.04 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.88 3.67 3.98 4.35 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.85 4.10 4.41 4.78 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.16 1.05 4.02 4.37 4.79 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.16 1.03 4.05 4.40 4.82 ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.17 1.02 4.35 4.70 5.11 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 001 . (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)(0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (1.10) (1.07) (1.08) (1.09) (0.58) (0.51) (1.10) (1.06) (1.08) (1.09) (0.58) (0.51) (1.08) (1.04) (1.07) (1.07) (0.59) (0.52) 0 p < ∗∗∗ , 01 . 0 p < ∗∗ , 05 . 0 p < ∗ , 10 . 0 p < Years Since Last Reform 0.16 Post Cold WarConstant 0.98 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a+ measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. Cut Point 1 4.28 Cut Point 2 4.62 Cut Point 3 5.04 Group Fixed EectsNumber of Observations 3146 Yes 3146 Yes 3146 Yes 3146 Yes 3146 No 3146 3146 No 3146 Yes Yes

114 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

4.2.4 Testing the Transition Path Hypothesis: Mass-Driven Democratization and Reputational Incentives

Finally, the next set of models presented in Table 4.7 test the hypothesis that certain democratization paths are more conducive to government concessions over self-determination than others. It is expected that, where democratization is driven by pressures from pro- democracy masses, repression of minority populations can generate reputational costs in addition to the strategic ones that result from political instability. Hence, elite incentives for accommodation will be stronger and self-determination reform will be more likely in such mass-driven transitions in comparison to democratization processes that are initiated absent any pressure from the masses either by the incumbent itself or reform-minded authoritarian elites from its winning coalition (Hypothesis 4).

Models 29, 32 and 35 test the eect of transition path on self-determination reform using the Polity-based measure of democratization in three dierent model specications. In the rst model estimated with a xed-eects ordered logit regression, mass-driven democratization in the past three years appears to have a positive eect on the minority achieving a higher level of self-determination reform in a given year, which is statistically signicant at the 0.01 level. Results from the other two models using Polity indicators are consistent with this nding; one dierence is that their coecient estimates for elite-driven democratization are also signicant. For instance, the LPM estimates from Model 35 reveal that, for a given state-minority dyad, a recent move towards democracy preceded by mass protests predicts around a 7% increase in the probability of any degree of concessions over self-determination, compared to a smaller increase around 4% in the case of recent elite-led democratization.

I also estimate the models using the CGV’s relatively more restrictive coding of democratization that only marks cases where the country has transitioned from autocracy to an electoral democracy. The rst CGV-based measure I use indicates whether the country had a democratic transition in the past three years. Among the three models that use this measure (Models 30, 33, and 36), only the coecients from the standard ordered logit

115 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses model (Model 33) support earlier ndings, showing that recent mass-driven transition has a stronger positive eect on the likelihood of observing a higher degree of self-determination reform in a given year compared to recent elite-driven transition. While the coecients for both types of transition are signicant in other models as well, results from Model 30 contradict my hypothesis, with a slightly larger coecient for elite-driven transition. Model 36 also fails to provide strong support for Hypothesis 4, given the very small dierence in the coecient estimates for the two types of democratic transition. These contradictory ndings could mean that the hypothesis is weakly supported and that democratizing elites are not as concerned about reputational costs of minority repression as my theory suggests. That said, the results may not be entirely reliable given the fact that the particular CGV measure used in these models, which only records transitions from the past three years preceding the year of observation, fails to take into account a number of cases where democratic transition and self-determination reform were observed in the same year (e.g. Indonesia 1999, Mali 1992).

To see if this measurement choice had any signicant eect on the results, I estimate another set of models using a CGV-based transition variable that indicates whether the country had a democratic transition in the current or past three years.13 A comparison of coecient estimates for elite- and mass-driven transitions from Models 30 and 31 suggests that Hypothesis 4 nds strong support when we also account for democratic transitions that occur in the year of observation. In fact, consistent with ndings from models using the Polity-based measures, all three models using the alternative CGV-based variable (Mod- els 31, 34 and 37) produce coecient estimates for mass-driven transition that are larger than those for elite-driven transition. Model 31 nds that, for any given state-minority dyad, the predicted probability of major autonomy reform increases by 7% if the country experiences a democratic transition triggered by mass protests for regime change, and by around 5% in the case of a recent elite-driven transition that occurs absent bottom-up pressures. The dierence in marginal eects is more pronounced when we look at stan-

13Unlike in the case of Polity scores where including the current year would be an issue, endogeneity is not a major concern here given that the CGV variable codes cases of democratic transition following a procedural denition that only takes into account multi-party elections and alternation in power.

116 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses dard ordered logit and LPM estimates. Results from Model 34 show that states that have recently experienced a mass-driven democratic transition have a 10.7% predicted probability of adopting major autonomy reform, compared to 5.8% for states that have undergone a elite-driven transition and 2.4% for states that had no regime change. Finally, estimating a linear probability model with a binary measure of reform, Model 37 nds that the probability of any type of self-determination reform being observed in a given state-minority dyad year increases from 4.5% (no transition) to 10.6% in the case of recent elite-driven transition and 15.4% in the case of recent mass-driven transition. Overall, with the exception of two models, results presented in Table 4.7 largely support Hypothesis 4.

Figure 4.4. displays these predicted probabilities from Model 34, as well as those calculated for minor autonomy reform and cultural reform. Consistent with earlier models, recent democratization (of either type) appears to have a larger marginal eect on the probability of major autonomy reform compared to less substantial reforms. In the case of mass-driven transition, this nding may be explained by the fact that lesser concessions such as cultural and linguistic rights are typically extended either in conjunction with larger concessions to strong separatists or as the only accommodation to weaker groups with low mobilization capacity (e.g. indigenous peoples); in the latter case, reform initiatives are primarily driven by reputational incentives. On the other hand, major autonomy reform is typically achieved by militarily powerful groups and result from both strategic incentives to contain separatist conict as well as reputational concerns over avoiding a brutal crackdown on the minority population. The larger marginal eect of mass-driven transition shown in Figure 4.4(a) compared to (b) and (c) likely captures this dierence, with both strategic and reputational incentive mechanisms being at play in determining the predicted probability of major autonomy reform.

117 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

Figure 4.4: Predicted Probability of Dierent Degrees of Self-Determination Reform by Transition Type

(a) Major Autonomy Reform

(a) Minor Autonomy Reform (b) Cultural Reform

118 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses + + ∗∗ 0.06 0.11 -0.00 + ∗ ∗ 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.00 ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.93 0.47 1.12 1.63 + ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.87 0.64 1.10 -0.78 1.43 + + ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.091.06 0.05 1.28 0.00 1.26 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 (0.47) (0.46) 1.26 + ∗ ∗ + ∗∗ 1.19 (0.71)(0.52) (0.40) (0.31) (0.03) (0.04) 1.99 -0.04 Path (H4) + ∗ + ∗∗ ∗∗ 1.12 (0.74)(0.59) (0.41) (0.38) (0.04) (0.04) -0.04 FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM ∗ ∗ ∗∗ 0.55 -0.12 0.68 1.21 (1.28) (1.30)(0.57) (1.32) (0.55)(1.11) (0.41) (0.56) (1.00)(0.63) (0.40) (0.23) (1.02) (0.63) (0.38) (0.23) (0.86) (0.64) (0.06) (0.22) (0.83) (0.22) (0.05) (0.02) (0.83) (0.22) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) (0.19) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.41)(0.48) (0.25) (0.30) (0.01) (0.02) -0.04 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 (past 3) 1.43 (past 3) 0.63 0.48 1) P olity P olity (current or past 3) 1.70 (past 3) 1.59 − (current or past 3) 1.43 (past 3) 1.92 t ( CGV CGV CGV CGV 1) − t ( Income Inequality Mass-driven Transition Covariates Electoral Democracy Index Mass-driven Transition Elite-driven Transition Separatist WarNew StateFederal StateEthnic Fractionalization 1.25 1.55 0.17 1.85 0.09 0.04 0.59 -0.77 Mass-driven Democratization CGV-based Indicators Elite-driven Transition Polity IV-based Indicators Elite-driven Democratization Table 4.7: Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Eect of Democratization

119 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses + + ∗∗ 0.01 0.08 0.04 ∗ + ∗∗ 0.01 0.04 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 0.08 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 0.04 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.88 4.13 4.50 3.83 ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 3.94 4.31 3.64 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.85 4.34 4.71 4.03 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.15 1.04 4.53 4.95 4.18 + ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 0.15 1.05 4.36 4.78 4.01 ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02)(0.19) (0.02) (0.18)(0.17) (0.01) (0.18) (0.16) (0.01) (0.12) (0.16) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.00) (0.12) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (1.06) (1.09)(1.06) (1.09) (1.09)(1.04) (0.57) (1.08) (1.08) (0.50) (0.56) (1.07) (0.48) (0.50) (0.58) (0.48) (0.52) (0.50) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 001 . 0 p < ∗∗∗ , 01 . 0 p < ∗∗ , 05 . 0 p < ∗ , 10 . 0 p < Factions within MinorityNumber of SD DemandsPost Cold War 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.16 0.06 1.02 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a+ measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. Years Since Last Reform 0.18 Cut Point 2Cut Point 3Group Fixed EectsNumber of Observations 4.86 5.28 Yes 3146 3146 Yes 3146 Yes 3146 No 3146 No 3146 No 3146 3146 Yes 3146 Yes Yes Constant Cut Point 1 4.51

120 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses

4.3 Additional Robustness Checks

Models 1-37 presented in earlier sections checked the robustness of ndings using alternative model specications and dierent operationalizations of the dependent and independent variables. As an additional robustness check, I run the same models using a more recent dataset that contains information on government accommodation of self- determination demands. The Self-Determination Movements (SDM) dataset created by Sambanis, Germann and Schädel (2018) identies a larger number of ethnic groups with separatist demands and expands coverage to 1945-2012. The SDM authors identify selection problems in earlier data used in empirical studies of separatism, including Cunning- ham’s (2014)14, which rely on two data sources15 that are "biased in favor of including cases of highly mobilized, violent SDMs in less developed and to some extent less democratic countries" (Sambanis, Germann and Schädel 2018, 2). The size of the dierence in coverage between the SDM dataset and earlier datasets is substantial; the SDM data contains 464 state-minority dyads, in comparison to 142 dyads identied by Cunningham (2014). The reason why I run the main models using Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham (2016) is because they code concessions for all the self-determination movements included in the dataset, whereas the SDM only codes data on accommodation and other attributes of separatist disputes for a randomly drawn sample of 106 dyads. Statistical tests conducted with the latter exclude a signicant number of state-minority dyads that experienced a democratic transition and therefore represent cases of interest, but were not drawn into the SDM sample. As such, the former dataset allows me to use data on transition outcomes from these excluded cases, while the SDM dataset is useful for checking the robustness of ndings given the potential selection problem in the former.

The results from the replication of models using the SDM dataset are reported in Appendix. Overall, the ndings are largely consistent with those obtained from models

14Concessions data used in Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham (2016) largely match Cunnigham (2014), notwithstanding some minor dierences in case universe and number of observations. 15These commonly used sources of data are Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (Gurr 1993) and the Peace and Conict reports published by the Center of International Development and Conict Management (CIDCM; in particular, Marshall and Gurr 2003, 2005)

121 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses using Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham (2016).

4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 4 presented statistical analyses to test several hypotheses derived from my theory of self-determination reform. One key prediction that the models have sought to evaluate is that government accommodation of self-determination demands are most likely to occur in regimes where the ruling elite governs under limited institutional constraints to rule and faces threats to its survival that generate strategic incentives to co-opt minority populations. The two conditions, my theory argues, are most likely to be observed in tandem in states undergoing incipient democratization.

The rst set of models has examined the relationship between institutional constraints to rule and self-determination reform. The ndings from the models support Hy- pothesis 1b, showing a non-monotonous relationship between several measures used to operationalize institutional constraints on executive power and policies that accommodate self-determination demands. Major autonomy reforms such as the creation of an autonomous region appear more likely to occur in states with moderate institutional constraints to rule (e.g. hybrid regimes or democratizing states) compared to those where the ruling elite is either highly constrained by institutionally empowered veto players, as in advanced democracies, or face no constraints to its power and therefore lack the ability to make credible commitments, as in fully authoritarian regimes.

The next set of models has put to test my main argument that political instability, operationalized as the number of threats to elite survival, paves the way for self- determination reform by incentivizing the ruling elite to co-opt separatist minorities. The ndings show that, in countries where the ruling elite is moderately accountable to institutional veto players (i.e. high capacity for reform), an increase in threats to elite survival has a signicant and positive eect on the probability of an ethnic minority achieving higher degrees of concessions over self-determination. As expected, the relationship between threats to elite survival and self-determination reform is a lot less pronounced for

122 Chapter 4 Statistical Analyses other regime types where institutional constraints to rule are either too high or too low.

After testing the "capacity" and "incentive" hypotheses separately, I have introduced another set of models to evaluate the hypothesis that democratization is a critical juncture for the attainment of self-determination goals. In line with Hypothesis 3, the ndings show that major autonomy concessions to ethnic minorities are most likely to be observed during periods of early democratization, where both elite capacity and incentives for minority accommodation tend to be high. Finally, comparing across state-minority dyads in democratizing states, the last set of models reveals that self-determination reform is more likely to occur following a mass-driven democratic transition, where democratizing elites develop both strategic and reputational incentives to adopt conciliatory minority policies.

The way Chapter 4 has presented the models reect the steps that were followed to build theory in Chapter 3. Establishing that self-determination reforms are most likely to be observed in regimes with moderate institutional constraints to rule undergoing a period of political instability helps understand why early democratization, as a period typically characterized by both of these conditions, opens up a window of opportunity for separatist ethnic minorities to achieve autonomy concessions. What the statistical analyses fail to shed light on, however, are the causal processes that generate the statistical relationship between democratization and self-determination reform. In the next chapter, an in-depth case study of the Philippines-Moro separatists is introduced to help assess whether the causal mechanisms proposed in Chapter 3, described as strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation, help explain why self-determination reform is most frequently observed in emerging democracies.

123 Chapter 5

State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

In order to illustrate the causal mechanisms identied in theory development in Chapter 3, this chapter presents qualitative evidence from the early democratization period of the Philippines in the mid-1980s, which was marked by Aquino government’s accommodative policies towards autonomy-seeking minorities. I choose the Philippines as a typical case (also known as an on-the-line case) that is well explained by the model and helps probe the causal mechanisms identied by my theory (Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008). As such, the case study helps illustrate how strategic and reputational incentives to co-opt separatist minorities, combined with rising institutional constraints on executive power from low to moderate levels, paved the way for the introduction of accommodative self-determination reform during the Philippines’ incipient democratization. The qualitative evidence comes from secondary sources and more than 30 semi-structured interviews conducted during eldwork in the Philippines. Identied through snowball sampling, interview subjects included government and military ocials, human rights activists, constitutional committee members and rebel elite cadres who closely witnessed the trajectory of state-minority relations during the Philippines’ democratization period in the mid-1980s.

124 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

5.1 A Brief History of the Moro Peoples

The Muslim Moro peoples reside in the major island grouping of Mindanao1 and the Sulu Archipelago, located in the southernmost part of the Philippines (See Figure 5.1). The Mo- ros comprise around 5-6 percent of the country’s predominantly Christian population and 24 percent of the population in Mindanao (POPCEN 2015). The "Moro" or "Bangsamoro" problem of the Philippines is commonly described as a struggle of a minority people against political and cultural assimilation and economic marginalization (Mercado 1992, 159). As Santos (2005, 1) puts it, the origins of the Moro armed struggle for self-determination lies in the "historical and systematic marginalization" of the Moro peoples in their homeland, "rst by colonial powers Spain from the 16th to 19th century, then the U.S. during the rst half of the 20th century, and more recently by successor Philippines governments dominated by an elite with a Christian-Western orientation since formal independence in 1946."

Figure 5.1: Maps of the Philippines and Mindanao2

1Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao are the three major island groupings in the Philippines, which are composed of more than 7,100 islands. The transformation of the Philippine archipelago into a single political unit occurred during Spanish colonial rule which lasted between from 16th to late 19th century. 2UN Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs (OCHA) Regional Oce for Asia Pacic (ROAP), "Philippines: National Reference Map - Mindanao," UN Cartographic Section, Global Discovery,

125 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

Although their common characterization as a repressed Muslim minority in a Christian-dominated country suggests unity, the term "Moros" actually refers to a collective of thirteen ethnolinguistic groups3 whose conversion into Islam started in early 14th century following the arrival of Arab traders and missionaries from the Middle East. From then on until the end of 19th century, these groups lived under the dominion of four Mus- lim sultanates that held sway in Mindanao: the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, Buayan and Ranao. Externally, the sultanates were independent and sovereign political entities and had diplomatic and trade relations with countries in the region as well as the British and the Dutch (Hussin 2003, 11); internally, they were far from resembling a unied political entity as cross-tribal unity was hardly achieved and Moros’ loyalties lied primarily with their traditional leaders, known as datus, local warlords and ethnolinguistic group (Keister 2011, 121). During the Spanish colonial period, the sultanates successfully defended their territories from occupation and became notorious for acts of piracy against Spanish settlements in the Visayas, largely attacking their ships and terrorizing coastal towns (Minahan 2002, 1323).

The Spanish colonizers were the rst to refer to the Islamicized populations of the Southern Philippines as "Moro," a pejorative term that they used for the Muslims from North Africa (known as the Moors) who had previously ruled over the Iberian Peninsula for eight centuries. Interestingly, the term "Bangsa Moro," which translates as Moro nation, would later become the "adopted collective name of the identity entrepreneurs who were mobilized around ethno-nationalist sentiments in the late 1960s" (Ferrer 2016, 121). One of the foundations of the modern Moro self-determination claims is the fact that, although most of the northern Philippines had come under Spanish control by the end of 16th century, the Moro peoples under the leadership of sultans and datus had successfully resisted subjugation by the Spanish colonial regime for some 330 years. Moro resistance continued into the 20th century after the Spanish colonizers ceded all the Philippine islands, includ- https://reliefweb.int/map/philippines/philippines-national-reference-map-mindanao-21-september-2006. 3The thirteen groups are the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Sama, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kolibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawanon, Kalagan and Molbog. The rst three constitute the majority, making up around 66 percent of the country’s Muslim population (Ferrer 2005, 140).

126 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines ing Mindanao, to the United States with the 1898 Treaty of Paris. Muslim Moro leaders asserted that their territories should have been excluded from the transfer of sovereignty to the United States given that they had never come under Spanish control (Lingga 2016, 134). With their superior military technology and co-optation tactics, American colonizers were nevertheless successful in suppressing Moro resistance, rst through a mixture of political payouts and brutal repression under military rule (1899-1913), and later, through resettlement programs and "integrationist" local governance and education policies.

By the 1920s, the policy of Filipinization was accelerated as part of an eort to pre- pare the country for independence, with the rapid departure of American personnel from local public administration and their replacement with Filipino bureaucrats (Montiel et al. 2012). Having already acknowledged American sovereignty at the time, Muslim leaders feared becoming part of an independent Philippines governed by the Christian Filipinos. The Muslim demand for recognition of Mindanao as a separate entity from the Philip- pines was expressed in a series of petitions and resolutions adopted until the 1930s; these included a 1921 petition sent to the American President Warren Harding by prominent Muslims from Sulu who demanded to be part of the US rather than being included in the Philippines, the 1924 Zamboanga Declaration with similar demands that was sent to the US Congress by a group of Muslim leaders, and a 1935 letter to President Roosevelt from 121 Maranao datus "requesting either continuation of American rule or a separate independence" (May 1992, 126; Carnegie et al. 2016, 125). These eorts are cited by some scholars as early expressions of the "right to self-determine" (see e.g. Diaz 2003, 37), which were largely ignored by the Americans. The Mindanao and Sulu islands were placed under the administration of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 and became part of the newly independent Philippines in 1946.

5.2 Origins of the Modern Moro Conict

The dominant narrative about the seeds of Moro separatism is that it is a continuation of "centuries-old Moro resistance" against subjugation by the Spanish and American col-

127 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines onizers and the Christian Filipino governments that eventually replaced them. Scholars who point to the complexity of Moro history are critical of this orthodox view, which tends to generate historically deterministic conclusions about the inevitability of an ethno- nationalist separatist movement in Mindanao. As prominent critiques of this narrative, McKenna (1998) and Abinales (2016) discuss how the history of Moro resistance was in fact paralleled by periods of Moro elite collaboration and mutual accommodation with the imperialists. To elaborate on this point, Abinales (2016, 43-6) writes:

There is an element of a Hobsbawmian "invented tradition" in the foisting of this chronicle of the centuries-old Moro resistance. It assumes, among other things, a singular unrelenting act (resistance) with a single purpose (defense of the umma), when in fact it is not. Conict was outsiders was intermittent (and in one particular period - the Spanish era - Muslims were not resisting but were in fact on the oensive), and for most of this long duree what prevailed in the Muslim zones was a fragile peace between Muslims, settlers and Lumad... During the colonial period armed revolts were few, and when they did occur they were motivated less by grand visions that by localized exigent demands (including taxation, abuses by colonial ocials, the end of slave trade, and intra-elite conict).

These critiques remind us that, although resistance and conict have dened the geography of Mindanao for centuries, much of the earlier struggles were rooted in local power struggles and economic grievances that had little to do with concerns over preserving a collective "Moro" identity. In fact, on the part of the sultans and datus who had the allegiance of dierent Moro ethnic groups, a common response to Mindanao’s inclusion in the independent Philippine state was "to adjust to the political changes on top" to be able to keep authority over "constituents at the bottom" (Abinales 2000).

Although the depiction of the modern Moro conict having its roots in the "centuries-old resistance" against outside powers is largely a mischaracterization, some of the policies that were adopted by the colonizers and the Filipino state to govern Min- danao became major catalysts of the separatist conict. In fact, among the root causes of Moro struggle are the discriminatory public land laws and resettlement policies that

128 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines were adopted during American colonial rule and intensied under the new Philippine state, which completely transformed the demographics of Mindanao. A series of laws introduced by the US colonial government4 and remained in eect after independence institutionalized private land ownership, declared null and void traditional communal systems of land ownership and distribution, and mandated the ocial registration and titling of lands, which left dispossessed the Muslim and other indigenous peoples in Mindanao who were alien to these non-traditional institutions and lacked the appropriate education to consolidate their land claims under valid titles (Montiel et al. 2012, 76; Diaz 2003, 31). The increasing marginalization of local Mindanao populations in their own ancestral lands were made worse by the collaboration of Muslim datus with Christian settlers and businessmen who took advantage of the new legal system (Glang 1969).

In addition to land laws, resettlement programs contributed to the marginalization of the Moros in their homeland. These programs were rst introduced by the Ameri- cans with the 1913 Philippine Commission Acts 2254 and 2280, which created agricultural colonies where Christian Filipino migrants from the north were encouraged to settle (Keis- ter 2011, 123). Similar policies such as the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act (1935) were enacted in the Commonwealth period, as the growing number of plantations increased demands for farm labor (McKenna 1998, 115-6). The early post-independence years saw an upsurge in Christian settlements in Mindanao, which helped ease population pressures in the northern islands. The Filipino government saw internal migration as a measure that could help contain the the Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion (1946-1954), which was waged by landless agrarian peasants who demanded land reform. For instance, in 1950, the military-

4These laws were (a) Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, November 1902) mandating the registration of all lands occupied by any person or group, (b) Public Land Act (Act No. 718, April 1903) voiding the land grants made by Moro sultans, datus, and chiefs of tribes, (c) Public Land Act No. 926 (October 1903) declaring all lands not registered under Act No. 496 as public lands, and therefore available for homesteading, purchase or lease, (d) Mining Law of 1905 declaring all public lands as free to exploration, occupation and purchase by citizens of the Philippines and the US, (e) Cadastral Act of 1907 facilitating land titling, and (f) Public Land Act 2874 (1919) allowing Christian Filipinos to apply for 24 hectares of land (1024 hectares were allowed for corporations), while limiting Muslims to 10 hectares. The Commonwealth Act 141 introduced in November 1936 superseded the Act 2874 of 1919 and modied its provisions on land allocation, reducing the land area for Muslims to 4 hectares. Provision for Christian homesteaders was change to 16 hectares (still four times what the Muslims could own) while the provision for corporations remained at 1024 hectares (Muslim 1992, 18-19; Batistiana 2009, 92).

129 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines administered Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program was introduced to resettle surrendered Huk rebels and other landless farmers in homesteads in Mindanao in an ef- fort to "partly defuse the agrarian rebellion in Central Luzon" (Ferrer 1999, 42). A larger- scale immigration to Mindanao came about in 1955 when President Magsaysay established the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), which resettled around over 20,000 landless families, mostly in the rich farmland of Mindanao (Abaton Muslim 1994; Keister 2011).

Figure 5.2: Population Share of Moros in Mindanao (1903-2000)5

Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the dramatic transformation of Mindanao population over the course of the 20th century, which marginalized the Muslim Moros and indigenous Lumad peoples in their homeland. As the census data show, in the beginning of US colonial period at the turn of the century, the Moros comprised around 76 percent of Mindanao’s population. By the late 1930s, which marked the early years of the Philippine Common- wealth, the Moros had been relegated to a minority position, making up a mere 34 percent of the Mindanaoans. By the time the Moro separatist insurgency was launched in the late 1960s, the Muslims’ share of the Mindanao population had already come down to around 20 percent.

5"Population Make-up of Mindanao (1903-2000)." Menandro Sarion Abanes, Ethno-religious Identication and Intergroup Contact Avoidance: An empirical study on Christian-Muslim relations in the Philippines (Nijmegen Studies in Development and Cultural Change, LIT Verlag, 2014). 6"Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-1990)."; Soliman M. Jr. Santos, The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2000).

130 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

Figure 5.3: Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-1990)6

Just as the narrative of a "centuries-old Moro resistance" is awed, it is similarly problematic to assume that the Muslims or other indigenous populations in Mindanao had a long history of grievances about Christian settlements and eventually took up arms to defend their lands. As demographers Frederick Wernstedt and Paul Simkins (1965) point out, despite the massive human ow that brought around 2-million people into Mindanao between 1946 and 1960, most of these settlers were placed in Muslim-claimed but unoccu- pied lands; hence; there were few clashes with the locals during that period. Additionally, the majority of the Christian settlers consisted of the landless poor and, due to state’s inca- pacity to eectively supervise and regulate the settlement programs and implementation of land laws, largely suered from poverty, hunger and famine at the time, similar to local Muslim and Lumad populations (Sandoval 1957). There are also several accounts of Muslims and Christians living in peace and collaborating in local politics prior to the escalation of violence in the 1960s. Diaz (2003, 27), for instance, notes that resentments about the Christians taking over Moro lands, often expressed by Moro nationalists and separatist rebels, are in fact "more of an afterthought:"

The early datus and the middle class who welcomed the Christians did not consider them intruders and land grabbers. The provided the Christians with lands and protected them as their subjects even if, perhaps, another class of subjects.

