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MASARYK UNIVERSITY Willy Brandt and His Role in the Cold

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MASARYK UNIVERSITY Willy Brandt and His Role in the Cold MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Department of International Relations and European Studies Willy Brandt and his role in the Cold War Diploma thesis Tomáš Kolár Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Vít Hloušek, Ph. D. UČO: 251550 Field of study: European studies Immatriculation year: 2011 Košice, 2013 Hereby I declare that I have written this thesis by myself, drawing only on the cited sources. In Košice, December 15, 2013 ............................. First of all, I would like to kindly thank doc. PhDr. Vít Hloušek, Ph.D., for his enthusiasm, support, guidance, valuable comments and remarks. Table of content List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 5 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 7 2 The development of the divided Germany in the context of the Cold War after WWII till 1961 ...... 11 2.1 Development in the GDR ............................................................................................................ 12 2.2 Development in the FRG ............................................................................................................ 13 2.3 Konrad Adenauerʼs era (1949-1963) .......................................................................................... 14 2.3 Berlin wall and its consequences ................................................................................................ 17 3 Formative years of Willy Brandt ........................................................................................................ 20 3.1 Exile years ................................................................................................................................... 21 3.2 Return home ................................................................................................................................ 23 3.3 The mayor of West Berlin ........................................................................................................... 25 3.4 Grand Coalition (1966-1969) and Willy Brandt as the Minister of Foreign Affairs .................. 33 3.5 Summary of the Brandtʼs activities ............................................................................................. 41 4 Chancellor years (1969-1974) - peak of Brandtʼs career ................................................................... 43 4.1 The international climate at the end of 1960s ............................................................................. 45 4.1.1 Richard Nixonʼs administration ........................................................................................... 46 4.2 The initial talks with the Eastern bloc countries- First half of the 1970s .................................... 48 4.2.1 German- German talks ......................................................................................................... 48 4.2.2 German-Soviet talks ............................................................................................................ 50 4.2.3 Berlin status ......................................................................................................................... 51 4.3 The Moscow Treaty .................................................................................................................... 53 4.4 The Warsaw Treaty ..................................................................................................................... 54 4.5 The Quadripartite Agreement- Berlin Four Power Negotiations ................................................ 56 4.6 The Transit Treaty and the Basic Treaty ..................................................................................... 59 4.6.1 International consequences of the Basic Treaty................................................................... 64 4.7 Brandt’s resignation .................................................................................................................... 65 5 Long-term impact of Brandtʼs politics ............................................................................................... 68 6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 74 Appendixes ............................................................................................................................................ 78 7 Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 81 7.1 Primary sources ........................................................................................................................... 81 7.2 Secondary sources ....................................................................................................................... 84 7.3 Internet sources ........................................................................................................................... 86 List of abbreviations CDU Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) COMECON The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSU Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) DM Deutsche Mark ECSC The European Coal and Steel Community EEC The European Economic Community EURATOM The European Atomic Energy Community FDP Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) FRG The Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) GDR The German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) GNP Gross National Product MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MEP Member of the European Parliament MFN Most Favored Nation NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 5 NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSDAP National Socialist German Workersʼ Party (Nationalsozialistiche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation PRC Peopleʼs Republic of China SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAP Socialist Workersʼ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands) SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) UN The United Nations US The United States USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WWI The First World War WWII The Second World War 6 1 Introduction Germany was the main initiator and culprit of the Second World War. However, it was also the country, which suffered a huge defeat and as a consequence of this, in 1945, right after the end of war, Germany was in a catastrophic condition. Firstly, Germany lost approximately seven and half million inhabitants (almost 11% of its entire population). The nation was financially destroyed, owing to the Nazi's desperate spending to feed the war machine, even down to the final days, when it was clear that they had lost the war. The Allies partitioned the nation, strictly controlling all aspects of life in Germany and also implementing punitive sanctions at the same time. The nation was also humiliated and disgraced due to the atrocities carried out against mankind, particularly the Holocaust1. But above all, there was no single German state, since Germany was divided on the basis of Postupim conference. The Western Allies, France, United States and Great Britain controlled the western part of Germany- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established under their tutelage in 1949. On the other hand, the Communist Soviet Union was at helm in the eastern part of Germany and they created their puppet state, German Democratic Republic (GDR) there. Logically, the reunification question was raised, especially by the Western powers. Nevertheless, during the first fifteen years after the capitulation of the Axis, the circumstances and the ongoing global Cold War along with the developments in the divided Germany were not conducive to German unification at all. On one hand, the GDR was following the hard-line communist policy directed from Moscow, which led to immense economic problems and gradual massive migration of the inhabitants. Conversely, the FRG under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer had strong attachments to Western powers, United States in particular. This policy was supposed to lead to German unification, but it failed in this regard. It was precisely Germany and a huge influx of working force to West Germany from East Germany, where one of the major confrontations of the Cold War took place, which is known today as the Second Berlin Crisis. The resulting Berlin Wall, built in 1961, symbolized the "Iron Curtain" and partition not only of Germany, but of the whole world into two opposing blocks for almost three decades. Nevertheless, the Berlin Crisis and the 1 http://www.worldology.com/Europe/world_war_2_effect.htm 7 subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis represented crucial turning points in terms of viewing the German reunification from the side of Western powers, but more importantly, the FRG as well. The dominant Hallstein doctrine, exercised by Konrad Adenauer, came to no avail in this respect. The main defender of the necessity to officially recognize the GDR and to maintain relations with the states from the Eastern bloc was Willy Brandt. In this thesis I am going to deal mainly with his actions as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1966-1969), but
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