Reviews An Assessment of Leadership The Generals: American Military stewards accountable to the public. We larly pertains to politicians, lawyers, Command from World War II to would better serve our country and academics and journalists. We need not Today. Thomas E. Ricks. The Penguin enforce accountability, Ricks believes, apologize for being protective of our Press. 558 pages; index; notes; black-and- if we speedily fired colleagues encoun - colleagues and their reputations. We white photographs; $32.95. Publisher’s tering difficulties—visibly and pub - do need to ensure that this protective - website: www.us.penguingroup.com. licly. The practice of quietly moving ness does not extend to the point of en - square pegs out of round holes does dangering the lives of our soldiers or By BG John S. Brown not appeal to him; shared catharsis im - the missions they are called upon to ac - U.S. Army retired proves the disciplinary tone of the en - complish. tire organization. Much the same was Ricks particularly admires the mass homas E. Ricks thinks we should said about public flogging in its day. firings promulgated by GEN Marshall Tfire more generals. In this theory in World War II. In this he reflects a he joins , Paul Ying- somewhat gauzy memory of the great ling, about every man. Before he was deified, Marshall Command and Staff College was viewed as capable of making mis - class we have surveyed in the last takes amid otherwise generally sensi - hundred years, and others. Unfortu - ble decisions. Ricks purports a “Mar - nately for our professional self-esteem, shall system” for generals, sternly but we cannot dismiss Ricks as a brainy fairly enforcing meritocracy by ad - crank who will not be read much out - vancing the capable and removing the side the Army, or as a promising ap - ineffective. Marshall’s peers held a prentice who has not yet walked in the more nuanced view, believing that his shoes of his elders. hundreds of reliefs did considerable Ricks is a seasoned Pulitzer Prize- harm as well as good. Some reliefs winning journalist with ample experi - were almost Stalinist, removing expe - ence with our boots on the ground rienced men who might have ad - overseas. His newly published The vanced contrary points of view. More Generals: American Military Command reflected a prejudice against (modest) from World War II to Today is engaging, age, removing men because of their well-written, sensibly documented and years alone rather than because those interestingly organized. People are go - years had adversely affected their per - ing to read and enjoy this book. This formance. A pernicious variant of this suggests that, as military professionals, We probably should confess to con - was turning older commanders who we should figure out what we think sciously inculcating a “band of broth - had raised and trained divisions out of about it. While I embrace a number of ers” mentality into our young. The command in favor of younger men to Ricks’ ultimate recommendations, the downside of encouraging colleagues lead these divisions overseas. Almost book as a whole falls short on several to watch each other’s backs in the face two thirds of our divisions deployed counts. Ricks is too unforgiving of our of danger is their tendency to be over - under leadership other than that which corporate culture, has too rosy a view protective of each other should they had brought them up, hugely increas - of Generals George C. Marshall and err. This has parallels in the “blue wall ing the risk of complications in the face Matthew Ridgway, has too grim a view of silence” too often erected by police - of their first battles. of our senior leadership since, con - men, or the reluctance of firefighters to Reliefs for cause in combat were flates a mass of ill-fitting material into critique their comrades’ tactical deci - generally justifiable and effective, but his forced paradigm, simplifies cause sions to outsiders. Highly individu - often serendipitous. Had they truly and effect in and Afghanistan to ated professions with little emphasis been premised on the welfare of sol - the point of caricature, and ends up on teamwork tend to acquire a differ - diers, surely some would have fol - comparing apples and oranges. ent stereotype, that of stabbing each lowed the mass fratricide of paratroop - A recurrent theme in The Generals is other in the back to gain personal ad - ers over Sicily, the terribly botched that we as a profession have become vantage. From what I’ve gathered from Rapido River crossings, recurrent suici - organization men, acting more like “Law & Order” reruns and other pop - dal disasters during the Combined “keepers of a closed guild” than like ular programs, this stereotype particu - Bomber Offensive and other pointless