131 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

Otherwise, Christian communities like Tapayan in Sultan Kudarat, Maguin- danao and Tunggol in Pagalungan, Maguindanao could not have survived in a socio-cultural and physical environment completely strange to them... To some extent, the Christian settlers enhanced the prestige and power of the datu. In exchange for patronage and protection, the Christians... lived as good, loyal subjects respecting the Muslim customs, traditions and Islam... By the 1960s, the Christian votes had become critical to the winning or losing in local elections. To win Christian votes, datus running for mayor had Christians for vice mayor and a fair number for councilors.

Abinales (2016, 52) similarly discusses how the Moro-Christian "peace" in Min- danao in the 1950s was "ensured by the Muslim elites themselves who saw the settlement zones as new constituents in their patronage games with national elites." However, peaceful relations would last only until the late 1960s, when demographic shifts in Mindanao exacerbated Moro-Christian tensions by fueling land disputes and political rivalries. An increasingly large number of Muslim and Lumad people as well as pre-war immigrant settlers found themselves dispossessed of their land due to discriminatory land laws, ex- tortions by elites and land-grabbing. Economic impoverishment led to the ourishing of banditry, cattle-rustling, raiding and illegal logging operations, encouraging landowners and wealthy politicians "to hire armed goons and private armies, while Muslim and tribal groups organized along clan lines" (May 1992, 129). By 1970, violence in Mindanao had become highly sectarian; one form of sectarian violence consisted of Christian uprisings against oppressive and extortionists Muslim datus, while the other form consisted of organized assaults on Muslim communities (McKenna 1998, 154).

Further exacerbating these inter-communal tensions was the emergence of political rivalries between settler and Muslim elites. Christian politicians from settler communities had begun to gain more support from local constituents and establish their own power bases, which threatened the political supremacy of the Muslim datus. The eect of these rivalries was an increase in hostilities between Muslim and Christians prior to the Novem- ber 1971 elections (Che Man 1990). With support from these politicians, uniformed and armed bands of Christians called the Ilaga, or "Rats," began to terrorize Moros in an eort

132 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines to drive them away from towns and help ensure Christian electoral victory in tradition- ally Muslim territories (Majul 1985). In return, the Muslims formed their own paramilitary groups, calling themselves the "Blackshirts" and "Barracudas," to defend their communities from Ilaga terror and retaliate in kind against the Christians. As McKenna (1998, 154) writes, what was most distressing to Moro Muslims was the "ample circumstantial evidence implicating the Philippine Constabulary" in supporting the Ilaga gangs who had massacred7 scores of Muslim civilians. A series of atrocities directly perpetrated by the Philippine Army and Constabulary units in Mindanao also had a strong radicalizing eect on the Moro masses.

5.3 Armed Separatism in Mindanao: the Moro National Liberation

Front

Apart from increasing sectarian violence and the Ilaga terror, a crucial event that prompted the rise of Muslim separatism was the 1968 Jabidah massacre (also known as the "Corregi- dor Incident"), which involved the killing of Moro soldiers who were being trained in the island of Corregidor for a covert military operation to take over Sabah region from Malaysia. The massacre came to light when one of the survivors reported that 28 mutinous Muslim trainees were executed by army troops after protesting the conditions of their training and demanding to return home (Majul 1985; McKenna 1998). The incident was heavily publicized by the media and its aftermath was marked by a series of rallies by both Muslim and Christian activists in Mindanao and Manila, as well as congressional investigations and military trials. For the political opposition, Jabidah killings provided an opportunity to heavily criticize the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos. For the Moro Muslims, the incident became "a touchstone of anti-Manila sentiment" (Keister 2011, 128), fueling the formation of an ethno-nationalist separatist movement.

7The most appalling act of terror perpetrated by the Ilaga was the Manili Massacre (1971), which refers to the mass murder of 70-80 Muslim men, women and children who were gathered by a group of armed Ilagas into a mosque under the pretext of a peace conference. The fact that Manili was under the control of Philip- pine Constabulary at the time, which had failed to respond to the massacre, strengthened Muslim leaders’ suspicion that there was collusion between agents of the state, Christian politicians and Ilaga terrorists.

133 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

In May 1968, Datu Udtog Matalam, a traditional Muslim leader and ex-governor of the Cotabato province, founded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM)8, whose manifesto declared an intention to secede from the Philippines in order to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao and Sulu. The MIM and its secessionist ideals failed to gain much popularity among the Filipino Muslims and remained a "paper movement" whose political actions was limited to manifestos and declarations drawing attention to the Muslim plight (Diaz 2003, 104). In fact, owing to its establishment only six weeks after the Jabidah massacre, the movement was taken more seriously by Christian settlers and Manila than it was by the Muslims (McKenna 1998). President Marcos met with Datu Udtug and appointed him presidential adviser on Muslim aairs; at the same time, combat-ready troops were airlifted to Cotabato (George 1980).

Although the MIM did not become the vanguard of Muslim separatism in Min- danao, it did inspire others that would assume this role. As McKenna (1998, 147) writes, the movement had a lasting impact by "attracting mostly young, educated Muslims either disenchanted with or debarred from Muslim electoral politics" and increasing their political activity in the Moro provinces. Among this young generation of Muslim separatists was Nur Misuari, who was among the rst batch of MIM recruits (known as the "Top 90") sent for military training in Malaysia in 1969 (Ferrer 2005, 119). With the members of the Top 90, Misuari founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972. The striking aspect of this new liberation movement was that it was launched by the younger generation of non-aristocratic Moro counter-elite9 rather than the traditional Muslim leaders,

8To assure the non-Muslim communities that they would be welcome in the new state, the name was changed to Mindanao Independence Movement shortly after. 9Ironically, the emergence of this Muslim counter-elite was facilitated by the Commission on National Inte- gration (1957) scholarships, which provided an opportunity for non-elite Muslim students from Mindanao to attend universities in Manila. During their education, they gained rst-hand exposure to anti-Muslim sentiments in the nation’s capital, especially after Marcos’s election as president in 1965, and became more involved in anti-government activism following the Jabidah killings. In Muslim Rulers and Rebels, Thomas McKenna writes (1998, 142-3): "Nur Misuari was a Tausug from Sulu and the son of a very poor family. Supported by a CNI scholarship, he had graduated from the University of the Philippines and by 1968 was teaching there in the Department of Political Science. Misuari had been active in progressive student politics for some time but, shortly before 1968, had begun to focus his eorts on issues specic to Philippine Muslims... Misuari has stated that it was the Jabidah protests that inspired his political career and motivated his rise to the leadership of the Muslim separatist movement (Majul 1985, 45)."

134 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines who were perceived by the former as opportunistic and "a party to the oppression being waged against the Bangsa Moro people" (George 1980, 201-2). Misuari had nevertheless established a pragmatic relationship with some prominent Muslim leaders such as Con- gressmen Salipada Pendatun and Rashid Lucman, who had arranged the travel of Top 90 to Malaysia for training and later played a key role in securing foreign military and diplomatic assistance to the Moro liberation, most notably from Libya, Malaysia and other members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The establishment of the MNLF marked the beginning of the Moro separatist war against the Philippine state. Issued in 1974, the MNLF manifesto stated as the group’s goal "to secure a free and independent state for the Bangsa Moro people," declaring armed struggle as the only means to achieve complete freedom for the Moros.10 As Che Man (1990, 82) notes, the Front operated as a region-wide network that aimed to consolidate the various Moro armed groups ghting against the Marcos regime and lacked a strict hierarchical structures:

The basic components of the MNLF organizational structure consisted of a Central Committee, headed by a chairman chosen from among its members, and provincial committees. The Central Committee, ocially formed in Libya in 1974, functioned as the "executive" body of the Front... Unlike most conventional revolutionary organizations, the MNLF Central Committee operated outside the Moro homeland. Its leaders directed their eorts mainly at cultivat- ing external support, leaving the task of ghting and organizing to local leaders... In the homeland, provincial revolutionary committees were established in dierent Moro provinces... The major functions of the provincial committees were to consolidate the existing Moro armed groups within the province, to recruit and train Moro ghters, and to ght the war. But the boundaries dif- ferentiating Moro groups ghting under and outside the Front remained uid."

Despite its loosely knit structure and inability to coalesce all Muslim armed groups under its banner, the MNLF was successful in ascending to a leadership role in the Muslim sep-

10Hajji Nur Misuari, Chairman, Central Committee, Moro National Liberation Front, "The Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front: Establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republic," Bangsa Moro Homeland, 28 April 1974, Appendix 3 of W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990) 189-90.

135 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines aratist insurgency. Much of this success owed to MNLF’s ability to secure large amounts of external assistance and become the "major supplier of arms and ideological support for the insurgency" (McKenna 1998, 157).

5.4 State Policy Towards the "Moro Problem" Under the Marcos

Dictatorship

5.4.1 Early Martial Law Years and Military Crackdown

In September 1972, President Marcos declared martial law, marking the beginning of a dictatorship that would last until the 1986 People Power Revolution. Among Marcos’ jus- tications for the power grab was to protect the country from the violence perpetrated by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Muslim secessionist insurgency in Mindanao. However, to most observers, it was clear that Marcos’ actual intention was to avoid stepping down from power after two consecutive terms in oce. Proclamation No. 1081, which ocially declared martial law, stated that most of of Mindanao and Sulu were virtually "in a state of actual war" and referred to MIM as one of the main perpetrators. However, most historical accounts of this period point out that Muslim-Christian violence in the South had actually started to wane at the time. McKenna (1998, 156), for instance, notes that no serious incidents had been reported in the six months preceding the imposition of martial law, and the MIM had been inactive for more than a year. Filipino historian Cesar Majul (1985, 59) oers a similar account of how the rst half of 1972 in Mindanao saw no large-scale skirmishes or massacres. He adds that the Ilaga terror in Moro provinces of Lanao and Cotabato had diminished by that time, possibly because "they had already performed their function there" by securing victory for almost all Christian candidates in the November 1971 elections.

Overall, the chronology of events by most historical accounts show that Marcos’ martial law was in fact not the consequence, but a catalyst of the Muslim rebellion in the South (Noble 1976; McKenna 1998). Shortly after the imposition of martial law, there was

136 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines an escalation of violence in Mindanao. The incident that marked the beginning of the Moro rebellion occurred on 24 October 1972, when hundreds of non-MNLF Muslim rebels11 at- tacked the Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Marawi City, in the province of Lanao, in response to martial law regime’s attempts to collect unauthorized rearms in Mindanao. To the Muslim Moros, the martial law regime meant the centralization of political power exclusively in Christian hands while its "immediate moves to collect guns from civilians meant that compliance removed the potential for an eventual resort to force" (Noble 1976, 411-2). Shortly after the 24 October clashes, MNLF too began to launch attacks with a ghting force of around 6,000 men, one thirds of whom were armed with sophisticated weapons (Gloria and Vitug 2000, 30).

During the initial period of ghting, MNLF’s success in occupying and controlling important territory such as Cotabato became a cause for deep concern in the army. In response to escalating violence in Mindanao, President Marcos ordered the deployment of thousands of troops to the island, which marked the beginning of intense militarization in the Moro provinces. On the Muslim side too, more and more young Muslims joined the MNLF ranks in the early 1970s. One of the most devastating military confrontations between the MNLF and government forces occurred in April 1974 at The Battle of Jolo, more commonly known as the burning of Jolo. Two thirds of the city of Jolo, capital of Sulu island, was completely destroyed during the battle and hundreds of civilians - some claim thousands - lost their lives. One of the ex-MNLF interviewees who grew up in Sulu recalled that, after the Jolo burning, a lot of young boys who had survived the attacks joined the MNLF.12 From 1972 to 1975, Mindanao was in a state of all-out war between the MNLF and government forces. It is estimated that about 120,000 lives were lost13 and around 300,000 were displaced during the course of the war (Gloria and Vitug 2000, 27).

11Che Man (1990, 76) describes the attackers as "a force of several hundred men comprising seven dierent groups of Maranao youths led by traditional and secular elites." 12Interview with former MNLF rebel, Manila, 19 October 2016 13Rodil (2000, 2003) gives the following estimates for the distribution of these wartime casualties: 50 percent MNLF, 30 percent military, and 20 percent civilians.

137 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

5.4.2 Marcos’s Turn to Policies of Attraction and Co-optation

President Marcos was quick to realize that the war with the MNLF was at an impasse and could not be won by military means only. While military operations against the Muslim rebels in the South went on, Marcos resorted to divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken the Moro front.14 Much of his strategy relied on exploiting existing divisions between the traditional Muslim elites and the younger generation of non-elite MNLF leaders in an attempt to co-opt the former. Datu commanders of the MNLF were lured to surrender arms and join the government side through oers of amnesty, large cash payments and business opportunities, and most importantly, through government posts that helped them retain their privileged position of power (McKenna 1998; Gutierrez 2000). A lot of new municipalities were created to generate mayoral positions for the co-opted Muslim elites.15

In addition to co-optation tactics, Marcos introduced several policies of attraction in an eort to appease moderate Filipino Muslims and persuade their supporters abroad of his intention to bring peace to Mindanao. The rst series of initiatives were intended to pave the way for the socio-economic development of the Moro provinces, with development plans focusing primarily on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-torn areas, improvements on infrastructure, education and health services, and refugee resettlement (Melchor 1973, Che Man 1990, 151-156). These initiatives were part of a broader set of reform measures that appeared to address the social, economic and cultural roots of the Moro conict:

Some early decrees were intended to remove restrictions on the traditional barter trade (Presidential Decree [PD] 93, 1973); to grant amnesty to persons

14Several interviewees emphasized the role of Marcos’ astute divide-and-conquer tactics as key to the martial law regime’s success in suppressing the MNLF rebellion: "The rst wave of MNLF commanders was lured to surrender by Marcos through carrots. He granted them municipalities for them to lord over and become mayors, so they put up their own political clans" (Interview with senior political leader in the ARMM, Manila, 12 September 2016); "Marcos bought a lot of Moro leaders. That’s why I always say, for every Moro resistance ghter, for rebel, there is a collaborator. He was able to manage them through the elites who were with him in the government, including former MNLF." (Interview with former member of the MILF peace panel, Manila, 21 September 2016). 15Interview with former Secretary of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Manila, 28 September 2016.

138 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

who had committed any act penalized by existing laws in Muslim areas (PD 95, 1973); to authorize the use of Arabic language as a medium of instruction in madaris16 (Letter of Instruction [LOI] 71A, 1973); to declare Muslim holidays as legal Philippine holidays (Proclamation 1198, 1973); to direct the University of the Philippines Board of Regents to establish an Institute of Islamic Stud- ies (LOI 82, 1973); and to declare ancestral lands occupied and cultivated by national minorities as alienable and disposable in the 26 provinces across the country (PD 410, 1974)... Other major programmes... included the creation of the Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB)17, the codication of Muslim laws, and the establishment of the Ministry of Muslim Aairs (Che Man 1990, 151).

More so than promoting the well-being of the Muslim Moros, these nominally conciliatory reforms helped President Marcos establish stronger ties with pro-government traditional Muslim elites and signal to foreign patrons of the Moro rebellion, most notably the leaders of Islamic countries, his "sincere" eorts to make peace with the country’s Muslim minority. The main reason why reforms largely failed to benet the ordinary Moro masses was their half-hearted, and often misdirected, implementation. In a widely-cited journal article about the MNLF written in 1976, Lela Noble talks about how the only development projects implemented in Moro provinces by the time of her writing had been road, airport and harbor improvements - projects that were clearly more benecial to the Philippine military than to the local Muslim populations (Noble 1976, 421). The 1974 land decree, which recognized ancestral lands and allocating them as small farm lots to Muslims and other minorities, turned into a failure when "its implementing order created bureaucratic procedures which ironically made it more dicult for cultural minorities to secure land titles" (Che Man 1990, 154). Another example of failed reform is the code of Muslim Per- sonal Laws, which was approved by Marcos but never came into eect during his time in oce (McKenna 1998). The creation of the Ministry of Muslim Aairs in 1981 similarly turned into a major disappointment for many Muslims when Marcos appointed as minister Admiral Romulo Espaldon, the former Commander of the AFP18 Southern Command

16Plural of madrasa, which is an Islamic educational institution. 17A specialized bank that operated on the basis of Islamic banking rules and practices (e.g. prohibition of interest payments). 18Armed Forces of the Philippines.

139 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines in Mindanao and a recent convert to Islam (Che Man 1990, 154).

Among all so-called concessions that Marcos failed to implement in good faith, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement is the one that created the most resentment among the Filipino Muslim separatists, becoming a point of reference for Moro self-determination claims in all subsequent peace negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government. The agreement was largely an outcome of mediation eorts by Libya and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and promised the introduction of autonomy in thirteen of Min- danao’s twenty-three provinces. It was "initially hailed as a breakthrough in the Mindanao war by all sides" (McKenna 1998, 168) including the MNLF leaders, given the extent of autonomy it promised to the Moros. Agreement provisions stipulated that the thirteen autonomous provinces would have their own executive, legislative and judicial branches, a special regional security force, the right to set up Shari’a courts, and a "reasonable share" from the revenues of the natural resources in their territory; matters of foreign policy and national defense would be under the jurisdiction of the central government (Tripoli Agree- ment 1976). The parties also agreed on a ceasere, which took eect in January 1977.

What seemed to be promising start towards Moro self-determination ended in shat- tered hopes for the MNLF when the next rounds of talks in February-March 1977 collapsed due disagreements over the implementation of the Tripoli provisions. As opposed to MNLF’s demand that the thirteen provinces be declared a single administrative unit, President Marcos insisted on holding a plebiscite in each province prior to implementing the autonomy deal. There had been no mention of a plebiscite in the initial talks; yet, Marcos used as justication a last-minute provision included the nal draft of Tripoli agreement by his own request, which made its implementation subject to "necessary constitutional processes."19 He also emphasized that, among the thirteen provinces, only a few had a majority Muslim population. After MNLF rejected the results of the plebiscite and negotiations ended, Marcos unilaterally implemented the agreement on his own terms by

19Noble (1981) writes: "According to Philippine documents, it was understood by all parties that "constitutional processes" included a referendum ("to determine various questions including the administrative nature of the government") and elections for public ocials." Noble’s reference: Southwestern Philippines Question, 2nd ed., issued by the Department of Foreign Aairs, Republic of the Philippines, 1977, pp. 17-18.

140 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines creating two autonomous regions - instead of one - that only consisted of ten provinces and were granted nowhere near the substantial degree of autonomy promised in the original agreement.

Ultimately, the creation of the "autonomous" regions appeared as another deceptive tactic that had helped co-opt the traditional Muslim elites and weaken the rebellion:

The governing bodies of the nominally autonomous regions were cosmetic cre- ations with no real legislative authority and no independent operating budget. They were headed by martial law collaborators and rebel defectors, many of whom were datus and all of whom were absent from the province more often than not, usually in Manila pursuing separate careers or looking after business interests (McKenna 1998, 168).

One of my interviewees from the MNLF elite cadre gave the following account about how the creation of the two so-called autonomous regions had helped Marcos divide and conquer the MNLF leadership:

When the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (Regional Executive Council) were organized in regions, many MNLF commanders joined. As part of the policy of attraction, Marcos assigned a Muslim commodore (he became an admiral later, Admiral Romulo Espaldon) to head the Oce of the Regional Commissioner; he was the SouthCom Commander at the same time. Since he knew many of the MNLF, he was able to convince them. That brought a certain participation of the MNLF commanders; rst the return of the Magic 8. Then the return of Gerry Salapuddin and other commanders. Then, the participation of Ampat- uan, Sali Wali... While the MNLF organizationally did not participate, some MNLF participated. Of course, Misuari rejected all of them.20

A former government ocial who was part of the peace processes with the MNLF in the late 1980s made similar comments about Marcos’s conciliatory politics, citing one of his military generals:

Well, Marcos’s policy was divide and rule. In a context where you had rival factions and clan wars, it was very easy to do. He had the Magic 8; the leading

20Interview with former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016.

141 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

commanders who were bought. One of Marcos’ generals who later became involved in the peace process said something... We were having discussions about what to do at a security meeting... he literally said "well, we buy peace," he said, "Look at Magic 8." Since they were kind of co-opted, they became translated into political leaders, most of them eventually became governors... Some would say "warlord" because they did keep their arms.21

Surrender of several MNLF leaders in exchange for political posts in the new autonomous regions was not the only cause of fragmentation within the rebel organization. The failure of the Tripoli Agreement also exacerbated the rivalries among the MNLF’s leadership cadre, galvanizing those who were critical of Chairman Misuari’s ideological orientations and leadership style. Several traditional elite members of the MNLF saw Mis- uari as an arrogant and secretive leader, and "fundamentally a Communist who was using the banner of Islam" to achieve his own ends (Che Man 1990, 85-87). In December 1977, Hashim Salamat, a member of the Central Committee and a religious-educated aristocrat, became the rst to break away from the MNLF after a failed attempt to take over chair- manship from Misuari. Initially calling itself the New Leadership, Hashim’s splinter group went on to establish the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the following years. The second large split came in 1982 when Dimas Pundato, the MNLF Vice Chairman, was ex- pelled by Misuari after pushing for reform within the rebel organization and ended up forming his own MNLF-Reformist Group.

Overall, much of Marcos regime’s success in suppressing the Moro rebellion can be attributed to the astute use of attraction and co-optation strategies alongside repressive measures. Through using a carrots-and-sticks approach to exploit cleavages among the MNLF leadership, Marcos was able to weaken the fragile unity of the Moro separatist front. Even after ghting resumed in Mindanao with the collapse of the Tripoli ceasere, MNLF rebels were not able to pose as strong a military challenge to the Philippine army as they had in the early 1970s, having suered from a stream of defections, leadership rivalries and loss of foreign support for the movement.

21Interview with former government ocial from Corazon Aquino’s Peace Commission and Oce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Manila, 21 October 2018

142 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

5.4.3 Explaining Marcos’ Policy Shift from Repression to Co-optation

As briey discussed in Chapter 3, my theory proposes that stable authoritarian governments are unlikely to accommodate separatist minorities unless "aggrieved minorities can ght a separatist war so eectively that a non-conciliatory response risks incurring heavy costs from ghting." The underlying assumption here is that, absent any threats to elite survival, a strong authoritarian leadership will not view containment of separatist conict as a strategy that could help preserve its position of power in the center; hence, what determine the likelihood of conciliatory policies towards separatists that emerge in such contexts are the material costs of ghting a separatist insurgency (e.g. territorial loss, international sanctions from foreign sponsor, etc.).

This argument helps explain Marcos’ policy shift from a strictly military solution to the Moro problem towards a mixed strategy of repression, co-optation and attraction. It was clear that Marcos had rmed his grip on state power with the declaration of martial law in September 1972; as such, the military balance between the government forces and MNLF, and in particular, the latter’s ability to make it a costly war for the former, was the key determinant of Marcos’ policy towards the rebellion in the South. As discussed earlier, shortly after the eruption of large-scale ghting in Mindanao in late 1972, Marcos realized that the war could not be won by military means only. In particular, two aspects of the Moro rebellion in the early 1970s made an exclusively repressive response "far too costly nancially and politically" for the Marcos government (McKenna 1998, 165).

The rst one was the heavy material and human costs of the war. Despite its supe- riority in war technology and manpower, the Philippine army had found itself confronted with a strong liberation army who relied on both conventional warfare and guerrilla tactics. The MNLF commanders had gone through military training in Malaysia and their attacks were "not at all like the attacks by private armies of the traditional Muslim warlords, by bandits, or by isolated disgruntled groups" (Majul 1985, 64). Around 75 percent of the Philippine army had to be deployed to Mindanao during the period of most intense ghting between 1972 and 1976, accompanied by a ve-fold increase in the annual bud-

143 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines get of AFP and a four-fold increase in its size to 250,000 troops (Ferrer 2005; Reed 2013). Military casualties were also high; most of the 1973 graduating class of the Philippine Mil- itary Academy had lost their lives in the war (Noble 1976). Even after the Moro rebellion was weakened in the late 1970s, the Marcos regime would continue to benet from the co-optation of traditional Muslim elites and MNLF defectors. The AFP in the South still had to ght several MNLF commanders who remained loyal to Misuari and the separatist cause; moreover, the New People’s Army (NPA), the Communist Party of the Philippines’ (CPP) armed wing, had begun to expand its military presence in many parts of Mindanao. In fact, by the early 1980s, the communists had outgrown the MNLF threat and become the major producer of violence and instability in the South. When ghting these on-going threats, the military relied on assistance from the co-opted Muslim elites, whose "private armies became the de facto state militias" (Abinales 2016, 56).

The second factor that made military crackdown costly was the diplomatic pressures for settlement from the OIC states, in particular from the Libyan President Gadda.22 In 1973-4, the OIC states adopted a series of resolutions calling on the Philippine government to meet with the MNLF leaders and negotiate a peaceful solution to the Moro problem. Fearing an oil embargo and economic sanctions - threats that had been issued by Gadda - the Marcos government was left with no option but to enter into dialogue with Misuari. An interviewee from the MNLF elite cadres gave the following account about the role of international pressures in paving the way for the Tripoli Agreement in 1976:

From 1972 after the declaration of the martial, there were problems in Min- danao, Muslims killed by paramilitaries or AP force multipliers. In 1973, the OIC in Benghazi, Libya, the purpose of which is to demand from Filipino government to explain the atrocities against the Muslims, threatened to impose oil embargo in the case it is not satised with the report of the government. The oil supply of the Philippines was 95% Middle Eastern, from OIC members.

22After the war broke out in 1972, Libya became the major provider of funds, weapons and other military equipment for the MNLF. Che Man (1990, 140) reports that, according to separatist resources, Libya had donated $1 million to fund the training of MNLF rebels in Malaysia during 1971-2, and that about $35 million was given to the MNLF by Libya and other OIC states between 1972 and 1975. The majority of this support was delivered through the Sabah region of Malaysia, which was a training site and safe haven for the MNLF rebels and displaced Moros (Reed 2013).

