12 Boterdijk

At Boterdijk, near Roermondsplein, is an Airborne pillar, a memorial to the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions and their efforts in the after- noon of 18 and the morning of 19 September 1944 to join their com- rades at the bridge. The pillar marks the farthest point these British parachutists managed to reach. After the Rhine Bridge’s northern ramp was secured by British units in the evening and night of the 17th, other troops made further at- tempts to break through to the bridge over the following days in or- der to bolster the allied positions. On Monday 18 September two groups from the 3rd Parachute Battalion would get as far as Boter- dijk. Involved was a group led by Lieutenant John Dickson and a group led by Anthony Deane-Drummond. Next day they would be taken prisoner. On Tuesday 19 September companies of the 1st Parachute Battalion tried to get to the Rhine Bridge. ‘S’ Company ca- me to within 800 metres of the Rhine Bridge, but by then had too few men and too little fire-power to continue its advance. In this sto- ry the tale of these groups is depicted using war diaries and recollec- tions of British soldiers who were there.

Dickson’s group Deane-Drummond’s group Units of the 1st Parachute Battalion in the attack 'S' Company R Company Making the balance

Dickson’s group

Map showing the situation around Boterdijk in 1944 (Copyright Cartographic Bureau MAP/Bert Stamkot)

In the afternoon of 18 September the 3rd Parachute Battalion failed in its efforts to break through the German defence line al- ong Noordelijke Parallelweg and over Utrechtseweg. Resistance was apparently too strong and at the day’s end approxima- tely 150 officers and men still remained in the vicinity of St. Elisabeths Gasthuis. A small group from this company, led by Li- eutenant John Dickson, did actually get through the German line. Dickson succee- ded in reaching Boterdijk and then noticed that he was the only one from his group to have completed the attack. He came across two other men from his battalion who had arrived at the same point via a different route. No reinforcements turned up so they looked for shelter in the attic of a nearby house.[1]

1 Deane-Drummond’s group

The Old Harbour seen from Nieuwe Kraan towards the Botermarkt on the far side. (Gelders Archive Col- lection, Blok 1501-04, negatief B_140_8)

Another group from the 3rd Parachute Battalion which had joined up with the 1st Parachute Battalion earlier that day also came to within close proximity of Boterdijk. This group was being led by Major Anthony Deane-Drummond, the deputy commander of the 1st Airborne Division’s signals unit. He had been heading in the direction of Arnhem in order to pass on radio frequency alterations to the bat- talions which up till then had been impossible to contact. Deane-Drummond met up with the 1st Parachute Battalion and decided to stay with it. This battalion was also accompanied by the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s HQ. Major Tony Deane-Drummond established radio contact with Major Tony Hibbert of 1st Parachute Brigade headquarters at the road bridge in Arnhem – passed on the new radio frequency and decided to stay with the 1st Parachute Battalion a little longer. His decision was influenced by Lieutenant Colonel David T. Dobie’s telling him that in the afternoon they would be making a new attempt to reach the bridge via Klingelbeekseweg and Onder- langs. The commander of the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s HQ Company had been badly wounded. Deane- Drummond took over command and led part of the company forward: "About four hundred metres further along our side of the river, at the level of the ship bridge, the river bank was interrupted by the inlet to a small harbour in the centre of the city. There was a group of houses just before the inlet and I gave the order to occupy and defend them un- til the rest of the battalion appeared to our left. As we ran along the river bank we were under constant rifle fire, and at a certain point the Ger- mans began throwing hand-grenades at our group. These caused little damage and the Ger- mans quickly stopped when we returned the compliment with Mills bombs. We finally reached the row of houses but there were only about twenty men left from the entire company.[2] A short recce showed that we had left the rest of the battalion far behind us, and that our position would soon become untenable. A count of our ammunition revealed that we had just a few hundred bullets to share between us, so not much. It was about four o’ clock in the afternoon and I gave the order to take up de- fensive positions. We spread out over three houses giving a good overview of the area. The big problem was we were unable to inform battalion headquarters where we were or how successful our attack had been.” [3] The 1st Parachute Battalion had not succeeded in following Major Deane-Drummond’s group but des- pite this Lieutenant Colonel Dobie was determined to carry out another attack towards the bridge. However, his battalion had been reduced in number from 548 to roughly 200 officers and men. The arrival of the 2nd Battalion the South Staffords and his own ‘R’ Company, which had fought a re- arguard action at Amsterdamseweg, brought new hope.

