MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Department of International Relations and European Studies

Willy Brandt and his role in the Cold War

Diploma thesis

Tomáš Kolár

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Vít Hloušek, Ph. D. UČO: 251550 Field of study: European studies Immatriculation year: 2011

Košice, 2013

Hereby I declare that I have written this thesis by myself, drawing only on the cited sources.

In Košice, December 15, 2013 ......

First of all, I would like to kindly thank doc. PhDr. Vít Hloušek, Ph.D., for his enthusiasm, support, guidance, valuable comments and remarks.

Table of content

List of abbreviations ...... 5 1 Introduction ...... 7 2 The development of the divided Germany in the context of the Cold War after WWII till 1961 ...... 11 2.1 Development in the GDR ...... 12 2.2 Development in the FRG ...... 13 2.3 Konrad Adenauerʼs era (1949-1963) ...... 14 2.3 Berlin wall and its consequences ...... 17 3 Formative years of Willy Brandt ...... 20 3.1 Exile years ...... 21 3.2 Return home ...... 23 3.3 The mayor of West Berlin ...... 25 3.4 Grand Coalition (1966-1969) and Willy Brandt as the Minister of Foreign Affairs ...... 33 3.5 Summary of the Brandtʼs activities ...... 41 4 Chancellor years (1969-1974) - peak of Brandtʼs career ...... 43 4.1 The international climate at the end of 1960s ...... 45 4.1.1 Richard Nixonʼs administration ...... 46 4.2 The initial talks with the Eastern bloc countries- First half of the 1970s ...... 48 4.2.1 German- German talks ...... 48 4.2.2 German-Soviet talks ...... 50 4.2.3 Berlin status ...... 51 4.3 The Moscow Treaty ...... 53 4.4 The Warsaw Treaty ...... 54 4.5 The Quadripartite Agreement- Berlin Four Power Negotiations ...... 56 4.6 The Transit Treaty and the Basic Treaty ...... 59 4.6.1 International consequences of the Basic Treaty...... 64 4.7 Brandt’s resignation ...... 65 5 Long-term impact of Brandtʼs politics ...... 68 6 Conclusion ...... 74 Appendixes ...... 78 7 Sources ...... 81 7.1 Primary sources ...... 81 7.2 Secondary sources ...... 84 7.3 Internet sources ...... 86

List of abbreviations

CDU Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)

COMECON The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSU Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern)

DM Deutsche Mark

ECSC The European Coal and Steel Community

EEC The European Economic Community

EURATOM The European Atomic Energy Community

FDP Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)

FRG The Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)

GDR The German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik)

GNP Gross National Product

MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MEP Member of the European Parliament

MFN Most Favored Nation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSDAP National Socialist German Workersʼ Party (Nationalsozialistiche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei)

OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation

PRC Peopleʼs Republic of China

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAP Socialist Workersʼ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands)

SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

UN The United Nations

US The United States

USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI The First World War

WWII The Second World War

6

1 Introduction

Germany was the main initiator and culprit of the Second World War. However, it was also the country, which suffered a huge defeat and as a consequence of this, in 1945, right after the end of war, Germany was in a catastrophic condition. Firstly, Germany lost approximately seven and half million inhabitants (almost 11% of its entire population). The nation was financially destroyed, owing to the Nazi's desperate spending to feed the war machine, even down to the final days, when it was clear that they had lost the war. The Allies partitioned the nation, strictly controlling all aspects of life in Germany and also implementing punitive sanctions at the same time. The nation was also humiliated and disgraced due to the atrocities carried out against mankind, particularly the Holocaust1. But above all, there was no single German state, since Germany was divided on the basis of Postupim conference. The Western Allies, France, United States and Great Britain controlled the western part of Germany- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established under their tutelage in 1949. On the other hand, the Communist Soviet Union was at helm in the eastern part of Germany and they created their puppet state, German Democratic Republic (GDR) there. Logically, the reunification question was raised, especially by the Western powers. Nevertheless, during the first fifteen years after the capitulation of the Axis, the circumstances and the ongoing global Cold War along with the developments in the divided Germany were not conducive to German unification at all. On one hand, the GDR was following the hard-line communist policy directed from Moscow, which led to immense economic problems and gradual massive migration of the inhabitants. Conversely, the FRG under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer had strong attachments to Western powers, United States in particular. This policy was supposed to lead to German unification, but it failed in this regard. It was precisely Germany and a huge influx of working force to West Germany from East Germany, where one of the major confrontations of the Cold War took place, which is known today as the Second Berlin Crisis. The resulting Berlin Wall, built in 1961, symbolized the "Iron Curtain" and partition not only of Germany, but of the whole world into two opposing blocks for almost three decades. Nevertheless, the Berlin Crisis and the

1 http://www.worldology.com/Europe/world_war_2_effect.htm 7 subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis represented crucial turning points in terms of viewing the German reunification from the side of Western powers, but more importantly, the FRG as well. The dominant Hallstein doctrine, exercised by Konrad Adenauer, came to no avail in this respect. The main defender of the necessity to officially recognize the GDR and to maintain relations with the states from the Eastern bloc was Willy Brandt. In this thesis I am going to deal mainly with his actions as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1966-1969), but mostly Chancellor of Germany (1969-1974). I will analyze his domestic and foreign policy according to the following research questions:  What were the goals of Willy Brandt? To what degree did he fulfil them?  What were the consequences of his policy in terms of the course of the Cold War? To what extent did he make German unification feasible?

This thesis consists of 5 chapters and a lot of subchapters. The first chapter is of theoretical nature that will determine the methodology used in this thesis. The following chapter will depict the development and circumstances in the GDR and the FRG since the end of WWII till the erection of the Berlin Wall. The third chapter will briefly introduce the personality of Willy Brandt and it will point out the most fundamental features and events which had influenced him and his mindset. The following chapter will be the most extensive and at the same time the most important part of this thesis. In it, his politics, particularly regarding Ostpolitik and the individual treaties involved within the Ostpolitik context will be quite thoroughly described and analyzed. His period in the Grand Coalition as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1966-1969) and his Chancellorship years (1969-1974) will be discussed. This analysis emphasizes impact his policy had on the German unification and the course of the Cold War as such. In the last section of the thesis, an effort to answer the research questions is made, followed by relevant conclusions. This thesis utilizes an empirical- analytical approach, which puts emphasis on neutrality towards the studying object. Impartiality and necessity to detachment of the reached knowledge and conclusions are peculiar to this approach2. As far as the used methodology is concerned, since the topic is historical in nature, a historical approach has been selected to conduct a research in a significant

2 Říchová, B. (2006): Přehled moderních politologických teórií, p. 21 8 part of this thesis. The long historical passages and texts, based on the historical evidence, documents and relevant information, are sometimes completed with appropriate political analyses of the given events and their consequences. As a result of the historical background of this topic, the choice of the available and applied literature was quite clear- books, articles with historical focus and primary documents from that period of time. Taking into consideration the fact that the main period of research took place about 40 years ago; there are plenty of documents, books, articles related to this topic. In spite of this fact in the core analysis uses only primary documents, Moskauer Vertrag (Moscow Treaty), Warschauer Vertrag (Warsaw Treaty), Viermächteabkommen (Four-Party Treaty or Quadripartite Agreement), Transitabkommen (Transit Treaty), Grundlagenvertrag (Basic Treaty) and Prager Vertrag (Prag Treaty). Besides that, a lot of other primary documents, such as official declarations and speeches of Brandt, Bahr or the Social Democrats are used. Apart from primary documents, the book Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history written by Weber proved to be very useful for this thesis. This book provides the readers with lively description and trustworthy interpretation of the most significant events in German history from the end of Second World War up to the present. The added value of the book is in my opinion in its parallel composition; it describes the development of both German states side by side, which makes it easier for reader to see things and events in wider context. This book was used mainly for the first chapters of this thesis, since they focused on the internal development of the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany. Another helpful book was Willy Brandt: Die Biographie written by Gregor Schöllgen. It deals with a typical biography; it depicts the life of Willy Brandt from the very beginning till the end quite thoroughly. The large of quotations from this book are included in the part dedicated to formative years of Brandt, which significantly influenced his way of thinking later on. Another German title, written by Willy Brandt himself- Erinnerungen was a very interesting and unique source as well. With hindsight, Brandt is explaining the motives and incentives for his behaviour and is putting also emphasis on his years spent abroad, in exile. The title The Foundations of Ostpolitik written by Julia von Dannenberg accentuates the all the measures that had to be taken "behind the scenes" before signing the Moscow Treaty and its negotiations as well. Henceforth, its application was mainly in the part of this thesis devoted to Moscow Treaty

9 negotiations. The title- Dealing with the devil by Mary Elise Sarotte, was one of the biggest help for the writing of this thesis. Using new archival sources--including previously secret documents of the East German secret police and Communist Party- - Sarotte goes behind the scenes of Cold War Germany while East and West tried negotiation instead of confrontation to settle their differences. In this book, she explores the motives of the German Democratic Republic and its Soviet backers in responding to both the Ostpolitik of West Germany and the foreign policy of the United States under President Nixon. Her analysis is very complex and beneficial for also for this thesis mainly due to setting the Ostpolitik in the much wider context that others books. The role of the United States, Soviet Union and China above all in all the decisionmaking process concerning the German- German and German-Soviet negotiations is described quite in-depth in this book. The modern technologies, including the internet, provided immense amount of scientific articles and portals as well; I used the well-known JSTOR predominantly. The overwhelming majority of the used sources focused rather either only on the Brandtʼs years as the Chancellor or his life as such (except Dealing with the devil). I tried to make this thesis more complex. From my point of view, it was very important to depict the course, which both German states took after 1945 in order to be able to evaluate Brandtʼs policy properly. The youth of Brandt I see a crucial turning point in his further life in politics; therefore I paid attention to this period as well, unlike many books and articles. The core part of this thesis deals not only with Brandtʼs Ostpolitik as such but mainly his role and consequences of his actions in terms of the ongoing Cold War.

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2 The development of the divided Germany in the context of the Cold War after WWII till 1961

Germany, as the loser of the Second World War, was completely devastated after 1945. One could not talk about a single, unified nation, because Germany was divided into two parts on the basis of Yalta conference results in 1945. German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, which was one of the satellite states of the communist Soviet Union and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), or West Germany, which was under the joined control of United States, Great Britain and France, which had their occupation zones there were both established in 1949, but under completely incomparable conditions. These zones were supposed to be only temporary. Therefore, durability was not one of the criteria used in their demarcation. Apparently, a divided Berlin inside the Soviet zone was not an ideal long-term arrangement for either side. However, the realities of post–World War II politics soon hardened the provisional demarcation lines into fortified borders. The division was political and economic as well as geographic. Politically, the three Western zones soon adopted a common democratic constitution called the Basic Law, while the Eastern zone increasingly fell under the authoritarian control of Moscow and its hand-picked German affiliates from the German Communist Party (SED). Moreover, different political vision and affiliation became even stronger after entry of FRG into NATO in 1955 and GDR joining the Warsaw pact in the same year, in other words two archenemies and opposing sides in the course of the Cold War with completely different policies and goals3. In terms of economy, the Western zones benefited from the Marshall Plan4, while the Eastern zone endured Soviet expropriation of its industrial plant and collectivization of its agriculture. Furthermore, the establishment of a separate economy in the Soviet zone, which had previously been closely integrated into a united German economy, required vast investment in heavy industry, to the deficit of consumers.

3 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 17 4 Marshall plan, or European Recovery Program (April 1948-December 1951) was U. S. sponsored program designed to rehabilitate the economies of 17 western and southern European economies so as to create stable conditions in which democratic institution could survive. It was supposed to help Europe to recover, mainly economically, from the consequences of WWII. 11

2.1 Development in the GDR

In the GDR, those politicians brave enough to resist the Communist pressure were soon removed from the office. The unions, the youth organization (Freie Deutsche Jugend), women’s organization and all other so-called mass organizations were turned into extensions of the SED. The ruling party consolidated its grip at the first elections in 1950 taking almost 100% votes by virtue of massive propaganda, ceaseless pressure on the population and terror against political rivals and last but not least, gerrymandering. In other words, the Stalinist system of one-party model was replicated in almost every aspect of the state, economy and society5. This situation was understandably very unfavourable and unpleasant for the population. The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) was forced to deal with a shortage of raw materials, massive emigration and general discontent of the workforce. Nevertheless, the Ulbricht’s and via him Stalin’s grip on GDR was very strong and did not give any leeway for even the slightest change of circumstances. But after the death of Stalin in June 1953 the situation changed. Under the influence of new Soviet leadership, Ulbricht promised that the needs of consumers would be met by reducing the prices of products, goods and services. However, the population called for actions and would not be placated with hollow promises6. As a result of these circumstances, the SED faced a serious revolt of workforce in June 1953 in East Berlin due to their dissatisfaction with the existing conditions. The rebellion spread to several other cities as well. The main demands were free elections, removal of the Ulbricht regime and economic reform. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union intervened to put a quick end to this protest. This interference strengthened considerably the position of the SED and its head Walter Ulbricht in the GDR. He made some concessions to people (reduction of prices), but made thorough purges in SED and enhanced the position of the security apparatus. This event was illustrative both, for Western and Eastern countries as well. Western countries realized that any more voiced expression of discontent within Soviet sphere of influence would be suppressed immediately. On the other hand, politicians of the

5 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 61 6 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 64 12

Eastern bloc became aware of the fact that any minor, insignificant protests could get out of control and gain threatening dimensions7. From 1955, the Soviet Union had officially recognized the sovereignty of the GDR, but it was only a formal step, because GDR remained highly dependent on USSR after that as well. GDR was bound into the Eastern Bloc not only politically, but also militarily (Warsaw pact) and economically (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Although Khrushchev, as Stalin’s successor, was much less rigid in the rigid policy of his predecessor, it did not bring any tangible improvement of the conditions in the GDR. On the contrary, from late 1957, the SED made political persecution even more ruthless so as to root out those not prepared to follow the communist line. Attempts to leave the GDR (Republikflucht), or to help anyone in doing so, were now officially considered and declared to be crimes8. Nevertheless, people were desperate and disillusioned with the prevailing situation. The vision of well-paid jobs and stability in the FRG was simply a sufficient incentive and motivation to risk their lives and leave the totalitarian regime in the GDR. Ulbricht’s undemocratic regime, following the Soviet example, led to substantial emigration to West Germany- it is estimated that approximately 2.6 million inhabitants of GDR fled to FRG or other country of the Western bloc between 1949 and 19619 (see Table 1.).

2.2 Development in the FRG

On the other hand, FRG pursued a completely different path, although its foundation was very problematic and troublesome too. The London Conference between France, Great Britain, United States and the Benelux countries in 1948 and the following London Program in 1949 called for a separate West Germany and currency reform as a tool to reach this goal. The western Allies aimed at combining their zones so that they could be administered as a single economic in order to enable the homogenous currency exchange throughout the western sectors of Germany. However, putting that into practice- implementing a new currency in Berlin

7 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 10 8 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 65 9 http://www.theartofgoodgovernment.org/berlinwall.html 13 on June 23 1949 in combination with financial aid from Marshall Plan to FRG resulted in the first huge crisis during the Cold War period. The next day the Soviets imposed a complete blockade on Berlin. Railways and highways were restricted so that no surface traffic could happen between the western zones and Berlin. The Soviets were able to do this without breaking any international laws; the west and the Soviet Union never made a written pact in view of the right of western ground access to Berlin. But the western powers did not give in so easily. The Americans performed a towering airlift which delivered necessities such as coal and food into the western sectors of Berlin. This airlift lasted for 324 days, and roughly 13,000 tons of supplies were provided daily. In the spring of 1949 it was clear that the objectives Stalin had in mind when ordering the blockade were not going to be met. Therefore, he ended this blockade in May 194910. This first Berlin crisis gave rise to pro-western government in West Germany and its future political orientation. More importantly, it deteriorated the already quite tense relations between the West and East, but mainly between West Germany and the Soviet Union.