January 2013 I ARMY 65 sacrifices of comparable scope. Reliefs ishingly thin. If Ricks wants us to fire sessing military leadership since for cause more often reflected a per - more of the current crop of generals, 9/11, however, he ventures onto un - ceived lack of aggressiveness rather one would have thought he would shaped ground. His attacks on Gener - than a perceived lack of competence. have made more of a contemporary als and Overall, Marshall’s reliefs did move case. American generalship involved in are extended and caustic, stretching out appreciable “dead wood,” impart a successes off the battlefield since World to about half the space he devotes to sense of urgency and focus command War II don’t seem to matter. The recon - this period. Dissatisfied with out - energies on battlefield success, but struction of Germany and Japan, cre - comes, he is quick to see them as per - they also created more leadership tur - ation of NATO and other successful al - sonal failures. bulence than necessary and divested liances, equipping and training up of Ricks is dismissive of the notion that the Army of talent that could have numerous allies, successful prosecution we as a nation gave both men far too proved useful. The Marshall system is of the Cold War, Partnership for Peace, few troops for the mission of occupying worthy of thoughtful study but not of deterrence, and other military accom - Iraq—not, incidentally, our initial pur - blind emulation. As an aside, Ricks plishments that were achieved without pose. He also seems unmindful of the attributes to Marshall an uncanny pre - (or without much) bloodshed are be - Army’s experience with operations science in GEN Dwight D. Eisen - yond the scope of this book. other than war during the 1990s, doc - hower’s rise to greatness. This over - The Generals is like a delicate neck - trine relevant to that experience, the looks the manifold twists of fate, lace. Each bead in itself is a good read, Coalition Forces Land Component reverses and paths not taken that oc - albeit not necessarily comprehensive Command Phase IV planning that did curred along the way. or objective, but the thread holding occur prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, them together is tenuous at best. Ricks the mission of LTG Jay M. Garner, U.S. icks seems to believe we have not focuses a chapter each on Generals Army retired, or the mammoth conse - Rdone much worthy of favorable Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, Clark, quences when Ambassador L. Paul Bre - comment since World War II. He does Allen, MacArthur, Simpson, Ridgway, mer III fired Baathists at all levels and admire Ridgway’s mass firings upon Taylor, Westmoreland, DePuy, Powell the Iraqi army to boot. Garner would arrival in Korea, without particularly and Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, tell you that we made 600,000 enemies assessing what percentage of these was Sanchez, Casey, and Petraeus. He pro - in a single day. To complicate things, actually beneficial. Beyond that, the Ko - vides an engaging account of Eisen - we declared victory, withdrew the rean War comes across as one bungle hower’s dealings with Montgomery, a “dream team” headquarters we had as - after another. Ricks’ discussion of the stirring account of the escape from sembled to invade Iraq and turned af - War is even more scathing. Chosin, a thoughtful discussion of the fairs over to a corps headquarters hope - GEN is pre - Truman-MacArthur controversy, a lessly understaffed for the missions sented as a dunderhead, and GEN brief overview of the imposed upon it. Institutional short - Maxwell Taylor as the Sith Lord. Most and its impact, a harrowing account of comings that did surface—mismatched astonishing to me, I found the war I the My Lai Massacre and cover-up, intelligence structure, insufficient lin - myself fought in, Operation Desert and a bizarre rendition of Operation guists, deficient cultural familiarity, ad Storm, described as a military debacle. I Desert Storm emphasizing the Safwan hoc senior headquarters and an unclear had been under the illusion that accom - snafu and alleged dysfunction be - mission—were not personal failures. plishing all assigned missions with a tween Generals Norman Schwarzkopf Ricks seems fond of a quote he attrib - minimum of casualties while liberating and Fred Franks. Of 30 numbered utes to Field Marshal Bernard Law a friendly country and driving out a chapters, only six concentrate on the Montgomery: “If, having received the powerful adversary was a success—but type of institutional history that the help he might normally expect, a man what did I know? Denigration of Oper - subtitle suggests. There is also the fails—then he must go.” We have not ation Desert Storm puts Ricks on an small matter that the term The Gener - given any of our commanders in Iraq ideal glide path to pillory our general - als does not seem to encompass the or Afghanistan the help they might rea - ship since 9/11. As much as he seems Navy or Air Force. One suspects that sonably expect, given the tasks we to want to, Ricks never builds up a full Ricks is an avid reader of military his - placed upon them. Nevertheless, they head of steam on this subject. Out of tory, has amassed a portfolio of fa - fought their way through to a measure 466 pages of text, only 50 pertain to vorite stories he wants to tell and has of success we did not deserve to expect. events since 9/11. These 50 pages are worked them in. Instruction via biopic (On Point II or chapter 9 of Kevlar Le - given over to a chapter each on Gener - and vignette can be interesting but is gions , both official histories, might help als Tommy R. Franks, Ricardo Sanchez, often hard to follow. balance the account as we come to George W. Casey Jr., and David Pe - Leadership issues relevant to the terms with these wars we have most re - traeus. Within the context of miniature Korean and Vietnam Wars have long cently fought.) professional biographies of these four since been examined by many. Ricks’ Perhaps most notable, Ricks starts men, attention to tactical or operational thoughts with respect to these fall out with apples and ends up with or - aspects of Afghanistan and Iraq is van - into schools shared by others. In as - anges. GEN Marshall, and GEN John J.