144 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

At that time, in 1973, because of the trouble in the South, the economy was not good. If the embargo was imposed, the regime would not have survived. So Marcos utilized everything to convince the OIC not to go through with this embargo. He sent diplomats to all Middle East countries. In 1973, the Mar- cos strategy was working, they were able to convince the OIC to participate in a negotiation. The OIC resolution, which was agreed by Marcos, was to solve the problem in Southern Philippines, and to nd a political solution to the problem through negotiations within the context of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. When the Philippine accepted that, the MNLF demand for independence was no longer availing, because they agreed to the OIC resolution, to discuss solution within the context of Philippine sovereignty. That is when the demand switched from independence to autonomy. That is why, in 1974, in order to conrm this agreement, the OIC-ICFM met in Kuala Lumpur to pass Resolution 18. This resolution arms that the MNLF and the government will meet in a negotiation facilitated by the good oces of the OIC. This led to the signing of the Tripoli in 1976.

Other accounts by Noble (1976) and Vitug and Gloria (2000) provide similar accounts about the Marcos regime’s vulnerability to diplomatic pressures from foreign supporters of the MNLF. An excerpt from the latter emphasizes the role of oil politics in co- ercing Marcos to take an accommodative step towards the MNLF leadership:

In condential exchanges between Marcos and his senior advisers, the government acknowledged that it could not deal with the MNLF without considering its rich and powerful supporters in the Middle East. Oil politics seemed like an umbilical cord tied up with the MNLF problem. Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s brief boycott of oil exports to the Philippines had slowed down the military’s air operations, and Marcos was well too aware of the worsening of oil crisis (Vitug and Gloria 2000, 31).

In the end, the Tripoli Agreement and its unilateral "implementation" were a success for the Marcos dictatorship. Although Gadda and other leaders of Islamic states gave angry responses to the Philippine government’s failure to honor the agreement, their diplomatic pressure on the regime had eased throughout the process (McKenna 1998). Increasing rivalries among the MNLF leadership following the collapse of 1977 talks led to loss of foreign support for the Moro rebellion. Much to MNLF’s disappointment, subsequent OIC

145 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines resolutions did not declare an oil embargo on the Philippines despite calling on Islamic states to continue external support to the MNLF and deploring Manila’s violation of the Tripoli Agreement (Majul 1985).

The discussion of how the Marcos regime’s responses to the Moro rebellion have shifted over time is a useful illustration of factors that shape authoritarian governments’ responses to separatism during periods of political stability. As the 1972-5 period of intense ghting in Mindanao shows, military crackdown is often the go-to solution of strong authoritarian leaders when dealing with separatist rebels, until it becomes a too costly strategy. Even when it does, the costs associated with continued military repression are mostly material (e.g. economic drain of war or threat of international sanctions) and rarely pose a direct threat to elite survival unless the regime weakens due to factors external to the conict. Under such conditions, although the authoritarian government may be incen- tivized to adopt a conciliatory response towards the minority population, accommodation of separatist demands occurs through a slow process and typically comes in the form of half-hearted measures that lack credibility - similar to Marcos’s unilaterally implemented, watered down autonomy concessions to the MNLF.

5.5 Philippine Transition to Democracy and the Aquino Period

In the Philippines, democratization occurred through a revolutionary mass-driven process. After 20 years in power, Ferdinand Marcos was toppled by a military-backed popular uprising, known as the People Power or EDSA23 Revolution, which took place in February 1986. The revolution brought to power Corazon Aquino, the widow of former Senator Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino, who had been the main opposition gure against the Marcos dictatorship during martial law years and was assassinated in 1983 upon his return from exile. Ninoy’s assassination brought Cory into public spotlight during a period where anti-Marcos opposition was gaining momentum. When Marcos called for snap elections in December 1985, all opposition forces including the country’s minority populations united to support Cory’s

23EDSA is an acroynm for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue Revolution, the main avenue in Manila where the majority of public demonstrations took place between February 22-25, 1986.

146 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines presidential campaign. Although the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) dominated by Marcos’s party ocially declared him the winner of the election, allegations of electoral fraud led to massive public demonstrations, sparking the EDSA Revolution. In the face of widespread popular uprising and the military leadership’s refusal to open re at the crowds, Marcos was forced the ee the country, conceding the presidency to the true winner of elections, Cory.

5.5.1 Capacity for Accommodative Self-Determination Reform

Early post-Marcos period was marked by limited horizontal constraints on policymaking, which my theory emphasizes as a characteristic of democratizing states that facilitates the adoption of self-determination reform. Although the premise of the EDSA revolution was transition to democratic governance, the Aquino administration started its tenure "under the mantle of a revolutionary government with virtually unlimited powers" (Tomas 1999, 5). In March 1986, Cory Aquino dissolved the unicameral legislature, which was lled with Marcos loyalists, and promulgated an interim "Freedom Constitution" by which the country would be governed until a new constitution was ratied. Several interviewees talked about the exibility in decision-making Aquino enjoyed during the rst year of her tenure; she had assumed law-making powers under the Freedom Constitution and ruled largely by decree.24 President Aquino’s capacity to push forward a radical reform agenda was key to newly democratic government’s early conciliatory eorts towards the Muslim Moros. Ma- jor autonomy concessions were rst introduced with the 1987 Constitution; Article 10 of the Constitution stipulated the establishment of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, which would have legislative powers over administrative organization, revenue generation, economic and social development, education and cultural aairs. While interviewees who served in the 1986 Constitutional Commission mentioned that the consensus over autonomy provisions was reached without any interference from the Aquino administration, it is telling that all 48 members of the commission were appointed

24Interviews with member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Manila, 11 October 2016; former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016.

147 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines by President Aquino and, in line with her conciliatory agenda towards ethnic separatists, included representatives from minority populations.25

Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created in August 1989 with the Republic Act No. 6734. Among the 13 Muslim-inhabited provinces in Mindanao where a plebiscite was held, only 4 voted in favor of inclusion in the ARMM, thereby establishing the territorial boundaries of the autonomous region. While the implementation of autonomy provisions followed democratic processes, there is evidence that President Aquino had oered to the MNLF leadership more substantial autonomy concessions while still ruling under the Freedom Constitution. In September 1986, Aquino took her rst major step towards reconciliation with the Moro separatists by inviting the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari back to the Philippines after his twelve years in exile and meeting with him in an eort to start peace negotiations (Stern 2012). Aquino not only broke protocol by meeting with the rebel leader in the Jolo island, a stronghold of the Muslim separatists, but also went against the counsel of her government and military advisors who had warned her about resuscitating a weakened rebel group (Almonte and Vitug 2015, 109-110).

This rst dialogue between Aquino and Misuari was followed by peace talks in Jeddah, held in January 1987. At that time, Aquino’s peace panel proposed to MNLF ne- gotiators a 10+3 formula, whereby the government would "establish autonomy in the 10 provinces in Mindanao via an executive fayad26, using the revolutionary powers of Aquino and then hold a plebiscite in 3 provinces" (Parcasio 2012). This deal was rejected by the rebel side, due to what one interviewee from MNLF’s elite cadre recalled as a "miscom- munication between the panel and Chairman Misuari."27 With the ratication of the new constitution in February 1987, the autonomy deal became subject to constitutional processes, making plebiscite a condition for all 13 provinces in Mindanao. Nevertheless, the fact that such a generous deal was proposed by the Aquino government illustrates the

25Interviews with three members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Manila, 7-14 October 2016. 26The Arabic word translates as benet or advantage. 27Interview with former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016.

148 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

exibility with which newly democratic leaderships can oer autonomy concessions to separatists during incipient democratization. Had the proposal been accepted by the rebel side before the Constitution came into eect, an autonomous region would have been created by executive decree, without being subject to further deliberation or overview by the Congress.28

The newly democratic government’s high capacity for radical reform was even more transparent in the case of autonomy concessions given to another ethnic minority, the indigenous peoples of the Cordillera region. Following a peace agreement with the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), President Aquino established by decree the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) on July 15, 1987. This rst step towards autonomy was taken in less than two weeks before the convening of the new Congress, which marked the end of Aquino’s legislative powers. The Executive Order which created the CAR specied "an urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras,... without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the rst Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis" (Executive Order No. 220, s. 1987). Given its timing, this was clearly a top-down initiative by President Aquino to establish the foundation for future Cordillera autonomy, the implementation of which could be delayed once the Congress was opened and resumed its legislative powers.

While low institutional constraints to rule may have characterized the rst months of the Aquino administration, broader institutional reforms undertaken in the meantime and eorts to include Muslim representatives in both constitution-writing and peace processes are likely to have strengthened the credibility of Aquino’s conciliatory initiatives. The Constitutional Commission put together by Aquino had several delegates representing Muslim interests, whose presence shaped the debates around self-determination rights. The inclusion of minority representatives was part of Aquino’s broader eort to ensure

28One interviewee from MNLF recalled this as a lost opportunity for the Moros, since the deal was oered at a time during which President Aquino was still acting under the Freedom constitution and had limited constraints on her ability to implement an autonomy agreement.

149 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines that the country’s new Constitution signaled her commitment to pluralism and fair representation. One interviewee who served in the Commission mentioned that Aquino’s appointees represented dierent segments of the population; including "former Justices of the Supreme Court, former members of Congress, NGO workers, advocates, university students as well as retired military people."29 Another interviewee discussed how the commission’s decision to include autonomy provisions in the 1987 Constitution had come about after long deliberations and considerations about the type of accommodation that would be least likely to be overturned later:

In the Constitutional Commission, there was a draft constitution coming from the University of Philippines Law Center. It essentially provided for any area, region of the country to petition to become an autonomous region. It was objected on the Floor, so the Commissioners recessed into an executive session and discussed "okay, what are we going to do? They are not going to accept this." Some talking about federalism, which has been revived, and according to the memory of the person telling the story (one of the Commissioners) it was about 5-6 of the 50 that were for federalism. OK, clearly not going to y. How about the ability of any area to petition to be autonomous? The worry was that that would be fragmenting. We are in the middle of an economic crisis, we got the communist insurgency, the world is a mess. So they wanted a strong center. So that was rejected. In the end, only the two that were seen as at the time requesting autonomy was put in the Constitution, the Cordillera and the Muslim Mindanao.30

Muslim representatives were also brought in to the process of assisting Congress in the enactment of an Organic Act for the proposed autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao. This would be task of the Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission (MRCC), which was part of a new peace initiative Cory introduced in October 1987. In March 1988, the MRCC was ocially formed and 52 commissioners, 26 of whom were Muslims, began to work towards the autonomy framework (Vitug and Gloria 2000, 40). One of the directors of Aquino’s Peace Commission who oversaw the formation of the MRCC gave the following

29Interview with member of the 1986 Constitutional Committee, Manila, 11 October 2016. 30Interview with senior international NGO ocial with specialization on Mindanao peace and development programs, Manila, 14 September 2016.

150 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines account about the initiative:

So, when there was a new Constitution, the idea was to start rst with the Mindanao autonomy issue. And so, we had to have a law pass rst to implement the provision. Also, the law called for the creation of a commission that would then draft the law implementing the provision... So, the assignment to the Peace Commission - our job was to have consultations with aected areas, drop a list of nominees from which the President would choose for the Com- mission... that was extremely dicult; some people were happy, some not... There were consultations and we would get input from dierent people about who should be included. The shortlist was sent to the President and she chose from the list. There had to be a balance - enough indigenous peoples, Moro representatives and Christians... Initially we helped to set up the Commission and then we had to disengage... We felt that the process was so independent that the President refused to campaign for a Yes or No. The commission’s job was to draft the Organic Act. There was a lot of local input.31

Overall, the way in which democratization generated new constraints to rule, alongside initiatives and practices that signaled Aquino’s acceptance of those institutional boundaries to her power, added to the credibility of accommodative policies towards the Moros. This has likely contributed to the government’s ability to secure Muslim cooperation in the formation of the ARMM, even though peace talks with the MNLF had collapsed and the rebel group campaigned against the implementation of the Organic Act.

5.5.2 Incentives for Accommodative Self-Determination Reform

My theory suggests that, for self-determination reform to occur, the governing elite should have both the capacity and incentives to introduce and implement such reform. In nascent democracies, limited institutional constraints on the executive facilitate the adoption of self-determination reform but do not guarantee it; strategic and/or reputational incentives to accommodate separatist demands should also be present. As this section illustrates, in cases like the Philippines’ transition where democratization processes are initiated by mass

31Interview with former government ocial from Corazon Aquino’s Peace Commission and Oce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Manila, 21 October 2018

151 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines mobilization and overseen by elites who have long stood in opposition to authoritarian rule, it is common for both types of incentive mechanisms to be at work.

Role of Strategic Incentives

A commonly cited explanation for President Aquino’s conciliatory eorts towards Moro separatists is that she wanted to honor her late husband Senator Ninoy Aquino’s promise of meaningful autonomy for the Muslims. While partially true, this explanation is too simplistic and underplays the importance of strategic incentives for averting separatist rebellion in the early post-Marcos period. A closer look at the domestic threat environment within which the Aquino government operated at the time indicates the presence of multiple threats from dierent angles, which made political stability "of paramount concern" in the early days of post-Marcos era (Reid and Guerrero 1995, 49). A group of army mutineers who had played a crucial role in the EDSA revolution, namely the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), had turned against Aquino soon after Marcos’ departure; communist insurgents led by the Communist Party of the Philippines and New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) continued their armed struggle in the rural areas; Muslim separatists in Min- danao threatened to resume their ght for autonomy, and a new separatist struggle had taken root in the northern Luzon region with the formation of a Cordillera rebel group (CPLA). President Aquino also faced threats from the conservative members in her cabinet such as Juan Ponce Enrile, who had served as Marcos’ defense minister and was one of key gures (along with General Fidel Ramos) whose defection from the Marcos ranks contributed to the success of the revolution. As part of an eort to reward those who had brought her to power, Aquino had retained Enrile as defense minister - a decision taken against the counsel of her presidential sta who saw Enrile as an unreliable ally due to his past allegiance to Marcos as well as close aliation with the RAM. Another major threat to Aquino’s power was posed by Marcos loyalists in the army, who were displeased with what they considered as left-wing, antimilitary bias in Aquino’s cabinet and prepared for a counter-revolution. On 6 July 1986, ve months after the People Power Revolution, they undertook a coup attempt against the Aquino government, which marked the rst among

152 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines nine failed coups that took place between 1986 and 1989 (McCoy 1999).

Against threats to her rule from Marcos loyalists and power-seekers such as the RAM soldiers and Minister Enrile, Aquino’s response was unyielding. Shortly after coming to power, she took decisive measures to consolidate her government’s position both in Manila and in the provinces, such as abolishing the National Assembly, purging Marcos- era ocials in the government and military, and replacing elected mayors and governors - local beneciaries of Marcos’ patronage network - with appointees who had supported her campaign. On the other hand, Aquino government’s response to threats from the periphery was conciliatory. The six months following the February Revolution were marked by peace overtures towards both Communist and separatist rebels. In their detailed account of the Aquino administration’s rst year, Reid and Guerrero (1995, 66) point out the contrast in how the government responded to dierent threats:

Aquino made highly publicized visits to remote areas of the country to meet with Nur Misuari, leader of the Muslim rebels, and former Roman Catholic priest Conrado Balweg, chief of a band of mountain tribesmen who had been allied with the Communists... Such gestures of reconciliation, however, were not directed toward the Marcos camp, nor to Enrile’s followers, still nominally part of the administration but clearly and deeply estranged.

The fact that the Aquino government selectively co-opted those who posed a lesser threat to its political survival shows that its "national reconciliation" agenda was shaped by strategic concerns. In a politically turbulent environment marked by multiple threats to her power, President Aquino invested in eorts to contain more manageable threats from dissidents in the periphery, whose anti-regime activities were focused on achieving policy concessions rather than grabbing power by force.

With respect to Aquino government’s handling of separatist threats, several interviewees pointed out that democratizers’ strategic incentives to establish peaceful relations with Muslim separatists had originated during early Marcos years in the late 1960s.32 At

32Interviews with former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016; former member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace panel, Manila, 21 September 2016.

153 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines that time, Senator Ninoy Aquino became the leading opposition gure as an outspoken critic of President Marcos’ authoritarian leanings, rampant corruption, and militarization of the government. In an eort to form a united opposition against the Marcos regime, Senator Ninoy Aquino showed considerable eort to ally with the Muslims from the late 1960s until his death in 1983. An interviewee from the MNLF side mentioned that Ninoy Aquino had occasional contact with the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari during the 1970s and that they had worked together "to expose the evils of Marcos."33 The seeds of the alliance were sown in March 1968, when Senator Aquino exposed the Jabidah massacre. Aquino gave a powerful speech at the Senate accusing Marcos of trying to "insure his continuity in power" by achieving territorial gains and invited the sole survivor of the incident for a congressional hearing, during which Nur Misuari - a university student at the time - served as the interpreter.34

The alliance between pro-democracy factions and Muslim separatists got stronger during the 1970s; an MNLF interviewee close to Nur Misuari accounted that, during Ni- noy Aquino’s time in prison during the 1970s, Misuari provided safe passage to several anti-Marcos opposition gures (some of whom were aliated with Aquino), helping them escape the country through the Sulu islands and hosting them in the MNLF camps based in Sabah.35 Shortly after Senator Aquino was released from prison and allowed to go to exile in the U.S., he resumed eorts to join forces with the Muslim separatists. In May 1981, he went to Jeddah to meet Nur Misuari and delivered a lecture in King Abdulaziz University. During the lecture titled "A Brief History of the Muslim Struggle," Aquino defended self- determination rights for his "Muslim brothers" and made clear that he would resolve the conict through negotiation and autonomy concessions if he came to power. Ninoy’s nal remarks referred to his eorts to form a united opposition: "For my part, I have come to mediate and to ask and to plead that we should now join forces, and hopefully once we are united, Mr. Marcos will listen to us, after stealing power now for sixteen years" (Aquino

33Interview with former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016. 34Interviews with former member of the MILF peace panel, Manila, 21 September 2016; former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016. 35Interview with former member of the MNLF peace panel, Manila, 26 October 2016.

154 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines

1981).

This brief discussion of a historical alliance between opposition leaders and separatist rebels show that, for the revolutionary elite who oversaw the Philippines’ democratic transition in the mid-1980s, strategic incentives for minority accommodation had already emerged during Marcos years as part of an eort to form a united opposition against the dictatorship. One interviewee from the rebel elite cadres talked about how these incentives were also apparent during Cory’s presidential campaign:

"For her, the Mindanao issue was a strategic ally in terms of going against Marcos, because we suered the most the brunt of martial law, we had a lot of grievances, so she was trying to ally with the Muslims."36

Cory’s eorts to secure Muslim support in her ght against the Marcos dictatorship are most transparent in her team’s early contact with the MNLF leader Nur Misuari prior to the 1986 snap elections. As mentioned earlier in the introduction chapter, Cory’s brother- in-law Butz Aquino had paid a visit to Misuari on the eve of the election and asked for the Muslim vote by assuring Misuari that, once Cory was in power, "all the promises of Benigno Aquino would be fullled" (Misuari 2006). That said, what provides stronger evidence for my theory is the fact that the opposition’s incentives to appease the Moro separatists persisted even after it nally succeeded in bringing down the Marcos regime. Particularly during the rst few years of her administration, Cory Aquino made an eort to hold her campaign promise of addressing Moro grievances over self-determination, clearly seeing an advantage in co-opting the separatists. There is evidence to suggest that these conciliatory eorts were heavily informed by Aquino’s strategic concerns over managing threats to her power during incipient democratization, rather than being merely a continuation of Ninoy’s eorts or a reection of Cory’s commitment to democratic ideals.

First of all, the timeline of concessions is telling. The earliest conciliatory eorts by the Aquino government were directed not towards the separatists, but rather towards the Communist insurgency, which had a stronger armed presence in both the countryside and

36Interview with senior political leader in the ARMM, Manila, 12 September 2016.

155 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines the cities and thereby posed a more pressing challenge to the central government. In the early 1970s, Marcos had used military’s war with the communists as a pretext for declaring martial law; the newly democratic government had therefore reason to believe that the continuation of the communist insurgency might present Marcos loyalists in the army an opportunity to justify and gather support for a coup plot.37 In March 1986, less than a month after the People Power Revolution, Aquino released political prisoners aliated with the communist coalition, including some high-prole prisoners like Jose Maria Sison, who had founded the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and Bernabe Buscayno, who was the founder and former commander of the New People’s Army (Reid and Guer- rero 1995, 52). In April, after the killing of 35 Filipino soldiers in rebel ambushes, Aquino appealed to communist guerrillas to "give peace a chance" and promised to announce a cease-re soon to allow for peace talks.38

While peace talks with the communists had already begun by the summer of 1986, the Aquino government was slower to take conciliatory action towards Muslim separatists. This was because Marcos’ divide and conquer policies in the late 1970s had been successful in neutralizing Misuari and his MNLF forces and government-rebel ghting in Mindanao had largely subsided. It is clear that strategic incentives for accommodating the separatists re-emerged around April-May 1986 when Muslim Moro elites began to threaten rebellion, raising concerns among Aquino and her aides that Moro separatists could become an additional source of instability in Mindanao. The triggering event that led the Aquino government pay closer attention to the Moro problem was a gathering of Muslim leaders in Zamboanga City for the rst Bangsamoro (Moro Nation) Congress in April 1986, where threatening remarks were directed at the government. One leader said that Aquino’s failure to begin negotiations over Moro separatist demands within ten days could risk "a holy war that will make the massacres and the carnage of the 1970s look like an afternoon pic- nic" (Fineman and Tempest 1986). Concerned with the gathering, Aquino had sent her

37In a New York Times article dated 26 February 1986, ocials from the Aquino government were quoted as saying "unless the Communists suddenly reverse political course..., they will pose a serious threat to President Corazon Aquino’s eorts to revive the economy and restore democracy" (Buttereld 1986). 38"Aquino oers ’honorable peace’ to nation’s communist guerrillas," The Sun, 21 April 1986.

156 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines brother-in-law, Butz Aquino, to attend the Congress. Butz’s response to threats issued by Muslim leaders was to ask for more time for President Aquino, who was "so busy trying to consolidate her government that she may not get to the Moro problem for several months" (Ibid.). This short dialogue between Muslim separatists and Aquino’s envoy was a clear indication of how the government approached the Moro separatist issue strategically; rather than making self-determination reform a priority on her agenda, Aquino began conciliatory eorts only after coming under pressure from the Muslims to address Moro demands. As promised by Butz to Muslim leaders, Cory took the rst step towards reconciliation ve months later by meeting with Nur Misuari in Sulu, laying a foundation for future peace talks.

Several interviewees also emphasized the strategic concerns behind the Aquino government’s eorts to accommodate separatists. One interviewee from the rebel elite cadres talked about how the rightist threat posed by Defense Minister Enrile and RAM leader Gringo Honasan had a crucial impact on Cory’s adoption of an appeasement policy towards the Muslims in her early tenure.39 The interviewee further added that, once there had appeared a strategic incentives for seeking reconciliation with the Muslims, the real struggle for President Aquino was to strike the right balance in terms of how much to concede:

At the time, they just took over and the military was not really on her side. If she had given already the MNLF leeway, then she would have probably faced new problems when Mindanao became a plane where MNLF would have succeeded in seceding, because she was weak. Rather than facing two threats, the Rightists and the Moro insurgency, she tried to co-opt the latter but only to the extent that she does not alienate her supporters in Mindanao from the Chris- tian side. There were also those supporters from Mindanao who supporter her because of the human rights atmosphere - the nuns, the priests, the left. She had to balance that. If she favored everything from the Moros, she would lose her Christian constituency, which was the majority.

In the end, the Aquino government’s concerns over retaining Christian support in Min-

39Interview with senior political leader in the ARMM, Manila, 12 September 2016.

157 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines danao and persistence on adhering to the provisions stipulated by the 1987 Constitution led to the breakdown of peace talks with the MNLF in May 1987, as the rebels continuously opposed the requirement of a plebiscite to determine which provinces and cities would be included in the autonomous region. After that, Aquino’s policy initiatives towards solving the "Moro problem" continued unilaterally, with the most notable concession occurring in 1989 with the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Overall, qualitative evidence drawn from secondary sources and interviews illustrate the importance of strategic incentives in shaping Aquino government’s eorts to seek reconciliation with Moro separatists, paving the way for accommodative self-determination reform.

Role of Reputational Incentives

The Aquino government’s reputational concerns over establishing democratic credentials also played a role in shaping its conciliatory policy towards autonomy-seeking minorities. Having come to power with the support of the masses and promise of radical democratic reform, President Aquino had reputational incentives to avoid use of forceful measures against any form of dissent. Even in response to Marcos loyalists who presumably posed the largest threat to Aquino’s power, the administration exercised restraint: pro-Marcos rallies in Manila that frequently took place during the rst months of Aquino’s presidency were handled with a policy of "maximum tolerance" - a phrase that was inscribed on the plastic shields carried by riot police (Reed and Guerrero 1995, 58). The administration was clearly aware that repression of dissidence would have "made a mockery of people power ideals and embarrassed a government supremely conscious of its image" (Ibid., 59). Sim- ilar concerns shaped the Aquino government’s dealing with the insurgency problem. In that case, Aquino was not only cautious to avoid repression, but also took proactive steps towards fullling her campaign promise of "national unity." An interviewee who person- ally knew President Aquino commented that her decision to undertake conciliatory eorts towards Communist and Muslim insurgencies so soon after assuming oce was partly driven by the revolutionary spirit of pro-democracy masses, which favored bold steps to-

158 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines wards national reconciliation:

She had to do that before she wanted to be a unity president... After the eu- phoria of the revolution during the time, there was the sentiment that all of us were Filipinos, all of us were together. If you were there, you’d have that feeling. We did not want to be divided anymore, because we wanted to rebuild the country. And all of us had fought against Marcos as a united front. The idea during the time was to rebuild the country, and it was very very forceful. I was part of the EDSA revolution, so I felt the euphorial feeling of being a Filipino. And the feeling that we should really unite to rebuild this country.40

In her inaugural address, Cory Aquino responded to these sentiments with an "appeal to everybody to work for national reconciliation (Inaugural Speech 1986). In line with that message, some of President Aquino’s earliest policies were meant to extend an olive branch to the Communist insurgency, whose ght against the Philippine military forces continued unabated before and after the 1986 Revolution. When the Moro separatists, and later the Cordillera, started to threaten war as well, Aquino similarly adopted a conciliatory response, conscious of the reputational costs of any repressive measure that would be reminiscent of Marcos’ dictatorial rule. An interviewee referred to Aquino’s conciliatory politics towards separatist minorities as a reection of her desire to be "un-Marcos."41

That said, Aquino’s reputational incentives for minority accommodation were not as strong as those observed in some other cases like Indonesia’s incipient democratization, where the majority population’s increased awareness and sympathy towards minority grievances in the transitional period gave an additional impetus to conciliatory politics. Largely because Marcos had dealt with the separatist problem in Mindanao with a mixture of repression and cooptation (i.e. buying o some local Muslim elites and MNLF commanders), the Moro self-determination movement was very divided in the mid-1980s, weakly represented by civil society groups and therefore unable to use eectively the opening of democratic space as an opportunity to draw attention to past suerings from military

40Interview with senior international NGO ocial with specialization on Mindanao peace and development programs, Manila, 14 September 2016. 41Interview with senior international NGO ocial, Manila, 8 September 2016.

