Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Self-Determination Reform

Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Self-Determination Reform Aslıhan Saygılı Submitted in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019 ©2019 Aslıhan Saygılı All rights reserved ABSTRACT Democratization, Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Self-Determination Reform Aslıhan Saygılı Conventional wisdom portrays ethnic minorities as likely victims of democratization who often fall prey to nationalist aggression fueled by power-seeking elites. Yet, history is re- plete with newly democratic states that have not only avoided targeted violence against ethnic "others" but also sought to reconcile with aggrieved ethnic minorities through con- cessions over self-determination. In light of conventional wisdom, this picture is puzzling and raises two important questions: 1) Why is self-determination reform so frequently observed during democratization periods? 2) Why do some democratizing states accommodate minority demands for self-determination while others continue to neglect minority grievances, or worse, become a breeding ground for exclusionary nationalism and minority repression? This dissertation is dedicated to addressing these questions. To answer the rst question, I develop a novel theory of self-determination reform that explains the conditions under which government leaders develop both the capacity and incentives to intro- duce policies that devolve some degree of autonomy to separatist minorities. The theory pinpoints early democratization as a critical juncture where two key conditions neces- sary for self-determination reform - limited institutional constraints to rule and threats to elite survival - are most likely to be observed together. During early democratization, newly democratic governments are able to push forward radical policy changes without the meddling of institutionally empowered veto players, who typically gain more leverage as the democratic regime consolidates. Matching this capacity for reform are democratizers’ strategic incentives to co-opt ethnic separatists. The source of these incentives, I argue, is the emergence of threats to elite survival during the early democratization period, which may be posed by a number of anti-democratic forces including the loyalists of the authoritarian regime and coup-plotting military factions. Amidst political instability, extending an olive branch to separatist minorities helps threatened democratizers strengthen their hand vis-a-vis imminent threats to their survival by containing separatist violence in the periph- ery and preventing tactical alliances between center-seeking and separatist rebel groups. In certain paths to democracy, democratizers also develop reputational incentives for self- determination reform, which helps establish democratic credentials through signaling a clean break with authoritarian practices. I test my hypotheses using a mixed-method research design, combining statistical analyses of large-N data with a detailed case study of the Philippines-Moro relations during the country’s transition to democracy in the mid-1980s. The quantitative ndings conrm my hypotheses about the domestic political conditions that are most conducive to minority accommodation, as well as the relationship between democratization and self- determination reform. The Philippines chapter illustrates how strategic and reputational incentives for minority accommodation drive self-determination reform in early democ- racies, drawing on evidence from secondary sources and semi-structured interviews con- ducted during eldwork in Manila. In later chapters, I turn to my second research question and explore the variation in transition outcomes for separatist minorities across democratizing states. The key insight is that conciliatory steps towards ethnic separatists is a likely outcome in all types of transition paths marked by political instability, with the exception of coerced incumbent-led transitions where the incumbent views electoral competition as the primary threat to its survival prospects. In addition to this exception, non-conciliatory outcomes may also be observed in top-down transitions led by powerful autocrats who democratize voluntarily and do so without allowing the transition process to generate any threats to their survival. Case studies of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey introduced in the last chapter help probe the generalizability of the theory and illustrate how dierent transition paths shape democratizers’ policies towards separatists disputes. Altogether, my dissertation project presents a novel theory of self-determination reform, as well as undertaking the rst systematic analysis of the conditions under which democratization paves the way for state-minority reconciliation. More broadly, the theory and ndings also add nuance to current thinking about democratization and ethnic minorities, providing evidence that transition processes are not closely associated with minority victimization and ethnic violence as is commonly assumed. Contents List of Tables iii List of Figures iv 1 Introduction1 1.1 Democratizers, Separatists and The Accommodation Puzzle.........1 1.2 Current State of the Debate...........................6 1.3 Summary of The Argument........................... 15 1.4 Research Design................................. 20 1.5 Dissertation Roadmap.............................. 23 2 Denitions and Universe of Cases 27 2.1 Denitions.................................... 27 2.2 The Universe of Cases.............................. 37 3 A Theory of Self-Determination Reform 41 3.1 Three Phases of Self-Determination Reform................. 44 3.2 Elite Capacity for Reform............................ 46 3.3 Elite Incentives for Reform........................... 53 3.4 How the Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes Shape the Reform Process 59 3.5 Survival of Authoritarianism and Commitment Problems.......... 65 3.6 Democratization: A Critical Juncture for Separatist Minorities....... 71 3.7 Conclusion.................................... 80 4 Statistical Analyses 82 4.1 Data and Methods of Analysis......................... 84 i 4.2 Results...................................... 96 4.3 Additional Robustness Checks......................... 121 4.4 Conclusion.................................... 122 5 State Responses to Moro Separatism in The Philippines 124 5.1 A Brief History of the Moro Peoples...................... 125 5.2 Origins of the Modern Moro Conict..................... 127 5.3 Armed Separatism in Mindanao: the Moro National Liberation Front... 133 5.4 State Policy Towards the "Moro Problem" Under the Marcos Dictatorship. 136 5.5 Philippine Transition to Democracy and the Aquino Period......... 146 5.6 Conclusion.................................... 160 6 Why Some Democratizers Accommodate While Others Repress 162 6.1 Democratizers vs Separatists: A Formal Model of Self-Determination Reform 164 6.2 Explaining Alternative Transition Outcomes for Ethnic Minorities..... 174 6.3 Conclusion.................................... 188 7 Cases of Spain, Nicaragua and Turkey 191 7.1 Spain’s Reformer-Driven Transition and Basque Separatism (1975-1981).. 194 7.2 Nicaragua’s Incumbent-Driven Transition and Indigenous Miskito Sepa- ratism (1979-1987)................................ 203 7.3 A Negative Case: Turkey’s Transition to Democracy and the Kurdish In- surgency in the 1980s.............................. 215 7.4 Conclusion.................................... 220 8 Conclusion 223 8.1 Theoretical Approach and Main Findings................... 224 8.2 Contributions to the Literature......................... 228 8.3 Policy Implications............................... 231 Bibliography 233 Appendix 246 ii List of Tables 4.1 List of Hypotheses................................ 83 4.2 Dependent Variable Measuring Degrees of Self-Determination Reform.. 86 4.3 Summary Statistics............................... 95 4.4 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Capacity Hypotheses (H1a-b)................... 99 4.5 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Incentive Hypotheses (H2a-b-c).................. 107 4.6 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of Self-Determination Reform Testing the Democratization Hypothesis (H3)................ 113 4.7 Ordered Logit and Linear Probability Models of of Self-Determination Re- form Testing the Eect of Democratization Path (H4)............ 119 6.1 Types of Democratization and Political Instability.............. 182 6.2 How Transition Paths Shape Democratizers’ Response to Territorial Sepa- ratists....................................... 190 iii List of Figures 2.1 List of Relevant Cases, 1960-2005........................ 40 3.1 Key Determinants and Phases of Self-Determination Reform........ 57 3.2 Potential Outcomes of Political Instability Episodes in Authoritarian and Weakly Democratic Regimes.......................... 63 4.1 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Horizontal Ac- countability Index (V-Dem)........................... 101 4.2 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform by Institutional Checks and Balances (DPI)................................ 102 4.3 Predicted Probability of Self-Determination Reform at Dierent Threat Levels, Moderated by Regime Institutions................... 109 4.4 Predicted Probability of Dierent Degrees of Self-Determination Reform by Transition Type..............................

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