2.3 Konrad Adenauerʼs era (1949-1963)

The first Federal Chancellor, seventy three years old Konrad Adenauer (CDU), was definitely not a staunch supporter of the communist ideology and Soviet Union, although he realized that Soviet Union is also an important actor in terms of German reunification, which was his utmost goal. His essential political aims, which he pursued from the first day of his tenure against all resistance, was the removal of all limitation imposed by the occupation, and the transformation of the Federal Republic from a political object defined by the Western powers politics into a full partner with equal rights. This process would bind West Germany firmly to the western world. Nevertheless, he thought that the only chance even to negotiate with Moscow on the German question lay in establishing a position of strength that could stem from a close alliance and amicable relations with the West, the United States in the first place. He was defending this "policy of strength" throughout all his tenure, even after that11. He was very devoted to his goals and contributed hugely to entry of the FRG

10 http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/berlin_blockade.asp 11 Craig, G. (1994): Did Ostpolitik work?, p. 162 14 into the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO. He was also one of the driving forces behind laying the foundations of the European integration in the 1950s12. Adenauer refused to recognize Oder-Neisse line13 as the permanent border between Poland and Germany based on argument that no permanent changes in German border could take place prior to the negotiation of a final all-German peace treaty14. Besides that, Hallstein doctrine became a lynchpin of FRGʼs foreign policy since 1955 onwards. This doctrine stipulates that the Federal Republic asserts the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation. It will not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with states that recognize the German Democratic Republic, with an exception of the USSR15. This doctrine was used "only" three times- Yugoslavia (1957), followed by Cuba (1963) and Arab countries (1965), but it certainly added insult to injury in terms of mutual relations between FRG and GDR, because FRG de facto did not recognize GDRʼs sovereignty. From my point of view, sticking to this policy from the Adenauerʼs side was in contrast with his desired German reunification. Willy Brandt, who had similar goals but used different approaches to achieve them, was aware of that fact .On the contrary, since he was aware of the Soviet Union’s necessary input into German reunification, he secretly put some effort into opening the negotiations with Moscow in order to prevent potential agreements between Moscow and Washington. He was afraid of that happening and by doing so preserving the status quo and making the longed-for reunification inconceivable. However, this Adenauerʼs Ostpolitik of his own led only to further Westernization and confrontation with the East16. Be that as it may, Adenauerʼs policy towards Soviet Union and its block is usually served as some kind of Ostpolitikʼs outline for Brandt. This gradual change in an approach towards East considerably resulted in a change of the international

12 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 46 13 Oder-Neisse line was the border line between Germany and Poland devised by the Allied powers at the end of WWII. It transferred a large territory of German territory to Poland and it was a bone of contention between the FRG and USSR for 15 years. 14 Wolfram, F. (1980): The Foreign Policy of West Germany, France and Britain, p. 54 15 http://bio.bwbs.de/bwbs_biografie/Hallstein_Doctrine_G136.html 16 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 20 15 situation in the 1950s. The Soviet Union became a world power that reached strategic parity with the United States17. Moreover, in May 1955 the four powers – the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France – signed an agreement that re-established Austria's independence. The Kremlin pulled its troops out of Austria, and, of the three countries divided at the end of World War II, Austria became the first to achieve reunification. Thereupon mutual interest in unwinding tensions was also apparent during the first meeting of Eastern and Western leaders in a summit conference at Geneva in 1955, where the famous Eisenhower’s proposal of "Open Skies18" was discussed in the first place together with German reunification19. In spite of the fact that this summit did not bring any tangible results and documents, even the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was thrilled by the Soviet willingness to cooperate and to have good relations with everyone20. Within just a few years a series of reciprocal visits of Soviet and American leaders took place, which is also an undeniable proof that the world situation changed along with slow rapprochement21. Actually, Adenauer did achieve the first agreements with the Soviet Union, the Long- Term Pass Agreement on Trade and Payments and the Agreement on General Questions of Trade and Negotiation in 1958, although their significance was rather minor, but it was a positive sign anyway in my point of view. However, these trade deals were not signed under the conditions the Germans had envisaged. The FRG made the majority of political concessions in these agreements, while the Soviets conceded little, if anything22. As far as the domestic policy was concerned, Adenauer was very successful. At the beginning of Adenauerʼs reign, the economic position was fragile. Substantial unemployment, widening gap between average earnings and those of the rich and rising prices were amongst the crucial problems. Apart from that, shortage of such fundamental things as bread, wheat or sugar, were quite a commonplace as well.

17 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 20 18 After it became clear that no consensus could be made on arms control agreement and German question, President Eisenhower called for the USSR and US to exchange maps indicating the exact location of every military installation. France and Great Britain were enthusiastic about this idea, USSR rejected it plainly and called this an espionage plot. 19 http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-presents-his-open-skies-plan 20 http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24t6.htm 21 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 21 22 Spaulding, R. (1997): Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer, p. 471 16

Ludwig Erhard, the Minister for Economics, managed to liberalize the economic exchange of goods, especially after the Korean War. Exports rose continuously, the construction industry flourished and unemployment halved and by 1955 reached 5.5% for the first time since the war. This "economic miracle" caused almost a full employment rate in 1960 (unemployment 1.2%), which consequently led to looking for employees abroad. "Prosperity for all" was Erhardʼs slogan and really everyone profited from the extraordinary economic boost. That said, it came to me as no surprise whatsoever that taking into account the terrible conditions in GDR, opposing to the flourishing economic circumstances and a lot of job opportunities in FRG, a lot of people (see Table 1.) from East Germany fled to West Germany in order to seek employment. One of the implemented measures, "equalization" in 195223, which meant that more ten million exiles and refugees, as well as others disadvantaged by the war, were compensated, was in my opinion very luring for people from East Germany, because something like that was only a mere hope and illusion.

2.3 Berlin wall and its consequences

One of the crucial points in the course of the whole Cold War between the Western and Eastern bloc came at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. In 1958 Khrushchev wanted to dissolute the four-power status of Berlin. Therefore, he delivered an ultimatum to the Western powers, United States, Great Britain and France in November 1958 to pull their forces out of West Berlin within six months. It was a reaction towards the increasing number of people leaving the GDR for East Germany. However, the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was determined not to give in to Soviet demands. Instead, he opened a foreign minister's conference at Geneva in the summer of 1959 and tried to negotiate a new agreement on Berlin. From my point of view it is very important to note that this focus on solving the status of Berlin and on the demand for German reunification as such was a consequence of change of the abovementioned Western policy, while some origins of the Ostpolitik could be traced back here as well. Western powers realized that they were going to need USSR too in order to solve the German question and it would not be done

23 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 48 17 overnight, but a long-lasting process with little steps was awaiting them. On the other hand, Khrushchev wanted the Western strongholds out of West Berlin as a forerunner for the city reunification, but Eisenhower believed that an ongoing U.S. presence is vital for preservation of the freedom of West Berlin. Although Khrushchev and Eisenhower made some progress toward mutual understanding during talks at Camp David in the United States in 1959, yet relations became tense after the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane in Soviet air space in 1960. In the wake of this incident, there appeared to be little hope for progress in this issue. In the summer of 1961, the new U.S. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna to talk about the Berlin issue, but it did not bring any positive results24. Due to this strained situation and unclear prospects of leaving the GDR in the foreseeable future, tens of thousands left the GDR up to August 1961. This massive exodus of people would have awful consequences for the GDR, so Ulbricht, under the strong pressure from Moscow, resorted to a radical solution- he sealed off East Berlin from West Berlin by beginning the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961. The barbed wire fence was soon expanded to include cement walls and guard towers. The Berlin Wall was supposed to prevent the West from having further impact on the East, stop the flow of migrants out of the communist sector. The Berlin Wall ultimately has became the most apparent and outward symbol of the Cold War in Europe. Its erection meant not only curbing the influence of the West on the East, but it also divided the families in two opposing German states25. To these days, the erection of the Berlin wall and its presence for twenty-eight years is undoubtedly is considered as one of the most tragic moments, basically for all the Germans, regardless whether they were born in the West or East Germany. Nevertheless, in terms of the Cold War, it represented a turning point together with the following Cuban missile crisis a year later, during which the world was on the brink of witnessing a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Face to face with the nuclear escalation threat, the United States made it clear to West Germany that they had in mind to press with improving the relations with the Soviet Union despite the continued division of Germany. However, more crucial from the West German perspective was that its hard-line policy of non-recognition of the GDR

24 http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/BerlinCrises 25 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 67 18 had not worked. Contrary to the logic of the "policy of strength", national reunification was highly unlikely to happen by relying solely on the Western Allies’ agencies, and surely not by putting in for reunification as an essential assumption for any reconciliation with the East. Willy Brandt, then the mayor of West Berlin, was surely one of the proponents of this way of thinking.

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3 Formative years of Willy Brandt

There are three main determinants that we shall investigate and look closer upon in the development of Ostpolitik, before turning to the policy’s later development. The first determinant is Willy Brandt’s own childhood and youth, as well as the early years of his engagement with the left wing of the Social Democratic party, initially as a rising star in the party’s youth movement, and later in exile in Norway to escape and hide from the Nazi regime. These early years were riddled with a string of dramatic events that had a long-lasting and profound effect on the development of Brandt’s Weltanschauung (World view), which on the other hand, his later political opponents made use of it. They used to accentuate his obscure, simple background and revolutionary convictions. The second factor is the political experience of Brandt and his entourage in the 1950’s and 1960’s as Brandt rose to the leadership of the SPD, in spite of the shifting in the Cold War order in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe that took place after Stalin’s death in 1953. The events resulted in a reassessment of the Federal Republic’s eastern policy. Last but not least, we shall consider the gradual transformation that were already under way in German population by the early 1970’s, and which are apparent till these days. I hint mainly at the growing awareness among younger generations of Germans of the far- reaching extent of the Holocaust and the crimes committed in the occupied Soviet Union during World War II. To sum up, all of these factors contributed to a fundamental change in the foreign policy of FRG towards the Soviet Union, driven by a mixture of good intentions, economic interests and Realpolitik26, but having long- term effects and aftermaths that has not always been in accordance with Germany’s best interest27. Willy Brandt, born as Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, was the only child of a single mother who worked as a shop-assistant in the local shop. He had no contact with his biological father and what is more, he had never even met him. This left its mark on Brandt- he felt a lifelong need for love and acceptance, both in his personal life as well in his political career. Considering the conservative German society, his illegitimacy was obviously seen as a handicap, although as his subsequent career

26 Realpolitik- a system of politics based on the actual situation and needs of a country or a political party rather than moral principles. Realpolitik thus suggests a pragmatic view and a disregard for ethical considerations. 27 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 5 20 proves, not that insurmountable at all. Nevertheless, his political opponents never hesitated to point out the issue of his illegitimacy which made him feel like an outsider28. Brandt was born in December 1913 in the northern German city of Lübeck. He was raised by his mother and his grandfather, who had socialist tendencies, which considerably influenced the little Herbert. Soon he became a member of the youth organization Roten Falken (Red Falcon), which was one of the groups of the Socialist working youth. In 1929 he began his prolific journalist career in Volksboten29, a magazine of the working youth in Lübeck. A year later, after finishing his secondary education, he joined the Social Democratic Party for the first time. However, it was only a short-term mission. Brandt was very disappointed with the leadership of SPD, which did not pay enough attention to the rising threat originating from the National Socialists. Brandt and other young Socialists were growing increasingly alarmed of the passivity of the SPD, despite signs of rising Nazism and the growing power of Hitler. Many of them chose to join the Communists, but Brandt decided to join the new party Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei (Socialist Workersʼ Party- SAP) in 1931, pinning his hopes on a third way ability to achieve unity on the left and bring down the Nazis30. However, the results of 1932 elections came as a shock to Brandt. SAP gained a negligible support at the height of 0.2% and Hitlerʼs NSDAP reached 37%- Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. Within a few months the SPD and SAP were smashed, many of its leaders arrested and the party organization driven underground. No matter how much Brandt wanted to fight Hitler and Nazism, he had no choice but to leave the country if he wanted to stay alive. He fled to Norway in April 193431.

3.1 Exile years

Brandt was very gifted at learning foreign languages, which made his stay abroad much easier. He learned English, Spanish and French at school. Moreover,

28 Brandt, W. (1989): Erinnerungen, p.24 29 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 11 30 Brandt, W. (1989): Erinnerungen, p. 94 31 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 14 21 he did not have difficulties with Swedish, Danish or Dutch language. Therefore he became fluent in Norwegian quite easily and in a short period of time32. He soon joined the Norwegian SAP and in the 1930s he travelled in order to participate in underground operations to places like Prague, Paris and even to Berlin, under a different name. Apart from that, he was working for the local magazine and later became a full-fledged journalist as his main profession. However, he published under his pseudonym, Willy Brandt, a name he kept for the rest of his life. Due to his political convictions, which were in stark contrast with the Nazi ideology in Germany he was forced not only to change his name, but he was also dispossessed of his German citizenship by the Nazi regime. Therefore, he accepted a Norwegian citizenship in 193833. His presence in the Spanish Civil War, where he served among Republic forces, had a huge impact on his future attitudes. He witnessed the Communist suicidal insistence on keeping the control of the government and their abomination towards other left parties. The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939 removed whatever remaining illusions Brandt might have had about Stalin’s Soviet Union and communism as such. At the same time, however, Brandt himself was deviating from his more radical earlier beliefs toward a more pragmatic, reformist socialism, influenced predominantly by his experiences and contact with Norwegian Social Democracy34. He became the fervent proponent of social democracy as the combination of reformism and revolution. Unlike the typical leftists, he was never interested in the revolutionary theory. He put more emphasis on the simple things such as eating or drinking, which were according to him the preferable items for ordinary citizens. Consequently, in spite of his deep dislike of the Communists, Brandt never abandoned hope that they would recognize their fault and mend their ways. When it became clear to Brandt and his advisors that Stalinism was a thing of the past, and that a more pragmatic (though still brutal and authoritarian) brand of Communism was in power, they convinced themselves that it was possible to deal with the Soviets

32 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 16 33 Merseburger, P. (2002): Willy Brandt. Visionär und Realist, p. 172 34 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 6 22 and their people in the Eastern Europe35. This, although contradictory way of thinking, explains a lot of actions of Brandt, as will be described below. World War II and especially the German invasion of Norway, which started on 9 April 1940 affected Brandt’s life tremendously. Taking into consideration that escape is not feasible, he followed the advice of a friend and put on a Norwegian military uniform. Thus he surrendered himself as a prisoner of war. Brandt thought he would get away with it. Although his plan worked out and he was set free after a couple of weeks, this step had much long-lasting impact than he had thought at that time. Not only his political opponents, but also a lot of ordinary people perceived this as a huge treason and the reproaches concerning this act accompanied him throughout his entire political career36. After being released from prison, Brandt found exile in Sweden, where he continued to take part in the Norwegian resistance against the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germans. This activity did not escape the attention of the public and he was criticized for this in his campaigns during the 1960s. The atrocities caused by Hitler and his regime and which were being gradually revealed horrified Brandt. German guilt and the desire for redemption became one of the keynotes of Brandt’s chancellorship37.

3.2 Return home

After the end of World War II, Brandt came back to Germany; he initially started working as a correspondent of the Scandinavian newspapers. Later he became the media attaché of the Norwegian war mission. The German citizenship was given back to him only in 1947 and in the same year he joined the SPD for the second time, however with different attitudes and visions this time and his official political career started38. Brandt moved to Berlin at the beginning of 1948, because he gave preference to become the deputy of the SPDʼs presidium over the Bundestag mandate in Schleswig-Holstein. The first months in his new office in Berlin had profound influence not only on his approaches towards Western powers and the Soviet Union

35 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 6 36 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 27 37 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 7 38 Müller, H. (1999): Dějiny Německa, p. 395 23

(due to the First Berlin Crisis), but also towards his own party and political rivals in Berlin. Franz Neumann was at the head of Berlinʼs SPD, who later became the long- standing rival of Brandt. On the other hand, Kurt Schumacher served as the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany since 1946. Schumacher was a fervent opponent of both far-left communism and Nazism. As a result of tensions and discrepancies between Schumacher and Neumann problems and difficulties occurred within Brandtʼs own party39. Brandt tried to solve the apparent differences between him and Neumann via writing. He became very active as a journalist after his return to Germany. Firstly, he started writing just for a Scandinavian newspaper but in 1950 he became the editor in chief of Berliner Stadtblatt. In spite of the fact that Berliner Stadtblatt went bankruptcy only one year later, Brandt managed to publish approximately 300 articles in 195040. Nevertheless, Brandt became active in local politics in the first place. In December 1950 he was elected as the member of the Berlin parliament. Since he took office, the differences between him and Neumann became even more visible and a fight for the SPD leadership in Berlin broke out. The elections in 1952 brought a convincing win for Neumann (193 votes against 96 votes) while Brandt suffered a humiliating defeat. The same happened two years later, although this time with a smaller gap of only two votes41. The threshold between 1940s and 1950s meant a great disappointment for the Social Democrats. They lost more than one-fourth of its members. SPD won the elections in 1949 with 2.2%, but was not able to form a coalition. Their coalition potential was very low, mainly because they dwelled too much on the objectives of the left labour party. Another urgent problem was the divergence of opinions within the SPD itself. Willy Brandt was one of the members of the SPD, who voiced his disagreement with the official policy of the SPD. Many Social Democrats did not approve the Adenauerʼs policy at that time. They claimed that creation a close relationship with the archenemy –France and GDRʼs gradual entrance into NATO and Western European Union would only lead to loss of a certain extent of national sovereignty and more importantly, it would throw the possibility of German unification off its track for a while. On the other hand, Brandt was aware of the fact that Western

39 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 36 40 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 37 41 Ibid. 24 involvement in the German unification was vital but it will cost something. And in this case he had in mind integration within the Western organizations, de facto he agreed with Adenauerʼs vision in this regard42.