159 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines atrocities during martial law years or raise public awareness about its cause. Consequently, although general public sentiment in the post-revolution phase was in favor of national unity and reconciliation, the Aquino government did not come under signicant public pressure to address minority demands for self-determination.

5.6 Conclusion

Using a case study of the Philippines’ separatist conict, this chapter has aimed to illustrate the causal mechanisms that generate accommodative self-determination reform during periods of early democratization. Under the Marcos dictatorship, Muslim Moro separatism in the southern Philippines escalated into an armed conict in the early 1970s. Marcos’s early response to the conict was military repression, which continued until the war in Mindanao became too costly from a political and nancial standpoint. Towards the late 1970s, the Marcos administration turned to co-optation tactics that sought to divide and conquer the movement; while minor concessions were made during this period to appease the Moros, Marcos ultimately defected from the larger autonomy promises made to the MNLF. The absence of major self-determination reform during the Marcos regime conforms to the expectation that, absent political instability, strong authoritarian leaders rarely concede to separatist minorities. Even if they do introduce some concessions due to the increasing costs of ghting, these can easily be rescinded or watered down as soon as the minority is demobilized and the costs of refusing to accommodate self-determination demands decrease.

In line with the theory, the Philippines’ early democratization period was marked by conciliatory eorts towards the Moro separatists from the outset. Even prior to toppling down the Marcos dictatorship, pro-democracy opposition led by the Aquinos had established contact with the MNLF leadership multiple times, pledging to accommodate Moro self-determination demands once they were in power. In the aftermath of the 1986 People Power Revolution that brought Marcos’s downfall, Cory Aquino multiplied these conciliatory eorts by initiating peace talks with the MNLF and extending the most gen-

160 Chapter 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines erous autonomy oer that the Moro separatists ever saw. Even after the peace talks with the MNLF collapsed, the Aquino administration remained committed to the process of self- determination reform, tasking her Peace Commission to oversee the process and putting together a largely independent regional consultative body to work on drafting an autonomy statute. The reform initiatives undertaken during Cory’s term laid the groundwork for the establishment of the ARMM in 1989.

Drawing on evidence from rst-hand interviews, the case study has shown that the Filipino democratizers’ conciliatory policies towards the Muslim separatists were largely shaped by the political instability that prevailed in the early post-Marcos period. Threats to Cory Aquino’s survival came primarily from Marcos loyalists as well as anti-Marcos politicians and RAM ocers who had supported the revolution but were equally displeased with what they considered a "communist" takeover of the government by Aquino and her aides. As the case study has shown, political instability caused by such threats gave the Aquino government strategic incentives to build peaceful relations with the Muslims and prevent the re-escalation of separatist violence in Mindanao. The same strategy was observed in Aquino’s approach to the communist insurgency and Cordillera separatists in the North. All of these groups posed a lesser threat to Aquino’s survival than power-seekers who operated close the center and came very close to toppling down the newly democratic government in one of their failed coup attempts.

Case study ndings show that reputational incentives also played an important role in driving the newly democratic government’s conciliatory eorts towards separatist minorities. Drawing her political power largely from the pro-democracy masses, Cory Aquino wanted to establish as broad of a coalition as possible by becoming a "unity president" who was committed to national reconciliation. As part of this eort, Aquino avoided repressive policies towards the country’s long-standing insurgencies and sought to manage dissent in conciliatory ways that distinguished her rule from Marcos’ dictatorial leadership.

161 Chapter 6

Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

The previous chapters have presented theory and empirical ndings that pinpoint democratization as a critical juncture for separatist minorities in terms of self-determination goals. This chapter situates the theory within the broader literature on democratization and ethnic violence. The aim is to reconcile the argument that minority accommodation may be part of a survival strategy for democratizing elites with existing theories about how the very same context may generate elite incentives to fuel nationalist hatred against ethnic minorities. In particular, I address the following questions: If political instability incentivizes the ruling elite to co-opt separatist minorities, and if democratization in particular facilitates these co-optation eorts by allowing for credible reforms and generating additional incentives for minority co-optation, how can we explain the fact that not all democratizers adopt an accommodative policy response to ethnic separatism? What makes some democratizing elites less "minority-friendly" than others, and among those, some particularly prone to act as nationalist warmongers?

Theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 3 suggest that, amidst political instability marked by more imminent threats to elite survival, democratizing leaders develop incentives to adopt accommodative policies that help co-opt separatist minorities and avoid an escalation of conict in the periphery. I refer to these incentives as strategic incentives,

162 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress given that they arise from the ruling elite’s concerns over empowering the center vis-a-vis threats to their political survival. The emergence of strategic incentives is central to the theory and is a necessary condition for the democratizing elite’s threat perception to be shaped in favor of devolution of major autonomy concessions to ethnic separatists. My theory also discusses another type of elite incentive for self-determination reform, namely reputational incentives, which may appear in certain types of transition and increase the likelihood of pro-minority policies. Despite being key to understanding why some democratization processes are more conducive to state-minority reconciliation, reputational incentives have limited explanatory power compared to strategic incentives and are rarely sucient alone for major autonomy reform with redistributive eects such as the creation of an autonomous region.

The key insight that explains the variation in transition outcomes is that, whereas high elite capacity for self-determination reform is a characteristic shared across all democratizing states, not all political leaders who oversee democratization processes develop strategic incentives to co-opt separatist minorities. The following sections discuss potential explanations for why elite incentives for minority co-optation may not appear in democratizing countries with an on-going separatist dispute, although structural conditions in the early post-authoritarian period are propitious for both the legislation and implementation of self-determination reform. More specically, I identify three reasons that help explain this variation in transition outcomes. Elite incentives for minority co-optation may be weak or absent if (i) the minority population is too weak to threaten or sustain a violent mobilization eort in the periphery, (ii) democratization processes generate no credible threats to elite survival, or (iii) regime change is initiated by reluctant top-down democratizers (typically, the incumbent) who perceive minority repression as a more benecial strategy than accommodation in terms of improving their chances of controlling executive power. While the rst two conditions typically generate status quoist policies, the third is conducive to active repression of minority population for populist ends.

To substantiate these insights, the rst section presents illustrative game theoretic

163 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress models that formalize state-minority interaction in authoritarian regimes and democratizing states respectively. The formal illustration helps demonstrate how democratization can become a critical juncture in the trajectory of self-determination disputes, as well as the conditions under which transition processes produce non-conciliatory outcomes such as preservation of the status quo, escalation of separatist violence and nationalist repression. In later sections, I discuss in more detail the three key conditions under which these alternative transition outcomes tend to be observed.

6.1 Democratizers vs Separatists: A Formal Model of Self-

Determination Reform

This section presents a formal illustration of theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 3 and helps demonstrate the conditions under which democratization may generate alternative outcomes for ethnic minorities. Before moving onto the game that democratizers play, I introduce as a point of reference the relatively simpler game that autocrats play when dealing with separatist conict in a politically stable environment (i.e. no perceived threat of forceful removal from power). The model formalizes the interaction between the ruling elite and separatist minorities in stable authoritarian regimes. A key insight that this model provides is that, in the absence of threats to elite survival, accommodation in a non-democratic context occurs only when the perceived costs of ghting exceed the costs of accommodation, that is, when a separatist rebel group is militarily so strong that reaching a mutually acceptable autonomy deal becomes a favorable strategy for the authoritarian government. Next, to illustrate state-minority interaction during democratization processes, I introduce a similar model that relaxes the assumption about political stability and introduces control over oce as a payo that the ruling elite receives with a certain probability. The model provides straightforward predictions about how the broader threat environment impacts the democratizing elite’s strategic incentives to accommodate mobilized separatist minorities, as well as illustrating the conditions under which these incentives fail to appear.

164 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

6.1.1 Autocrat’s Game

Figure 3.4 displays the game played by autocrats in a stable political environment, that is, in the absence of any perceived threats of forceful removal from power. The game starts with a separatist minority that must decide whether to mobilize for war against the government to capture the territory it resides in. If no separatist mobilization occurs, the autocrat may decide to maintain the status quo, accommodate the minority’s demands for self- determination or repress the minority. If the minority mobilizes, the autocrat must then decide to ght the separatists or accommodate their demands. Upon accommodation, the separatists get another move, choosing between ghting or settling for the accommodative policy proposed by the autocrat. Figure 3.4 presents the extensive form representation of the game.

Figure 6.1: Self-Determination Reform in Stable Authoritarian Regimes

At status quo, the separatists receive a payo of 0, while the autocrat receives a pay- o of T , which represents the value of controlling the disputed territory inhabited by the minority population.1 Accommodative reforms to co-opt the separatists cost a > 0 to the

1For simplicity, I assume that the territory is highly valuable to both players.

165 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

autocrat. The autocrat’s net payo from repressing a non-mobilized minority is T + rA, where rA ∈ (−∞, ∞). A positive value for rA means that the autocrat receives a positive gain from cracking down on a minority population that it would not have received under the status quo. In authoritarian regimes, such gains from minority repression are observed in cases where ethnic cleansing helps a despotic government advance its nation-building agenda or resettlement of majority population in minority-inhabited regions facilitates economic exploitation of the disputed land. Where positive gains are absent, rA becomes a negative value given the material (and potentially, reputational) costs of minority repression. The separatist minority incurs a cost rM < 0 if it becomes subject to government repression despite not having invested in a violent mobilization against the center.

Both players incur a cost from ghting, represented as fA and fM for the authoritarian government and separatist minority respectively. The decision to mobilize against the authoritarian government presupposes an investment of m in forming a new rebel organization or reviving an existing one that has been inactive. While these investments are reected in the separatists’ payo as a cost, they facilitate the capture of a de facto portion of disputed territory, qT , which the separatists receive if they mobilize but end up backing down after receiving an accommodation. If the autocrat decides to ght the mobilized separatists rather than accommodate, it receives a payo of (1 − p)T − fA, where p ∈ (0, 1) represents the minority’s probability of capturing the disputed territory by force. In the case where the autocrat accommodates yet ends up ghting anyway due to separatists’ refusal to settle, it receives a payo of (1 − αp)T − a − fA instead. The coecient α ∈ (0, 1] captures the eectiveness of accommodation in changing the military situation in the disputed territory between separatist rebel groups and government forces. Higher values of α correspond to lower eectiveness, whereas values approaching 0 indicate that accommodation is eective in undermining separatists’ capacity to ght, increasing the government’s probability of retaining its sovereign control over minority-inhabited regions.

The subgame on the left shows that, if the minority refrains from mobilizing under authoritarian rule, the autocrat has no incentives to accommodate (given T > T − a)

166 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

and might even adopt repressive measures if rA > 0. Given that rM is always negative and Accommodate is not an equilibrium absent minority mobilization, the highest payo separatists can achieve in that subgame is 0 under status quo. Hence, in a stable authoritarian setting, separatist minorities will choose to mobilize if they expect to secure a positive payo from launching a rebellion or ghting a full-scale separatist war. In the case of mobilization, a separatist group will ght despite accommodation if αpT − fM > qT , that is, when the separatists’ expected payo from ghting exceeds the value of de facto territorial control they can achieve through mobilization only. In the case where the autocrat faces militarily strong separatists who ght rather than settle, the equilibrium condition for accommodation is pT (1 − α) > a. The key insight inferred from these conditions is that the autocrat’s decision to accommodate separatists depends on the military balance between the two parties. The likelihood of accommodation gets higher as separatists’ capacity to capture territory by force, p, increases, so long as reforms introduced to appease the minority population are not completely ineective.

6.1.2 Democratizers’ Game

Now consider an alternative scenario where the same game is being played in the context of democratization. The player on the government side (Player 2) is the "democratizing elite," who may be leaders of former opposition groups or reform-minded regime insiders who replace the authoritarian leadership, as well as an incumbent who decides to undertake democratic reform.2 While the extensive game form and several parameters that determine players’ payos are same as those introduced in the autocrat’s game, there are several dierences in the payo structure. First, the government’s payos have changed due to the introduction of a new parameter that captures political instability, π(c)O. For democratizers, the value of controlling executive oce is O. Amidst potential threats to elite survival that appear during this period, the democratizing elite receives O with a probability of π ∈ (0, 1), which is an increasing function of its share of the total military

2I use the terms "newly democratic elite," "democratizers," and "democratizing elite" interchangeably when referring to Player 2.

167 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress capabilities available to those who have an interest in executive power, or c. Newly democratic leaders who are more vulnerable to threats to political survival have lower values of c.

The status quo represents cases where the minority population does not mobilize and there is no signicant change in government policy on minority self-rule. Under status quo, democratizers get the payo from holding oce with a certain probability, π(c)O, plus the payo from controlling disputed territory, T , whereas the minority receives 0. If repressed, a non-mobilized separatist minority incurs a cost rM < 0 as in the previous game.

The democratizers’ net payo from repressing a non-mobilized minority T +π ˆ(c)O + rD, where rD ∈ (−∞, ∞) as in the previous game and πˆ captures the possibility of receiving O with a dierent probability than in the status quo case. Another new parameter introduced in this game is R(S), where R denotes the reputational gains from minority accommodation and is an increasing function of degree of mass involvement in the democratization process, S ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that democratizers who rise to power with popular support will receive R(S) if they accommodate self-determination demands, regardless of whether the minority in question is mobilized or not.

A key parameter introduced in the democratizers’ game is δ ∈ (0, 1], which denotes the extent to which ghting a separatist war in the periphery hurts the democratizers’ ability to control the center. Higher levels of δ mean a low level of association between what happens in the periphery and the center. If democratizers ght a separatist minority without oering any accommodation, their probability of controlling oce is δ1π(c), whereas the same probability after accommodation is δ2π(c). The dierence between δ1 and δ2 captures the eectiveness of accommodative self-determination reform in improving the democratizers’ chances of controlling oce amidst political instability; the larger this dierence, the more crucial minority appeasement is to democratizers’ ability to survive threats to their political survival.

168 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress Figure 6.2: A Formal Illustration of Self-Determination Politics in Democratizing States

169 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

The subgame on the left shows that, in the case of non-mobilization, separatist minority only receives accommodation if R(S) is positive and larger than the costs of accommodation, a. This means that accommodation of non-mobilized minorities is not an equilibrium of the game unless democratizing elites expect to receive reputational gains from self-determination reform that outweigh its costs. In other words, for ethnic minorities who lack the capacity to mobilize for separatist war, the conditions that generate reform are rather restrictive and the role of pro-democracy masses in the democratization process is key to determining whether the equilibrium can shift from status quo to accommodation. The subgame also shows that minority repression is preferred over status quo if it increases the democratizing elite’s probability of controlling oce (i.e. πˆ > π), even if there are no other expected gains from repressing a non-violent minority (rD = 0).

The subgame on the right side provides insights about how political instability, and the uncertainty it creates about democratizers’ prospect of controlling oce, shapes the way in which they interact with mobilized separatist minorities. Minority payos in the case of mobilization are similar to those in the autocrat’s game; in the last node, minority chooses to ght if the following condition holds:

αpT − fM > qT (6.1)

In such scenarios where democratizers face militarily strong separatists who ght rather than settle, the equilibrium condition for accommodation is the following:

(1 − αp)T + δ2π(c)O − a − fg + R(S) > (1 − p)T − fg + δ1π(c)O

αpT + δ2π(c)O − a + R(S) > T p + δ1π(c)O (6.2)

(δ − δ )π(c)O − a + R(S) 2 1 > α − 1 pT

Combining the two gives the following condition:

(δ − δ )π(c)O − a + R(S) qT + f 2 1 + 1 > α > m (6.3) pT pT

170 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

This equilibrium condition shows when democratizers will accommodate, rather than ght, a separatist minority who is militarily strong and expects a high return from ghting. Recall that α denotes the eectiveness of accommodation in undermining the separatists’ probability of capturing disputed territory by force and has a value that ranges between 0 and 1. The condition supports the core argument of my theory presented in Chapter 3: self- determination reform becomes increasingly likely as δ2 − δ1 increases, that is, as minority appeasement becomes more consequential for democratizers’ ability to survive threats to their political survival that arise during the transition period and control executive power. This holds true even when an accommodative strategy towards the ethnic minority is completely ineective in terms of changing the military balance of power between separatist rebel groups and government forces (i.e. α = 1). In such cases where self-determination reform fails to undermine separatists’ ability to ght and the war continues, democratizers may still benet from accommodation in terms of increasing their chances of political survival. By creating a new autonomous region, for instance, democratizers may be able to co-opt moderates from within the minority population and generate fragmentation within the separatist movements by pitting moderates against radical separatists who sustain the ght. While separatist rebels may still retain the capacity to control territory by force (i.e. α is high and does not aect pT ), they can become distracted from the ght for secession and concentrate some of their violence on local rivals who cooperate with the government. Such partial and temporary containment of separatist war is not necessarily what democratizers aim for with self-determination reform, but it nevertheless improves their ability to concentrate eorts on ghting o more severe challenges to their rule.

Democratizers’ game helps illustrate some of the main arguments presented in Chapter 3. More importantly, both models illustrate the assumptions and conditions under which my theory is expected to work, which may not apply to all democratization trajec- tories. Looking at these conditions, we can theorize about when and why democratization fails to pave the way for accommodative self-determination reform. More specically, I identify three conditions under which democratization processes may generate alternative outcomes such as preservation of status quo or minority repression.

171 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

1. Separatist Minorities with Low Mobilization Capacity: In the democratizers’ game, separatist minorities move rst by deciding whether to mobilize or not. As opposed to the autocrat’s game where accommodation of a non-mobilized minority is not an equilibrium and separatists are better o grabbing territory by force if they can regardless of the accommodation, separatist minorities who play the democratizers’ game may choose ¬Mobilize if they see that the elite expects to receive reputational gains from accommodation, R(S), that outweigh its costs, a. This is a rather restrictive condition that is likely to hold in a particular type of transition, namely mass-driven transitions, where popular pressures for democratization increase elite concerns over signaling a clean break with authoritarian repression. In a substantial number of transitions marked by the absence of reputational incentives, on the other hand, democratizers never accommodate a non-mobilized minority (given the larger payos for Repress and StatusQuo when R(S) = 0 ) and minorities choose to mobilize and ght as long as their expected benets from separatist rebellion exceed

the costs of ghting (i.e. αpT − qT > fM ). This highlights the rst condition under which democratization may fail to generate accommodative self-determination policies: democratizing elites facing only weak separatist minorities for whom mobilization and/or ghting would be too costly. In many cases, this condition, which I shortly refer to as "low mobilization capacity," compels ethnic minorities with self- determination demands to respect the status quo or even endure repression if costs of ghting are suciently high, given that accommodation may be observed only under specic conditions (R(S) > a) that hold for a subset of democratic transitions.

2. "Stable" Transitions and Democratizers Playing the Autocrats’ Game: To display the eect of political instability on state-minority relations, democratizers’ game assumes that π ∈ (0, 1) and π cannot receive a value of 1, meaning that there is always some uncertainty over democratizers’ ability to control oce. That said, this assumption does not hold for particular types of top-down democratization that occur gradually or in a very controlled manner that entails limited liberalization, generating no credible threats to the political survival of the elite (typically, the in-

172 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

cumbent) who oversees the transition as well as the newly democratic leaders who are elected into oce. In such transition cases where political instability is absent, the interaction between democratizers and separatists resembles more closely to the autocrat’s game and the transition process itself does not give way to strategic or reputational incentives for minority appeasement. The likely outcome in such contexts is preservation of status quo3 for non-mobilized minorities who nd separatist war too costly, and escalation of violence in the case of stronger separatist groups (i.e. minority mobilizes and government ghts). The explanation for the latter is that, because top-down democratizers who play the autocrat’s game cannot credibly commit to reform in the case of non-mobilization, strong separatist groups will be better o trying to grab territory by force. On the other hand, democratizers who can transform the country’s institutions without falling victim to political instability may also be a powerful enemy to ethnic minorities and have a high probability of exerting military control over disputed territory, which makes them more likely to ght than accommodate separatist groups.

3. Threat of Electoral Defeat and Positive Returns to Minority Repression: A potential equilibrium of the game in the case where the minority does not mobilize

is Repress, which is preferred over StatusQuo when (ˆπ − π)(c)O > rD. In other words, democratizers may choose to repress a non-violent minority if they see that doing so will improve their chances of controlling oce and do not expect to incur a high cost from repression. This equilibrium is most commonly observed in involuntary, incumbent-led democratic transitions, where the authoritarian leadership opens up political space for competition in an eort to pre-empt the regime’s downfall and uses minority repression as a strategy to increase its chances of winning the rst democratic elections. Particularly in contexts where elites can easily use ethnic cleavages to polarize the public and the majority population shows a tendency to respond to nationalist propaganda, the dierence πˆ − π increases, making

3Depending on authoritarian legacies, status quoist policies could mean a continuation of no-concessions policies towards ethnic minorities or preservation of past concessions (e.g. keeping an autonomous region intact).

173 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress

repression the more likely outcome of democratic transition.

While "repression" is most clearly observed in the subgame on the left where the minority does not mobilize, a similar mechanism could also help explain the government’s decision to ght, rather than accommodate, a mobilized minority. Recall Equation 6.3, which is the equilibrium condition where the minority ghts and democratizers accommodate. The democratizing elite’s decision in that node is more

likely to shift from "accommodate" to "ght" in the case where δ2 − δ1 goes negative, which might happen if the threat of electoral defeat outweighs other threats to elite survival and cracking down on separatists is expected to improve democratizers’ probability of controlling executive power, (π)(c)O, by amassing nationalist votes. This particular scenario is the one that has been discussed the most in existing literature on democratization and ethnic violence.

6.2 Explaining Alternative Transition Outcomes for Ethnic Mi-

norities

As discussed in the previous section, alternative outcomes such as escalation of separatist war or nationalist repression of minorities can be explained by three conditions under which transition processes may fail to generate strategic incentives to appease or co-opt separatist minorities. The rst condition is a minority attribute and determines the extent to which separatist activities of an ethnic minority shape the cost-benet calculation of the decision-making elite. The latter two relate to transition paths, distinguished in terms of the driving forces behind democratization. This section aims to present a more in-depth discussion of these conditions, explaining how they shape state-minority interaction during incipient democratization and the types of outcomes they are likely to generate.

The rst part distinguishes among separatist minorities on the basis of mobilization capacity, and describes the types of minorities who would the least and most likely to achieve self-determination goals during a period of democratization. As discussed in Chapter 3, my theory of self-determination reform primarily explains large-scale conces-

174 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress sions that devolve some degree of autonomy, given that minor concessions that fall short of some form of territorial autonomy are unlikely to co-opt separatist minorities who have the potential to mobilize for a rebellion or are already at war with the state. Below, I refer to these high-capacity groups as territorial separatists, further distinguishing among their types to better illustrate the extent of variation in the "separatism problem" that democratizing elites may have to deal with upon taking over power from an authoritarian regime. Compared to territorial separatists, ethnic minorities with low mobilization capacity, whom I shortly refer to as cultural separatists, are unlikely to achieve any major concessions over self-determination during incipient democratization.

The second part distinguishes among transition paths building o the typology introduced in Chapter 3 and explains how particular paths to democracy can be more conducive to two conditions that make alternative outcomes more likely than self- determination reform: (i) low threats to elite survival and (ii) positive returns to minority repression. While these conditions are rarely observed in mass-driven and reformer- driven democratization processes, they are more common in incumbent-driven transitions to democracy. Particularly, incumbents who reluctantly democratize under pressure from domestic or external political actors are more likely to resort to repressive policies against ethnic minorities. Democratization voluntarily initiated by the authoritarian incumbent with no outside pressure driving the process may also be conducive to non-conciliatory outcomes, given the low level of political instability that characterizes these transitions. Absent threats to elite survival, the authoritarian leadership or newly elected leaders who replace it are unlikely to develop strategic incentives to contain separatist conicts in the periphery or co-opt ethnic minorities into the regime’s coalition of supporters.

Minority Mobilization Capacity and Alternative Outcomes

Presented in detail in Chapter 3, my theory builds on the assumption that government concessions that devolve a certain degree of autonomy to separatist minorities occur when costs of repression are suciently high to make accommodation the more attractive policy option. Major autonomy reform is discussed as a co-optation strategy that democratizers

175 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress use to contain or prevent separatist conict, fearing that a civil war could further destabilize an already turbulent context and strengthen the hands of adversaries who pose a larger threat to center than separatist groups. This proposition suggests that the prospect of large-scale self-determination reform will only appear in contexts where democratizing elites are faced with aggrieved ethnic minorities with a latent or already activated potential to wage separatist war. On the other hand, ethnic minorities who lack mobilization capacity and cannot credibly threaten war are unlikely to receive any major concessions over self-determination in democratizing states, even though newly democratic elites may have reputational incentives to oer some minor concessions such as cultural and linguistic rights.

Given that high mobilization capacity is hardly a trait shared across all separatist minorities, the condition narrows down the set of cases to which my theory applies. Ex- cluded from the list of ethnic minorities who are expected to gain political autonomy during a democratization period are those who are devoid of the will or capacity4 to ght for self-determination and whose political activities are too limited to shape the political elite’s threat perception within the turbulent context of regime change. This description mostly applies to what I refer to as "cultural separatists," whose struggle for self-determination is largely conned to demands for recognition of their distinct ethnic identity, language rights and cultural protection.5 Examples include the Berbers in Algeria, Uzbeks in Kyr- gyzstan, Russian minorities in post-communist states, and some indigenous populations in Latin America (during the Third Wave), whose self-determination claims during periods of democratization in their respective countries have been short of territorial autonomy. Due to their limited self-determination agenda and lack of resolve/capacity to ght, which deem government repression or ghting largely unnecessary in turn, these minorities tend to be the least threatening among all types of separatist challengers that the elite in de-

4Low mobilization capacity may be linked to limited nature of self-determination demands, resource constraints or lack of cohesion among the minority population due to geographical dispersion, among other possible explanations. 5This is not to suggest that these minorities were only concerned with cultural survival; in most cases, they expressed additional demands for socio-economic rights, land reform, resource transfers for regional development, representation of minority interests at the national level, and so on.

176 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress mocratizing states may be forced to deal with.