2 The Old Harbour photographed by a German war pho- The same Old Harbour photographed after the liberati- tographer on 19 September 1944. (Bundesarchiv Col- on 1945; the boats are now gone (W.S. Jaquet, Gelders lection, Koblenz) Archive Collection, blok 1534, negatief 1-29A)

Units of the 1st Parachute Battalion in the attack A new attack was planned for 1 am but this was postponed when incorrect news came in that the part of the 1st Parachute Brigade at the bridge had been taken prisoner. The attack eventually got under way at 04.00 hours, led by ‘S’ Company, along the lower road on the bank of the Rhine. 'S' Company Lieutenant Richard A.J. Bingley, the commander of 6 Platoon, recalled later: “Early the next morning (19 september) the remainder of the battalion with my company in the lead advanced along the road running parallel to the river, clearing snipers and machineguns on the way. After some 500 metres my excellent platoon sergeant who was walking next to me was shot dead by a sniper. I wanted to help but I was then hit in the ankle. At this point the colonel decided to go up to the middle road [Utrechtseweg], and continue the advance there. ‘T’ Company cleared up the area ahead too, and drove some SS out of a large, white, three-storey house, after which ‘S’ Company joined them. It was impossible to move al- ong the street so we had to go from one house to the next by blowing holes in the walls. This was done twenty times or so until we came to the last house in the row, where it was crawling with German tanks and artillery which were firing straight at our houses. After a while we were overpowered within sight of our objective, just a kilometre up ahead. Three days to cover twelve kilometres with virtually one hundred per cent losses! It was a bitter pill."[4] ‘S’ Company was close to Roermondsplein when it was overwhelmed. It had got to within about 800 metres of the road bridge but had insufficient men, ammunition and weaponry to breach the German defence. The official war diary of the 1st Parachute Battalion, written by Lieutenant Colonel Dobie, says this about the attack: “06.00 hours The SOUTH STAFFS appears to have withdrawn, the gunfire stopped some time ago. Our situation is hopeless because the enemy is on higher ground and in the houses above us (to the north thus). Anti-aircraft and machineguns are firing at us from across the river. Tanks are shooting from close range. R Company - 6 men left. S Company - 15 men left (about). T Company - 8 men left. (HQ Com- pany in jeeps should arrive after the SOUTH STAFFS). HQ Company - 10 men left (about). This was my last count. No more radio contact with other companies. Commander goes forward to find out where they are. Was fired on and wounded. Orders were given to capture the houses on the higher ground [Utrechtseweg] (. . . . . )

3 06.30 hours - T Company was cut off and unable to fight its way out. Enemy throws grenades from the houses we want to occupy. We succeed in entering one house, but have only 16 men with me. Enemy now between us and S and T Companies. I sent the commander of R Company [Major “Tim” Timothy] out to see what the situation is. There is gunfire in the distance. S Com- pany seems to have got into a perilous position and has withdrawn to some trenches. Unable to send message through. Many civilians in the cellar with us. Nothing more can be done. Four men are wounded. 07.30 hours - SS enter house. Group [HQ Company] taken prisoner.”[5]

