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Access/Checkpoint Issu 1325_INDEX 11/30/07 1:16 PM Page 1103 310-567/B428-S/11005 Index References are to document numbers Abrasimov, Pyotr A., 54, 261 Acheson, Dean—Continued Bundesversammlung in West Berlin, Ostpolitik, 143, 146, 149, 150, 155 2 Soviet-U.S. relations, 254 Four Power talks/negotiations on Ackerson, Col. Frederick, 279 Berlin: Adenauer, Konrad, 164, 335 Access/checkpoint issues, 293, 295 Adzhubei, Alexei, 138 Acrimonious discussions between Africa, 335 Soviet-British-French Agnew, Spiro T., 6, 126 ambassadors, 291 Agriculture, 335 Agreement (final), 327, 329 Ahlers, Conrad, 15, 16, 79, 115, 154, 254 Agreement (tentative), 281, 296 Akalovsky, Alexander, 212, 214, 270, 323 Air corridors to Berlin closed, 121 Albania, 335 Ambassadorial meetings, Allott, Gordon, 196 December 11, 1970, 144 Alphand, Hervé, 153 Ambassadorial meetings, May 25, Alsop, Joseph R., Jr., 22 1971, 242 Anderson, David, 362 Ambassadorial meetings, August Apollo missions: 10-12, 1971, 284, 286, 287 11, 22 Ambassadorial meetings, August 12, 44 16-18, 1971, 293, 295 13, 78 Draft agreement, Soviet, 210, 215, Arabs. See Middle East. 222 Arendt, Walter, 150 Draft agreement, Western, 242 Argentina, 336 Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings, 152, Ash, Roy L., 378 168 Audland, Christopher J., 199 Kissinger-Ehmke meetings, 151 Austria, 372 Kissinger’s assessments, 166 Nixon-Soviet leadership Bahr, Egon, 44, 228 communications, 166 Brandt, no-confidence motion Passport issues, 281, 296 submitted against, 358 Private negotiation channels, 207, Brandt’s review of global affairs, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 255 217, 221, 226, 227 Four Power talks/negotiations on Rush, meetings with, 114, 251, 281 Berlin (see also Bahr-Kohl Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings, 243, 263 (Michael) parallel negotiations Rush’s assessments, 122, 196 and Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings Sonnenfeldt’s assessments, 170 under Four Power talks/ Soviet presence in West Berlin, 250, negotiations on Berlin): 270, 272, 281, 284, 295 Access/checkpoint issues, 188, 210, Paris, assignment to, 230 224, 264, 266, 292 Access/checkpoint issues in Berlin (see Agreement (final), 329, 349 also under Four Power talks/ Agreement (tentative), 271, 274, negotiations on Berlin), 33, 34 275, 277, 308, 313 Acheson, Dean, 133 Ambassadorial meetings, Four Power talks/negotiations on November 17–18, 1970, 137 Berlin, 149 Ambassadorial meetings, May Nixon, meetings with, 140 17–18, 1971, 239, 240 1103 1325_INDEX 11/30/07 1:16 PM Page 1104 310-567/B428-S/11005 1104 Index Bahr, Egon—Continued Bahr, Egon—Continued Four Power talks/negotiations on Four Power talks/negotiations on Berlin—Continued Berlin—Continued Ambassadorial meetings, August Sonnenfeldt’s assessments, 222, 381 10–12, 1971, 287 Soviet presence in West Berlin, 230, Assessments conveyed to U.S. State 257, 274 Department, 67 Tactics for the wrap-up Backchannel discussions between ambassadorial meetings, 270 Kissinger/Rush/Bahr, 171, Traffic issues, 182, 183, 264, 265, 266 172, 183, 187 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 36 Brandt’s trip to U.S., 80 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Central Intelligence Agency’s 36, 140 assessments, 87, 146, 150 Ostpolitik (see also Treaty listings Draft agreement, Soviet, 215, 224, below): 230, 234, 235 Assessments conveyed to European alliance/unity, 68 Kissinger, 134 Falin, communications with, 210 Brandt’s U.S. trip, 79 Falin, meetings with, 157 Central Intelligence Agency’s Fazio, meetings with, 168 assessments, 146, 150, 164 Federal presence in Berlin, West Ehmke’s trip to U.S. (proposed), 150 German, 174, 224, 243, 248, Gromyko, meetings with, 74, 79, 249, 264, 265, 266 85, 91 Fessenden-Sahm meetings, 154 Hillenbrand, meetings with, 107 Gromyko, meetings with, 59, 68, Kissinger, communications with, 70, 84 85, 102 Hillenbrand, meetings with, 107 Kissinger, meetings with, 76, 108 Kissinger, communications with, Kissinger, meetings with 102, 167, 168, 192, 215, 249, (proposed), 222 264, 265, 275, 308, 349 Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt Kissinger, meetings with, 224, 226, communications, 146 257 New York Times, coverage of, 151 Kissinger, meetings with Rush, meetings with, 91 (proposed), 222 Rush’s assessments, 92 Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings, 178, Sonnenfeldt’s assessments, 222 183, 262 Sonnenfeldt’s European trip, 89 Kissinger-Rush communications, Soviet officials, meetings with, 138, 210, 263, 265, 266, 270, 271, 141 274, 277 Renunciation-of-force agreements, 56, Leaking information, 243 97 Legal formula as to status, 226, Soviet-East German relations, 36 228, 235 Soviet-U.S. relations, 330, 331 Linkage between Berlin settlement Soviet-West German relations: and other issues, 83 Brandt upgrades negotiations with National Security Council’s Soviets, 50 assessments, 139 Gromyko, meetings