66 ARMY I January 2013 Pershing before him, presided over World War II and theater commanders “fair” opportunity to prove them - armies that had increased in size orders under scrutiny now are not equiva - selves. Ricks suggests a fistful of un - of magnitude overnight and featured lent. Ricks laments that lately our conventional career moves designed to leaders serving several levels above civilian political leadership has been nourish strategic-level thinking. Some their previous experience. The division so heavily involved in controversial of these are sane; at least he is in the and corps commanders relieved for command moves. This is as it should right arena. Our cursus honorum leads cause overseas in World War II aver - be in the case of strategic leadership, to tactical and operational excellence. aged four months of combat experience which reports to the national com - Strategic excellence occurs, but not be - (mostly in ) and less than mand authority. Our problem is dif - cause we particularly develop it. Ricks’ 12 months of field-grade command ferent from that of Generals Pershing underlying theme, of course, is ac - time, most of which was not recent. An and Marshall. They struggled to cre - countability. Few would argue with equivalent sample of demonstrably ate an Army competent at the tactical that, although we may debate whether successful World War II commanders and operational levels in conventional and how far we have fallen short in had about the same amount of combat warfare. We already have one. Our achieving it. experience but twice as much field- challenge is to sustain the strategic vi - The Generals will raise your blood grade command time, most of it recent. sion and institutional means appro - pressure and expand your mind. I rec - The uniformly successful division com - priate for the ever-more complex se - ommend it. The most annoying thing manders of Operation Desert Storm av - curity demands of the 21st century. about it is not its substance but its tone. eraged 23 months of combat experience In Ricks’ words, GEN Tommy Franks (mostly in Vietnam) and 42 months of or all its quirks, The Generals does was a “two-time loser,” Sanchez was field-grade command time. Our cur - Fwrap up, along with further admo - “over his head” and Casey was “tread - rent generals would be comparable, as nitions to fire generals, with some ing water.” This seems like presumptu - the cursus honorum for generalship has pretty respectable recommendations. ous language. been about the same for almost 50 Ricks proposes a broad-ranging intro - years. Combat and field-grade com - spective study of post-9/11 perfor - BG John S. Brown , USA Ret., was chief mand time provide enormous winnow - mance modeled on the institutional of military history at the U.S. Army ing processes, screening out leaders un - soul searching we did after the Viet - Center of Military History from De - suitable for command at the tactical nam War. This seems like a good idea. cember 1998 to October 2005. He com - and operational levels. Ricks himself He argues that personnel practices re - manded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, finds little to criticize in our post-9/11 sulting in general-officer tenures of a in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf leadership at these levels. Indeed, he year or less are dysfunctional. It is hard War and returned to Kuwait as com - hardly mentions it. This is a pity be - to argue that our rapid turnovers of se - mander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry cause there are truly exemplary divi - nior leadership in Afghanistan have Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate sional performances worthy of review. been good for us. Dozens of other com - in history from Indiana University. His Ricks’ post-9/11 criticism is of strategic mands and agencies have experienced book, Kevlar Legions: The Transfor - level leaders, of which there were but similar turbulence. There must be a mation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005 , few. Division commanders relieved in better way to give dynamic leaders a was published in 2011. The Road to Independence ’s Military Genius. torians have been far less kind, in - the 18th-century American Army, in - Dave R. Palmer. Regnery Publishing, cluding Pulitzer Prize winner David cluding The River and the Rock: The His - Inc. 272 pages; illustrations; maps; notes; McCullough, who lauds Washington tory of Fortress West Point, 1775–1783 ; selected bibliography; index; $27.95. for maintaining the integrity of the The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in Publisher’s website: www.regnery.com Continental Army but who also states The War for America, 1775–1783 ; and that Washington “was not a brilliant George Washington and Benedict Arnold: By COL Cole C. Kingseed strategist or tactician.” The diversity A Tale of Two Patriots . In addition, U.S. Army retired of opinion examining Washington’s Palmer frequently appears as a com - ability as a military commander has mentator in television documentaries n The Compact History of the Revolu - now caused Dave R. Palmer to recon - on the Revolutionary War period and Itionary War: The Story of the American sider Washington as a strategist. its military commanders. Revolution , authors R. Ernest and Palmer is no stranger to the readers In George Washington’s Military Ge - Trevor N. Dupuy depict George Wash - of ARMY Magazine. A former superin - nius , Palmer casts his subject in a highly ington as “by far the most able military tendent of the U.S. Military Academy favorable light. Palmer’s Washington is leader, strategically or tactically, on ei - at West Point, Palmer has compiled a not the Washington of the heroic mode ther side in the Revolution.” Other his - distinguished record of publications on who pursued a Fabian strategy that