In responding to these lesser threats, democratizing states may ignore minority demands altogether or introduce less redistributive types of reform related to cultural autonomy (e.g. ocial recognition of minority languages, right to ancestral lands, inclusive citizenship laws), for which the logic of accommodation operates dierently. Such "easy" concessions have less to do with elite incentives to avoid the costs of ghting and are better explained by international pressures for genuine democratization or leverage of foreign patrons with kinship ties to separatist minorities. In Romania, for instance, early steps towards democratization in the early 1990s were characterized by Romanian ethnic nationalism and led by former communists who largely ignored the demands for cultural and linguistic autonomy expressed by the country’s large Hungarian minority. After years of diplomatic negotiations with neighboring Hungary, Romania took its rst signicant steps towards accommodation with a treaty signed between the two states in 1996, which committed Romania to a range of accommodative policies such as recognizing its Hungarian minority’s right to freely use their mother tongue in public, facilitating minority access to bilingual education, and allowing street signs and geographic places to be displayed in minority language in Hungarian-inhabited areas (Treaty on Understanding, 1996). Although increased political mobilization of minority representatives in the post-revolutionary period, spearheaded by a political organization named the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, may have also contributed to the achievement of cultural accommodation in the mid-1990s, the Hungarian minority possessed neither the collective will nor the mobilization capacity to put more comprehensive self-determination reform within the range of policy concessions they could achieve during Romania’s early democratization.

Compared to cultural separatists, ethnic minorities who demand costlier reforms such as territorial autonomy - referred to as territorial separatists from here onwards - tend to have higher mobilization capacity. In fact, it is often the case that the conditions that allow minorities to mobilize eectively and threaten rebellion, such as territorial concentration or geographic proximity to an ethnic kin state, also push minority demands towards

177 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress a more radical self-determination agenda. That said, there is also some variation in terms of ability to threaten separatist war across higher-capacity groups that democratizing elites may be forced to deal with during regime transition. A basic typology presented in Figure 6.1 shows a continuum of mobilization capacity that separatist minorities may possess at the onset of democratization.

Figure 6.3: A Continuum of Minority Mobilization Capacity at Democratization Onset

Cultural separatists lay at the lowest end of the continuum and lack the capacity to threaten war; as such, the highest level of concessions they can typically achieve during early democratization are cultural reforms and ethnic recognition. Some indigenous populations who are geographically dispersed and have minor self-determination demands also fall close to cultural separatists in the mobilization capacity spectrum. Territorial separatists who have latent mobilization potential but who have been either contained or co-opted by the authoritarian regime fall in the middle range of the continuum. Contained territorial separatists are minority populations who have been subject to brutal repression under the authoritarian regime and largely contained but may nd an opportunity to mobilize during the democratization period. Co-opted territorial separatists are those that have

178 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress been largely content with the current status quo due to having received concessions in the past; these groups too may perceive regime transition as a window of opportunity to mobilize for greater self-determination. While contained separatists may nd it more dif- cult to mobilize due to having experienced high levels of repression in the recent past, both types of minorities have latent mobilization capacity6 and therefore the potential to launch or threaten a separatist war. Given this latent capacity, how these groups choose to interact with the democratizing elite during the transition period may pave the way for major autonomy concessions. Among all types, at-war territorial separatists who are already ghting against the state at the onset of democratic transition are most likely to perceive and experience it as a critical juncture in terms of achieving major autonomy concessions, given their ability to shape the elite’s threat perception through destabilizing an already unstable context.

6.2.1 Transition Paths, Political Instability and Alternative Outcomes

Distinguishing among minority types on the basis of mobilization capacity only accounts for one of the three conditions that help explain why some democratizers accommodate ethnic separatists while others repress. The other two conditions - level of political instability that mark the transition period and democratizers’ expected gains from minority repression - are a function of the democratization process itself.

Some initial discussion of how a country’s path to democracy can inuence the prospects of self-determination reform was introduced in Chapter 3. One of the hypotheses that I developed and tested building o that discussion made a distinction between mass- driven transitions and elite-led transitions. My argument there was that, while all types of transitions may generate strategic elite incentives for self-determination reform and

6As democratization processes unfold, some factions within co-opted or contained minorities may be emboldened to re-ignite the separatist struggle. The fragile equilibrium that had been established between the authoritarian regime and minority populations either through repression, as in the case of contained separatists, or through concessions, as in the case of co-opted separatists, may break down if a separatist movement’s political and armed wings or radical factions that split from them come to perceive democratization as a window of opportunity to consolidate their territorial control and gain greater autonomy from the center. Drawing on the literature on social movements, Gurr (2000) describes a similar dynamic when he refers to democratization as a transient political opportunity, which facilitates minority mobilization for ethno-political action.

179 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress thereby represent a critical juncture for separatists, mass involvement in the transition process can further increase the prospects of reform by generating reputational incentives for accommodation in addition to strategic ones. What this argument fails to shed light on, however, is why some democratization processes fail to generate strategic incentives for minority accommodation in the rst place, resulting instead in non-conciliatory policy outcomes.

One of the three conditions that explain this variation in outcomes relates to the severity of political instability that marks the transition period. My theory suggests threats to elite survival as the dening element of political instability and the mechanism that drives the ruling elite’s decision to accommodate separatist groups. Although the emergence of such threats is common in early democratization periods,7 not all regime transitions are equally conducive to political instability. In particular, the "why" and "by whom" of democratization processes substantially inuence how turbulent the transition period will be for the elite who initiates and oversees it. At one extreme are bottom-up transitions like the 1986 People Power Revolution in the Philippines, the 1992 transitions in Mali and Niger and Indonesia’s democratization in 1998, which were driven by the revolutionary struggle of the masses, and as indicated by set transition dates, made a sharp break with the previous regime by bringing down authoritarian rulers. At the other extreme are top-down transitions like Brazil, whose democratization was initiated by the military dictatorship in the 1970s and occurred so gradually that, as Huntington (1991, 126) notes, "it is virtually impossible at what point Brazil stopped being a dictatorship and became a democracy." Although both extremes fall under the umbrella of democratization, the degree of political instability that marks these transitions and the sense of vulnerability to threats felt by the elite who oversees them dier remarkably.

A typology of transition paths is helpful for theorizing about when democratization may occur without generating no credible threats to elite survival. As for any social phenomena, transition paths are dicult to t into neat categories. A common practice

7In fact, the most common operationalization of political instability in cross-national analyses is a recent shift in a country’s Polity score (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003).

180 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress in the traditional democratization literature has been to locate transition processes "along a continuum in terms of the relative importance of governing and opposition groups as the sources of democratization" (Huntington 1991, 114). Juan Linz (1978) groups transition paths into two categories - reforma and ruptura - where democratization processes are driven by the elites in power or opposition groups respectively. In his work on Third Wave democratization, Huntington (1991) refers to the same processes as transformation and replacement; the former occurs as a regime-initiated process with the emergence of reformers from within the authoritarian elite circle, who are markedly stronger than the opposition groups and are therefore able to co-opt the latter through gradual liberalization, whereas the latter results from the opposition gaining sucient strength vis-a-vis a non-conciliatory authoritarian regime and eventually overthrowing it through popular revolt. Huntington adds another category to the list named transplacement, which results from the joint action of the incumbent and the opposition. This third path typically occurs through a negotiating pact between the two parties, whereby the authoritarian leadership concedes to democratization upon the realization that continued repression of opposition groups will eventually bring about the regime’s downfall (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990; Huntington 1991).

As discussed in Chapter 3, I use three categories to distinguish among transition types, which are along the lines of Huntington’s tripartite typology. First, I distinguish between two types of elite-led transitions, which are incumbent-driven democratization and reformer-driven democratization. The former refers to cases where the authoritarian ruler initiates a top-down process of liberalization or democratization. Some cases of incumbent-driven democratization come in the form of concessions to opposition groups who demand democratic rights, similar to what Huntington describes as transplacement, and aim to pre-empt a forceful removal from power, whereas others occur in the absence of any bottom-up pressures for change and can be driven by international pressures for democratic reform or the incumbent’s decision to move the country in a democratic direction, similar to Huntington’s transformation. Reformer-driven transitions, on the other hand, are cases of transformation and occur when reformists from an autocrat’s winning coali-

181 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress tion replaces the incumbent - either by force, through an elite pact or following the incumbent’s death - and initiate a top-down democratization. The third category, mass-driven democratization, is similar to Huntington’s replacement (or Linz’s ruptura) and occurs when the incumbent loses power to opposition leaders who overthrow the authoritarian leadership, typically with the support of revolutionary masses and the military.8 Table 6.1 shows how each of the three categories map onto Huntington’s typology of democratic transitions and the degree of political instability that typically marks each category.

Table 6.1: Types of Democratization and Political Instability

Democratization Path Huntington’s Typology Level of Political Instability Incumbent-Driven = Transformation (if voluntary) Low = Transplacement (if pre-emptive) High

Reformer-Driven = Transformation High

Mass-Driven = Replacement High

Reformer-Driven and Mass-Driven Transitions

As Table 6.1 summarizes, reformer-driven and mass-driven transitions are typically conducive to threats to the political elite who initiates and oversees the democratization process. The major source of political instability in both cases is the sore losers of the transition, such as loyalists of the fallen authoritarian regime who have no prospects of inclusion in the new leadership’s winning coalition. In some cases, these include military factions who remain loyal to the authoritarian regime (e.g. Francoist military ocers in Spain) or are as disillusioned with the newly democratic government as they had been with the authoritarian leadership (e.g. anti-Marcos RAM faction in the Philippines). With respect to reformer-driven transitions, Huntington (1991, 137) discusses at length how the success of the democratization process crucially depends on the subduing of these "standpatters," examples of which from the Third Wave included "the Francoist ’bunker’ in Spain, the mili-

8I refer to rst two categories as cases of "top-down democratization," given that they are both led by regime insiders, whereas the third category is referred to as "mass-driven" or "bottom-up" democratization.

182 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress tary hard-liners in Brazil and other Latin American countries, the Stalinists in Hungary, the mainlander old guard in the KMT, the party bosses and bureaucracy in the PRI..." Follow- ing the initiation of a reformer-led democratization process, such authoritarian elements may still retain the capacity to grab power from reformers by force. One of the strategies that reformers use upon taking control of the government, Huntington notes, is to alienate the standpatters and "reinforce themselves by ... expanding the political arena and appealing to new groups that were becoming politically active as a result of the opening" (Ibid., 139). While this observation highlights reformers’ coalition-building eorts towards opposition parties as a strategy to weaken the standpatters, my theory suggests that a similarly strategic rationale could help explain reformers’ initiatives to make peace with separatist minorities amidst political instability.

In reformer-driven transitions, moderates with liberal leanings from within the authoritarian regime play the key role in driving the democratization process and typically do so in the absence of strong bottom-up pressures for change. As such, once they take over power from the incumbent and are elected into oce, major threats to their survival come from rival elites or military factions who remain loyal to the old regime, whereas opposition parties that represent other segments of the population become potential coalition partners. In mass-driven transitions, on the other hand, reformers from within the regime are typically absent and the democratization process is driven instead by a coalition of opposition groups who unite against the authoritarian incumbent and force it out of power via mass mobilization, and in many cases, cooperation from the military. The aftermath of such revolutionary transitions are marked by subtantially higher levels of political instability compared to reformer-driven transitions, given that the newly democratic government has to ght o both the loyalists of the fallen authoritarian regime and rivals from within its own coalition of former opposition groups. With respect to the Third Wave, Huntington (1991, 148) describes this turbulent post-revolutionary setting as follows: "Before the fall, opposition groups are united by their desire to bring about the fall. After the fall, divisions appear among them and they struggle over the distribution of power and the nature of the new regime that must be established." Even in cases where those who ll this power

183 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress vacuum introduce multiparty elections (as opposed to instituting their own authoritarian regime as in the case of ayatollah in Iran or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) and provide an opportunity for other opposition groups to be represented in government, struggles over power ensue and threats to the survival of the newly democratic government typically mark the early democratization period.

Incumbent-driven Transitions

Compared to reformer-driven and mass-driven democratization, incumbent-driven transitions tend to show more variation in terms of degree of political instability that characterizes the transition period. This variation can be understood better by distinguishing further between voluntary (non-coerced) and pre-emptive (coerced) incumbent-led transitions. I argue that transition paths where an authoritarian leader initiates a top-down democratization process voluntarily are most conducive to a continuation of the status quo in state-minority relations. As these transitions typically occur in a gradual and controlled manner, they are marked by low levels of political instability and therefore fail to generate the strategic incentives for minority co-optation that typically pave the way for major autonomy concessions.

Where the authoritarian incumbent’s decision to democratize is pre-emptive and driven by fear of losing power to opposition absent reform, democratization processes can be marked by higher levels of political instability. Resembling what Huntington identies as transplacement, some of these transitions tend to involve negotiations over regime change between the incumbent and the opposition, neither of which is powerful enough to take down the other by force, and entails a turbulent process marked by "a seesawing back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations, on the one hand, and repression, jailing, police violence, states of siege, and martial law, on the other" (Ibid., 153). What makes such democratization processes conducive to political instability is that negotiations for regime change typically occur amidst opposition from hard-liners in both sides: on the government side, threatened authoritarian elites may disagree with the incumbent’s decision to relinquish power willingly; on the opposition side, some radical groups may reject

184 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress negotiations in fear of lending legitimacy to the authoritarian leadership or conceding too much to a regime that they believe could be overthrown. Once the authoritarian incumbent and the opposition moderates reach an agreement over the terms of the former’s exit and initiate the democratization process, these hard-liners become potential threats to the survival of the newly elected government. In other pre-emptive transitions, pressures for democratization may come from armed opposition groups who refuse to negotiate at all or powerful international adversaries who can coerce the authoritarian incumbent into introducing democratic reform. These transitions similarly occur in a weakened authoritarian regime where the incumbent elite faces threats to its survival and introduces elections and other liberalizing reforms as part of a pre-emptive eort. Characterized as such by high levels of political instability, pre-emptive incumbent-led transitions can generate strategic incentives for the new elite to ameliorate relations with ethnic minorities in an eort to prevent them from becoming an additional source of instability.

An important caveat about pre-emptive democratization led by illiberal incumbents is that it is a particular type of transition where there may also be positive returns to minority repression. My theory links high levels of political instability in mass-driven and reformer-driven transitions to self-determination reform based on the argument that opposition groups or regime insiders who initiate these processes are threatened by center- seeking rivals who may conspire to take over oce by force and therefore develop strategic incentives to co-opt minority populations. It is assumed that, because these elites democratize by choice, they are not as threatened by the prospect of defeat in the rst multi- party elections following authoritarian breakdown. This assumption does not hold for autocrats who reluctantly initiate a top-down democratization in an eort to pre-empt political instability, which may result in an inglorious exit from power. For these types of "democratizers," it is often the case that electoral defeat poses the most imminent threat to survival, given that democratization eorts are undertaken preemptively before opposition groups or other center-seekers are suciently mobilized and able to create a high level of political instability. In such contexts, the assumption that co-optation of aggrieved separatist minorities can be helpful as a survival strategy does not necessarily hold, given

185 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress that containing separatist conicts in the periphery is unlikely to help threatened elites improve their chances of winning an electoral competition. As Snyder (2000, 32) argues, a more politically advantageous strategy under such conditions may be the use of "nationalist persuasion campaigns" to compete for popular support. If successful, such exclusionary policies may also serve the purpose of containing bottom-up pressures for democratization, which is typically on the agenda of reluctant democratizers who use democratic reform to pre-empt popular revolt.

During such cases of pre-emptive democratization that breeds nationalism, the extent of victimization suered by target minorities may vary. In some transitional contexts, nationalist policies toward autonomy-seekers may nd expression in relatively milder form, engendering policies such as discriminatory citizenship laws or restrictions on public expression of ethnocultural identities distinct from the one that overlaps with state- endorsed nationality. For example, in Romania, the newly elected National Salvation Front that came to power after Ceausescu’s fall in 1990 turned a blind eye to local-level nationalist politicians who had initiated a policy of de-Magyarization in certain towns, cleansing the public space of ethnic Hungarian (Magyar) symbols and suppressing the Hungarian minority’s quest for cultural autonomy.9 In other cases, particularly where autonomy-seeking minorities are highly mobilized and possess sucient military capabilities to ght the government, exclusionary nationalism often takes the form of outright repression and military crackdown, potentially escalating into a large-scale separatist war. Moldova’s incipient democratization after the dissolution of the USSR, for instance, was marked by an escalation of military conict with Transdniesterian secessionists, who had mobilized in response to nationalist-dominated government’s exclusionary policies and whose protests against the authorities were initially met with crackdown rather than compromise. Once adopted as a central policy, the degree and form of nationalist exclusion and repression that ethnic minorities are subject to are shaped by several factors including minority mobilization capacity, extremity of self-determination demands, elites’ strategic interests in targeting ethnic outsiders as well as context-specic dynamics. Overall, pre-emptive incumbent-driven

9See Brubaker et al. 2006.

186 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress transitions where the major threat to elite survival is electoral defeat not only fails to generate favorable conditions for self-determination reform, but may also become a breeding ground for minority repression.

In contrast to involuntary incumbent-driven transitions, democratization processes initiated by an authoritarian leadership in the absence of increasing bottom-up pressures for regime change are characterized by lower levels of political instability. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 39) describe, these are controlled transitions led by "authoritarian incumbents with sucient cohesion and resources to dictate the emerging rules of the game," in which political opponents of the regime "must either acquiesce and compete under unilaterally determined conditions or resist and risk being shut out of (or being victimized by) subsequent developments." Such voluntary transitions can be driven by a variety of factors including legitimacy concerns, expected gains from democratic reform in the international arena, or the incumbent’s belief that the country is "ready" to move in the direction of democracy (Ibid., 128). In the absence of domestic pressures for regime change, authoritarian ruling elites are able to exercise control over the pace and degree of democratic reform and typically rely on voters to elect them (or the candidates they support) to form the new government. In particular, incumbent-driven democratization initiated by military dictatorships or juntas (e.g. Brazil in the 1970s; Turkey in the early 1980s) typically unfolds in a controlled manner, entails gradual and limited liberalization, and is therefore unlikely to generate any credible threats to political survival for either the military leadership who oversees the process or the new ruling elite who is elected into oce through military supervised elections. These types of democratic transitions rarely give way to major self-determination reform, given that democratizers lack strategic incentives to co-opt minority populations in the absence of political instability.

Key conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that, while mass- driven and reformer-driven transitions typically generate propitious conditions for self- determination reform, incumbent-driven transitions can shape state-minority interaction in distinctive ways depending on whether the democratization eort is undertaken volun-

187 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress tarily or as a pre-emptive measure, and if pre-emptive, whether threatened authoritarian elite expects positive returns to minority repression in terms of improving its chances of political survival. To sum up Table 6.2 presents an overview of conditions that help explain the variation in democratizers’ response to territorial separatists. It displays the degree of political instability that typically marks dierent transition paths and how democratizers along each path may respond to ethnic separatism.

6.3 Conclusion

Presented in Chapter 3, my theory of self-determination reform argues that democratization is a critical juncture in the trajectory of self-determination disputes in which the elites may develop strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation. Chapter 6 has sought to reconcile this argument with existing theories that view incipient democratization in a more negative light with respect to state-minority relations. As the discussion throughout the chapter aims to clarify, my theory does not contradict the conventional wisdom on democratization and ethnic violence. Rather, it adds nuance to existing theories by drawing attention to the fact that non-conciliatory transition outcomes for ethnic minorities, which have received the broadest attention in the literature, are observed under specic conditions.

To identify the conditions, I utilized illustrative game theoretical models that formalize the logic of self-determination reform in democratizing states. More specically, the models help explain when democratization processes become more conducive to non- conciliatory outcomes such as preservation of the status quo or minority repression. The ndings present three conditions under which elite incentives for minority accommodation may fail to appear in democratizing countries: (i) minority populations lack the mobilization capacity to ght or threaten separatist rebellion, (ii) the democratization period is marked by low levels of political instability, and/or (iii) democratization is initiated involuntarily by an incumbent autocrat who perceives minority repression as a useful strategy for remaining in power. The rst condition is helpful for identifying the types of ethnic mi-

188 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress norities for whom democratization presents a window of opportunity for achieving major autonomy concessions. Given my theoretical focus on such large-scale concessions, the rest of the discussion narrows down the scope of analysis to ethnic minorities with some mobilization potential, whom I refer to as territorial separatists.

The other two conditions pertain to democratization processes and emphasize that not all transition paths are equally conducive to strategic incentives for appeasing separatist minorities. Building o this insight, I introduce a typological theory that establishes a relationship between a country’s democratization path and how democratizers respond to on-going self-determination disputes during and after regime transition. While mass- driven and reformer-driven transitions typically generate strategic incentives for minority accommodation by facilitating the emergence of threats to elite survival, certain other types of transitions, namely voluntary incumbent-driven transitions, where the authoritarian leadership exercises full control over the democratization process and initiates reform without external pressures are marked by relatively lower levels of political instability. In such voluntary transitions that occur in a gradual and top-down manner, the status quo vis-a-vis separatist minorities is likely to be preserved. Outcomes tend to vary more in the case of coerced incumbent-led transitions where the decision to democratize is taken under domestic or international pressures for regime change. If the democratizing incumbent fears defeat in the rst elections more than other challenges to its rule, nationalist aggression towards ethnic minorities may be observed. If, on the other hand, electoral defeat is a relatively minimal concern compared to threats posed by adversaries who seek to overthrow the newly democratic government, strategic incentives for minority accommodation appear as in the case of other transition paths marked by high political instability.

The next chapter introduces additional case studies that probe the generalizability of the theory as well as illustrate the conditions under which alternative outcomes may be observed. Cases are selected on the basis of the typology of democratization paths presented in Chapter 6, which reects the variation in key conditions that may generate dierent policy responses to separatism in emerging democracies.

189 Chapter 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress (Territorial Separatists) Separatist war may erupt or escalate due to in- Separatist war may erupt or escalate due to in- Major SD Reform (if non-electoral threats to elite Major SD Reform Status quo Escalation of separatist war is likely Major SD Reform Nationalist Repression (if threat of electoral defeat • • • • • • • • creased mobilization during transition creased mobilization during transition survival outweigh threat of electoral defeat) outweighs non-electoral threats to elite survival) Low Weak Weak High Strong Weak High Strong Weak High Strong Strong Table 6.2: How Transition Paths Shape Democratizers’ Response to Territorial Separatists Path Instability Incentives Incentives (Voluntary) Mass-Driven (Pre-emptive) Democratization Democratization Democratization Democratization Reformer-Driven Incumbent-Driven Incumbent-Driven Democratization Level of Political Strategic Reputational Transition Outcome for Ethnic Minority

190 Chapter 7

Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

This chapter presents additional case studies to provide further qualitative evidence in support of my theory of self-determination reform as well as illustrate the conditions under which alternative outcomes are observed. Cases are selected using what Seawright and Gerring (2008) call the diverse-case method, which helps achieve "maximum variance along relevant dimensions." Building o the arguments presented in Chapter 6, this method is particularly helpful for showing how dierent democratization paths, which vary along the level of political instability that marks the post-authoritarian period, reshape state- minority relations in the context of an on-going separatist dispute. The variance along transition paths captures the extent to which strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation shape the cost-benet calculations of democratizing elites. Having presented the Philippines as a case of mass-driven transition where both types of incentives are at play, the next set of cases cover the other three types of transition paths introduced in Chapter 6: reformer-driven, incumbent-driven (pre-emptive) and incumbent-driven (voluntary) democratization.1 As expected, the qualitative ndings show that the rst two paths that were marked by the rise of threats to elite survival in the transitional context generated propitious conditions for reconciliation eorts towards ethnic separatists, while

1Given my theoretical focus on major autonomy concessions, which are only observed as a transition outcome in the case of territorial separatists with latent or active capacity to mobilize for separatist rebellion, I treat minority mobilization capacity as a scope condition. Hence, cases are selected from a subset of democratizing countries that are host to a minority population who are already at war with the state or have the potential to launch one.

191 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey the latter case saw no shift from the repressive policies of the pre-transition years, leading instead to an escalation of separatist conict.

The rst two cases, Spain’s reformer-driven transition (1978-1981) and Nicaragua’s pre-emptive incumbent-driven transition (1984-1990), conform to the theory’s expectations that democratization paves the way for autonomy concessions to separatist minorities - Basques in the case of Spain and of Miskito Indians in the case of Nicaragua. While Spain-Basque and Nicaragua-Miskito dyads are selected primarily as typical cases from the two of the four transition types that represent the diversity in democratization paths, they can also be considered as most-dierent cases.2 Most-dierent cases are similar in the causal variable of interest (X1) and the dependent variable (Y) but show dierent values in "all other plausible independent variables" (Ibid., 306). Obviously, Spain and Nicaragua cases dier signicantly in terms of the democratization path that the countries embarked upon in the late 1970s and early 1980s, respectively. That said, they also show signicantly dierent values in other key variables emphasized by competing theories of self-determination reform. Cunningham’s theory, for instance, suggests that more fragmented groups are more likely to receive concessions over self-determination. Her dataset records that the two minority groups largely diered in their level of internal factionalization: while the Basques were highly fragmented and had more than ve factions during Spain’s democratization in the mid-1970s, the Miskitos had only two factions in 1984 when Nicaragua’s transition to democracy began, one of which was known for its loose commitment to the self-determination agenda. The two cases also dier in terms of number of ethnic groups in the country, which, according to Walter (2006), determine the likelihood of accommodation by generating reputational concerns over signaling toughness to "potential separatists." While Spain is a country with numerous regionally concentrated, ethnolinguis-

2The diverse-case and most-dierent-case methods are not at all incompatible. In fact, in a discussion of the weaknesses of the most-dierent method in terms of causal identication, Gerring (2007, 675-6) writes: "There is a more charitable way of approaching the most-dierent method. Arguably, this is not a pure "method" at all but merely a supplement, a way of incorporating diversity in the sub-sample of cases that provide the unusual outcome of interest. If the unusual outcome is revolutions, one might wish to encompass a wide variety of revolutions in one’s analysis. If the unusual outcome is post-Communist civil society, it seems appropriate to include a diverse set of post-Communist polities in one’s sample of case studies... From this perspective, the most-dierent method (so-called) might be better labeled a diverse-case method."

192 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey tic fragments with separatist agendas or potential thereof, Nicaragua’s autonomy-seekers largely consist of indigenous populations concentrated along the Atlantic coastal region.