with, 61, 68 Nixon, communications with, 236, Kissinger, communications with, 50 237, 238 Kissinger, meetings with, 36 Nixon-Brandt meetings, 254 Moscow trip (actual), 55 Rights/responsibilities, four power, Moscow trip (proposed), 51 374, 381, 382 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 80, Rush, development of the 108, 243 relationship with, 210 Treaty of Moscow (1970): Rush, meetings with, 97, 141, 229, Barzel’s request for U.S. assistance, 251 359 References are to document numbers 1325_INDEX 11/30/07 1:16 PM Page 1105 310-567/B428-S/11005 Index 1105 Bahr, Egon—Continued Barzel, Rainer—Continued Treaty of Moscow (1970)—Continued Four Power talks/negotiations on Bundesrat in West Germany votes Berlin: against, 344, 345 Access/checkpoint issues, 219 Dean, communications with, 344 Agreement (final), 328 Embassy (U.S.) in Germany, Agreement (tentative), 275 assessments by, 354 Assessments conveyed to U.S. State Kissinger, communications with, Department, 69 330, 352 Brandt, meetings with, 275 Kissinger, meetings with, 348, Brandt, rift between Barzel and, 353 188, 189 Kissinger, meetings with Draft agreement, Western, 189 (proposed), 345 Federal presence in Berlin, West Lednev, meetings with, 353 German, 219 Media, statements to the, 348 Hillenbrand, meetings with, 384 Rogers’ trip to Bonn, 365 Kissinger, meetings with, 115, Sonnenfeldt’s assessments, 345 219 Vietnam linked to, 350 Rights/responsibilities, four power, Treaty of Warsaw (1970), 141 384 Barzel’s request for U.S. assistance, Rush, meetings with, 179, 220, 251, 359 328 Embassy (U.S.) in Germany, Nixon, meetings with: assessments by, 354 Four Power talks/negotiations on Kissinger, communications with, Berlin, 218, 220 352 Ostpolitik, 218, 220 Kissinger, meetings with, 348, Rush-Barzel meetings, 220 353 Treaty of Moscow (1970), 338 Kissinger, meetings with Treaty of Warsaw (1970), 338 (proposed), 345 Nixon’s election victory over George Lednev, meetings with, 353 McGovern, 384 Media, statements to the, 348 Ostpolitik (see also Treaty listings Nixon-Brandt communications, below): 158 Assessments conveyed to U.S. State Rogers’ trip to Bonn, 365 Department, 69 Troop (U.S.) commitment in Europe, Christian Democratic Union’s 36, 108 concerns, 72 United Nations, German membership Kissinger, meetings with, 115 in the, 373 Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt U.S. visit (proposed), controversy communications, 103 over, 28 Nixon, meetings with, 218, 220 Vietnam, 352 Opposition to, 86 Voting rights of Berlin deputies in the Rush, meetings with, 179 Bundestag, 30, 36 Treaty of Moscow (1970): West-East German relations, 40, 43, Dean, meetings with, 116, 220 369, 371 Embassy (U.S.) in Germany, Baker, John A., Jr., 147 assessments by, 354 Ball, George, 161 Kissinger, meetings with, 115, Bartholomew, Reginald, 111 219 Barzel, Rainer, 318, 329, 335 Nixon, meetings with, 338 Brandt, attempts to unseat, 86 Soviet Union, trip to the, 338 Brandt, no-confidence motion U.S. assistance, request for, 359, submitted against, 357, 358 362, 363 Elections (1972) between Brandt and, Vietnam linked to, 116, 220, 338, 378, 380, 385 367 References are to document numbers 1325_INDEX 11/30/07 1:16 PM Page 1106 310-567/B428-S/11005 1106 Index Barzel, Rainer—Continued Berlin—Continued Treaty of Warsaw (1970): Christian Democratic Union/ Embassy (U.S.) in Germany, Christian Social Union meeting assessments by, 354 in Berlin, 137 Kissinger, meetings with, 219 Contingency planning on, review of, Nixon, meetings with, 338 34 U.S. assistance, request for, 359, Dobrynin-Rogers meetings, 8 362, 363 Four Power talks accepted, 54 Vietnam linked to, 338, 367 Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings, 17 West-East German relations, 384 Kissinger-Helms communications, 12 Bauer, Leo, 92 Kissinger-Laird communications, 12 Beam, Jacob D., 19, 21, 54, 102, 170 Kissinger-Rogers communications, 12 Belgium, 336 Military traffic (U.S.) over the Berg, Hermann von, 43, 60 Autobahn to and from West Bergsten, C. Fred, 89 Berlin, 12 Beria, Lavrenti, 343 National Security Council’s Berlin (see also Four Power talks/ assessments, 18, 34 negotiations on Berlin; Nixon-Dobrynin meetings, 11 Ostpolitik): Nixon-Kiesinger meetings, 15, 16 Abrasimov-Lodge meetings, 2 Nixon-Kissinger communications, 26, Access/checkpoint issues, 33, 34 42 Air corridors closed, 121 Nixon-Kosygin communications, 19 Allied probe on Berlin: a status Nixon’s trip to West Berlin, 17 report, 47 Rogers’ assessments, 42 Bundestag convening in West Berlin, Social Democratic Party holding Soviet protests over, 48 meetings in, 148 Bundesversammlung (Federal State Department (U.S.) and White Convention) in West Berlin: House, confusion between, 32 Abrasimov-Lodge meetings, 2 Transitional arrangements, 20 Brandt-Rusk communications, 3 Travel restrictions to, 1 Kiesinger-Tsarapkin meetings, 13 Tripartite aide-mémoire to Soviets, 47 Kissinger-Dobrynin Voting rights
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