3.3 The mayor of West Berlin

The major breakthrough in his political career came in 1957, but one has to admit that it was not only due to his merits. In August 1957, Otto Suhr, the second successor of the very famous Berlinʼs mayor Ernst Reuter died and this sad event paved the way for Brandt. He became the mayor of West Berlin on 3 October 1957. This huge achievement logically resulted in the change at the head of Berlinʼs SPD as well. In January 1958 Brandt defeated Neumann with a comfortable majority of 163 against 124 votes43. Moreover, the whole situation in the SPD changed. The head of SPD, Kurt Schumacher died in 1952 with Erich Ollenhauer becoming his successor, who was more in accordance with Brandtʼs approach towards Western countries. This change in way of thinking resulted in the support of SPD deputies in Bundestag in 1957 as far as the EUROATOM and ECSC treaties were concerned44. As a rising star of the SPD, which was the main opposition party in the 1950s, Brandt was turning into a figure, which was highly appreciated even by the ruling Christian Democrats. His relationship with Konrad Adenauer, as the chairman of the main opposing party, CDU, was of particular interest. Although there was an undeniable rivalry between them, it is clear from Brandt’s memoirs that he held Adenauer in high esteem and considered him a first-rate politician. On the contrary, Adenauer, on the other hand, always kept in mind that he was dealing with a political contestant, referring to Brandt in the 1961 elections as “Brandt, né Frahm” for example45. As had been already mentioned above, the Second Berlin Crisis was followed by the erection of Berlin Wall (13 August 1961). This was an event, during which the name Willy Brandt attracted attention of politicians and media all around the world. He strongly opposed the ultimatum given by Khrushchev in 1958. As he wrote in his memoirs, he learned a tough but important lesson on the day the Berlin Wall was

42 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 37 43 Ibid. 44 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 42 45 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 7 25 built, not only about his neighbours to the East but also about his allies to the West. He saw that absolute dependence on cooperation with the West alone would not settle the issues of the German division. Brandt was almost as offended by the U.S. and other Western Allies for not doing anything to stop the Berlin Wall as he was by the Soviets and East Germans for its construction. In an annoyed letter to Kennedy on August 16, Brandt spoke of a “crisis of confidence” among West Berliners and “pointed out that Western Powers were in the process of being ousted from areas of joint responsibility in Berlin46". Brandt was so infuriated that he even went so far as to call the United States leaders “shitheads47”. He felt that the United States should have responded much sooner, and in not doing so, the US leaders had disrespected one of their closest allies in the West Berlin. The Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Wall convinced Brandt and his advisors that the existing Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic was a dead end and that a very careful and extensive re-evaluation was necessary, not least owing to the fact that ordinary families and friends found themselves on opposite sides of the Wall. Brandt felt that he was compelled to find new means to deal with what was clearly going to be a prolonged division. Based on the previous examples of the Soviet responses to revolutionary movements in Hungary in 1956 and East Germany in 1953, he rightly claimed that those policies should not be so provocative, exactly in order not to give any incentive or impulse which would in turn stir Soviet intervention48. Already during his tenure as mayor of the West Berlin Brandt was very active in visiting the Western countries and by doing so he created necessary preconditions for his further measures. For example, in 1959, he visited the US President Eisenhower, French President de Gaulle, United Nations General Secretary Hammarskjöld and many others to discuss the prevailing problems and his solutions for them49. In the meantime, a crucial change occurred in the leadership of the Social Democrats. It was mainly Willy Brandt but also his main rival Herbert Wehner and many others who called for a thoroughgoing reform and modernization in the programme of SPD platform. They met their goal and a new programme was adopted

46 Brandt,W. (1961): Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State 47 Lippert, W. (2011) : The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma, p. 4 48 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.11 49 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 43 26 in 1959 in Bad Godesberg by an overwhelming majority (324 votes for and 16 against)50. This programme made SPD much more accessible for a wider spectrum of potential voters, since it contained a renunciation of the fundamental Marxist ideas and dropped its hostility towards capitalism. Moreover, it called for reinforcement of regional security systems which were essential for easing of the tension (Entspannung) in the world. This new programme of the SPD also suggested full- fledged membership of a united Germany in these organizations51. As far as the approach towards East Germany was concerned, Brandt claimed that strictly keeping to the Hallstein doctrine by which the FRG did not recognize the GDR and countries in the Eastern bloc was out-of-date and something needed to be done. He based his views on the interwar period, Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 and the policy of Gustav Stresemann in the 1920s. Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Soviet Union was of vital significance, because the two pariah states which stood at the different sides during WWI were brought together and this treaty also provided important military and business links between these two states. Secondly, Gustav Stresemann, who served as Foreign Minister during Weimar Republic (1923-1929) and also as its Chancellor, but only of a very short period (102 days), who contributed immensely to German-French reconciliation despite many hindrances. As will be shown below, these traits were to considerable degree reflected in the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt52. He also called for the development of what he called an "open door policy", which was supposed to lead to a certain "degree of normalisation" in Berlin and eventually also between the two Germanies, since the swift unfolding of the German problem was being unimaginable. During his 25 November 1960 speech to the SPD party conference in Hannover, Brandt referred explicitly to the urgency of fixing the status quo so as to "acquire the freedom of manoeuvre indispensable for any political move beyond the status quo". In the same speech Brandt depicted the communist system as already lacking dynamism and having an ideology which had lost any power of allurement and captivation. Brandt ended his speech with this interesting statement: "We have all the means to carry out a self-confident Ostpolitik53". Apparently, even before the pinnacle of the Berlin crisis, Brandt had thus started to

50 Ibid. 43 51 SPD (1959): Godesberger Programm, p. 19 52 Brandt, W. (1989): Erinnerungen, p. 178 53 Brandt, W. (1960): Politik für Deutschland, p. 6 27 develop the thoughts and concepts which would underpin his thinking throughout the 191960s54. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Brandt was hardly the only person, who believed that a new vision of the Federal Republic’s relations with its eastern neighbours was necessary. He was supported by his inner circle of advisers; Heinrich Albertz, Klaus Schütz, but predominantly his press secretary Egor Bahr55. Since being a journalist, Bahr was aware of the necessity for a sustained campaign in order to sell the conception of Ostpolitik to the public. He was also convinced that non- recognition of the regime in the GDR under Adenauer had solely granted the East German government an opportunity to cement its position56. While it seemed that Brandtʼs position within his own party was stable and unshakeable, the Hannover gathering of the Social Democrats in November 1960 proved otherwise. He, unlike the majority of SPD deputies, voted for the nuclear armament of Germany57. This represented a very sensitive issue and resulted in Brandt taking the 22nd place in the election to the executive58.This was not because Brandt was a big fan of atomic weapons (quite the opposite as will be shown in this thesis) but he was fully aware of what was going on in the world in this aspect. The Cuban missile crisis and the fact that 143 nuclear tests had been conducted by 196259 proved his point of the importance of being "ready" for a nuclear conflict. For Brandt and his advisers, the erection of the Berlin Wall was a huge wake- up call in view of their foreign policy. Physically experiencing the division of Berlin, they strived to improve the living conditions in the divided Germany and divided Europe in the first place. They became conscious of the fact that Adenauer’s hard- line policy of non-recognition and pressure had not worked. Instead, a door had been slammed right in their faces. The Wall went up. Brandt and Bahr realized that if they wanted to change anything on the other side and help their compatriots, they had to take matters into their own hands- “instead of relying solely on others to speak for us60.” They needed to change the nature of West German policy toward the East, probably without U.S. support. Thereupon, against the background of Kennedy’s

54 Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, p. 68 55 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 23 56 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 9 57 Brandt, W. (1960): Politik für Deutschland, p. 6 58 Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, p. 47 59 Ibid. 60 Brandt, W. (1978): People and Politics: The years 1960-1975, p. 168 28

"strategy of peace", proclaimed during his famous visit of Berlin in June 1963, which called for humanity and human actions61. At the same time Brandt and his team developed what they would call a "policy of small steps". For more than two years they made an attempt through unconventional channels to restore at least some basic human contact between the two divided parts of Germany. Brandt strove for humanitarian aid and pragmatic East–West relations within the boundaries, not only of the divided city but also of the country and continent. As mayor and leader of the Social Democrats who were part of a Social–Liberal coalition in West Berlin, the centre of divided Europe, he suddenly found himself acting on the world stage, discussing very important matters with such highly estimated and regarded politicians as John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and the French President Charles de Gaulle62. French and American Presidents especially encouraged Brandt to explore the alternatives of dialogue and negotiation with the

Eastern bloc63. Brandt was in the spotlight mainly during his speech at Harvard University in October 1962, where he expressed the bold announcement that he does not fear communism. He based his argument on the development of China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Poland at the beginning of the 1960s, where the deviation from the official Soviet line was more than apparent. Basically, it was the first time, when he presented his ideas on the new international context and its implications for the German question in a systematic manner64. In my opinion, with hindsight we can say that as one of the few at that time, he rightly assessed that Eastern bloc is not as united and coherent as it may have seemed at the first sight. The first tangible proof and step of this new policy was issuing special passes to enable West Berliners to visit East Berlin at least during certain holidays. The first of these passes was Pass-Agreement (Passierschein Abkommen)65, which went into force for the Christmas holidays in 1963 and represented the first trans-Wall traffic since its construction. This initiative met its goals and it also fell on fertile ground in

61 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx 62 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 23 63 Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, p. 72 64 Brandt. W. (1963): Koexistenz- Zwang zum Wagnis 65 For more information see: http://www.1000dokumente.de/pdf/dok_0244_pas_de.pdf 29

GDR, where Ulbricht himself set up a state secretariat to deal only with this particular issue66. The success of this agreement emboldened them in their determination and faith that such contacts could generate real-, or at least meagre results. They also realized that playing an active role in tackling the relations with the GDR was in the self-interest of the West Germans, because the construction of the Wall proved their allies would not necessarily act on their behalf and for their sake. Out of this realization emerged the July 1963 speech of Egon Bahr in Tutzing. This raised him to the political spotlight. Bahr put forward a revolutionary goal: "overcoming the status quo, by first not changing the status quo67". He saw no real possibility of overthrowing the regime of East Germany in the foreseeable future. Therefore, East Germany would have to be considered as a reality without legal recognition. The preconditions for reunification were to be made only via agreements with Moscow. This is a policy which could be summed up in the formula: "change through rapprochement" ("Wandel durch Annäherung"). This represented the essence of Brandtʼs Ostpolitik68. Bahr, unlike Brandt, had no scruples about talking and openly challenging the taboos of German problems. He believed that it was futile to hope that the GDR would segregate from the Soviet empire or collapse imminently. From his point of view, the only strategy which could deliver tangible results was one based upon improving the living conditions of the East German population – and doing so in "homeopathic dosages" so as not to change the situation too quickly as this could provoke a violent reaction from the Soviets69. These new perspectives were surely welcomed in East Berlin, but the Christian Democrat government in Bonn criticized this new approach and many members of CDU, mainly conservative ones, were opposed to any endeavours to build relations with the Warsaw Pact states because of the probability that this might deepen the division of the German nation. Though, there was a group of CDU members, who believed that the "policy of strength" needed to be revised. These pro- reform tendencies were much more visible in the camp of FDP, CDUʼs coalition partner70. As one can see, the beginning of the 1960s was crucial for the further

66 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.11 67 Bahr, E. (1963): Wandel durch Annäherung, p. 3 68 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.12 69 Bahr, E. (1963): Wandel durch Annäherung, p. 8 70 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 24 30 development of GDRʼs approach towards East Germany and the Eastern bloc as such. The elections of 1963 put an end to Konrad Adenauerʼs era and his visions and attitudes in the foreign policy of FRG. As a result Ludwig Erhard, the former Adenauerʼs Minister of Finance, became the Chancellor and Gerhard Schröder became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new government was more attuned to Brandtʼs political perceptions, although one has to take into consideration that the foreign policy of FRG under Erhard and Schröder towards East Europe was highly influenced by the contemporary international climate. After the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and USSR agreed on a policy of détente and arms limitation. The recognition of the status quo in Europe, which consequently included Germany, served as a prerequisite for this policy. Therefore, significance of the German question which had been the focal point of world politics for a long time already, diminished considerably. Erhard tried to convince the American President Johnson to put the reunification of Germany on the international agenda, but he met with plain denial and warning that West Germany should follow the American policy of détente. It was a clear sign that no policy initiative for West Germany would be feasible without acknowledging the interests of the GDR71. Consequently, the Bonn government succeeded in launching several initiatives in the Eastern bloc. In 1963–4, Schroder reached agreements with all governments of the Soviet bloc, with the exceptions of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to establish trade missions as a substitution for full diplomatic relations. He continued in his efforts in March 1966, when he sent so called "Peace Notes" to all the states with which it had diplomatic relations and to the entirety of the Eastern Bloc except for the GDR. In the note, the Bonn government declared its intention to be "an equitable European order on the basis of peaceful agreements72". In other words, it proposed, for the first time, agreements limiting and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union and other East European states.73 Nevertheless, the Eastern bloc countries plainly rejected these proposals. In my opinion, this initiative was doomed to fail from its very beginning as it attempted to

71 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 67 72 Bundesregierung (1966): Friedensnote 73 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 25 31 bypass both Moscow and East Germany by communicating directly with the Eastern bloc. In the meantime, by the mid 1960’s, Brandt was beginning to hold increased political power within the Federal Republic despite being the "only" Mayor of Western Berlin. Consequently in 1964 he became the leader of the Social Democrats. Brandt began to publicly point out that the FRG ought to take action that would not only recognize East Germany as a legitimate entity, but also begin normalizing ties between the East and the West. Moreover, Brandt started to look toward Eastern trade negotiations. In September of 1964, he wrote a paper in regard to the relations of Western states with the states of Eastern Europe, within which he supported including the Eastern European states in the “largest volume of communications possible”, saying that Western policy toward the East should lie the in economic and cultural sphere74. In 1965 he Brandt ran against Erhard in the campaign for the Chancellorship but lost this time75. Schröderʼs foreign policy, "policy of movement" as it used to be called, had couple of problems and it was also contradictory in a way. First of all, it was primarily addressed at the East European states, which it treated them as sovereign partners, but it continued to isolate the GDR simultaneously. Furthermore, Erhard was strictly against any contacts between the two parts of Germany until the end of his chancellorship. Secondly, the seemingly conciliatory "Peace Note" was full of the kinds of qualifications that were bound to alienate even those to whom it was addressed. Apart from not even including East Germany, it insisted on German national rights, and even repeated the old assertion that in "international law Germany continues to exist in the frontiers of 31 December 1937, so long as a freely elected all-German government does not recognize other frontiers". These conditions were simply unacceptable not only to the Soviet Union, but also to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR76. Consequently, "policy of movement" did not bring to fruition in terms of selective normalization of relations. Henceforth, its international acceptance and acclaim was unsatisfying and it did not stir much commotion. Furthermore, FRGʼs

74 Letter from the Deputy Chief of Mission in Berlin (Calhoun) to Secretary of State Rusk; 4 September 1964; The Brandt Paper was an attachment of this communication between Calhoun and Rusk; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, Document 67. 75 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 49 76 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 26 32 foreign policy at that time was perceived negatively also in the West due to its insufficient orientation towards pro-détente policy77. All in all, the result was that Erhardʼs policy on the German question ran into a dead end. But also in other fields of Federal foreign policy the attempt to isolate the GDR turned out to be counterproductive, because West Germany found itself under the imminent threat of becoming politically isolated and could be placed under economic or political pressure. The development in the Near East was a shining example of these tendencies. In spite of the fact that FRG was putting substantial amounts of money into economic assistance to Arab countries, GDR gained support there, especially from Egypt. GDR exploited the hesitation of FRGʼs positioning between Israel and Arab countries. FRG set in motion establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel in August 1965, which was, however, met with rapid deterioration and loss of influence in the Arab countries, Egypt as the main enemy of Israel in the first place. Erhard was criticized for this turn of events not only by members of his coalition partners but by his own party as well78.

