Prudence in Victory: the Management of Defeated Great Powers
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PRUDENCE IN VICTORY: THE MANAGEMENT OF DEFEATED GREAT POWERS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Paul Brian Fritz, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2006 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Randall L. Schweller, Advisor Professor John Mueller _____________________ Professor Theodore Hopf Advisor Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT How should victorious states manage their vanquished foes to provide for stable post-war international politics? Though there is relatively little work on how states manage victory, the conventional wisdom in international relations scholarship is that moderation in victory is the only approach that will provide post-war stability. That is, defeated states should not be restricted in the post-war era, nor should the gains made by victors be too large. Otherwise, post-war stability is jeopardized. I argue that restrictive war-ending settlements tend to provide postwar stability when there is a large postwar gap in capabilities favoring the victors and those states actively enforce the settlement. When these conditions hold, postwar stability, defined as no or only minor alterations to the settlement attempted by the vanquished nation, can follow two pathways. The first is the acceptance of the restrictive settlement by the vanquished based on simple coercion, or where the defeated state is unable to challenge the settlement and thus grudgingly endures its treatment at the hand of the victors as long as the power gap favors the victors. The second, coercion plus socialization, is acceptance of the restrictive settlement by the defeated state based on legitimacy, or where the defeated state is eventually socialized to the settlement such that it no longer desires to challenge or alter the settlement even if the opportunity arises to do so. ii When the gap in capabilities between the victors and vanquished is not large or cannot be perpetuated because of lack of enforcement, a less restrictive settlement is more likely to provide postwar stability. To test my arguments against the conventional wisdom, I conduct a comparative analysis of all great power war-ending settlements since 1815. I find that restrictive settlements do in fact lead to postwar stability at least as often as lenient ones. Moreover, the comparative analysis demonstrates that the coercion and coercion plus socialization both enjoy strong support. To further probe the coercion plus socialization model, I conduct an in-depth case study of West Germany after the Second World War. The case demonstrates very clearly that the victorious states instigated a process of socialization in West Germany by constructing a restrictive settlement. By doing so, the war-ending settlement proved remarkably stable. iii To my family iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have been fortunate enough to have the help and encouragement of many individuals while writing this dissertation. My greatest intellectual debts are, of course, owed to my dissertation committee. Ted Hopf provided extraordinarily helpful comment and guidance during the entire process of writing the dissertation. John Mueller always forced me to consider the issues pursued in the dissertation in a different light and in the process helped to refine my thinking. Randy Schweller, my chair, helped me to form the initial ideas in the dissertation and provided invaluable comment and advice from the beginning of my graduate career and continued to do so through the end of the dissertation. Each of my committee members offered constant encouragement during the entire process of writing the dissertation, especially during the times when I struggled most. A better committee and chair I could not imagine. Many others at Ohio State have helped me along the way. Tim Frye, Goldie Shabad, and Don Sylvan provided me with much useful guidance and were sources of support to which I could always turn. Sandy Wood, Wayne DeYoung, Retta Semones, Diana Camella and the other front office staff helped me at critical times with administrative difficulties, and always did so with great kindness. I was also very lucky to have an amazing group of fellow graduate students to help me through the process. David Bearce, Pat McDonald, and Kevin Sweeney took it upon themselves to socialize me to graduate school and in the process became good friends. Bridget Coggins, Brent v Strathman, and Jeff Martinson were not only sharp minds I could rely on for help but also provided great friendship. Yoav Gortzak and Yoram Haftel have been the best of critics for everything I have ever written, always providing invaluable comment and acting as my greatest proponents. Yoav and Yoram have also been the