Title a Comprehensive Study on U.S. Military Government on Okinawa
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A Comprehensive Study on U.S. Military Government on Title Okinawa (An Interim Report)( CHAPTER 3 ) Author(s) Ota, Masahide; Miyagi, Etsujiro; Hosaka, Hiroshi Citation Issue Date 1987-03 URL http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/13849 Rights THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA (1961-1972) Hiroshi Hosaka Introduction In this treaties, I highlight the period from the early years of 1960's to the month of May 1972, when the reversion of Okinawa took place. My energy was directed mainly to clarify the Japanese-U.S. negotiations over the returning of the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, which ended up in the form of "Reversion With Home-land Level Restrictions Without Nuclear Weapons." It should be noted that the fact that diplomatic documents executed from 1969 to 1971, during which years the negotiation reached its climax, still remain heavily veiled and undisclosed at this point in time by the Japanese and the U.S. governments from political considerations. This has prevented me from carrying out examination widely and from many different angles. However, the memoirs recently published by the high ranking Japanese and the U.S. ex-officials or by the officials directly involved in the reversion negotiations helped my examination to a lesser extent. This treatise is to explain the political bargaining which took place between Japan and the U.S., which was most exemplified in the final phase of 1972 reversion, with the aid of recently published memorirs, and utilizing the minutes of the U.S_ Congress and Japanese Diet, newspapers, magazines, and other documents executed by the USCAR(The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands), and inter views with the people concerned. The important themes to be given consideration are the" reversion movement" and the various political problems such as the public election of Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus ( GRI), the transferring of jurisdic tional power to GRI, the riot that occurred at Koza city in 1970, transportation of poisonous gas', all of which without fail catch the eyes of historians, but they are for the most part excluded from this treatise due to the restricted number of pages of this report and the limited availability of refer ence materials. The next treatise scheduled to succeed this will focus light on how the Okinawans evaluated and how they realized the reversion. To conclude, the reversion to the mainland Japan was used as a tool of political bargaining between the governments of Japan and the U.S. contrary to and neglecting the hopes and expectations for peace cherished by the Okinawan people. The U.S. sought more effective and lawful maintenance of the U.S. bases in the Ryukyus in return for the rever- -101- sion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. On the other hand, the Government of Japan could keep respecting the non-nuclear policy by realizing the "Reversion With Home-land Level Restrictions Without Nuclear Weapons," and thereby got rid of the critical internal polio tical problem and preserved the stable government by the conservative political party. * Books and treatises to be referred to are listed below; Gregory Henderson, ed, Public Diplomacy and Political Change, New York: Praeger, 1973. Albert Seigal, United States Policy toward Okinawa, 1945 -1972. Doctorial dissertation, West Virginia Univer sity, 1978. Neal Abel, Marcot, The Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process: A Case Study-Okinawa Reversion, Doctorial dissertation, Georgetown University, 1981. John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle-Company, 1972. Herbert A. Kampf, The United States and Okinawa ,- A study in Dependency Relationship, Doctorial dissertation, The City University of New York, 1972. I Kennedy's New Policy and High Commissioner Caraway's Administra tion of Okinawa. 1. Kennedy's New Policy On March 19, 1962, President John F.Kennedy announced his New Policy for Okinawa with respect to the U.S. administration of Okinawa. This new policy revised Presidential Executive Order 10713 issued on June 5, 1957, and worked out more concrete arrangements for the U.S. administration of Okinawa in line with closer Japan-U.S. cooperation based on the meeting held in June 1961 between Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and President Kennedy. Included in the New Policy were three basic items as follows: (1) To enhance the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of Okinawa and, for that purpose, to ask Congress to amend the Price Act to remove the present $6 million limit on assistance to Okinawa; (2) to enter into discussions with the Japanese government to work out the precise arrange ments of a co-operative relationship between the United States and Japan in providing assistance to promote the welfare and economic development of the Okinawa