3.4 Grand Coalition (1966-1969) and Willy Brandt as the Minister of Foreign Affairs

The federal elections of 1965 caused another disappointment for Brandt. Although his SPD gained approximately 40%79, which was the best result of Social Democrats since 1945 (Table 2.), the ruling CDU did well in the elections too and formed a coalition with FPD and Erhard was re-elected as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, relations with the FDP had deteriorated. Moreover, the economic conjecture, which had lasted for couple of years and was attributed mainly to Erhardʼs policies as Minister for Finance under Adenauer, stopped and people used to increasing wages and almost full employment put it down to Erhardʼs policy and were dissatisfied with the current situation. Private and public investment was diminishing. The miners were the ones, who had to pay the highest price for the ongoing crisis. At that time, coal was not the most important source of energy

77 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 26 78 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 67 79 http://electionresources.org/de/bundestag.php?election=1965 33 anymore. Relatively cheap oil from the Arab states had just become prevalent in the energy sector. As a result of that, miners took to the street to protest80. A recession and a budget crisis caused the FDP to drop out of the coalition. Erhard ruled with a minority government but only for a short time. There was a huge pressure inside the CDU towards Ludwig Erhard to resign and at the behest of his own party. He relinquished the post of Chancellor in November 196681. After Erhard’s resignation, the Grand Coalition government, formed by the two largest rival political parties: the CDU/CSU (7 ministers) and SPD (9 ministers). The government consisted of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU), who had served as minister president of Baden-Württemberg as Chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor at the same time. The composition of the new government represented reconciliation with the German past. Firstly, Kiesinger had been a member of the Hitlerʼs NSDAP and had worked for the Nazi propaganda radio under Ribbentrop. Herbert Wehner (SPD) was the main architect of this coalition, who had been a leading officer of the German Communist Party during the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) when he was cooperating closely with Walter Ulbricht. However, towards the end of WWII he left the Communist ranks and gradually transformed into a Social Democrat. The attainment of Willy Brandt is described quite thoroughly above. To sum it up, there was a very heterogeneous group of people from contrasting political backgrounds and visions which was supposed to serve as a "temporary alliance" for crisis management82. Considering the incoherent configuration of the new cabinet and taking into account that in 1966 West Germany was dealing with unprecedented economic problems- high unemployment, high budget deficit and unexpected rise in the support of right-wing groups, the prospects were not encouraging and the new government had to deal with a number of issues not only in the domestic policy but in the foreign policy as well83. In view of the domestic policy, the Grand Coalition proved to be very successful. In a short period of time, the government brought order into state finances, gave incentives to economic activities via a series of investments. Accordingly, unemployment was gradually decreasing. In 1968, GNP grew by 7.1%,

80 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 76 81 http://countrystudies.us/germany/53.htm 82 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 77 83 http://countrystudies.us/germany/53.htm 34 unemployment decreased by 1.5% and wages grew by 6.2%84. The economic problems were over but problems in the foreign policy were much more complicated and turned out to be a stumbling block for the coalition. However, a comprehensive reassessment of the foreign policy, especially in towards the Eastern bloc, was desperately needed. The government declaration made by Chancellor Kiesinger on 13 December 1966 determined the primary approach of the Grand Coalition towards the East German question. It did not start by stressing the right to reunification and denouncing East Berlin for preventing it. Contrastingly, its main keynote was peace and détente; it outlined the vision of a European peace order85 (europäische Friedensordnung) as the precondition for an eventual reunification of Germany. It reiterated the "Peace Note" offer of renunciation-of-force agreements, but this time with giving priority to this offer to the Soviet Union in the first place86. It also advocated for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Germany’s Eastern neighbours, thereby eroding the Hallstein Doctrine. It further abandoned any attempt to isolate East Germany, and called for a regulated coexistence ("geregeltes Nebeneinander")87. It surely meant a substantial shift from the previous viewpoints as far as the relations with the Eastern bloc was concerned; however, the German Democratic Republic was still omitted in this declaration. By way of explanation it still insisted on non-recognition of the GDR because the claim of sole representation was not abandoned. Be that as it may, it undoubtedly gave birth to a new course of Ostpolitik: willingness to search for a modus vivendi with East Germany and thereby show an unfeigned and sincere commitment to work on détente as the best means towards eventual reunification. In summary, being aware of the urgent need to readjust Bonn’s established stances to the advancing superpower détente, the new government had substituted the former strategy, maintained since 1949, of "détente through reunification" by that of "reunification through détente". A restoration of Germany’s unity was no longer a prerequisite for détente, but became a goal to be achieved through peace policy. Kiesinger considered a reunified Germany as hardly

84 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 78 85 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 27 86 Bundesregierung (1966): Friedensnote der Bundesregierung 87 Kiesinger, K.G. (1966): Regierungserklärung der Großen Koalition, p. 12 35 attainable in the present political structure of Europe; therefore the unification was set in the context of a "general European peace order"88. Bonn’s determination to normalize its relations with the governments of Eastern Europe was welcomed by the Western powers. They saw it as a breakthrough in the policies of détente. In NATO’s Harmel report89, the Western powers adopted the resolution to make more active steps towards détente and the European peace order in which the division of Germany would also be overcome. It further stated that the two main tasks for the Alliance would be to preserve military strength for the sake of deterring the aggression and looking for solutions to underlying political problems so as to build a more stable international relationship. It short, it represented a broadening of the Alliance’s approach to security. The Harmel report created a framework which provided legitimacy for German Ostpolitik in the eyes of the Allies90. The Harmel report and its recommendations stipulating that NATO should have the double objective- détente and security in Europe, was in full accordance with Brandtʼs visions and his way of thinking. The main distinctive feature of the Brandtʼs foreign policy was a multilateral approach and he put special emphasis on nuclear arms control and limitation. Approximately six months after the publication of Harmel Report, came another positive step from the Atlantic Alliance. Foreign Ministers of NATO met in Reykjavik and issued the so-called "Reykjavík signal" to initiate talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)91. This turn of events also played in the cards of Brandt and everything seemed to be going exactly as he had planned and wanted. However, problems with East Germany were apparent and prospects for an agreement on Bonn’s terms between the two Germanies grew ever smaller. FRG tried to establish diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries within the abovementioned strategy of the new government. The first palpable result came at the beginning of 1967, when they succeeded in creating diplomatic relations with Romania. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was afraid of the domino effect and was willing to do anything in its power to prevent such scenario in case of Hungary,

88 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 28 89 Harmel report- very important document of NATO published in 1967, which outlined the future tasks of the Alliance, with emphasis on East-West relations and security policy. The Allies had agreed that NATO rested on two pillars: military security and a policy of détente. 90 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 28 91 Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, p. 72 36

Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria which wanted to follow the suit as well. Moscow reacted with a statement that the normalization of relations between the East Bloc and FRG could proceed only after the recognition of the GDR and Oder-Neisse border by Bonn92. The reaction of the GDR was similar and Ulbricht was eager to block the new West German offensive, labelling it Bonn’s old "revisionist’ policy" which aims to isolate the GDR. Ulbricht was soon supported by his Polish and Soviet colleagues and at a Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1967, the Warsaw Pact states obtained a pledge from all the others to adhere to a "reverse Hallstein Doctrine". Putting it simply, the states agreed not to enter into diplomatic relations, or even any correspondence, with the FRD before it fully recognizes the Oder–Neisse line, the statehood of the GDR, and West Berlin as an autonomous political unit93. These unfavourable reactions caused a crucial setback in the promising development because Kiesinger was not eager to talk about recognition of the GDR. His intentions were purely practical: better co-existence of the two Germanies and deeper economic cooperation. This became a bone of contention and caused the first tensions within the governing coalition. Kiesingerʼs attitude was unshakeable and he was not willing to compromise at all, whereas SPD and mainly Willy Brandt realized that the essence of even slight improvement in intra-German relations is taking place in Moscow. Thereupon, the leadership of SPD was prepared to go much further in their policy regarding East Germany and the German question than Kiesinger was94. This represented a major obstacle in further development. Since the formation of the Grand Coalition at the end of 1966, Brandt began to push for a process of dialogue and negotiation with all the countries of Eastern Europe, including the GDR. GDR would not be fully recognised as a state even though Brandt and the majority of the SPD favoured its de facto acceptance since this alone would pave the way towards negotiated agreements. Nevertheless, the objective was not only in contrast with positions adopted by Moscow and East Berlin but it also inflamed some of the divisions which already existed within the ruling coalition in Bonn, as has been described above. The dissenting attitudes between CDU and SPD on this matter

92 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 82 93 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 28 94 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 82 37 were suddenly revealed for the first time in May 1967. This was over an issue related to Soviet policy, namely the letter Kiesinger had received from Willi Stoph, chairman of the East German Council of Ministers. Stoph proposed to normalize relations between the two German states as the first step to resolve the conflict in Europe. Although the Social Democrats proposed to respond by sending a letter, Kiesinger and many other members of the CDU opposed this idea. Despite his disapproval, Kiesinger eventually gave in and send off a letter of reply but he did not used the term "GDR" in this letter as had been suggested by Brandt95. Taking that into consideration, it is hardly surprising that negotiations reached a stalemate at that point. Moreover, the CDU was angered by Brandt’s and Bahr’s repeated references to East Germany, for example as a "territory with a different order" as "the GDR" with which Bonn was ready "to live in peaceful coexistence"⁹ and which Bonn had to recognize gradually, and as one of the "two political orders which exist on German soil96". Last but definitely not least, In November 1967, views on the renunciation-of- force issue clashed openly for the first time, revealing Kiesinger’s much more sceptical attitude to the issue. Kiesinger rejected talks with Moscow on the basis of the Soviet memorandum delivered to Bonn. In a letter to Brandt, Bahr vehemently protested against the Chancellor’s resolution. He argued that the credibility of Ostpolitik as a whole would be put in question if Bonn stopped the exchange with Moscow. In his eyes, this was a decision the Chancellor could not take without his Foreign Minister. As a result of these discrepancies, Soviet government made an uncompomising declaration in December, which made the progress in this question impossible. Consequently, Brandt changed his strategy and for the rest of his term he pursued much more secretive policy towards the Soviets97. He did a lot of things behind Kiesingerʼs back (see below), which, however, did not increase the mutual faith and confidence in each other. The problems reached even that dimensions that the irritation and dissatisfaction that Willy Brandt felt as a part of the Grand Coalition gave him strong impetus to rethink his role as Vice Chancellor. Brandt was said to be on the verge of resigning from office in 1968 when Chancellor Kiesinger invoked the Hallstein

95 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 75 96 BAK,N1371, 361 and 357, 1: Brandt to the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, 2–3 July 1967 97 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 80 38

Doctrine to cut off diplomatic relations with Cambodia. However, Brandt was aware that with the Chancellery election upcoming, abdication would be disastrous for his own chances at election, and the prospect of bringing real change to West Germany. This sparked his determination to pursue his own style of détente outside the Grand Coalition98. Consequently, it was necessary to exhaust internal bargaining before the government could agree on the conditions of a dialogue with Moscow or East Berlin. Nevertheless, no decision whatsoever could be reached on the issue whether to sign or not the nuclear non-proliferation treaty99. As far as the role of Willy Brandt within the Grand Coalition was concerned, his competencies were limited despite being the Foreign Minister. The major role in the foreign policy had the Chancellor as is usually the case in Germany. Since the differences between him and Kiesinger were quite obvious, therefore he did not have much choice but to prepare the ground for his future plans. He did so by travelling, which suited his nature very well. Throughout 1968 and 1968 he made 25 visits, excluding visits as the leader of the Social Democrats all around the world to discuss international problems.

During his first year in office Brandt many times stressed the fundamental points of the "Peaceful coexistence in Europe":  European security system has to be based on the current alliances, which pursuant to long-term and graduated process reach agreements among them and by doing so they build up a new system, in which both United States and Soviet Union will be present.  Creation of a political system, in which human, minority, self-determination, individual mobility rights and freedom of information are enforced.  Each state is entitled to determine its cultural, political, economic and social path of development.  Economic and trade bilateral treaties should make a meaningful unit.  Coordination is necessary between the European economic community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)100.

98 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 59 99 Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, p. 72 100 Brandt, W. (1967): Entspannung mit langem Atem, p. 7 39

Moreover, Brandt succeeded in surrounding himself with like-minded people at the Ministry for Foreign affairs despite substantial opposition from the CDU. Having established a grip on the operations of the Foreign Ministry, Brandtʼs team could set about devising a renunciation-of-force policy. With the identification of Moscow as the key to success in any Eastern negotiations, the Foreign Ministry gave top priority to the establishment of closer contacts with the Soviet Union. Moscowʼs reaction implied that Bonn should abstain from force towards the GDR. Consequently, the idea of an additional renunciation-of-force pact with the GDR as a means to gain leverage in the stagnating German– Soviet dialogue was coming into surface in Brandt’s ministry in late summer 1967. In September 1967, the unit for European security questions produced a first report on an intra-German renunciation of force. Another round of encouraging talks between the Soviets and Brandt took place in November 1967, which proved that an agreement with the Soviets was possible. Brandtʼs and Bahrʼs steps gained popularity within the ranks of SPD and by the beginning of 1968 the SPD as a whole had developed a foreign policy platform in which it encouraged the government to initiate negotiations about a legally binding renunciation of force with both Moscow and East Berlin101. The Soviet intervention to crush the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not have much impact upon Brandt’s ideas, although it shook his position in the SPD considerably. A majority of Social Democrats supported his efforts anyway102. No Western government wanted to allow the repression in Czechoslovakia to interrupt the general improvement of East–West relations in Europe What Brandt termed Moscow’s ‘"imperialist action" forced him to have a more realistic position and served as a reminder of how far the continent still was from anything approaching the "European peace order103". This long-term objective remained in force for him. At another level, the Soviet invasion also reinforced the conviction in West Germany that the country’s Atlantic and European links were more necessary than ever in order to maintain the stability and security104. Brandt continued his talks with the Soviets and the tangible result came in form of the Soviet note from September 1969, which Soviets regarded as a basis for bilateral negotiations with the new government.

101 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 123 102 Ibid. 103 Brandt, W. (2005): Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik 1969-1974 , p. 161 104 Calleo, D. (1987): Beyond American hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, p. 48 40

This was then followed by preparations within the Foreign Ministry for the start of renunciation-of-force negotiations between the new government and Moscow105. The Soviet leadership also indicated a preparedness to negotiate with West Germany and with the West as a whole, surprisingly soon after suppression of the revolutionary tendencies in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, Moscow even suggested to Bonn that full recognition of the GDR and the Oder–Neisse line was no longer a precondition for negotiations. However, the Kiesinger government was not able to seize the unique opportunity due to internal conflicts in the government. Discrepancies between the two coalition partners about the further course of Ostpolitik had grown into outspoken confrontation prior to the Bundestag elections in September 1969 with the result that this last period became a time of political paralysis106. To sum up, the general picture of Ostpolitik as pursued by the Grand Coalition government’s is ambivalent from my point of view. On one hand, it introduced certain modifications in its agenda that were without any doubt important: the danger of West Germany’s isolation had been avoided and the first bridges to communist countries had been built. On the contrary, Ostpolitik did not develop far beyond the policies of its predecessors. Nevertheless, this was in my opinion, to considerable extent due to the Soviets’ and the GDR’s reluctance to allow détente to take place. And if they desisted from their conditions, divergences of opinions, which had been apparent from the very beginning of the Grand Coalition, reached its peak and prevented further progress in this issue. As far as I am concerned, owing to these various kinds of reasons, the promising start of the Grand Coalition did not last long and no groundbreaking changes occurred in terms of relations with the East. However, Willy Brandt as the Minister of Foreign Affairs put a lot of effort into establishing relations with the Soviet Union and by doing so he laid crucial foundations for his later activities and policies.

3.5 Summary of the Brandtʼs activities

As far as the main political goals of Brandt - normalization of the relations with the Eastern bloc countries and German reunification, was concerned, Brandt had

105 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 120 106 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 30 41 achieved only minor results till 1969. As for improvement of the relations with the Eastern bloc countries, he started negotiations with the Soviet Union, a large part of them were of secret nature due to disagreements with Chancellor Kiesinger. Considering the relatively short period of Kiesingerʼs government and Brandtʼs limited competencies being Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brandt was able to lay the basic foundations for the Moscow Treaty. Brandt did not start official talks with Poland or Czechoslovakia, but more importantly, he travelled a lot to gain support from various countries all over the world for the politics he was just about to implement once he became the Chancellor. In terms of the German reunification, Brandt achieved even less than in case of the Soviet Union. The reason was simple, stubborn sticking to Hallstein doctrine by the Christian Democrats and Kiesinger in particular, which made the whole rapprochement between two Germanies difficult to execute. Since Brandt did not accomplish much before he became the Chancellor, the impact of his actions for the course of the Cold War was marginal at that point.

42

4 Chancellor years (1969-1974) - peak of Brandtʼs career

A new atmosphere was attributed to the election campaign of 1969. The Liberals (FDP), under the new leader Walter Scheel, promised to come up with a brand new start. The motto of the Social Democrats was similar in a way, namely "we will create the new Germany107". The outcome of the 1969 election (see Table 3) held on the 28th September considerably altered the political landscape in the West Germany. Nevertheless, the electoral mathematics left open the alternative of different coalition compositions. The Social Democrats gained 42.7%, which meant an increase of 3.4%, but the Christian Democrats remained the strongest party in West Germany with 46.1% and they hoped for continuation of the Grand Coalition also after this election. However, Brandt on the basis of the previous experience came to the right conclusion that with CDU in coalition, hardly any progress in terms of reunification and improvement of relations with the Eastern bloc could have been made. Therefore, he came to a quick agreement with Walter Scheel, who was seen as a loser of this election because FDP gained only 5.8% but Scheel became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Together they created a small coalition with only a 12-seat majority108. Unlike Christian Democrats, Liberals found common ground with Brandt, apart from the recognition of Oder-Neisse border was concerned. The SPD and FDP agreed that their Ostpolitik should be closely linked to Westpolitik, should give priority to peacekeeping and consider the German question only in an international context109. Not many people believed in this coalition and they considered it to be only a temporary solution. These doubts and distrust seemed to be justified from the creation of the new government. Only 251 out of 254 combined MPs of the SPD and FDP voted for Brandt to become a Chancellor, which could be seen as a blatant proof of scepticism even among the ranks of the newly constituted government. Furthermore, it was for the first time in the history of the FRG that the Christian Democrats were forced to get accustomed to being on the opposition benches. On the contrary, it was the first time since 1930 that a Social Democrat was the head of the German government. To add insult to injury, it was a person who had been very

107 SPD (1969): Regierungsporgramm, p. 6 108 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 104 109 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 133 43 active in the resistance to the Hitler regime, which was regarded negatively in the national conservative camp and which resulted in frequent defamations against him110. Despite these pessimistic prospects and low faith in the persistence of new government, Brandt manifested vigorously already during his inaugural speech of 28 October 1969 that he is determined to his utmost goal: easing of the current tensions in the relationship between the two parts of Germany111. In this speech, the new chancellor brought to light that he had in mind to distinguish himself from his predecessors by making a serious attempt to negotiate with the East in the interest of preventing further alienation between the two Germanies. He further announced his intentions to negotiate “reunification-of-force agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia” as well as hold formal talks with East Germany in order to cultivate “agreed cooperation”. However, the most controversial line of his government declaration was when Brandt acknowledged and named the two Germanies as separate states, when he said: "Even if there exist in Germany two states, they are not foreign to one another; their relations cannot but have a special character112." Brandt had thus played the card of GDR state recognition at the very outset, while at the same time making clear the limits of his flexibility. In their bilateral relations, the two states could henceforth be seen as equals – thereby opening the way to political contacts and, as far as was possible, to the normalisation of their relations113. This government declaration stirred up a strong criticism among the ranks of the Christian Democrats, although it had been presented as a continuation of the Grand Coalition. Both, the former Chancellor Kiessinger114 and a new high politician of the CDU- Rainer Barzel, expressed a strong dissatisfaction with the thesis of two Germanies in the first place and Brandt had to face a wave of criticism in Bundestag from the very beginning of his tenure. On the other hand, towards the United States, the newly elected Chancellor expressed the changing relationship, he called for more "independent policy", which met with growing fears from the side of United States and Henry Kissinger above all115.