greatest friends a person could hope to have. The support and friendship of all these individuals greatly enhanced my academic experience during graduate school and also made it much more enjoyable. Quite a few others have helped to shape this dissertation. I thank Michael Doyle, Rick Herrmann, Jacques Hymans, Jack Levy, Irfan Nooruddin, and Alex Wendt for reading various versions or sections of the dissertation and providing very useful comments and suggestions. My family deserves more thanks than I could ever express. My parents showed me what hard work can achieve, and their unfailing support and encouragement for everything I have ever done means the world to me. Jessica, my sister, and Nikki and Eric, my sister and brother-in-law, never seemed to tire of explaining that their brother was still in school. But more importantly, all were always available to lean on. My niece Emma and my nephew Cameron have brought much joy to my life and, along with the rest of my family, have been sources of support and inspiration. My wife, of course, deserves special recognition. Sheila encouraged me throughout graduate school, and did so with patience and grace. Without her love and support, none of this would have been possible. vi VITA December 25, 1974 ……………………... Born – Versailles, Ohio 1997 …………………………………….. B.A. Political Science University of Dayton 2001 …………………………………….. M.S. Political Science The Ohio State University 1998-present ……………………………. Graduate Research & Teaching Associate Department of Political Science The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Paul Fritz and Kevin Sweeney. 2004. “The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power Theory.” International Interactions. 30: 285-308. 2. Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz. 2004. “Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances.” The Journal of Politics. 66(2):428-49. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ..………………………………………………………………………………..ii Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………iv Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………….v Vita …………………………………………………………………………………….vii List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………...xi List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………xiii Chapters: 1. Introduction: The Problem of Victory and Postwar Stability …………………...1 1.1 The Problem of Victory …………………………………………………1 1.2 Thinking Theoretically about War-ending Settlements …………………7 1.2.1 Conventional Understandings of War-ending Settlements ………….7 1.2.2 Targets of War-ending Settlements: Autonomy and Power ……….10 1.3 Contributions and Limitations of the Dissertation ……………………..19 1.4 Plan of the Dissertation ………………………………………………...22 2. What is a Victor to do? .......................................................................................25 2.1 Introduction ……………..……………………………………………...25 2.2 Views on Moderation in Victory ………………………………………27 2.3 Is Moderation or Leniency the Path to Postwar Stability?........................33 2.4 Beyond Moderation in Victory ………………………………………...37 2.4.1 Postwar Power Gaps ……………………………………………….37 2.4.2 Enforcement of Restrictive Settlements: Postwar Threat and Victor Unity ……………………………………………………………….40 2.5 On the Acceptance of Restrictive Settlements …………………………49 2.5.1 The Coercion Model ……………………………………………….49 2.5.2 The Coercion plus Socialization Model ……………………………53 2.6 Summary and Hypotheses ……………………………………………..62 3. Research Design and Measures for the Comparative Historical Analysis………68 3.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………68 3.2 Domain of Cases …………………….…………………………………70 3.3 The Severity of War-ending Settlements ………………………………71 viii 3.3.1 Territorial Restrictions ………………………………………….….72 3.3.2 Economic Restrictions ……………………………………………..73 3.3.3 Military Restrictions …………………………………………….....74 3.3.4 Political Restrictions ……………………………………………….76 3.3.5 The Overall Severity of War-ending Settlements ………………….81 3.4 Levels of Postwar Stability ………………………………………………...82 3.5 Great Power War-ending Settlements and Postwar Stability ..…………….84 4. Great Power War-ending Settlements from the Napoleonic Wars to Russo- Japanese War …………………………………………………………………..88 4.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………....88 4.2 Post-Napoleonic Wars: France 1816-1845 …………………………….89 4.3 Post-Crimean War: Russia 1857-1886 ………………………………..100 4.4 Post-Italian War of Unification: Austria 1860-1889 …………………105 4.5 Post-Austro-Prussian War: Austria 1867-1896 ………………………109 4.6 Post-Franco-Prussian War: France 1872-1901 ……………………….114 4.7 Post-Russo-Japanese War: Russia 1906-1935 ………………………..119 4.8 Summary ……………………………………………………………...124 5. Great Power War-ending Settlements and Postwar Stability from the First and Second World Wars …………………………………………………………..126 5.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………...126