Reviews An Assessment of Leadership The Generals: American Military stewards accountable to the public. We larly pertains to politicians, lawyers, Command from World War II to would better serve our country and academics and journalists. We need not Today. Thomas E. Ricks. The Penguin enforce accountability, Ricks believes, apologize for being protective of our Press. 558 pages; index; notes; black-and- if we speedily fired colleagues encoun - colleagues and their reputations. We white photographs; $32.95. Publisher’s tering difficulties—visibly and pub - do need to ensure that this protective - website: www.us.penguingroup.com. licly. The practice of quietly moving ness does not extend to the point of en - square pegs out of round holes does dangering the lives of our soldiers or By BG John S. Brown not appeal to him; shared catharsis im - the missions they are called upon to ac - U.S. Army retired proves the disciplinary tone of the en - complish. tire organization. Much the same was Ricks particularly admires the mass homas E. Ricks thinks we should said about public flogging in its day. firings promulgated by GEN Marshall Tfire more generals. In this theory in World War II. In this he reflects a he joins Douglas Macgregor, Paul Ying- somewhat gauzy memory of the great ling, about every Fort Leavenworth man. Before he was deified, Marshall Command and General Staff College was viewed as capable of making mis - class we have surveyed in the last takes amid otherwise generally sensi - hundred years, and others. Unfortu - ble decisions. Ricks purports a “Mar - nately for our professional self-esteem, shall system” for generals, sternly but we cannot dismiss Ricks as a brainy fairly enforcing meritocracy by ad - crank who will not be read much out - vancing the capable and removing the side the Army, or as a promising ap - ineffective. Marshall’s peers held a prentice who has not yet walked in the more nuanced view, believing that his shoes of his elders. hundreds of reliefs did considerable Ricks is a seasoned Pulitzer Prize- harm as well as good. Some reliefs winning journalist with ample experi - were almost Stalinist, removing expe - ence with our boots on the ground rienced men who might have ad - overseas. His newly published The vanced contrary points of view. More Generals: American Military Command reflected a prejudice against (modest) from World War II to Today is engaging, age, removing men because of their well-written, sensibly documented and years alone rather than because those interestingly organized. People are go - years had adversely affected their per - ing to read and enjoy this book. This formance. A pernicious variant of this suggests that, as military professionals, We probably should confess to con - was turning older commanders who we should figure out what we think sciously inculcating a “band of broth - had raised and trained divisions out of about it. While I embrace a number of ers” mentality into our young. The command in favor of younger men to Ricks’ ultimate recommendations, the downside of encouraging colleagues lead these divisions overseas. Almost book as a whole falls short on several to watch each other’s backs in the face two thirds of our divisions deployed counts. Ricks is too unforgiving of our of danger is their tendency to be over - under leadership other than that which corporate culture, has too rosy a view protective of each other should they had brought them up, hugely increas - of Generals George C. Marshall and err. This has parallels in the “blue wall ing the risk of complications in the face Matthew Ridgway, has too grim a view of silence” too often erected by police - of their first battles. of our senior leadership since, con - men, or the reluctance of firefighters to Reliefs for cause in combat were flates a mass of ill-fitting material into critique their comrades’ tactical deci - generally justifiable and effective, but his forced paradigm, simplifies cause sions to outsiders. Highly individu - often serendipitous. Had they truly and effect in Iraq and Afghanistan to ated professions with little emphasis been premised on the welfare of sol - the point of caricature, and ends up on teamwork tend to acquire a differ - diers, surely some would have fol - comparing apples and oranges. ent stereotype, that of stabbing each lowed the mass fratricide of paratroop - A recurrent theme in The Generals is other in the back to gain personal ad - ers over Sicily, the terribly botched that we as a profession have become vantage. From what I’ve gathered from Rapido River crossings, recurrent suici - organization men, acting more like “Law & Order” reruns and other pop - dal disasters during the Combined “keepers of a closed guild” than like ular programs, this stereotype particu - Bomber Offensive and other pointless January 2013 I ARMY 65 sacrifices of comparable scope. Reliefs ishingly thin. If Ricks wants us to fire sessing