ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2016-7-1(22)-116-121 GERMANY’S NEW OSTPOLITIK Gilbert Doctorow When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 The generalized failure of International and the possibility of German reunifi cation arose, Relations professionals, not to mention lay setting on the immediate to-do list of Europe journalists and the broad public, to get its and of the broader trans-Atlantic community collective mind around the German problem the realization of political ambitions that dated begins in Germany itself. I propose to examine from the very start of the Cold War, there were that fi rst, then to look into the conceptual forebodings in France and the U.K. that there limitations that prevail in the United States, the could be trouble ahead. As President Francois single greatest arbiter of world opinion on all Mitterand reportedly joked with regard to his international matters large and small. I will end own misgivings, he liked Germany so much this survey with a look into the reactions to the that he wanted there to be two of them. changing role and ambitions of Germany within At a minimum, Germany’s European Russia, which surely has to be one o f the most allies feared that the new more powerful interested powers in what is occurring. Germany would break free of the constraints of the European Economic Community and * * * NATO to defi ne an independent path serving In Germany, the post-reunifi cation move its own interests. There was particular concern of its capital from what was intended to be that Germany might strike a strategic deal with its temporary site in Bonn to the city which Russia to secure peace in Europe without the forged the German nation, Berlin, was always Americans and at the expense of the West. considered to hold potential for a change in the However, with the encouragement political culture of the country. But the most of both Russia and the United States, common supposition was always a change from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl seized the Western liberalism and free thinking to Prussian opportunity and proceeded posthaste with military tradition and social conservatism. reunifi cation while remaining fi rmly anchored Changes in geopolitical calculations inherent in to the other member states of the EEC and a move of the center of gravity away from the NATO. The fears of the French and the British French-Luxembourg-Dutch-Belgian borders to over Germany’s reliability as a partner in the neighborhood of Poland were not given due what became the European Union proved consideration. to be misplaced. Yet, German reunifi cation Now the reality of the new neighborhood and the move of the capital back to Berlin intrudes into the daily life of Germany’s ultimately have resulted in other challenges statesmen and federal offi cials. When you visit to the European order which one could hardly a Kaufhof department store in downtown Berlin have envisioned back in 1989. As I argue in today, you fi nd that directions inside the store are this essay, they have contributed mightily to given also in Polish, and many of the shoppers the unfolding Ukraine crisis and to the present are indeed Poles on day trips. When you speak East-West confrontation that looks very much to German Mittelstand factory owners based in like a New Cold War. Berlin today you hear how one or another slips 116 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА . 1 (22) / 2016 ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ across the border during working hours to look militarism, Germany since reunifi cation has in on his production sites in Poland. fallen under the sway of trends in political and It is reasonable to expect that the changed societal thinking coming from the West. neighborhood infl uences German state policy, Germany has adopted not only the whether or not it is the subject of an ideology or acquis, the entire body of EU law, but also EU a doctrine. Indeed, within Germany today there mythology. This means, fi rst of all, universal is no such ideology or even consciousness of its values that act as a comprehensive smoke screen special place in Europe, because, in her 10 years for national egoism, one that is more persuasive in power, Angela Merkel has made a virtue of than mere deference to France ever could be. down-to-earth pragmatism. She has eschewed Both parties of the German coalition any “big vision” such as her predecessor government, representing the bulk of the Helmut Kohl took pride in.1 Moreover, political country’s political establishment, share the correctness in Germany today blinds its citizens enthusiasm for the secular religion that has to the possibility of there being a home-grown settled in the European Institutions in Brussels. foreign policy in general and an Ostpolitik in We may call this a religion because it rests on particular. unprovable postulates that are taken on faith by The suggestion that Germany has reverted believers to be the highest truth. to the geopolitical and economic domination of The fi rst article of this modern day a neighborhood that in the pre-WWI decades catechism is that authoritarian regimes cannot was called Mitteleuropa would strike German live in peace with democratic nations. This is political observers as odd, even antiquarian. so because authoritarian regimes are necessarily The notion that Germany has re-entered a brittle; they do not enjoy the support of the people direct competition with Russia for control of and when challenged by domestic opponents the Balkans and southeastern Europe through they must defl ect attention from themselves Ukraine to the Caucasus would be seen as a by inventing enemies abroad, undertaking acts provocation. of aggression that build international tension From the 1960s to the new millennium, and facilitate isolation from the greater world. Germany was always the most powerful partner Another key article of faith is that foreign in the French-German tandem that was at the policy must be built on values of democracy core of what has become the European Union. and protection of human rights plus rule of law. With a backward glance at its inglorious past It is outdated at best and immoral at worst to in WWII, Germany gladly took the rear seat to ground foreign policy on national interests. France in representing Europe to the world. The issue is highly relevant to any Today the place of France in keeping discussion of Germany’s new Ostpolitik, Germany out of the limelight has been assumed because in practical terms the aforementioned by Brussels. As a good European citizen, articles of faith provide justifi cation in German Germany defers to Brussels to speak on its mainstream thinking for breaking with Moscow, behalf. This is, of course, a convenient fi ction ending business as usual with a regime that gets given that all of the European Institutions – the poor grades in democracy, human rights and the Commission, the Council and the Parliament – rule of law.2 The allegedly authoritarian regime are now led by offi cials who have effectively of Vladimir Putin is held up as a textbook been chosen and supported by Angela Merkel case of aggression abroad. In the view of the and her party. political establishment in Brussels and in But if Germany pulls the strings of Berlin, the annexation of Crimea and assistance power in Brussels, the concepts guiding the to separatists in Donbass are instrumentalized exercise of that power are pan-European. Far from reverting to Prussian conservatism and 2 Doctorow, Gilbert. 2015 Schlangenbad Dialogue: the East-West Confrontation in Microcosm / Lalibre blogs, 1 Packer, George. The Quiet German. The May 12, 2015. Mode of access: http://usforeignpolicy. Astonishing Rise of Angela Merkel, the Most blogs.lalibre.be/archive/2015/05/12/2015- Powerful Woman in the World // The New Yorker, schlangenbad-dialogue-the-east-west-confrontation- December 1, 2014. in-mi-1143250.html. COMPARATIVE POLITICS . 1 (22) / 2016 117 ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ ЗАМЕТКИ by Putin and his entourage to rally the nation to outside Germany have assumed this was done its side and foil domestic opposition. under US pressure and against the interests of There are many features of the European her own country. Within Germany, that view Union policy that work splendidly to Germany’s has been propagated only by the small far Left special advantage today. The Euro has been a opposition party, Die Linke, with fewer than boon to the export-led German economy by 10% of deputies in the Bundestag.3 its intrinsic discount to the overly powerful No serious examination has yet been done Deutsche mark. The bail-outs of failing the into the relative advantages to the German southern Member States after the fi nancial crisis economy of its trade and investment with of 2008 paid off German creditors on what were Russia versus the benefi ts accruing to Germany arguably ill-considered loans. All of this is kept from its close economic integration with from public discussion in Germany; it is buried Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as other within EU formulations of solidarity. former Soviet bloc countries now inside the Similarly, the premature accession of a EU. They are, after all, major subcontractors number of the new Member States from the to German industry, usually without full cycle former Soviet bloc served German economic production in the country, meaning they are aggrandizement handsomely. And where the suppliers of components and subassemblies unbalanced relationship and grievances from while full value from overseas sales is enjoyed the past have proven thorny, as in the case of in Germany.