R Company Private Bryan Willoughby was one of the remaining soldiers in ‘R’ Company. His unit and ‘T’ Company had carried out the last attack with fixed bayonets. ‘R’ Company began the attack with 40 officers and men; there were just six left at the end of it. Willoughby recalled the last attack: “Someone was being hit all the time, and while we continued advancing in battle order we lost even more. Sadly, it was impossible to stop to help the wounded. A bit further on we were joi- ned by another company. Suddenly we were stopped by an extremely convincing Spandau ma- chinegun. I heard a shouted order from the of the company that had just joined us: “Knock out that gun!” There was a short pause where nothing happened. Then off they went towards it to the sounds of the cry ‘Whoa Mahomet!’, followed by utter silence.[6] No more machinegun fire. I was pleased that I had had nothing to do with it. But my turn came soon enough, although in all honesty I didn’t go looking for it. We were being targeted by fire from between the houses to the left of us from over a dike.[7] Two of us were sent out to silence it. To complicate matters further a gun was continuously shelling our bank from across the river. Having reached the top of the dike we could see the Germans at the far side of a small square lying between the houses. We ran at them, firing wildly as we went. When we had come down I was sent out as company runner to the other platoons to tell them to link up for a new assault. There were not many men left. Just a handful of men and an officer dashed across the open terrain to cover the last little bit to the bridge. We didn’t get far. The last I remember was shooting at anything that moved at the house directly ahead of us and then seeing the company commander, Major Timothy, signalling that we had to close up on him. But he was standing by a house far away to our left and I didn’t make it. I walked into a rain of hand grenades being thrown from the upper windows of the houses in this row. I managed to crawl further and reached a small group of wounded about fifty metres back, where a Red Cross flag had been hoisted high enough to be seen. I was then taken prisoner and carried to St. Eli- sabeths Gasthuis on the back of a German tank.” [8]

Making the balance The 3rd Parachute Battalion, which had followed the 1st Parachute Battalion, also suffered heavy los- ses. Commander Lieutenant Colonel John Fitch was killed during the withdrawal to the Rijnpaviljoen. By evening 60 officers and men from the battalion had gathered in the pavilion under the command of Captain Richard Dorrien-Smith. Lieutenant James Cleminson, who had hidden out in Zwarteweg 14 together with Major Urquhart and Captain William Taylor, rejoined his battalion there. The 1st Parachute Battalion numbered an amazing 120 survivors, most of them being men who had become lost or left behind the previous day. The two groups under Lieutenant Dickson and Major Deane-Drummond, which got close to Boterdijk, were taken prisoner. The major was the only one of them who managed to return to the allied lines, after spending thirteen days hidden in a cupboard (standing) in the building where the POWs were being interrogated. He crossed back over the Rhine at Renkum during the night of 22/23 October 1944 and rejoined his unit in Britain.

4 In November 1944 Brigadier Gerald Lathbury wrote the following about the efforts of his 1st Parachu- te Brigade during the : “It is certain that the courageous but futile attempts by the 1st and 3rd battalions to reach the bridge tied up many enemy troops and caused them heavy losses, which gave the defenders at the bridge a little more time.” [9]

5 Notes to top

[1] Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, (London, 1994), 183. [2] A part of the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s HQ Company, led by Lieutenant Herbert D. Burwash, suc- ceeded in rejoining the rest of the battalion in Utrechtseweg. See 08: Zwarteweg 14. [3] Anthony Deane-Drummond, Return Ticket (London, 1953), 154. [4] Richard Bingley, ‘Verslag van de lotgevallen van het 6e Peloton S Compagnie van het 1e Paraba- taljon’, Ministory 9, Newsletter Society of Friends of the Airborne Museum, 1985. [5] War Diary 1st Parachute Battalion. http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_1stBatt.htm Consulted on 12 December 2006. [6] The cry “Whoa Mahomet” was ‘borrowed’ by the 1st Parachute Brigade in the winter of 1942/1943 from the North African herdsmen in Tunisia. At that time the British noticed that the herdsmen greeted one another with “Whoa Mahomet”. Almost exclusive to the officers and men of the 1st Parachute Brigade, the call was used as a sign of recognition and to frighten the enemy. [7] This was Boterdijk. [8] M. Middlebrook, Arnhem. Ooggetuigenverslagen van de Slag om Arnhem (Baarn, 1994), 197- 198. With the addition of an account by Bryan Willoughby, November 2004; Frank van Lunteren col- lection. [9] Brigadier Gerald W. Lathbury, Operation Market. Story of 1st Parachute Brigade, November 1944.

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