As opposed to the Philippines case where mass-driven democratization produced both strategic and reputational incentives for accommodative self-determination reform, both Spain and Nicaragua cases are elite-led transitions that occurred in the absence of bottom-up pressures for democratization and only illustrate strategic incentives at play. As such, they conrm the theoretical proposition developed in Chapter 3 that strategic incentives hold more explanatory power and will lead to minority accommodation even in the absence of reputational incentives (although the opposite may not be true). The Spanish case shows how regime reformers who emerge from within the authoritarian elite and initiate a top-down democratization process may adopt self-determination reform in an eort to contain separatist violence and strengthen their hands vis-a-vis larger threats to center posed by loyalists of the ousted dictatorship. The Nicaraguan case provides even stronger evidence in favor of the theory, showing that authoritarian incumbents who reluctantly democratize the country may also develop strategic incentives for accommodating separatist minorities when political instability is a major concern.

The third case study examines the Turkish government’s policy towards Kurdish separatism after the country’s military-led transition to democracy in 1983. In light of the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 3, the case represents a negative case where democratization failed to pave the way for Kurdish self-determination. In fact, the PKK insurgency was launched a year after the reinstitution of multi-party elections in 1983, with the rest of the decade marked by increasing violence in the Southeastern regions where the rebel group engaged the Turkish military. The case study discusses how the particular transition path that Turkey went through in the 1980s - a voluntary transition led by the incumbent military junta - failed to generate the conditions that produce strategic incentives for accommodating Kurdish demands for autonomy.

193 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

7.1 Spain’s Reformer-Driven Transition and Basque Separatism

(1975-1981)

A case that conforms with my theory’s expectations is the Spanish policy towards separatist regions during the country’s democratization period in the 1970s. In the early years of post-Franco era, the rst democratically elected government under Adolfo Suarez took major steps towards increased autonomy for dierent nationalities making up the Spanish state. The new Constitution, ratied in December 1978, recognized "autonomous communities" as one of the governing principles of the Spanish state, laying the legal foundation for the formation of regional governments. Conciliatory eorts towards separatists were particularly notable in the case of the Basque Country, which had become a turbulent place where "dictatorship and transition governments were openly deed; labour militancy and terrorist violence were intense;...and eective state control was constantly undermined" (Bourne 2008, 29). As early as January 1978, a provisional organ called the Basque General Council was established to rule the region, albeit with no real authority or funds. In Oc- tober 1979, an Autonomy Statute for the Basque Country, drafted after long negotiations between the Suarez government and the Basque representatives, was nally approved in referendum, devolving to the region substantial competencies over taxation, education, healthcare, economic planning, policing, language, and cultural aairs.

Spain’s early democratization period during which these concessions were introduced was also marked by political instability, with the primary threat to the democratizing elite posed by Franco loyalists in the army. Findings presented below help illustrate the link between the domestic threat environment during Spain’s reformer-driven transition to democracy and the Suarez government’s turn to conciliatory policies towards the Basque rebels in the late 1970s. Importantly, the case reveals an alternative causal mechanism through which threats to survival may incentivize the democratizing elite to accommodate the separatists. So far, the theory has argued democratizers’ attempts to make peace with the separatists are primarily shaped by strategic incentives (i) to avoid ghting battles on multiple fronts from a position of weakness and (ii) prevent anti-regime alliances be-

194 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey tween separatists and center-seeking rivals. Findings from the Spanish case show that, in cases where the main threat to elite survival is posed by the country’s armed forces, democratizers may also invest in stabilizing minority-populated regions in an eort to prevent anti-democratic military factions from using separatist conict as a pretext to take over the government and reverse the course of democratization.

7.1.1 Political Instability in the Early Post-Franco Era

Spanish transition to democracy is not commonly characterized as a period of "political instability" due to the fact that it was a peaceful transition that ultimately produced a stable democratic regime. Several scholars have noted that democratization in Spain was brought about "relatively quickly and smoothly" under the skillful leadership of King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez and set a model for the democratizations in Latin America and East- ern Europe (Huntington 1991, 127; Maxwell 1991). After Franco’s death, Suarez had been appointed by Juan Carlos as Prime Minister in July 1976 and initiated a political reform programme, which was introduced after intensive negotiations with the opposition and approved via referendum in December 1976. Coming to power amidst a long-standing struggle between opposition forces who demanded a ruptura or complete "democratic break" with the Franco era and those who defended continuity with the Francoist institutions, Suarez was able to nd a midway solution by engaging in a politics of compromise with all sides and restoring democracy "through a gradual process and using the legal instruments inherited from Francoism" (Carr and Fusi 1979, 226). Within the rst few years of the post- Franco period, the country saw sweeping reforms introduced by the Suarez government: a bicameral system based on universal surage was introduced, political parties were legalized, free trade unions were re-established, several amnesties were granted to political prisoners, parliamentary elections were held, and a democratic constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum (Huntington 1991; Gilmour 1985; Carr and Fusi 1979).

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to view Spain’s transition process as "smooth" by merely looking at the outcomes it produced. Threats to elite survival were troubling to all the Spanish governments that ruled during the 1970s. An extreme scenario unfolded in

195 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey the early 1970s, when Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, an immobilist3 authoritarian leader whom Franco had trusted with the continuation of his legacy, was assassinated in 1973 by the Basque nationalist terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Country and Freedom). His successor Arias Navarro, "a Francoist at heart" who had initiated moderate reforms in order to preserve the regime, governed under threats from the far-right faction in the Parliament known as the "Bunker." Two months after Arias Navarro announced his "12 February" reform programme that promised a democratic opening, the leaders of the Bunker faction published a manifesto "condemning any liberal interpretation of the Arias programme" and warning that "the right would not tolerate treason to Franco, his regime, and the memories of the Civil War" (Ibid., 199). The limited liberalization process stalled as the Navarro government failed to secure support from both the Bunker faction as well as the reformist elites and opposition forces who demanded more substantial democratic reform. Carr and Fusi (1979, 205-210) give the following account of how the disillusionment on the opposition, combined with unrest caused by an economic crisis, provided another other source of political instability in the early transition period:

The economic situation had deteriorated seriously in 1975. Labour unrest had increased. 1974 witnessed the largest number of strikes in Spanish history. The rst two months of 1975 saw spectacular waves of strikes: even actors struck and theaters had to close... Terrorism continued; 1975 was the most violent year since the days of the guerrilla maquis4 of the 1940s... In the rst three months of 1976, the Arias cabinet was confronted with a formidable wave of strikes and street demonstrations... Unrest and public disorder reinforced the bunker’s oensive against the reformism of the government... The right saw this as an indication of weakness and abandonment of the principle of authority.

Although it is clear that true steps towards democratization were not taken under Navarro’s leadership, this brief overview of the 1974-1976 period is helpful for understand-

3Carr and Fusi (1979, 179) describe Spanish politics in the 1960s and 1970s as a struggle between aperturistas, described as "those who believed that the regime must be ’opened’ in order to survive by winning a wider support" and immobilistas, who saw Francoism as "an indivisible whole" and resisted all forms of regime change. 4Anti-Franco guerrilla forces.

196 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey ing the domestic political environment that Suarez came into when he was appointed to replace Navarro as Prime Minister in July 1976. While Suarez’s consensus-based reform initiatives were able to diuse some of the tensions that had contributed to his prede- cessor’s demise, the early years of the Suarez government were nevertheless marked by threats to elite survival, which were posed mainly by the Francoist factions in the Parlia- ment and the army. On the eve of the December 1976 referendum on Suarez reforms, for instance, the Bunker leaders vehemently campaigned against a ’yes’ vote, using the slogan "Franco would have voted no." In the months following the approval of the reform package, right-wing extremist groups launched a campaign of violence in Madrid in the hopes that an atmosphere of terror and chaos would call for a military intervention (Gilmour 1985, 158-160). In 1978 and 1979, street occupations and demonstrations were held on the anniversaries of Franco’s death (Maravall 1982, 43).

A larger threat to the newly democratic government was posed by the Francoists in the army. A clear evidence of Suarez’s fear of military intervention was his early contact with the army leaders to secure their support for the reform process:

Before going ahead with the reform programme, Suarez made the wise decision to discuss his plans with senior ocers in the armed forces. He knew that the Bunker would oppose him but, although this was a nuisance, it was not really important. The army, on the other hand, was powerful enough to wreck the entire constitutional experiment, and thus its support from the beginning was crucial. On September 8 (1976), therefore, Suarez invited the leading generals, admirals and air force ocers to a meeting where he told them of the reforms he intended to make... Two days later the cabinet discussed the proposed Law for Political Reform, and none of the four military ministers objected to it (Gilmour 1985, 155).

The army nevertheless remained a consistent threat against the Suarez government. The rst crisis between the government and the military unfolded after Suarez decreed the legalization of the Communist Party (PCE) ahead of the June 1977 elections, breaking an earlier promise to the army that the PCE would not be legalized. In response, the Minister of Navy resigned in protest, the army leaders publicly denounced the reform and rumors

197 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey of a military coup began to spread around (Carr and Fusi 1979, 226). In November 1978, the police uncovered a coup plot by Francoist ocers within the military, referred to as Operation Galaxia, which sought to overthrow the new democratic regime. Francoists’ most serious attack on the new democracy came on 23 February 1981 when about 200 Civil Guard ocers and soldiers stormed the Spanish Parliament and took hostage the deputies (known as the 23-F coup attempt). While the King Juan Carlos’s rm disavowal of the coup led to its failure, the attempt was nevertheless a reminder that threats to new democracy posed by Franco loyalists remained alive even six years after the dictator’s death. Between 1978 and 1982, there were at least ve coup attempts against the democratic government (Gilmour 1985, 230).

7.1.2 Basque Mobilization in the Transition Years

While Basque nationalism originated in the 19th century, its evolution into a violent separatist movement occurred in the 1960s. Founded in 1959 by a group of young nationalists who were disillusioned with the moderate stance of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) vis-a-vis the Franco regime, ETA executed its rst fatal attacks in 1968, killing a Spanish police commissioner and a member of the Civil Guard in separate incidents. Madrid’s response to these early acts of terror was brutal repression, which became the ocial state policy against the Basque separatists during the Franco era. Mass arrests, torture, trial and imprisonment by military courts, and forced exile of ETA militants and sympathizers were not uncommon during the early 1970s. Although police repression and internal faction- alism seriously weakened the organization in this period, ETA nevertheless managed to remain intact: The years 1972-1973 were marked by a series of ETA kidnappings, hold-ups and terrorist activities; in December 1973, the organization launched its "most audacious and dramatic attack," killing Franco’s Prime Minister Carrero Blanco (Carr and Fusi 1979, 192; Clark 1984, 57). Increased state repression in the aftermath of the Blanco assassination, which reached a new height with the execution of two ETA members in September 1975, sparked the escalation of ETA violence in the nal years of Franco’s rule. Although the transition period saw some splits within the organization due to disagreements over the

198 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey merits of continued armed struggle, ETA did not signicantly change course in response to the democratization process that was initiated by the reformists in mid-1976. ETA militants were responsible from a number of terrorist attacks during the 1976-77 period, producing "about the same level of violence observed during the last two years of the Franco regime" (Clark 1984, 103).

Besides continuing ETA violence, the early post-Franco period was marked by broader social unrest in the Basque provinces, which manifested itself in massive strikes as in other parts of Spain. When Suarez was appointed as Prime Minister in the summer of 1976, succeeding a series of government leaders who had tried to solve the "Basque problem" by means of repression, he faced a highly mobilized Basque population whose protests focused on two immediate demands: amnesty for political prisoners and legalization of the Basque ag (Gilmour 1985, 218). Although Suarez’s approach to these demands marked a departure from the repressive attitude of past governments, concessions were partial and slow: initial amnesties granted by King Juan Carlos and Suarez excluded most of the Basque prisoners; the Basque ag was legalized in January 1977 only the after the government faced a rebellion of Basque mayors over delays (Della Porta 2013, 53; Carr and Fusi 1979, 218). Consequently, social tensions and street disorder in the Basque country persisted, as "piecemeal concession, far from appeasing the Basques, fueled popular discontent and maintained an explosive climate where violence could prosper" (Ibid. 1979, 218). Clark (1984, 89-90) draws attention to the unpopularity of the Suarez government among the Basques despite its democratic reform agenda, providing the following account of the political climate in the region during the early post-Franco years:

For one thing, the level of street disorders rose markedly during 1976 and 1977. In March 1976, street demonstrations and strikes in Vitoria, the capital of Alava province, were brutally repressed by riot police at a cost of ve deaths. This violence was answered by a general strike throughout the Basque provinces, which saw about half a million workers walk o their jobs, and which eventually had to be quelled by police ring live ammunition over the heads of strikers. In September, a young demonstrator...was allegedly shot...by a police ocer... This killing provoked another general strike throughout the province,

199 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

which spread to other Basque provinces and eventually involved some 700,000 workers...In March and again in May 1977, demonstrations in favor of amnesty for all prisoners had been forcefully put down by police, leaving more than half a dozen dead and scores injured.

It is therefore not surprising that the Basque provinces had the highest abstention rates in the referendum for Suarez’s reform package that was approved in December 1976. To contain the unrest in the region and secure higher participation from the Basques in the June 1977 elections, the Suarez government made a tactical concession, granting a new amnesty shortly before the elections.

Despite the Basques’ negative sentiments towards the Suarez leadership, fueled by its policy of piecemeal concessions and continued police violence against strikes and demonstrations, most of the ethnic Basque parties that were newly formed or had re- appeared with the legalization of political parties by the Suarez government ran in the 1977 elections. In addition to the PNV led by moderate Basque nationalists and the Span- ish center-right and leftist parties who had competed over Basque votes in the 1930s, a new phenomenon of the Basque Left had emerged in the post-Franco era. As opposed to the PNV, which occasionally coalesced with the Spanish parties and had less intransi- gent demands about the extent of Basque autonomy, parties belonging to the Basque Left rejected all such cooperation and strongly defended "a greater degree of separation, cer- tainly to include all Spanish civil and military ocials" (Ibid., 96). However, apart from the Basque Country Left (EE) that gained one seat in the Parliament, all the Basque vote was split among the PNV and the two main Spanish parties - Suarez’s Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). What the 1977 election results made clear that the long-standing PNV still had the central position in Basque politics and would lead the eort to gain concessions from the newly democratic government towards increased Basque autonomy.

200 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

7.1.3 Strategic Incentives to Accommodate Basque Demands

The political climate of transition years in Spain show that the newly democratic government was troubled with the task of overseeing a democratization process amidst high political instability at the center accompanied by increased terrorist violence and social unrest in the Basque country. With respect to the Basque question, it was clear from the outset that Suarez himself, who had risen to power from the Francoist ranks rather than the democratic opposition, had no idealistic view about granting self-determination rights to Basque or other nationalities of Spain. His early concessions such as granting amnesty or legaliz- ing the Basque ag, made in response to growing unrest among the Basques, appeared to be "dictated by tactical considerations, not by conviction or by principle" (Gilmour 1985, 219). The limited and reactionary nature of government concessions to Basques, whose timing coincided with periods of increased tensions in the region, was also indicative of Suarez’s strategic thinking about the minority problem. Although a pre-autonomy statute for the Basque country was announced in December 1977 following long negotiations between the Spanish Minister of the Regions and Basque deputies, the provisional organ that was established with the statute - the Basque General Council - lacked the funds and authority to build an administrative apparatus in the region; in the meantime, no other progress towards a nal autonomy statute were made until after the completion of the discussions over the country’s new constitution (Ibid.).

While larger autonomy concessions were not introduced until after the approval of the Constitution in December 1978, the Basque demands for self-determination, and more generally, the question of power-sharing between the center and the dierent regions and nationalities in Spain remained at the top of the agenda of the Suarez government (Mees 2001). Suarez’s Basque policy was informed by a broader strategic concern over preserving public order, which was viewed as necessary to move forward with the restoration and consolidation of the democratic regime. As Carr and Fusi (1979, 219) note, for Spain’s newly democratic leadership, "the stability of democracy demanded an energetic defense of public order in a country where forty years of partisan propaganda had identied democracy

201 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey with chaos." It was not uncommon for the Bunker in the parliament to use ETA violence as a pretext to block democratic reform; in June 1976, for instance, the Francoist Right in the Parliament had blocked a reform of the Penal Code that penalized party activities under the pretext of recent ETA violence (Ibid., 216). The Suarez government also feared that peripheral violence could serve as a justication for the Francoist military factions to interfere in civilian aairs, and the concern was justied. Many high-ranking ocers in the armed forces were angered by insurgent activities and expressions of regional identity in the Basque and Catalan regions. There were reports of secret meetings where powerful rightist generals gathered to discuss "how to save Spain from chaos, a leftist takeover and fragmentation of the nation by Basque and Catalan nationalists" (Acoca 1977).

As scholars argue, an escalation of civil violence can increase military inference in civilian aairs by placing them in a politically pivotal role (Svolik 2012) and impede civilian control over armed forces (Desch 1999). It is therefore not surprising that, with the exception of the Bunker and military factions who remained loyal to Franco-era institutions and defended a a highly centralized state, most political parties saw regional autonomy as necessary to prevent center-periphery cleavages from undermining the new democracy (Bourne 2008). Although the 1978 Constitution fell short of meeting PNV’s demands for Basque self-determination, it gave legal recognition to the country’s dierent nationalities and regions and guaranteed their right to political autonomy while emphasizing the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation. As the Constitution required the details of autonomy devolution for each region to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, the Basque General Council was tasked with preparing a draft autonomy statute to be considered in the Parliament. Approved in 1979, the statute devolved substantial autonomy to Basques "in matters of police, culture, education and healthcare, and industrial and agricultural policies; gave autonomous institutions the capacity to collect taxes; recognized Euskera as an ocial language; and created a Basque radio and TV station" (Della Porta 2013, 53). Through such concessions, the Suarez government sought to pacify Basque politics by undermining popular support for ETA and other radical separatists and avert a widespread rebellion in the Basque territory, which could serve the interests of anti-democratic fac-

202 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey tions within the military and the Parliament. At the same time, given concerns over of- fending the right-wing politicians and the Francoist ocers who detested the concessions, the Suarez government was forced to slow down the transfer of powers to the Basques in the early 1980s (Gilmour 1985, 221).

Besides illustrating the strategic concerns behind democratizers’ eorts to appease separatist regions, the Spanish case also provides a good illustration of how autonomy concessions are not always successful in stabilizing the periphery. The 1979 autonomy statute came into eect with the leadership of the PNV moderates, who cooperated with the government and was therefore accused by more radical party members and other nationalists of betraying the Basque cause. ETA’s military wing and a rejectionist Basque nationalist front that had united under Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) were among the most radical opponents of PNV’s cooperative attitude towards the government. The years 1979-1980 were marked by highest levels of ETA terrorism that the country had ever seen. The rise of terrorist violence "in almost perfect correlation with increasing autonomy given to the Basques" has been interpreted by some as ETA and Herri Batasuna’s attempts to pro- voke a military coup in the hopes that the reinstitution of a repressive military dictatorship would help gather support for the insurgency from the Basque population (Clark 1984, 140; Gilmour 1985, 225). Regardless of its triggering factors, the rise of violence in the Basque country despite Suarez’s autonomy reforms introduced in the late 1970 is a reminder that accommodative self-determination reform and separatist violence are not mutually exclusive phenomena.

7.2 Nicaragua’s Incumbent-Driven Transition and Indigenous

Miskito Separatism (1979-1987)

Nicaragua’s self-determination dispute started in the early 1980s when the revolutionary Sandinista government became embroiled in an armed conict with the Miskito Indian peoples, one of the largest indigenous groups in Central America constituting more than half of the ethnic makeup of the Atlantic coastal region (MAR 2006). The period between

203 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey the start of the Miskito rebellion in 1981 and the creation of two autonomous regions in Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast in 1987 was marked by a high level of political instability, with the primary threat to center posed by the US-backed Contra war against the Sandinista regime. It was also during this period that the revolutionary government decided to initiate a top-down process of democratization, with the introduction of multiparty elections in 1984 that marked the country’s rst experience with participatory democracy.5 Findings presented below help illustrate the link between the domestic threat environment during Nicaragua’s incumbent-driven transition to democracy and the Sandinista leadership’s turn to conciliatory policies towards the Miskito rebel groups in the mid-1980s.

Nicaragua can be considered as an example of pre-emptive democratization where a threatened authoritarian elite introduces elections as a means "to bolster its declining legitimacy and mitigate opposition pressure" (Huntington 1991, 186). In the lead-up to the 1984 elections, both domestic and international pressures for democratic reform played an important role in driving the transition process. The Sandinistas received substantial foreign aid from a number of Western European countries whose leaders linked develop- mental goals to democracy and saw democratic reform as essential to continuing support (Orozco 2002). Aside from economic concerns, the Sandinistas also wanted to bolster their image abroad and accumulate international political support in the face of counterrevolutionary opposition backed by the US (Haggard and Kaufman 2016). Domestic pressures from a coalition of political parties, private-sector groups and trade unions also played a role in Nicaragua’s early democratization, inducing the Sandinista leadership to enter into dialogue with the opposition to "establish the ground rules of an electoral democracy" (Williams 1994, 177). Between 1982 and 1984, there were a series of negotiations in which the FSLN6 and the right-wing opposition alliance, known as Coordinadora, debated propos- als about political parties law and electoral law (Ibid.). In November 1984, the Sandinistas’s FSLN won 63 percents of the votes, securing both the presidency as well as a majority in

5To be exact, elections were also held prior to the 1979 Sandinista revolution, but were used by the Somoza dictatorship as an instrument to remain in power, marked by fraud, vote-buying, and repression of political parties (Middlebrook 1998). 6Sandinista National Liberation Front.

204 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey the National Assembly. Although the 1984 elections kept the Sandinista regime in power and were therefore regarded as partial democratization at best, international observers declared the elections free and fair.7

What sets apart Nicaragua’s transition period from the Philippine and Spanish experiences is that political instability was not an outcome of transition process initiated by the masses or reformist elites; instead, as the name "pre-emptive transition" suggests, the rise of threats to democratizing elite’s survival largely informed the decision to democratize. Such cases where democratic reform runs parallel to autonomy reform are nevertheless valuable for illustrating the role of political instability in pushing a liberalizing authoritarian regime towards a more conciliatory stance towards ethnic separatists. The Nicaraguan case is particularly useful for showing that even pre-emptive democratization processes initiated by threatened authoritarian leaders, which are typically associated with risks to ethnic minorities, may instead be marked by major autonomy concessions.

7.2.1 Political Instability in the Early Sandinista Period

Before explaining the major autonomy concessions oered to Miskito separatists during the period of Nicaraguan democratization, it is crucial to understand the domestic political context in which the Sandinista government and Miskito separatists interacted at the time. The period preceding the 1984 elections in Nicaragua was marked by the incumbent Sandinistas’ high sense of vulnerability to threats posed by both domestic and international adversaries. Soon after the 1979 revolution that brought down the Somoza dictatorship, former members of Somoza’s National Guard and other loyalists of the fallen regime known as Somocistas launched a counter-revolutionary armed movement against the junta government, forming the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (NDF) in 1981. Operat- ing in the northern front with bases in Honduras and largely nanced and armed by the U.S., the FDN was joined by smaller anti-Sandinista groups and would soon emerge as the largest force in the Nicaraguan resistance known as the Contras. In addition to NDF, the

7Because 1984 elections had failed to generate an alternation in power, the Polity IV dataset marks as Nicaragua’s transition to democracy the 1990 elections where the FSLN lost to opposition parties. On the other hand, CGV dataset records 1984 as the transition date for Nicaragua.

205 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

Sandinistas also faced opposition from those who had supported the anti-Somoza insurrection but was equally disillusioned with the Sandinista leadership. Most notable of these was the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), which was led by a renegade Sandin- ista guerrilla commander and formed the southern front of the Contra struggle operating from bases in Costa Rica.

The US support for the Contras proved a major source of instability for the San- dinista government throughout the 1980s. The Carter administration had failed to keep the Somoza regime in power despite pouring in military aid and intelligence assistance to be used against the Marxist-Leninist guerillas. When the Sandinistas took over power in 1979, Carter’s response was to maintain ties with Nicaragua and avoid an openly hos- tile attitude to prevent it from becoming "another Cuba" (Sklar 1988, 38). This mediation eort was short-lived; with the election of Reagan as President in November 1980, the U.S. policy turned to an anti-Communist war against the Sandinistas, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) beginning to provide money, sophisticated weaponry, military training and intelligence assistance to Contra guerillas. The U.S. support for the Contras became public with the leak of a top secret document titled National Security Decision Di- rective 17 (NSDD-17), which allotted $19 million to the CIA to recruit and train a 500-man force of Contras to conduct covert operations against the Sandinista government (LaFeber 1993, 281). A Newsweek article dated November 1982 reported that, as part of the covert plan, Argentina would train an additional 1,000-man force and the CIA bases would be stationed in Honduras, "training the Honduran intelligence and security forces in intelligence gathering and interrogation, providing logistical support for raids into Nicaragua, aiding the Honduran coast guard and helping the Argentines and other non-Nicaraguans train anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans in sabotage operations using small arms supplied by the Americans" (Brecher et al. 1982). The CIA’s involvement in the Contra war was not limited to rebel assistance; in 1983, the CIA operatives directly engineered a series of attacks on Nicaragua’s coastal oil pipelines and storage tanks in order to immobilize the Sandinista army through cutting o its oil supplies (Sklar 1988, 150). In conducting similar operations such as mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the CIA worked with contract operatives known as

206 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

"Unilaterally Controlled Latin Assets" (UCLAs) who were recruited from El Salvador, Hon- duras, Argentina and other Latin American countries to "sabotage ports, reneries, boats, bridges and try to make it appear that the Contras had done it" (Ibid., 151). The U.S. also pursued a parallel strategy of crippling the Sandinista regime by non-military means, trying to block Nicaragua’s access to foreign economic assistance and pressures on Western Europe and Mexico to isolate Nicaragua (Lopez and Stohl 1987, 87).

The US-backed Contra War not only generated heavy economic and human costs for the Sandinista government, but also pushed it towards increased authoritarianism. Two emergency decrees were enacted in 1981 and 1982 in response to "mounting threats to the stability of the revolutionary government," imposing limitations on civil liberties through increased censorship, strike bans, restrictions on public gatherings and demonstrations, and detentions of suspected Contra collaborators (Ibid.). Among those who would suer the most during this period of intense ghting and emergency laws were the indigenous Miskito population of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, who had become an attractive target for the US and Contras to be dragged into the counterrevolutionary struggle.