people; (3) to make some modifications in the governmen tal structure and procedures of the administration of Okinawa which included (a) the appointment of a 'civilian' civil administrator (an office under the High Commissioner which had been previously occupied by military personnel), (b) restating the Executive Order to clarify the restricted purposes of the veto power of the High Commissioner, (c) provisions for nomination of the Chief Executive of the GRI by the -102- legislature, (d) transfer, when possible, of certain governmental functions to the GRI, and so on.1 In his statement President Kennedy acknowledged "the desires of the Ryukyuan people to assert their identity as Japanese" and went on to say "I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland." And further he stated "I (have directed) to minimize the stress that will accompany the antcipated eventual restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese administration." The concept of "residual sovereignty" was always in the minds of the U.S. administra tors of Okinawa. But President Kennedy's statement wherein he recognizes "Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland" outdistanced the concept here-to-fore held by the U.S., although the U.S. still held on to the idea that U.S. bases in Okinawa were of the greatest importance in maintaining peace in the Far East. This idea was well expressed in the words bases is of the greatest importance in maintaining our deterrent power in the face of threats to the peace in the Far East." peace in the Far East." Although acknowledging that the Ryukyu Islands were part of the Japanese homeland, the New Policy only stressed that the importance of the U.S. bases in the Ryukyus remained the same. Consequently, the Presidential Statement only served to give democratic camouflage to the U.S. ruling over the Ryukyu Islands, satisfying people both in mainland Japan and in the Ryukyu Islands. In October 1961, prior to the statement of Kennedy's New Policy, the Task Force Ryukyus was dispatched to Okinawa. "As a result of the deep concern of the High Commis siOller of the Ryukyu Islands, General Caraway", the Task Force headed by Carl Kaysen, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was composed of five officials from the White House, the State Department, the Agency for International Develop ment, the Department of Labor, and the Defense Department, accompanied by a working group of eight members. This Task Force arrived in Okinawa in two groups, on October 5 and 13 respectively and carried out more than 21 days of investigation. During their stay, they contacted authorities from the Okinawa side and conducted professional investigations on political, economic, labor and other problems. On their way back to the U.S., they stopped in Tokyo to meet with the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reishauer and with high ranking officials of the Japanese Government. Members of the Task Force Ryukyus, upon returning to the U.S., debated among themselves and drafted their Report and Recommenda- -103- tion in December 1961, although it was unofficial. According to the Report, Task Force Ryukyus was established on August 11, 1961 by the National Security Action Memorandum (No 68). The aims of, and considerations to be given in undertaking the investigation are noticed in the following: (The Task Force Ryukyus was) directed to investigate the extent to which economic and social conditions contribute to the dissatisfaction of the Ryukyuans, what measures can we undertake to improve economic and social conditions, and what specific steps are needed to make such a program effective. In carrying out its task the group will bear in mind the importance to us of (a) Okinawa as a military base, (b) continued friendly relations with Japan, and (e) our responsibility to the people of the Ryukyus under the peace treaty with Japan.3 From the above sentences, it becomes clear that the Recommendation was intended to coordinate the desires of Japan, the U.S., and the Ryukyus with a view to secure the best and safest method of effective maintaining and management of the U.S. bases in the Ryukyu Islands. The statement by President Kennedy expressed that "the Ryukyuans are Japanese and naturally wish to be reunited with home islands." However, the Kaysen Report, without taking any form of recommendation, stated that: The source of our present and potential problems in the Ryukyus lies in the fact that the population feels itself to be Japanese, the basically, with the exception of a small group of businessmen who benefit substantially from our presence, there is a widespread but not intense desire to return to Japanese administration, and a widespread and much stronger tendency to compare the present situation of the Ryukyus with what it would be under Japanese administration. It is difficult to conclude whether or not the Ryukyus would be better off if they had remained part of Japan and there had been no American bases there: Regarding the U.S.