January 2013 I ARMY 67 was essentially defensive in nature. War.” As evident in Washington’s cor - Rather, Palmer finds that the evidence respondence, patriot aggression marked of Washington’s “extraordinary grasp the American response to the British of strategy is compelling.” Though during the initial year of the war. Washington’s tactical ability was at As commander in chief, Washington times deficient, by war’s end, he had launched offensives against the British become the nation’s preeminent strate - in Canada, and he invested in gist and more than justified “Light- March 1776. According to Palmer, “It Horse Harry” Henry Lee’s epitaph is hard to detect the spirit of Fabius in that Washington was “first in war.” George Washington during this initial phase of the War of Independence .” almer divides his text into two sec - For the next 18 months, Washing - Ptions: The first section addresses ton’s Continental Army was obliged to the basic components of strategy as defend the independence that the Con - they appeared to the American Revo - tinental Congress had declared in July lutionary generation fighting to estab - 1776. Here, Washington adjusted his lish the ; the second part strategy to counter two British inva - examines four distinctive phases of sions. Palmer opines that Washington the war that presented quite different made his one great strategic blunder of circumstances demanding entirely dif - the war by deciding to defend New ferent responses. In Palmer’s view, York City in August 1776. Though these phases included: “Run All Washington’s tactical dispositions on Risques, April 1775–June 1776”; “A vember 1781–December 1783.” Long Island were inept, Palmer posits Choice of Difficulties: July 1776–De - As Palmer views the war, Washing - that “his risks, always calculated, were cember 1777”; “One Great Vigorous ton was compelled to run all risks to never a gambler’s throw.” Perhaps not, Effort, January 1778–October 1781”; defeat the enemy during the “revolu - but Washington soon realized that and “The Arts of Negotiations: No - tionary period of the Revolutionary American success was dependent upon

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68 ARMY I January 2013 keeping the Continental Army in the with which the combined [American stood far better than his contempo - field. Hence, he adopted a defensive and French] armies moved suggests raries that the minor “battles fought af - strategy aimed at avoiding a general something less than a blind fixation on ter Yorktown were in many ways far action and protracting the war. New York.” more important than earlier and better Palmer credits Washington with his known engagements” because they highest accolades during the final hile combat operations shifted convinced George III that the Atlantic combat phase of the war following Waway from North America dur - colonies were irrevocably lost. France’s entry into the conflict. Backed ing the immediate period following Was Washington as strategically as - by a powerful French navy and an ex - Cornwallis’ capitulation, Washington tute as Palmer attests? Did the Ameri - peditionary force, Washington resumed still sought a more decisive military can commander display true military the offensive, culminating in the de - victory to hasten the negotiations being genius? Washington was certainly struction of Lord Charles Cornwallis’ held in Paris to terminate armed hostil - more adept strategically than he was army at Yorktown in October 1781. ities between the United States and tactically. The reader will find few Palmer challenges the conventions of Great Britain. Washington termed this flaws in Washington’s conduct of the history by stating emphatically that period conciliatory war. Later, scholars war in Palmer’s narrative. Consider - Washington’s intentions for the 1781 criticized Washington for not recog - ing Palmer’s obvious admiration for campaign were far more flexible than nizing straightaway that Yorktown Washington as a military commander, most historians claim. Rather than con - ended active combat operations in this is hardly surprising. centrating his efforts on assaulting the America, but Palmer believes that British garrison in New York in lieu of Washington was quite justified in be - COL Cole C. Kingseed , USA Ret., Ph.D., a carrying the war into , Wash - lieving the war would continue. In - former professor of history at the U.S. Mil - ington moved rapidly: “The very speed deed, Palmer’s Washington under - itary Academy, is a writer and consultant. On the Brink of War Blueprints for Battle: Planning for Cold War remained that way until the once organized, the Warsaw Pact. The War In Central Europe, 1948–1968. dissolution of the Soviet Union pre - authors address perceptions of both Jan Hoffenaar and Dieter Krüger, editors. cisely because of the presence of the sides, each of which believed it had University Press of Kentucky. 