The Client Regime in Competitions
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5th International Conference on Competitions 2014 Delft The Client Regime in Competitions From Requirement to Professional Praxis in Selection of Design Teams to Competitions Magnus Rönn 118 5th International Conference on Competitions 2014 Delft The client regime in competitions - from requirement to professional praxis in selection of design teams to competitions by Magnus Rönn, School of Architecture and the Built Environment, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden Abstract This paper discusses the client regime in competitions. I present a client regime theory based on case studies of six restricted competitions in Sweden; three architectural competitions and three developer competitions. The competition task includes both senior housing and ordinary apartments. All six competitions have been organized by the public sector. The aim of developing the theory was to understand how organizers select design teams for restricted competitions. There are two main driving forces for clients: Attracters and Gate- keepers, which have a decisive impact on the selection of design teams for restricted competi- tions. Strong attracters give clients a wide range of applications to choose from by gatekeep- ers, who point out the participants. The organizer initiates prequalification by inviting candidates to competitions. General infor- mation, submission requirements and criteria for the evaluation of applications provided by public clients are part of an established practice. Demands in the invitation refer to require- ments in the procurement law and professional practice. Criteria for evaluations are based on professional experience and have an open character, typical for how juries assess design pro- posals. This is the case for both architectural and developer competitions. Companies respond to an invitation by submitting an application. One important difference between architectural competitions and developer competitions is the number of interested candidates and design teams. The three architectural competitions generated 120 applications from architecture firms. The client invited 11 design teams (9%). The three developer compe- titions attracted only 21 applications from construction companies and real estate managers. 16 were invited (76%). This difference is very important and has a huge impact on the rela- tion between attracters and gatekeepers in competitions. The selecting committees had only one meeting for choosing candidates in developer competitions. In architectural competitions the selection committees use three to four meetings for assessing applications and had to de- velop judging strategies for finding design teams suitable for the competition task. Key words: Architectural competitions, developer competitions, restricted competitions, invi- tation, prequalification, selection, client. 119 5th International Conference on Competitions 2014 Delft 1. INTRODUCTION This paper presents and discusses a theory; the client regime theory. It is a theory for under- standing prequalified competitions in architecture and urban design from the client perspec- tive. The theory is founded on results from a research project (Rönn, 2012), which studied prequalification in architectural competitions and developer competitions.1 In both these com- petitions the organizer initiates the process with an invitation. Candidates reply to invitations by sending in applications. The clients’ selection committees then choose design teams. If there are more applicants than places in the competition the organizer must make an evalua- tive selection. Some candidates must be seen to be more suitable than others. This is the basic problem, common for all competitions with a limited number of participants. In Sweden the majority of architectural competitions and developer competitions are organ- ised by municipalities. The town planning office is a main actor in architectural competitions. Property departments in municipalities control developer competitions. In restricted architec- tural competitions the economic competition covers development of design proposals. But it is the future assignment and implementation of the winning design that makes the competition attractive. The same goes for developer competitions. This competition enables the builder, constructer and real estate manager to procure publicly owned land. They compete with both design and financial offers. The winner gets access to the property. It is a risky investment in future profits. The realization is controlled by a land allocations agreement between the mu- nicipality and the company behind the winning design. There is no architectural research on developer competitions in Sweden. I have only found one study in Finland by Leif Östman (2012) investigating this competition form from an ar- chitectural point of view. Government agencies, research reports and university papers that have an economic, legal and business perspective on land allocation dominate the literature on developer competitions in Sweden. Architecture and prequalification do not play a leading role in these investigations. Thus, my study contributes new knowledge that is important for the understanding of prequalified competitions and their conditions. The academic research on architectural competitions covers 16 theses. They can be divided into two main types: research on competitions from an architectural historical perspective and analyses of contemporary competitions. However, there are few studies about how design teams are selected in restricted competitions.2 Focus is on design proposals, quality and judg- ment. There are a handful of research projects about prequalification for architectural compe- titions in Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Leentje Volker (2010) has investigated how public promoters in Holland contract architectural services using architectural competitions. There is a dissatisfaction among architects towards the bureaucratic and expensive application re- quirements from public clients (Kroese, Meijer & Visscher, 2009; Volker, 2010). The pro- curement law is criticized both by architects and clients in the public sector. Volker and Lauche (2008) note that the evaluation of architects for competitions and the judg- ing of design proposals resemble each other, even though the criteria differ. The selection is based on a combination of experience, reputation, references and architectonic qualities. Kris- tian Kreiner and Merete Gorm reviewed prequalification in Denmark in 2008 and 2009. Map- 1 The concept “developer competitions” can also be translated as “real estate competitions”. The main competi- tors are companies such as builders, construction companies and real estate managers. 2 The following theses on competitions have an architectural historical perspective (Waern, 1996; Tostrup, 1999; Sauge, 2003; Rustad, 2009; Bloxham Zettersten, 2000; Hagelqvist, 2010). The following theses analyze contemporary competitions (Blomberg 1995; Östman, 2005; Svensson, 2008; Fialho 2007; Volker, 2010; Schmiedeknecht 2010; Katsakou, 2011; Andersson, 2011, Silberberger, 2011; Ramberg 2012). 120 5th International Conference on Competitions 2014 Delft ping from 2008 gives an account of the promoters’ perspective. Kreiner and Gorm seek knowledge using questionnaires to architect offices and promoters (public and private). My studies deal with public clients. I have investigated prequalification of architectural firms in ten competitions held by munici- pal or government organizers (Rönn, 2011). The organizers’ selection committees evaluated the applications from design teams using the same “soft” criteria as in judging design pro- posals. It is criteria with an open character used for identifying and assessing qualities in ar- chitecture. The result is in line with findings by Volker and Lauche (2008). But first the can- didates have to fulfill a number of “must have” demands specified in the invitation. Otherwise applications don’t move on to the next step for assessing design teams. The “soft” criteria are crucial to selection committees when making a final decision at the end of the evaluation. In a follow-up research project I examined prequalification in three architectural project competi- tions and three developer competitions (Rönn, 2012). The empirical findings from these six case studies have been used for theorizing invitation, application and selection of design teams in restricted competitions. In this paper I will (re)use findings from the research project. Aim, theory and method The theory in this article is built on case studies. The article has two purposes. First, I wish to present a theory on client regime in restricted competitions. Second, I wish to test/explore the theorizing of empirical findings in architectural and developer competitions. The theory pro- vides a fundamental model of how design teams are invited to prequalification competitions in Sweden.3 The emphasis is on early control of the competition through the invitations and choice of design teams. I hope that the theory contributes to the understanding of the power play, lays a good founda- tion for advice to the organizers and can be used to find an explanation of the result of prequalification. Even if the future is always unsure it is possible to predict some of the forces that restricted competitions set in motion. This is because invited competitions follow a set of regulations and established praxis. If this is a good theory depends on its ability to deliver good advice to the organizers who need