military leadership since for cause more often reflected a per - more of the current crop of generals, 9/11, however, he ventures onto un - ceived lack of aggressiveness rather one would have thought he would shaped ground. His attacks on Gener - than a perceived lack of competence. have made more of a contemporary als Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez Overall, Marshall’s reliefs did move case. American generalship involved in are extended and caustic, stretching out appreciable “dead wood,” impart a successes off the battlefield since World to about half the space he devotes to sense of urgency and focus command War II don’t seem to matter. The recon - this period. Dissatisfied with out - energies on battlefield success, but struction of Germany and Japan, cre - comes, he is quick to see them as per - they also created more leadership tur - ation of NATO and other successful al - sonal failures. bulence than necessary and divested liances, equipping and training up of Ricks is dismissive of the notion that the Army of talent that could have numerous allies, successful prosecution we as a nation gave both men far too proved useful. The Marshall system is of the Cold War, Partnership for Peace, few troops for the mission of occupying worthy of thoughtful study but not of deterrence, and other military accom - Iraq—not, incidentally, our initial pur - blind emulation. As an aside, Ricks plishments that were achieved without pose. He also seems unmindful of the attributes to Marshall an uncanny pre - (or without much) bloodshed are be - Army’s experience with operations science in GEN Dwight D. Eisen - yond the scope of this book. other than war during the 1990s, doc - hower’s rise to greatness. This over - The Generals is like a delicate neck - trine relevant to that experience, the looks the manifold twists of fate, lace. Each bead in itself is a good read, Coalition Forces Land Component reverses and paths not taken that oc - albeit not necessarily comprehensive Command Phase IV planning that did curred along the way. or objective, but the thread holding occur prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, them together is tenuous at best. Ricks the mission of LTG Jay M. Garner, U.S. icks seems to believe we have not focuses a chapter each on Generals Army retired, or the mammoth conse - Rdone much worthy of favorable Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, Clark, quences when Ambassador L. Paul Bre - comment since World War II. He does Allen, MacArthur, Simpson, Ridgway, mer III fired Baathists at all levels and admire Ridgway’s mass firings upon Taylor, Westmoreland, DePuy, Powell the Iraqi army to boot. Garner would arrival in Korea, without particularly and Schwarzkopf, Tommy Franks, tell you that we made 600,000 enemies assessing what percentage of these was Sanchez, Casey, and Petraeus. He pro - in a single day. To complicate things, actually beneficial. Beyond that, the Ko - vides an engaging account of Eisen - we declared victory, withdrew the rean War comes across as one bungle hower’s dealings with Montgomery, a “dream team” headquarters we had as - after another. Ricks’ discussion of the stirring account of the escape from sembled to invade Iraq and turned af - Vietnam War is even more scathing. Chosin, a thoughtful discussion of the fairs over to a corps headquarters hope - GEN William Westmoreland is pre - Truman-MacArthur controversy, a lessly understaffed for the missions sented as a dunderhead, and GEN brief overview of the Tet Offensive imposed upon it. Institutional short - Maxwell Taylor as the Sith Lord. Most and its impact, a harrowing account of comings that did surface—mismatched astonishing to me, I found the war I the My Lai Massacre and cover-up, intelligence structure, insufficient lin - myself fought in, Operation Desert and a bizarre rendition of Operation guists, deficient cultural familiarity, ad Storm, described as a military debacle. I Desert Storm emphasizing the Safwan hoc senior headquarters and an unclear had been under the illusion that accom - snafu and alleged dysfunction be - mission—were not personal failures. plishing all assigned missions with a tween Generals Norman Schwarzkopf Ricks seems fond of a quote he attrib - minimum of casualties while liberating and Fred Franks. Of 30 numbered utes to Field Marshal Bernard Law a friendly country and driving out a chapters, only six concentrate on the Montgomery: “If, having received the powerful adversary was a success—but type of institutional history that the help he might normally expect, a man what did I know? Denigration of Oper - subtitle suggests. There is also the fails—then he must go.” We have not ation Desert Storm puts Ricks on an small matter that the term The Gener - given any of our commanders in Iraq ideal glide path to pillory our general - als does not seem to encompass the or Afghanistan the help they might rea - ship since 9/11.