304 pages; two sides. Aron asserted, “A military cause to fear the other. Perhaps more index; maps; charts; notes; $28. Pub - void is more dangerous than a pres - important and in some ways surpris - lisher’s website: www.kentuckypress.com. ence,” a comment that was made in ing—considering the duration of the 1961 and proved prescient. Aron artic - confrontation and the espionage ef - By COL Gregory Fontenot ulated the principle of deterrence ar - forts on both sides—is how mistaken U.S. Army retired guably practiced by both NATO and, each was about the other. How the belligerents expected ag - gression to unfold and what they pro - an Hoffenaar and Dieter Krüger’s an - posed to do about it form the heart of Jthology Blueprints for Battle: Planning this anthology on planning for a third for War in Central Europe, 1948 –1968 is major war in Europe. By 1949, any essential reading for any serving officer good feelings that remained between and should be required reading for se - the erstwhile allies had evaporated as nior defense officials. Blueprints , if read, the Soviet Union detonated its own would go a long way toward correcting nuclear weapon, consolidated in cen - the apparent memory loss of the pur - tral Europe and retained some 200 di - pose of armies and illusions of whether visions. The United States and the or not the Cold War was complicated western European powers responded or complex. The contributors to this ex - by forming NATO and planning to cellent addition to the Association of field first, 30 divisions and ultimately the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Stud - 50 divisions. ies series have illuminated the major Viktor Gavrilov, a well-known Russ - outline of military planning among the ian military historian examining the allies and their adversaries in the pecu - problem from the Soviet perspective, liar confrontation that was the Cold War. described the Soviet view as driven by In his lucid and pithy foreword MG two articles of faith: First, the proper David T. Zabecki, AUS retired, reprises task of the armed forces is the destruc - Raymond Aron’s observation that the tion of their opposite number; second,

January 2013 I ARMY 69 that a strategic offensive is the most ef - tactical nuclear weapons by wonder - both from their observation of NATO fective means of defense. Accordingly, ing, “Which planet do these people in - exercises combined with analysis of the Soviets motorized their forces and tend to live on in the future, and to accounts of those exercises. Not sur - focused on high-tempo mounted oper - which earth do they plan to send their prisingly, East German intelligence ations as the answer to ensuring the troops to conquer territories?” And sought to determine which NATO ac - survival of their system. Obviously, that was only his opening salvo. tivities would enable them to identify this approach—while perfectly reason - indicators and thus warning of the in - able from the Soviet point of view— lanning for coalition warfare proved evitable imperialist aggression. could be, and was, interpreted as pos - Pproblematic for both sides. The So - This short anthology titillates but ing a threat of preemptive assault. viet Union and its allies had an easier does not entirely satisfy. There is so The plans of the protagonists then time of it than their western counter - much more to learn. Hopefully this is proceeded along lines driven by basic parts simply because the Soviets only the first in a series of works study - assumptions that each made. The Sovi - could—and did—mandate common ing the preparation for war not only in ets did so as noted, but the picture that equipment. In the West, interoperabil - central Europe but also from the Arctic emerges of NATO planning is far less ity became the mantra, while often the to the Anatolian peninsula, at sea from clear. To start with, while the Euro - best that could be achieved was more the East Coast of North America to the peans tended to defer to the Ameri - or less common ammunition. France Baltic and the Mediterranean and in cans, they nonetheless pursued their proved a particularly restive member the sky overhead. For nearly 50 years own interests. NATO planning re - of the NATO alliance, ultimately with - the potential for war and still another flected the many competing views of drawing from the military structure. catastrophe in Europe loomed large. the membership. First, those countries Force levels proved an equally diffi - Now there is a chance to truly under - overrun by the Nazis did not entirely cult problem for all concerned, but stand what went on in the capitals trust the Germans nor were they will - again the Soviets enjoyed an advan - and defense ministries of the various ing to build forces adequate to the task tage in the short term. NATO never countries. There remains much to be of defending Germany and thus them - had the means to man 30 divisions in learned from this dangerous period in selves. In the end, they accepted with central Europe let alone 50. history. some reluctance that Germany had to In many ways, Jan Hoffenaar’s ac - be rearmed. Whether to defend for - count of East German intelligence op - COL Gregory Fontenot , USA Ret., com - ward or hold the Rhine-Ijssel River line erations is the most interesting chapter manded a tank battalion in Operation provided grist for considerable debate or at least the most fascinating. Hoffe - Desert Storm and an armor brigade in in NATO. How to survive nuclear naar argues convincingly that NATO Bosnia. A former director of the School combat proved a challenge to both was an open book to the East Ger - of Advanced Military Studies, he is NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. A mans. Besides classic clandestine oper - coauthor of On Point: The U.S. Army Soviet naval officer most aptly de - ations, the East Germans proved adept in Operation Iraqi Freedom and is di - scribed the ruminations of his general at open source analysis. For example, rector of the University of Foreign Mili - staff colleagues on unlimited use of they gleaned important information tary and Cultural Studies.

“While you men engage the enemy, I will pursue the thankless task of readiness sustainment.”

70 ARMY I January 2013