110 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 133 111 Inaugural speech to the Bundestag 28.10.1969 112Inaugural speech to the Bundestag 28.10.1969. 113 Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, p. 76 114 Meissner, B. (1970): Die Deutsche Politik 1961-1970. Kontinuität und Wandel, p. 384-390 115 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 61 44

He also laid stress upon the importance, not only for West Germany but for all the Western allies as well, of discussing with the Soviet Union about the status of Berlin in the first place. A series of tiny but weighty actions helped convey the seriousness of his intentions. Brandt renamed the ‘‘All-German Ministry’’ the ‘‘Ministry for Inner-German Relations.’’ In terms of international context and Brandt as the German Chancellor, his signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty116 (NPT) in 1969 was of way more importance and far-reaching consequences, because by doing so West Germany confirmed to Moscow its renunciation of any claim to nuclear weapon117. West Germany joined the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain who signed the NPT in July 1968118. The conservatives in Germany, headed by the CDU, saw Brandt’s initiatives as a real threat to West Germany’s ties to its Western allies. His recognition of an undemocratic regime in East Germany was seen as morally unjustified. Brandt also wanted to recognize the controversial Oder-Neisse line which his opponents saw as a serious obstacle towards eventual unification. Therefore, the CDU switched political fronts. In the first half of the Cold War the CDU had promoted integration with the West in preference to reunification with the East. At that time, it was the SPD that worried about hindrances to a possible reunification119.

4.1 The international climate at the end of 1960s

The situation in world politics was conducive to the policy of normalization of relations with the East. The Prague crisis illuminated not only the threshold of Warsaw Pact degree of tolerance for divergence but also the widening Sino-Soviet rift. China felt particularly nervous about the Soviet claim, demonstrated incontestably inPrague that the USSR could justifiably intervene in any socialist state where they found socialism to be endangered. The Chinese leadership apparently feared that this definition could be applied to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as well, and this fear played a significant role in the October 1968 decision of PRC defense

116 NPT- is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. It was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. Till these days 189 countries signed this treaty. 117 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 33 118 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.28 119 Ibid. 45 minister Lin Biao to put the PRC on a war footing. This rising Chinese hostility had a profound effect on the German situation, since it made the Soviets more inclined to compromise in Europe. They did so in order to avoid problems on two ‘‘fronts.’’ Sino- Soviet tensions transformated into actual fighting with a border skirmish on the Ussuri river on 2 March 1969. When the information of the alleged nuclear attack on China from the Soviet side leaked, the United States intervened. Thereupon, the American President Richard Nixon took a very bold step by warning the Soviet Union that the United States would not remain idle if it were to attack China. Nonetheless, the border clashes continued till September 1969120. The whole rupture in the communist world had far-reaching consequences. Both, the Soviet Union and China understood that they could not be enemies of the United States and each other at the same time. As a result of that, both Leonid Brezhnev and Mao Zedong pursued much more amicable and friendly policy towards the United States. Détente reached its peak on the verge of 1960s and 1970s. Based also on this experience, Moscow and Washinghton were holding talks over the limitation of strategic arms. Both superpowers were going along the détente direction. The Soviet leadership under Brezhnev pinned their hopes on profiting from such a course and to stabilize the Soviet Unionʼs sphere of influence in Europe. On the other hand, Nixonʼs administration seeked to cut down on Americaʼs overstretch in the world, in Vietnam in the first place, and had redefined the national interest of the country as one of maintaining parity between the super-powers121. Apparently, the developments of policies of the both main actors within the Cold War were in full accordance with Brandtʼs plans. Emphasis on the arms reduction and gradual rapprochement between the United States and USSR served as great preconditions for implementation of his policy.

4.1.1 Richard Nixonʼs administration

Richard Nixon became the President of the United States in January 1969. It turned out to be a problem for Brandtʼs plans, because Nixonʼs views of the FRGʼs foreign policy were more in line with the foreign policy of the previous Grand Coalition. Under the leadership of Kiesinger, the FRG still wished to have better ties

120 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.22 121 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 106 46 with their Eastern counterparts, but fundamentally, they strove to avoid an outbreak of a war. This made the Christian Democrats the component of the Grand Coalition doubtful of any plan that entailed the joining of interests between Moscow and Bonn. Therefore, it is logical that Brandtʼs radical change in terms of Eastern policy deteriorated relations between Washington and Bonn, because the United States was accustomed to treating West Germany as an obedient ally122. Nevertheless, Brandt was fully aware of the necessity of the United States involvement in his plans and upon that, prior to his official inauguration, Willy Brandt sent his emissary, Egon Bahr, to have a conversation with the President Nixon’s Assistant for Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger, in which Bahr wanted to assure Nixon and his administration "in Brandt’s name, of the basic continuity in German policy and of Brandt’s desire to have close relations123”. During that initial meeting, Bahr also “outlined a series of German moves toward the USSR, Poland and East Germany”. Kissinger was hesitant in regard to the true intention of the new West German government and he also expressed doubts whether West Germany is strong enough to be in successful in Ostpolitik without sacrificing their relations with the West to certain extent. Moreover, the United States thought that the more the West Germans were committed and engrossed into negotiations and deals with the East, the more the Federal Republic would be uprooted from the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, Bahr and Kissinger concluded the meeting by deciding that the United States would deal with West Germany as “a partner, not a client"124. Furthermore, Kissinger put forward the question of parity for nuclear arms and an urgency of taking a global approach towards this problem125, which fitted Brandtʼs views more. In spite of the apparent mistrust and suspicions from the Nixon’s administration towards Brandt and Bahr, especially from the side of Kissinger, there was no discussion on that Kissinger and Nixon were thinking along similar lines to those of Bahr and Brandt. Both pairs of leaders, although from parties at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, were going along with betting that they could redefine

122 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 62 123 Ibid. 124 Foreign Relations of the United States (1969-1976): Germany and Berlin, Volume XL 125 Sarotte,M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p.22 47 the conduct of the Cold War by virtue of unparalleled talks with their Communist colleagues126.

4.2 The initial talks with the Eastern bloc countries- First half of the 1970s

First of all, Brandt learned his lesson from the previous Grand Coalition experience, where lack of coordination between him and Kiesinger was a huge problem. Therefore, he created a link between the previously separate Chancellery and Foreign Ministry in the form of a regular exchange127. Furthermore, similarly as had done during his tenure as the Foreign Minister, Brandt double-checked that he surrounded himself with confidants. This time he simply brought his advisers from the Foreign Ministry. Most notably, the key positions were allocated to Bahr as State Secretary and Carl-Werner Sanne, a former assistant to Bahr in the planning section as principal in the department for foreign and intra- German relations128.

4.2.1 German- German talks

Having all the people he believed in around him, Brandt started establishing initial contacts with East Germany, Soviet Union and gradually with other countries of the Eastern bloc as well. As for the German-German talks, face-to face meetings started in the very beginning of 1970. Willy Brandt met with the East German Prime Minister Willy Stoph in March 1970 in Erfurt and in a follow-up meeting in May in Kassel. In spite of the fact that these meetings produced only negligible tangible results and slow progress because the SED leadership insisted on demanding the full recognition of GDR to make headway, these meetings were of tremendous importance for the further implementation of Ostpolitik and course of the Cold War as well129.

126 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 62 127 Sahm, U. (1994): Diplomaten taugen nichts, p. 230 128 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 136 129 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 108 48

It was the first time the heads of government of the two German states were sitting at the same table, which was undoubtedly a very positive sign. Moreover, this meeting was exceptional since it was also the first occasion when the West German Chancellor travelled to East Germany since the start of the Cold War130. Erfurt meeting broke the ice between two German states and brought also fractional agreements in terms of post and connections between the FRG and GDR. Brandt and Stoph were of the same mind as far as building the trunk highways, opening the other border crossings and acceleration of the train connection were concerned131. Furthermore, talks in Erfurt caused not only evident exaltation among the public in the GDR, who cheered and shouted for the West German Chancellor132, but it made a durable impression also in Moscow, Washington and Paris, although, rather negative one. The Soviets were encouraging the GDR to participate in this meeting, but they changed their mind due to course of the meeting. The Soviet Union began to be concerned about the possible rapprochement of the GDR with the Western countries. As for criticism in the United States, they particularly feared that West Germany was being run by experimenting West Berliners. Dean Acheson, very important American statesmen, who played a crucial role in the foreign policy of the United States throughout the Cold War, regarded this initial implementation of Ostpolitik as a ‘‘dangerous and alarming departure from Bonn’s past diplomatic practice of conducting its Eastern policies under American tutelage133." Along with the United States and Soviet Union, France was particularly disturbed by the forthcoming Ostpolitik as well. Paris did want to maintain cooperative the FRG- French relations, which would seem to comprise supporting Bonn’s major foreign policy initiatives. However, the French saw hostility between the two Germanies as some kind of guarantee that German reunification would not come about. As a result, Ostpolitik led to a lot of anger in Paris134. Considering the Kassel meeting, Brandt tried to switch the discussion to more specific aspects of the German-German relations by listing what later became known as the ‘‘Twenty Points,’’ or twenty areas in which the FRG was looking for

130 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 76 131 Federálne ministerstvo zahraničných vecí (1972): Dokumenty k politice obou německých států a k úsilí o normalizaci vztahů v Evropě 1964- 1972, p. 349 132 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 108 133 Hanrieder , W. (1989) : Germany, America, Europe: Forty years of German foreign policy, p. 199 134 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 58 49 congruence. General appeals, such as calls for basing the intra-German relations upon the principle of human rights, to avoid the use of violence, to respect each other’s independence and self-sufficiency, to grant each side a possibility to represent itself diplomatically, to acknowledge that both Germanies belong to one nation and to recognize the authority of the four occupying powers were among them. The points also included more specific goals, such as a desire to solve the problems of families torn apart by the German division or to turn to the issues of people living in border towns. Nevertheless, Brandt did not succeed in convincing Stoph to discuss these issues in a detailed way. Both statesmen agreed on a "pause for reflection"135.

4.2.2 German-Soviet talks

Simultaneously, Egon Bahr, who enjoyed a full confidence of Brandt, tested the water in numerous talks about a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko from the very beginning of 1970. However, since Brandt was very well aware of the significance of economics as an essential part of politics, he started with deepening of the cooperation in the economic field. Therefore, he wanted to base his Ostpolitik strategy on the so-called Osthandel. Being three months in the office, he succeeded in completing the first agreement with the Soviets, gas-line deal, which was both economically and politically significant. The Brandtʼs administration had facilitated negotiations between the Soviets and representatives of the German steel industry136. This extremely quickly arranged agreement met with considerable dosage of apprehension and fear in the United States. First of all, Nixon thought that the Soviet Union could be treated only as an adversary, from which you can only stay away. But even more troubling for him was the fact that Brandt proved his words of more independent policy from the United States, because he reached this agreement without Nixon’s interference, he bypassed him137. Both sides had been waiting for negotiation on the political level. A member of the Soviet embassy in Bonn went to the SPD headquarters on September 15, 1969

135 Brandt, W. (1970): Stenografische Niederschrift über das Gesprach des VdM der DDR, W. Stoph, mit dem Bundeskanzler der BRD 136 Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States-West German Relations, p. 73 137 Lippert, W. (2011) : The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma, p. 74 50 and told a party official that the Soviet government wanted to negotiate on all aspects of the issue of the renunciation of force. Only one week later, Bahr met with his Soviet counterpart in New York, where Gromyko was attending the General Assembly of the UN. Their exchange of views was also in line with these tendencies138. His mandate was to obtain not only a kind of non-aggression accord but also more general Soviet signals that would indicate that serious German- German talks could proceed. Bahr and Brandt had long felt that Moscow’s tolerance would be crucial to success in the German-German negotiations. During Bahr’s first visit in Moscow at the end of January 1970, he immediately addressed what Moscow considered to be a core issue: European borders. Bahr made clear that the FRG under Brandt would be willing to formally recognize all existing borders. But he also expressed an opinion that there could be no mention of full legal recognition for the GDR from the FRG139. This claim was simply inadmissible for the Soviet side therefore this first round of talks was not very successful for Bahr. He continued in these talks despite being harshly criticized from the opposition in Bonn for conducting secret diplomacy that bypassed Bundestag. The second round of talks took place in March 1970 and was accompanied by Soviet fears of the problems with China. Accordingly, the Soviets were more willing to find a common ground with the FRG so as to avoid problems at least in the West. They suggested that the FRG had sought a treaty with the GDR that would have "the same legally binding nature as treaties with other socialist countries". Although the phrase ‘‘same legally binding nature’’ was almost the same to ‘‘legally binding nature’’ in linguistic terms, it was precisely that kind of measure that could help Bahr to build upon in the further talks140.

4.2.3 Berlin status

The third important component of the Brandt’s multilateral policy was dealing with the status of Berlin, which was still divided. However, based upon the abovementioned rather sceptical approaches of the Western powers towards

138 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (AdsD). Parteivorstand 139 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 39 140 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 43 51

Ostpolitik it could be hardly surprising that talks between the Soviets and the three Western allies about Berlin got off to a slow and cheerless start141. The first session of the quadripartite talks began in Berlin on 26 March 1970. In its opening remarks, the United States conveyed it’s welcoming of economic, social, juridical and monetary ties between the FRG and West Berlin, but not integrating West Berlin into the FRG political structure. The second round of talks took place directly in Washington, where Brandt and Bahr flew to have the first face- to-face meeting between Brandt and Nixon since the two were elected Chancellor and President of their respective countries. From the outset was clear that United States' feelings were less than amicable toward the West Germans. The Federal Republic’s goal in these meetings was to attain the approval of the United States so as to continue in Ostpolitik. In any event, these talks were very important for Brandt and Bahr also domestically, especially with the growing tension felt from the CDU regarding Brandt’s policies. The Christian Democrats accused the government of the division of Germany due to its policy from the beginning of the new government142. They felt offended that Brandt did not consult such a far-reaching new strategy, as Ostpolitik undoubtedly represented, with the opposition in a more detailed way and they feared that it could have long-term consequences for the whole Europe143. Nonetheless, Brandt adhered to his policy and did not feel an obligation to inform the opposition party of the every move he was going to make. Ultimately, this summit with the United States finally established Brandt's standing as a world leader among the past Chancellors of the FRG and amongst the ranks of the British leader Wilson, and the French leader, Pompidou. The outcome was also important for the Federal Republic’s strategic negotiating position with the Soviets. Brandt sought backing that the American troop presence would remain in Berlin. If the American assistance of the Federal Republic were to diminish, this could send the negative signal to the Soviets and undermine the leverage behind Brandt's efforts. As a conclusion of this summit, the United States acknowledged the fact that, West Germany sought stability

141 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 59 142 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 61 143 Barzel said: “Under the present political and military circumstances in Europe, this action would amount to a general accommodation of the USSR by the Western Alliance, with absolutely no recompense in return. The aftereffects would be extremely serious. From Helsinki to Rome—in every capital in Europe—the Soviet word, Soviet policy, Soviet desires would have more weight. Europe would no longer be assured of its freedom and independence and would come to terms with the Soviets.” Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, 25 March 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 69 52 in the future and the desire to “explore how to develop new paths of progress with the Soviet Union and East Germany”. Henceforth, Nixon thoughtfully publicly supported Brandt’s Ostpolitik, even though both he and Kissinger were questioning this whole concept, to say the least. It seems that President Nixon thought at this point, an American intervention or opposition to Ostpolitik would cause more damage than benefit for the Western alliance144. Overall, this meeting meant a great achievement for Brandt, since he had successfully secured the major objectives that he had hoped for out of the summit. However, Brandt was aware of the persistent doubt from the side of American administration, Nixon and Kissinger in the first place.

4.3 The Moscow Treaty

Despite efforts from both sides, West Germany and the Soviet Union, there remained many issues to be solved and the course of West German–Soviet negotiations was everything but smooth. Moscow was reiterating its insistence on full legal recognition of East Germany, a demand that it dropped only towards the end of the talks and refused to accept the FRG’s attitude to stand firm for mentioning the German unification or national unity. On the other hand, the West Germans elucidated it clearly that such a mention was absolutely necessary to guarantee the constitutionality of the treaty. Notwithstanding these differences of opinions, the Soviets and the West Germans were able to reach an accord by the summer of 1970. The key breakthrough was the idea that the mention of German unity should be contained in a separate letter, not in the actual treaty145. The Treaty of Moscow was signed on August 12, 1970 in Moscow. This treaty consisted of five articles. The first article called for the normalisation of relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union. The second stated that all disputes between the two states would be settled peacefully, and they would refrain from both the threat and the use of force towards one another. The third article of the treaty showed both signatories agreement that the borders in central and Eastern Europe valid at that time were inviolate, thus confirming the FRG‟s recognition of the Oder-Neisse

144 Memorandum of conversation between Bahr, Brandt, Nixon, HAK, and many other US and FRG officials; 11 April 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 81. 145 Baring, A. (1982): Die Ära Brandt-Scheel, p. 342 53 line and the border between the FRG and the GDR. This was in line with the Soviet Unionʼs desire for the FRG to accept the status quo in Europe. The final two articles of the treaty stated that all previous agreements between the two parties involved would be unaffected, and that the treaty would come into effect after ratification146. Important issues such as the FRGʼs continued wish to achieve full German unity at some point in the foreseeable future and the rights and responsibilities of the Soviet Union, United States of America, Great Britain and France with regard to Germany and Berlin, were tackled in the form of separate letters, "Letter on German Reunification147". These letters were sent to each of the four powers, illuminating that these issues were not connected to the Treaty of Moscow148. Signing of this agreement represented not only the first major essential foreign policy achievement within Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, but it also answered for a pivotal point in European political relationships, since before this milestone diplomatic efforts had not resulted in any momentous outcomes that influenced East-West relations. The Moscow Treaty convinced Nixon of the real and deep commitment of Brandt to implement his policy and improve the relations between East and West and in his press conference he expressed a hope that this treaty was going to have its successors in order to improve the situation in Europe149.

