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Brandt and the Policy of Ostpolitik

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Brandt and the Policy of Ostpolitik Brandt and the policy of Ostpolitik Learning objective: to identify how relations between East and West Germany improved Today’s Challenges summarise Brandt’s career examine Ostpolitik policy assess the success of Brandt’s policy Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? LO: Starter: Complete To describe the Cold War tension your date, key which surrounded Berlin 4/5 learning and starter sheet. Be To explain how Willy Brandt ready to share improved relations with your ideas! East Germany and the USSR 6/7 To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Disagreements over how to deal with the German Disagreements over how to deal with the German question resulted in tension and arguments that led to question resulted in tension and arguments that led to the Cold War. the Cold War. Stalin’s fear of a strong unified Germany put him at odds Stalin’s fear of a strong unified Germany put him at odds with American policy to establish an economically strong with American policy to establish an economically strong state which was able to trade effectively and freely with state which was able to trade effectively and freely with the West. the West. The resulting Berlin blockade increased tension further, The resulting Berlin blockade increased tension further, with the possibility of Marshall Aid planes being shot with the possibility of Marshall Aid planes being shot down by the Red Army. down by the Red Army. The poor relations between East and West Germany and The poor relations between East and West Germany and the dangerous Cold War atmosphere of the Berlin Wall the dangerous Cold War atmosphere of the Berlin Wall persuaded some West German politicians to find ways of persuaded some West German politicians to find ways of improving relations between east and west. improving relations between east and west. What caused tension between Stalin/USSR (East Germany) and USA What caused tension between Stalin/USSR (East Germany) and USA (West Germany)? (West Germany)? _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ Why did some German politicians begin to find ways to improve Why did some German politicians begin to find ways to improve relations between East and West Germany? relations between East and West Germany? _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ Challenge: Why was the Cold War such a tense time? Challenge: Why was the Cold War such a tense time? _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? Challenge: Why was Berlin a point of tension within the Cold War? LO: To describe the Cold War tension Watch the clip and answer on your whiteboard. which surrounded Berlin 4/5 Be ready to share your knowledge! To explain how Willy Brandt improved Berlin caused tension within the Cold War because… relations with East Germany and the USSR 6/7 To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? Brandt adopted a policy of “Ostpolitic”. Keyword: Ostpolitik meant reconciliation/making amends with East Germany and the USSR. LO: To describe the As part of his Ostpolitic, Brandt had a number of policies aimed at Cold War tension reconciliation with East Germany. Arrange them in order from most which surrounded Berlin 4/5 to least successful and be ready to justify your answer! To explain how Challenge: Why was Willy Brandt Willy Brandt so eager improved to make amends with relations with East Germany and East Germany and the the USSR 6/7 USSR? To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? Task: Watch the clip and use your card sort to answer the following question: LO: How successful were Willy Brandt’s policies in rectifying To describe the Cold War tension relations between East and West Germany? which surrounded Berlin 4/5 Willy Brandt’s policies were successful because… To explain how Willy Brandt improved relations with East Germany and the USSR 6/7 To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? Explain why Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik led to the reunification of Germany in 1991 (8 marks) LO: To describe the Cold War tension which surrounded Berlin 4/5 To explain how Willy Brandt improved relations with East Germany and the USSR 6/7 To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Key learning: Why was Willy Brandt important in causing the reunification of Germany? Answer the question on your whiteboard. Try to answer in 240 characters or less! LO: Willy Brandt was important in causing the reunification of Germany because… To describe the Cold War tension which surrounded Berlin 4/5 To explain how Willy Brandt improved relations with East Germany and the USSR 6/7 To evaluate the success of Willy Brandt’s policies 8/9 Brandt’s policy: OSTPOLITIK • Brandt organized a non-aggression treaty between West Germany and the USSR. This was known as the Treaty of Moscow. By signing the treaty (agreement) both the Allies, West Germany and the USSR pledged not to use any force against eachother. • Brandt organized an agreement with Poland that ensured that Poland would have land returned back to them which was taken in WWII. • Brandt kneeling in homage at the memorial to Polish Jews killed by the Nazis in the Warsaw ghetto showed the world that West Germany was apologetic for its actions in WWII. • Acceptance of the four-power division of Berlin as permanent. The Agreement laid the foundation for a series of East-West agreements which accompanied in the period usually known as Détente (cooperation). It also reestablished ties between the two parts of Berlin, improved travel and communications between the two parts of the city and brought numerous improvements for the residents of the Western Sectors. • Brandt organize a Basic Treaty in 1972 between East and West Germany in which they agreed to exchange diplomatic missions, increase cross-border contacts and respect each other’s independence. Brandt organized a non-aggression treaty between Brandt organized an Brandt kneeling in West Germany and the USSR. This was known as the agreement with Poland that homage at the memorial Treaty of Moscow. By signing the treaty (agreement) ensured that Poland would to Polish Jews killed by both the Allies, West Germany and the USSR pledged have land returned back to the Nazis in the not to use any force against eachother. them which was taken in Warsaw ghetto showed WWII. the world that West Germany was apologetic for its actions in WWII. Acceptance of the four-power division of Berlin as Brandt organize a Basic permanent. The Agreement laid the foundation for a Treaty in 1972 between East series of East-West agreements which accompanied and West Germany in which in the period usually known as Détente (cooperation). they agreed to exchange It also reestablished ties between the two parts of diplomatic missions, increase Berlin, improved travel and communications between cross-border contacts and the two parts of the city and brought numerous respect each other’s improvements for the residents of the Western independence. Sectors. Was the policy successful? Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 in recognition of his efforts. The results of Ostpolitik saw improved relations between East and West Germany. Both countries were now part of the United Nations. Travel and communications were easier and trade increased throughout the 1970s. ASK Plenary… A – what has your attitude to learning been in today’s lesson? How do you know this? How will you improve or maintain this next lesson? S – what skills have you used in today’s lesson? Where else can you use them? K – what do you know now that you didn’t know before today’s lesson? Today’s Challenges summarise Brandt’s career examine Ostpolitik policy assess the success of Brandt’s policy.
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