7.2.2 Miskito Mobilization and Alliance with the Contras

The Miskitos had begun to mobilize around ethnic demands already under the Somoza regime, forming the Alliance for the Progress of the Miskito and Sumo (ALPROMISU) in 1974. Although the organization had a pioneering role in terms of indigenous social activism and awakened in the Miskito communities "a shared sense of marginalization" (Meringer 2010, 7-8), its demands were moderate, peaceful and far from separatist. The main objectives of ALPROMISU founders were to protect Miskito traditional lands, generate educational opportunities for Miskitu students and convince the government to promote socio-economic development in the Atlantic region. As the ALPROMISU was largely co-opted by the Somoza dictatorship by the late 1970s, the Miskito and other indigenous populations of the Atlantic Coast were largely insulated from the Sandinista revolutionary struggle that deposed the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979 (Hale 1994, 132). Shortly after the revolution, however, they began to exhibit a greater degree of mobilization un-

207 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey der the leadership of a younger generation of radicalized Miskito university students who had rejected the moderate integrationism of the ALPROMISU leaders and promoted an "ethnically exclusive agenda of Indian rights" (Meringer 2010, 12). Taking over its leadership, they renamed the organization MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Sandinistas United)8 and became the vanguards of the Miskito separatist movement that culminated into a full-scale rebellion in February 1981.

As the inclusion of "Sandinistas" in the name shows, the MISURASATA was in fact founded with the acquiescence of the leader of the revolutionary junta, Daniel Ortega, after the Miskitos had expressed their demands to form a new mass indigenous organization. More conciliatory policies were to follow, such as MISURASATA being granted a seat on the ruling council of the revolutionary government, which gave the Miskito leaders and their organization "a remarkable degree of formal recognition" (Dennis 1981, 286). This initial solidarity between the Miskitos and Sandinista was also reected in the MISURASATA’s founding document General Directions (1980), which represented "a strong anti-imperialist statement that aligns the new organization with the Sandinistas’ anti-imperialist ideology and egalitarian values" (Baracco 2011a, 122). Until the deterioration of relations with the government, MISURASATA was responsible for implementing state-supported policies amongst the indigenous communities, including the Literacy Project that allowed teaching of literacy in indigenous languages and English as well as Spanish (Rivera 1983, 211). Throughout the process, MISURASATA was able to expand signicantly its regional presence and improve communication with the Miskito communities throughout the Coast, generating "ideal conditions for the growth of ethnic militancy" (Hale 1994, 134). The rup- ture with the Sandinista regime came in early 1981 as the emboldened Miskito leadership prepared to publish its Plan 81,9 which included Miskito claims to around 60 percent of territories along the Atlantic coast, including lands that were never inhabited by indigenous groups (Sollis 1989, 506). Before a ceremony where the plan was to be announced publicly, 33 MISURASATA leaders were arrested under accusations of fomenting a separatist

8Sumu and Rama are two other indigenous populations living in Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast region. 9Plan of Action for the MISURASATA Movement in 1981.

208 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey uprising.

The arrests marked the beginning of Miskito-Sandinista ghting. A particularly crucial arrest that changed the course of the rebellion was that of Steadman Fagoth, one of the founding leaders of MISURASATA, who ed to Honduras upon his release and began calling on Miskitos to start an uprising. Upon the call, around two thousand Miskitos crossed to Honduran border to join the ranks of Fagoth’s new organization named Miskitu Sumu and Rama (MISURA). Adopting a strong anti-communist rhetoric that signaled a departure from the Miskito self-determination agenda, Fagoth committed his forces to the counter-revolutionary Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the largest CIA-backed Contra organization made up of former members of Somoza’s National Guards. With support from the US, the MISURA and FDN forced were trained together in military camps close to the Nicaraguan border in Honduras, forming the largest ghting force in the Atlantic Coast (Ortiz 1987). Fagoth’s decision led to a split among the Miskito leadership; while the MISURA organized in the north and launched cross-border attacks from Honduras, MISURASATA, whose leadership was taken over by another founding member, Brooklyn Rivera, aligned itself with another CIA-backed counter-revolutionary organization, ARDE, and remained committed to the original demand for autonomy (MacDonald 1985).

Despite Rivera’s desire to pursue the original agenda for Miskito self-determination rather than adopting an anti-communist one, MISURA’s cooperation with the Contras nevertheless reshaped the Sandinista government’s views about the Miskito movement, feed- ing its suspicions that MISURASATA had been a CIA front all along (Baracco 2011b, 243). Those who would bear the brunt of this perception were the Miskitu people. In response to a series of MISURA’s cross-border raids in late 1981 known as the "Red Christmas" of- fensive, the Sandinista government forcibly relocated 8,500 Miskitos from the Coco River along the border with Honduras in order to create a free-re zone and weaken MISURA’s support from the Miskito villages on the Nicaraguan side of the border (Ohland and Schnei- der 1982; Jarquín 2018). During 1982 and 1983, the victimization of indigenous communities was further exacerbated by MISURA and FDN’s massive kidnappings and indiscrim-

209 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey inate attacks against civilian villages and newly founded settlements, which forced thousands to seek refuge in Honduras. At the same time, government repression increased as many Miskitos suspected of aiding the Contras were arrested and imprisoned by the Sandinista army (Ortiz 1987).

7.2.3 Sandinistas’ Turn to Conciliatory Policies Towards the Miskitos

Road to Self-Determination Reform

In mid-1983, the Sandinista policy towards the Miskitos took a conciliatory turn, paving the way for the peace talks and self-determination reforms that would be introduced in the years to follow. A remarkable concession that signaled this change in attitude came in December 1983, when the government granted amnesty to Miskito rebels ghting in the north and released around 300 Miskito prisoners who had been jailed under the state of emergency in 1981-1982 ("Nicaragua Oers Foes Amnesty," 1983). This was accompanied by a public apology by the Minister of Interior Tomas Borge who admitted to the government’s mishandling of the security threats in the Atlantic Coast, which had inicted suering on the Miskito peoples, and led to an investigation and punishment of reported abuses committed by Sandinista army ocers (Lopez and Stohl 1987). In the following months, the government proposed to negotiate autonomy with the MISURASATA leadership and invited Brooklyn Rivera to peace talks, which began in Bogota in December 1984. Conducted with participation from a number of foreign government representatives and indigenous non-governmental organizations, the rst meeting led to the announce- ment of a national commission that would work on a roadmap for regional autonomy in the Atlantic Coast (Ortiz 1987, 51). Although peace talks with Rivera soon broke down in May 1985 due to disagreements about the extent of autonomy, the Sandinista government announced its openness to resuming negotiations with MISURASATA and was also able to conclude a ceasere agreement with MISURA in the meantime, which allowed the return of relocated Miskitos to their villages in the Coco river area near the border with Honduras (Ibid., 51-54).

210 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

In July 1985, the eighty-member National Autonomy Commission published a proposal on "principles and policies" that recommended the inclusion of an autonomy statute in the Nicaraguan constitution. Completed into its nal form after two years of intensive negotiations and consultations with indigenous communities, the Autonomy Statute was approved by the National Assembly in September 1987 and led to the creation of two autonomous units: Regional North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and Regional South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). The Statute dened the regional governments’ administrative and scal responsibilities among others as well as guaranteeing indigenous communities’ rights to communal land and resources, religion, customs, and education in native languages (Sollis 1989, 514-5).

Sandinistas’ Strategic Incentives for Accommodation

My theory about the role of political instability in triggering a shift in government policy towards separatist minorities can help explain the reconciliation process that led the Sandinista government to oer major autonomy concessions to Miskito peoples and other indigenous communities in Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast region. As discussed in Chapter 3, larger threats to survival posed by center-seeking challengers can incentivize the ruling elite to accommodate separatist minorities whose aspirations do not directly challenge the elite’s control over state power. Most accounts of the conciliatory steps towards the Miski- tos discuss how the Sandinista leadership’s perception of the Miskito threat had begun to change in 1983 as a result of their increased contact with the Miskito communities who had been relocated to settlement areas (Sollis 1989). Bothmann (2015, 86), for instance, argues that policies towards the region changed when the government came to understand that the Miskitos’ counterrevolution was "about ethnic rights rather than power in Managua." Baracco (2011, 70) similarly notes that by 1985 it had become increasingly clear to Sandin- istas that "the Miskito ghters’ demands for autonomy represented a legitimate grievance which was unconnected to the FDN’s anticommunist contra agenda." By these accounts, the road to Sandinista-Miskito reconciliation opened up once there was a clear understanding on the government’s part of the Miskitos’ political agenda, which was limited to

211 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey self-determination.

While Sandinistas’ changing perception of the Miskito communities may have facilitated the adoption of conciliatory steps towards armed Miskito groups as well, it is an insucient explanation for the major autonomy concessions oered to the Miskito separatists during the 1984-87 period. Clearly, the main driver of conciliatory politics was the domestic threat environment within which the Sandinista government operated at the time, which generated strategic incentives to contain the Miskito rebellion. As discussed earlier, the major source of instability was the US-backed Contra war, which had escalated signicantly by 1984:

In 1984, the FDN developed more ambitious plans, inltrating the interior of the country with its forces and generally seeking to create a climate of civil war in the country. That year also saw the mining of two of Nicaragua’s key ports, several aerial attacks, numerous attacks on agricultural cooperatives, and a major attack in June on the city of Ocotal. ARDE probably reached its height of activity in early 1984... During 1984 the FDN worked very closely with the CIA and entered 1985 in a relatively hopeful state projecting for that year what it called "the year of the Final Oensive." The plan was to culminate in mid-year with an oensive within Nicaragua against the main central and northern cities, following earlier attacks against Sandinista army border units (Prevost 1987, 10).

The Sandinista leadership’s vulnerability to threats to its survival was exacerbated by the security situation in the Atlantic Coast:

In 1983 it was also clear that the militarization of the River Coco had failed to stop the Miskito contra organizations, Misurasata and Misura, from setting up bases inside the country. The settlements in Tasba Pri were not immune from attack either... It dawned on the military authorities that they were not equipped to ght the type of war they faced on the coast. There were problems of indiscipline and abuses by young Spanish-speaking recruits who were treated as part of an army of occupation by a population whose language they did not speak and whose customs they did not understand. Although better training, better discipline and troop selection assisted in solving some of these

212 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

problems, the Sandinistas were aware that they faced a well-armed and motivated insurgency, receiving substantial support from the local population, from refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica as well as from the United States (Sollis 1989, 509).

Concessions to indigenous Miskitos, oered both to unarmed communities and rebels, were intended to strengthen the government’s hand vis-a-vis the more extreme threat to the Sandinista regime posed by the US-backed Contras. The major gains from accommodative self-determination policies would be to cut o the ow of Miskito recruits to the FDN- MISURA ranks by appealing to the broader Miskito population and disrupt the alliance between the Miskito and Contra rebel groups. A 1983 news report quoted a Sandinista ocial saying that the amnesty decree introduced that year was "aimed at persuading Miskitos to refrain from participating in eorts to overthrow the Sandinistas" ("Nicaragua declares amnesty," 1983). The initiation of peace talks with MISURASATA and MISURA leaderships served similar strategic ends. Potential gains that the Sandinista government would make from reconciliation with Miskito rebel groups was not lost to the regime’s biggest adver- sary either; in the 1987 Congressional hearings about the Iran-Contra aair, it came out that the CIA had oered $100,000 to MISURATA leader Rivera in 1985 to persuade him to end peace talks with the Sandinista government (Buvollen 1990). A similar eort was the U.S. Congress’s allocation of several million dollars to MISURASATA and a new indigenous rebel organization named KISAN (Coast Indians United in Nicaragua) in order to interrupt their disintegration, which was already underway at the time, and convince them to continue the ghting (Ibid., 108). These eorts to sabotage Sandinista-Miskito reconciliation failed in the end, as the Sandinista government was able to sign cease-re agreements with Miskito rebels as well as move forward the process of self-determination reform.

Interaction of Autonomy Reform and Democratization Processes

The discussion of the Nicaraguan case presented so far suggests that the democratization and self-determination reform processes went parallel to one another and were both informed by the Sandinistas’ perception of threats to its survival. Faced against multiple

213 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

Contra groups receiving massive amounts of nancial and military from a Cold War su- perpower, the Sandinista government saw it in its best interest to appease both the Miskito minority population and opposition groups from the Mestizo majority including private- sector groups, workers’ unions and peasants.

The fact that democratization per se did not cause the politically turbulent environment that generated elite incentives for accommodating armed separatists does not suggest that the two processes were entirely independent. In fact, there is evidence that political instability increased around the time of 1984 elections and in its aftermath, which is likely to have strengthened the Sandinista elite’s incentives to contain the Miskito rebellion. The source of increased instability was the escalation of U.S. aggression towards Nicaragua. The U.S. Congressional investigation into the Iran-Contra aair brought to light that, in 1984, the CIA had intensied its covert operations against the Sandinista regime, mining Nicaraguan harbors to cut o the country’s access to oil supply and trade and securing a $1 million-a-month ow to the Contras by another state when $21 million congressionally approved funds proved inadequate (Report of the Congressional Committees 1987, 37-40). Apart from increased support to the Contras, there were behind-the-scenes eorts by the hard-liners in the Reagan administration to discredit Nicaragua’s electoral process so that continued military pressure on the Sandinista regime could be justied (Williams 1990, 16). Under pressures from the U.S. and despite Sandinistas’ willingness to accommodate the opposition’s demands about electoral laws, the major right-wing opposition alliance, Coordinadora, boycotted the elections. The U.S. operatives also resorted to other means of destabilization, the most notable of which was the trade embargo imposed on Nicaragua in 1985. Overall, the Sandinistas’ increased sense of insecurity in the post-transition period is likely to have informed its strategy to stabilize the Atlantic Coast by concluding ceasere agreements with Miskito rebels and introducing autonomy reforms that would help co-opt the broader indigenous population.

214 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

7.3 A Negative Case: Turkey’s Transition to Democracy and the

Kurdish Insurgency in the 1980s

Turkey’s democratization process in the early 1980s not only failed to generate any positive outcomes in relations between the government and the Kurdish minority, but also was marked by an escalation of violence with the launch of the PKK insurgency in 1984. This observation does not necessarily suggest that democratization had any causal eect on the timing of the Kurdish war; however, it shows that the Turkish case deviates from the theoretical predictions set forth in Chapter 3. As Di Palma describes (1990, 82), Turkey’s 1983 transition was "deliberately slow and reined in by the old regime," making it an example of voluntary incumbent-led transition. As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, this type of transition is typically marked by low levels of political instability, which impede the emergence of elite incentives for containing separatist rebellion. Below I present a discussion of how this argument can help us understand why Turkey’s transition to electoral democracy in 1983 failed to provide an opportunity for reconciliation with the Kurdish separatists.

Kurdish Nationalist Mobilization Prior to the 1980 Coup

Although there were a number of Kurdish uprisings against the Ottoman rule in the late 19th century, the origins of Kurdish nationalism date back to the early post-WWI period when the collapse of the Ottoman state had become inevitable (Ozoglu 2004). The early decades of the modern Turkish Republic were marked by a series of Kurdish uprisings in southeastern Anatolia spearheaded by religious leaders or tribal chieftains, which were brutally suppressed by the Turkish military. After the Dersim rebellion of 1937-38 where thousands of Kurds were killed and many others displaced, the Kurdish nationalist movement entered its "silent decades" (Ozcan 2006). It revived in the 1960s as part of the broader leftist movement, which had carved itself a space in Turkish political arena thanks to the socio-political liberalization under the 1961 Constitution. At the time, Kurdish intellectuals and university students who adopted the socialist ideology expressed their grievances largely in terms of social injustice and regional economic inequalities, denouncing tribal

215 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey landed elites (aghas) and religious leaders (sheikhs) who exerted political and economic dominance in Kurdish provinces in collaboration with the Turkish state (Yavuz 2001, Celik 2012). Nevertheless, the alliance with the leftist movement had also contributed signicantly to Kurdish nationalist mobilization by the late 1960s:

In 1967 certain Kurds in DISK,10 in TWP,11 Dev Genc,12 or in student associations organized mass meetings, crowds of 10,000 in Silvan and 25,000 in Diyarbakir, protesting against oppression of the Kurds and demanding democratic rights. This was the rst real deance of the state since 1938, but more signicantly, it was the rst mass urban Kurdish challenge to the republic. It signaled the critical shift in social mobilization away from the aghas and semi- tribal peasantry, towards urban-based, modestly educated students and young professionals... These formed the basis of a bourgeois intellectual leadership, largely of mildly leftist inclination, for growing Kurdish national feeling (Mc- Dowall 2004, 410).

A series of meetings held between 1967 and 1969 in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian cities set the scene for the development of a separate Kurdish solidarity. The alliance with the leftist organizations also began to disintegrate as the Kurdish members became discontent with the Turkish leftists organizations’ inattention to Kurdish concerns (Somer 2005). Founded in 1969, the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Devrimci Dogu Kul- tur Ocaklari, DDKO) became the "rst organizational attempt to raise the consciousness of the Kurdish population" via an emphasis on social justice and identity issues (Yavuz 1990). After the 1971 coup, which banned all leftist political parties, associations and trade unions as well as imposing heavy restrictions on Kurdish rights, the Kurdish youth became increasingly involved in underground organizations. In 1974, Abdullah Ocalan became the founder of a new Kurdish Marxist-Leninist movement which identied as its enemies "the fascists..., agents of the state and those who supported them, the Turkish Left which sub- ordinated the Kurdish question to the leftist revolution and nally the exploitative Kurdish landlord class" (McDowall 2004, 421).

10Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions. 11Turkish Workers’ Party. 12The Federation of Revolutionary Youth.

216 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

When the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) formed in 1977 as an armed separatist group under Ocalan’s leadership, its primary target was the landed Kurdish elites who exploited the region with state support. Candar (2013, 65) notes that, at its initial stages, the PKK’s political activities reect "an intra-Kurdish class struggle rather than being directed against the Turkish government." This would change following the 1980 military coup after which the Kurds became subject to brutal repression under the junta regime and began to view the Turkish state as the principal enemy. While the leading gures of PKK including Ocalan had escaped to Lebanon and Syria on the eve of the coup, PKK militants and sympathizers were arrested and imprisoned by the military. All forms of political and cultural expression of Kurdish national identity, including the use of Kurdish language in public, were banned. The radicalization of PKK supporters that occurred in this period owes much to these repressive policies as well as the subjection of many Kurdish militants and activists to widespread torture in the notorious Diyarbakir prison (Orhan 2015). Most detainees who survived the prison joined the PKK ranks upon their release, helping the rebel organization grow in size and popularity. While the PKK laid low during the three-year military rule, it held two successive congresses in 1981 and 1982 where a detailed strategy for guerrilla warfare against the Turkish state was laid out. In August 1984, the PKK forces launched several attacks on police and gendarmerie stations in the Southeast, marking the beginning of Turkey’s armed separatist conict.

Lack of Strategic Incentives to Accommodate

As the PKK prepared to escalate separatist violence in Southeastern Anatolia, the Turkish military initiated a top-down transition to democracy in 1983. Turkey’s transition exem- plies a voluntary incumbent-led transition, or in Barkey’s (1990, 171) terms, a "planned transition" which is characterized by the "military’s willful exit from power following an orderly process in which the rules of the game are clearly laid out and controlled by the military rules." The 1980 coup had been launched largely in response to extreme political instability that troubled Turkey in the late 1970s, caused by a combination of unstable government coalitions, economic stagnation and violent clashes between left-wing and right-

217 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey wing groups that occurred on the streets on a daily basis. From the outset, the military junta had pledged that the intervention would be of limited duration, dening its power grab as an "interruption in the formal pattern of democracy" that would last until civil order was restored (Huntington 1991, 130). The post-coup period was marked by extreme restrictions on political and civil rights that helped the junta regime eliminate all forms of political violence and opposition: political dissidents including Kurdish nationalists, leftists and political Islamists were jailed, the parliament was dissolved, leaders of political parties were arrested, unions and societal organizations were shut down, and martial law was declared throughout the country.

During its three-year rule, the junta regime led by the Chief of Sta General Ke- nan Evren introduced some sweeping political and institutional changes that dened the boundaries of political competition for the following decades. The Consultative Assembly appointed by the military generals changed electoral laws and devised a new Constitution, which was approved in 1982 in a public referendum and paved way for General Evren’s election as President through a temporary provision included in the constitution. The military-authored rules were designed in a way that would prevent the country’s transition back to democratic rule from generating the sort of political instability that had marked the late 1970s:

It (The Constitution) elevated the presidency from its former largely ceremo- nial role to an important source of power. A unicameral legislature supplanted the bicameral one, thus, in the military’s view, eliminating one more arena of political contestation. In addition, the new constitution contained a great number of exclusionary articles designed to minimize the politicization of the 1970s. Unions were not allowed to associate or have links with political parties, the right to strike was curtailed, corporatists controls were extended to all types of associations, and state-appointed local ocials were given considerable power over groups within their jurisdiction (Barkey 1990, 179).

Turkey’s transition to civilian rule occurred under such restrictions set by the military. The extent of political contestation that would be allowed in the transition period was further restricted by the requirement that parties have to receive at least 10% of the national vote

218 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey to enter the Parliament and temporary provisions that banned from participation all politicians from the pre-coup period (Ibid., 179). As envisioned, this type of controlled democratization, accompanied by the junta regime’s draconian measures to suppress all forms of political opposition, made Turkey’s return to electoral democracy a relatively tranquil period marked by low levels of political instability. In terms of threats to the political survival of "democratizers" - military leaders in this case - a key source of stability was the internal cohesion within the Turkish army at the time. As Kadercan and Kadercan (2016, 93) write, "not only was this coup highly organized and planned," but also "the hierarchical structure of the army also remained completely intact, even in the post-coup period."

Given Turkey’s restricted democratization under military supervision, it is not surprising that state policy towards the Kurdish minority did not change signicantly in the period following the 1983 elections. The same type of repression that marked the 1980-1983 period was observed under civilian rule after 1983. Even though their favored candidate, the pro-military Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), had lost the election to Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, the military retained signicant control over civilian authority. Under such conditions where political instability was low and the only threat of forceful removal from oce was posed by the very elite who had initiated and overseen the restoration of democracy, the Ozal government was not able to take any bold steps towards making peace with the Kurdish separatists. The following excerpt from a journalist’s interview with Ozal shows the reservations that the newly democratic government had with regards to resolving the "Kurdish problem:"

"We could have tried to nd an earlier solution to the problem in the Southeast. But remember... In the rst term of the Motherland Party, there was a struggle of transition to civilian rule. For about 1.5-2 years, some of my ministers listened to Evren Pasha more than me... They were scared of him, not me... Also, we had to primarily deal with economic stagnation, foreign exchange problems. We had to do that to prevent the threat of new military coups in a country that had just come out of a military regime" (Barlas 2001, 15).

The argument that domestic political context largely shaped the Ozal government’s policy

219 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey towards the Kurds during the mid-1980s nds stronger support in light of the fact that Ozal did, in fact, sympathize with the Kurds. In his later terms, he made statements in favor of debating all possible solutions to the separatist conict including federalism and spearheaded some reform initiatives to reconcile with the Kurdish minority, the most notable of which was the abolition of the ban on the use of Kurdish language.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced three mini-case studies that probe the generalizability of the theory developed in Chapter 3 as well as illustrate the dynamics of self-determination politics across various transition paths. The ndings from the Spanish and Nicaraguan cases show that, so long as threats to survival become a major concern in the transition period, democratizing elites develop strategic incentives to make peace with separatist ethnic groups. During Spain’s reformer-driven democratization, such threats were posed by the right-wing Bunker in the Parliament and Francoist army ocers who wanted to preserve the legacy of the late dictator. In the face of coup threats from the Francoist power-seekers, the Suarez government followed an appeasement strategy with the Basque separatists and other regionally concentrated nationalists to establish more peaceful relations between the center and the periphery and reshape the domestic threat environment in a manner that would gradually remove the military out of its dominant socio-political role. In the case of Nicaragua, democratization was initiated by the Sandinista leadership in response to domestic and international pressures and as part of an attempt to renew the declining legitimacy of the revolutionary government. The massive threats to center caused by the US-backed Contra war played an important role in inducing the Sandinista government to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Miskito Indians, who had also taken up arms against the state and joined forces with the Contras. Breaking up this strategic alliance and co-opting both separatists rebel groups and broader indigenous population to the side of the revolutionary government were among the key objectives behind the autonomy concessions that were extended to the Miskitos.

220 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey

The Turkey case, on the other hand, provides an example of a controlled democratization marked by low levels of political instability and lack of strategic incentives for minority co-optation. Even though autonomy reforms may have been unimaginable in the Turkish case due to the strong nationalist ideals upon which the republic was founded, the fact that the newly elected government would not take even minor steps towards reconciliation with the Kurdish separatists supports the argument that self-determination reform is unlikely in the case of voluntary incumbent-led democratization.

The case studies also reveal some important insights about the escalation of separatist violence in the context of democratization. The Spanish case shows that policy concessions to separatist minorities do not always succeed in mitigating violence, at least not in the short run. The risk of "failed" concessions may be particularly high in cases where there are a number of separatist factions claiming to represent the ethnic minority. Autonomy reforms oered to internally divided separatist movements may push the extremist factions towards increased violence, as was the case with ETA terrorism making a spike in the late 1970s, while the moderates accept the reforms and cooperate with the government towards their implementation. That said, even though an autonomy deal struck with the moderate factions may lead to increased violence in the short term, concessions can nevertheless pave the way for conict resolution by co-opting the broader minority population and decreasing the popularity of extremist rebel groups. This partly explains ETA’s loss of popularity among the Basque people in the early 1980s.

Another key insight is that the escalation of separatist violence in a democratizing state does not necessarily suggest a causal relationship between democratization processes and increased violence. In Spain, ETA terrorism spiked in the years following the transition to democracy, but this occurred in the aftermath of autonomy reforms rather than rst elections. In Turkey, the Kurdish insurgency was launched in 1984, which was a year after the restoration of multiparty elections; however, the decision to go to war had been made by PKK leaders already in 1982 during their second congress in Syria. These examples reveal that the escalation of separatist violence in a transitional context is not necessarily

221 Chapter 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey caused by increased political competition or opportunities for mobilization that come with democratization, as some civil war theories would expect. More importantly, as the Spanish case shows, escalation of separatist violence and accommodation of separatist demands are far from mutually exclusive outcomes.