4.4 The Warsaw Treaty

The Moscow Treaty served as a framework and model for subsequent agreements, which Brandt intended to make. Almost 10 months after negotiations between the West Germany and Poland began in February of 1970 these two countries signed the Treaty of Warsaw on December 7, 1970. The agreement was in a similar vein as the Moscow Treaty: it called for normalization of the relations between the Federal Republic and Poland and named the Oder Neisse line as the official border between Poland and West Germany. In other words, restoration of the Potsdam Agreementsʼ borders occurred. The West Germans were once more forced

146 The Moscow Treaty of August, 12 1970, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=919 147 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 109 148 Korbel, J. (1972): Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?, p. 187 149 Press Statement; attached to a memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary to Henry A. Kissinger; 11 August 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library, NSC Files 54 to make some concessions, because the Poles had insisted “that the “starting point” for any normalization of relations was the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border as a final boundary, and without any qualifications150.” It meant that Germany had lost 24.3% of its pre-war area. Although Brandt was going ahead with the course he had in mind for his Ostpolitik, the United States was everything but pleased with all the compromises Brandt was making so as to accomplish its Eastern deals151. The abovementioned atonement for the German sins in the past played a significant role in connection with the Warsaw Treaty as well. Therefore, right before signing of the Warsaw Treaty, Willy Brandt made a very symbolic gesture- he knelt at the memorial of the victims of the Warsaw ghetto, where in 1943 the Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto rose against the Nazis. During that uprising thousands of the inhabitants were killed. On that occasion Brandt said, “I wanted to apologize in the name of our people for a million crimes which were committed in the misuse of the German name152." In spite of the fact that this token was seen by some as more symbolic one and Brandt was criticized for "overdoing153" it, the way I see it, it was an act nobody from the leading German politicians had dared to do in such an official way since the end of the WWII. Furthermore, from my point of view, this "Warschauer Kniefall" (Warsaw Genuflection), as this gesture went down in the history, reinforced the position of Willy Brandt of a highly respected and esteemed politician internationally, especially in relation with the Jews and Israel. Although, as far as the reaction in Germany was concerned, the opposition made an attempt to seize this opportunity and use it at Brandt’s disadvantage via Constructive Vote of No Confidence154 in April 1972, which Brandt survived only by 2 votes155. Once Brandt had survived the no-confidence vote, his first goal which he had in common with Moscow was to secure ratification of the Moscow, Warsaw Treaties

150 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen (1970): p. 1-2 151 Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 10 March 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976; Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 63 152http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/18281/kniefall_vor_der_geschichte.html?o=position- ASCENDING&s=1&r=1&a=18281&c=1 153 http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d- 43822427.html?name=KNIEFALL+ANGEMESSEN+ODER+%26Uuml%3BBERTRIEBEN%3F 154 It means that the Bundestag can remove a chancellor only when it simultaneously agrees on a successor. This legislative mechanism ensures both an orderly transfer of power and an initial parliamentary majority in support of the new chancellor. The constructive no-confidence vote makes it harder to remove a chancellor because opponents of the chancellor not only must disagree with his or her governing but also must agree on a replacement. 155 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 110 55 followed by the Quadripartite Agreement and the Transit Treaty. However, this process was quite long and by far not without problems. The Soviets were very keen on pushing to secure this ratification, particularly because of worries about other ‘‘fronts’’ in the Cold War. The U.S. announcement in January 1972 of Kissinger’s secret talks with the North Vietnamese only exacerbated these worries. Therefore, Moscow insisted on Brandt to make efforts to ratify the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in the West German parliament as soon as possible. Parliamentary debate on the ratification did begin in February 1972 but the outcome was up in the air156. It was accompanied by bitter bargaining inside the Christian Democrats between the fundamentalists who wanted to put an end to the treaties, and the reformist members who wanted to allow them to pass. In order to avoid failing the Eastern Treaties at the last minute, Rainer Barzel and Brandt agreed on a common formula that the accord would be allowed to survive, as long as Bundestag would attach a provision concerning reunification. This provision had to be phrased in a way that the CDU would be able to vote for it157. This compromise was embodied in editing of a joint parliamentary resolution as an interpretive document of the treaties, satisfactory for the government, opposition and Moscow as well. Notwithstanding, Barzel did not succeed in convincing the fundamentalists to accept the treaties on the basis of this resolution. Henceforth, to avoid splitting the party, it was agreed among the opposition to abstain on this vote. On 17 May 1972, the Christian Democrats unanimously accepted the now-official joint resolution but neither the Moscow Treaty (238 CDU/CSU abstentions, 10 votes against) nor the Warsaw Treaty (231 CDU/CSU abstentions, 17 votes against)158. As a result, the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty were ratified, which was undoubtedly a huge success for Brandt and it was also a step which helped him to move forward in other negotiations as well.

4.5 The Quadripartite Agreement- Berlin Four Power Negotiations

Recognizing an impasse in the making of any further progress in terms of the German-German talks, both superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, took measures in early 1971 to speed up these talks. The Soviet officials made clear to

156 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 130 157 Ibid. 158 Dannenberg, J. (2008): The foundations of Ostpolitik, p. 208 56

SED that it should cooperate more with the FRG and do not block progress in the negotiations by demanding concessions from the Brandt’s government. On the other hand, Brandt and Bahr criticized the United States for not sufficient involvement in these talks. Nevertheless, this sudden deep interest in advancing the negotiation was not groundless. Brandt made clear to the Kremlin leadership that the Moscow Treaty would not be passed by the Bundestag without security guarantee for West Berlin, taking into account that Berlin was considered as a test of the Soviet sincere eagerness to adhere to détente159. The Soviet profound interest in progress of the German-German talks and also in soon ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties was from my point of view quite understandable also from another angle. They placed a lot of emphasis on the question of borders since they felt threatened and insecure from the eastern side. Moscow had offered to sign a non-aggression pact with the Chinese in January 1971. Peking had rejected this proposal repeatedly160. The example of the Soviet large-scale involvement was soon followed by the United States. At exactly the same time the Soviets were promoting progress in the German-German and Berlin talks, the United States began to stimulate progress actively as well161. This much wider engagement of the two main protagonists of the Cold War made suitable conditions for making progress in the solving of the Berlin status. By the summer of 1971 the situation in the international sphere had changed. Brezhnev called off Ulbricht, who was quite reluctant as far as the progress in the German-German talks was concerned. It was the first time that the change at the head of the GDR since the start of the Cold War occurred. His successor was Erich Honecker who was more pro-Western oriented. Nevertheless, the most striking shift took place due to the American president Richard Nixon’s surprising announcement on 15 July 1971 of Kissinger’s visit to China. This U.S. initiative altered the Cold Warʼs geopolitical landscape immediately. He took this decision without consulting it with his Western allies, which justifiably angered them162. The progress in the Berlin status talks in the middle of 1971 happened not only due to abovementioned changes in the Cold War context, but also due to willingness

159 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 109 160 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 103 161 Ibid. 162 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 114 57 on the part of the Soviets to retreat from their insistence that only East Germany could discuss issues of transit to West Berlin163. After long discussions and deliberations, the Quadripartite Agreement was signed on 3 September 1971. Both sides made certain concessions. The Soviets agreed to the strengthening of ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. In exchange for that the Western Powers acknowledged that the three western sectors of Berlin did not belong to the FRG164. Moreover, the treaty provided a legal basis for civilian transit from the Western sectors to West Germany and all the way around. It also guaranteed the opening of telephonic communication between the two parts of Berlin after twenty years. The Soviets, in return for the right to open a consulate in West Berlin and a reduction in activities of the FRG government in West Berlin, settled on that the FRG could represent West Berlin abroad. West Berliners were allowed to hold West German passports to travel abroad. There was a bizarre afterpiece of the Quadripartite Agreement. SED produced its own German translation, which differed considerably from Bonn’s version. Formulations in the East German version were much sharper than those in the Western draft. Since they did not find a common ground, the Allies agreed that solely the English, French, and Russian versions of the treaty were official165. The Four Power Agreement, or Quadripartite Agreement, was one of the major successes of the Brandt’s policy. First of all, the status of the city because of which the world felt itself on the brink of war was successfully solved. The main added value of this agreement lied in the fact that the main two rivals in the Cold War not only participated in the talks and both actually signed this treaty, which was a very unique case in the course of the Cold War till then. Moreover, by signing this treaty the superpowers also showed their support of the Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which was a very important factor due to heavy criticism Brandt was exposed to face within the opposition ranks166. Furthermore, from my point of view, the Quadripartite Agreement did not only accelerate the German-German talks but had a very stimulating and encouraging effect for the negotiation of the security in Europe and in the whole world, such as the Helsinki Final Act or Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). By doing that Brandt changed the course of the whole Cold War and

163 Kissinger, H. (1979): White House Years, p. 801 164 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 109 165 Kissinger, H. (1979): White House Years, p. 832 166 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 89 58 considerably contributed to peak of détente at the beginning of the 1970s. It is also important to note that it was the first treaty where western powers used the term German Democratic Republic, which paved the way for its recognition by the western powers followed after signing of the Basic Treaty167.

4.6 The Transit Treaty and the Basic Treaty

The Quadripartite Agreement did not become valid immediately. Two Germanies had to reach a practical agreement over the details of transit first. How quickly the German talks proceeded had direct influence not only on the situation in both German parts, but it had a significant global influence as well. On the one hand, the Quadripartite agreement waited on its conclusion which meant that the much- longed-for ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties depended upon it as well. Moreover, the Allies were encouraging both atmosphere for the German states to make progress as soon as possible in order to create an amicable parallel SALT I168 negotiations and upcoming pan-European security conference169. The Transit Accord was negotiated by Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl, on behalf of the FRG and the GDR respectively. It was signed in December 1971 and it restored the personal contacts between the separated families and friends of East and West Berlin and Germany. Kohl let Bahr know during the negotiations that the SED wished for the FRG to pay a special fee to cover the costs of maintaining the roadways and the streets of the GDR and to pay a tax-like fee to cover the “profit which FRG companies earned using the streets of the GDR” as well. Bahr shrewdly grouped all these fees into one annual payment, including the cost of the visas for those West Germans travelling to the GDR, thus making “a better optical impression on the population”, as they would not have to pay out themselves each time they wished to visit family or friends in the East. It is also interesting to point out that

167 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 89 168 SALT I, the first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, extended from November 1969 to May 1972. During that period the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the first agreements to place limits and restraints on some of their central and most important armaments. In a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, they moved to end an emerging competition in defensive systems that threatened to spur offensive competition to still greater heights. In an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the two nations took the first steps to check the rivalry in their most powerful land- and submarine-based offensive nuclear weapons. 169 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 124 59 during the negotiations the argument that arose when discussing was who would be granted permission to travel to the GDR under this new accord. It showed concerns the SED had over who would be meeting and influencing the East German citizens. Kohl and the SED initially wanted the right to prevent anyone with “criminal intent” or who they deemed inadmissible from visiting the GDR. Former GDR citizens who had fled to the FRG were included in this group. Eventually it was agreed that GDR refugees would be allowed to return to visit East Germany and that while technically certain people could be prevented from travelling it would be very difficult for the East German authorities to justify their refusal of some people from entering the GDR. Bahr also secured the right for West Germans to use their own cars when travelling to the GDR170. However, these were only segregated questions. Much more comprehensive regulation of the intra-German relations was to follow in the Groundwork (Basic) Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) with the same negotiators taking place from June 1972 onwards. With successful negotiations of the Transit Treaty, the focus was shifted towards the most important issue- dealing with the German-German talks. How to define the relationship between the German states was one of the many dominant issues during the German-German talks. Due to the controversial nature and sheer number of issues involved negotiations filled six intense months in the second half of 1972. Three questions dominated the negotiations:  Did a German nation still exist?  What did the lack of a peace treaty for World War II imply for the German situation?  How did one define ‘‘German’’ citizenship?

Consequently, as the two Germanies moved from negotiating to implementing the treaty, three more issues came to the fore:  When and how would it be possible for the two Germanies to join the UN?  How would the two Germanies manage questions of emigration?  What sums of money would the GDR receive in return for permitting expatriates to leave171?

170 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 127-9 171 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 140 60

The negotiations were protracted because every single comma of the Treaty was vigorously fought over. The Basic Treaty was eventually signed on 21 December 1972 by Bahr and Kohl, although both sides agreed on the conditions of the Treaty in the early November. The parliamentary election on 19 November 1972 was the reason for that delay. Being election right around the corner, Brandt rightly supposed that his success in this election is dependent on the progress in the negotiations. Therefore, he did his best to agree on all burning issues before election and succeeded in doing so. However, precisely that became a strong argument of the opposition parties in Bundestag. They claimed that the speed of the negotiations was detrimental to quality of the final document. They proclaimed that the Basic Treaty had not been signed under as favourable conditions for the FRG as it would have been if the negotiations proceeded after the election as well172. It is true that Brandt based his campaign upon his success with agreement on the Basic Treaty and this strategy brought its fruition. Not only the turnout was over 91%, but the Social Democrats achieved 45.8%. This result meant that for the first time since the end of WWII SPD became the strongest party in Bundestag173. In the Basic Treaty, Bonn and East Berlin recognized that the division of Germany would remain in place for the foreseeable future (even if the FRG avoided including any formal recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state) and established a basis for regulating the practical problems caused by that division. The Basic Treaty addressed a great range of other issues as well. It formally stated the commitment of both Germanies to the principle of nonviolence in their dealings with each other. It pointed out both sides’ willingness to make an attempt to spread out the peaceful relations in Europe as a whole. Both Germanies also agreed to respect each other’s autonomy in internal issues. Various attachments hinted more specific intentions, e.g. to increase trade and ease traffic. They also agreed to exchange ‘‘permanent representations,’’ or missions which would essentially serve as "pseudo embassies"174. However, not all the questions were solved by the Basic Treaty. The followed- up talks in 1973 were dominated by three open controversies left over from the negotiations. These three open issues had emerged as problem areas in the very

172 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 122 173 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 112 174 The Basic Treaty (1972): http://www.1000dokumente.de/pdf/dok_0023_gru_de.pdf 61 beginning of the negotiations, but instead of finding resolution they became only more questionable as both sides shifted from negotiating to implementing the accord. These were the abovementioned questions of UN membership, of human rights, and of trade with and financial transfers between the FRG and the GDR175. As for the UN membership, SED backed up by the Soviets, wanted to access the United Nations from the outset of the negotiations, whereas Brandt was asserting to proceed with an application only after the Basic Treaty was negotiated. SED insisted on the UN membership before ratifying the Basic Treaty. This issue soon became inextricably tied to two even more complicated problems: human rights concessions and financial compensation176. In the 1960s, the FRG had established a practice of basically buying the freedom of political prisoners and other would-be émigrés from the GDR. By the time the Wall came down, the FRG had spent over 3.5 billion DM to secure the release of roughly 34,000 prisoners and reunite approximately 250,000 families divided by the Wall177. Till the negotiations, this question had not been tackled sufficiently. Therefore, from the beginning of the talks, Bahr voiced himself clearly that the FRG wished to address human rights issues in the Basic Treaty. Bahr told Kohl at the very first round of the Basic Treaty talks on 15 June that the FRG hoped to provide means for 7,000 divided families to reunite. Bonn also sought to increase chances for cross- border marriages and travel. Nevertheless, Kohl was very reluctant to talk about these issues, mainly because the SED regime feared the impact on its citizens of more often visits from Westerners, of greater chances to reunite with family members and of higher opportunity to marry West Germans. On the other hand, East Germany was interested in increasing the credit it could get from the FRG. These two issues apparently were in contrast, but the course of negotiations proved that the second one gained the upper hand in SED. For example, when talks stalled in late September 1972 over the issue of mentioning the nation, the GDR announced its willingness to issue an amnesty to some prisoners. It also offered to release from the GDR citizenship those East Germans who had escaped to the West and had become

