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Home , Donald Tusk, Ostpolitik

ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ

http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2016-7-1(22)-116-121 ’S NEW OSTPOLITIK

Gilbert Doctorow

When the came down in 1989 The generalized failure of International and the possibility of German reunifi cation arose, Relations professionals, not to mention lay setting on the immediate to-do list of Europe journalists and the broad public, to get its and of the broader trans-Atlantic community collective mind around the German problem the realization of political ambitions that dated begins in Germany itself. I propose to examine from the very start of the , there were that fi rst, then to look into the conceptual forebodings in France and the U.K. that there limitations that prevail in the , the could be trouble ahead. As President Francois single greatest arbiter of world opinion on all Mitterand reportedly joked with regard to his international matters large and small. I will end own misgivings, he liked Germany so much this survey with a look into the reactions to the that he wanted there to be two of them. changing role and ambitions of Germany within At a minimum, Germany’s European Russia, which surely has to be one o f the most allies feared that the new more powerful interested powers in what is occurring. Germany would break free of the constraints of the European Economic Community and * * * NATO to defi ne an independent path serving In Germany, the post-reunifi cation move its own interests. There was particular concern of its capital from what was intended to be that Germany might strike a strategic deal with its temporary site in Bonn to the city which Russia to secure peace in Europe without the forged the German nation, Berlin, was always Americans and at the expense of the West. considered to hold potential for a change in the However, with the encouragement political culture of the country. But the most of both Russia and the United States, common supposition was always a change from German Chancellor seized the Western and free thinking to Prussian opportunity and proceeded posthaste with military tradition and . reunifi cation while remaining fi rmly anchored Changes in geopolitical calculations inherent in to the other member states of the EEC and a move of the center of gravity away from the NATO. The fears of the French and the British French--Dutch-Belgian borders to over Germany’s reliability as a partner in the neighborhood of were not given due what became the proved consideration. to be misplaced. Yet, German reunifi cation Now the reality of the new neighborhood and the move of the capital back to Berlin intrudes into the daily life of Germany’s ultimately have resulted in other challenges statesmen and federal offi cials. When you visit to the European order which one could hardly a Kaufhof department store in downtown Berlin have envisioned back in 1989. As I argue in today, you fi nd that directions inside the store are this essay, they have contributed mightily to given also in Polish, and many of the shoppers the unfolding Ukraine crisis and to the present are indeed Poles on day trips. When you speak East-West confrontation that looks very much to German Mittelstand factory owners based in like a New Cold War. Berlin today you hear how one or another slips

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across the border during working hours to look militarism, Germany since reunifi cation has in on his production sites in Poland. fallen under the sway of trends in political and It is reasonable to expect that the changed societal thinking coming from the West. neighborhood infl uences German state policy, Germany has adopted not only the whether or not it is the subject of an ideology or acquis, the entire body of EU law, but also EU a doctrine. Indeed, within Germany today there mythology. This means, fi rst of all, universal is no such ideology or even consciousness of its values that act as a comprehensive smoke screen special place in Europe, because, in her 10 years for national egoism, one that is more persuasive in power, has made a virtue of than mere deference to France ever could be. down-to-earth pragmatism. She has eschewed Both parties of the German coalition any “big vision” such as her predecessor government, representing the bulk of the Helmut Kohl took pride in.1 Moreover, political country’s political establishment, share the correctness in Germany today blinds its citizens enthusiasm for the secular religion that has to the possibility of there being a home-grown settled in the European Institutions in Brussels. foreign policy in general and an Ostpolitik in We may call this a religion because it rests on particular. unprovable postulates that are taken on faith by The suggestion that Germany has reverted believers to be the highest truth. to the geopolitical and economic domination of The fi rst article of this modern day a neighborhood that in the pre-WWI decades catechism is that authoritarian regimes cannot was called Mitteleuropa would strike German live in peace with democratic nations. This is political observers as odd, even antiquarian. so because authoritarian regimes are necessarily The notion that Germany has re-entered a brittle; they do not enjoy the support of the people direct competition with Russia for control of and when challenged by domestic opponents the Balkans and southeastern Europe through they must defl ect attention from themselves Ukraine to the Caucasus would be seen as a by inventing enemies abroad, undertaking acts provocation. of aggression that build international tension From the 1960s to the new millennium, and facilitate isolation from the greater world. Germany was always the most powerful partner Another key article of faith is that foreign in the French-German tandem that was at the policy must be built on values of democracy core of what has become the European Union. and protection of human rights plus rule of law. With a backward glance at its inglorious past It is outdated at best and immoral at worst to in WWII, Germany gladly took the rear seat to ground foreign policy on national interests. France in representing Europe to the world. The issue is highly relevant to any Today the place of France in keeping discussion of Germany’s new Ostpolitik, Germany out of the limelight has been assumed because in practical terms the aforementioned by Brussels. As a good European citizen, articles of faith provide justifi cation in German Germany defers to Brussels to speak on its mainstream thinking for breaking with Moscow, behalf. This is, of course, a convenient fi ction ending business as usual with a regime that gets given that all of the European Institutions – the poor grades in democracy, human rights and the Commission, the Council and the Parliament – rule of law.2 The allegedly authoritarian regime are now led by offi cials who have effectively of Vladimir Putin is held up as a textbook been chosen and supported by Angela Merkel case of aggression abroad. In the view of the and her party. political establishment in Brussels and in But if Germany pulls the strings of Berlin, the annexation of Crimea and assistance power in Brussels, the concepts guiding the to separatists in Donbass are instrumentalized exercise of that power are pan-European. Far from reverting to Prussian conservatism and 2 Doctorow, Gilbert. 2015 Schlangenbad Dialogue: the East-West Confrontation in Microcosm / Lalibre blogs, 1 Packer, George. The Quiet German. The May 12, 2015. Mode of access: http://usforeignpolicy. Astonishing Rise of Angela Merkel, the Most blogs.lalibre.be/archive/2015/05/12/2015- Powerful Woman in the World // The New Yorker, schlangenbad-dialogue-the-east-west-confrontation- December 1, 2014. in-mi-1143250.html. COMPARATIVE POLITICS . 1 (22) / 2016 117 ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ

by Putin and his entourage to rally the nation to outside Germany have assumed this was done its side and foil domestic opposition. under US pressure and against the interests of There are many features of the European her own country. Within Germany, that view Union policy that work splendidly to Germany’s has been propagated only by the small far Left special advantage today. The has been a opposition party, Die Linke, with fewer than boon to the export-led German economy by 10% of deputies in the .3 its intrinsic discount to the overly powerful No serious examination has yet been done . The bail-outs of failing the into the relative advantages to the German southern Member States after the fi nancial crisis economy of its trade and investment with of 2008 paid off German creditors on what were Russia versus the benefi ts accruing to Germany arguably ill-considered loans. All of this is kept from its close economic integration with from public discussion in Germany; it is buried Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as other within EU formulations of solidarity. former Soviet bloc countries now inside the Similarly, the premature accession of a EU. They are, after all, major subcontractors number of the new Member States from the to German industry, usually without full cycle former Soviet bloc served German economic production in the country, meaning they are aggrandizement handsomely. And where the suppliers of components and subassemblies unbalanced relationship and grievances from while full value from overseas sales is enjoyed the past have proven thorny, as in the case of in Germany. Poland under the rule of the Kaczynski brothers When the calculations are done, it may well earlier in the new millennium, Germany has turn out that the strategic partnership with Russia made a special effort to establish peace by could be sacrifi ced on the altar of German national acceding to the foreign policy ambitions of economic interest without reference to the more these neighbors in what concerns the lands subjective and disputable altar of geostrategic farther to the East. Hence, Germany’s blind eye orientation. Acquiescence in the anti-Russian to the Russia-bashing policies and irresponsible policies of these neighborhood partners may be a efforts to tear Ukraine from the Russian sphere small price for Germany to pay. of privileged relations such as fl ourished under At a recent high-level German-Russian Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk or under conference, under the aegis of the main think Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė. tank of the SPD, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Indeed, even when the price of these imprudent the U.S. role in the confl ict with Russia over policies became clear in terms of the emerging Ukraine was not invoked once in the course crisis in Ukraine, Angela Merkel proceeded of three days of intense discussions.4 The with the warm relations by overseeing Tusk’s conceptual framework of participants was installment as president. strictly limited to the EU’s well-meaning efforts From the moment when sanctions against to meet the aspirations of Ukrainians and put Russia came onto the agenda of the EU them on a path to improved governance, greater following Crimea’s annexation (or reunifi cation democracy, and economic reform through the with Russia, depending on one’s political Association Agreement with the EU. The standpoint), there were commentators who problem, on the European side, if any existed, argued that Germany would not support sanctions or would water them down. These 3 See, for example, the fi ery speech of Die analysts pointed to the more than 20 billion euro Linke parliamentarian Sahra Wagenknecht in of German capital invested in Russia and the December, 2014 / Russia Insider. Mode of access: 300,000 German workers who depend for their http://russia-insider.com/en/sahra_wagenknecht_ livelihood on good relations with Moscow. speech. 4 Instead, as 2014 progressed, Chancellor Doctorow, Gilbert. 2015 Schlangenbad Dialogue: the Merkel emerged as the Continent’s leading East-West Confrontation in Microcosm / Lalibre blogs, May 12, 2015. Mode of access: http://usforeignpolicy. proponent of tough sanctions against Russia, blogs.lalibre.be/archive/2015/05/12/2015- riding herd over the 28 Member States to ensure schlangenbad-dialogue-the-east-west-confrontation- compliance and support. Political observers in-mi-1143250.html.