222 Chapter 8

Conclusion

As Thomas Carothers put it eloquently when describing Myanmar’s troubled transition process, democratization in the presence of aggrieved autonomy-seekers is like "trying to drive across a narrow, badly paved bridge with steep drops on either side while at the same time struggling to stop a ght with a whole set of angry passengers inside the car" (Carothers 2012). This analogy is relevant for all democratizations that have unfolded in countries with an on-going self-determination dispute. For the political elite who oversees a democratization process, containing separatist conicts in the periphery can be key to surviving the turbulence of regime transition as well as averting a backslide into authoritarianism. Although conventional thinking suggests government crackdown on ethnic "others" as the winning strategy that would help democratizers consolidate power vis-a-vis their rivals in a transitional context, historical record warns us against such deterministic conclusions. The prevalence of accommodative self-determination policies during periods of democratization reveals that, under certain conditions, extending an olive branch to separatists can become the preferred strategy of democratizing elites.

In exploring the link between democratization and self-determination reform, the dissertation has shown that the domestic politics of states have a signicant impact on government policy towards separatist minorities. While the domestic threat environment largely shapes the ruling elite’s incentives to make peace with aggrieved separatists, the nature of regime institutions determine whether and how these incentives pave the way

223 Chapter 8 Conclusion for accommodative self-determination policies. As shown by the quantitative ndings and diverse set of cases, periods of early democratization often represent a window of opportunity for ethnic separatists to achieve self-determination goals. In the rest of this concluding chapter, I present a brief summary of key ndings, followed by a discussion of theoretical contributions and policy implications.

8.1 Theoretical Approach and Main Findings

This dissertation contributes a novel theoretical framework that explains how democratization can become a critical juncture in the trajectory of self-determination disputes, paving the way for the devolution of autonomy to separatist minorities. Presented in Chapter 3, my theory of self-determination reform argues that government leaders develop strategic incentives to co-opt ethnic separatists when faced with existential threats to their survival posed by power-seeking adversaries. The particular type of threats that drive elite incentives to contain separatist rebellion are those that pose a risk of irregular leadership change, which entails a forceful removal from power. Extending an olive branch to separatist minorities amidst political instability help the threatened elite increase its chances of survival by focusing on more imminent challenges to their rule as well as preventing the formation of anti-government alliances between radical separatists and center-seeking adversaries. That said, for self-determination reform to occur, the ruling elite should also have the capacity to introduce and implement potentially controversial policies with redistributive implications such as the creation of an autonomous region in minority-populated territories. This capacity is a function of regime institutions, and more specically, the extent to which the elite is constrained in policy-making processes by institutionally empowered veto players. What makes democratization a critical juncture for ethnic separatists, I argue, is that it is a period where these two conditions that improve the prospects for self-determination reform - threats to elite survival (i.e. strategic incentives for minority co-optation) and limited institutional constraints to rule (i.e. high capacity to push forward reform) - are most likely to be observed together. In certain types of democratic transitions driven by bottom-up pressures of the masses, reputational incentives for minority accommodation

224 Chapter 8 Conclusion appear in addition to strategic ones, further increasing the likelihood of self-determination reform.

The dissertation presents several key ndings that support the theory. The rst one is that regimes with moderate institutional constraints to rule, such as hybrid regimes or democratizing states, provide the most favorable conditions for major self-determination reform. This is in comparison to advanced democracies, where the ruling elite is highly constrained by institutionally empowered veto players and have diculty in pushing accommodative self-determination reform through its legal phase, as well as fully authoritarian regimes, where the lack of institutional constraints to rule power prevents the elite from making credible concessions to autonomy-seeking minorities and secure their cooperation in the implementation phase of reform. This conrms an earlier nding by Cunningham (2014, 170) that states with a moderate number of internal veto factions are most likely to make concessions to self-determination groups, compared to unitary or highly divided states.

The novel empirical nding that is central to my theory is that, in regimes where moderate institutional constraints to rule enable the government to introduce decentralization policies that meet minority demands for self-rule, the emergence of threats to elite survival substantially increases the prospects of large-scale autonomy reform. This supports my argument that the ruling elite develops strategic incentives to appease aggrieved autonomy-seekers when faced with power-seekers who pose a larger threat to the center, and that these incentives translate into reform where the elite is empowered by the institutional context to legislate and implement autonomy concessions. Finally, empirical ndings support my proposition that early democratization - a period where both elite capacity and incentives for self-determination reform tend to be high - constitutes a critical juncture at which the prospects of achieving self-determination goals increase signicantly. As expected, I nd that the positive relationship between democratization and self-determination reform is signicantly more pronounced for mass-driven transitions where the democratizing elite develops reputational incentives to seek reconciliation

225 Chapter 8 Conclusion with separatist minorities in addition to strategic ones.

Detailed examination of the Philippines-Moro relations during the country’s transition to democracy in the mid-1980s helped illustrate the causal processes that generate accommodative self-determination reform in the context of democratic transition. Draw- ing largely on original interview data, I showed that threats to the survival of Corazon Aquino’s newly democratic government, posed primarily by coup-plotting Marcos loyalists and army mutineers, played a key role in incentivizing President Aquino to establish peaceful relations with the Muslim Moro minority and prevent a re-escalation of separatist violence in the southern Philippines. Autonomy concessions introduced in this period were partially a continuation of the Marcos-era democratic opposition’s eorts to join forces with the Muslim minority against the dictatorship. Once in power, the Aquino-led democratizers retained strategic incentives to keep the Moro separatists as their ally rather than enemy, so that they could focus on averting the "real threat" to their survival posed by anti-democratic center-seekers. Case study ndings also showed that, as a revolutionary leader drawing her political power from the pro-democracy masses, Cory Aquino also had strong reputational incentives to adopt conciliatory policies towards the Muslim minority; by doing so, she hoped to signal a clean break with Marcos-era politics and project an image of a "unity president" committed to national reconciliation eorts.

The last two chapters aimed to reconcile my theory of self-determination reform, which present minority accommodation as part of a survival strategy for democratizing elites, with existing theories about how survival concerns may incentivize the elite to target ethnic minorities with nationalist aggression. Utilizing illustrative game theoretical models, I identied the conditions under which alternative transition outcomes may be observed and developed a typological theory that establishes a link between transition paths and the variation in state-minority relations across democratizing states. The main argument is that accommodative self-determination reform is a likely outcome in all types of democratization paths marked by political instability, with the exception of coerced incumbent-driven transitions where the incumbent views electoral competition as

226 Chapter 8 Conclusion the primary threat to its political survival and capitalizes on ethnic cleavages to secure votes. Apart from this exception, which represents the most-studied transition type in the literature on democratization and ethnic violence, non-conciliatory outcomes may also be observed in top-down transitions led by powerful authoritarian incumbents who democratize voluntarily and do so without allowing the transition process from generating political instability.

Having used the Philippines case as an example of mass-driven democratization where both strategic and reputational incentives help explain conciliatory self- determination policies, I presented three additional case studies to probe the generalizability of theory across a diverse set of transition paths and illustrate the conditions in which non-conciliatory outcomes may occur. A detailed examination of Spain-Basque relations during the early post-Franco period produced ndings that support the argument that reformer-driven democratization, as a type of democratization that can be marked by high levels of political instability, generates strategic incentives for accommodating separatist minorities. Case study ndings also show that, where existential threats to democratizers are posed by military hard-liners who seek to restore the authoritarian regime, accommodation of separatist minorities may serve the purpose of preserving public order and preventing social unrest and violence in the periphery from being used as pretext for military takeover. Next, the discussion of major autonomy concessions granted to Miskito peoples during Nicaragua’s democratization period in the 1980s showed that coerced incumbent- driven transitions may also coincide with peace initiatives towards separatist minorities so long as existential threats to elite survival are present and pose a larger concern for the central government than the prospect of electoral defeat. Finally, presented as a negative case, an examination of Turkey-Kurdish relations in the early 1980s showed that voluntary incumbent-driven transitions, which are marked by low levels of political instability, fail to generate any type of incentive for self-determination reform.

227 Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.2 Contributions to the Literature

The dissertation’s ndings contributes to the two literatures that shaped my research questions at the outset. To the literature on self-determination politics, I contribute a novel and dynamic theory that explains how domestic politics of states impact government policy towards separatist ethnic minorities. Although a fair number of studies examine the sources of variation in state responses to self-determination demands, surprisingly little attention has been given to the role of domestic politics in shaping state-minority interaction in the context of on-going self-determination dispute. Even Cunningham’s theory, which emphasizes the link between internal political of states and accommodation of self-determination groups, only looks at how the number of institutional veto players may aect elite capacity to introduce large-scale policy changes such as autonomy reform and says very little about the role of domestic politics in generating elite incentives for minority accommodation in the rst place. The causal story in Cunningham’s theory puts the emphasis on the internal divisions within self-determination groups, which provide states with an opportunity to strategically use concessions as part of a "divide and conquer" strategy.

My theory lls in this gap in the self-determination literature by establishing a causal link between the domestic threat environment within which the ruling elite in- teracts with ethnic minorities and its propensity to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards self-determination bids. The major theoretical contribution in this respect is the insight that self-determination reform may be a strategic tool that threatened elites employ to increase their chances of survival in a politically turbulent context. This causal insight, combined with arguments about the institutional context that is most conducive to policy changes, helps pinpoint incipient democratization as a critical juncture where large-scale self-determination reform is observed frequently. While oering concessions to separatist ethnic groups in a turbulent transitional context may sound counterintuitive in light of existing theories, it makes theoretical sense once we acknowledge that the strategic interaction between states and ethnic minorities does not occur in a vacuum and there are often larger threats to central authority that emerge during periods of regime transition. In terms

228 Chapter 8 Conclusion of political survival, co-opting aggrieved minority populations is often a wiser strategy for threatened democratizers than relying on a policy of repression that could ultimately defeat its purpose by increasing anti-government violence in the periphery, laying ground for strategic coalitions between separatist minorities and anti-democratic forces who seek to capture the state, or allowing the military to retain its pivotal role in the political sphere.

The project also makes a crucial contribution to the literature on democratization and ethnic violence. Rather than disproving the dominant view of democratization as being conducive to nationalism and minority victimization, my theory adds nuance to it by drawing attention to the fact that such negative outcomes for minority populations, which have received the broadest attention in the literature, are observed only in particular paths to democracy. The theory and ndings reveal that the common characterization of democratizing states as a breeding ground for minority victimization overlooks two important facts: not all democratic transitions are led by or give rise to nationalist politicians who target ethnic minorities for illiberal ends, and more importantly, regardless of who is behind the wheel of democratization, repression of ethnic out-groups is not always a winning strategy for the elites who want to consolidate political power in a transitional context. The second point particularly holds true for cases where ethnic out-groups in question are autonomy- seeking minorities rather than center-seeking ethnic groups. Being typically peripheral to processes of regime transition, these minorities rarely pose a direct threat to the survival of newly elected leaders in an emerging democracy, even when they are highly mobilized and capable of waging separatist war.

There are two important caveats to consider when situating my theory within the literature on democratization and ethnic violence. First, my theoretical arguments about the types of democratization paths that pave the way for concessions to separatist minorities may not generate similar predictions about how states along a given transition path will interact with other types of ethnic minorities. Democratization brings afore dierent challenges and opportunities for dierent types of ethnic minorities depending on their political and socio-economic status under authoritarian rule, as well as how their collective

229 Chapter 8 Conclusion grievances and political aspirations were shaped by contextual, demographic and historical factors. Historically, in terms of state responses to minority demands, democratization processes generated very dierent outcomes for "new" minorities of newly independent states (e.g. Russian minorities in post-Soviet states), than for migrant minorities who had a fragile co-existence with the "sons of the soil" (e.g. Madurese migrants in Indonesia’s West Kalimantan), or market-dominant minorities who were long resented by local or national ethnic majorities for their economically privileged position (e.g. ethnic Chinese in the Philippines and Indonesia). This wide variation in types of ethnic minorities highlights the diculty of developing an overarching theory that would guide our expectations about how democratization will recongure state-minority relations in a particular context. How newly democratic leaders perceived and responded to the "minority problem" are heavily inuenced by such dierences; hence, predictions about state responses to separatist minorities in the context of regime transition may not hold for other minority types.

Second, the theory does not lend itself to the conclusion that democratization will bring peace to minority-inhabited regions marked by armed separatist conict. Democra- tizers’ strategic accommodation of self-determination demands does not necessarily help settle conict and may even instigate larger amounts of violence in separatist regions, similar to what Spain experienced with ETA in the early 1980s. In the case of protracted separatist conict, autonomy reforms conceded by the newly democratic government are often negotiated with the moderate factions that represent the minority population, while extremists may be sidelined and continue the armed struggle. Even in cases where a single rebel organization leads the separatist struggle, autonomy concessions may fail to resolve conict due to commitment problems. Particularly in the early post-authoritarian period, separatists rebels may nd the newly democratic elite’s reform initiatives as non-credible, not only due to their deep distrust of the state but also because of uncertainty over whether the new elite will survive threats from anti-democratic forces and remain in power long enough to see its reforms implemented. That said, over the long term, autonomy concessions adopted in the early transition period may improve the prospects of more peaceful relations with the periphery by co-opting the larger minority population and weakening

230 Chapter 8 Conclusion the support base of armed separatist groups.

8.3 Policy Implications

The theory and ndings have several implications for policymakers within states and in the international community seeking to develop strategies for resolving and managing separatist conict. One key insight for policymakers is that paying close attention to domestic politics of states can help detect opportunity moments for state-minority reconciliation. Despite the common notion of advanced democracies being more respectful of minority rights, non-democratic and weakly democratic states where the government is less constrained in its ability to introduce radical policy shifts generate more propitious conditions for large-scale self-determination reform. As Cunningham (2014, 174) rightly notes, this nding warns us against "writing o minority groups that live in non-democracies as des- tined to be repressed." That said, international observers should also exercise caution in applauding non-democratic leaders for extending an olive branch to separatist minorities, given that these are typically informed by strategic concerns that emerge amidst political instability and, in the absence of credible commitment tools, any concessions that follow may be rescinded as soon as the incumbent regains power.

By mitigating such commitment problems to some extent, democratization generates more favorable conditions for state-minority reconciliation compared to other periods of political instability that occur in non-democratic or weakly democratic regimes. That said, not all democratizations produce minority-friendly policies and the insights developed in Chapter 6 about transition paths should guide our expectations about how democratizing elites may manage their interaction with separatist minorities. For instance, in light of my argument about voluntary incumbent-led transitions not generating strong incentives for concessions to ethnic minorities, it is not at all surprising that Myanmar’s "democratization" over the past decade has not created a major change in state policy towards the country’s separatist minorities. Although Aung San Suu Kyi’s early eorts towards a national reconciliation process was initially welcomed with enthusiasm, the government

231 Chapter 8 Conclusion has shown little progress in fullling the commitments made in the Nationwide Ceasere Agreement that was signed with several major separatist groups. Initiated and overseen by the military leadership who still controls the key levers of power, the Myanmarese transition was not marked by the kind of threats to elite survival that generate strategic incentives for co-optation of ethnic minorities. Cases like Myanmar warn us about the fact that conciliatory initiatives taken along top-down democratization paths where the power still rests on the authoritarian leadership often fail to produce any tangible improvements in state-minority relations.

That said, other types of democratization can generate opportunities for policymakers and civil society organizations to push the government towards conciliatory policies towards ethnic minorities. In particular, mass-driven transitions that are brought about by bottom-up pressures for democratic reform can bring to power leaders who have reputational incentives to avoid repressive policies reminiscent of authoritarian rule. Given that these reputational concerns typically increase with visibility, NGOs and civil society groups sympathetic to the minority cause may work to raise awareness about the past suerings of minority populations under authoritarian rule and shape public sentiment in favor of self-determination reform. Majority support for minority demands can tilt the balance in favor of accommodative policies towards ethnic minorities, paving the way for national reconciliation.

Overall, the key insight presented in this study is that political leaders who want to take the country in a democratic direction can benet from extending an olive branch to ethnic minorities early on. In a turbulent transitional context, winning over aggrieved minorities not only increases the chances of overcoming imminent threats to elite survival posed by power-seeking rivals, but also can help achieve important steps towards democratic consolidation.

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245 Appendix

• Tables A.1 and A.2 present the universe of cases relevant to my theory about democratization and self-determination reform. In A.1, relevant cases are identied using a Polity-based denition of democratization and the SDM dataset, which contains a signicantly larger number of self-determination groups compared to those included in Cunningham’s (2014) dataset. In A.2, I identify several additional cases matching the SDM groups with a CGV-based measure of democratization.

• Tables A.3 through A.6 reestimate models presented in Chapter 4 using the SDM dataset. The ndings are largely consistent with results from earlier models estimated using Cunnigham’s dataset. The ordinal measure of accommodation used in the ordered logit models come from the SDM dataset, in contrast to those from earlier models where a binary variable was coded into an ordinal measure with the help of Cunningham’s (2014) qualitative dataset on government concessions to self-determination movements.

246 247 248 249 A.3 Robustness Checks for the Capacity Hypotheses (H1a-b)

FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Horizontal Accountability Index (V-Dem) 0.77∗ 0.53+ 0.13 0.03 (0.33) (0.29) (0.10) (0.02) Horizontal Accountability squared -0.75∗∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.04∗ (0.26) (0.11) (0.02) Checks and Balances (DPI) -0.72∗ 1.99+ 1.52∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.29) (1.03) (0.44) (0.05) Checks and Balances squared -1.35∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ (0.45) (0.23) (0.01) Executive Constraints (Polity IV) 0.19+ 0.58 (0.10) (0.43) Executive Constraints squared -0.05 (0.04) 250 Separatist War 0.35 0.32 0.03 0.05 0.48+ 0.46+ 0.15 0.20 0.03 -0.01 (0.24) (0.25) (0.49) (0.45) (0.27) (0.27) (0.15) (0.20) (0.02) (0.03) New State 1.04 0.67 0.64 0.58 0.95+ 0.85 0.29 0.49 0.12 0.12 (0.65) (0.70) (0.77) (0.71) (0.53) (0.56) (0.51) (0.75) (0.09) (0.19) Federal State -0.92 -0.71 -2.18∗∗ -2.64∗ 0.01 0.01 0.61∗∗ 0.21 -0.06 -0.32 (0.71) (0.45) (0.81) (1.08) (0.64) (0.66) (0.19) (0.28) (0.06) (0.21) Ethnic fractionalization -0.77∗ -0.56 (0.37) (0.58) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ Income Inequality(t−1). -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Post Cold War 0.01 0.14 0.76∗∗ 0.66∗ 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.34 0.00 0.05∗ (0.22) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.14) (0.21) (0.02) (0.02) Years since Accommodation 0.01 0.01 0.19∗ 0.21∗ 0.01 0.01 -0.10∗ -0.07 0.00 0.01 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) Constant 0.21∗ 0.07 (0.08) (0.10) Cut Point 1 3.31∗∗∗ 0.95 2.09+ 3.01∗ 3.49∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗ -0.05 1.41∗∗ (0.78) (1.23) (1.10) (1.19) (0.96) (1.26) (0.52) (0.52) Cut Point 2 3.56∗∗∗ 1.21 2.34∗ 3.25∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗ 0.19 1.64∗∗ (0.77) (1.22) (1.10) (1.19) (0.95) (1.25) (0.52) (0.51) Cut Point 3 7.13∗∗∗ 4.80∗∗∗ 5.88∗∗∗ 6.80∗∗∗ 7.38∗∗∗ 7.90∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 5.27∗∗∗ (0.88) (1.29) (1.24) (1.28) (1.11) (1.42) (0.62) (0.67)

Group Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Number of Observations 3025 3025 1748 1748 2963 2963 2937 1690 3025 1748 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 251 A.4 Robustness Checks for the Incentive Hypotheses (H2a-b-c)

FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20

Center-seeking Armed Groups 0.30 0.48+ 1.84∗∗∗ 0.70∗ 0.09∗ (0.34) (0.29) (0.51) (0.28) (0.03) Threats to Elite Survival 0.25 0.41 1.27∗ 0.63∗ 0.06+ (0.27) (0.27) (0.53) (0.28) (0.03) Horizontal Accountability Index 0.90∗ 0.70∗ 0.90∗ 0.69∗ 0.16 0.17 0.04+ 0.04+ (0.36) (0.32) (0.37) (0.32) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) Horizontal Accountability squared -0.74∗ -0.60+ -0.26∗ -0.25∗ -0.04+ -0.03 (0.33) (0.31) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) Center-seekers * Hor. Acc. -0.48 -1.16∗∗ -0.45 -0.06∗ 252 (0.35) (0.44) (0.30) (0.03) Center-seekers * Hor. Acc. * Hor. Acc. -1.09∗ -1.11∗∗ -0.04 (0.47) (0.41) (0.03) Threats * Hor. Acc. -0.26 -0.59+ -0.33 -0.03 (0.26) (0.32) (0.25) (0.02) Threats * Hor. Acc. * Hor. Acc. -0.83∗ -0.91∗ -0.03 (0.42) (0.35) (0.02)

Electoral Democracy Index(t−1) 0.11 0.21 (1.27) (1.32) Separatist War 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.28+ 0.29+ 0.02 0.02 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.16) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) New State 1.02+ 1.03 0.63 1.02 0.98 0.46 0.36 0.22 0.12 0.10 (0.62) (0.64) (0.63) (0.66) (0.68) (0.73) (0.50) (0.52) (0.09) (0.09) Federal State -0.65 -0.95 -0.87∗ -0.73 -1.01 -0.92∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.08 (0.54) (0.75) (0.44) (0.55) (0.74) (0.46) (0.18) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) Ethnic Fractionalization -0.43 -0.39 (0.36) (0.39) ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ Income Inequality(t−1) -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Post Cold War 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.00 (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) Years Since Last Reform 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.09+ -0.09+ 0.00 0.00 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Constant 0.21∗ 0.19∗ (0.09) (0.09) Cut Point 1 2.36∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 0.78 2.50∗ 3.52∗∗∗ 1.16 0.34 0.27 (1.05) (0.82) (1.33) (1.08) (0.83) (1.28) (0.53) (0.51)

253 Cut Point 2 2.60∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 1.03 2.75∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 1.42 0.59 0.52 (1.05) (0.82) (1.33) (1.08) (0.83) (1.28) (0.53) (0.51) Cut Point 3 6.16∗∗∗ 7.22∗∗∗ 4.65∗∗∗ 6.31∗∗∗ 7.38∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 3.98∗∗∗ (1.12) (0.91) (1.38) (1.14) (0.92) (1.35) (0.64) (0.61)

Group Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Number of Observations 3021 3025 3025 3016 3019 3019 2937 2931 3025 3019 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 A.5 Robustness Checks for the Democratization Hypothesis (H3)

FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28

Polity IV-based Indicators

∗∗∗ DemocratizationP olity (past 5 years) 1.12 (0.31) ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ DemocratizationP olity (past 3 years) 1.35 1.06 0.12 (0.26) (0.17) (0.03) CGV-based Indicators

∗ Democratic TransitionCGV (past 5 years) 0.86

254 (0.34) ∗∗ ∗ Democratic TransitionCGV (past 3 years) 1.01 0.33 0.08 (0.35) (0.26) (0.03) Covariates

Electoral Democracy Index(t−1) -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.18 -0.05 -0.43 -0.05 -0.05 (1.17) (1.17) (1.22) (1.24) (0.31) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09) Separatist War 0.28 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.02 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) New State 0.49 0.23 1.08+ 1.08+ -0.22 0.45 0.02 0.11 (0.67) (0.66) (0.63) (0.63) (0.57) (0.58) (0.09) (0.09) Ethnic Fractionalization -0.50 -0.59 (0.39) (0.37) Federal State -0.44 -0.55 -0.70 -0.70 0.69∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.04 (0.60) (0.57) (0.51) (0.50) (0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ Income Inequality(t−1) -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Post Cold War 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.01 0.01 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) Years Since Last Reform 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.10∗ 0.00 0.00 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Constant 0.17+ 0.17∗ (0.08) (0.08) Cut Point 1 1.92+ 2.18∗ 2.07∗ 2.16∗ 0.85+ 0.50 (1.03) (1.01) (1.05) (1.05) (0.47) (0.46) Cut Point 2 2.17∗ 2.43∗ 2.32∗ 2.41∗ 1.10∗ 0.74 (1.03) (1.01) (1.04) (1.04) (0.47) (0.45) Cut Point 3 5.75∗∗∗ 6.03∗∗∗ 5.88∗∗∗ 5.97∗∗∗ 4.57∗∗∗ 4.19∗∗∗ 255 (1.09) (1.09) (1.11) (1.12) (0.63) (0.61)

Group Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Number of Observations 3021 3021 3021 3021 2933 2933 3021 3021 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 A.6 Robustness Checks for Models Testing the Eect of Democratization Path (H4)

FE Ordered Logit Ordered Logit LPM Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37

Polity IV-based Indicators

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ Top-Down DemocratizationP olity (past 3) 1.24 1.03 0.12 (0.26) (0.16) (0.03) ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ Mass-driven DemocratizationP olity (past 3) 1.72 1.15 0.13 (0.44) (0.34) (0.04) CGV-based Indicators

∗ + Top-Down TransitionCGV (past 3) 0.91 0.15 0.07

256 (0.38) (0.28) (0.04) ∗ + Mass-driven TransitionCGV (past 3) 1.23 0.78 0.09 (0.56) (0.46) (0.06) ∗∗ ∗ Top-Down TransitionCGV (current or past 3) 1.12 0.29 0.09 (0.39) (0.28) (0.04) ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ Mass-driven TransitionCGV (current or past 3) 1.78 1.12 0.15 (0.52) (0.42) (0.07) Covariates

Electoral Democracy Index(t−1) -0.25 -0.22 -0.27 -0.06 -0.45 -0.39 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 (1.16) (1.22) (1.16) (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Separatist War 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) New State 0.34 1.09+ 1.16+ -0.19 0.46 0.47 0.02 0.11 0.11 (0.70) (0.64) (0.67) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Federal State -0.55 -0.68 -0.70 0.70∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 (0.56) (0.50) (0.48) (0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) Ethnic Fractionalization -0.51 -0.63+ (0.40) (0.37) ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Income Inequality(t−1) -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Post Cold War 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.28+ 0.01 0.01 0.02 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Years Since Last Reform 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.10∗ -0.09∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Constant 0.17+ 0.17∗ 0.17∗ (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) Cut Point 1 2.23∗ 2.16∗ 2.19∗ 0.85+ 0.48 0.67 257 (1.03) (1.04) (1.03) (0.47) (0.46) (0.42) Cut Point 2 2.48∗ 2.40∗ 2.44∗ 1.09∗ 0.72 0.90∗ (1.03) (1.04) (1.02) (0.47) (0.46) (0.41) Cut Point 3 6.08∗∗∗ 5.96∗∗∗ 6.01∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ (1.11) (1.12) (1.11) (0.62) (0.61) (0.58)

Group Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Number of Observations 3021 3021 3021 2933 2933 3021 3021 3021 3021 Group-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a measure of years since last reform with cubic splines. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001