175 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 147 176 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 148 177 Hertle, H. (1996): Chronik des Mauerfalls: Die dramatischen Ereignisse um den 9. November 1989, p. 45 62 the FRG citizens. This move would facilitate them to travel back into the East without being afraid of being repatriated against their will178. Moreover, Kohl also stated in early November that he would be willing to give Bahr a list of the children’s names on the day the treaty would be initialled, or accepted as a final draft awaiting only official signing. However, approximately one week before signing the Basic Treaty Bahr complained that the list was not complete and he was threatening not to give the loan of 60 million DM to the GDR as a response. The problem remained unresolved in late April 1973179. On the May 11 1973, 268 MPs of the Bundestag voted for the ratification of the Basic Treaty. Nevertheless, Bavaria appealed to the Constitutional Court which seriously endangered one of the conditions of the GDR towards the further progress. Furthermore, entrance of Germany in the United Nation was still not a reality, which made further only more difficult to achieve. It seemed that the situation was a dead end. However, the change on the international scene within the Cold War had changed. The situation of the Soviet Union deteriorated dramatically. First of all, détente with the United States had become increasingly troublesome despite MBFR talks beginning in early 1973. Moreover, the American senator Henry Jackson asserted linking trade relations with the USSR, to be more precise, granting of the Most Favoured Nation180 (MFN) status to a softening of restrictions on Jewish emigration. As a result of that, the Soviets did not receive MFN status. On the contrary, they officially withdrew their request. Last but definitely not least, Brezhnev was worried about the situation in China and its rapprochement with the United States as well. As a consequence of all these concerns, Brezhnev made it perfectly clear that the SED should be less obstinate in its dealings with the West Germans181. These favourable conditions were even exaggerated by the decision of the Constitutional Court at the end of July 1973. It confirmed the validity of the Basic Treaty and it came into force. Apart from that, the negotiations concerning the

178 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 149 179 Bericht über das Gespräch zwischen Genossen Staatssekretär Kohl und Staatssekretär Grabert am 26. April 1973 im Bundeskanzleramt in Bonn, p. 6, in DC20-5614 (SeKo), BA-V 180 MFN status- A level of status given to one country by another and enforced by the World Trade Organization. A country grants this clause to another nation if it is interested in increasing trade with that country. Countries achieving most favored nation status are given specific trade advantages such as reduced tariffs on imported goods. 181 Niederschrift über ein Gesprach zwischen dem Generalsekretar des ZK der KPdSU, Genossen Leonid I. Breshnew, und dem Mitglied des Politburos des ZK der SED und VdM der DDR, Genossen Willi Stoph, am 21.3.1973 im Kreml von 11.00–13.15 Uhr,’’ p. 7, in DC20-4415 (Stoph), BA-V. 63

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began. The last document of the Brandt’s Eastern policy was signed in December 1973 as well. The Treaty of Prague between the FRG and Czechoslovakia was drafted in a similar vein as the Warsaw Treaty. It acknowledged the inviolability of their common borders and abandoning all the territorial claims. In other words, they declared the Munich Agreement182 from 1938 to be null and void183. Considering the momentum brought about by these events, the entry of the two Germanies into the UN went quite smoothly, contrary to the initial expectations. In September of 1973, East and West Germany became respectively the 133rd and 134th members of the United Nations. Both sides eventually achieved their goals, the SED delegation had managed to meet its goals of securing payment as a compensation for human rights concessions and of gaining recognition both from the FRG and the world community. On the other hand, the FRG delegation also achieved one of its top priority goals, namely, obtaining kind of reference to the nation184.

4.6.1 International consequences of the Basic Treaty

In spite of the fact that a lot of questions remained unresolved, such as issues of citizenship and property ownership and the "German question" as such in the first place, the Basic Treaty was an unprecedented milestone. First and foremost, after more than 20 years the FRG recognized the GDR as a second German state with full sovereignty on its own territory and independence in the inner and external issues as well. In the treaty was also mentioned that no German state could represent the other one on the international level or act on its behalf. In other words, it put an end to the long-held Hallstein doctrine, according to which only the FRG had been entitled to speak on behalf of the German nation. Undoubtedly, it gave an unparalleled rise to the GDR, which had been labelled before only as the "Soviet occupation zone185".

182 Munich Agreement- settlement reached by Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy in September 1938 that permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia. 183 Prager Vertrag (1973): http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0250_pra&object=pdf&st=PRAGER% 20VERTRAG&l=de 184 Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, p. 160 185 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 123 64

Both sides found a common ground also in terms of support of the peaceful relations among the European states by striving for controlled limitation of the international armament. This point was very important taking into account the ongoing SALT I negotiations and upcoming CSCE talks. It may seem that it was only a normal document and establishment of the standard diplomatic relations between two neighbouring states. But there was obviously much more than met the eye. It meant an end of the mutual animosity between two parts of Germany, which had been clear since the end of WWII and had been reflected to in the European and world politics to certain extent as well. Both German states belonged to different social systems and had different perceptions towards a lot of fundamental questions. However, in the Basic Treaty they expressed a common will to peace, renunciation of force and equality of the both states. By doing that not only good assumptions for peaceful and good neighbourhood were created, but it enabled both states to take part in various kinds of the world politics actions. They both could enter the international organizations, which they actually did right away. Besides the Quadripartite Agreement, it was another agreement which surpassed the bilateral level. From the external actors, the Soviets intervened mostly. The Soviets were ceaselessly attacking the opposing voices in Bundestag mainly during the election campaign. They did it because they were aware of the fact that if Brandt had not defended his position as the Prime Minister, other government would not make as huge concessions towards the GDR as Brandt had made186.

4.7 Brandt’s resignation

In the wake of the 1972 elections, Willy Brandt and successes of his negotiations within the Ospolitik Brandt should have been at the zenith of his power and strength as both the Chancellor and party leader. However, the opposite was true. In late 1972, Willy Brandt was a man on the verge of exhaustion, and more than once thinking seriously about quitting. Brandt paid the high price for the cumulative pressures of his long struggle to the party leadership, the difficult restructuring of his party’s organization and political platform, the taxing years of governing in a coalition government with his and his party’s arch enemies, and the unyielding electoral

186 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 122 65 campaigning at both the national and federal levels. But first and foremost, he was probably collapsing mostly by the stress of leading a social-liberal coalition government whose coherence was constantly threatened. Consequently, Brandt suffered from period bouts of depression, but in late 1972 and early 1973 he was in a particularly bad conditions and his long-established tendency in these periods to withdraw from both his work and the people surrounding him was particularly visible187. Furthermore, domestic reforms that had been announced progressed but only in a slowly manner. The global economic crisis in 1973 only added insult to injury. It had a huge impact on the FRGʼs economy- inflation climbed to almost 7%, economic growth fell from 7.5% in 1969 to 0.5% at the beginning of 1974, and the number of unemployment tripled to 600 000. Higher prices gave an impetus to trade unions to call for higher wages as well which led only to even bigger inflation188. However, the hugest trigger for Brandt’s resignation lied elsewhere. It was discovered that one of his personal advisers, Günter Guillaume, had been a spy for the East-German intelligence service. Even less favourable for Brandt was the fact that he had allowed Guillaume to remain in his position even though he had been already under surveillance. Guillaume and his wife were officially arrested in April 1974 for spying and betrayal of their country. Once Brandt was informed that Guillaume might reveal secret stories about his life, he decided to resign on May 6 1974189. It remains us only to speculate whether that was the real reason for resignation, or he was simply tired of the political struggles after so many years. Another factor which could have contributed to his relinquishment of an office were quarrels inside the party between him and his successor Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner over the course the government should take. From my personal point of view, it was a combination of all circumstances and he shrewdly covered his weariness of politics under the Guillaume affair. Be that as it may, Willy Brandt was in my opinion one of the greatest politicians in the 20th century and his contribution to the more peaceful course of the Cold War is of immense value. His efforts were also

187 http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/staff/hart/pubs/brandt_schmidt_case1.pdf 188 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 114 189 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 115 66 rewarded by the Peace Nobel Price in 1971, which was still the time when these prices were given to people who had really deserved them. Also after resignation Brandt stayed active in politics. He remained the head of the Social democrats till 1987 and was its honorary chairman till his death. He was still supporting an idea of European integration and he even became the MEP (Member of the European Parliament) in the first directly elected European Parliament in 1979. He died in October 1992 of cancer190.

190 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/brandt_willy.shtml 67

5 Long-term impact of Brandtʼs politics

Up until 1969, the FRGʼs governments achieved very little or almost nothing in terms of the improvement of the relations with East. There was no rapprochement between the two German states but rather the gap between them was widening. Not only this main goal, but also other partial goals were not achieved. The West German politicians failed in normalizing the relations with the socialist countries. Although trade missions with Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria were established, the most problematic relation with the GDR was still marked by confrontation and distrust. It became clear that the German question was inextricably linked with European politics, and that the Hallstein doctrine would not be a tool with positive effect for progress in the German question. The changes occurred gradually, first steps had been made under the Erhardʼs government followed by the Grand Coalition, mainly attributed to Willy Brandt as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But the turning point came with Willy Brandt taking the Chancellor post in 1969. One of the biggest contributions of Willy Brandtʼs foreign policy towards socialist countries was to increase the FRGʼs independence and credibility in European and international politics as well, mainly due to unambiguous recognition of its borders191. This thesis has demonstrated that Brandtʼs strategy within Ostpolitik to put paramount emphasis on relations with the Soviet Union, was a very shrewd one. The Soviet Union was the undisputed leader of the Eastern bloc, therefore signing the first of the Eastern treaties made it easier for Brandt to negotiate with other states. Taking into account unfavorable circumstances in China-Soviet relations, the Soviets were very much interested in a peaceful coexistence on its western borders, which was reflected in their effort to convince the GDR to sign the Basic Treaty in the first place. However, Brandtʼs strategy fell short of his ultimate goal of German reunification. I think there are number of reasons why he did not succeed in this regard. First of all, it was probably too ambitious and hardly feasible at that time. It is true that it was a time of America-Soviet détente, but neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to have a strong united Germany in Central Europe. As has been previously described Richard Nixon was far from enthusiastic about Brandtʼs

191 Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, p. 138 68

Ostpolitik, especially in its initial outset. The United States was accustomed to have tremendous influence on the FRGʼs foreign policy, therefore having another vigorous and reunited player with fully independt foreign policy was unacceptable for them. Furthermore, the United States made sure that any significant agreements between Bonn and the GDR were included tightly into the larger set of negotiations between East and West. Another obstacle, even more insurmountable from my point of view, was a communist government in the GDR that would never agree on unification at that time. In my opinion, it was also obvious to Brandt, but he probably overestimated his convincing and negotiation abilities, which could be seen as one of his few flaws. wIIdt'sEvaluating the long-term impact of Brandt‟s Ostpolitik and the role it played in the unification of Germany after 1989 is not clear. The change of government in the FRG in 1982 from the SPD-FDP coalition to a conservative CDU-FDP coalition only aggravates to detect direct links through the chancellorships of Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl respectively. However, some common traits can be found. Brandtʼs successor Helmut Schmidt, represented a completely different type of politician than Brandt: very realistic, cautious and pragmatic one. He wanted to focus on issues that were present at that very moment rather than a much larger overall vision and future plans like Brandt. Therefore, he declared that the era of great reforms was over. Unfortunately for him, the ongoing global crisis had a very negative impact on Germany- rising inflation and unemployment192. In terms of foreign policy, Schmidt and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans- Dietrich Genscher, put more emphasis on the West than Brandt did. He gained an international recognition as an economic expert. Thanks to his initiative, economics summits of the seven prominent industrial powers (USA, France, Great Britain, Italy, FRG, Japana and Canada) are held annually since 1975. Nevertheless, German- American relations deteriorated considerably because of mutual resentment between the very pragmatic Schmidt and moralistic US President. On the other hand, Valéry Giscard dʼ Estaing, the French President since 1974, was on the same wavelength as Schmidt. Their very amicable relations and mutual deep interest in economic cooperation culminated in 1978. They joined forces and set an initiative in motion for

192 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 121 69 a European Monetary System (EMS), which was a necessary precondition for an introduction of the common European currency- Euro193. As far as intra- German relations were concerned, Schmidt persisted in the continuity from the previous Brandtʼs endeavours. A series of technical agreements were added to the Basic Treaty. These included the construction of a motorway from Berlin to Hamburg or making the railway between Berlin and Helmstedt two-track. Besides that, further cooperation was achieved in transportation, road use and posts, as well as the extension of trading agreements. Also the internal German tourism from West Germany into the GDR and vice versa began to flourish. As well as Brandt, Schmidt was also aware of the necesitty of having good relations with the Soviet Union in order to make any progress in the German question. The FRG-Soviet cooperation rested upon economics mostly. The Federal Republic was the most important trading partner in the West for the Soviet Union and in 1978 they signed the deal on Soviet gas deliveries to Germany valid until 2000194. However, the end of 1970s was accompanied by other global circumstances. Particularly the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in its satellite states, with the potential of "decoupling" US and Western European security interests, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, gradually forced Schmidt to take a more harsh course. Schmidt was one of the first western top-notch politicians who warned his allies about the dangers posed by the Soviet armaments policy and he argued for an increase in Western European armament if negotiations would not succeed in having the Soviet SS-1920s removed by 1983. His opinions served as a basis for the NATOʼs Double Track Decision195 adopted in December 1979. And precisely this point was the main bone of contention between Schmidt and Brandt. Although Brandt officially supported Schmidt, he remained committed to the notion of Western concessions to the Soviet Union and he did his best to cause discrepancies and discords within the SPD. This led to the fall of Schmidt in the autumn of 1982 by a constructive vote of no confidence196. Immediately after Schmidt was out of his office, Brandt voiced publicly against the implementation of the Double Track Decision and

193 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 122-3 194 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 124 195 The NATO Double-Track Decision of December 12, 1979- NATO decided that in case arms control negotiations with the USSR should fail, the intermediate nuclear forces of the West would be modernized to provide a counterweight to the new Soviet SS-20 missiles. 196 Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, p. 5 70 pushed the SDP Congress to adopt a stance that unconditionally dismissed Schmidt’s policies of the previous years197. In 1982 the SPD was replaced by the CDU, although the FDP remained a coalition partner. This meant that some elements of Ostpolitik pioneered by Brandt and continued by Helmut Schmidt were brought into the Ostpolitik or Deutschlandpolitik of the new government as well. The new chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) called for a change in economics and social policy. However, in terms of foreign policy, continuity was declared and was guaranteed by the figure of Hand- Dietrich Genscher, who remained Foreign Minister. In terms of intra-German relations, Kohl was more critical of the SED undemocratic rule in the GDR than his predecessors- he denounced the Berlin Wall and expulsion of the SED regime on a regular basis. He was realistic, he spoke about reunification in very abstract terms, but this approach was based on the real existing conditions. Kohlʼs general policy and goals could be therefore regarded as very similar to Schmidtʼs- normalization of intra-German relations on the basis of existing treaties and agreements198. In return for financial support and special economic privilidges from Bonn, the GDR came up with more humanitarian concessions. The GDR desperately needed these financial resources, because its economy was on the verge of collapse in 1984. Henceforth, this loan contributed to gradual improvement of relations between the GDR and the FRG. The rapprochement went so far that Kohl and Honecker were supposed to meet in person in September 1984. However, the new Soviet General Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko, strongly disapproved the reconcilement between the FRG and the GDR. More importantly, he feared that the Sovietʼs own security could be endangered if the SED regime becomes tied to the FRG. In spite of undeniable effort Kohl put into negotiations with the GDR, he did not change FRG relations with the GDR that much, until 1985. He could not find a new way to accelerate German unification either, instead continuing a high level of German- German contact which already began under Brandt and continued under Schmidt. The radical change came externally in 1985. Mikhail Gorbachev became the new General Secretary of the Soviet Union. Consequently, Honeckerʼs visit to the FRG took place, although it was three years later than originally planned. This unprecedented meeting laid solid foundations for events to come, which ultimately

197 Cary, N. (2000): Reassesing Germanyʼs Ostpolitik. Part 2: From Refreeze to Reunification, p. 372 198 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 178 71 resulted in German reunification in 1990. Already by the end of 1987, there was a sharply increasing number of visits by GDR pensioners to the FRG and all the way around as well199. Obviously, the Ostpolitik of Brandt and Bahr had launched high and frequent levels of contact between ordinary Germans from East and West that had continued to rise throughout the 1980s. This increasing exposure to the citizens of West Germany, along with the occasional visit to the FRG for a minority of East Germans, was crucial in helping Germans either side of the border to preserve a sense of shared identity and in preventing a further alienation of the German nation200. Brandtʼs Ostpolitik helped in vouching for the possibility of unification still existed and when the circumstances arrived, the Soviet Unionʼs collapse and the following Cold Warʼs end, the ground was prepared. As for the course of the Cold War, the focus of Brandt‟s Ostpolitik on promoting human rights and reuniting families on a divided continent certainly found resonance in the opinions of Western Europeans and many Eastern Europeans as well at the time. Features of Brandtʼs policies helped shape European-wide policies in the latter stages of the Cold War. Brandtʼs concentration on relieving the hardships of ordinary citizens in the East through the promotion of basic human rights and the contact of ordinary people was incorporated into a broader formulation of a European foreign policy by the West European Six (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany, and Italy) in the "Davignon Report‟ which had been issued on 23 October 1970. When the negotiations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe started, this unified approach gave the European Six an opportunity to be in the driving seat, although the Soviet Union and the United States were still the major players in world affairs at the time201. It is surely no coincidence that the FRGʼs Ostpolitik and preparation for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place simultaneously. As had been mentioned above, you can find direct hints at organization of the huge conference with primary focus on human rights already in the texts of the Ostverträge. The CSCE resulted in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by 35 states, including the Soviet Union and the United States. These Helsinki Accords

199 Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, p. 182 200 OʼBrien,A. (2010): Opening the Iron Curtain: The Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, p. 39 201 Ibid. 72 consisted of three linked baskets of issues. While in the first basket granted each state a possibility to “choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations,” it also enabled the revision of borders “by peaceful means”. The second basket demanded cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, environment, and the promotion of tourism. From our point of view most importantly, the third basket concerned human rights, where it was also mentioned to allow “meetings between and reunifications of families, marriages between citizens of different states, travel for personal or professional reasons"202, which is a clear lesson from the German case and Brandtʼs legacy.