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was a failure to appreciate Russia’s red lines. The small minority that does not accept In summation, although establishing the Washington narrative also ignores Europe hegemony in its neighborhood and extending and Germany within it as independent factors that neighborhood to Ukraine for the sake of in the confl ict. We may take as the leading economic and political profi t at the expense of example the writings and public appearances Russia fi gures nowhere in German thinking, of Professor John Mearsheimer, author of including expert thinking of specialists in the controversial essay published by Foreign relations with Russia, German deeds tell a Affairs magazine on why the West is to be different story. In that sense, the smoke-screen blamed for the Ukraine crisis.6 The ‘West’ of EU foreign policy to explain the crisis with is taken to mean the United States, since the Russia amounts to dangerous self-deception. leading causal factor in the outbreak of the Germany controls Brussels in the fi nal analysis confl ict, in Mearsheimer’s view, was NATO and its own actions of backing Polish and expansion and, in particular, the possibility of Baltic revanchism incrementally have put it NATO accession for Ukraine. NATO accession on a collision course with Russian geopolitical has been and remains an America-sponsored interests. Hence, the Ukraine crisis. proposal which met repeatedly with resistance from Europe, most famously at the April 2008 * * * NATO Summit in where Germany Meanwhile, in the United States the and France decisively defeated the American prevailing view of the driving forces in the initiative on the subject. Ukraine crisis and of the broader East-West As a counterpoint to the observations made confrontation is a mirror-image of what exists in above regarding the German establishment Germany. The confl ict as seen across the Atlantic conference in Schlangenbad, we can make is grounded in the US-Russian relationship. The reference to a conference in Washington, D.C. role of Europe in general and of Germany, in held in the Hart Senate Offi ce Building in late particular, is taken to be zero. This thinking cuts March 2014. During a full day of discussions of across the whole spectrum of American politics. the causes and possible solutions to the Ukraine The American foreign policy establishment standoff with Russia, only one speaker directed takes it to be axiomatic that Germany is a loyal attention to Europe’s role in bringing on the follower of American policy in dealing with crisis.7 Russia’s violation of the post-Cold War order * * * through its annexation of Ukraine and support to the separatists in Donbass. When and For much of 2014, the East-West con- if Germany fails to snap to attention, extra, frontation over Ukraine was viewed in Russia behind-the-scenes arm-twisting does the trick, in terms of the old adversarial relations with as Vice President Biden boasted earlier this the United States. This is entirely understand- year, and then Germans perform as expected, able given that throughout the Cold War the bringing Europe along with them.5 USSR measured itself only against the United The few specialists in Russian affairs, who States. Europe never counted as an indepen- also pay attention to German domestic politics, dent force. take the existence of a Ukraine crisis as a given Insofar as Germany received the attention and look at how German policy towards Russia of Russian political observers at all, it was ex- has evolved since, rather than examine the pected to continue its traditional role as Russia’s possibility of Germany having been a causal advocate within the EU. Even when Chancellor factor in the genesis of the crisis. 6 Mearsheimer, John. Why the Ukraine Crisis is 5 Every rule has its exceptions. George Friedman the West’s Fault // Foreign Affairs, September- takes such a view when he describes Germany October, 2014. as an independent actor and ‘signifi cant player’ 7 Presentations to U.S.-Russia Forum, Washington in the Ukraine crisis. See, Germany Emerges // DC, March 25-26, 2015. Mode of access: http:// Stratfor Global Intelligence, February 10, 2015. newcoldwar.org/presentations-to-u-s-russia- However, Friedman does not develop this. forum-in-washington-dc-march-25-26-2015/. COMPARATIVE POLITICS . 1 (22) / 2016 119 ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ

Merkel clearly was pursuing quite a different The Grand Chessboard that Ukraine must be position as enforcer of the sanctions, Russian excised from the Russian sphere of infl uence analysts were in no rush to reassess relations to prevent Russia’s return to great power sta- with Germany. The reappraisal began only this tus. Thus, Germany was given the green light year, when the zigzags in the Chancellor’s poli- by Washington to proceed. cies, in particular, her leading role in bringing The problem with Shishkin’s thesis is that about the Minsk-2 accords, suggested that Ger- it sets out a German program which no one in many was an independent actor with its own Germany would recognize, which has no con- agenda. temporary authors or supporters. Instead, the In a sign that the mainstream Russian answer to the puzzle is more banal, though no foreign policy analysts have indeed taken less dangerous for world peace. notice of the issue, one can cite recent remarks As I noted at the start, no ideology has by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the journal been crafted in Germany to drive its actions Russia in Global Affairs. In an interview with in the East. But these actions incrementally Max Fisher published in the US, Lukyanov have put it on a collision course with Russian noted that the change in German conduct to geopolitical interests. The Russians did not see a hard line on Russia was at fi rst attributed to this coming, just as the Germans, for the most American pressure, but fi nally, that explanation part, were surprised at how they had triggered was not persuasive: “We wanted to believe that a violent Russian reaction. And yet it was a this change was entirely because of American major causal factor in the current confl ict over pressure on Germany. I spent two months Ukraine, no less than NATO expansion engi- in Germany earlier this year, and I can say neered by the United States. American pressure is there, of course. But We may earnestly hope that the crisis in in fact, it’s much deeper. This is really about Donbas will become nothing worse than a fro- Germany repositioning itself as the European zen confl ict or even fi nd resolution should the power.”8 So far Lukyanov has not developed political provisions of the Minsk-2 accords be this idea further. fully implemented. But the bigger issues of the One Russian researcher who has devel- operating principles and intellectual horizons oped it into a complex and comprehensive ex- guiding American, Russian and German poli- planation is Igor Shishkin, deputy director of cies in Eastern and Southeastern Europe must the Institute of CIS Countries in Moscow. On be properly understood if there is not to be an- 15 March, he published a 20-page essay en- other acute East-West confl ict in the medium titled “Merkel and the Fourth Reich.” Shishkin term. Such proper in-depth analysis will devote posits Frau Merkel with an ambitious policy of all due attention to Germany’s new Ostpolitik, putting Russia down in the service of German both at the subjective and objective levels. economic and political interests. He tells us that Germany integrated the GDR immediately after 1989, then spent anoth- er 15 years digesting the former Pact countries from which it extracted enormous wealth as colonial overlord. Now in Ukraine Germany is poised to realize its centuries-long ambition of Drang Nach Osten – to obtain control of the enormously productive farm- land of Ukraine and its mineral wealth. Here Germany’s national aspirations coincided with Washington’s geopolitical strategy dating from 1997 when explained in

8 Why One of Russia’s Top Foreign Policy Experts is Worried about a Major War with Europe / Vox Topics, Johnson’s Russia List, No. 91, May 7, 2015. 120 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА . 1 (22) / 2016 ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ

Germany’s New Ostpolitik

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD, the European Coordinator of The American Committee for East-West Accord, based in Brussels

Abstract: A survey of perceptions of Germany’s new Ostpolitik in Russia, the United States and Germany. The author argues that Germany’s abandonment of its strategic alliance with Russia by assuming the lead on sanctions within the EU has not received due attention of experts because it is not supported by any doctrine within Germany itself. The new Ostpolitik is the product of many small steps. It is the consequence of Germany’s uncritical acceptance of democracy promotion as the guideline to foreign policy coming from Brussels and of Berlin’s political accommodation with its neighborhood, the new EU Member States to the East, bringing their revanchism and hostility to Russia into the EU institutions that Germany controls. Key words: Germany, Ostpolitik, Russia, economic sanctions, doctrine, foreign policy, EU, NATO.

Новая восточная политика Германии

Гилберт Доктороу, PhD, европейский координатор Американского комитета за согласие между Востоком и Западом (Брюссель)

Аннотация: В настоящей статье предлагается обзор восприятий новой немец- кой восточной политики (Остполитик) в России, США и в самой Германии. Автор считает, что отказ Германии от стратегического партнерства с Россией в связи со своим решением активно продвигать санкции против Кремля не получил долж- ного внимания экспертов, поскольку эти изменения не подкреплены никакой новой доктриной внутри страны. Новую немецкую Остполитик можно концептуализи- ровать только в ходе анализа многих конкретных шагов. Такая политика является следствием некритического принятия тезисов о продвижении демократии, кото- рые стали новым руководящим принципом внешних сношений, в сочетании с поли- тическими компромиссами Берлина в отношениях со своими соседями среди новых членов ЕС. Реваншизм и враждебность к России этих государств были привнесены ими в центральные учреждения ЕС, где доминирующие позиции занимает именно Германия. Ключевые слова: Германия, Остполитик, восточная политика, экономические санк- ции, доктрина, внешняя политика, Европейский Союз, НАТО.

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