202 The Helsinki Final Act (1975) : http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true 73

6 Conclusion

After the Second World War, Germany was not only devastated politically, economically and socially, but it was also divided into two separate states. The FRG pursued a democratic path, whereas the German Democratic Republic was fully controlled by the communist Soviet Union. Taking that into consideration, any reconciliation and progress in the mutual relations had been hardly possible till the 1960s. The division of Germany and Berlin were among the most flagrant symbols and representations of the Cold War. Germany was divided, according to the Potsdam conference, among the four most powerful states at that time: France, Great Britain and the United States controlled the FRG, while the GDR was to be among the USSRʼs puppet states. The bloodsheds on the battlefields of the Second World War were replaced by a period of no direct fights, but a high dosage of tensions and animosity, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. Specifically Germany, and Berlin in particular, became the first serious bone of contention in the Cold War in 1949. Although the crisis was solved, the problems prevailed both in Germany and in the world as well. Due to unfavorable conditions in the GDR- dictatorship, high unemployment, low wages, people were leaving for the Western countries, Federal Republic of Germany in the first place. The ratio of refugees reached such a level, that the GDR decided to take a radical action. The Berlin Wall had to be erected in order to prevent the continuing massive outflow of the GDRʼs citizens. This Second Berlin Crisis, which resulted in the Berlin Wallʼs construction was very important for Willy Brandt and his future career. After years spent in exile, because of his dissenting opinions with the Nazi regime, Willy Brandt came back to Germany after the Second World War. He became active in politics as a member of the SPD, but initially mainly on the local level in Berlin. The first peak of his political life came in 1957, when he was elected as the Mayor of West Berlin. The erection of the Berlin Wall happened right "under Brandtʼs nose" and he was very disappointed and angered about that. He was upset about the approach of the Western powers, the United States in particular, which did not intervene as soon and as vehemently as they had promised. He understood that the exclusive dependence on partnership

74 with the West alone would not solve the issues of the German division. Brandt realized that in order to achieve his most important goal- improvement of the intra- German relations followed by German reunification, the FRG had to cooperate with the Eastern bloc as well. He also claimed that the rigid clinging to the Hallstein doctrine, by which FRG did not recognize GDR and countries in the Eastern bloc had been a major hindrance to progress in his plans. As previously described in this thesis, he used his position as the mayor of West Berlin to travel all around the world, especially during the Berlin Crisis, to meet and speak with top-notch world politicians not only about the ongoing problems but mostly about his future visions and viewpoints. This increased his reputation and prestige worldwide as an influential politician. His standpoints were officially declared by his closest co-worker and Federal Minister for Special Affairs of Germany, Egon Bahr in Tübingen in 1963. In the famous speech, the "Wandel durch Annäherung" formula was proclaimed. Brandtʼs position within the ranks of the Social Democrats rose as well. In 1964 he became the new leader of the SPD, and began to publicly criticize the prevailing use of the Hallstein doctrine, which he felt needed to be revisited. After the 1966 election, the Grand Coalition of the main German political parties CDU and SPD was formed. Willy Brandt became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite his enormous efforts to improve relations with the GDR and the Soviet Union as well, he achieved very little due to serious discrepancies not only between him and the Chancellor Kiesinger, but also between the two coalition parties as well. Brandt did however succeed in laying the foundation for a gradual rapprochement with the Soviets during his tenure in this Grand Coalition. Thanks to these crucial divergences of opinions, the Grand Coalition was doomed to fail from the very beginning of its existence. In the 1969 elections, the Social Democrats became the strongest party in the Bundestag, and along with Liberals, formed a coalition. In spite of widespread pessimism and low faith in this Coalition, Willy Brandt as the Chancellor lived up to his promises and proved to be a great leader. Undeterred throughout his tenure by constant opposition in the Bundestag towards his Ospolitik, he was very successful as the Chancellor. The purpose of this thesis was to analyze Willy Brandtʼs policies and to illustrate the influence his actions had on further development of the Cold War. Two research questions mentioned in the introduction had been helpful in this regard.

75

The first research question concerned Brandtʼs major goals and the extent to which he achieved them. On the basis of his official declarations, one can conclude that normalization with the Eastern bloc countries and creation of the European security system with presence of the Cold War superpowers- the United States and the USSR and most ambitious German reunification, belonged to his crucial goals. Understandably, these were not his only goals, the others inextricably connected with these crucial ones. Brandtʼs Ostpolitik was crowned with the success of Ostverträge: the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty, the Prague Treaty, the Quadripartite Treaty and the Basic Treaty. These agreements normalized the relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic as had been one of the major Brandtʼs goals. Creation of the European security system, based on alliances with presence of the Soviet Union and the United States represented, another aim. Along with the first goal, he succeeded in fully achieving this from my point of view. Via the aforementioned Ostverträge, he managed to solve the sensitive boundary issues, which undoubtedly increased the security in Europe. During the Quadripartite Treaty and the Basic Treaty negotiations, involvement of the superpowers was an especially important factor. American and Soviet politicians were sitting at the same table during the long negotiations of these treaties, which was something unprecedented at that time of the Cold War. It was not a single-shot occassion, but the United States and the Soviet Union were the signatories of the parallel very important SALT I negotiations culminated in 1972 with an actual agreement. These successes are even more admirable taking into account the very short time frame Brandt needed to accomplish them. Furthermore, as this thesis demonstrated, his Ostpolitik was initially welcomed with considerable reservations and fear from the Western allies, the United States administration in particular. Although it should be noted that Sovietʼs propensity to sign these treaties and to press the GDR to be more willing to compromise were highly influenced by the negative development of the Chinese-Soviet relations at the beginning of the 1970s. Therefore, the Soviet Union wanted to live under as peaceful conditions as possible, at least on one front. However, it is true that Brandt did not succeed in his utmost goal- German reunification. However, due to the conditions at that time, that was simply impossible. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to have a new united Germany in Central Europe, and without their help, accomplishing this plan was unthinkable.

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The second pair of research questions dealt with Brandtʼs impact on the course of the Cold War and his contribution to German reunification in 1990. According to my research, Brandt contributed largely to a much more peaceful course of the Cold War. Long-disputed boundary issues were solved because of the previously mentioned treaties enacted under Brandt. Following the Basic Treaty, both the FRG and the GDR entered the United Nations, which was a huge step forward, because they represented two antagonized conflicting blocs in the course of the Cold War both in economic (COMECON and EEC) and political terms (Warsaw Treaty and NATO). In addition to that, Brandt was very well aware of the danger of the nuclear weapons. He put a large emphasis on the control of armament as a result. On behalf of the FRG he signed the NPT, but more importantly, his Ostpolitik served as a spring-board for the important parallel negotiations of SALT I and later on, the Helsinki Accords as well. His focus on fundamental human rights found its reverberation in the third basket of the Helsinki accords. As had been mentioned above, the mutual cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during negotiation of the Quadripartite agreement and the Basic Treaty was of immense value, taking into account that they were main enemies. Consequently, they both signed SALT I as well. As for German reunification, Brandt really failed to achieve this target. Nevertheless, this thesis claims that Brandtʼs steps had a far-reaching positive impact on the improvement of the intra-German relations, and to a large extent paved the way for reunification, which eventually took place in 1990. Ostpolitikʼs elements did not vanish after Brandtʼs resignation in 1974, but as this thesis demonstrates, could be traced also in the politics of his successors Helmut Schmidt but Helmut Kohl as well. Understandably, the Ostpolitik of Brandt had set in motion high regular contacts between ordinary Germans from East and West that kept increasing throughout the 1980s. This rising exposure to the citizens of West Germany, along with the occasional visit to the FRG for a minority of East Germans was essential in assisting Germans from either side of the border to keep a sense of shared identity and in avoiding a dreadful scenario- further estrangement of the German nation. In other words, Brandtʼs Ostpolitik kept the possibility of German unification alive, and when the appropriate conditions arrived, the Soviet Unionʼs collapse and the following Cold Warʼs end, Germany was ready to finally be reunited.

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Appendixes

AAand, in AAdasdAddsaAsome instances, at Bonn's expense. Table 1 Number of refugees from the GDR till the Berlin Wallʼs erection

Through West- Inner borders and Year All in all Berlin abroad

1949 129 245

1950 193 227 299 454 197 788

1951 165 648

1952 118 300 64 093 182 393

1953 305 737 25 653 331 390

1954 104 399 79 799 184 198

1955 153 693 99 177 252 870

1956 156 377 122 812 279 189

1957 129 579 132 043 261 622

1958 119 552 84 540 204 092

1959 90 862 53 055 143 917

1960 152 291 46 897 199 188

till 13.8.1961 125 053 30 349 155 402

Together 1 649 070 1 037 872 2 686 942

(Source: http://www.berlinermaueronline.de/geschichte/fluchtzahlen.htm)

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Table 2 Election results of SPD since 1949

Number of Year Votes in % Candidate for the Chancellor seats

1949 29,2 % 131 Kurt Schumacher

1953 28,8 % 151 Erich Ollenhauer

1957 31,8 % 169 Erich Ollenhauer

1961 36,2 % 190 Willy Brandt

1965 39,3 % 202 Willy Brandt

1969 42,7 % 224 Willy Brandt

1972 45,8 % 230 Willy Brandt

1976 42,6 % 214 Helmut Schmidt

1980 42,9 % 218 Helmut Schmidt

1983 38,2 % 193 Hans-Jochen Vogel

1987 37,0 % 186 Johannes Rau

1990 33,5 % 239 Oskar Lafontaine

1994 36,4 % 252 Rudolf Scharping

1998 40,9 % 298 Gerhard Schröder

2002 38,5 % 251 Gerhard Schröder

2005 34,2 % 222 Gerhard Schröder

2009 23,0 % 146 Frank-Walter Steinmeier

(Source: www.electionresources.org.de)

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Table 3 Federal elections in 1969

Parties Constituency Party list Total seats

Votes % +/− Seats +/− Votes % +/− Seats +/− Seats† +/− %

Social Democratic 14,402,374 44.0 +3.9 127 +33 14,065,716 42.7 +3.4 97 −11 237 +20 45.8 Party(SPD)

Christian Democratic 12,137,148 37.1 −1.8 87 −31 12,079,535 36.6 −1.4 106 +28 201 −1 38.8 Union (CDU)

Christian Social 3,094,176 9.5 −0.4 34 −2 3,115,652 9.5 −0.1 15 +2 49 ±0 9.5 Union(CSU)

Free Democratic 1,554,651 4.8 −3.1 0 ±0 1,903,422 5.8 −3.7 30 −19 31 −19 6.0 Party(FDP)

(Source: www.electionresources.org.de)

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7 Sources

7.1 Primary sources

Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (AdsD). Parteivorstand- http://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/geschichte/adsd.htm

Baring, A. (1982): Die Ära Brandt-Scheel, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt

BAK,N1371, 361 and 357, 1: Brandt to the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, 2–3 July 1967

Bericht über das Gespräch zwischen Genossen Staatssekretär Kohl und Staatssekretär Grabert am 26. April 1973 im Bundeskanzleramt in Bonn

Brandt, W. (1968): A Peace Policy for Europe, Frankfurt am Main

Brandt, W. (1971): In Exile: Essays, Reflections, and Letters, 1933-1947, London

Brandt, W. (1967): Entspannung mit langem Atem, in Aussenpolitik, Vol.8, 1967, p. 5- 15

Brandt, W. (1989): Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main, Propyläen

Brandt, W. (1993): My life in politics, Harmondsworth, Penguin

Brandt, W. (1960): Politik für Deutschland, Rede Auf Dem Parteitag Der SPD in Hannover AM 25 November 1960

Brandt, W. (1970): Stenografische Niederschrift über das Gesprach des VdM der DDR, W. Stoph, mit dem Bundeskanzler der BRD

Brandt, W. (1963): Zwang zum Wagnis, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlag Anstalt

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Berlin Pass Agreement December 17, 1963 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=916

East-West German immigration statistics, 1961-1990 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=925

Egon Bahr Change through Rapprochement Speech at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing on July 15, 1963 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=81

Federálne ministerstvo zahraničných vecí (1972): Dokumenty k politice obou německých států a k úsilí o normalizaci vztahů v Evropě 1964- 1972

Foreign Relations of the United States (1964-1968): Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

Foreign Relations of the United States (1969-1976): Volume XL, Germany and Berlin

Friedensnote der Bundesregierung (1966)- http://library.fes.de/spdpd/1966/660412.pdf

Godesberger Programm der SPD (1959)- http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/1816/data/godesberger_programm.pdf

Hertle, H. (1996): Chronik des Mauerfalls: Die dramatischen Ereignisse um den 9. November 1989, Berlin, Ch. Links

Kiesinger, K.G. (1966): Regierungserklärung der Großen Koalition- http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0078_kei&obj ect=pdf&st=LUDWIG%20ERHARD&l=de

Kissinger, H. (1979): White House Years, Boston, Weidenfield & Nicolson

82

Niederschrift über ein Gesprach zwischen dem Generalsekretar des ZK der KPdSU, Genossen Leonid I. Breshnew, und dem Mitglied des Politburos des ZK der SED und VdM der DDR, Genossen Willi Stoph, am 21.3.1973 im Kreml von 11.00–13.15 Uhr

Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin September 3, 1971 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=77

Press Statement; attached to a memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary to Henry A. Kissinger; 11 August 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library, NSC Files

Regierungsprogramm der SPD, 1969- http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bibliothek/retro- scans/fa-06999.pdf

Sahm, U. (1994): Diplomaten taugen nichts, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag

Schöllingen, G. (2001): Willy Brandt: Die Biographie, Berlin, Propyläen Verlag

The Basic Treaty December 21, 1972 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=172

The Harmel Report, 1967- http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp- content/uploads/2008/10/nato12.pdf

The Helsinki Final Act, 1975- http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true

The Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=919

The Prague Treaty of December 11, 1973- http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0250_pra&ob ject=pdf&st=PRAGER%20VERTRAG&l=de

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The Warsaw Treaty of December 7, 1970- http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0246_war&o bject=pdf&st=WILLY%20BRANDT&l=de

Willy Brandt Policy Statement during his Inaugural Address to the Bundestag on October 28, 1969 - http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=168

7.2 Secondary sources

Calleo, D. (1987): Beyond American hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, New York, Basic books

Cary, N. (2000): Reassesing Germanyʼs Ostpolitik. Part 2: From Refreeze to Reunification, Central European History, Vol. 33., No. 3.

Craig, G. (1994): Did Ostpolitik work? The Path to German Reunification, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.1, p. 162-7

Dannenberg, W. (2008): The Foundations of Ostpolitik, New York, Boston University Press

Hanrieder , W. (1989) : Germany, America, Europe: Forty years of German foreign policy, Paderborn, Schöningh

Korbel, J. (1972): Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?, Princeton, Princeton University Press

Korte, K. (1998): The Art of Power: The Kohl System, Leadership and Deutschlandspolitik, German Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 64-90

Lippert, W. (2011) : The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma, Providence, Berghahn books

84

Ludlow, N. (2007): European integration and the Cold War, Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, New York, Routledge

Meissner, B. (1970): Die Deutsche Politik 1961-1970. Kontinuität und Wandel, Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik

Merseburger, P. (2002): Willy Brandt. Visionär und Realist, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt

Müller, H. (1999): Dějiny Německa, Praha, Nakladatelství Lidové Noviny

Nielsen. K. (2010): Haunted by the ghost of Willy Brandt, Tartu, University of Tartu

OʼBrien,A. (2010): Opening the Iron Curtain: The Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, Dublin, University College Dublin

Plšková, J. (1999): Východní politika Brandtovy vlády, Praha, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů

Popovich,S. (2012): Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik: The Changing Role in United States- West German Relations, Claremont, Scripps College

Říchová, B. (2006): Přehled moderních politologických teórií, Praha, Portál

Sarotte, M. (2001): Dealing with the devil, London, The University of North Carolina Press

Spaulding, R. (1997): Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer, Providence, Berghahn books

Weber, J. (2004): Germany 1945-1990: A parallel history, Budapest, Central European University Press

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Wolfram, F. (1980): The Foreign Policy of West Germany, France and Britain, London, Prentice Hall College

7.3 Internet sources

All sources verified to 10. 12. 2013 http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/salt

http://www.worldology.com/Europe/world_war_2_effect.htm http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/366654/Marshall-Plan http://www.theartofgoodgovernment.org/berlinwall.html http://www.coldwar.org/articles/1940s/berlin_blockade.asp http://bio.bwbs.de/bwbs_biografie/Hallstein_Doctrine_G136.html http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/425069/Oder-Neisse-Line http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-presents-his-open-skies-plan http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24t6.htm http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/BerlinCrises http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx http://electionresources.org/de/bundestag.php?election=1965 http://countrystudies.us/germany/53.htm

86 http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/18281/kniefall_vor_der_ges chichte.html?o=position-ASCENDING&s=1&r=1&a=18281&c=1 http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d- 43822427.html?name=KNIEFALL+ANGEMESSEN+ODER+%26Uuml%3BBERTRIE BEN%3F http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/staff/hart/pubs/brandt_schmidt_case1.pdf http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/brandt_willy.shtml http://www.berlinermaueronline.de/geschichte/fluchtzahlen.htm http://www.1000dokumente.de/ http://www.digitalisiertedrucke.de/ http://www.jstor.org/

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